G.R. No.

L-4963

January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO
NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA,
Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five
(5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province
of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and
her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and
Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his
death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino
Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his
common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said
lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on
February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino
Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to
separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their
separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony
and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property
that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).

After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence,

the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the
plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without
special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the
present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful
wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands
litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria
del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a
common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had
four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears
that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the
new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized
of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir,
his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly
said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death
of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs.
Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the
rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her
right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to
inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave
upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on
February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that
future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p.
12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor
defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and

under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June,
1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are
entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter
(article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these
successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code,
they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation
(Article 2253, new Civil Code).

done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this
claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any,
partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it
involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it
shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in
the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil
Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it
results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to

provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall
have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so
only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired
right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right
should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective
at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may
have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or
acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part
of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands
in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late
husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law
which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from
the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right
recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children
of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of
the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband
was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to
assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that
they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother
and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes,

Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-44837

November 23, 1938

SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffsappellees,

vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Adriano T. de la Cruz for appellants.
Simeon Bitanga for appellees.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by the defendants
Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael
Quitco and Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros, the dispositive part of which reads:

For the foregoing considerations, the court renders judgment

in this case declaring Ana Quitco Ledesma an acknowledged
natural daughter of the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, for
legal purposes, but absolving the defendants as to the
prayer in the first cause of action that the said Ana Quitco
Ledesma be declared entitled to share in the properties left
by the deceased Eusebio Quitco.
As to the second cause of action, the said defendants are
ordered to pay to the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, jointly and
severally, only the sum of one thousand five hundred
pesos(P1,500), with legal interest thereon from the filing of
this complaint until fully paid. No pronouncement is made as
to the costs. So ordered.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following errors
allegedly committed by the trial court in its aforesaid decision:
1. That the trial court erred in holding, that the action for the
recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing the last
installment of the note Exhibit C has not yet prescribed.
2. That the trial court erred in holding that the property
inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather
by the right of representation is subject to the debts and
obligations of their deceased father who died without any
property whatsoever.lawphi1.net
3. That the trial court erred in condemning the defendants to
pay jointly and severally the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma the
sum of P1,500.
The only facts to be considered in the determination of the legal
questions raised in this appeal are those set out in the appealed
decision, which have been established at the trial, namely:

In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived

maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still
single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born
a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In
1921, it seems hat the relation between Socorro Ledesma
and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the latter
executed a deed (Exhibit A), acknowledging the plaintiff Ana
Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter and on January 21,
1922, he issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a
promissory note (Exhibit C), of the following tenor:
P2,000. For value received I promise to pay Miss Socorro
Ledesma the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000).
Philippine currency under the following terms: Two hundred
and fifty pesos (P250) to be paid on the first day of March
1922; another two hundred and fifty pesos (P250)to be paid
on the first day of
November 1922; the remaining one
thousand and five hundred (P1,500) to be paid two years
from the date of the execution of this note. San Enrique,
Occ. Negros, P. I., Jan. 21, 1922.
Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant
Conchita McLachlin, with whom he had four children, who
are the other defendants. On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M.
Quitco died (Exhibit 5), and, still later, that is, on December
15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the
latter left real and personal properties upon his death,
administration proceedings of said properties were instituted
in this court, the said case being known as the "Intestate of
the deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 of this
court.
Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio
Quitco and the appointment of the committee on claims and
appraisal, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on August 26,

1935, filed before said committee the aforequoted

promissory note for payment, and the commissioners, upon
receipt of said promissory note, instead of passing upon it,
elevated the same to this court en consulta (Exhibit F), and
as the Honorable Jose Lopez Vito, presiding over the First
Branch, returned said consulta and refrained from giving his
opinion thereon (Exhibit C), the aforesaid commissioners on
claims and appraisal, alleging lack of jurisdiction to pass
upon the claim, denied he same (Exhibit H).
On November 14, 1933 (Exhibit I), the court issued an order
of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the deceased
Eusebio Quitco, and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not
included among the declared heirs, Socorro Ledesma, as
mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for the
reconsideration of said order, a petition which the court
denied. From the order denying the said petition no appeal
was taken, and in lieu thereof there was filed the complaint
which gives rise to this case.
The first question to be decided in this appeal, raised in the first
assignment of alleged error, is whether or not the action to recover
the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment for the payment
of the promissory note Exhibit C, has prescribed.
According to the promissory note Exhibit C, executed by the
deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, 1922, the last
installment of P1,500 should be paid two years from the date of the
execution of said promissory note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The
complaint in the present case was filed on June 26, 1934, that is,
more than ten years after he expiration of the said period. The fact
that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on August 26,
1933, with the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the
intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend the running of the
prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt,

because the claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the
promissory note should no have been presented in the intestate of
Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the one who executed
the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should
have been instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in
section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to
institute said case through the appointment of an administrator for
the purpose of collecting his credit. More than ten years having thus
elapsed from the expiration of the period for the payment of said debt
of P1,500, the action for its recovery has prescribed under section
43, No. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, well-founded.
As to the second assignment of alleged error, consisting in that the
trial court erred in holding that the properties inherited by the
defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are
subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased
father, who died without leaving any property, while it is true that
under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a
children presents his father or mother who died before him in the
properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of
representation does not make the said child answerable for the
obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as
may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with
the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the
properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants,
as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo
M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father
from whom they did not inherit anything.
The second assignment of alleged error is also well-founded.

