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ESTADO DA INDIA, CA. 1661-1683
The University
of Toledo,OH
Based on extensive archival research in Lisbon and Goa, this article examines the symbiotic relationship between the newly independent Portuguese Crown and the rising
provincial nobility in Portugal during the late seventeenth century. The provincial nobility had been a prime supporter of Joo, duke of Braganza, in his revolution against
Habsburg Spain in 1640. Thereafter, the new dynasty and the provincial nobility assisted
each other in meeting the political, military, economic, and imperial challenges of the
post-1640 period. By examining the careers of roughly a dozen nobles originally from
the pre-1640 provincial nobility, the article shows that this relationship proved to be
mutually beneficial and advantageous. The house of Braganza preserved its independence and was able to overcome many daunting challenges, in particular stabilizingthe
precarious position of the Asian empire, the Estadoda India, during these years. At the
same time, the members of the provincial nobility, through their serice to the Crown
at home and in the empire, were able to rise in the social hierarchy, sometimes entering the lofty ranks of the titularesor "titled ones" in the process.
As Carl A. Hanson and others have shown, the December 1640 revolution in Lisbon, directed against the 60 year long "captivity" at the
increasingly shaky hands of the Spanish Habsburgs, owed much to the
support of the provincial nobility in Portugal.' Philip II had originally
promised merely a personal union of the Crown to his vast imperial
holdings along with a good deal of Portuguese autonomy in his conof power from 1580-1582.? Both Philip III
quest and consolidation
' Cf. Carl A. Hanson,
Economyand Socieryin BaroquePortugal(Minneapolis, 1981), 2324 ; and Dicionriode Histriade Portugal,ed. Joel Serrao (4 vols., Lisbon, 1971), vol. III:
2 For details on
Philip II's conquest and consolidation of power in Portugal, among
others, cf. Geoffrey Parker, PhilipII (3rd ed., Chicago, 1995), 142-47;Parker, The Gland
of PhilipII (New Haven, 1998), 166-68;Henry Kamen, Philipof Spain(New Haven,
1997), 169-77; David Birmingham, A ConciseHistoryof Portugal(Cambridge, 1993), 1034 ;A.H. Oliveira Marques, Historyof Portugal(2 vols., New York, 1972),vol. I: 300-19;
and H.V. Livermore, A New Historyof Portugal(2nd ed., Cambridge, 1976), 150-62.

(1598-1621) and Philip IV (1621-1665), however, had violated this pledge.
A complex conjuncture of factors had ultimately culminated in the "revolution" of 1640. Resentment against the centralization plan of Olivares,
economic crisis, deep-seated nationalism, a rejection of six decades of
cultural Castilianization,
as well as imperial losses in Asia, Africa, and
America occasioned by the tie to Madrid all played a part.3 The Habsburg
strategy to maintain control in Portugal during the reigns of the three
Philips had revolved in part around pre-empting any possible revolt on
the part of the privileged classes in general and the nobility in particular. The indigenous court nobility of the Aviz period had been reduced
to impotence during the Habsburg years through favoring the presumably less dangerous provincial nobility at their expense, in combination
with a concerted campaign of intermarriage. As A.H. Oliveira Marques
has argued, one result of such policies was to deprive Portugal of a true
"court culture" and court nobility in Lisbon during these years.4 The
de facto Lusitanian court of the dukes of Braganza at Vila Vi?osa may
have sought to fulfill this role, but it was no competition for the earlier Aviz courts or the Habsburg court at Madrid; quite simply, royal
power and largesse did not reside in the Alentejo. This political ambiguity on the part of the Portuguese nobility had been exacerbated by
the fact that many great nobles had initially accepted and served the
Habsburgs in the expectation of further social and economic advancement, or fell prey at least temporarily to the lure of Crown patrimony
The initial reluctance of the duke of Braganza to embrace his role
in the events of 1640 reflects the power of such inducements. Nevertheless,
prompted by provincial nobles like Pedro de Mendon?a and others he
had finally accepted the challenge.6 The overthrow of Duchess Margaret
of Mantua and her advisors, of course, only revealed how difficult it
was to maintain Portugal's independence
at home and in the empire
Godinho put it some 40
D. Luisa de
years ago, Joao IV,
3 On the reasons for the 1640 revolution,
among others, cf. Livermore, .A?c History,
163-72; Oliveira Marques, Historyof Portugal,vol. I: 318-26; and J.H. Elliot's chapter,
"Thc Spanish Peninsula, 1598-1648"in the New C,ambrid?e
ModemHistoryIV, TheDeclineof
Spainand The ThirtyYearsWar, 1609-48/59, ed. J.P. Cooper (Cambridge, 1970), 435-73.
4 Cf. Oliveira
Marques, Historyof Portugal,vol. I: 323.
5 On this
tendency, cf. Birmingham, ConciseHistory,36-37.
6 For details on the
negotiations that ultimately convincedJoao of Braganza to join
the uprising of 1640 perhaps the best source remains, Luis de Menezes, count of Ericeira,
Historiade PortugalRestaurado(4 vols., Lisbon, 1710, Porto, 1945-46),vol. I: 56-120.

Gusmao, and his sons Afonso VI and Pedro II would succeed by ca.
1683 in firmly establishing the house of Braganza on an independent
Portuguese throne.' This was no mean achievement given the difficulties
confronting them in 1640. One aspect of this consolidation process that
has not received extensive attention in the historiography was the need
to re-establish a new court and administrative nobility in the wake of
the revolution of 1640. By examining roughly a dozen noble careers
during the Restoration years, this article will argue that Joao IV and
his immediate successors logically sought to rebuild this court and administrative nobility with the sons of the provincial nobles who had originally supported the revolution of 1640. It will argue further that a
common model of career advancement
characterized the rise of these
young nobles, and that this model was a clear reflection of the challenges and structures of seventeenth-century
Portugal. Finally, it will
maintain that one of the main challenges confronting the Braganza
dynasty was to restore some semblance of wealth to Portuguese Asia,
the so-called Estado da India. This Asian Empire, stretching from Mozambique in southeast Africa to Macau in China, had won glory and riches
for the Aviz dynasty while attracting the jealousy of European rivals.
The office of Viceroy of India remained a coveted position, and a fitting
culmination for provincial nobles on the rise under the Braganzas. In
fact, no indigenous Portuguese dynasty would ever be considered legitimate and solid without fulfilling the task of restoring to viability this
"most glorious" of the conquests. At the same time, no provincial noble
fulfilled until
family would consider its mission of social advancement
it had reached the ranks of the titulares or "titled ones." Between ca.
1661-1683 both the Braganzas and selected noble families would achieve
their ambitions by trying to salvage what remained of Portuguese Asia.
During these years, the Braganza dynasty would devote increasing attention to this "most glorious" imperial possession and, in doing so, offer
much largesse to those nobles who agreed to take on the challenges of
the office of Viceroy in Goa.
What were the main challenges confronting Joao
IV and his successors in the decades after 1640? Winning the independence
war with
Spain was certainly the immediate problem. But the need to find an
acceptable end to the struggle with the Dutch for overseas empire, and
to rebuild a moribund military and economy severely taxed by six
' Cf.
ModernHistoryV' The
Godinho, "Portugal and her Empire" in TheNew Cambridge
of France,1648-88, ed. F.L. Carsten (Cambridge, 1961), 384-97.

