OPLEVSTORRES

[G.R.No.127685.July23,1998]
293SCRA141
FACTS:PetitionerSenatorBlasF.Opleassailedtheconstitutionalityofthe
AdministrativeOrderNo.308entitledAdoptionofComputerizedIdentification
ReferenceSystemonthefollowinggrounds:

1.)Theadministrativeorderissuedbytheexecutiveisdeemedtobealawandnota
mereadministrativeorderthusitisausurpationoflegislativepowerofthecongressto
makelaws,and
2.)Itimpermissiblyintrudesthecitizensconstitutionalrightofprivacy.

ISSUE:DoestheAdministrativeOrderNo.308violatestheconstitutionalrightto
privacy?
HELD:Yes,theAdministrativeOrderviolatestheconstitutionalrighttoprivacybecause
itsscopeistoobroadandvaguethatwillputpeoplesrighttoprivacyinclearand
presentdangerifimplemented.TheA.O.308alsolacksofpropersafeguardsfor
protectingtheinformationthatwillbegatheredfrompeoplethroughbiometricsand
othermeans.Thus,A.O.No.308mayinterferewiththeindividualslibertyofabodeand
travelbyenablingauthoritiestotrackdownhismovement;itmayalsoenable
unscrupulouspersonstoaccessconfidentialinformationandcircumventtheright
againstself
incrimination;itmaypavethewayforfishingexpeditionsbygovernment
authoritiesandevadetherightagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.
AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29
APR 1988]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987,
for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the
historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed
motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the
MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also
signified his approval of the intended film production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters
interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage
as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and

Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American

historian have developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation,
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any
member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or
other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners
acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the
movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any
fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or
bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom
to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures
in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not
exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the
respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely
look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of
any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public
interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage
in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of
public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place,
Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost,
to some extent at least, their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and
the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that
the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events.

SJS VS DDB
OTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board
(G.R. No. 158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658)
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with
certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a
candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC
from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of
five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a
member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC,
by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test,
create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must
first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the
Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are
constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA
9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative
rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and
void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to
the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.
The provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon
the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test is
not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the

guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating

rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure,
is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions
of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Vivares vs stc
I
n January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas
College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her
classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their
undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their
teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and
downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STCs
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the students handbook and
banned them from marching in their graduation ceremonies
scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining
order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the
students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other
mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at
Friends Only. They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy
which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used
and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated
their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently
showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
information, data, and digital images happened at STCs Computer
Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the
court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data
be declared illegally obtained in violation of the childrens right to
privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is
not a case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is
not an entity engaged in the business of gathering, collecting, or
storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied
only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances.
Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like
Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use of such privacy
tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of
privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy
must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned
made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their
post (status) on Facebook were published as Public.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a
users posts on his wall (profile page):
(a) Public the default setting; every Facebook user can view the
photo;
(b) Friends of Friends only the users Facebook friends and their
friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
networks of the Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is Public and if a user wants to have some
privacy, then he must choose any setting other than Public. If it is
true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case
so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then
how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact
was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed
and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it
appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook
hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures
of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students right to privacy. The manner which
the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it
appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture

to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures,
merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a
legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the
standards of the school (to which the students and their parents
agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their
children there).
Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National Telecommunications
Commission, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
DECISION
(En Banc)
PUNO, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact

disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between thenPresident Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano,
respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had
copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held
liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or
airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by
anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread,
the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV
network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits
issued to them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of
Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use their stations for the
broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The
NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello Garci taped
conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the AntiWiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate
of Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or
willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media
establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press
Statement which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes
should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary

Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?
2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes
and Tinga in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura,
Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the minority) in granting the petition insofar
as respondent Secretary Gonzalezs press statement was concerned. Likewise,
it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco
in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De
Castro and Tinga in the minority) in granting the same insofar as NTCs press
statement was concerned.]
1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will
NOT justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the
press.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content
is
given
the strictest
scrutiny,
with
the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality
by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of
media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger
test. [T]he great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape
recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case
at bar however are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls
short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The
Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a
complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of

