O debate Socialist do clculo [verso traduzida da original abaixo]

O debate do clculo Socialist emergiu no fim do 19o sculo. Com a pobreza esmagando da volta
industrial porque a evidncia, os Socialists, Marxians e outros crticos do laissez-faire discutiram que
os mercados livres, tinham falhado de fato e que um governo benevolent com controle sobre os meios
de produo e de distribuio, poderia alocar bens em uma maneira mais eficiente e mais equitable.
Do clculo Socialist o debate retirou quando os proponents do laissez-faire discutiram que os
mercados poderiam alocar dos recursos melhor ou pelo menos no mais mau do que um governo
infinita sbio uniforme poderiam.
Embora o debate fosse eficazmente sobre durante o emergence da escola de Marxian, o debate formal
do clculo Socialist era primeiro discutido seriamente pelo economista Enrico Barone de Walrasian
em um artigo 1908 no Ministry da produo em um estado de Collectivist que seguisse acima em
Pareto (1896; 1906: p.266-9) para possuir speculations. Barone fz o argumento que, pelo menos no
princpio, uma economia socialist poderia fazer assim como um capitalista um enquanto os preos
devem ser vistos meramente como a soluo a um jogo das equaes em um sistema de Walrasian - se
estes estiveram resolvidos pelo governo ou o mercado era irrelevant.
Mas pde um sistema socialist realmente fazer mais melhor? A pergunta posed por Otto Neurath.
Neurath observou que durante a guerra de mundo I, os governos europeus funcionaram da uma
economia guerra que mantivesse a elevao do emprego, fluctations eliminados do negcio, etc. Que,
o feltro de Neurath, era devido ao fato que o governo lucr-no procurava durante a guerra e parecido
ser um organizer eficiente dos recursos e do maximization da produo para o esforo da guerra. No
podiam o mesmos ocorrer no tempo de paz? Neurath pensou assim que - com o benefcio adicional do
elimination do dinheiro em um sistema como os valores reais seriam suficientes se houvesse um
controle coletivo. Outros economistas de Marxian tais como Otto Bauer e EmilLederer, que foi
envolvido com o comit alemo da socializao no aftermath dessa guerra no era to adamant quanto
Neurath sobre o elimination do dinheiro, mas eles pensou certamente de que, particularmente com a
existncia da concentrao industrial, a soluo socialist era mais eficiente.
Esta pergunta posed pelo alfaiate de Fred M. em seu artigo famoso de 1929 AER e foi respondida
tambm no affirmative - sim, um estado socialist poderia ser pelo menos to eficiente quanto uma
economia de empresa confidencial - com o benefcio que em um sistema coletivo, distribuio inicial
da renda (ou o endowment) seria uma varivel adicional do controle o governo possudo que uma
economia de mercado no teve em sua eliminao. Que sobre o consumo? Maurice H. Dobb (1933) foi
mais mais e discutiu que o consumidor que o sovereignty era prprio overrated: se o governo
controlasse o consumo as well as decises da produo, no haveria nenhuma introduo do
inefficiency.
Os Austrians incorporaram a batalha abaixo com um cannonade por Ludwig von Mises. Em um artigo
1920 famoso clculo econmico na comunidade Socialist, Mises foi no ataque - discutir que fixando
o preo de sistemas em economias socialist eram necessariamente deficient porque se o governo no
possusse os meios de produo, a seguir nenhum preo poderia ser obtido para bens importantes
porque eram transferncias meramente internas dos bens em um sistema Socialist e no em objetos da
troca (bens finais desiguais) - assim eles era unpriced e daqui o sistema seria necessariamente
inefficient.
Mas o argumento de Mises foi interpretado erroneamente - porque H.D. Dickinson (1933) era rpido
indicar. Apesar de tudo, porque Barone e o alfaiate tinham mostrado, se ns virmos o mundo como um
sistema de equaes de Walrasian que necessidade solues, no h nenhuma edio sobre no
poder fixar o preo de produtos internos. A esfera estava para trs na corte Austrian, e era at Friedrich
von Hayek (1935) para construir um argumento. O sistema das equaes Barone e do alfaiate
envisioned, Hayek discutiu, requerido demasiada informao que certamente no estaria fcilmente

