Freedom of Exp To Freedom of Religion

SABANDO, F.
CASE BRIEFS FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION
TELEBAP vs COMELEC Case Digest

Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs. COMELEC
289 SCRA 337
G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of
lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case
as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the
subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippinesaffected by the enforcement of Section 92,
B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall
be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations.
For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio
or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and
magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it
contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with
the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to
do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale
of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in
this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30
minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just
compensation.
Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves
and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the
grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and
television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers
and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without
merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print
media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that
they provide air time to the COMELEC.
SABANDO, F. CASE BRIEFS FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION
SWS vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and
release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on
the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any
clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results
through mass media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it
is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period,
and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital
to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
Social Weather Stations v. COMELECG.R. No. 147571May 5, 2001

FACTS:
On the one hand, Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveys in various fields. Kamahalan
Publishing Corp., on the other hand, publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper of general circulation and
features items of information including election surveys. Both SWS and Kamahalan are contesting the validity and
enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially section 5.4which provides that surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published 15days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
7 days before the election. SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the
national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan,
for its part, intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom
of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint
RULING/RATIO:
Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech, expression, and the
press. The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the
right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms
among candidates. Here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this section pass the
Obrient test for content related regulation because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types
such as editorials, etc.; and (2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest because the
interest can e protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment.
Note: Justice Kapunans dissenting opinion basically says that the test of clear and present danger is inappropriate to use
in order to test the validity of this section. Instead, he purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing and balancing
the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.
However, he failed to show why, on the balance, the other considerations (for example, prevention of last minute pressure
on voters) should outweigh the value of freedom of expression
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. September 13, 2001]

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER
CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR
SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners request for permission to televise and broadcast
live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as
one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and
the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash
between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the
repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any
party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his
trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the
impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger
massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada
contends that the right of the people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and
prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason
to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the
former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members,[1] the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the
Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices,[2] has resolved to order the
audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices[3] vote against the audio-visual recording
of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.
Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of
preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The
recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for
public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording
pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office
for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.[4]
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be
recorded in its entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held public pursuant
to Rule 119, 21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be included in the documentary except
annotations which may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings shall be
made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings are of historic significance. They are an
affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non
debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people
who have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual
presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes. The recordings will be
useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture
the sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the
proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts
of stenographic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings
will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of their roles whether as counsel,
witnesses, court personnel, or judges will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar
of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility
that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial - which, it may be assumed, is the concern of
those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will be addressed since the tapes will not be released
for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much
of the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trials can be served by audio-visual recordings without
impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v.
Capulong,[5] this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary
film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA
people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where
that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute
matters of a public character."[6]
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary record is made of the
proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and any
attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes clbres was made way
back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found similarly moving. An educational
television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and broadcast the
document in full, in four installments, several months after the case was concluded - concluded incidentally, with a verdict
of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in which the truth was
searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and burden of
proof, and the sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar good reasons. And yet the use of
television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of completeness
and consent, is an educational experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable
commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact on the
public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is now a desperate need.[7]
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of
the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions are
running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual
recordings of the proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby
ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in
its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule
119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual
recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of
scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the
Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under
pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are
observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously
with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National
Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE CITY OF
CAUAYAN, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT
Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of
its broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to
local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is classified as a commercial area. The radio station was able to
fully operate smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayors permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos
Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers
showing that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance
of mayors permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II
office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayors permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent
Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that
they did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of
Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio
station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before
Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no
permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors permit but both courts denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the
same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayors permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004,
enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayors permit to submit either an
approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural land or an
approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of
property from agricultural to commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed with
several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based
on the classification of property as commercial without objections raised by the respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the
property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled
that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood
to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.
Issue:
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels on the
grounds that the state is immune against suits.
Held:
No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its officials or agents, there is an
exception.
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and
may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public.
They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice
clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens,
and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel
may
be
invoked
against
public
authorities
as
well
as
against
private
individuals
Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the government official
whose acts are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the State, the Supreme Court have declined
to apply State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the
respondents that the Cauayan City government had previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for
commercial use. The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were
incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous recognition of
the property as commercial was wrong.
Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the Cauayan City government
that the property was commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none, that the local officials who
issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even
require petitioners to secure approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted
from prime agricultural land to commercial land.
Respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. Petitioners have been aggressive in
exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political
dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that respondents denial of the renewal applications on the ground that
property is commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and
suppress the latters voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court
of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby
GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately issue petitioners zoning clearances and mayors permits for
2004 to petitioners.
HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA,
petitioner,
vs.PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., LETTY JIMENEZ MAGSANOC, ROSAURO G.ACOSTA, JOSE MARIA
NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR., RAFAELCHEEKEE, and MANILA DAILY BULLETIN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION,NAPOLEON G. RAMA, BEN F. RODRIGUEZ, ARTHUR S. SALES, CRIS J. ICBAN,JR.,
respondents.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not petitioner is required to prove malice to beentitled to damages?
2.Whether or not the respondents are liable for maliciousand imputing statements to the petitioner?
FACTS:
1.Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the May 11, 1992 elections.
2.Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila
Bulletin)published the following story:
The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUC Dcandidate for mayor of Bais City
for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he
was officer-in-charge of the mayors office of Bais City. A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992,respondent
Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also came out with a similar story, to wit:
The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for
having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was
the officer-in-charge of the mayors office in the city.
3.On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as scheduled. When results came out, it turned out that
petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid.
4.Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the above-quoted stories, petitioner sued respondents PDI
and ManilaBulletin as well as their publishers and editors for damages before the RTC of Bais City. He alleged that the
articles were maliciously timed to defeat him. He claimed he should have won by landslide, but his supporters reportedly
believed the news items distributed by his rivals and voted for other candidates. He asked for actual damages of
P270,000 for the amount he spent for the campaign, moral damages of P10,000,000, an unspecified amount of exemplary
damages, attorneys fees of P300,000 and costs of suit.5.Respondents disclaimed liability. They asserted that no malice
can be attributed to them as they did not know petitioner and had no interest in the outcome of the election, stressing that
the stories were privileged in nature.6.On April 18, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner that the
defendants Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and Manila [Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation with their respective officers
are liable [for] damages to plaintiff:
1. As moral damages, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and the Manila[Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation are ordered
to pay P1,000,000.00 eachto plaintiff; 2. Both defendants are likewise ordered to pay an exemplary damage in the amount
of P500,000.00 each; 3. To pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000.00 4. And to pay the costs.
7.This petition for review on certiorari assails the Amended Decision dated May 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No.54134, reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch
44 in Civil Case No. 206-B, which had awarded damages to petitioner for respondents false reporting.
RULING OF THE CASE:
1. YES.
The news items derogatory and injurious to petitioners reputation and candidacy. It faulted respondents for failing to verify
the truth of the news tips they published and held respondents liable for negligence, citing Policarpio v. Manila Times Pub.
Co.,Inc. the news items lacked truth and fairness, they were not privileged communications.
2.Although the stories were false and not privileged, as there is no proof they were obtained from a press conference or
release, respondents were not impelled by malice or improper motive. There was also no proof that petitioners supporters
junked him due to the reports. Neither was there any proof he would win, making hisaction unfounded.
3.YES.
Petitioner argues that his cause of action is based on quasi-delict which only requires proof of fault or negligence, not
proof of malice beyond reasonable doubt as required in a criminal prosecution for libel. He argues that the case is entirely
different and separate from an independent civil action arising from libel under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. He
claims he proffered proofs sustaining his claim for damages under quasi-delict, not under the law on libel, as malice is
hard to prove. He stresses that nowhere in the complaint did he mention libel, and nothing in his complaint shows that his
cause of action had some shade of libel as defined in the Revised Penal Code. He also did not hint a resort to a criminal
proceeding for libel.4.PDI and its officers argue that petitioners complaint clearly lays a cause of action arising from libel
as it highlights malice underlying the publications. And as malice is an element of libel, the appellate court committed no
error in characterizing the case as one arising from libel.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as PRESIDENT
and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS, Petitioners,
vs.
DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B.
GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges
against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia,
Pilar Layco, and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f)
in relation to Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS),
in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, committed as follows:
That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for
Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;
That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and defiantly raised
clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005
from appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;
That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October
2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and
heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.
This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of
the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-SD), Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS Investigation
Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents requiring them to
explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not be administratively dealt with.
Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two others, submitted a letterexplanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005. Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained
that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former union
president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support, they were interested in that hearing as it
might also affect them. For her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a scheduled
pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate supervisor about it, attaching a copy of the
order of pre-hearing. These letters were not under oath.
PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service against each of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to
submit their written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt thereof. None was filed.
On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven (7) respondents
guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant
thereto.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were
not denied their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,
The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red shirts, to witness a public hearing cannot be
considered as constitutive of such offense. Appellants (respondents herein) assembly at the said office to express support
to Velasco, their Union President, who pledged to defend them against any oppression by the GSIS management, can be
considered as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right.
PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:
The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the act sought to be punished hardly falls within the
definition of a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted
activity of the respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the public service. Only about twenty (20)
out of more than a hundred employees at the main office, joined the activity sought to be punished. These employees,
now respondents in this case, were assigned at different offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite the belated claim
of the petitioners that the act complained of had created substantial disturbance inside the petitioner GSIS premises
during office hours, there is nothing in the record that could support the claim that the operational capacity of petitioner
GSIS was affected or reduced to substantial percentage when respondents gathered at the Investigation Unit. Despite
the hazy claim of the petitioners that the gathering was intended to force the Investigation Unit and petitioner GSIS to be
lenient in the handling of Atty. Molinas case and allow Atty. Velasco to represent Atty. Molina in his administrative case
before petitioner GSIS, there is likewise no concrete and convincing evidence to prove that the gathering was made to
demand or force concessions, economic or otherwise from the GSIS management or from the government. In fact, in the
separate formal charges filed against the respondents, petitioners clearly alleged that respondents marched to or
appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and
support for Mssrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises. Thus,
petitioners are aware at the outset that the only apparent intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to show
support to Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, their union officers. The belated assertion that the intention of the
respondents in going to the IU was to disrupt the operation and pressure the GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty.
Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, is only an afterthought.
ISSUE:
WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY SUPPLETORILY THE PROVISIONS OF THE
RULES OF COURT ON THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND FAILURE
TO FILE ANSWER, WHERE THE RESPONDENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS DID NOT FILE ANY
RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE FORMAL CHARGES AGAINST THEM.
HELD:
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents letters of explanation in response to
the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges. The
petitioners argue that there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed should have been
deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material averment in the complaint, other than
those as to the amount of liquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of
usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath.
According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court which reads:
SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration,
cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the
GSIS Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:
If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting
evidence, when requested, he shall be considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of
Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the
prosecution.
A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an answer merely translates to a
waiver of his right to file an answer. There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has
not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a suppletory character. Suppletory
is defined as supplying deficiencies. It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where
there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit
in case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.
Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this case, petitioners must
remember that there remain averments that are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are
immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint. Thus, even if respondents
failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and correct
in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget that even
in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the burden of proving,
with substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges.
SORIANO, Petitioner, versus MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD
Brief Antecedent
Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, a television evangelist, hosted the Ang Dating Daan, a popular television ministry aired
nationwide everyday from 10:00 p.m. to midnight over public television. The program carried a general patronage rating
from the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).
The Ang Dating Daans rivalry with another religious television program, the Iglesia ni Cristos Ang Tamang Daan, is well
known. The hosts of the two shows have regularly engaged in verbal sparring on air, hurling accusations and counteraccusations with respect to their opposing religious beliefs and practices.
It appears that in his program Ang Tamang Daan, Michael M. Sandoval (Michael) of the Iglesia ni Cristo attacked
petitioner Soriano of the Ang Dating Daan for alleged inconsistencies in his Bible teachings. Michael compared spliced
recordings of Sorianos statements, matched with subtitles of his utterances, to demonstrate those inconsistencies.On
August 10, 2004, in an apparent reaction to what he perceived as a malicious attack against him by the rival television
program, Soriano accused Michael of prostituting himself with his fabricated presentations. Thus:
.gago ka talaga Michael. Masahol ka
pa sa putang babae.
O di ba?
Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas,
o di ba!
O,masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan
ng demonyong ito
Michael and seven other ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo lodged a complaint against petitioner Soriano before the
MTRCB. Acting swiftly, the latter preventively suspended the airing of Sorianos Ang Dating Daan television program for 20
days, pursuant to its powers under Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree 1986 [1] and its related rules.
Petitioner Soriano challenged the validity of that preventive suspension before this Court in G.R. 164785. Meanwhile, after
hearing the main case or on September 27, 2004, the MTRCB found Soriano guilty as charged and imposed on him a
penalty of three months suspension from appearing on the Ang Dating Daan program. Soriano thus filed a second petition
in G.R. 165636 to question that decision. The Court consolidated the two cases.
On April 29, 2009 the Court rendered a decision, upholding MTRCBs power to impose preventive suspension and
affirming its decision against petitioner Soriano with the modification of applying the three-month suspension to the
program And Dating Daan, rather than to Soriano.