decades of subservience to the foreign policy vicissitudes of the Habsburgs,
did not lag far behind. The erstwhile duke of Braganza, however, also
possessed not insignificant internal weapons in fighting for his nascent
dynasty. The vestigial power of the Aviz dynasty and Crown largesse
would serve him well. The still extant administrative apparatus for both
the kingdom (reino) and empire (imperio) would also prove useful. Perhaps
most importantly, as V.M. Godinho and Oliveira Marques have maintained, Joao of Braganza had the solid "nationalist" support of the people (o povo) in this difficult campaign.s The multifarious powers of the
Catholic Church and its various organs, like the Inquisition, were useful, as were the still important military orders, especially those of Christ
and Santiago.9 Significantly, most of these key institutions also had direct
connections to the model of career advancement that characterized the
accession of the provincial nobility to the ranks of the court nobility
crusade against
and titulares from ca. 1640-1683. The independence
Spain in the Alentejo offered the young sons of these noble houses a
chance to "win their spurs" in combat, much as the sons of Joao I, the
founder of the house of Aviz in 1385, had won theirs fighting against
the "Moors" in North Africa. Given meritorious service in the fight
against Spain, Crown largesse in the form of pensions, lands, offices,
or a knighthood or commandery in one of the military orders would
follow.' The Council system, which Joao IV expanded in Lisbon beginning in 1640 to administer the war, the kingdom, and his empire,
afforded an even greater array of honors to covet." Finally, the tridimensional struggle against the Dutch in Brazil, Africa, and the Estado
da India offered an opportunity to serve the Crown, God, and Mammon
all at once, through vice-regal appointments that marked the apogee of
the social and career advancement model of the early Braganza period.
The first stage of the independence
struggle lasted for twenty years.
During this period, Portugal was able to rebuild the economy and military, while gaining generally favorable results in the war with Philip IV,

8 Cf.
"Portugal and her Empire," 389-90, 96-97; Historyof Portugal,vol. I: 322-23.
`-'On the
challenges confronting, and resources available to, Joao IV, cf. Godinho
History,34-43; Livermore,New
"Portugal and her Empire," 385-89; Birmingham, Concise
History,173-79; and Oliveira Marques, Historyof Portugal,vol. I: 327-31.
' On the
importance and functioning of the military orders in Portugal, cf. Francis
A. Dutra, "Membership in the Order of Christ in the SeventeenthCentury," TheAmericas
27 (1970): 3-25.
" For details on the Council
system of Joao IV, cf. V.M. Godinho, "Portugal and
her Empire," 390-92.

who admittedly had other battles to fight as well." Overseas, Joao IV
had to make a painful choice among imperial priorities. Given the limited resources of the kingdom, the king had to decide which parts of
the empire to defend actively, and which parts could be allowed to fend
for themselves. The traditional view holds that Joao devoted most of
his overseas resources to his "milch-cow" of Brazil, which was indeed
regained from the Dutch by 1654." It was certainly no coincidence that
it was precisely during these years that the Estado da India suffered its
most grievous losses to the Dutch VOC and to various indigenous powers : Melaka (1641), Ceylon (1640-1658), Muskat (1650), and Mangalore
(1652) were all lost. 14 By the early 1660s, the second stage of the independence struggle had begun, fueled by a generational shift within the
Portuguese ruling family as well as many of the noble houses in the
kingdom. Joao IV had died in 1656. Since his twelve-year-old son Afonso
VI was beset by emotional and physical problems, the Cortes delayed
his formal accession to the throne, and named D. Luisa de Gusmao as
Regent. A jealous and more talented younger brother, Pedro, waited
the nobles who acclaimed Joao
anxiously in the wings.?" Meanwhile,
in 1640, including Pedro de Mendon?a, had also died off, giving way
in the provincial noble houses of the realm to their sons, who began
to reach, in the words of Ortega y Gasset, their own "generation of
dominance." 16 Under Joao IV's sons and the sons of Pedro de Mendon?a
and others like him, the struggle against Spain shifted from a desperate quest for survival to a period of consolidation and reform, culminating in a measure of economic and imperial re-birth. One key aspect
of this process was an increasing desire to rehabilitate what still remained

12On the initial

stagesof the Restorationwar, cf. Godinho, "Portugal and her Empire,"
392-93; Oliveira Marques, Historyof Portugal,vol. I: 330-33; Livermore,NewHistory,17680 ; Birmingham, Concise
History,41-49; and C.R. Boxer, Salvadorde Sa and the Struggle for
Brazil and Angola,1602-1686 (London, 1952), 333-58.
13Cf. Boxer, A India
em meadosdo sculoXVII (Lisbon, 1980), 18; Oliveira
Marques, Historyof Portugal,vol. I: 338.
14On the losses,cf. C.R. Boxer, The
Empire,1415-1825 (New York,
in India (2 vols., London, 1894),vol. II: 1431969), 106-28; h'.G. Danvers, Vie Portuguese
362 ;and Glenn J. Ames, Renascent
Empire?:TheHouseof Braganzaand the QuestjbrStability
in Portuguese
MonsoonAsia, ca. 1640-1683 (Amsterdam, 2000), 17-38.
15On Afonso's
problems and the Regency years from 1656-1662,cf. Boxer, Salaador
de Sa, 333-45; Oliveira Marques, Historyof Portugal,vol. I: 331-33; Birmingham, Concise
History,48-49; Livermore, New History,184-95; and Ames, Renascent
16On this
theory and its possible relevance to historical change, cf. jos6 Ortega y
Gasset, Man and Crisis(En TornoA Galileo)translated by Mildred Adams (New York,
1958, 1962), 30-84.

of the Estado da India. By the mid-1660s, victory in the battle of Montes

Claros (June 1665) had largely blunted the Spanish threat, while peace
had been reached with the Dutch in Brazil and Asia, at a price, and
the treaty of 1661 with Charles II and England had also been arranged.
These developments afforded the Portuguese Crown a chance to address
the festering sore of the losses in the Asian empire."
It is worth noting that even during the generally disastrous years of
the mid-seventeenth
century, "the viceroyalty of Goa [had remained]
one of the most lucrative patronage appointments
in the gift of the
had served the
Braganzas sought to
obtain "two of the career objectives most commonly pursued" by their
class.'9 The first was, in a sense, communal: to preserve and advance
the interest of one's noble casa (house) and family. The second was more
individualistic: to advance one's own fama and reputafdo by performing
notable deeds in the service of the Crown. For a nobleman, the most
acceptable means for adding to one's reputation related to fama do valor
(reputation for military glory) and fama do cabedal (reputation for wealth).
A Viceroy found ample opportunities to achieve both types of fama during an appointment in Goa. Fighting against the armies of the Muslim
king of Bijapur, the Mughal emperor, or the great Hindu leader Shivaji
provided ample "fields" for glory and fama do valor. The plethora of
opportunities found in Goa offered plenty of opportufor
cabedal. Viceroys traditionally
used casado (married
Portuguese subjects permanently
empire) and indigenous third party merchants to become involved in private trade throughout the Indian Ocean basin. Socially, the most acceptable of these trades
were the horse trade with the Persian Gulf, and the rice and grain trade
with the Kanara coast. For the nobility, these commodities provided
familiar links with their quintas (estates) in Portugal and did not involve
social dirogeance. Upon a Viceroy's departure for the Reino (kingdom),
the proceeds of entrepreneurship
were generally converted to diamonds
and other precious stones.2

" For details on this reformation

campaign from ca. 1665-1683, cf. Ames, Renascent
Anthony R. Disney, "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur: The Count of Linhares at
Goa in the 1630s" in Emporia,Commodities,
and Entrepreneurs
in Asian Maritime Trade,
c. 1400-1750, ed. R. Ptak and D. Rothermund (Stuttgart, 1991), 427-44; and Virginia
no siculoXVII (Coimbra, 1961).
Rau, Fortunasultramarinase a nobrezaportuguesa
According to Disney, "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur," 428.
details, cf. Disney, "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur," 429-44.