the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent,
especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wiretappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are
some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of
the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping
law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different
kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which[,] even if
violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but does not
endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their
violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free
speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be
sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of
speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to
private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status
accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting
freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated
measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance
with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted
as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be
vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil
consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per
se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right
whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no
option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no
showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers
the national security of the State.
2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the
NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has
transgressed the Constitution.
[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were
not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient
that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise
of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his
statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the
regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and
on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on
prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already
converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the
easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press

statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute
impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.
New york times vs Sullivan
SynopsisofRuleofLaw.Theconstitutionalguaranteesrequireafederalrulethat
prohibitsapublicofficialfromrecoveringdamagesforadefamatoryfalsehoodrelatingto
hisofficialconductunlessheprovesthatthestatementwasmadewithactualmalice
thatis,withknowledgethatitwasfalseorwithrecklessdisregardofwhetheritwasfalse
ornot.
Facts.ThePlaintiffwas oneofthreeCommissionersofMontgomery,Alabama,who
claimedthathewasdefamedinafullpageadtakenoutintheNewYorkTimes.The
advertisementwasentitled,HeedTheirRisingVoicesanditchargedin partthatan
unprecedentedwaveofterrorhadbeendirectedagainstthosewhoparticipatedinthecivil
rightsmovementintheSouth.Someoftheparticularsoftheadvertisementwerefalse.
AlthoughtheadvertisementdidnotmentionthePlaintiffbyname,heclaimedthatit
referred to him indirectly because he had oversight responsibility of the police. The
Defendantclaimedthatitauthorizedpublicationoftheadvertisementbecauseitdidnot
haveanyreasontobelievethatitscontentswerefalse.Therewasnoindependenteffortto
checkitsaccuracy.ThePlaintiffdemandedthattheDefendantretracttheadvertisement.
TheDefendantwaspuzzledastowhythePlaintiffthoughttheadvertisementreflected
adverselyonhim.Thejuryfoundtheadlibe
lousperseandactionablewithoutproofofmalice.ThejuryawardedthePlaintiff
$500,000indamages.TheAlabamaSupremeCourtaffirmed.TheDefendantappealed.
Issue.IstheDefendantliablefordefamationforprintinganadvertisement,which
criticizedapublicofficialsofficialconduct?
Held.No.Reversedandremanded.
* Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press are required by the First and
FourteenthAmendmentsoftheUnitedStatesConstitution(Constitution)inalibelaction
broughtbyapublicofficialagainstcriticsofhisofficialconduct.
*UnderAlabamalaw,apublicationislibelousperseifthewordstendtoinjureaperson
inhisreputationortobringhimintopubliccontempt.Thejurymustfindthatthewords
werepublishedofandconcerningtheplaintiff.Oncelibelpersehasbeenestablished,the
defendanthasnodefenseastostatedfactsunlesshecanpersuadethejurythattheywere
trueinalltheirparticulars.
*Erroneousstatementisinevitableinfreedebateanditmustbeprotectedifthefreedoms
ofexpressionaretohavethebreathingspacethattheneedtosurvive.
*Theconstitutionalguaranteesrequireafederalrulethatprohibitsapublicofficialfrom
recoveringdamagesforadefamatoryfalsehoodrelatingtohisofficialconductunlesshe
provesthatthestatementwasmadewithactualmalicethatis,withknowledgethatit
wasfalseorwithrecklessdisregardofwhetheritwasfalseornot.
*TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates(SupremeCourt)holdsthattheConstitution
delimitsaStatespowertoawarddamagesforlibelinactionsbroughtbypublicofficials
againstcriticsoftheirofficialconduct.Inthiscase,therulerequiringproofofactual

maliceisapplicable.
*TheDefendantsfailuretoretracttheadvertisementuponthePlaintiffsdemandisnot
adequate evidence ofmalice forconstitutional purposes. Likewise, it is not adequate
evidenceofmalicethattheDefendantfailedtochecktheadvertisementsaccuracyagainst
thenewsstoriesintheDefendants ownfiles.Also,theevidencewasconstitutionally
defectiveinanotherrespect:itwasincapableofsupportingthejurysfindingthatthe
allegedlylibelousstatementsweremadeofandconcerningthePlaintiff.
Concurrence.JusticeHugoBlack(J.Black)arguedthattheFirstandFourteenth
AmendmentsoftheConstitutiondonotmerelydelimitaStatespowertoaward
damages,butcompletelyprohibitaStatefromexercisingsuchapower.TheDefendant
hadanabsolute,unconditionalrighttopublishcriticismsoftheMontgomeryagencies
andofficials.
Discussion.Inorderforapublicofficialtorecoverinadefamationactioninvolvinghis
officialconduct,malicemustbeproved.Withouttheshowingofmalice,theSupreme
Courtfeltthatadefamationactioninthiscasewouldseverelycripplethesafeguardsof
freedomspeechandexpressionthatareguaranteedintheFirstAmendmentofthe
ConstitutionandapplicabletotheStatesviatheFourteenthAmendmentofthe
Constitution.
SWS vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such
survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on
the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls
and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and
constitutional?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period,
and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters
of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so
vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