Issue Presented
This dissenting opinion presents a narrow issue: whether or not the Court is justified in imposing the penalty of threemonth suspension on the television program Ang DatingDaan on the ground of host petitioner Sorianos remarks
about Iglesia ni Cristos Michael prostituting himself when he attacked Soriano in the Iglesias own television program.
The Dissent
The Ang Dating Daan is a nationwide television ministry of a church organization officially known as Members of the
Church of God International headed by petitioner Soriano. It is a vast religious movement not so far from those of
Mike Velardes El Shadai, Eddie Villanuevas Jesus is Lord, and Apollo Quiboloys The Kingdom of Jesus Christ.These
movements have generated such tremendous following that they have been able to sustain daily television and radio
programs that reach out to their members and followers all over the country. Some of their programs are broadcast
abroad. Ang Dating Daan is aired in the United States and Canada.
The Catholic Church is of course the largest religious organization in the Philippines. If its members get their spiritual
nourishments from attending masses or novenas in their local churches, those of petitioner Sorianos church tune in every
night to listen to his televised Bible teachings and how these teachings apply to their lives. They hardly have places of
worship like the Catholic Church or the mainstream protestant movements.
Thus, suspending the Ang Dating Daan television program is the equivalent of closing down their churches to its
followers. Their inability to tune in on their Bible teaching program in the evening is for them like going to church on
Sunday morning, only to find its doors and windows heavily barred. Inside, the halls are empty.
Do they deserve this? No.
1. A tiny moment of lost temper.
Petitioner Sorianos Bible ministry has been on television continuously for 27 years since 1983 with no prior record of use
of foul language. For a 15-second outburst of its head at his bitterest critics, it seems not fair for the Court to close down
this Bible ministry to its large followers altogether for a full quarter of a year. It is like cutting the leg to cure a smelly foot.
2. Not obscene.
Primarily, it is obscenity on television that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech does not protect. As the
Courts decision points out, the test of obscenity is whether the average person, applying contemporary standards, would
find the speech, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. A thing is prurient when it arouses lascivious thoughts
or desires[2] or tends to arouse sexual desire.[3]
A quarter-of-a-year suspension would probably be justified when a general patronage program intentionally sneaks in
snippets of lewd, prurient materials to attract an audience to the program. This has not been the case here.
3. Merely borders on indecent.
Actually, the Court concedes that petitioner Sorianos short outburst was not in the category of the obscene. It was just
indecent. But were his words and their meaning utterly indecent? In a scale of 10, did he use the grossest language? He
did not.
First, Soriano actually exercised some restraints in the sense that he did not use the vernacular word for the female
sexual organ when referring to it, which word even the published opinions of the Court avoided despite its adult
readers. He referred to it as yung ibaba or down below. And, instead of using the patently offensive vernacular equivalent
of the word fuck that describes the sexual act in which the prostitute engages herself, he instead used the
word gumagana lang doon yung ibaba or what functions is only down below. At most, his utterance merely bordered on
the indecent.
Second, the word puta or prostitute describes a bad trade but it is not a bad word. The world needs a word to describe
it. Evil is bad but the word evil is not; the use of the words puta or evil helps people understand the values that compete in
this world. A policy that places these ordinary descriptive words beyond the hearing of children is unrealistic and is based
on groundless fear. Surely no member of the Court will recall that when yet a child his or her hearing the word puta for the
first time left him or her wounded for life.
Third, Soriano did not tell his viewers that being a prostitute was good. He did not praise prostitutes as to make them
attractive models to his listeners. Indeed, he condemned Michael for acting like a prostitute in attacking him on the
air. The trouble is that the Court, like the MTRCB read his few lines in isolation. Actually, from the larger picture, Soriano
appears to have been provoked by Michaels resort to splicing his speeches and making it appear that he had taught
inconsistent and false doctrines to his listeners. If Michaels sin were true, Soriano was simply defending himself with
justified anger.
And fourth, the Court appears to have given a literal meaning to what Soriano said.
Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka
pa sa putang babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,
[dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!
This was a figure of speech. Michael was a man, so he could not literally be a female prostitute. Its real meaning is that
Michael was acting like a prostitute in mouthing the ideas of anyone who cared to pay him for such service. It had no
indecent meaning. The Bible itself uses the word prostitute as a figure of speech. By their deeds
they prostitutedthemselves, said Psalm 106:39 of the Israelites who continued to worship idols after God had taken them
out of Egyptian slavery.[4] Sorianos real message is that Michael prostituted himself by his calumny against him.
If at all, petitioner Sorianos breach of the rule of decency is slight, one on a scale of 10. Still, the Court would deprive
the Ang Dating Daan followers of their nightly bible teachings for a quarter of a year because their head teacher had used
figures of speech to make his message vivid.