The men who held the office of Viceroy of the Estado da India during the years ca. 1661-1683 began their careers in the 1640s fighting
in the war in the Alentejo against the Spanish. After winning their
"knightly spurs" in honorable combat, they enjoyed royal largesse in
the form of a pension or office in the developing administrative bureaucracy in Lisbon.2' Next, it was common for these young nobles to receive
a knighthood or commandery in one of the military orders, usually the
Order of Christ, followed by an initial imperial posting in Brazil, Africa
or the Estado da India. After returning to the reino following meritorious
service abroad, there would frequently be a post on the king's principal councils (state, war, overseas). Finally, given sufficient reputafao, personal ties to the Crown, influence at court, and fortune, one might hope
for an appointment as Viceroy of the Estado da India as the capstone of
one's career. This final step in career advancement
under the early
Braganzas often involved entrance into the elite of the noble class in
Portugal, the ranks of the titulares. Overall, then, the break with Spain
facilitated the rise of a group of hitherto relatively minor provincial
noble families who, by their aggressive service to the Crown, would
come to dominate the administrative system of the Braganzan state. In
doing so, they not only helped to establish this dynasty, they also saved
what remained of the Estado da India.
In early 1661, at the outset of the second stage of the Restoration
struggle, Queen Regent D. Luisa wrote letters to the fourth governing
Council of the Estado, warning of a large fleet of some "30 ships and
8000 soldiers" that the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was preparing to send to Asia.22 D. Luisa informed her Governors that for some
time she had hoped to report a peace with Holland, a pact that would
the States-General
and VOC
"improve things there." Unfortunately,
were proving obstinate. Meanwhile, the Governors were ordered to continue the policy of "the defense and conservation of the prafas and liberty of commerce." On a more positive note, D. Luisa wrote that the
war with Spain was going well, despite the separate peace that France
had concluded, and that the kingdom would fight on until the last drop

plethora of minor and major pensions and grants that these rising nobles
receivedfrom the Crown can be traced most convincinglyin Arquivo Nacional da Torre
do Tombo [ANTT] Chancelarias
Reaisand Registro
geralde Mercescollectionsfor the reigns
of Joao IV and Afonso VI.
22 Cf. Historical Archive of Goa,
Panjim, India [HAG] Livrosdas monesdo Reino
[MR] 28A, Count of Ponte to D. Luisa Gusmao: fo. 232, 7/11/1661; fo. 236, 14/II/1661.
and MR 28A Count of Miranda to D. Luisa:fo. 238, 10/11/1661;and fo. 234, 1/111/1661.

of blood !23 That same month, the Queen Regent reaffirmed her intention to appoint a new Viceroy as soon as possible and one "of such
quality" that one could justly expect that "his experience and valor
would promptly procure a Remedy to the affliction" in which the Estado
found itself. Until major assistance could be dispatched, she was convinced that "with your work and industry, and above all your valor,
and that of your subjects," the impending challenge could be met.24
The members of this Governing Council were D. Pedro de Lencastre,
Luis de Mendon?a Furtado e Albuquerque and D. Manoel Mascarenhas.25
then held the lucrative post of Captain of Mozambique
and had declined the honor of the Viceroyalty.26 The other two members of the Council were both younger sons of provincial nobles who
had championed the 1640 revolution. Lencastre was the fourth son of
D. Louren?o de Lencastre and D. Ines de Noronha. He had begun his
service to Joao IV "in the year of his happy acclamation in the province
of the Alentejo." There, he had held the offices of Captain of the
Infantry, Captain of Cavalry, Commissario and Mestre de Campo. Lencastre
had served in the Restoration War until 1657. In that year, he first
traveled to India as capitiio-mor (captain-major) of the fleet that conducted
his uncle, the Count of Vila Pouca de Aguiar, to Goa as the 29th
Viceroy of the Estado. Vila Pouca had died on the outward voyage and
never assumed his office. A Dutch blockade of the mouth of the Mandovi
had also prevented Lencastre from returning to the Reino until the spring
of 1661, when he was named one of the Governors on the Council. 17
Luis de Mendon?a Furtado e Albuquerque was the son of Pedro de
Mendon?a. His father had been alcaide-mor of Mourdo, commendador(commandery holder) of Santiago de Cassem and Vila Franca, senhor of
Seregeira, one of the principal nobles who had acclaimed D. Joao IV
in December
1640, and later guarda-mor for the king.28 Luis was the
eldest child of Pedro's second marriage to D. Antonio de Mendon?a,
a lady-in-waiting of D. Luisa de Gusmao. Like Lencastre, he had begun
2s Cf. HAG MR 28A fo. 212, D. Luisa Gusmao to Governors of India, ll1IV/1661.
24 Cf. HAG MR 28A fo. 215, D. Luisa Gusmao to Governors of India,
and also HAG MR 28A fo. 218, 26/IV/ 1661.
z5 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10;
J.F. Ferrcira Martins, Os hice-Reisda India, 15051917 (Lisbon, 1935), 149-50.
2f Cf. HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Ferreira Martin, Os Vice-Reis,
149-50;and Biblioteca
Publica de Evora [BPE] Codex CXV/1-21 fo. 91v.
27 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Ferreira Martin, Os Vice-Reis,
28 On Pedro de
Mendon?a's notable role in the events of 1640, cf. Count of Ericeira,
Historiade PortugalRestaurado,
vol. I: 104-13.

his career in the 1640s fighting in the war in the Alentejo, where he
and "distinction." Luis had first traveled
performed with "reputation"
to the Estado in 1651, as capitiio-mor (captain-major) of a three ship fleet
that made a swift voyage to and from Goa. In 1653, he had repeated
this impressive feat in an epoch of general maritime disasters for the
Estado by departing from Lisbon in March with two ships and reachFurtado had
ing Goa in October of that year. In 1657, Mendon?a
returned to the Estado aboard the fleet carrying the count of Vila Pouca
and Lencastre, with the title of Admiral of the Indian Seas. Between
January and March 1658, he had also commanded with great skill the
Portuguese fleet that tried to break a Dutch blockade of the Mandovi
and relieve Jaffna, the remaining Estado outpost on Ceylon. According
to the Jesuit Queiroz, Mendon?a
Furtado had the most impressive
at that time. Throughout these
naval encounters with the Dutch fleet: "Great was the valour and wisdom [with] which the Portuguese Admiral acted ... infusing courage
into all by his presence."29
On land, Mendon?a Furtado's fama do valor had also grown during
his imperial service in the 1650s. In late 1658, the king of Bijapur, in
league with the VOC, had invaded the Goan province of Salsette with
some 400 cavalry and 4,000 infantry under the general Abdula Hakim.
The only Portuguese force then in Salsette was some 250 men in Rachol
under the command of Gaspar Carneiro Girao. In Goa, this news
prompted the dispatching of Mendon?a Furtado as general along with
some troops to meet the challenge. In a pitched battle fought near the
village of Arli, the Portuguese inflicted a decisive defeat upon Abdula
Hakim's army and obliged his men to retreat across the Western Ghats.
Again according to Queiroz, Mendon?a Furtado performed a notable
feat of valor on that day. As the armies deployed for battle, "one of his
[Abula Aquimo's] higher officers who was considered the most valiant
among them, took manifest pains to get a view of him [Mendon?a
Furtado]." The Portuguese general "sallied forth from the ranks to meet
him with only the dress sword which he had at his side and a round
target, which they had given him in Rachol by way of a shield, because
background on Mendon?a Furtado's family and early career, cf. Gayo, Nobiliario
de Familiasde PortugalXX (Braga, 1939):53-56; Caetano de Sousa, HistoriaGenealogica
(Coimbra, 1953): 260-61; Martins Zuquete, ,Nobrezade Portugal(Lisbon, 1960), vol. II:
678; Braamcamp Freire, Brasiesda Sala de Sintra (Coimbra, c. 1923), vol. II: 366-67;
HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; C.R. Boxer, A india Portuguesa,
43-44, 59-61; and Queiroz,
The Temporaland SpiritualConquestof Ceylon,trans. S.G. Perera (Colombo, 1930), 990.

