G.R. No.

L-29658

November 29, 1968

ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner,

vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent.
The question for resolution in this case is whether a person who has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least
three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. The question calls for an
interpretation of the following provisions of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864):
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency
unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the
police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school
graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant
colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen.
Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a
provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila.
On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but
rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position."
Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post and called the attention of the mayor to section 4 of the
Decentralization Act of 1967 which requires the filling of a vacancy within 30 days after its coming into existence. Earlier, on September
5, he announced in the metropolitan newspapers that the position of chief of police of Manila was vacant and listed the qualifications
which applicants should possess.
The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a demand that the respondent include him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants
from which the mayor might appoint one as chief of police of the city. He contended that his service alone as captain for more than
three years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for appointment. The demand was contained in a letter which he wrote to the
respondent on October 8, 1968. The mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but the respondent refused to reconsider his stand. Hence
this petition for mandamus to compel the respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five next ranking eligible and qualified
persons."
The petitioner's reading of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 is, per his own phrasing, as follows:
NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless HE
(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning AND has served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR
(2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record, OR
(3) has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; OR
(4) any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain
and/or higher.
As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant colonel in the MPD since 1954, the petitioner's insistence is that he
falls under the third class of persons qualified for appointment as chief of a city police department.
In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act "to place the local police service on a professional level," 1 and contends
that a bachelor's degree does not guarantee that one who possesses it will make a good policeman, but that, on the other hand, one
who, like the petitioner, has risen from patrolman to lieutenant colonel "meets the test of professionalism."

Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's view still we do not see how the requirement of a college degree as additional
qualification can run counter to the avowed policy of the Act. On the contrary, we should think that the requirement of such additional
qualification will best carry out that policy. The fallacy of petitioner's argument lies in its assumption that the choice is between one who
has served long and loyally in a city police agency and another who, not having so served, has only a bachelor's degree. But that is not
the issue in this case. The issue rather is whether, within the meaning and intendment of the law, in addition to service qualification, one
should have educational qualification as shown by the possession of a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner invokes the last paragraph of section 9 of the Act which provides:
Persons who at the time of the approval of this Act have rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a provincial, city
or municipal police agency although they have not qualified in an appropriate civil service examination are considered as civil
service eligibles for the purpose of this Act.
In effect, he contends that if a person who has rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a police agency is considered a civil
service eligible, so must a person be considered qualified even though he does not possess a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish between eligibility and qualification. For the statute
may allow the compensation of service for a person's lack of eligibility but not necessarily for his lack of educational
qualification. Second, section 9 governs the appointment of members of apolice agency only. On the other hand, the appointment of
chiefs of police is the precise gravamen of section 10, the last paragraph of which states:
Where no civil service eligible is available, provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service Law and
rules: Provided, that the appointee possesses the above educational qualification: Provided, further, That in no case shall such
appointment extend beyond six months, except for a valid cause, and with the approval of the Civil Service Commission.
Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a member of a
police agency, it gives no such credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of police. On the contrary, by providing that a
person, who is not a civil service eligible, may be provisionally appointed 2 chief of police "[ p]rovided, [t]hat the appointee possesses the
above educational qualification," the Act makes it unequivocal that the possession of a college degree or a high school diploma (in
addition to service) is an indispensable requisite.
It is next contended that to read section 10 as requiring a bachelor's degree, in addition to service either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or in the National Bureau of Investigation or as chief of police with an exemplary record or as a captain in a city police
department for at least three years, would be to create an "absurd situation" in which a person who has served for only one month in
the AFP or the NBI is in law considered the equal of another who has been a chief of police or has been a captain in a city police
agency for at least three years. From this it is concluded that "the only logical equivalence of these two groups (Chief of Police with
exemplary record and Police Captain for at least 3 years in a City Police Agency) is the bachelor's degree."
Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in what capacity service in the AFP or in the NBI must have been rendered, but an
admission of the existence of the ambiguity in the statute does not necessarily compel acquiescence in the conclusion that it is only in
cases where the appointee's service has been in the AFP or in the NBI that he must be required to have a bachelor's degree. The
logical implication of the petitioner's argument that a person who has served as captain in a city police department for at least three
years need not have a bachelor's degree to qualify, is that such person need not even be a high school graduate. If such be the case
would there still be need for a person to be at least a high school graduate provided he has had at least eight years of service as
captain in the AFP?
The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to (the meaning of which is not in issue in this case), section 10 of the Act needs no
interpretation because its meaning is clear. That the purpose is to require both educational and service qualifications of those seeking
appointment as chief of police is evidence from a reading of the original provision of House Bill 6951 and the successive revision it
underwent. Thus, section 12 of House Bill 6951 (now section 10 of the Police Act of 1966) read:
Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a Police Agency. No chief of a police agency of a province or chartered
city shall be appointed unless he is a member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's degree in police administration.
Any holder of a bachelor's degree who served either in the Philippine Constabulary or the police department of any city from
the rank of captain or inspector, second class, or its equivalent for at least three years shall be eligible for appointment to the
position of chief of the police agency.

