Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

www.elsevier.com/locate/pragma

Some observations concerning mental verbs and

speech act verbs
Rumiko Shinzato
School of Modern Languages, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332-0375, USA
Received 9 March 2001; accepted 8 January 2003

Abstract
By adding further linguistic evidence (e.g., semantic, semiotic and functional similarities) to
the studies of Leech (Leech, Georey N., 1983. Principles of Pragmatics. Longman, London)
and Nakau (Nakau, Minoru, 1994. Principles of Cognitive Semantics. Taishukan Shoten,
Tokyo) on the relationship between mental and speech act verbs, this paper argues that
mental verbs (e.g., think) and speech act verbs (e.g., say) essentially depict the same phenomenon, which Dahl (Dahl, Osten, 1997. Egocentricity in Discourse and Syntax. Available from
<http://www.ling.su.se/sta/oesten/egocentric > calls internal reality. The dierence is that
mental verbs depict the internal reality still in the private domain, while speech act verbs
refer to the same phenomena made public (i.e., externally manifested). This paper points out
that this dichotomy relates to well-known epistemological dichotomies such as ego vs. nonego (Akatsuka, Noriko McCawley, 1978. Another look at no, koto, and to: epistemology and
complementizer choice in Japanese. In: Hinds, John, Irwin, Howard (Eds.), Problems in
Japanese Syntax and Semantics. Kaitakusha, Tokyo, pp. 178212), experiencing self vs.
observing self (Lyons, John, 1982. Deixis and subjectivity: loquor, ergo sum? In: Jarvella,
R.J., Klein, W. (Eds.), Speech, Place, and Action. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, New York, pp.
101124; Lyons, John, 1989. Semantic ascent: a neglected aspect of syntactic typology. In:
Arnold, G.D. et al., (Eds.), Essays on Grammatical Theory and Universal Grammar.
Oxford University Press, London, pp. 153186), S-perspective vs. O-perspective (Iwasaki,
Shoichi, 1993. Subjectivity in Grammar and Discourse. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam) and private vs. public (see Dahl, 1997 above). It then argues that such a
dichotomy also serves to dierentiate self- vs. other- addressed questions, and wish vs. command. That is, the same dichotomy cuts across the three major sentence types (statement,
question, and command). Therefore, it is possible to use this dichotomy as a new principle for
organizing sentence typology. In addition, this paper notes that this epistemological dichotomy
E-mail address: rumiko.simonds@modlangs.gatech.edu (R. Shinzato).
0378-2166/03/$ - see front matter # 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0378-2166(03)00002-X

862

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

is reected in the grammaticalization of the verb say and the semantic extension of the two
Old Japanese question particles ka and ya.
# 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Mental verbs; Speech act verbs; Internal reality; Private vs. public domain

1. Introduction
With Austins (1962) seminal work on speech act theory and Searles (1969) development and elaboration of it, speech act verbs have been widely recognized as forming
an established group of verbs which express illocutionary force in their rst person,
present tense forms. Accordingly, considerable research has been done on the semantic
sub-eld of speech acts, including classicatory studies, exploratory studies, (e.g.,
indirect speech act, politeness), extended studies on grammaticalization (Traugott and
Dasher, 1987), and Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) theory (Wierzbicka, 1987).
In contrast, the status of so-called mental, or psychological verbs has not yet been
established or investigated in a satisfactory manner. However, their uniqueness has
been recognized in studies of linguistic epistemology, subjectivity, and perspective
theories (see Kuroda, 1973; Akatsuka, 1979; Iwasaki, 1993; Quinn, 1994; Dahl, 1997).
It is general practice to discern mental and speech act verbs as two distinct verb
groups. As a result, very little eort has been made to nd any connection between
them. In this regard, Leech (1983) and Nakau (1994) are rare and important exceptions. Both studies argue that these two verb groups have semantic parallelism, and an
implicational relationship. More specically, they claim that a speech act verb is paired
with its corresponding mental verb in such a way that the former implies the latter. In
addition to such a relationship, Nakau (1994) emphasizes the dierence between the
two as follows: mental verbs do not assume the underlying you; whereas, it is essential
for speech act verbs to have that component (see also Nitta, 1991a; Moriyama, 1997).
Building on Nakaus studies, this study aims to elucidate the similarities as well as
dierences between these verb types. More specically, it claims that what makes the
implicational relationship possible is their semantic anity, in that both types of
verbs essentially represent what originates in the subjects mind (cf. Dahls (1997)
internal reality). This paper brings to light several linguistic facts to show the
semantic anity of mental and speech act verbs. As for Nakaus second point, the
presence/absence of you, this paper interprets it as a dierence in the manifestation
of the internal realty. It argues that mental verbs depict the internal reality still in
the private domain, while speech act verbs refer to the same reality made public (i.e.,
externally manifested). In support of such a distinction, this paper alludes to the contrast in the semantic extension of the two Old Japanese question particles, as well as the
grammaticalization of the temporal/conditional if clauses (tara/ttara) with/without an
incorporated verb of saying. Secondly, this paper illustrates that the semantic dierence
between mental and speech act verbs makes it possible not only to distinguish two types
of declarative sentences, but also serves to dierentiate self- vs. other- addressed questions, and wishes vs. commands. Incidentally, these three oppositions are those of

863

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

statement (declarative), question (interrogative), and command (imperative) in traditional utterance (sentence) typology (Lyons, 1977: 745); that is, the same semantic
dichotomy cuts across the three major utterance (sentence) types; therefore, it is possible to use this dichotomy as a new organizing principle of sentence typology. Thirdly,
this paper suggests the close parallelism of the notion of internal vs. external manifestation to well-known epistemological dierences such as ego vs. non-ego (Akatsuka,
1979), experiencing self vs. observing self (Lyons, 1982, 1989), S-perspective vs.
O-perspective (Iwasaki, 1993), private vs. public (Dahl, 1997), and waga-koto my
aairs vs. hito-goto other peoples aairs (Watanabe, 1991). Thus, it becomes possible
to situate the mental vs. speech act verb dichotomy in a larger theoretical frame.

2. Internal vs. external codication of internal reality

Following Searle (1969), Leech (1983) asserts that the categories of illocutionary force
can be reduced to a limited number of logical types. Adding rogatives to Searles original typology, he proposes the following ve categories, and further points out that they
map to the categories of psychological (mental) predicates as below in such a way that the
former meta-implicates the latter, provided the Maxim of Quality is observed (Table 1).
Similar remarks were made by Nakau (1994: 85), who notes that there is an implicational relationship between speech act and mental verb pairs, as shown below:1
(1) a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

I say/state/assert/claim/tell you (that)

I ask (you) inquire/question (wh-)
I promise (to do)
I order (you to do)
I conrm (that)
I deny (that)

I
I
I
I
I
I

believe (that)
wonder (wh-)
intend (to do)
want (you to do)
know (that)
doubt (that)

Table 1
Correspondence between illocutionary and psychological predicates (Leech, 1983: 211)
Illocutionary predicates

Psychological predicates

Category

Examples

Category

Examples

A Assertive

Report
Announce

Creditive

Believe, assume

B Directive

Urge, command

Volitional

Wish, (be) willing

C Commissive

Oer
Promise

D Rogative

Ask, inquire

Dubitative

Wonder, doubt

E Expressive

Excuse, thank

Attitudinal

Forgive, (be) grateful

Intend, (be) determined

1
Coincidentally, Traugott and Dasher (1987) claim that both English and Japanese speech act verbs
are derived from mental verbs. For instance, recognize was originally a mental verb (cf. cognize), but
developed the speech act meaning of admit around the 11th century.

