Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the
plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the same to us since the facts are not
in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were
classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in
Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them,
together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the
school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort
found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn
by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she
had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra
girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter
turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right
eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and
treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye
became swollen and it was then that the girl related the
incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for
treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July
20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a
total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent the
sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria
Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf
of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa
Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00
as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent
for an act of his minor child which causes damage to another
under the specific facts related above and the applicable
provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180
thereof, which read:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
2
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed colleagues in
holding that the act of appellant's daughter does not constitute
fault within the contemplation of our law or torts. She was 13
years and should have known that by jokingly saying "aloud
that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the
Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her," it was likely that
something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt.
As to the liability of appellant as father, I prefer to hold that
there being no evidence that he had properly advised his
daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on
her classmate and playmates, he can be liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to show
that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the
damage caused upon plaintiff child.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A.
AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA,
SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA
TISCALINA
A.
AMADORA,petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSERECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON
thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS.
NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his
guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking
forward to the commencement exercises where he would
ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and
friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were
scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate
would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On
April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school,
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon,
fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations
and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon
was
convicted
of
homicide
thru
reckless
imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the
victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article
2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys,
and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other
students, through their respective parents. The complaint
against the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of
First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to
the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation,
funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees . 3 On appeal to the respondent court, however,
the decision was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved . 4
3
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on
June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it
was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a
school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom
Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented,
arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held
liable Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1)
teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades
in particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts
and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an
elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during
recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and
the parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for damages.
Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter
(as the school itself had also not been sued that the school was
not liable because it was not an establishment of arts and
trades. Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved
as this "contemplates a situation where the student lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents." Justice
J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other members of the
court concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year
old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the
laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. Although the
wrongdoer who was already of age was not boarding in the
school, the head thereof and the teacher in charge were held
solidarily liable with him. The Court declared through Justice
Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article "so
long as (the students) remain in their
custody" means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess
time. There is nothing in the law that requires
that for such liability to attach, the pupil or
student who commits the tortious act must
live and board in the school, as erroneously
held by the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it
relied, must now be deemed to have been set
aside by the present decision.
This
decision
was
concurred
in
by
five
other
members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in
answer to the dissenting opinion, that even students already of
age were covered by the provision since they were equally in
the custody of the school and subject to its discipline.
Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for
retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted
that the rule should apply only to torts committed by students
not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco
parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice
Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the
school involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as
to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic
institutions will have to await another case wherein it may
properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held
liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school
of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The
parties herein have also directly raised the question of whether
or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are
technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the
offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has
come to the conclusion that the provision in question should
apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where
the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in
nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the
first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and
only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general
rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the
acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable.
Following
the
canon
ofreddendo singula
singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and
students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to
the word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art.
1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts
and trades and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there between them
insofar as concerns the proper supervision
and vice over their pupils? It cannot be
seriously contended that an academic teacher
is exempt from the duty of watching that his
pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment
of third Persons, so long as they are in a
position to exercise authority and Supervision
over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase
"teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil
Code, the words "arts and trades" does not
qualify "teachers" but only "heads of
establishments." The phrase is only an
updated version of the equivalent terms
"preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian
and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis
of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903
in someculpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred
in the exercise of their authority, it would
seem clear that where the parent places the
child under the effective authority of the
teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should
be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the
very reason/that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor
with the authority and supervision of the
teacher while the child is under instruction.
And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic
and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by
their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected
from the teacher over the students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is
teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is
that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of
the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any
student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in
an academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or
the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the
teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved
whereas the teacher and the head of the non-academic school
would be held liable, and simply because the latter is a school
of arts and trades.
4
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should
be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the
nature of their respective schools. There does not seem to be
any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because
the school is academic in nature and for increasing such
vigilance where the school is non-academic. Notably, the injury
subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the
school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or
its equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by any
student regardless of the school where he is registered. The
teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply
showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on
the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were
non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the
academic school is to be held answerable for the torts
committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only
who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts
and trades? And in the case of the academic or non- technical
school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead
of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that
historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a
closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic
school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the
training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally
and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of
their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a
master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching
his students, who usually even boarded with him and so came
under his constant control, supervision and influence. By
contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved
with his students and exercised only administrative duties over
the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the
students. The head of the academic school had then (as now)
only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently,
while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the
students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of
his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present
in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the
consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding
diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads
with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged.
In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the
Court according to its clear and original mandate until the
legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation
subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary
amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the
responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive
with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies
during the school term, as contended by the respondents and
impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear
that while the custody requirement, to repeatPalisoc v.
Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be boarding
with the school authorities, it does signify that the student
should be within the control and under the influence of the
school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury.
This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be coterminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes
and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time
before or after such period, such as the period of registration,
and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student
is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under
the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
5
view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely
to cause violence and resulting injuries in the school premises.