Disini vs
Facts
ThecasearisesoutofconsolidatedpetitionstotheSupremeCourtofthePhilippineson
theconstitutionalityofseveralprovisionsoftheCybercrimePreventionActof2012,Act
No.10175.
ThePetitionersarguedthateventhoughtheActisthegovernmentsplatformin
combatingillegalcyberspaceactivities,21separatesectionsoftheActviolatetheir
constitutionalrights,particularlytherighttofreedomofexpressionandaccessto
inforamtion.
InFebruary2013,theSupremeCourtextendedthedurationofatemporaryrestraining
orderagainstthegovernmenttohaltenforcementoftheActuntiltheadjudicationofthe
issues.

DecisionOverview
JusticeAbaddeliveredtheCourtsopinion.
ThegovernmentofPhilippinesadoptedtheCybercrimePreventionActof2012forthe
purposeofregulatingaccesstoanduseofcyberspace.Severalsectionsofthelawdefine
relevantcybercrimesandenablethegovernmenttotrackdownandpenalizeviolators.
Among21challengedsections,theCourtdeclaredSections4(c)(3),12,and19oftheAct
asunconstitutional.
Section4(c)(3)prohibitsthetransmissionofunsolicitedcommercialelectronic
communications,commonlyknownasspams,thatseektoadvertise,sell,orofferforsale
ofproductsandservicesunlesstherecipientaffirmativelyconsents,orwhenthepurpose
ofthecommunicationisforserviceoradministrativeannouncementsfromthesenderto
itsexistingusers,orwhenthefollowingconditionsarepresent:(aa)Thecommercial
electroniccommunicationcontainsasimple,valid,andreliablewayfortherecipientto
rejectreceiptoffurthercommercialelectronicmessages(optout)fromthesame
source;(bb)Thecommercialelectroniccommunicationdoesnotpurposelydisguisethe
sourceoftheelectronicmessage;and(cc)Thecommercialelectroniccommunication
doesnotpurposelyincludemisleadinginformationinanypartofthemessageinorderto
inducetherecipientstoreadthemessage.
Thegovernmentarguedthatunsolicitedcommercialcommunicationsamounttoboth
nuisanceandtrespassbecausetheytendtointerferewiththeenjoymentofusingonline
servicesandthattheyentertherecipientsdomainwithoutpriorpermission.
TheCourtfirstnotedthatspamsareacategoryofcommercialspeech,whichdoesnot
receivethesamelevelofprotectionasotherconstitutionallyguaranteedformsof
expression,butisnonethelessentitledtoprotection.Itruledthattheprohibitionon
transmittingunsolicitedcommunicationswoulddenyapersontherighttoreadhis
emails,evenunsolicitedcommercialadsaddressedtohim.Accordingly,theCourt
declaredSection4(c)(3)asunconstitutional.
Section12oftheActauthorizesthelawenforcementwithoutacourtwarranttocollect
orrecordtrafficdatainrealtimeassociatedwithspecifiedcommunicationstransmitted