864

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

Nakau maintains that the above relationships are corroborated by structural

parallels, as well as by the semantic proximity of the pairs. For instance, speech act
verbs (e.g., assert) and mental verbs (e.g., believe) exhibit structural parallels such
as having a rst person singular subject, an armative simple present tense verb,
indicative mood, and an active voice, as seen below:
(2) a. I believe that Gus is guilty.
b. I assert that Gus is guilty.
Nakau argues that the semantic anity between the two verbs is evident since in
order to declare Gus guilt in (2)b, the speaker has to rst believe that proposition.2
Likewise, one often asks a question about something, because one wonders about it.
Nakau believes that the same applies to the other speech act verbs. In his view,
speech act verbs and mental verbs are in essence the subjective expressions of the
speakers mental attitudes (hatsuwa shutai no shinteki taido no shukanteki hyoomei),
or subjective modality expressions. The only dierence, according to him, is what
each lexical item expresses: that is, whether it is a mental act (shikoo sayoo), or a
speech act (hatsuwa kooi).
In addition, Nakau remarks that speech act verbs always assume the existence of
the underlying second person you. He argues that it is meaningless to engage in
questioning, ordering, or promising, without assuming the involvement of a you.
In other words, speech acts, he claims, are, in principle, communicative acts, and
thus necessitate the existence of the second person. In his view, both types equally
express modality, but are dierent in their strength: speech act verbs express strong
modality, while mental verbs express weak modality. Although Nakau does not
mention explicitly how he measures the strength of modality, strong modality is
interpreted in this paper as illocutionary force acting upon the addressee, as opposed
to weak modality which mainly expresses the speakers subjective evaluation of the
propositional content.3
Neither of the above papers, however, dealt extensively with the question as to
why mental and speech act verbs map the way they do. The present paper argues
that their structural and semantic parallels are the consequence of their codication
2

Some may argue that one can still declare the same proposition without committing oneself to
the truth of the proposition. Though Nakau did not mention explicitly, it is useful to supplement the
qualifying phrase, the felicity condition being provided.
3
This view of the strength of modality conforms to the traditional Japanese linguistic view.
Traditional Japanese linguists perceive a sentence to be consisting of proposition (jojitsu) and modality
(chinjutsu), and predicative elements to follow a xed linear order of more proposition-like elements to
more modality-like elements. Haga (1954) further divides modality into two groups, one which denotes
the speakers attitude towards the proposition (juttei), and the other which expresses illocutionary force
directed towards the addressee (dentatsu). Between juttei and dentatsu, the latter comes after the former in
the linear order, and is thus considered more modality-like. These two types of modality may be considered to parallel the two types of modality expressed by mental and speech act verbs. Incidentally, three
domains identied by Sweetser (1990) as being represented by sentences seem to point to similar distinctions made by Haga as follows: jojitsu::real-world content; juttei::epistemic premises and conclusions;
dentatsu::speech acts.

865

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

of essentially the same phenomenon: the complement (X) of both I think X and He
says X is something which originates and is entertained in the subjects mind.
Adopting Dahls (1997) term, this very phenomenon presented in the complement
(X) is referred to here as the internal reality.4 The dierence is that mental verbs
depict the same phenomena (X) still held internally (i.e., thought or believed), while
speech act verbs refer to such reality already manifested externally (i.e., said). It is
important to note that what is at issue is only the complement (X), not the entire
sentence, I think X, or I say X. At the level of the complement (X), there is a
dierence as to where X belongs. The X of I think X can be uttered in soliloquy,
and thus belongs to a private domain, while the X of I say X is used only in a
dialogue, and thus is in the public domain. However, if the whole sentences are in
scope, both I think X and I say X in their entirety belong to the public domain.
These points are easier to see using Japanese examples, as in the following.
Nitta (1991a) notes that Japanese volitional expressions such as suru (will) do
(citation form) and suru tsumorida intend to do (citation form+tsumorida) show
dierent compatibility patterns with omou think and iu say. The verb yaru (a
variant of suru) can be used in soliloquy, as in (3a), but the verb ganbaru tsumorida
with the added tsumorida intend to, as in (4a), is only used in a dialogue.5 That is,
(3a) and (3b) deal with a private act (internally manifested); whereas (4a) can only
be a public act (externally manifested), which is why (4b) is impossible:
Ore wa itsuka yatsu wo nagutte-yaru6
I TOP someday him OBJ hit-give
I will hit him someday.
b. Sono toki ore wa itsuka yatsu wo nagutte-yaru to
omotta.
that time I TOP someday him OBJ hit-give
COMP thought
I thought Id hit him someday.

(3) a.

(4) a.

Boku wa ganbaru tsumorida

I
TOP try hard intend to
I intend to try hard.
b. *Boku wa ganbaru tsumorida to
omotta.
I
TOP try hard intend to COMP thought
I thought that I intend to try hard.

Dahl (1997) did not give the exact denition, except for the mention of this term as in the quote
appeared in Section 3.1.
5
The example sentences (3) and (4) are drawn from Nitta (1991a) with the added gloss by the author.
6
In this paper, the following abbreviations are used:
TOP

topic marker

COMP

complementizer

PERF

SUB

subject marker

CL

clause connective

INF

perfect auxiliary
inference auxiliary

OBJ

object marker

DIP

discourse interactional particle

NEG

negative auxiliary

QP

question particle

HOR

honoric auxiliary

EMPH

emphatic particle

INJ

interjection particle

866

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

Let us assume that (3a) and (4a) correspond to the complement (X) of a verb of
thinking such as omou in examples (3b) and (4b). When framed by the verb omou,
yaru in the complement is acceptable, as in (3b), but ganbaru tsumorida is not, as in
(4b). This dierence stems from the fact that (3a) can be internally manifested (i.e., I
think X), but (4a) can only be manifested externally i.e., *I think X is not possible,
as the complement (X) of I think X here belongs to a private domain.7 For the
same reasons, and in analogy with this, the complement (X), when framed by the
verb iu, X is a property of the public domain (I say X), as evidenced by the cooccurrence of (4a) with itta I said as below:
(4)

c.

Boku wa
ganbaru tsumorida
I
TOP try hard intend to
I said that I will try hard.

to
COMP

itta.
said

Thus, at the level of framing, the complements (i.e., the X of I think X and X
of I say X) are qualitatively dierent. However, if the entire contexts of both I
think X and I say X are considered, both sentences (3b) (i.e., I think X) and (4c)
(i.e., I say X) belong to the public domain since both can be uttered in a dialogue.
This observation is again consistent with the claim in the previous section.
To recapitulate this section, this paper makes the following two claims:
A. The structural parallel and semantic anity (i.e., implicational relationship)
between mental and speech act verbs are the consequence of their codication
of the same item, internal reality.
B. Both verbs are dierent in that mental verbs depict the internal reality still
held internally, while speech act verbs refer to the same reality manifested
externally.
These two points will be further elaborated upon in the next section.