disponvel e os clculos seguindo (para milhares das equaes) seria demasiado difcil.
Similarmente, os incentives econmicos fornecidos em uma economia de mercado no podiam ser
reproduzidos em um sistema coletivo.
O Paretianos economistas, notvelmente Alfaiate (1928), Jacob Marschak (1923), Oskar Lange (1936,
1938) e Abba Lerner (1934) discutiram que uma economia state-run poderia pelo menos ser porque
eficiente - os planners fornecidos do governo usaram o sistema do preo como se em uma economia de
mercado. Esta, naturalmente, era meramente uma aplicao dos theorems do bem-estar de Paretian.
Alm disso, em termos prticos, uma economia de mercado pode fcilmente encontrar as falhas do
mercado (por exemplo da competio imperfeita, dos externalities ou dos custos da transao) que
impedem que o mecanismo do preo consiga um alocamento eficiente; um governo que ajustasse
preos como se em um sistema cheio-do competidor poderia superar isto e seria assim mais eficiente.
O argumento de Oskar Lange estava compelindo particularmente: os preos, discutiu, meramente
taxas de troca de uma boa para outra (ou, como Pareto (1906: p.155) discutiria, da um dispositivo
contabilidade em relao distribuio dos bens e sua transformao). Mesmo se ns o virmos como
parmetros para responsveis pelas decises, a seguir se esto fornecidos por um planner central ou
por um mercado irrelevant contanto que os gerentes de empresas de estado forem dados instrues
para agir como o custo-minimizers. A introduo de encontrar preos corretos e a estabilidade do
mercado eram notveis: deixar o ato do governo como o Walrasian mythical auctioneer procurarando por preos atravs do tatonnement. Alm disso, na introduo da falta de economias
socialist dos incentives, Lange reiterated aquele em uma economia de capitalista moderna, com a
diviso crescente entre a posse (acionistas) e os gerentes (CEOs, etc.), os incentives eram justos como
torcido (Lange apelado ao trabalho de vrio Institutionalists para este).
Friedrich Hayekrefinou sua posio em resposta a este argumento novo. Fz este em uma srie de
artigos seminal (1937, 1940, 1945, 1948, 1968) onde discutiu essencialmente que uma economia staterun no poderia conseguir uma eficincia mais grande no alocamento de recurso do que um capitalista
um pela maior parte porque a informao feita saber pelo preo-mecanismo de uma economia de
mercado era mais grande do que a informao todo o planner poderia possivelmente adquirir. Isto
conduziu sobre ao trabalho na informao e na self-organizao que dominaram a segunda metade da
carreira de Hayek.
Entre os resultados mais interessantes deste debate era o adoption, na Unio Sovitica prpria, das
tcnicas sugeridas por Lange. Isto conduziu ao desenvolvimento da programao linear por Leonid
Kantorovich que demonstrou que o alocamento eficiente em uma economia de planeamento requereu
eficazmente o mesmo do uso dos preos que em uma economia de mercado do competidor. Isto foi
descoberto tambm por Tjalling C. Koopmans em sua discusso formal da eficincia em um scenario
do multi-mercado. Em sua concluso, isso uma economia do collectivist poderia fazer no melhor do
que um sistema confidencial do mercado no mundo idealized de Walrasian - mas pde tambm fazer
no mais mau. No short, confirmaram o conjecture original de Barone - pelo menos na teoria. Os
Austrians prenderam sobre posio de Hayek no papel informativo dos preos e do problema dos
incentives.
Recursos

Clculo econmico do "" de Peter Boettke: A contribuio Austrian economia poltica "
Allin Cottrell e clculo, complexidade e planeamento do W. Paul Cockshott : O download
socialist do pdf do debate do clculo uma vez outra vez - CORDA, 1993 Allin Cottrell e informao e economia do W. Paul Cockshott : Uma crtica de Hayek
Do socialismo de mercado Borne-Lange por James A. Yunker, 1995, JEI
O debate econmico Socialist do clculo e a crtica Austrian do planeamento central por
Andrew D. Chamberlain