bymeansofacomputersystem.TrafficdataunderthisSectionincludestheorigin,
destination,route,size,date,anddurationofthecommunication,butnotitscontentnor
theidentityofusers.
ThePetitionersarguedthatsuchwarrantlessauthoritycurtailstheircivillibertiesandset
thestageforabuseofdiscretionbythegovernment.Theyalsoclaimedthatthis
provisionviolatestherighttoprivacyandprotectionfromthegovernmentsintrusion
intoonlinecommunications.
AccordingtotheCourt,sinceSection12mayleadtodisclosureofprivate
communications,itmustsurvivetherationalbasisstandardofwhetheritisnarrowly
tailoredtowardsservingagovernmentscompellinginterest.TheCourtfoundthatthe
governmentdidhaveacompellinginterestinpreventingcybercrimesbymonitoring
realtimetrafficdata.
AstowhetherSection12violatedtherighttoprivacy,theCourtfirstrecognizedthatthe
rightatstakeconcernedinformationalprivacy,definedastherightnottohaveprivate
informationdisclosed,andtherighttolivefreelywithoutsurveillanceandintrusion.In
determiningwhetheracommunicationisentitledtotherightofprivacy,theCourt
appliedatwoparttest:(1)Whetherthepersonclaimingtherighthasalegitimate
expectationofprivacyoverthecommunication,and(2)whetherhisexpectationof
privacycanberegardedasobjectivelyreasonableinthesociety.
TheCourtnotedthatinternetusershavesubjectivereasonableexpectationofprivacy
overtheircommunicationstransmittedonline.However,itdidnotfindtheexpectation
asobjectivelyreasonablebecausetrafficdatasentthroughinternetdoesnotdisclosethe
actualnamesandaddresses(residentialoroffice)ofthesenderandtherecipient,only
theircodedInternetProtocol(IP)addresses.
EventhoughtheCourtruledthatrealtimetrafficdataunderSection12doesnotenjoy
theobjectivereasonableexpectationofprivacy,theexistenceofenoughdatamayreveal
thepersonalinformationofitssenderorrecipient,againstwhichtheSectionfailsto
providesufficientsafeguard.TheCourtviewedthelawasvirtuallylimitless,enabling
lawenforcementauthoritiestoengageinfishingexpedition,choosingwhatever
specifiedcommunicationtheywant.
Accordingly,theCourtstruckdownSection12forlackofspecificityanddefinitenessas
toensurerespectfortherighttoprivacy.
Section19authorizestheDepartmentofJusticetorestrictorblockaccesstoacomputer
datafoundtobeinviolationoftheAct.ThePetitionersarguedthatthissectionalso
violatedtherighttofreedomofexpression,aswellastheconstitutionalprotectionagainst
unreasonablesearchesandseizures.
TheCourtfirstrecognizedthatcomputerdataconstitutesapersonalproperty,entitledto
protectionagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.Also,thePhilippines
Constitutionrequiresthegovernmenttosecureavalidjudicialwarrantwhenitseeksto
seizeapersonalpropertyortoblockaformofexpression.BecauseSection19
precludedanyjudicialintervention,theCourtfounditunconstitutional.
CHAPLINSKYVSHAMPSHIRE

BriefFactSummary.ChaplinskywasconvictedunderaStatestatuteforcallingaCity
MarshalaGoddamnedracketeerandadamnedfascistinapublicplace.
SynopsisofRuleofLaw.FightingwordsarenotentitledtoprotectionundertheFirst
AmendmentoftheUnitedStatesConstitution(Constitution)
Facts.ANewHampshirestatuteprohibitedanypersonfromaddressinganyoffensive,
derisiveorannoyingwordtoanyotherperson whoisonanystreetorpublicplaceor
calling him by any derisive name. Chaplinsky, a Jehovahs Witness, called a City
MarshalaGoddamnedracketeerandadamnedfascistinapublicplaceandwas
thereforearrestedandconvictedunderthestatute.
Issue.DidthestatuteortheapplicationofthestatutetoChaplinskyscommentsviolate
hisfreespeechrightsundertheFirstAmendmentoftheConstitution?
Held.No.Thelowercourtisaffirmed.
ConsideringthepurposeoftheFirstAmendmentoftheConstitution,itisobviousthatthe
righttofreespeechisnotabsoluteunderallcircumstances.Therearesomenarrowly
definedclassesofspeechthathaveneverbeenprotectedbytheFirstAmendmentofthe
Constitution.Theseincludefightingwords,wordsthatinflictinjuryortendtoexcitean
immediatebreachofthepeace.Suchwordsareofsuchlittleexpositionalorsocialvalue
thatanybenefittheymightproduceisfaroutweighedbytheircostsonsocialinterestsin
orderandmorality.
Thestatuteatissueisnarrowlydrawntodefineandpunishspecificconductlyingwithin
thedomainofgovernmentpower.Moreover,theSupremeCourtofNewHampshire,
whichistheultimatearbiterofthemeaningsofNewHampshirelaw,hasdefinedthe
Statuteasapplyingonlytofightingwords.Therefore,theStatutedoesnot
unconstitutionallyimpingeupontherightoffreespeech.
Discussion.Byholdingthatfightingwordsarenotprotectedformsofspeechthe
SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates(SupremeCourt)announcedarareformofcontent
basedrestrictiononspeechthatispermissible.Thestudentshouldconsiderwhat
characteristicsdistinguishafightwordfromabonafidecriticism.Onedifferencemay
lieinthespeakersintent.Fightingwordsareintendedtoinflictharm,bonafide
criticismsareintendedtocommunicateideas.Anotherdifferencemaylieinthediffering
likelyeffectsofeach:fightingwordsarelikelytoprovoketheaveragepersonto
violencewhilebonafidecriticismsarenot.
MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 135306, Jan. 28, 2003
FACTS: Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local
federation of more than 70 Muslim religious organizations, filed a
complaint for damages against MVRS Publications, Inc., arising from an
article, which reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?

Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi

kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito
kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa
tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila
ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na
tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
ISSUE:

W/N this is an action for defamation (libel) or an emotional distress tort

action
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that there is no cause of action for
defamation.
DEFAMATION DEFINED:
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of
injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and
malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to
diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or
to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the
publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or
reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation
is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which
others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.
GROUP LIBEL/DEFAMATION:
where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or
class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or allembracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can
prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so
that he can bring the action separately, if need be.
The statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not
specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were
purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication.
Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social
censure pointedly resulting in damages.

The action likewise is not for emotional distress.

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS v. DEFAMATION:
Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e.,
it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his
emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. It has no
application in the instant case since no particular individual was
identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage
caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle
of relational harm which includes harm to social relationships in the
community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the
principle of reactive harm which includes injuries to individual
emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress.
In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the
standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in
propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim
communities in the country. It is thus beyond cavil that the present
case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort
actions for defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on
which the concept of emotional distress properly belongs.
WHEN PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER:
To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff
must show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in
reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The
plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must
have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten
the plaintiff.
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction
such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger,
disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock,
fright, horror, and chagrin. "Severe emotional distress," in some
jurisdictions, refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or
mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by
professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress disorder,

neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia. The plaintiff is

required to show, among other things, that he or she has suffered
emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be
expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the
cause of action, not simply a matter of damages.
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than
mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does
not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of
outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and
required to be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough
language, and to occasional acts and words that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the
other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt,
is not enough.
(3) Interferences with Contractual Relations
Art. 1314: Any third person who induces another to violate his contract
shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
MILLER VS CALIFORNIA
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Millers (Defendant) conviction for mailing
advertisementsforadultbookstounwillingrecipientswasvacatedandremandedinan
efforttoshifttheburdenofobscenitydeterminationstothestateandlocalcourts.
SynopsisofRuleofLaw.Indeterminingwhetherspeechisobscene,thebasicguidelines
forthetrieroffactmustbe:(a)whethertheaverageperson,applyingcontemporary
communitystandardswouldfindthematerial,takenasawhole,appealstotheprurient
interestofsex,(b)whethertheworkdepictsordescribes,inapatentlyoffensiveway,
sexualconductspecificallydefinedbytheapplicablestatelaw,and(c)whetherthework,
takenasawhole,lacksseriousliteracy,artistic,political,orscientificvalue.
Facts. The Defendant was convicted under the California Penal Code for mailing
advertisementsforadultmaterialtononsolicitingrecipients.
Issue.Whetherstatestatutesmayregulateobscenematerialwithoutlimits?
Held.No.Judgmentofthelowercourtvacatedandremandedforfurtherproceedings.In
determiningwhetherspeechisobscene,thebasicguidelinesforthetrieroffactmustbe:
(a)whethertheaverageperson,applyingcontemporarycommunitystandardswould
findthematerial,takenasawhole,appealstotheprurientinterestofsex,(b)whetherthe