3. Omou think vs. iu say

The two verbs think and say have been given frequent attention in studies of
evidentiality (cf. Chafe and Nichols, 1986), semantic primitives (cf. Wierzbicka,
1987; Onishi, 1997), and subjectivity (cf. Iwasaki, 1993). However, these studies did
not try to investigate any semantic connection between these two verbs. The present
section, therefore, focuses more on their semantic similarities and relatedness. In
7
Since complement X of I think X and I say X was dened as internal reality, this statement, (4a)
can be manifested externally might appear contradictory. As discussed in Section 2, the term internal
reality was adopted because it refers to the pre-linguistic phenomenon which originates in the speakers
mind. However, this origination does not preclude the possibility of its being communicated to others, or
being manifested externally as in (4a).

867

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

addition, it explores the eect of iu in the grammaticalization of the temporal/conditional clause -ttara, to show the external orientation of iu and the illocutionary
force it exerts.
3.1. Semantic and other similarities of verbs of thinking and saying
As Nakau pointed out with regard to English mental and speech act verbs (cf. Ex.
2), their Japanese counterparts also show structural parallels. Both omou think and
iu say take the complementizer to, and the propositional content as below:
(5)

Hannin wa
Yamaguchi da to
culprit
TOP
be COMP
I think that the culprit is Yamaguchi.

watashi
I

wa
TOP

omou.
think

(6)

Hannin wa
Yamaguchi da to
culprit
TOP
be COMP
Yamada said, the culprit is Yamaguchi.

Yamada

wa
TOP

itta.
said

There are three major complementizers in Japanese: no, koto and to. It is widely
agreed that no and koto take factive predicates, while to takes non-factive predicates (cf. Kuno, 1973).8 Since the verbs which take the same complementizer
generally share certain semantic features, the two verbs omou and iu are seen as
being equally non-factive, and equally non-committal as to the factuality of the
propositional content. This is a reasonable characterization; however, there is more
to the shared properties of omou and iu as regards to their semantic, semiotic, and
discourse functional anities than just this characterization. I will deal with
semantics rst.
The semantic proximity of verbs like think and say may be seen from the fact
that one single lexeme represents both meanings in some languages. According to
Ninomiya (1986), the same Chinese character (kanji), , was used for both think
and say in classical Chinese texts. In the examples below, the rst line represents
the classical Chinese use of , while the second line shows the customary reading of
the same kanji in Old Japanese.
(7)
ware omoheraku kiku
ha
hana
no initsu
naru
I
think
chrysanthemum TOP owers of hidden treasures be
mono nari. (Airensetsu)
thing be
I think that chrysanthemums are the hidden treasures among owers.
(Loving Lotus Story)
8
Actually, the story is more complicated than this. However, for the present purpose, no harm is done
by adopting this simplied version. For more extensive treatment, see Akatsuka (1978, 1985), Suzuki
(1994).

868

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

(8)
shoko ware
wo
kehu
nari to
ihite karugarushiku kitarite ware
lords us
OBJ cowards be COMP say readily
come us
wo
utan. (Shiki)
OBJ destroy
Saying that we are cowards, the lords will come readily to destroy us. (Annals)
In example (7), the Chinese word (i.e., kanji)
was translated (i.e., read) as
omoheraku I think, while in example (8), the same word (kanji) was translated
(read) ihite saying. Ninomiya (ibid: 75) states that if we change the subject of (7)
to the third person (he rather than I), then the same kanji, , should be read as
iheraku he says rather than omoheraku he thinks. This, according to him, reects
characteristics of the Japanese language, which draw a sharp line between mental
acts (shikoo no kooi) and speech acts (hatsugen no kooi), and in essence, the dierence between self (ji) and others (ta).
He also points out that the French verb, trouver nd, may mean both think and
say, as shown in the examples below:
(9)

Louis me trouve vicieux, je me trouve pire.

Louis says/thinks that I am vicious, (but) I think/*say I am worse than that.

An English colloquial expression, be like, which is gaining popularity among the

current younger generation in the USA might be yet another example.9 According
to the speaker of the following utterance (a 14 year old female), the expression was
like with I is a possible equivalent of I thought, while the same phrase with he
means he said, as in (10):
(10) He was like, She shouldnt take it out on Becky. I was like, She was just upset.
Thats all. But I didnt say it to him because. . .
It seems that the Chinese, French, and English uses suggest a similar tendency in
distinguishing the same lexeme ( , trouver, be like) between the two meanings, think
and say. The choice of one reading over the other seems to be bound up with the cooccurring subjects: with rst person subjects, the reading is think, while with third
person subjects, it is say. This situation recalls a familiar phenomenon in phonology,
that of complementary distribution, when we determine whether similar phones should
be treated as allophones of the same phoneme, or as separate phonemes. Just as phones
in complementary distribution are analyzed as allophones of one phoneme in phonology,
so, too think and say may be in complementary distribution as allolexemes. As for
the meaning of the superordinate lexeme, I suggest that it codies internal reality.
9
The Thai complementizer, waa used with both khit think and phuut say may be yet another candidate. According to Peansiri Vongvipanond, waa was originally a verb meaning state, or be of such an
opinion, and came to be grammaticalized as assertive embedded proposition marker. Likewise, Middle
Korean ho-ta is another possible candidate (p.c. Leon A. Seram).

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

869

Such a distributional tendency seems to be in eect even when think and say are
lexicalized as two separate entities. For instance, Ninomiyas statistical analysis of
Japanese dialogue shows that the verb think co-occurs predominantly with rst
person subjects, while the verb say tends to co-occur with third person subjects.
Out of 25 occurrences of think in his data, 23 have a rst-person subject. Similarly,
a majority of the 48 instances of say are coupled with the third person subject.
Although he does not give a concrete example, Ninomiya states that when say does
take the rst person subject, that subject is regarded not as the speaker, but as
the speakers alter ego. This is in line with Macaulays distancing eects in selfquotation (quoted in Maynard, 1996: 208), whereby the speaker presents himself or
herself as an actor in a scene.
A similar statistical nding was also reported in Dahl (1997). Dahls statistical
study of Swedish nds that of all the occurrences of tycka think with animate
subjects, 91% were with egocentric subjects (1st and 2nd person subjects). In contrast, only 55% of animate subjects occurring with saga say were egocentric subjects. Dahl (1997: 50) gives the following interpretation of such a distinctive
distribution:
This suggests that the standard way of communicating other peoples internal
reality in spoken discourse is by reporting what they say, rather than by stating
directly what they think. To a large extent, this is done in the form of direct
quotations (they arent necessarily verbatim, of course), but indirect speech also
occurs.
The structural parallel, the lexicalization of mental and speech act verbs as one
lexeme, and their complementary distribution with respect to their co-occurring
subjects seem to indicate the semantic anity of these two verbs. As Dahl states
above, the link is essentially found in their function of representing internal reality
(the specics of this term will be discussed in Section 5). Diachronic data which
attest to the shared etymological sources for mental and speech act verbs also lend
support to the semantic anity of both verbs (see Traugott and Dasher, 1987).
Next, as to the semiotic value of this internal reality, we look to Fujita (1999) for
an illustration. Fujita groups both think and say sentences as possessing quotative
structures (inyoo koobun). According to him, what they quote is essentially the same:
they are both utterances, the only dierence is that one is mental, the other spoken.
Drawing on Peirces tripartite classication of signs (i.e., icon, index, and symbol),
Fujita views what is quoted as an icon. That is, what is quoted is a direct transfer of
what happened in reality (jijitsu reberu de gugen sareta mono) to a linguistic expression; in this sense, the quote is iconic. Fujita considers the fact that Japanese
onomatopoeic expressions take the quotative particle to, as shown below, in (11), is
suggestive of this iconic nature of the quotative structures:
(11)