No chief of a municipal police force shall be appointed unless he is a holder of a four-year college degree course or a holder of
a Bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology.
Where no civil service eligible is available provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service Law and
rules, provided the appointee possesses the above educational qualification but in no case shall such appointment exceed
beyond six months.
It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood as requiring both educational and service qualifications that the following
exchanges of view were made on the floor of the house of Representatives:
MR. VELOSO (F.). Section 12, Minimum Qualification for Appointment of Chief of a Police Agency, provides that the chief of a
police agency of a province or a chartered city should be at least a member of the Philippine Bar or a holder of a bachelor's
degree in Police Administration; and the chief of police of a municipality should be at least a holder of a four years' college
degree or holder of a bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology.
At first blush, there is no reason why I should object to these minimum requirements; but I find such requirement very rigid
because it would not allow a man to rise from the ranks. Take a policeman who rose from the ranks. He became a corporal, a
sergeant, a police lieutenant. Shouldn't he be allowed to go higher? If he merited it, he should also be appointed chief of police
of a city or municipality.
MR. AMANTE. During our committee discussions, I objected to this provision of the bill because it is a very high qualification.
However, somebody insisted that in order to professionalize our police system and also to attain a high standard of police
efficiency, we must have a chief of police who has a college degree. The point which the gentleman is now raising was brought
up by one Member in the sense that a policeman who rose from the ranks through serious hard work, even after serving for
fifteen or twenty years in the police force, cannot become chief of police for lack of a college degree.
The gentleman's objection is a very good and reasonable one. I assure him that if he brings it up during the period of
amendments, I will consider it.
MR. VELOSO (F.). I am glad that the Committee will accept my amendment. My only regret, however, is that because I made
a number of proposed amendments, I will not be ready to submit them immediately. We should just limit ourselves to the
sponsorship this evening.3
Thus it appears that it was because of the educational requirement contained in the bill that objections were expressed, but while it was
agreed to delete this requirement during the period of amendment, no motion was ever presented to effect the change.4
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure. 5 It
is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance.
Parenthetically, the substitute measure gives light on the meaning of the ambiguous phrase "and who has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation." The provision of the substitute bill reads:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank
of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department
of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the capacity of captain for at least three years.
At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so as to make the
provision read:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank
of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department
of a city or who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.6