work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically

definedbytheapplicablestatelaw,and(c)whetherthework,taken asawhole,lacks
seriousliteracy,artistic,political,orscientificvalue.TheSupremeCourtoftheUntied
States(SupremeCourt)doesnotadoptasaconstitutionalstandardtheutterlywithout
redeemingsocialvaluetest.Ifastatelawthatregulatesobscenematerialisthuslimited,
aswrittenorconstrued,FirstAmendmentconstitutionalvaluesareadequatelyprotected
by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of
constitutionalclaimswhennecess
ary.
Dissent.Tosendmentojailforviolatingstandardsthattheycannotunderstanddueto
vagueness,deniesthemofdueprocess.
Thestatuteinquestionisoverbroadandthus,unconstitutional.
PITA VS CA
FACTS: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Ramon
Bagatsng, policemen seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic, and indecent and later burned the seized materials in
public. Among the publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy
Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. After
his injunctive relief was dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected
by CA, he seeks review with SC, invoking the guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure.
Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal
HELD: YES. It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only
through a judicial warrant , otherwise, they become unreasonable and
subject to challenge. In Burgos v Chief of Staff (133 SCRA 800) , the
SC countermanded the orders of the RTC authorizing the serach of the
premises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila Dailies,
by reason of a defective warrant. There is a greater reason in this case
to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a
warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an
obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a political case,
because speech is speech, whether political or "obscene". The
authorities must apply for the issuance of the a search warrant from
the judge , if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order. They must
convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
"obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive

enough to warrant State interference and action. The judge must

determine WON the same are indeed "obscene": the question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's sound discretion.
If probable cause exist, a search warrant will issue.
PITA vs CA
FACTS:
An anti-smut campaign initiated by the Mayor of City of Manila, Ramon
Bagatsing, seized & confiscated from dealers, distributors, news stand
owners and peddlers along sidewalks, magazines, publications and
other reading materials believe to be obscene, pornographic and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at University
belt along CM Recto Avenue. Among the publications seized, and later
burned was Pinoy Playboy magazines and Co-edited by plaintiff Leo
Pita.
Pita assailed, Preliminary Injunction, as to whether or not the
defendants and or their agents can without a Court order confiscate or
seize plaintiffs magazine before any judicial finding is made on which is
said may be obscene or not.
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED, reversed & set-aside.
RATIONALE:
TEST OF OBSCENITY (PEOPLE vs KOTTINGER)
1.
Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to
deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged
is being obscene may fall.
2.
Those that shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an
indecency
PASEI vs DRILON (Definition of Police Power)
State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote GENERAL WELFARE
PROCEDURE (OBSCENE MATERIALS)
1.
The authorities must apply for the issuance of a Search Warrant
from a Judge, in in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
2.
The authorities must convince the Court that the materials sought
to be seized are obscene, and pose a CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
of an evil substantive enough to warrant a State interference and
action;

3.
The Judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed
obscene the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and
on his hands sound discretion;
4.
If, in the opinion of the Court, probable cause exists, it may issue
the Search Warrant;
5.
Paper suit, Article 201;
6.
Any conviction is subject to appeal
NEWYORK VS FERBER
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Ferber (Respondent), was convicted of
distributingchildpornographyinviolationofNewYorkstatelaw.
SynopsisofRuleofLaw.Childpornographyisobscenewithoutexception.
Facts.Useofchildreninpornographicmaterialshasincreasedovertheyearscausingthe
introduction of many state laws prohibiting such activity. The Respondent was a
storeownerwhosoldmaterialshowingchildrenundertheageof16engagedinsexual
activities.
Issue.Ischildpornographyaformofobscenitythatmaybeconstitutionallyrestricted?
Held. Yes. The prohibition on the sale and distribution of child pornography is
constitutionalevenifthematerialisnotobscene.
Distributionofthesematerialsisintrinsicallyrelatedtochildabuse.
Advertisingandsellingthesetypesofmaterialsprovideaneconomicmotivetoengagein
illegalactivity.
Thevalueofshowingchildrenengagedinsexisdeminimis.
Concurrence.Itispossibleforsomedepictionsofchildsexactstohaveseriousliterary,
artistic,scientificormedicalvalue.
Discussion.Theselawsprotectthechildrenfrombeingexploitedandabused.This
protectionofchildrenisalegitimatestateinterestthatoutweighsanadultsfreedomto
enjoysexuallyexplicitmaterial.
RENOVSAMERICANCIVILAUTHORITIES
Brief Fact Summary. Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA)thatcriminalizedprovidingobscenematerialstominorsbyontheinternetwere
heldunconstitutionalbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates(SupremeCourt).
SynopsisofRuleofLaw.Whereacontentbasedblanketrestrictiononspeechisoverly
broadbyprohibitingprotectedspeechaswellasunprotectedspeech,suchrestrictionis
unconstitutional.
Facts. At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to protect
minorsfromindecentandpatentlyoffensivecommunicationsontheInternet.The
DistrictCourtmadeextensivefindingsoffactabouttheInternetandtheCDA.Itheldthat