Inu ga
wan wan to
dog SUB bowwow
COMP
The dog barks bow wow.

naku.
bark

870

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

The iconic nature of quotative structures is reminiscent of the quotative use of

English like discussed above. Interestingly, Romaine and Lange (1991: 259) give an
account of English like which is remarkably similar to Fujitas account. They say:
Semantically, it is because like has the referential meanings of comparison, for
example as if, and so on, that it is suitable for use in a construction reporting
hypothetical discourse or thought. (emphasis added, RS).
Finally as for discourse functional similarities, according to Maynard (1996), verbs
of self-representation of thought (i.e., think) and self-quotation (i.e., say) in their rstperson, singular, present armative forms express what she calls a speech act qualication, such as mitigation, parody, and emphasis.10 For instance, compared with a
straightforward statement, the one framed in omou [example (12), example 2.3 in
Maynard (1996)], softens the force of the assertion, thereby creating the impression
that the speaker is not too brash, tactless, or domineering (Maynard, 1996: 220):11
(12) . . .sono yooni gorikai-o-itadakitai
mono da to omoimasu.
that way want to be understood thing BE QT think
I hope that you would understand it as I stated.
In addition to the mitigating function as the one presented above, self-quotation
expresses emphasis as shown in example (13) below (Maynards example 15.5), in
which the inset misenasai show it to me is repeated from the previous utterance,
and framed with the speech act verb say:
(13)

Misenasai to
itteiru n
Show
QT say
NOM
Im telling you, show it to me!

da!
BE

Having discussed the semantic, semiotic, and discourse functional similarities between
mental and speech act verbs, I will now turn to the question of grammaticalization.
3.2. Roles of iu in the grammaticalization of the temporal/conditional clause
Nakau claims that speech act verbs always assume the existence of a you and
express a stronger modality than do mental verbs. This section will substantiate his
claim, focusing on the role played by iu say in the grammaticalization of the temporal/
10

Maynard (1996: 211) notes that the study of quotation to date has focused on other-quotations. The
reason she chooses self-quotation instead of other-quotation is because the multivoicedness (i.e., the
quotees voice and the quoters voice) may be revealed in its most crystalized form in self-quotation. Since
the other-orientation of say was emphasized in Section 3.1, where the distributional tendency of say
with third person subjects was mentioned, the readers might nd such a tendency at odds with Maynards
study of self-quotation. However, the other-orientation is still persistent in self-quotation since the quotee
(I in the quote) is regarded as a dierent individual from the quoter (the speaker); the quotee is distanced
from the quoter (cf. distancing eect) and has a dierent voice (cf. multivoicedness).
11
This and the following examples use Maynards gloss and conventions: BE (various forms of the verb
be), QT (quotative marker), NOM (nominalization), O (object marker).

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

871

conditional clause.12 A case in point is the Old Japanese perfect auxiliary tara+the
conditional particle ba.
Hayes and Shinzato (2001) delineate this grammaticalization process as below:
(14)

1st stage
2nd stage
3rd stage
to (COMP)+ihi say+tara (PERF)+ba > to ittara (CC) > ttara (DIP)

At the 2nd stage, the clause functioned as either a conditional (if), or temporal
(when) clause connective (textual in the sense of Traugott, 1989), thereby conjoining the protasis and the apodosis, respectively, the two temporal clauses. However,
at the 3rd stage, the apodosis (respectively the second clause) was lost, and ttara
came to function as a sentence-nal discourse interactional particle (expressive in
the sense of Traugott, 1989).
Hayes and Shinzato (2001) further identify three discourse functions of ttara, as
below:
Attention Getter
(15) Onee-chan,
onee-chan-ttara!
sister-HOR
sister-attention getter
(In an eort to wake up her sister) Sister, sister!
Coercive Request
(16) Chotto, omoi-wa-yo.
Doite-ttara!
hey
heavy-DIP-DIP get o (me)
Hey, you are heavy, you know. Get o me!
Emphatic Statement
(17) Marude
kyoohaku
da
na.
Warui
koto
ja nai-ttara.
like
blackmail
be
DIP
bad
thing
be not
You know, you are blackmailing me (to tell you what I was talking to him
about). I tell you its not something bad!
As the authors note, the above sentences would be complete even without ttara.
However, ttaras function is, with the help of the embedded verb say, to make an
utterance into an explicit performative in order to strengthen its illocutionary force.
Since clearly, examples (15) and (16) are directives issued to the addressee, while (17)
is aimed at creating a perlocutionary eect in the addressee, the underlying you
fullls an indispensable role in the ttara sentences.
12
While the previous section discussed the similarities between think and say, the present section
turns to their dierences, especially in the grammaticalization paths of Japanese. One major such dierence is that in the case of omou, in contrast to that of iu, grammaticalization has produced compound
verbs (e.g., omoidasu remember, omoikomu assert wrongly) and nouns (omoichigai misunderstanding,
omoiyari sympathy), but has not yet become fully grammaticalized so as to become a clitic (Hopper and
Traugott, 1993). However, omou might be considered an epistemic parenthetical in the sense of Thompson
and Mulac (1991). For this view, see Moriyama (1992).