It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase, "who has served the police department of a
city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate
(both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the
legislative process the phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained.
Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was made by mistake, the writer of this opinion personally and painstakingly read
and examined the enrolled bill in the possession of the legislative secretary of the Office of the President and found that the text of
section 10 of the Act is as set forth in the beginning of this opinion. The text of the Act bears on page 15 thereof the signatures of
President of the Senate Arturo M. Tolentino and Speaker of the House of Representatives Cornelio T. Villareal, and on page 16 thereof
those of Eliseo M. Tenza, Secretary of the Senate, and Inocencio B. Pareja, Secretary of the House of Representatives, and of
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Under the enrolled bill theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito8 this text of the Act must be
deemed as importing absolute verity and as binding on the courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in Marshall Field &
Co. v. Clark:9
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the
two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in the form, the sanction of
the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bill which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, its authentication as
a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the house of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal
and independent department requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.10
To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that, when the two chambers of the legislature met in conference committee, the
phrase "has served as chief of police with exemplary record" was added, thereby accounting for its presence in section 10 of the Act. 11
What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that except for that vagrant phrase "who has served the police department
of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher" a high school graduate, no matter how long he has served in a
city police department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police.
Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who has served as captain in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for eight years
irrespective of the branch of service where he served can be Chief of Police of Manila, why not one who holds an A.A. degree,
completed two years in Law School, and served as Chief of the Detective Bureau for 14 years, holding the successive ranks of Captain,
Major and Lt. Colonel? Not to mention the fact that he was awarded three Presidential Awards, and was given the Congressional
Commendation the highest award ever conferred in the history of the Manila Police Department."
The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to concede its soundness, still we would be hard put reading it in the law
because it is not there. The inclusion of desirable enlargements in the statute is addressed to the judgment of Congress and unless
such enlargements are by it accepted courts are without power to make them. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put the matter with lucidity:
An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later
wisdom may recomment the inclusion.
The vital difference between initiating policy, often involving a decided break with the past, and merely carrying out a
formulated policy, indicates the relatively narrow limits within which choice is fairly open to courts and the extent to which
interpreting law is inescapably making law.12
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief of
police of the city of Manila. Consequently, the respondent has no corresponding legal duty and therefore may not be compelled
by mandamus to certify the petitioner as qualified and eligible.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No pronouncements as to costs.

G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974

HERMINIO
A.
ASTORGA,
in
his
capacity
as
Vice-Mayor
of
Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in
his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR
LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO
MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA,
PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as
members of the Municipal Board, respondents.
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers,
Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act
Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third
reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably
recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President
Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were
introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator
Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the
Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by
Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives
thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were
then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the
Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the
Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from
Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President
of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him

and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July
11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses
as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill
as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of
his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the
Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in
view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the
previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two
Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic
Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the ViceMayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7,
1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of
Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of
the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that
the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining order,
without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred
upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law
until further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and
Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on
the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United States Federal and State Courts, have been
submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar
question came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil.
Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been laid
to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be
appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M.
Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of
separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the
reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the
question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us,"
specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil
Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands,
or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the case of acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof.

Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding
officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, 3 to
signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or
rejection. 4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses.
Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such
that their absence would render the statute invalid. 5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the
power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary 6 There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill
where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed
mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. 7 Another case however, under the
same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The
authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by
the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the
sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in
the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of
the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity
with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the
judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other
cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10although they are silent
as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to
the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form
furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the
necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the
question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said,
by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his
signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated,
which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the
validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of
the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law,
be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State

Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully
enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to
have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed
out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or
absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether
or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is
not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to
inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text
sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a
risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed
and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding
such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE
POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary
restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
"constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and
transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996.
A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess,
Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he
was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a
vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C.
Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on
the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of
the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December
5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by
the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the
Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the
transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21,
1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as
certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version
abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word
"approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996
the world "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does
not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the
other versions.

Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have
announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts
relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word "approved" appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners'
principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules
embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De
Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in
submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the years or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion
in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112, 3 the Chair
deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or
ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, 4 the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's
motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII,
109, 5 the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a
privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November
28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker
Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a
reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed,
considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the
government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled
bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment.
Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is
not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill
doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of
the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three
readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A.
No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion,
were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends
that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of
Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection,
the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996
over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of
discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal
rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do
not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on
its head. In the decided cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked
by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.