4. The average child as listener
The Court claims that, since Ang Dating Daan carried a general patronage rating, Sorianos speech no doubt caused harm
to the children who watched the show. This statement is much too sweeping.
The Court relies on the United States case of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica Foundation,[5] a
1978 landmark case. Here are snatches of the challenged monologue that was aired on radio:
The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. Those are the ones that
will curve your spine, grow hair on your hands and maybe, even bring us, God help us, peace without honor and
bourbonAlso cocksucker is a compound word and neither half of that is really dirtyAnd the cock crowed three
times, the cockthree times. Its in the Bible, cock in the BibleHot shit, holy shit, tough shit, eat shit, shit-eating
grinIts a great word, fuck, nice word, easy word, cute word, kind of. Easy word to say. One syllable, short
u. FuckA little something for everyone. Fuck. Good word. x x x
Imagine how the above would sound if translated into any of the Filipino vernaculars. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
the above is not protected speech and that the FCC could regulate its airing on radio. The U.S. Supreme Court was of
course correct.
Here, however, there is no question that Soriano attacked Michael, using figure of speech, at past 10:00 in the evening,
not at 2:00 in the afternoon. The average Filipino child would have been long in bed by the
time Ang Dating Daan appeared on the television screen. What is more, Bible teaching and interpretation is not the stuff
of kids. It is not likely that they would give up programs of interest to them just to listen to Soriano drawing a distinction
between faith and work or action. The Court has stretched the child angle beyond realistic proportions. The MTRCB
probably gave the program a general patronage rating simply because Ang Dating Daan had never before been involved
in any questionable broadcast in the previous 27 years that it had been on the air.
The monologue in the FCC case that was broadcast at 2 in the afternoon was pure indecent and gross language, uttered
for its own sake with no social value at all. It cannot compare to Sorianos speech where the indecent words were slight
and spoken as mere figure of speech to defend himself from what he perceived as malicious criticism.
5. Disproportionate penalty
The Court applied the balancing of interest test in justifying the imposition of the penalty of suspension
against Ang Dating Daan. Under this test, when particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order and the
regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of
the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented.
An example of this is where an ordinance prohibits the making of loud noises from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Can this
ordinance be applied to prevent vehicles circling the neighborhood at such hours of night, playing campaign jingles on
their loudspeakers to win votes for candidates in the election? Here, there is a tension between the rights of candidates to
address their constituents and the interest of the people in healthy undisturbed sleep. The Court would probably uphold
the ordinance since public interest demands a quiet nights rest for all and since the restraint on the freedom of speech is
indirect, conditional, and partial. The candidate is free to make his broadcast during daytime when people are normally
awake and can appreciate what he is saying.
But here, the abridgment of speechthree months total suspension of the Ang Dating Daan television bible teaching
programcannot be regarded as indirect, conditional, or partial. It is a direct, unconditional, and total abridgment of the
freedom of speech, to which a religious organization is entitled, for a whole quarter of a year.
In the American case of FCC, a parent complained. He was riding with his son in the car at 2:00 in the afternoon and they
heard the grossly indecent monologue on radio.Here, no parent has in fact come forward with a complaint that his child
had heard petitioner Sorianos speech and was harmed by it. The Court cannot pretend that this is a case of angry or
agitated parents against Ang Dating Daan. The complaint here came from Iglesia ni Cristo preachers and members who
deeply loathed Soriano and his church. The Courts decision will not be a victory for the children but for
the Iglesia ni Cristo, finally enabling it to silence an abhorred competing religious belief and its practices.
What is more, since this case is about protecting children, the more appropriate penalty, if Sorianos speech during the
program mentioned was indecent and had offended them, is to raise his programs restriction classification. The MTRCB
classify programs to protect vulnerable audiences. It can change the present G or General Patronage classification
of Ang Dating Daan to PG or with Parental Guidance only for three months. This can come with a warning that should the
program commit the same violation, the MTRCB can make the new classification permanent or, if the violation is
recurring, cancel its programs permit.
This has precedent. In Gonzales v. Katigbak,[6] the Court did not ban the motion picture just because there were
suggestive scenes in it that were not fit for children. It simply classified the picture as for adults only. By doing this, the
Court would not be cutting the leg to cure a smelly foot.
I vote to partially grant the motion for reconsideration by modifying the three-month suspension penalty imposed on the
program Ang Dating Daan. In its place, I vote to raise the programs restriction classification from G or General Patronage
to PG or with Parental Guidance for three months with warning that should petitioner Soriano commit the same violation,
the classification of his program will be permanently changed or, if the violation is persistent, the program will be
altogether cancelled.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism CounciL
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY CASES

Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed
by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue
that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a
clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause
as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion,
protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase
maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated.