872

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

This external orientation becomes even more evident when ttara is compared with
its variant, tara, which originated in the same conditional/temporal clause connection as did ttara, but without incorporating the verb say. In contrast to the three
functions which Hayes and Shinzato identied for ttara (see above), the function
wish is characteristic for the tara variant; its use, as seen in example (18), serves to
illuminate the point.
(18) (Talking about her deceased father in soliloquy)
Okite kite,
Ohayoo,
Chie
tte itte-kure-tara. . .
Getting up
good morning
Q say-give
(It would be nice) if my father would get up and say, Good morning, Chie.
Compared to examples (15)(17), in which the speech acts illocutionary force is
directed towards the addressee, example (18) only expresses the speakers wish. It is
in this sense that ttara, with the incorporated speech act verb of saying, is considered to have a stronger modality than tara, which does not incorporate the verb
say.
The tara vs. ttara contrast can also be seen with regard to the hedging verbs the two
variants take. The ttara examples (15)(17) do not allow the embedding in a verb of
thinking, while the tara example (18) can readily be embedded in think as in (19):
(19) Okite kite, Ohayoo,
Chie tte itte kure-tara to
omou kedo
Getting up good morning
Q say-give
COMP think but
I think that (it would be nice) if my father would get up and say, Good
morning, Chie.
Consonant with the claim that the complement (X) of omou think has to be a
private act, executed in soliloquy, only a tara sentence as in (18) is compatible with
omou. The incompatibility of ttara with omou is expected, because the ttara sentences are public acts that can be embedded in the verb iu say. Given these facts, it
is evident that tara is in line with mental verbs, while ttara may be grouped together
with speech act verbs.13 Furthermore, example (19), on the one hand, and examples
(15)(17), on the other, may be seen to parallel Maynards two cases reproduced
above as examples (12) and (13): as omou in (12) has a mitigating function, omou in
(19) subdues its inset. Likewise, as iu in (13) merely increases emphasis, the use of
the same verb in (15)(17) results in a more forceful, pressing, and demanding tone.

4. Self- inquiry vs. other-inquiry

In Nakaus formula of the implicational relationship (see Section 2), the mental
verb wonder is paired with the speech act verb ask. These two verbs parallel two
13

It should be pointed out that, when embedded in a verb like omou, the example sentence (19) can no
longer be uttered in soliloquy, but only in a dialogue.

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

873

types of questions, namely posing a question (self-inquiry) and asking a question of

someone (other-inquiry), as noted by Lyons (1977: 755):
When we pose a question, we may merely give expression to, or externalize,
our doubt; and we can pose questions which we do not merely expect to remain
unanswered, but which we know, or believe, to be unanswerable. To ask a
question of someone is both to pose the question, and in doing so, to give some
indication to ones addressee that he is expected to respond by answering the
question that is posed.
Just as the semantic anity of omou and iu is seen in the fact that they are lexicalized as one lexeme (as we have seen in the case of Classical Chinese, French, and
English), the semantic closeness of wonder and ask is similarly seen in the fact that
some languages do not distinguish between self- and other-inquiries. For instance,
Lyons (1995: 191) states that it is dicult to draw a functional distinction between
expressing doubt and asking a question in several American Indian languages
including Hidatsa, Serrano, and Menomini. They use a dubitative mood to express
the speakers doubt. If the speaker utilizes that mood in a conversation situation,
then it is understood to be an invitation for the addressee to resolve his doubt.
In Old Japanese, however, wonder and ask have been lexicalized separately by
an opposing pair of question particles, ka and ya, just as think and say are two
separate lexemes.14 In what follows, we will rst compare these two interrogative
particles to show their parallelism with say and think, and then explore how such
an opposition is reected in their semantic extensions.
4.1. The old Japanese question particles, ka and ya
The Old Japanese question particles ka and ya are structurally similar, occurring
sentence-medially and sentence-nally,15 but dierent as to the nature of the questions they make. Ayuhi-sho, a grammar book written in 1778 (quoted in Ono, 1993)
dierentiates the two as omohu wonder and tohu ask. That is, when using ka, the
speaker wonders about something, and then comes up with an answer on his own,
though it is not denite. In contrast, questions formed with ya characterize situations in which the speaker solicits an answer from the addressee, instead of coming
up with one by himself. In other words, ka questions form self-addressed questions,
14
In a historical perspective, around 10th century, ya advanced to take over the functional domain
exclusively occupied by ka, but then later ka replaced ya, leaving it to a limited function. Yamaguchi
(1986) argues that such a vicissitude was only possible because ka and ya shared semantic properties at a
deep level.
15
When these particles occur sentence-medially, they form a so-called kakari musubi construction. This
is a syntactic agreement phenomenon in which a so-called kakari particle (a member of the set ya, ka, zo,
numu, and koso) calls for an o-norm conjugation form in its musubi (predicate) to produce certain
rhetorical eects such as interrogation, emphasis, and exclamation. The particles ka and ya are two of this
limited number of kakari particles. It is noteworthy that ka and ya are not only the members of this highly
restricted group, but that they also both take the same adnominal conjugational form to complete the
sentence.

874

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

while ya questions make other-addressed questions (see Ono, 1993; Quinn, 1997;
Shinzato and Seram, in press).
The question particle ka occurs sentence-medially in (20) and sentence-nally in
(21):16
(20) Shiranami
no
hamamatsu ga e
no tamukekusa ikuyo made ni
white wave
SUB beach pines s branch on oering
how long
ka toshi no he-nu-ramu
QP time SUB pass-PERF-INF.
I wonder how long it has been (since) the oering was made on a branch
of a pine tree by the beach where white waves (washed). (Manyoshu 34)17
(21) Ihami no ya Takatsunoyama no ko no ma
yori wa ga furu sode
Ihami s INJ Mt. Takatsuno s tree s between from I SUB wave sleeve
wo imo
mi-tsu
-ramu ka
OBJ my love see-PERF-INF QP
I wonder if my love has seen me waving my sleeve between trees in Mt.
Takatsunos peak in Ihami. (Manyoshu 132)
Examples (22) with the sentence-medial ya and (23) with the sentence-nal ya are
directly addressed to the hearer for an answer.
(22) Yuki koso
ha
haru hi kiyu
rame kokoro sahe kieuse
snow EMPH TOP spring sun disappear INF heart
even fade away
tare
ya koto mo kayoha nu
PERF QP word even come
NEG
The snow would disappear in the spring sun. Is it that your heart (of snow)
faded away that you sent me no word? (Manyoshu 1782)
(23) Umitsudi no nagi-na-mu
toki mo
watara-namu kaku tatsu nami
Ocean route SUB calm-PERF-INF when EMPH go out- want this high wave
ni
funade su beshi
ya
when sail
do should QP
Go out when the ocean is calm. Should you sail when the waves are this high?
(You shouldnt.) (Manyoshu 1781)
In the context of the present discussion, the dierence between ka and ya is
perhaps most succinctly characterized in Sakakuras (1993) following paraphrases:
16
In response to possible doubts about my interpretation of the poems used as examples in the
following, and to show the objectivity of the interpretations, I refer to a published translation of the
poems by Honda (1967), one of the very few available English translations (see Appendix).
17
It should be added that ka co-occurs with the inferential auxiliary mu at a high rate. Seram and
Shinzato (2000) attribute this to the self-inquiry nature of ka questions.