10

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that
'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.'
And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may
be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that
some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the
power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence
of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of
the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any
business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of
the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a
failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by
the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each
house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and
independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but
when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the
legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed
from its own rules of procedure."
In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to
ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its
introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of
the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof, and which it or
they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house
concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law
punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the
suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read
or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any
rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon
proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of
the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons
for the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the
legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was
actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an
act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its

11

deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C.
151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each
House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does
not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The
above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question
in a case where private rights are involved. 18
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House,
chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of
that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade
without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government,
more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We
must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that
under Art. VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the
jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a
justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.
For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as
those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of
foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Court's function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it
thinks is apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules
of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII. 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query
to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved
for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: "There being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . .
. Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized
by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee
report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the members should have been taken. They say that the
method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report.

12

No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case such as this involving approval of a
conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the
Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approval was by no means
a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which became the Local
Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M.
Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is
concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if
somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor on his point of
order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is
not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the
Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is
approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that
motion is not presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here,
and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and
how many are against. 22
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and even more just. 23 The
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the
deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a
whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a
diagnosis of the problem." 25
Nor
does
the
Constitution
require
that
the yeas and
the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances; upon the last and third readings of a
bill, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. 28 Indeed, considering
the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the members by yeas and nayshad already been taken, it would have been
sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and
subsequent adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the
problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority
Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was
anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows.
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon
of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House
to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's
question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. 30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's
question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration of
the question. 31

13

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent
Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself
said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII. 1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not he concerned. To
repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of
a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for
the purpose of delaying the business of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for
in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e.,
petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that
day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea
did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but
not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the
conference committee report. 37
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and
the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this
doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the
enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to
determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses
that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass
a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute
verify and is binding on the courts." 39This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if oldfashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures.
They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature.
But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to
improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal
principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been
"surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis
than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared,
we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases
would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. 41
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI. 26(2) of the
Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42
In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress.

14

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad.
enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:

44

The

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary
of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate,
and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 45
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule
of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the
membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule
Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT
cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners
are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996
which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The
keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in
its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With
respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus,
in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the
most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that
rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of
time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal.
Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as
void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to
seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested
with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its
power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48 may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its
conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. 49
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 2009-23-SC

February 26, 2010

RE: SMOKING AT THE FIRE EXIT AREA AT THE BACK OF THE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:

15

We resolve in this Resolution the administrative case involving Atty. Brandon C. Domingo, Atty. Leo Felix S. Domingo, and Atty.
Emiliana Helen R. Ubongen (respondents) for alleged violation of (1) Section 6, 1 in connection with Section 1,2 of Office Order No. 062009 entitled "Reiterating the Ban on Smoking as Provided for in Administrative Circular No. 09-99 and Reiterated and Clarified in
Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A," and (2) Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of
2009, entitled "Smoking Prohibition Based on a 100% Smoke-Free Environment Policy."3
By 1st Indorsement dated October 29, 2009,4 Eduardo V. Escala (Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Security Division of this Court)
forwarded to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria (Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer) for her information and appropriate
action, the Incident Report5 dated October 29, 2009 of Gregorio Alvarez (Alvarez), Security Officer II.
Alvarez related that on October 27, 2009 at about 2:50 p.m., Roel Suyo (Watchman II) instructed him to proceed to the Public
Information Office (PIO) because some staff members of that Office wanted to report violations of the Courts smoking ban. At the PIO,
Atty. Dominadoranne Lim reported to him that she found one female and two male Supreme Court employees smoking in the fire exit at
the back of the PIO. She further claimed that she recognized them as court attorneys from the Office of Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta, but was prevented from ascertaining their identities when one of the lawyers parried her hands as she tried to take a look at his
Supreme Court identification card.
In a Memorandum dated November 13, 2009, the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) requested Atty. Lim to name and identify the
employees she saw smoking inside the Court premises and to give additional details on the incident, so that the Office may act
accordingly on the report.6 Atty. Lim responded with a letter dated November 18, 20097 where she narrated that:
On 28 October 2009, at around noon time, upon inhaling second hand smoke in the PIO coming from the fire exit, my officemates and I
discreetly went to the fire exit, and upon opening the door, were met with a strong smell of cigarette smoke. I heard people conversing
upstairs. I proceeded up a flight of stairs, and immediately saw outside the 4th floor door, three (3) people smoking, who were identified
later as Brandon Carlos Domingo, Leo Felix S. Domingo, and Emiliana Belen R. Ubongen. Incidentally, they were in an area
surrounded by stacks and piles of paper documents.
I also called my office mate, Erika Dy, who immediately showed up at the flight of stairs and saw the smokers. Moments after, office
mates Dennis Balason and Jay Rempillo also arrived and also saw them.
Later in the day, the three smokers, accompanied by Atty. Josephine C. Yap, came to our office for a meeting attended by, [sic] all three,
Brandon Carlos Domingo, Leo Felix S. Domingo, and Emiliana Belen R. Ubongen, and DCA Jose Midas P. Marquez, Atty. Yap and
Erika Dy, and myself. During the meeting the three categorically admitted that they were indeed all smoking in the fire exit that
afternoon.
On November 19, 2009, the OAS individually directed the respondents to submit their respective comments/explanations on why they
should not be subjected to appropriate administrative disciplinary actions and sanctions for violating the ban on smoking within the
Court premises.8 The respondents collectively filed their Comment dated November 27, 2009. 9 They contended that Alvarezs report
was not based on his personal knowledge of the incident; he completely relied on the account given by Atty. Lim. They also claimed that
Atty. Lim uttered untruthful statements against them to retaliate for the administrative complaint lodged against her. They pointed out
that while Alvarez reported that the incident occurred on October 27, 2009, Atty. Lim inconsistently maintained that it occurred on
October 28, 2009.
The respondents further alleged that they were not informed of the particular memorandum or circular they were supposed to have
violated. Nevertheless, they questioned the validity of the existing regulations on smoking within Court premises. They averred that the
salient provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A,10 particularly the implementation of smoking cessation programs within the
Court and the designation of smoking areas within the premises, had not yet been implemented. Similarly, they noted that Republic Act
No. 9211 (otherwise known as "The Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003") likewise requires that the appropriate places for cigarette
smoking be designated. Moreover, the respondents consider an absolute ban on smoking within the Court premises to be
unreasonable.11
In the Memorandum12 dated December 21, 2009, Atty. Candelaria reviewed the respondents assertions regarding the inaccuracies in
the reports of Alvarez and Atty. Lim, but considered it more significant that the respondents did not deny that they were the persons
found smoking in the fire exit. She also clarified that the facts contained in the reports consisted of violations of reasonable office rules
and regulations, particularly Office Order No. 06-2009, and Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of
2009. She likewise cited a Memorandum dated October 6, 2009, issued by the OAS through Atty. Ma. Carina M. Cunanan, declaring
that smoking is now strictly prohibited inside the Supreme Courts premises.