the buckles were not large enough for his arms." Thus armed, on foot,
Mendon?a Furtado had then engaged the mounted Muslim officer, "and
when the Moor galloped at him at full speed, he got behind the hind
quarters of the horse and with his left foot he made the Moor's horse
stumble and from one side ran him through to the top of the opposite
shoulder, the Moor dropping dead, a feat characteristic of his strength
and darning.""
Mendon?a Furtado's initial foray into governing the
Estado with Lencastre from June 1661 until December 1662 was an anemic reflection of his military feats of glory. The root of many of his
problems related to a blood feud that developed with Bartolemeu de
Vasconcelos, who charged Mendon?a Furtado with various excesses after
the Salsette campaign.3' To avoid an open breach in Goa, Mendon?a
Furtado was sent to the strategic fortress of Mormugao. Upon his return
to Goa as Governor, however, the simmering feud between him and
Vasconcelos erupted into street fights between their partisans.3z Meanwhile,
problems confronting the Crown and its Viceroyalty, notably the continuing aggressions of the VOC on the west coast of India, were largely
ignored. During the chaos of this eighteen-month
period, the Dutch
their attention
captured Cranganor
to expelling the Portuguese from Cochin. :13
It was at this critical juncture that the long awaited Viceroy promised
by D. Luisa at last reached India. The fidalgo selected for this post,
Antonio de Mello de Castro, had the pedigree necessary for this daunting assignment, as his family had an impressive and long-standing record
of service to the Crown in the Asian empire. His paternal grandfather
and namesake had been Captain of the ships of India. Two of his
uncles, Diogo and Joao de Mello de Castro, had also served with distinction in the Estado, while his brother Fernao would serve as general
of Ceylon. Antonio and his brother were the sons of Francisco de Jello

; Cf. Fernao de
Queiroz, The Temporaland SpiritualConquest
of Ceylon,1000-1002.For
60 and
additional details on the 1658 campaign in Salsette, cf. Boxer, A india Portuguesa,
the sources cited therein.
3' Cf. Martins
Zuquete,NobrezadePortugal,vol. II: 678. Among other things,Vasconcelos
charged Mendonca Furtado with needlesslyattacking local strongholds and the indigenous populace on the pretext of being in league with the king of Bijapur, as well as the
more inflammatory charge of summarily executing I 1 men.
J.F. Ferreira Martins aptly noted on this Council, it was "always in discord,
being sterile in [its] administrativeaction when preciselythe opposite was indispensable."
See Os Vice-Reis,
33Cf. Ferreira
Martins, Os hice-Reis,149-50.

de Castro, who had himself held the posts of capitiio-mor of the seas of
India and Admiral of the Royal Fleet, and his second wife, D. Angela
de Mendon?a, whose own father had died serving in the Estado. Like
Lencastre and Mendon?a Furtado, Mello de Castro had begun his service to the Crown by fighting "with valour" in the war against Philip
IV's armies in the Alentejo. He had been awarded the commandery of
Fornellos and the post of alcaide-mor of Colares. Eventually appointed
to the Council of State, Mello de Castro was initially given the title of
Governor of the Estado by D. Luisa in Letters-Patent of 11March
with permission to assume the title of Viceroy a year later after successfully reaching Goa.?4 The generally dismal state of Portuguese maritime power at this time and the desire to exploit the terms of the 16611
treaty with England, including the cession of Bombay, ensured that
Mello de Castro sailed to take up his office aboard an English fleet
under James Ley, the earl of Marlborough.
This fleet departed from
Lisbon in April 1662 and reached Bombay in late September. By midDecember 1662, Mello de Castro reached Goa and officially assumed
the office of Governor. 35
In India, Mello de Castro confronted the dizzying array of difficulties
that Mendon?a Furtado and Lencastre had failed to address. Following
a long period during which the Crown had paid little attention to its
eastern possessions, Mello de Castro's term of office represented a promission. The new Governor was expected to
longed reconnaissance
wreckage of the previous decades of neglect, to isolate
the most glaring problems, to suggest remedies and, if possible, to begin
to address many of these difficulties. Viewed in this context, his Viceroyalty
must be judged a success. While Antonio de Mello de Castro's tenure
is most noted for the fact that he refused for three years to turn over
Bombay to the English, in fact his administration embodied a good deal
more. He oversaw a comprehensive
survey of the straining structures

34On Antonio de Mello de Castro's

family and early career, cf. HAG Codex 650
fo. 9v.; Ferreira Martins, Os Vice-Reis,
151-52; and Gayo, Nobiliariode Familiasde Portugal
XI: 44.
" For the
English account of this voyage, cfl The EnglishFactoriesin India, 1661-1664,
ed. William Foster (Oxford, 1923) [EF 1661-1664], 123-44. For Mello de Castro's side
de pazes que o Estadoda India
of the story, cf. J.FJ. Biker, Collecaode tratadose concertos
comquemteverelaoesnas partes da Asia e AfricaOriental
fez comos Reis e Senhores
desdea principioda conquistaati o fim do siculoXVIII (14 vols., Lisbon, 1881-87),vol. III:
HAG MR 28A, Mello de Castro to D. Luisa Gusmdo: los. 243-44, 16/X/ 1662;
fo. 36, 28/XII/ 1662; and 28B fo. 469, 18/X/1662.

of the Estado and developed insightful suggestions and initiatives on how
to recuperate a semblance of its erstwhile power and wealth.3`;
The palace coup of the late spring 1662, that installed Afonso VI
and the count of Castelo-Melhor in power, ensured that the next Viceroy,
Mello de Castro's successor, would be selected by the good count, and
reflect his priorities (or lack of them) for the Estado. On 11March
named Joao Nunes da Cunha the 30th Viceroy of the
State of India. Created the first count of Sao Vicente by Afonso VI,
Nunes da Cunha may have had close ties with the king and CasteloMelhor but he would demonstrate in Asia a rigidity that was decidedly
out of step with the Machiavellian
of the latter. With
respect to imperial service, Nunes da Cunha possessed an impressive
familial heritage. His father, Nuno da Cunha, took part in the quest to
regain Bahia from the Dutch in the 1620s and died fighting in one of
the galleons of the armada of D. Antonio de Menezes two decades
later. Nunes da Cunha could also trace a direct family line to Tristao
da Cunha, ambassador to Rome for D. Manoel I, who had sailed for
the Indies in 1506, "discovered" the islands that bear his name, and
conquered Socotra; and to Nuno da Cunha, Vedor of the Fazenda of
D. Joao III and Governor of India. Joao Nunes da Cunha, born in
Lisbon in 1619, possessed a keen mind and an aptitude for letters, publishing two books in the 1650s and 1660s: Peregrinaiiode D. -7odo IV and
hida de D. Pedro o Cruel Rei de Castela. Nunes da Cunha, like CasteloMelhor, had risen in court circles as much by his wits as by any fama
de valor he had achieved on the battlefields of the Alentejo. By the early
1660s he was a member of the Council of War and da chave dourada
and Deputy of the Junta of the Three Estates. He had been a gentleman of the Camara of the Prince D. Teodosio and later Afonso VI, and
had also obtained grants of the commanderies of Castelejo, Sao Romao
do Erdal, and Santa Nlaria de Vouzela from the Order of Christ. In
April 1666 he sailed from the Tagus with a four-ship fleet."
36 For the relevant
correspondence between Mcllo de Castro and the Reino,cf. HAG
MR 28A-35;Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon [AHU] Documentos
India [DAI] Boxes 25 (1661-1663)through 27 (1666-1668).Cf. especially, HAG MR
28A fo. 149, Mello de Castro to D. Luisa Gusmao, 30/XII/ 1662; MR 30 fo. 1 I 7,Mcllo
de Castro to Afonso, 14/1/1664; MR 30 fos. 141-41 v.,Mello de Castro to Afonso,
29/1/1664; MR 31 fo. 160, Mello de Castro to Afonso, 20/XII/1664; MR 31 fos. 3-6,
Mello de Castro to Afonso, 28/XII/1664; and MR 35 fo. 165, Mcllo de Castro to
Afonso, 29/1/1666. For a traditional treatment of Mello de Castro's tenure, cf. F.C.
in India, vol. II: 327-56.
Danvers, The Portugue.se
37 On
Joao Nunes da Cunha's family background and early career, cf. Gayo, Nobiliario