As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to
be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy
resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue
of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5,
6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the
exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of
speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this
rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless
and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The
power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare
of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner
of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public
places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and
influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city
and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance
notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated preemptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID
and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum
tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
SUSTAINED
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 is an act ensuring the free exercise by the Filipino people of their right to peaceably assemble
and make petition to thePhilippine Government for redress of grievances and other purposes.
Historical Background
The law, also known as "The Assembly Act of 1985", mandates local government units (LGUs) to designate area with
territorial jurisdiction. This is in line with the policy of the state to ensure the free exercise of the right of the people to
address grievances to the government as an essential element of the strength and stability of the country. The law was
enforced during the martial law period under President Ferdinand Marcos.
Provisions
The law requires anyone who wishes to hold any rallies or demonstrations to secure a permit. However, the mayor or
official authorized to issue the permit must act on the application within two days, otherwise, the permit is considered to be
granted. If such mayor or official refuses to accept the application, the person applying for such permit may post the
application on the premises of the mayor's office and it shall be considered to have been filed.
Prohibited Acts
The law prohibits any unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person. It also
prohibits anyone attending the rally to carry any deadly or offensive weapon such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, bladed
weapon and the like.
Penalty
Any person found guilty shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION CASES
Estrada vs. Escritor , 492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006
FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man
who is not her husband, for more than twenty five yearsand had a son with him as well. Respondents husband died a
year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to
legalize their union.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right tofreedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is
the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract
or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus
the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo
that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal
of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her
right to freedom of religion.
Soriano vs. La Guardia

G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made
obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against
petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in
petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and within the
protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioners
utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the
MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly
asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a
subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship
character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent
language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few,
if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
Austria v. NLRC G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999
KTA: Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee is purely secular in nature because it
has no relation with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church, such affairs are governed by labor laws. The
Labor Code applies to all establishments, whether religious or not.
Facts:
The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner was a pastor of the SDA
for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were terminated.
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications form Ibesate, the treasurer
of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by
his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who
authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very ill to be able to do the collecting.
A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing:
1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;
2) Willful breach of trust;
3) Serious misconduct;
4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and
5) Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative as grounds for the
termination of his services.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for reinstatement and backwages
plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner.
SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the
separation of church and state.
2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against the
SDA.
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved here is the relationship of
the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship with
the practice of faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioners dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor
Code.
2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an employee which it believes is
unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria was expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.
Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.
Facts:
Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to
Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers
on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request.
Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating
respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged,
among others, that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as
halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA
the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption.
Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification
for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as
halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certificates.
Issue:
Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
Held:
No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food
product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By
giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the religious
freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to
accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification
for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as
halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certificates.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its
interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious
activity. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like
herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim
Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection
and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption,
properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.
Velarde vs. Social Justice Society , GR 159357, April 28, 2004
The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein
respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock
to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions .They alleged that the
questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion.
ISSUE: What is the standard form of a Decision? Did the challenge Decision comply with the aforesaid form?
RULING:
The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court. In general, the essential
parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment
of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive
portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases in
which controversial or novel issues are involved.
No. Counsel for SJS has utterly failed to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the
paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no
facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision. The Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it
relied upon for its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual
allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS
merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition
of which was beyond the courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and
final disposition.
Taruc Vs De La Cruz
FACTS : he antecedents show that petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro,
Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish priest, respectively, of
the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another
parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Floranos wife
belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs, thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano
being identified with his wifes political camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr.
Florano to another parish Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during
the town fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from
pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials
as a parish priest were in doubt On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from
the Philippine Independent Church Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32.
They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory that they conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners
expelled and excommunicated from the PIC. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without
trial thus violating their right to due process of law
ISSUE : WON the court has jurisdiction
HELD : The SC hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. "Give to Ceasar what is
Ceasars and to God what is Gods." upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily apparent that cases involving
questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always received the profoundest attention from the courts, not only
because of their inherent interest, but because of the far reaching effects of the decisions in human society. [However,]
courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having been found that, in a form of
government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not
allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature The SC agree with the Court of Appeals that the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization The amendments of the constitution, restatement of
articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine,
form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the
church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province
of the civil courts

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