16

Atty. Candelaria found that the respondents acts constituted a violation of reasonable office rules and regulationsa light offense
under Section 52(C)(3) of Rule IV on Penalties of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 13 for which the penalty
is Reprimand.14 Nevertheless, she recommended that a WARNING be issued to the respondents, as well as a reminder that a repetition
of the same or similar acts be dealt with more strictly in the future. In merely admonishing the respondents instead of issuing a
reprimand, Atty. Candelaria considered that the respondents had never been charged with any offense prior to this incident.15
We agree with Atty. Candelarias recommendation that a WARNING issued to the respondents is sufficient. We appreciate Atty.
Candelarias submitted reason that this is the respondents first offense, and is in fact the first case in this Court involving smoking.
Separately from these reasons, we take into account compelling considerations that dissuade us from imposing the full sanctions on
the respondents.
The statute that actually penalizes smoking is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9211 or the Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003 16 which, in order to
foster a healthful environment, absolutely prohibits smoking in specified public places17and designates smoking and non-smoking areas
in places where the absolute ban on smoking does not apply.18Under this law, the Court is generally considered a place where smoking
is restricted, rather than absolutely banned. Exceptions to this characterization are the Courts elevators and stairwells; the Courts
medical and dental clinics; and the Courts cafeteria and other dining areas (including the Justices Lounge), together with their food
preparation areas, where an absolute ban applies. In the areas where smoking restriction applies, the law requires that the Court
designate smoking and non-smoking areas. Significantly, the law carries specific penalties for violations, ranging from a low of
a P500.00 fine for the first offense, to a high of not more than P10,000.00 fine for the third offense.19
In the present case, the respondents were caught smoking (as Atty. Candelaria found and we have no reason to dispute this finding) at
the Courts stairwell an area subject to an absolute ban on smoking. Thus, technically, a smoking violation under R.A. No. 9211 exists.
We note, however, that the respondents were never held to account for violation of R.A. No. 9211 and, in fact, had raised the question
of under which law or regulation they were being held accountable. In response, the OAS pointed to Section 6, in connection with
Section 1, of Office Order No. 06-2009; and Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 2009. 20 Thus, the
respondents never defended themselves against any charged violation of R.A. No. 9211 and cannot be held liable under this law
pursuant to the present charge against them.
Office Order No. 06-2009, under which the respondents are charged, covers absolute smoking prohibition areas greater than those
covered by R.A. 921, which include all interior areas of the buildings of the courts and the areas immediately adjacent to these
buildings. The Office Order still allows smoking within court premises (apparently referring to exterior areas), but such smoking has to
be done in designated places. Sections 2 and 3 of Office Order No. 06-2009 provides for the designation of smoking areas:
Sec. 2. Smoking Areas.-Court personnel who choose to smoke shall do so in open locations at reasonable distance (five or more
meters) from any building, enclosed area, or vehicle where smoking is prohibited to ensure that environmental tobacco smoke does not
enter the building, enclosed area, or vehicle through entrances, windows, ventilation or exhaust systems or any other means.
Sec. 3. Designation of smoking areas. (a) In the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals, their
respective Chief Administrative Officers shall designate the smoking areas in their compounds.
Compliance with the Office Order is enforced under its Section 6 on Administrative Sanction.21
Implicit, to our mind, in these provisions is that appropriate smoking areas should be designated to give full effect to the Office Order.
The smokers within the courts must know not only where they cannot smoke, but also where they can legitimately smoke.
Unfortunately, no designation of the smoking areas was immediately made. In fact, a clarificatory Memorandum dated October 6, 2009
states that "smoking is now strictly prohibited inside the Supreme Courts premises," since there are no open areas that are five or more
meters away from any building, enclosed area or vehicle where smoking is absolutely prohibited.
After the smoking incident involving the respondents on October 27, 2009, the Court clarified the interpretation of the issuances on
smoking to reflect the interpretation the Court believes to be correct. On December 15, 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the
Resolution directing the OAS to recommend smoking areas within the Court pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Memorandum Circular No.
01-2008A.22 In compliance with this December 15, 2009 Resolution, the OAS addressed a Memorandum to the Chief Justice
recommending two areas in the Court that may be designated as smoking areas: (1) a portion of the Taft side parking area in the Old
Compound; and (2) a space between the DOJ building and the front exit gate in the New Compound. In effect, the Court invalidated the