thestatuteabridgesthefreedomofspeechprotectedbytheFirstAmendmentofthe
UnitedStatesConstitution(Constitution).
Issue.WhetherthetwoCDAstatutoryprovisionsatissueareconstitutional?
Held.No.JudgmentoftheDistrictCourtaffirmed.UndertheCDA,neitherparents
consentnortheirparticipationwouldavoidapplicationofthestatute.TheCDAfailsto
provide any definition of indecent and omits any requirement that the patently
offensivemateriallackseriousliterary,artistic,politicalorscientificvalue.Further,the
CDAs broad categorical prohibitions are not limited to particular times and are not
dependentonanyevaluationbyanagencyfamiliarwiththeuniquecharacteristicsofthe
Internet. CDA applies to the entire universe of the cyberspace. Thus, the CDA is a
contentbasedblanketrestrictiononspeech,assuch,cannotbeproperlyanalyzedasa
formoftime,placeandmannerrestriction.TheCDAlackstheprecisionthattheFirst
AmendmentoftheConstitutionrequireswhenastatuteregulatesthecontentofspeech.
Inordertodenyminorsaccesstopotentiallyharmfulspeech,thestatutesuppressesa
largeamountofspeechthatadultshavea
constitutionalrighttoreceive.TheCDA places anunacceptableburdenonprotected
speech,thus,thestatuteisinvalidasunconstitutional.
Concurrence.TheconstitutionalityoftheCDAasazoninglawhingesontheextentto
whichitsubstantiallyinterfereswiththeFirstAmendmentrightsofadults.Becausethe
rightsofadultsareinfringedonlybythedisplayprovisionandbytheindecency
transmissionprovision,thejudgewouldinvalidatetheCDAonlytothatextent.
United States v. Williams case brief
United States v. Williams case brief summary
553 U.S. 285
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was charged with one count of pandering
child pornography under 18 U.S.C.S. 2252A(a)(3)(B) and one count of
possessing child pornography under 2252A(a)(5)(B). He pleaded guilty to both
counts but reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the
pandering conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that 2252A(a)(3)(B) was both overbroad and impermissibly vague.
Certiorari was granted.
OVERVIEW: 18 U.S.C.S. 2252A(a)(3) included a scienter requirement,
specifically, "knowingly." The statute's string of operative verbs--"advertises,
promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits"--was reasonably read to have a
transactional connotation. That is to say, the statute penalized speech that
accompanied or sought to induce a transfer of child pornography from one
person to another. The phrase, "in a manner that reflects the belief,"
2252A(a)(3)(B), included both subjective and objective components.
-The phrase, "in a manner. that is intended to cause another to believe,"
2252A(a)(3)(B), contained only a subjective element. The definition of "sexually
explicit conduct" was very similar to a definition of "sexual conduct" in a New

York statute that had been upheld against an overbreadth challenge.

HOLDING:
The Court held that offers to provide or requests to obtain child pornography
were categorically excluded from the First Amendment and that the Eleventh
Circuit had erroneously concluded otherwise. The Court held that the Eleventh
Circuit's contention that 2252A(a)(3)(B) gave law enforcement officials
virtually unfettered discretion had no merit; the statute was not vague.
RULES:
The Court stated that "an offer to provide or request to receive virtual child
pornography is not prohibited by the statute. A crime is committed only when
the speaker believes or intends the listener to believe that the subject of the
proposed transaction depicts real children. It is simply not true that this means
'a protected category of expression [will] inevitably be suppressed,' post, at 13.
Simulated child pornography will be as available as ever."
- See more at: http://www.lawschoolcasebriefs.net/2013/02/united-states-vwilliams-case-brief.html#sthash.QyopJ9ms.dpuf