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

(24)

. . .. ka
QP
doubt if. . .
. . .. ya
QP
ask if. . .

to
COMP

utagahu18
doubt

to
COMP

tohu
ask

875

The fact that the self-addressed question (ka) is framed by the mental verb, while
the other-addressed question (ya) is embedded by the speech act verb is suggestive of
the continuity of the mental vs. speech act verb dichotomy to question markers.
4.2. Semantic extensions of ka and ya
The self- vs. other-inquiry nature of ka and ya is also reected in their semantic
extensions. In the case of self-addressed questions, the particle ka develops the
pragmatic meaning of hope/wish when it follows the negative auxiliary. Wondering, doubting, and questioning the reality in which the desired situation does not
exist leads to the speakers wish for the opposite (cf. Sakakura, 1993: 143144). For
instance, in example (25), questioning his mortality turns into the speakers wish for
eternal life. Likewise, questioning the proposition that there is no uninhabited land
blends into his desire for the existence of such a land in (26).
(25) Wa ga inochi mo tsune ni ara-nu ka mukashi mi-shi Kisa no ogawa wo
my life
also eternal be-not QP long ago see-past Kisa in river OBJ
ikite mi- mu tame
go
see-INF for
Is my life also not eternal! (I wish it were) for going to see the river in Kisa,
which I saw a long ago. (Manyoshu 332)
(26) Hito
mo naki
kuni
mo ara-nu ka wagi moko to
people
even non-existent country also be-not QP my wife with
tadusahi-ikite
taguhite ora-mu.
hand-in-hand-go together live-INF
Wouldnt there be a land uninhibited by men! I would go there hand-in-hand
with my wife and we would live together (happily). (Manyoshu 728)
Similar to ka, ya also follows the negative auxiliary. In this case, however, questioning the addressee about the non-existence of a desired state develops into an
invitation, or even an admonition to the addressee to realize such a state.
18

The word doubt here should be understood in line with the concept of doubt advanced in Lyons
(1977) and Maynard (1995). In addition, it is important to note that the formula reads doubt if instead
of doubt that. If it is doubt that, then the paraphrase pairs with the speech act verb deny as seen in
Nakaus implicational relationship quoted in (1), above.

876

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

The following examples, (27) and (28), question the addressees intention of not
coming, which is obviously not acceptable to the speaker, thus conveying a message
that the addressee is urged to do the opposite. When ya follows the root modal
auxiliary beshi should, must, then such questions express a negative command, as it
is the case in example (23).
(27) Yamiyo
nara ba ubemo ki
masa-ji
ume no hana
murky night is
if naturally come HOR-NEG plum s blossoms
sakeru tsukuyo
ni ide
masa
ji
to ya
bloom moonlit eve on come HOR NEG QUOT Q
If it is a murky night, naturally you dont come. (But) is it that you wont
come on a moonlit night even when plum blossoms are in bloom? (You
should come).
(Manyoshu 1452)
(28) Hototogisu ki
naki toyomosu okahe naru fujinami mi ni ha
cuckoo
come chirp sound
hill
be
wisteria see to TOP
ko
ji
to
ya.
come NEG COMP Q
Are you NOT coming to see the wisteria in our hill where the cuckoos are
calling? (You should come)
(Manyoshuu 1991)
These phenomena are reminiscent of the grammaticalization of the conditional
clause connective with and without the verb iu. The ttara particle with the speech act
verb, iu, which assumes the existence of a you, produced an illocutionary force
acting directly on the addressee (cf. exx. 1517), while the tara particle without iu
simply expressed the speakers wish (cf. ex. 18). Once again, it is evident that the
other-addressed question with the assumed existence of a you makes it possible to
put pressure on the addressee towards the creation of the desired state. In contrast,
the grammaticalization of self-inquiry only leads to a wish, that is, the speakers
desire, contained internally in his private domain.

5. Mental and speech-act verbs and sentence typology

The foregoing discussion demonstrated that the dichotomous division of mental
and speech-act verbs extends to other sentence types. Instead of the classical term,
command, the term desiderative was adopted in this paper to cover both command (imperative) and wish (optative). This is because both command and wish
represent the speakers desire for the realization of his favorable state, and thus can
be readily subsumed by the term desiderative, which in turn is also categorically in
line with statement and question. Nittas (1991b) grouping together of both
command and wish as waiting and wishing (machinozomi) is similar in spirit.
Table 2 provides a summary of previously raised points along with a reorganization
of the classical sentence (utterance) types.

877

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

Table 2
Classication of sentence types

Statement
Question
Desiderative

Internal Reality
in private domain

Internal Reality
in public domain

Speech act verbs

Other-inquiry
Command

Mental verbs
Self-inquiry
Wish

The congruence of the mental verbs, representing self-inquiry and wish, on the
one hand, and of speech act verbs, representing other-inquiry and command, on
the other, is by no means accidental. This dichotomy boils down to the dierences
embodied in mental verbs and speech act verbs: the cognizing of an internal reality
held in the private domain vs. one manifested in the public domain, as well as
the non-existence vs. existence of you in the codication process. The internal
realities here refer to belief in statements, doubt in questions, and desire in
desideratives. When they are cognized internally, they appear as the complements
of the mental verbs in statements, self-inquiry in questions, and wish in desideratives. In contrast, when they are externalized, they are realized as the complements of speech act verbs, other-inquiry, and command. Thinking, wondering,
and wishing are not intended to be overheard by others; rather, they are executed
in soliloquy. In contrast, saying something, asking a question, and issuing a
command all assume an intended audience, without whom such a speech act is
meaningless.
Traditionally, the two functions of questioning, namely, posing (self-inquiry) and
asking (other-inquiry) a question, have been well-recognized, just as the distinction
between optative and imperative moods has been widely accepted. However, the
intricate relationships between mental and speech act verbs have not been pointed
out except by Leech (1983) and Nakau (1994). In addition, the grouping of wish and
command as representing the same function, namely, the realization of the desired
state, has not been carried out in traditional typological studies. Furthermore, the
grouping of mental verbs, self-inquiry, and wish on one hand, and the speech act
verbs, other-inquiry, and command on the other, has not been proposed so far.19
According to Lyons, making a statement, expressing a doubt, and issuing a command are universal and found in every language (Lyons, 1995: 251). In this universal context, two types of cognizing internal reality, cutting across essential
sentence types, may be seen as representing the principal processes of linguistic
codication.
19
Onoe (1987) presents a very similar sentence typology. His classication of self-inquiry and wish
as one, as opposed to other-inquiry and command, is the same as followed in this papers treatment.
However, for the statement column, he draws a division between sentences with/without sentence-nal
particles. The addressee orientation of sentence-nal particles is obvious, but it is the position of the
present paper that even sentences without sentence-nal particles can be distinguished as to addressee
orientation, as suggested by the mental vs. speech act verb opposition.