probably assumed that an intellectual like Nunes da
Cunha would continue the careful and frugal polices of his predecessor in Goa. If so, he misjudged his man. Taking power in October
1666, Sao Vicente pledged to restore the former greatness of the Estado
by "jrro e fogo" (iron and fire).38 Thereafter, his energies revolved around
two misguided campaigns inspired by religion. First, he managed to
squander most of Mello de Castro's savings in outfitting a huge armada
of eighteen ships intended for the Straits of Hurmuz. This fleet was
charged with humbling the Sultan of Oman and re-conquering Muskat. 3g
As the Surat Presidency of the English East India Company (EIC)
reported to their Directors in London in a letter of April 1667: "There
arrived from Portugall in Setember last a new Viceroy to Goa, who
hath busied himselfe ever since his coming in providing & setting forth
a considerable fleet... but the designe is not completely knowne; Some
others believe to Cong a Port a little above Gombrone
say for Muscat...
King of Persia"4o
da Cunha aimed his fire at those in Goa who had
of the overweening power of the Roman Catholic
Church, the abuses of the Goa Inquisition, and the multitude of religious orders established in Asia. Mello de Castro himself had decried
the power and abuses of the religiosos (members of religious orders):
"Among the greatest miseries that has existed for many years in this
State of India none is of less weight than the multitude of religiosos that
there are in it."4' Sao Vicente, on the other hand, did everything he
could to assist them and further entrench their social, political, and economic power. In January
1667, the Viceroy maintained that the surest
efficiency was to involve the religiosos
in government, since "in all the regions where we do not have them"
administrative thefts were great. Sao Vicente's exceedingly low opinion
of civilian administrators
also led him to lament that "men without
God" now dominated the empire." That samc month, in opposition to
the advice of the Procurador of the Crown and the Treasury Council,
de Familiasde PortugalX: 147-48; HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Martins Zuquete, Nobreza
de Portugal,vol. III: 356; Ferreira Martins, Os Vice-Reis,
153-54; and BPE Codex CXV//
1-21 fos. 93-93v.
38Cf. HAG MR 33 fo.
92, Sdo Vicente to Afonso, 25/1/1667.
39Cf. AHU DAl Box
27, Document 99, Sao Vicente to Afonso, 21/IX/1667.
41 Cf. India Office
rOC] 3213, President
Library, London [IOL] OriginalCorrespondence
and Council in Surat to Directors, 5/IV/ 1667.
41 Cf. HAG MR 35 fos. 149-49v., Mello de Castro to Albnso, 28/1/ 1666.
Cf. HAG MR 33 fo. 21, 25/1/1667; and MR 33 fo. 92, 25/1/1667.

the Viceroy urged the King not to tax the assets of the Society of Jesus
in Goa: "one should not take from religiosos who set such an example
and show such zeal to the service of God and His Majesty in conserving this Estado."43 In February 1667, hoping to levy a temporary
food tax (colecta)to finance more regular fleets, Sao Vicente won approval
from the city council, nobles, and povo of Goa. But since the religioso.s
of the Society of Jesus, the Dominicans,
the Augustinians
and the
Carmelites all opposed it, the Viceroy decided, in light of the "importance" of these dissenters, to wait for advice from the Crown before
proceeding further." When Sao Vicente died in Goa in November 1668,
his support of the religiosos was not forgotten: he was buried at the foot
of the Altar of S. Francisco Xavier in the Jesuit Church of Bom Jesus
in Velha Goa.4'
The letter of succession named Luis de Miranda Henriques, Manoel
de Corte-Real de Sampaio, and Antonio de Mello de Castro as the
fifth Governing Council.4f Meanwhile, the uncertainties engendered by
Prince Pedro's overthrow of Afonso VI in late 1667, the European
stemming from Louis XIV's invasion of the Spanish
and the usual delays all conspired to delay the arrival
of a new Viceroy until May 1671. Fortunately, all three of the new
Governors on the scene in Goa had substantial experience in the Estado.
Corte-Real de Sampaio had served on the Council of State in Goa
under Sao Vicente, while Miranda Henriques was then the Captain of
D iu. 17 Antonio de Mello de Castro, a distant relative to the former
Viceroy of the same name, had perhaps the most impressive record of
de Mello de Castro, governor
service to the Crown. Son of Jeronimo
of the Castle of S. Filipe in Setubal, alcaide-mor of Villa Vicoza, and
capitiio-mor of the Armada to the Indies of 1588, his paternal grandfather and uncle had also served in the Estado. By the late 1660s, Antonio
had served and lived in Asia for more than twenty years; he had married three times, had three sons there, and was considered a true casado.

43 Cf. HAG MR 33 fo. 305, S. Vicente to Afonso, 29/1/1667.

Cf. HAG MR 33 fo. 330 (?), S. Vicente to Afonso, 3/II/1667.
45 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 9v.
46The "Auto da sucessao da Govcrnan?a da India e Via
q. p.a ella se abrio na
Capela mor da casa profe?a da Comp.a de Jesus desta Cid.e p. falecimento do Ex.mo
Sor.Joao Nunes da Cunha de Sam V.te V. Rey e cap.m g.l da India" from the Council
of State records found in HAG Codex 9535, "Assentosdo Concelho do Estado, 16551676" (No. 6) is given in P.S.S. Pissurlencar, Assentosdo Conselho
do Estado, 1618-1750
[ACE] (5 vols., Bastora, 1953-57),vol. IV: 195-98.
Cf. ACE, vol. IV: 190-200.