That is a valid fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be
repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not the school that
will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due
diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held
answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or
the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in
selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate
supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the
pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance
of discipline among them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these
measures are effected through the assistance of an adequate
security force to help the teacher physically enforce those rules
upon the students. Ms should bolster the claim of the school
that it has taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that may
be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it
would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for
the damage caused by his students as long as they are in the
school premises and presumably under his influence. In this
respect, the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher
the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for
their influence over the child is not equal in degree. Obviously,
the parent can expect more obedience from the child because
the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It
need not be stressed that such dependence includes the child's
support and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's
influence, besides being coterminous with the period of custody
is usually enforced only because of the students' desire to pass
the course. The parent can instill more las discipline on the child
than the teacher and so should be held to a greater
accountability than the teacher for the tort committed by the
child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is
responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice
even if he is already of age and therefore less tractable than
the minor then there should all the more be justification to
require from the school authorities less accountability as long as
they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury.
After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the
student's acts because he has reached majority age and so is
no longer under the former's control, there is then all the more
reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for
the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at
the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in
the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally
ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to
finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics
report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the
company of his friends in the premises of the school is a
legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the
custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-incharge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only
a general authority over the student body and not the direct
control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of
particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in
its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who
the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere
fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the
without
any
6
Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons who
stand in loco parentis and thereby exercise substitute parental
authority:
Art. 349 The following persons shall
exercise
substitute
parental
authority:
xxx xxx xxx
2) Teachers and professors
xxx xxx xxx
4) Directors of trade establishments,
with regard to apprentices;'
Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 362. The relations between
teacher and pupil, professor and
student, are fixed by government
regulations and those of each school
or institution....
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed
can not contravene the concept of substitute parental
authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for the
tortious acts of their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs.
Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:
The protective custody of the school heads
and teachers is mandatorily substituted for
that of the parents, and hence, it becomes
their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the
students' activities during the whole time that
they are at attendance in the school,including
recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their
custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries
that some students themselves may inflict
wilfully or through negligence on their fellow
students. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the
responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article
2180 speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue
of the same provision, the school, as their employer, may be
held liable for the failure of its teachers or school heads to
perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents
(Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201).
Again, the school may exculpate itself from liability by proving
that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
7
2) Teachers and professors
xxx xxx xxx
4) Directors of trade establishments, with
regard to apprentices;'
Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 362. The relations between teacher and
pupil, professor and student, are fixed by
government regulations and those of each
school or institution....
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can not
contravene the concept of substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for the
tortious acts of their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs.
Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:
The protective custody of the school heads
and teachers is mandatorily substituted for
that of the parents, and hence, it becomes
their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the
students' activities during the whole time that
they are at attendance in the school,including
recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their
custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries
that some students themselves may inflict
wilfully or through negligence on their fellow
students. (Emphasis supplied)
8
1. The present action is not only against but a
violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now
Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment
which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action
against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was
relieved as guardian of the other defendant
through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the
above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration
filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965
and
after
thoroughly
examining
the
arguments therein contained, the Court finds
the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on
December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by
ordering the dismissal of the above entitled
case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p.
40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses
Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST
BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE
107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES
OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE
111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR
JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RESADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES
2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF
THE
OTHER
DEFENDANT
THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4,
Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffsappellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
9
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
and not only punished but also made civilly
liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in
an independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases
already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient
to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we
are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood, in the past, it might not he
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365
punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to
fault or negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of article
1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope
and application in actual life. Death or injury
to persons and damage to property- through
any degree of negligence - even the slightest
- would have to be Idemnified only through
the principle of civil liability arising from a
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere
would
remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a
situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are
we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed
to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the
spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient
origin
and
such
full-grown
development
as culpa
aquiliana or cuasidelito, which is conserved and made enduring
in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a
criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil
case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient
to make the defendant pay in damages. There
are numerous cases of criminal negligence
which can not be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance
of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can
and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise. there would be many
instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi
jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the
provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to
the overlapping or concurrence of spheres
already
discussed,
and
for
lack
of
understanding of the character and efficacy of
the action for culpa aquiliana, there has
grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by,
our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual.
In the present case, we are asked to help
10
from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil
action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but
for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said
article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to
only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo
about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth liftrather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the
lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and
3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and
more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176,
where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he
is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even
by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.4
11
G.R. No. L-12219
12
amount of the damages should be reduced on account of the
contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be seen the
defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an omission
only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility
for the dangerous condition of its track. In a case like the one
now before us, where the defendant was actually present and
operating the automobile which caused the damage, we do not
feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the
respective parties in order to apportion the damage according
to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the
negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and
determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent
negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the
special defense pleaded in the defendant's answer, to the effect
that the subject matter of the action had been previously
adjudicated in the court of a justice of the peace. In this
connection it appears that soon after the accident in question
occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be
instituted before a justice of the peace charging the defendant
with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the
preliminary investigation the defendant was discharged by the
magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that
the acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon the merits in a
criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned would be res
adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability arising from
negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to express an
opinion -- the action of the justice of the peace in dismissing the
criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no
effect. (See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the
lower court must be reversed, and judgment is her rendered
that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two