878

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

6. Mental and speech act verbs and linguistic theories

The dichotomy of internally cognized (private) vs. externally manifested (public) relates to the various epistemological notions referred to above (in Section 1):
self (ego) vs. other (non-ego) (Akatsuka, 1979); experiencing self vs. observing self
(Lyons, 1982, 1989);20 S-perspective vs. O-perspective (Iwasaki, 1993);21 uchi
(internal, experienced perspective) vs. soto (external, detached, or observed perspective) (Quinn, 1994)22 and private vs. public (Dahl, 1997).23 Japanese is often said
to be an epistemologically sensitive language (cf. Kuroda, 1973; Akatsuka, 1979;
Watanabe, 1991; Quinn, 1994; among others). One instance where Japanese shows
such epistemological sensitivity is that of the adjectives of sensation and feelings. In
Japanese, the adjective samui, used in a simple present tense form, does not allow
subjects other than the rst person, as seen below in (29). An epistemological
account attributes such a restriction to the fact that we can not access another persons inner world instantly. In the well-known theory of territory of information
(Kamio, 1997), this is explained as the result of such information (i.e., your or his
psychological state) not falling in the speakers territory of information, which is a
prerequisite for what he calls the direct form [e.g., samui in (29)], vis-a`-vis the
indirect form, samugat-te iru to be used in (30). There are four conditions which
lead the speaker to assume the information to be in his territory: internal direct
experience, professional/other expertise, external direct experience, and personal
data (Kamio, 1997: 18 and 39). According to Kamio (ibid: 62), none of these conditions apply to make the information like (29) with the second and the third person
subjects fall in the speakers territory of information. Thus, the second and third
person subjects are not tolerated.
(29) (watashi/*anata/*kare)
I
you
he
(I/You/He) is cold.

wa samui.
TOP cold

20
According to Lyons (1982: 107), the rst sentence below exemplies the speakers personal experience, while the second reports the memory of something observed rather than experienced. To put it
another way, it is the contrast between the subjective, experiencing, internal self and the objective,
observing, external self.

(31) I remember switching o the light

(32) I remember myself switching o the light.
For the application of Lyons dichotomy to the analysis of Japanese temporal auxiliaries, see Shinzato
(2003).
21
This is dened as follows: . . .What the speaker describes in the S-perspective is his own experience.
In O-perspective, it is another sentient beings experience. Zero-perspective occurs in situations where no
experience of sentient beings is involved. Iwasaki (1993: 19).
22
The dierence is characterized as self versus others, proximal versus distal, experiential versus
observed, or private versus public (Quinn, 1994: 254).
23
Dahl (1997: 23) states: The scale I want to suggest is one from private to public, or with basically
equivalent terms from internal to external. That is, the egocentricity of a predicate (=its propensity to
occur with egocentric subjects) depends primarily on the extent to which a judgment of its truth or falsity
involves knowledge that is privy to one individual only.

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

879

In referring to another persons inner feelings, we use what Quinn (1994) calls the
exteriorizing sux, -garu (as in gat(te iru)), as shown below:
(30)

(anata/kare) wa
samu-gatte iru.
you he
TOP cold-show sign of
(You/He) are/is (showing a sign of being) cold.

The above contrast between a simple present tense adjective and its -garu form
once again points to the basic dichotomy attested to throughout this paper: the
cognizing of internal reality held internally vs. the same reality manifested
externally.

7. Conclusion
This paper started with the comparison of the two simple, basic, and yet important verbs, think and say. The essential claim here is that they both codify what
originates in the subjects mind, internal reality, but that each codies it dierently:
think cognizes it internally, while say refers to such reality manifested externally.
Internal cognizing assumes no audience, and is executed privately in (internal) soliloquy. These characteristics are shared by self-inquiry and wish. In contrast, external
(linguistic) coding assumes the existence of an audience, and it is this feature that
characterizes other-inquiry and command.
Viewing mental verbs and speech-act verbs as both sides of the same coin makes it
easy to see the structural parallels observed between them (and their alternative
pairs) in statement, question, and desiderative. In this sense, the mental vs. speech
act dichotomy oers an organization of sentence types with a new perspective. It
also brings new insights to the grammaticalization of the temporal/conditional connective, with or without the incorporated verb say, and to the semantic extension
of two Old Japanese question particles.
The mental vs. speech act dichotomy is more far-reaching than it may seem at
rst. It has great relevance to the various epistemological dichotomies proposed.
This also suggests the fundamental quality of this dichotomy. After all, the
applicability of the think and say distinction is not too surprising, given that
these verbs represent very basic linguistic and cognitive activities of human
beings.

Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments,
which substantially enhanced the quality of this paper. I would also like to
express my deep gratitude to Professor Jacob Mey for his detailed editorial
assistance. Nonetheless, any remaining shortcomings of this paper are solely my
responsibility.

880

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

Appendix. (English translation of Manyoshuu poems by Honda, 1967)

(18)

How many years have passed, I wonder,

since men of bygone days
here hung the oerings on the pines
upon the beach by white waves washed? (Manyoshu 34)

(19)

Can my love see

from behind the trees
on Takatsunos peak the sleeve
I now on parting wave? (Manyoshu 132)

(20)

Why send me no word?

Is your heart of snow
that fades away in vernal sun?
Oh let me know. (Manyoshu 1782)

(21)

Start when the sea is quiet.

Why go now when tis raving? (Manyoshu 1781)

(22)

O that now I could see

Kisas stream once more,
the view of which I oft enjoyed
in days of yore! (Manyoshu 332)

(23)

Oh if there were a country where

no people dwell, there would I now repair
with my sweet love to live alone
well satised, and free from care. (Manyoshu 782)

(24)

I am aware you do not come

upon a murky night,
but why not on a moonlit eve
when plum in ower stands bright? (Manyoshu 1452)

(25)

Cuckoos sing about our hill

where wistarias are in ower
would you not care, my gentle friend
to make a visit to my bower? (Manyoshu 1991)

References
Akatsuka, Noriko McCawley, 1978. Another look at no, koto, and to: epistemology and complementizer
choice in Japanese. In: Hinds, John, Howard, Irwin (Eds.), Problems in Japanese Syntax and Semantics.
Kaitakusha, Tokyo, pp. 178212.

