Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
org
EDITOR : Nikolas K. Gvosdev
• 1615 L Street, N.W. • Suite 1230 • Washington, D.C. 20036 •
• (202) 467-4884 • Fax (202) 467-0006 • editor@nationalinterest.org •
• one stored electronic and one paper copy of any article solely for your personal,
non-commercial use; or
THE NATIONAL INTEREST ( ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly by the The National In-
terest, Inc., with the cooperation of The Nixon Center. Contact THE NATIONAL INTEREST
for further permission regarding the use of this work.
E
ARLIER THIS summer, operations require advance planning and
Bagdhad’s mayor, Alaa Mah- substantial commitment of money and
moud al-Timimi, threatened manpower to succeed, so does the second
to resign over shortfalls in funding for in- phase of victory, commonly called “na-
frastructure rehabilitation, especially for tion-building”—known inside the Penta-
the city’s unreliable water supply. Recent gon as “stabilization and reconstruction”
rebuilding efforts were set back when activities. We echo Zalmay Khalilzad’s
insurgents damaged a key water main, point in the previous issue that we must
leaving two million Baghdad residents “move forward quickly on the twin tracks
without water during a week when aver- of reconstruction . . . building up local
age temperatures topped 100 degrees. capacity for the long term.”1
Iraq’s economy and infrastructure re- We can no longer treat “nation-build-
habilitation remain shaky, as do the se- ing” as an occasional emergency rather
curity situation and political transition. than an ongoing reality of the post-Cold
More than two years after a stunning War world. Since 1993, from Mogadishu
three-week march to Baghdad, the Unit- to Mosul, the United States has undertak-
ed States still struggles to consolidate its en six such operations around the world.
battlefield victory. Currently, 135,000 U.S. troops remain on
Warfighting has two important di- the ground in Iraq, at an approximate cost
mensions: winning wars and winning the of $50 billion a year. In Afghanistan, three
peace. The United States excels in the years after the Taliban fled, 9,000 NATO
first, but without an equal commitment forces and 17,000 U.S. troops are left to
to stability and reconstruction, combat secure the capital and countryside and to
victories can be lost. Just as initial combat continue the hunt for Al-Qaeda. The pace
of peacekeeping activities by the United
Brent Scowcroft is president and founder of the Nations and regional organizations also
Scowcroft Group. General Scowcroft served continues to surge; the UN deploys 66,000
as national security advisor to Presidents Ger- peacekeepers in 17 operations.
ald Ford and George H. W. Bush. Samuel R. Yet “nation-building” remains a con-
Berger is chairman of Stonebridge Interna- troversial proposition. The term still
tional, LLC, and served as national security carries negative connotations, conjuring
advisor to President Bill Clinton. They co- up memories of the interventions of the
chaired a Council on Foreign Relations Inde- 1990s and the contentious debate about
pendent Task Force that produced the report
“Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities”, 1“How to Nation-Build: Ten Lessons from Afghan-
from which this article is derived. istan”, The National Interest (Summer 2005).
D
ESPITE SOME welcome attitudes and policies. The Bush Adminis-
initial moves, the stark real- tration created the Office of Stabilization
ity is that the United States and Reconstruction at the State Depart-
today does not possess the right mix of ment in July 2004. And the administra-
skills and capabilities to stabilize and re- tion’s current plan to establish a “Stabili-
build nations. Stabilization and recon- zation and Reconstruction Policy Coordi-
struction operations straddle an uncom- nation Committee”, designed to develop
fortable perch between conventional war general policy in this area, is a welcome
fighting—the purview of the military— first step in tightening coordination.
and traditional economic development However, much more is needed. At
assistance—traditionally a civilian respon- the highest level, there must be decisive
sibility. Within the U.S. government, re- leadership to direct the proper roles of
A
NOTHER TOP reconstruc- is responsible for roughly $1.2 billion) is
tion priority is providing es- a relative national security bargain.
sential services, including basic However, demand for the UN to con-
infrastructure repair, which, along with duct stabilization and reconstruction mis-
security, is a necessary precondition for sions continues to outstrip the capacity
further economic rehabilitation efforts. of the institution. Troop and personnel
Though many governments and inter- requirements often exceed the numbers
national organizations have developed that member states are willing to contrib-
quick-impact programs to jump-start ute, while failed states spiral into chaos.
small-scale projects, the larger capital Among other steps, we believe the
construction projects are subject to slow UN should focus more on mission plan-
and cumbersome processes. ning, training and developing operational
A core problem is the donor confer- standards to improve interoperability of
ence process. While the impact of fail- national forces in a multilateral environ-
ing infrastructure is felt from day one, ment, recognizing that many missions
these conferences take significant time authorized by the UN Security Coun-
and effort to pull together. Further, once cil may be more appropriately led by
A
LSO CRUCIAL is develop- States to engage other governments, such
ing stabilization and recon- as Australia, India, Brazil and Argentina,
struction capabilities within to encourage broader peacekeeping co-
regional organizations. There is a press- operation in regions that have not been
ing need to increase the overall num- actively engaged on this issue. These and
ber of well-trained and well-equipped others have demonstrated significant ca-
peacekeepers. The large majority of UN pabilities in stabilization and reconstruc-
peacekeepers are now in Africa, and Afri- tion, and their skills and expertise could
can governments have the greatest inter- play an important role in encouraging
est and incentive to contribute to such more effective involvement by states in
operations. However, they also have the their regions.
greatest need for train-and-equip pro- In the end, however, the momentum
grams to enable them to undertake ad- for change means that America must show
ditional responsibilities. The Bush Ad- leadership and sustained attention to this
ministration has indicated it would seek question. We must take the first step by
an additional $660 million to train and getting our own house in order. In doing
equip peacekeepers through the Global so, the United States will be in a strong
Peace Operations Initiative, starting in position to persuade others to change.
Africa. In a welcome move, Congress Enhancing America’s capability to
funded the first year of the Bush Admin- conduct stabilization and reconstruction
istration’s proposal at $80 million. operations in cooperation with others
Beyond Africa, both NATO and the should be a top foreign policy priority.
European Union have launched initia- In failed states with ongoing conflict and
tives to develop stabilization capabilities. terrorist footholds, economic and politi-
At the June 2004 NATO summit, the al- cal improvements will never be realized.
liance vowed to improve its operational Where conflict has been followed by inat-
capabilities to better deal with challenges tention and unmet promises, violence can
such as stabilization activities outside its reappear and spread, and military advan-
traditional theater of operations. NATO tages can be lost in chaos and corruption.
announced that it intended to upgrade its The United States, with history’s
commitment to the International Security most powerful armed forces, need not
Assistance Force in Afghanistan, partly squander its victories with poor post-
through the introduction of provincial war planning. The United States can no
reconstruction teams (PRTs). PRTs, with longer afford to mount costly military
both civilian and military personnel, are actions and then treat the follow-on mis-
deployed to Afghanistan’s provinces to sion with anything less than the same
provide security for aid workers and assist seriousness of purpose. ■