xxxx

The Socialist Calculation Debate

The "Socialist Calculation" debate emerged at the end of the 19th Century. With the crushing poverty
of the industrial revolution as evidence, Socialists, Marxians and other critics of laissez-faire argued
that free markets had, in effect, failed and that a benevolent government with control over the means of
production and distribution, could allocate goods in a more efficient and equitable manner. The
"Socialist Calculation" debate took off when proponents of laissez-faire argued that markets could
allocate resources "better" or at least "no worse" than an even infinitely wise government could.
Although the debate had been effectively on during the emergence of the Marxian School, the formal
"Socialist Calculation" debate was first seriously discussed by the Walrasian economist Enrico Barone
in a 1908 article on "Ministry of Production in a Collectivist State" which followed up on Pareto's
(1896; 1906: p.266-9) own speculations. Barone made the argument that, at least in principle, a
socialist economy could do as well as a capitalist one as prices should be seen merely as the solution to
a set of equations in a Walrasian system - whether these were solved by the government or the market
was irrelevant.
But might a socialist system actually do better? The question was posed by Otto Neurath. Neurath
observed that during World War I, European governments ran a "war economy" that maintained
employment high, eliminated business fluctations, etc. That, Neurath felt, was due to the fact that the
government was not profit-seeking during the War and seemed to be an efficient organizer of resources
and maximization of production for the war effort. Could not the same occur in peacetime? Neurath
thought so - with the additional benefit of the elimination of money in such a system as "real values"
would be sufficient if there was collective control. Other Marxian economists such as Otto Bauer and
Emil Lederer, who were involved with the German socialization committee in the aftermath of that
war were not as adamant as Neurath about the elimination of money, but they certainly thought that,
particularly with the existence of industrial concentration, the socialist solution was more efficient.
This question was also posed by Fred M. Taylor in his famous 1929 AER article and answered in the
affirmative - yes, a socialist state could be at least "as efficient" as a private enterprise economy - with
the benefit that in a collective system, initial income (or endowment) distribution would be an
additional variable of control the government possessed which a market economy did not have at its
disposal. What about consumption? Maurice H. Dobb (1933) went further and argued that consumer
sovereignty was itself overrated: if government controlled consumption as well as production
decisions, there would be no issue of "inefficiency".
The Austrians entered the fray under with a cannonade by Ludwig von Mises. In a famous 1920 article
"Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth", Mises went on the attack - arguing that
pricing systems in socialist economies were necessarily deficient because if government owned the
means of production, then no prices could be obtained for capital goods as they were merely internal
transfers of goods in a Socialist system and not "objects of exchange" (unlike final goods) - thus they
were unpriced and hence the system would be necessarily inefficient.
But Mises's argument was erroneously construed - as H.D. Dickinson (1933) was quick to point out.
After all, as Barone and Taylor had shown, if we see the world as a system of Walrasian equations
which need "solutions", there is no issue about not being able to price internal products. The ball was
back in the Austrian court, and it was up to Friedrich von Hayek (1935) to construct an argument. The
system of equations Barone and Taylor envisioned, Hayek argued, required too much information that
would certainly not be easily available and the ensuing calculations (for "thousands of equations")
would be too difficult. Similarly, the economic incentives provided in a market economy could not be
reproduced in a collective system.

The Paretian economists, notably Taylor (1928), Jacob Marschak (1923), Oskar Lange (1936, 1938)
and Abba Lerner (1934) argued that a state-run economy could at least be as efficient - provided
government planners used the price system as if in a market economy. This, of course, was merely an
application of the Paretian welfare theorems. Furthermore, in practical terms, a market economy can
easily encounter market failures (e.g. from imperfect competition, externalities or transaction costs)
that prevent the price mechanism from achieving an efficient allocation; a government which set prices
as if in a fully-competitive system could overcome this and would thus be more efficient.
Oskar Lange's argument was particularly compelling: prices, he argued, are merely rates of exchange
of one good for another (or, as Pareto (1906: p.155) would argue, they are an "accounting device in
connection with the distribution of goods and their transformation"). Even if we see them as
parameters for decision-makers, then whether they are provided by a central planner or by a market is
irrelevant as long as managers of state enterprises are given instructions to act as cost-minimizers. The
issue of "finding" correct prices and the stability of the market were remarkable: let the government act
as the mythical Walrasian "auctioneer" - searching for prices via tatonnement. Furthermore, on the
issue of socialist economies' lack of incentives, Lange reiterated that in a modern capitalist economy,
with the growing division between ownership (stockholders) and managers (CEOs, etc.), the incentives
were just as twisted (Lange appealed to the work of various Institutionalists for this).
Friedrich Hayek refined his position in response to this new argument. He did this in a series of
seminal articles (1937, 1940, 1945, 1948, 1968) where he essentially argued that a state-run economy
could not achieve greater efficiency in resource allocation than a capitalist one largely because the
information conveyed by the price-mechanism of a market economy was greater than the information
any planner could possibly acquire. This led on to the work on information and self-organization that
dominated the second half of Hayek's career.
Among the more interesting results of this debate was the adoption, in the Soviet Union itself, of the
techniques suggested by Lange. This led to the development of linear programming by Leonid
Kantorovich which demonstrated that efficient allocation in a planned economy required effectively
the same of use of prices as in a competitive market economy. This was also discovered by Tjalling C.
Koopmans in his formal discussion of efficiency in a multi-market scenario. In their conclusion, that a
collectivist economy could do no better than a private market system in the idealized Walrasian world but it might also do no worse. In short, they confirmed Barone's original conjecture - at least in theory.
The Austrians have held on to Hayek's position on the "informational" role of prices and the incentives
problem.
Resources

Peter Boettke's ""Economic Calculation: The Austrian Contribution to Political Economy"

Allin Cottrell and W. Paul Cockshott's " Calculation, Complexity and Planning: The socialist
calculation debate once again" - ROPE, 1993 - PDF download
Allin Cottrell and W. Paul Cockshott's "Information and Economics: A Critique of Hayek"
"Post-Lange Market Socialism" by James A. Yunker, 1995, JEI
"The Socialist Economic Calculation Debate and the Austrian Critique of Central Planning" by
Andrew D. Chamberlain

http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/essays/paretian/social.htm