In the service of His Majesty's Council, Mello de Castro had held the
posts of capitiio-mor of the campo of Ceylon (where he had distinguished
himself in the defense of Colombo in 1655-56), and of the Armada of
the North; General of the Armadas of the Reino; Captain of the fortress
of Bassein; and, from 1664 to 1667, Captain of Mozambique
Sofala. 41
The tenure of this Council was far less acrimonious than the previous one. As the Minutes of the Goa Council of State reveal, Mello de
Castro and Corte-Real de Sampaio made the major decisions and were
largely willing to allow the entrenched machinery of the Estado to function as before." The fact that only eight major Assentos (resolutions) of
the Council of State were taken during these years certainly suggests a
hands-off management style. so At the same time, both these men were
anxious to advance the long-term interests of the casado lobby in Goa
at the expense of the reinados, the service nobility from the Reino who
customarily held the post of Viceroy for a specified term and then
returned as rich men to Portugal. 51 'Their most notable military success
related to a 1669 fleet Mello de Castro and Corte-Real de Sampaio
sent to the Straits of Hurmuz. As they pointed out in a letter of January
1670 to Pedro, this fleet had been a "great credit to the reputation of
Your Arms:" bombarding
Muskat, and defeating the Omani Sultan's
fleet off Bandar Kung, sinking five of his best ships and killing nearly
2,000 of his men. News of this great victory had "frightened the nations
of the East" and helped to restore the reputation of the Portuguese as
"Senhores do mar," friends had sent congratulations,
enemies had sent
41 On the
family background and previous experience of Antonio de Mello de Castro,
cf: HAG Codex 650 fo. 10; Martins, Os Vice-Reis,
155-56;and Gayo, Nobiliariode Familias
de PortugalXI: 39-40, 71.
Henriques never reached Goa to share in the duties of government, as
the devastating attack of the Omani Arabs on Diu in December 1668 demanded all of
his energies in the years that followed. Cf. HAG MR 34 fo. 203, Governors to Pedro,
284-84v., 26/I/ 1670.
Cf. ACE, vol. IV: 203-17. It is interesting to note that in a letter of 8 January
1669, the Governors pointed out that Sdo Vicente had also been responsiblefor "only"
seven or eight consultasduring his tenure. Cf. HAG MR 35 fo. 23.
5' One of the
principal problems with the Estado,declared the pair in a letter of
January 1669, was that such Viceroys and Governors placed "little authority" in the
wise opinions of the casadosand others with long years of service in Asia, and instead
did "what seem[ed] best to [them]." This tendency "was not convenient to the service
of Your Majesty," since the reinadosproceeded for themselvesonly little advised of the
matters of this State. Cf. HAG MR 35 fo. 17, Governors to Pedro, 8/I/ 1669.
52 Cf. HAG MR 34 fos. 277-77v., Governors to Pedro, 28/1/1670; and MR 34 fos.
303-03v., Governors to Pedro, 28//1/1670. For details on the naval warfare between the

While Pedro was cheered to receive these glad tidings, he was nevertheless anxious to appoint a new Viceroy, one of his own, who would
once and for all reverse the decades of decline in the eastern possessions. The Prince Regent had already resolved upon a fundamental shift
in Crown policy regarding the tripartite empire, and was committed to
initiating a series of reforms in the Estado in order to regain a semblance of its former glory and economic benefit to the Crown .5' News
of Sao Vicente's death reached Lisbon in early November 1669.54 The
search for a suitable replacement took place amid a flurry of activity
regarding the approaching Dutch War, and Colbert's attempt to lure
Pedro into his war against the Netherlands by launching a campaign
against the VOC in Asia. In early 1670, the Prince Regent made two
important decisions regarding his quest to rehabilitate the Estado: he
rejected once and for all the often-repeated offers of an Asian alliance
against the Dutch proffered to him by Louis XIV's ambassador, the
and in March 1670 he selected Luis de
marquis de Saint-Romain;
Albuquerque as the 31st Viceroy.
Mendon?a Furtado returned to Portugal in January 1663, and thereafter became involved with the clique of young nobles in Lisbon that
came to favor the removal of Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor
and the
accession of Pedro to power. 55He had already garnered an impressive
cache of wealth from his service in Asia. Mendon?a Furtado was also
willing to favor the new Prince Regent with advice he did not want to
hear. In the immediate aftermath of the 1667 coup, he offered to repay
D. Maria Fran?oise's dowry within the space of three days provided
that Pedro would forego marrying his brother's wife. It was much to
the Prince Regent's credit that he did not hold a grudge for being
opposed on this emotional issue, for Mendon?a Furtado subsequently
served on both the Council of State and the Council of
Estado and the Omani Arabs during this period, cf. Glenn J. Ames, "The Straits of
Hurmuz Fleets: Omani-Portuguese Naval Rivalry and Encounters, c. 1660-1680," The
Mariner'sMirrorLXXXIII (November, 1997): 398-409.
Cf. Glenn J. Ames, "The Carreirada India, 1668-1682:Maritime Enterprise and the
Quest for Stability in Portugal's Asian Empire" TheJournal of EuropeanEconomic
20.1 (1991): 25-27.
reached the Tagus from Goa at that time. Cf.
ship NossaSenhoradosRernedios
HAG MR 35 fo. 7, Governors to Pedro, 8/1/1669; BPE Codex CXV/ 1-21 fo. 93v.
and Ames, "The Carreirada India, 1668-1682," 19-22, and the manuscript sources cited
55 On his actions in the 1667
coup against Castelo-Melhorand Afonso VI cfl Count
of Ericeira, Historicde PortugalRestaurado,
vol. IV: 444-45.
Mendon?a Furtado's return to the Reinoand activities there from 1664-1670,
cf. C.R. Boxer, Salvadorda S, 352 ff.

a common

step in the model of career advancement during these years,

was also elevated to the ranks of the titulares. LettersMendon?a
Patent of March 1670 bestowed the title of first count of Lavradio upon
him, thus completing the rise of another of the provincial noble families that had supported the Revolution of 1640. Mendon?a Furtado and
his five-ship frota departed Lisbon in April 1670 and reached Goa in
May 1671.s7 His two triennial terms as Viceroy would mark one of the
most crucial periods in the history of the Estado.
Pedro's first Viceroy had experience, strength, force of will, as well
as fama do cabedal and fama do valor. He needed all of these qualities to
confront the entrenched interests that typically frustrated any campaign
to reform the Estado's inefficient bureaucratic system. Mendona Furtado,
like most reinado.s, had always returned to the Reino after his imperial
postings. Unlike many of his predecessors, however, he had also spent
enough time living in Goa to appreciate as well as any casado the inherent weaknesses of the imperial edifice.
Before his departure
from Lisbon, Mendon?a
Furtado had been
approached by
marquis de Saint-Romain,
Asian trade against the
much-despised Dutch East India Company. Despite his willingness to
discuss the soundest strategy for the French to pursue in their impending campaign against the VOC, Lavradio predictably demurred on the
question of Portuguese support for any overt actions against Batavia's
interests." Pedro and his new Viceroy, after all, had already decided
to reject these overtures as "diplomatically"
as possible and instead to
undertake a series of reforms while their European rivals were busy
warring against one another beginning in 1672.
Lavradio's tenure witnessed the foundation of a new permanent T?er?o
of 500 men and officers in Goa; the prompt dispatching of yearly fleets

z For details on
Mendonca Furtado's assumption of his new titles and his voyage to
Goa, cf. BPE Codex CXV/ 1-21fos. 93-93v.;HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Ferreira Martins,
Os Vice-Reis,
157-58;ANTT Registryde Mercs:OrdensMilitares,Book 12 fo. 453 and Book
14 fo. 9v.; Martins Zuquete, Nobrezade Portugal,vol. II: 678; ACE, vol. IV: 217-23; and
HAG MR 36 fo. 405, Mendon?a Furtado to Pedro, 14/X/ 1671 and GlennJ. Amcs,
"A Noble Life: Luis de Mendon?a Furtado and the Quest for famain Baroque Portugal
de HistriaXXXII (1997-1998):305-29.
and her Empire" RevistaPortuguesa
58Saint-Romain's summaries of these conversationsand other information
relating to
the proposed Franco-Portuguesealliancecan be found in Archivesdes AffairesEtrangeres,
Paris [AAE] Correspondance
[CC] fos. 97-100v., "Extrait des Lettres de M. SaintRomain," 22/XII/ 1669-12/V/ 1670; fos. 103-05,Saint-Romainto Colbert, 30/XII/ 1669;
fos. 110-13v., Saint-Romain to Louis XIV, 22/1/1670; and fos. 119-20, Saint-Romain
to Colbert [in cipher], 4/II/ 1670.