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

881

Akatsuka, Noriko, 1979. Epistemology, Japanese syntax, and linguistic theory. Japanese Linguistics 6,
728.
Akatsuka, Noriko, 1985. Conditionals and the epistemic scale. Language 61, 625639.
Austin, J.L., 1962. How To Do Things with Words. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Chafe, Wallace, Nichols, Johanna, 1986. Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology. Ablex,
Norwood, NJ.
Dahl, Osten, 1997. Egocentricity in discourse and syntax. Available from <http://www.ling.su.se/sta/
oesten/egocentric> .
Fujita, Yasuyuki, 1999. Inyoobun no koozoo (Structure of quotative sentences). Kokugogaku (Studies in
the Japanese Language) 199, 115.
Haga, Yasushi, 1954. Chinjutsu to wa nanimono? (What is chinjutsu?) Kokugo Kokubun (Japanese
Language and Literature) 23, 4761.
Hayes, Sono Takano, Shinzato, Rumiko, 2001. Jooken no setsuzoku joshi kara danwa taijin kankei no
joshi e: tara, ttara no bunpoo-ka (From conditional connective to discourse interactional particle:
grammaticalization of tara and ttara). In: Masahiko, Minami (Ed.), Gengogaku to Nihongo kyooiku
(New Directions in Applied Linguistics of Japanese). Kuroshio Shuppan, Tokyo, pp. 127142.
Honda, H.H., 1967. Manyoshu, a New and Complete Translation. The Hokuseido Press, Tokyo.
Hopper, Paul, Traugott, Elizabeth Closs, 1993. Grammaticalization. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Iwasaki, Shoichi, 1993. Subjectivity in Grammar and Discourse. John Benjamins Publishing Company,
Amsterdam.
Kamio, Akio, 1997. Territory of Information. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
Kuno, Susumu, 1973. The Structure of the Japanese Language. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Kuroda, S.-Y., 1973. Where epistemology, style and grammar meet: a case study from Japanese. In:
Anderson, S.R., Kiparsky, P. (Eds.), A Festschrift for Morris Halle. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New
York, pp. 377391.
Leech, Georey N., 1983. Principles of Pragmatics. Longman, London.
Lyons, John, 1977. Semantics, Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Lyons, John, 1982. Deixis and subjectivity: loquor, ergo sum? In: Jarvella, R.J., Klein, W. (Eds.), Speech,
Place, and Action. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, New York, pp. 101124.
Lyons, John, 1989. Semantic ascent: a neglected aspect of syntactic typology. In: Arnold, G.D. et al.
(Eds.), Essays on Grammatical Theory and Universal Grammar. Oxford University Press, London, pp.
153186.
Lyons, John, 1995. Linguistic Semantics: An Introduction. Longman, London.
Matsumura, Akira, 1971. Nihon bumpoo dai-jiten (Unabridged Dictionary of Japanese Grammar). Meiji
Shoin, Tokyo.
Maynard, Senko K., 1995. Interrogatives that seek no answers: exploring the expressiveness of rhetorical
interrogatives in Japanese. Linguistics 33, 501530.
Maynard, Senko K., 1996. Multivoicedness in speech and thought representation: the case of selfquotation in Japanese. Journal of Pragmatics 25, 207226.
Nakau, Minoru, 1994. Principles of Cognitive Semantics. Taishukan Shoten, Tokyo.
Moriyama, Takuro, 1992. Bunmatsu shikoo dooshi omou wo megutte (On sentence-nal mental verb,
omou). Nihongogaku (Japanese Linguistics) 11-8, 105116.
Moriyama, Takuro, 1997. Hitorigoto wo megutte (On soliloquy). In: Kawabata, Yoshiaki, Nitta,
Yoshio (Eds.), Nihongo Bumpoo: Taikei to Hoohoo (Japanese Grammar: Its Organization and
Methodology). Hituzi Shobo, Tokyo, pp. 173188.
Ninomiya, Masayuki, 1986. Iu to omou (On say and think). Gengo (Language) 413, 7080.
Nitta, Yoshio, 1991a. Ishi no hyoogen to kikite sonzai (Expressions of the speakers will and the presence
of the listeners). Kokugogaku (Studies in the Japanese Language) 165, 113. (left).
Nitta, Yoshio, 1991b. Nihongo no Modaritii to Ninshoo (Japanese Modality and Person). Hituzi Shoboo,
Tokyo.
Onishi, Masayuki, 1997. The grammar of mental predicates in Japanese. Language Sciences 19, 219233.
Ono, Susumu, 1993. Kakari Musubi no Kenkyuu (Studies in kakari musubi). Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo.

882

R. Shinzato / Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) 861882

Onoe, Keisuke, 1987. Nihongo no koobun (Structure of Japanese). In: Yamaguchi, Akiho (Ed.),
Kokubunpoo Kooza (Seminar on Japanese Grammar), Vol. 6. Meiji Shoin, Tokyo, pp. 5775.
Quinn, Charles J., 1994. Uchi/Soto: tip of a semiotic iceberg? inside and outside knowledge in the
grammar of Japanese. In: Bachnik, Jane, Quinn, C.J. (Eds.), Situated Meaning. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 247294.
Quinn, Charles J., 1997. On the origin of Japanese sentence particle ka and zo. In: Haig, John, Sohn,
Ho-min (Eds.), Japanese/Korean Linguistics, Vol. 6. CSLI, Stanford, CA.
Romaine, Suzanne, Lange, Deborah, 1991. The use of like as a marker of reported speech and thought: a
case of grammaticalization in progress. American Speech 66, 227279.
Sakakura, Atsuyoshi, 1993. Nihongo hyoogen no nagare (Japanese through time), (Iwanami Seminaa
Bukkusu (Iwanami seminar books), Vol. 45. Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo.
Searle, John, 1969. Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press, London & New York.
Seram, Leon. A., Shinzato, Rumiko, 2000. Reconstructing the Proto-Japonic kakari musubi, *. . .ka. . .(a)m-wo. Gengo Kenkyu 118, 81118.
Shinzato, Rumiko, 2003. Experiencing self vs. observing self: semantics of stative extensions in Japanese.
Language Sciences 25, 211238.
Shinzato, Rumiko, Seram, Leon A.Kakari musubi in comparative perspective: Old Japanese ka/ya and
Okinawan-ga/-i. Japanese/Korean Linguistics (in press).
Suzuki, Satoko, 1994. Is that a fact? Re-evaluation of the relationship between factivity and complementizer choice in Japanese. In: Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Meeting of Berkeley Linguistics Society. Berkeley Linguistics Society, Berkeley, pp. 521531.
Sweetser, Eve E., 1990. From Etymology to Pragmatics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Thompson, Sandra A., Mulac, Anthony, 1991. A quantitative perspective on the grammaticization of
epistemic parentheticals in English. In: Traugott, Elizabeth Closs, Heine, Bernd (Eds.), Approaches to
Grammaticalization pp. 313329. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
Traugott, Elizabeth Closs, Dasher, Richard, 1987. On the historical relation between mental and speech
act verbs in English and Japanese. In: Giacalone Ramat, Anna et al. (Eds.), Papers from the Seventh
International Conference on Historical Linguistics. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp. 561573.
Traugott, Elizabeth Closs, 1989. On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: an example of subjectication in semantic change. Language 65, 3155.
Watanabe, Minoru, 1991. Wagakoto hitogoto (The viewpoint of waga-koto and hito-goto and the theory
of grammar). Kokugogaku (Studies in the Japanese Language) 165, 114 (right).
Wierzbicka, Anna, 1987. English Speech Act Verbs: A Semantic Dictionary. Academic Press, Sydney.
Yamaguchi, Gyoji, 1986. Gimon hyoogen no suii (Interrogative expressions through time). In: Yutaka,
Miyaji (Ed.), Ronshuu Nihongo Kenkyuu (Papers in Japanese Studies), Vol. 2. Meiji Shoin, Tokyo, pp.
123.
Rumiko Shinzato (PhD University of Hawaii) is Associate Professor of Japanese at Georgia Institute of
Technology. Her research interests include cognitive linguistics, historical linguistics, pragmatics and
Japanese pedagogy. Her recent publications include Experiencing self vs. observing self: semantics of
stative extensions in Japanese (Language Sciences 25, 2003), Reconstructing the Proto-Japonic kakari
musubi, *. . .ka. . .-(a)m-wo (Gengo Kenkyu, No. 118, 2000), and Cognition, epistemic scale and functions of the Old Japanese question particle ka (Linguistics 40, 2002). She is the author of Intermediate
Reader in Technical and Scientic Japanese (NFLRC, 1997).