17

October 6, 2009 Memorandum declaring a total smoking prohibition within court premises, but it was not until February 9, 2010 that the
matter was clarified when the Court En Banc approved the OAS Memorandum to the Chief Justice on the designated smoking areas.
To be sure, the stairwell where the respondents smoked is considered a completely banned area under the Office Order and does not
need the issuance of any clarificatory smoking area designation. The lack of designation, however, raises questions about the status of
the Office Order and the issuances it seeks to implement (specifically, Administrative Circular No. 09-99, Memorandum Circular No. 012008A, as well as the related Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 2009). One of the questions is whether there can be
a valid partial enforcement of the Office Order.1avvphi1
Effectively, partial enforcement upholds that part of the Office Order that prohibits smoking in certain areas, but nullifies equally critical
parts of the rule that clearly allow smoking in designated areas. Stated differently, partial enforcement gives effect to the part of the
Office Order absolutely prohibiting smoking in certain areas, without implementing the parts that call for the designation of smoking
areas. An arguable objection to this manner of implementation is the badge of inequity that it carries, as it places a greater burden upon
smokers than that which the Office Order intended; without any designated smoking area, they are always at risk of running afoul of the
Office Order.
When the interpretation of a statute or a rule according to the exact and literal import of its words would contravene the clear purposes
of the law (in the case of the Office Order, to safeguard health and environmental concerns, while respecting the rights of the
individual), such interpretation should be disregarded in favor of a construction of the law made according to its spirit and reason. 23 A
laws raison detre must be ascertained from a consideration of the rule as a whole, not of an isolated part of a particular provision
alone. A word or phrase taken in isolation from its context might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended.24
Another point to consider is the reality that the Office Order imposes an administrative sanction on violating court officials and
employees. Thus, strictly speaking, the Office Order is a penal measure because of the punishment it imposes. The penal provisions of
a law or regulation are to be construed strictly a rule of construction that emphatically forbids any attempt to hold that when the
commission of an act on certain specific occasions is penalized, it should be penalized on all other occasions. 25 It is beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts to increase the restrictions provided by law.26 When Section 6 of Office Order No. 06-2009 sets out to penalize
only the act of smoking outside the designated smoking areas, but ends up penalizing the act in all the areas within the Court because
no proper smoking area has been designated, the rule is thereby expanded beyond its intended parameters.
The rule, being penal, must also be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the respondents and at the
same time preserve its obvious intention. If the language is plain, it will be construed as it is read, with the words of the rule given their
full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the respondents than it would if the statute were remedial. 27 The
strict construction of penal statutes against the state and their liberal construction in favor of an accused, defendant, or respondent are
not intended to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality, but to provide a precise definition of forbidden
acts.28
It must likewise be considered, still with respect to the penal nature of the Office Order, that not only smoking violators but even the
Chief of our OAS may have technically been in violation of the Office Order when she failed to comply with the duty to designate the
smoking areas within Court premises.29 As worded, Section 3 of the Office Order imposes this duty on the Chief Administrative Officer.
Thus, the Office Order casts a net wider than that which caught the respondents. In the absence of any Court action for the omission
under Section 3, so also should we not act at this point on other violations of our rule.
An aspect obviously absent from this discussion is CSC Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 2009, that was also allegedly violated.
The absence is intentional to avoid repetition, as this Memorandum is no different in its terms and effects from Office Order No. 062009; thus, what applies to the latter with due adjustments owing to circumstances peculiar to the development of Office Order No.
06-2009 within the Court similarly applies to the former.
Under the circumstances, in addition to those pointed out by Atty. Eden Candelaria and out of considerations of fairness that the Court
should exemplify, we believe and so hold that we should not impose on the respondents the strict sanction the Office Order carries. The
health and safety concerns that our smoking policy embodies, however, should not be lost on the respondents and on everyone within
the Court, smokers and non-smokers alike. Hence, we have to give the respondents the firm warning that the chief enforcer of the
Office Order the OAS, through Atty. Eden Candelaria recommended, while at the same time also warning everyone that this initial
lenient consideration is not apt to be repeated in future violations now that our smoke-free policy is complete.

18

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Brandon C. Domingo, Atty. Leo Felix S. Domingo, and Atty. Emiliana Helen R. Ubongen
are firmly WARNED and PUT ON NOTICE that a repetition of any prohibited smoking under the law and against our internal Court
policies shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189122

March 17, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as
may be required,1 is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt
has not yet been proven, in the "dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? 2 Bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at
trial.3
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused
who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. 4 An
accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously
convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. 5 Even if the conviction is
subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to

19

efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison. 6 On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in
protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant
prison time.7 Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight from
court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. 8 Under what
circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the
accused.9
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts
are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with
grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.10
The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.11
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. 13 It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that
the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised "with grave caution and only for strong reasons." Citing
well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care
outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner
failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his
health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention
while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.14
For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also
considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination
that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.15
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions
justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
The Issue
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a
penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision
of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only
be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