in search of contraband shipping; a notable regularization of the sailings of the once moribund Carreira da India; the re-establishment of regular trading voyages to Macau and Timor; and a spirited attempt to
take on the overbearing social and economic power of the religiosos. S9
By 1677, great strides were made towards placing the Estado on a solid
footing once again. 61
The work of consolidating these gains fell to Lavradio's immediate
successors: the Viceroy D. Pedro de Almeida and the Governor Antonio
Paes de Sande. D. Pedro de Almeida's family background and record
of service to the Crown mirrored that of Mello de Castro, Nunes da
Cunha and Mendon?a Furtado. Born in March 1630, he was the son
of D. Joao de Almeida and D. Violate Henriques. His father was of
the Casas of Joao IV and Afonso VI, gentleman of the Cdmara Real, and
alcaide-mor of Alcobaa, and his mother was the daughter of the third
count of Arcos. Pedro de Almeida's family also had long traditions of
service in the Asian empire: his great-great grandfather, D. Lopo de
Almeida had been Captain of Sofala, while his great-grandfather
namesake had served with "great distinction" in India, especially during the notable defense of Diu by D. Joao Mascarenhas. D. Pedro de
Almeida had begun his service to the Crown in the Restoration War
in the Alentejo, where he held the posts of captain of Horse and mestre
do campo in a 'Z?er?oof Infantry. Having received the commanderies
Loures and Sal Salvador de Souto in the Order of Christ for his services, D. Pedro then moved on to the rigors of court life in Lisbon. By
the early 1670s he had become a Senator of the Cdmara Municipal of
the capital city, a deputy in the Junta of the Three Estates, Vedor of the
Casa Real, and a member of the Council of State. In Letters-Patent of
April 1677, the Prince Regent named him the 32nd Viceroy of the
Estado and, as with Nunes da Cunha and Mendonca Furtado, Almeida
was also elevated to the ranks of the titulares, as the first Count of
59 Cf.
Glenn J. Ames, "The Eftadoda India, 16fi3-1677:Priorities and Strategies in
Europe and the East" RevistaPortuguesade HistriaXXII (1987): 38-46 and the manuscript sources cited therein.
b As Gerald Aungier, the able English President in Bombay, wrote as early as 1674
on Lavradio's attempt to address the traditional banes of bad government and the abuses
of the religiousorders and nobles, "the prudence of this Viceroy hath raised them much:
both in one and in the other." Cf. IOL OC 3929, Aungier to Company Directors,
61 For details on the
family background and early career of D. Pedro de Almeida,
cf: Martins, Os hice-Reis,159-60;Braamcamp Freire, Brases,vol. II: 366-67; HAG Codex

One of the assumptions underlying Pedro's rehabilitation project was
a belief that development of the rich Rios de Cuama basin in Mozambique
could compensate for earlier losses suffered in Melaka, Ceylon, and the
Malabar coast, and serve as the basis for a renascent and profitable
Estado.62 Pedro was convinced that the time was at hand to colonize
the Rios de Cuama, and this was to be the main agenda for D. Pedro
de Almeida's brief Viceroyalty. The new Viceroy sailed from Lisbon in
late April and took power in Goa in October 1677. The following
to rendezvous with a fleet of four
January, he sailed for Mozambique
carry out the so-called enterprise of
Pate: a mission to establish colonists in the region, while subduing any
indigenous opposition that might be encountered. Despite some initial
successes, the expedition of Pate ended in failure. The new count Assumar
died in March of 1679 in the midst of the campaign.63
Shortly before Assumar's departure for Mozambique a sixth Governing
Council had been named to rule in his absence .6' The members of this
Council were to be D. Frei Antonio Brandao, the Archbishop of Goa;
Antonio Paes de Sande, then Vedor-Geralda Fazenda, and Francisco Cabral
de Almeida. But Cabral de Almeida was already dead and Brandao
died in July 1678. Hence, Antonio Paes de Sande acted as sole Governor
of the Estado for most of the period down to September 1681 when
Francisco de 1'avora, the count of Alvor would assume power as viceroy.
Born in Extremoz in 1622, Paes de Sande had held various posts in
both Europe and the Estado. His familial background was also solidly
da Gama de Sande, was
of the provincial nobility. His father, Jeronimo
of Christ, Procurador
a fidalgo
to the Restoration Cortes and generally "uma das principaes pessoas da

650 fo. 10; Martins Zuquete, Nobrezade Portugal,vol. II: 328; and Gayo, Nobiliariode
Familiasde Portugal,vol. II: 74-75.
62 Cf. AHU Codex 17 fos. 122v.-24.
63 For details on the Pate
expedition, cf: ACE, vol. IV: 304-15; BPE Codex CXV/121 fo. 95v.; HAG MR 43 fos. 208-09, Pedro to D. Pedro de Almeida, 5/IV/ 1677; HAG
in South
MR 43 fo. 218, Pedro to Governors, 8/IV/ 1677; Eric Axelson, 77? Portuguese
East Africa,1600-1700 (Johannesburg, 1964), 151 ff.; and AHU Documentsavulsosrelativosa Mofambique[DAM] Box 3, Document 16, Consultaof the Overseas Council on
the Pate Expedition, 23/VI/1677; and Glenn J. Ames, "An African Eldorado?: The
Portuguese Quest for Wealth in Mozambique and the Rios de Cuama,c. 1661-1683,"
Journal if AfricanHistoricalStudies31.1 (1998):91-110.
"Entrega que faz o exm.mno S.or Dom P.o dalmeida V. Rey da India da
governanca della aos Il.mos Sores Dom Fr. Antonio brandao, Arc.o de Goa, e Primas
da India e Antonio Paez de Sande, ambos do Concelho de S.A." is given in ACE, vol.
IV: 311-13. The letters of successionwere opened on 24 January 1678.

villa, e uivia [sic] das suas fazendas a lei da Nobreza." At the order
and expense of his father, Antonio, like many of his noble contemporaries, had been sent to fight in the Restoration struggle in search of
in September of 1643. He evifama do valor and social advancement
next two years in actions near
dently distinguished
Melo de Albuquerque
at Valverde under the command of Joao de Mesquita Pimental. After
marrying D. Catarina de Castro Pereira Soutto-Mayor in 1645, and with
the permission of the Crown, he spent several years in Spain serving
as provedor and corregedor of Moncao. In 1666, he received a commandery in the Order of Christ for his services and was named Secretary
of the Estado da India."
Sailing aboard the Viceregal fleet of the count of Sao Vicente, Paes
de Sande reached Goa for this first time in September 1666, whereupon Nunes da Cunha asked him to assume the office of Vedor-geral da
Fazenda in addition to his original duties. When he returned to Lisbon
in March 1671, the Prince Regent rewarded him for his services in the
Estado by naming him Guarda-mor of the Ribeira de Goa, "supraanumerario de Conselheiro de Capa e Espada, no Conselho Ultramarino,"
and the commander of Sao Mamede de Mogadouro in the Order of
sent on to Pedro as consultas of the
Christ. His insightful memoranda,
Overseas Council during the crucial Viccroyalty of Mendon?a Furtado,
no doubt helped to convince the Prince Regent to embrace many of
the long overdue reforms that characterized those years. In the spring
of 1677, in recognition of these services and his previous experiences
in Asia, Paes de Sande was nominated as the Vedor da Fazenda Geral of
the Estado, arguably the second most important position in the imperial
edifice in the east, "one of the most powerful that the Estado has,
exceeded only by that of Viceroy." Departing from Lisbon with D. Pedro
de Almeida aboard the Sio Pedro da Ribeira, Paes de Sande took office
on 4 November of that year and remained as Vedor until his appointment to the Governing Council in January 1678. 16