20

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal
under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the
adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years imprisonment
should automatically be granted.
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.
Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order,
such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16
Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application
for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present,
much less proven by the prosecution,"17 however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with
grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of
any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner
asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on the ground
that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of
a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to
bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively
lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners application
for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgmentbut it is such a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. 18Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion
must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.19 It must be

21

so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously
and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any
such implication or imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its
discretion. The denial of petitioners application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough
assessment of petitioners claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail,
the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate court did
not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or
fact.21 In this connection, Lee v. People22 is apropos:
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case,
even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts
findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure
as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not
only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.23 (emphasis supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioners Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is
imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely,
recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous
escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of
the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail;
undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz
D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules:
xxx

xxx

xxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20
years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20
years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be
granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.

22

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except
when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied.25 (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending
appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating26 circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other
words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself,
constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail
pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two
stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or
stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the
appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and
justice;27 on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the
exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial
to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke
bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail.
Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes
the established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all
situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a
situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of
whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance is
present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether
any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its "discretion" into
merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed
by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the
discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice." 28 Choice occurs where, between "two alternatives or among a possibly
infinite number (of options)," there is "more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision
maker."29 On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. 30 Thus, by severely clipping
the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all
instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory
effectively renders nugatory the provision that "upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary."
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must
necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own
view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter. 31 In view of the grave caution
required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment

23

if his conviction is affirmed.32 It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular case, such
as the record, character and reputation of the applicant, 33 among other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance
or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but
raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court. 34 In other words, a threshold requirement
for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable
issue.35 This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose
of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption
on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound, 36specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that
no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for substantial error.37
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio
alterius38 rule in statutory construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea
that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to "the following or
other similar circumstances." Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd
situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding
six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases
where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does
not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment must
be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not
exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious
offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious crimes?
Petitioners Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal
Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. After judgment by a municipal judge and
before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. After conviction by the Court of First Instance,
defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense which, under the law existing
at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter
of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the
time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
(emphasis supplied)

24

The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows:
The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right,
except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua,
shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that
the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc
lays down the following policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by
the trial court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he may be
allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise
pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial
court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph
shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial
court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of
his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal before his Court where the accused is still
on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from notice to the court of origin. The
bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered
by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as
the accused shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an
order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule
124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important
changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.

25

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period of
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:
a.

That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;

b.

That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

c.

That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional pardon;

d.

That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

e.

That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as
they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates
a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance
(predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to
the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion
perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge was not for
a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.39
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94
laid down more stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has authority to act on applications
for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the "tough on bail pending
appeal" configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. 40 Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant
to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending
appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex
abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the

26

circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration
of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United
States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated. 41While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it
nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that
judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending bail should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong
reasons.42 In fact, it has even been pointed out that "grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to
a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5."43
Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether
the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd
to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior
applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be
properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to
attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.44 (emphasis supplied)
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of
Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is "a matter of wise
discretion."
A Final Word
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. 46 From
then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending
appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of
the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial
determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the
deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing
in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus
may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction
invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

27

G.R. No. 186400

October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the December 10, 2008 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and
Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo
Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO
T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both
petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.

28

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting the Motion for
Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which
denied due course to Danilos appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September 19, 2006
Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that
he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of
abandoning him, the family home and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that
the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the
marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling
of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli 3 to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Courts Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA,
however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period
to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v.
Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT
CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE
INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE
"UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE
WORD "MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED
BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A
PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A
RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II

29

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.
MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even
involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision on its merits, still the same
cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the
marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both the
Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the
Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on
February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC
declaring their marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the parties who
were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15,
2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. 9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is
expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the
meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of
procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. 11 As a
corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to
prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.12

30

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that
the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as early
as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration is justified,
precisely because petitioners earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for
filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed its
motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course to respondents appeal and
denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts
should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas
City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our
judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every
party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal considering that what
is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our
Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.
The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

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