65For details on the

family background and early career of Antonio Pacs dc Sandc,
cf. Antonio Paes de Sande e Castro, AntonioPaes de Sande:0 GrandeGovemador
1951), 9-26.
66On Antonio Paes dc Sandc's carecr in Crown service from
1666-1677,cf. Paes de
Sande e Castro, AntonioPaesde Sande,12-22; Martins, Os Vice-Reis,
159-61; HAG Codex
650 fo. 11; HAG MR 33 fo. 242, "Certidao dc Antonio Paes de Sande," 21 /I/ 1667;
and ACE, vol. IV: 167-298.

Paes de Sande possessed a keen, orderly, and penetrating mind.6' As
an astute administrator,
he was able to consolidate the long overdue
reforms of the preceding decade. Had it not been for the subsequent
policies of Paes de Sande, Assumar's reforms might not have survived,
especially given his disastrous expedition to Pate, a setback that could
easily have plunged the Estado back into chaos under a less competent
Paes de Sande did everything possible to overcome this setGovernors
and financial reforms of the
back and to entrench the bureaucratic
1 670s.?? The impact of Paes de Sande's capable stewardship, and more
broadly of the reform policies that began with Pedro's accession to
power in 1668, is well-reflected in the Orfamento or State Budget for
1680, which revealed a positive saldo of 271,164 xerafins for the Estado
as a whole, including a surplus of 148,094 for Goa and her dependencies. These figures compare very favorably with the huge deficits
that characterized
the decades from the 1630s onward." In his document of transfer to Francisco de Tavora in September 1681, Paes de
Sande was able to pass on to his successor more than 202,000 xerajins
in the Royal Treasury, 12 "high seas" ships, another 20 galleys in Goa
and Bassein, and a regular Terfo with salaries paid!" This was a far cry
from the lamentable financial, geo-political and military condition of the
Estado upon the arrival of Antonio de Mello de Castro aboard an English
fleet some two decades earlier. It was also a fitting testimony to the
actions of the succession of Viceroys and Governors who served the
Crown in Asia during those years. The rehabilitation of the Estado during these decades constitutes one of the greatest achievements of the
second stage of the Restoration period under the Braganzas. This sucthe importance of the ultramar for any indigenous
cess reemphasized

found passimin HAG MR 42-45, covering the years 1677-81.

68 On the war with Kanara, cf. Paes de Sande e Castro, AntonioPaes de Sande,21-22;
ACE, vol. IV: 338-39; HAG MR 33 fo. 139 "Carta do rei da Canara" s.d. [c. 1666?]
MR 33 fo. 15, S. Vicente to Afonso, 25/l/1667; MR 33 fo. 138, S. Vicente to Afonso,
26/I/ 1667; MR 35 fo. 17, Mello dc Castro and Corte-Real de Sampaio to Pedro,
8/it 1669; and MR 43 fo. 239, Paes de Sande to Pedro, 17/I/ 1679.
69 On the
religiouspolicies of Paes de Sande, cf. Paes de Sande e Castro, AntonioPaes
de Sande,24-28. For a discussionof abuses relating to the "gentio" orphans during this
period and the adverse economic impact these practices were having on the trade of
the Estado,cf. Ames, "The Estadoda India, 1663-1677,"41-42; and Ames, "Serving God,
Mammon or Both?: Religious vis-a-visEconomic Priorities in the Portuguese Estadoda
India, c. 1600-1700," The CatholicHistoricalReview86.2 (2000): 193-216.
70For the 1680 figures, cf. HAG Codex 2316 fo. 27. These saldosare contrasted with
the 1630 figures in Ames, "The Estadoda India, 1663-1677,"46.
" This document is
given in ACE, vol. IV: 350-54.

Portuguese dynasty, mirroring the notable re-capture of Brazil from the
Dutch during the 1640s and 1650s. By the time of his formal accession
as king in 1683, Pedro II, bolstered by these twin overseas successes,
was assured of the support of the erstwhile provincial noble houses that
had risen to the ranks of the titulares in meeting these challenges.
The careers of the men who assisted in accomplishing these difficult
tasks, especially the challenges in the Estado da India, reveal a discernable
pattern of accession for provincial noble families anxious to rise in the
hierarchy of the new Braganza State. It is significant that during this
same period, as Nuno Gon?alo Monteiro has convincingly demonstrated,
the noble estate in Portugal remained an exceedingly closed and selfperpetuating class. Between 1650-1750 "very few houses were created
and very few were abolished." Of the 50 titled houses that existed in
1750, "34 had been granted their titles over a hundred years earlier
and, of these, seven dated back to the fifteenth century."'2 As the contemporary work Nobiliario dos Ilustrissomos Senhores Marquez, e Marqueza de
,Niza (1662) reveals, nearly all, if not all, of these titled families were
inter-related by marriage .73 Given this state of affairs, it is indeed worthy of note that between 1666 and 1683, all three of the nobles selected
for the office of Viceroy of India, Nunes da Cunha, Mendon?a Furtado,
and Almeida, also received elevation to the status of the titulares as part
and parcel of the appointment.
Was the Crown forced to offer such
an attractive inducement in order to recruit qualified nobles for the
Viceroyalty, given the inherent difficulties of the position? Or did the
Crown's renewed commitment to the Estado engender a calculated policy
of breaching the closed caste of the upper nobility? At least with respect
to Prince Regent Pedro, beginning in 1668, it seems that the latter was
the determining factor. As the Marquis de Fronteira reminded the Prince
in a 1669 memorandum,
the Estado was "the most glorious of all the
and in India, Your Majesty pledges himself to
[Crown's] conquests ...
the honor of God, the glory of the kingdom, [and] the interest and
this imperial possession was
remedy of your vassals. "74 Rehabilitating

72 Cf. "Aristocratic Succession in

Portugal (From the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth
and Succession,
ed. Joao de Pina-Cabral and Ant6nia
Centuries)" in Elites:Choice,Leadership
Pedroso de Lima (Oxford, 2000), 133-48; and 0 Crepusculo dos Grandes, A casa e o
da Aristocracia
em Portugal(1750-1832)(Lisbon, 1998).
73Cf. BibliotecaNacional de
Lisboa, [BNL] Codex 1029, also published as an Edifao
Facsimiladada Associao
de Genealogia
(Lisbon, 1995).
74Cf. BNL Fundo
Geral,Codex 748, Instrucfdoda Secretariade Estadoe paraceressobrea
liga de Francae Inglaterra,fos. 145-145v.

what Pedro strove to do, and with some success." As the deeds of Sao
a service nobility was
Vicente, Lavradio, and Assumar demonstrate,
developing, willing and able to provide real serr?i?ofor the pressing needs
of the Crown, in order to rise into the ranks of the titulares and the
most lucrative positions the court could bestow. It was a quid pro quo in
the truest sense of the word, an arrangement that benefited both sides:
the Asian empire received assistance that was badly needed after long
decades of neglect, while a noble estate badly in need of periodic transfusions received some fresh blood.

71Cf. Ames, Renascent


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