Being a mere sequel of the first two assignments of alleged errors,

the third assignment of error is also well-founded.

DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:

For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold:

(1) That the filing of a claim before the committee on claims and
appraisal, appointed in the intestate of the father, for a monetary
obligation contracted by a son who died before him, does not
suspend the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery
of said indebtedness; (2) that the claim for the payment of an
indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be filed for its
collection before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed
in the intestate of his father, and the properties inherited from the
latter by the children of said deceased do not answer for the
payment of the indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said
person.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendants
are absolved from the complaint, with the costs to the appellees. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555,
which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court
in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including
herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title
over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate
of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix
Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the
herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of
511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly
probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the
then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the
following provisions:
"FIRST

G.R. No. 113725

June 29, 2000

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA
vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y

BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.

I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr.

Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is
registered in my name according to the records of the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the
aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth

hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the

children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should
I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership
of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the
time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall
expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every
year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75)
(sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic
sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give
yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his
testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of
December of each year.

until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the
mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my
addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall
immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's
heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the
latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED
(100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command
in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No.
1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell,
lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near
descendants and my sister."
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina
and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all
surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos
brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the
above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the
provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the
defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:

SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the
event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir
shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee,
mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver
yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE
(75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic,

1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National

Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the
testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only
to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to
deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export
sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria

Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985

up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil,
despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the
Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or
mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee
shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of
sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in
the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of
a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late
Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default
but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to
defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.

75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in

any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin,
during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central;
and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and
in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next
succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and
1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs
as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into
consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop
year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a
staggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of
December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
1988-89;

During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a
certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was
lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendantheirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred
piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No.
49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of
1989, more specifically, to wit:

For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY

(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
1991-92."5

However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum

of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar
corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision,
dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds
that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the
defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe
the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from
them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the
title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of
the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally,
being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that
plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the
heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and
semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being
prematurely filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering
thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiffappellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under
Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to
deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendantsappellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985;
and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the

Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate
of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it
proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the
estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However,
plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open
Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator,
and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to
enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy
of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392
until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another
one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits
and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition,
contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion
of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of
paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the
purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the
appeal in accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on
modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised which is
the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner
maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no
modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple
substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be

substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the

obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not
complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue,
there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision
cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution
for the reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the
substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants"
without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near
descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843 of the New Civil
Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his
supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed
before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such
deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent
had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made
on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private
respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner
pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals
ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional
rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The
legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate
parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirsThus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation
of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional
rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the
decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his
death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by
virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the
time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death
also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof
would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon
the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to
his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to
herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir
reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the
usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being
demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar.
Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against
petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on
modal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix
intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be
substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be
noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to
private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons
to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under
substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the

designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case

the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance
or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave
his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates
neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in
default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or
renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of
subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default
due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that,
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions
imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and
turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point,
petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is
strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the
same later to the second heir.15 In the case under consideration, the
instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the
property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the
sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly
imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its
transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve
clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary
substitution."16 Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the
testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of
the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also

missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the
fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not
related by first degree to the second heir.17 In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal
institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the
provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code
provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the
application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed
on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that
such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once
provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for
compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of
anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests,
if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to
in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated
by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous
to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is
what is known in the law of succession as aninstitucion sub modo or
a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the
object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property

left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon
the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee
but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. 19 On
the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the
condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be
entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. 20 To some
extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.21
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned
unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be
inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the
testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the
herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the
lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a
devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is
clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the
property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The
manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is
evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such
institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of
liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be
considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself
that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the
institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. 22
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the
private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to
seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the right to

seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or

mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face
of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made. 23 Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be
adopted.24
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to
deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza
Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee
should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the
obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza
Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's
near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is
thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion
thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation
is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but
also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the
testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally
apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the
amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has
been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had
become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to
have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his
obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee
and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement
with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the

fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the
seizure of subject property.

effective as to bind the subsequent owners and hold them liable to

the claimant?

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free

act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his
death.25 Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person
intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of
the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the
subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the
very purpose of making a Will.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court assails the December 12, 2003 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70888.3 Said Decision modified the
June 14, 2001 Summary Judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 by holding
respondents Spouses Bienvenido and Elizabeth Pangan (the
Pangans) not solidarily liable with the other respondents, Spouses
Alfredo and Imelda Diaz (the Diazes) and Reina Comandante
(Comandante), to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer).
Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution5 dated September 10, 2004
which denied petitioners as well as respondents Spouses Diaz and
Comandantes respective motions for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision

of the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No.
CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165300

April 23, 2010

ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, REINA
COMANDANTE and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO PANGAN and
ELIZABETH PANGAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The basic questions to be resolved in this case are: Is a waiver of
hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while
the parents are still living valid? Is an adverse claim annotated on the
title of a property on the basis of such waiver likewise valid and

The parties respective versions of the factual antecedents are as

follows:
Version of the Petitioner
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint 6 that on May
7, 1999, the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante,
through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), 7 obtained from him a
loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage Contract8 by way of second mortgage over Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-66049 and a Promissory
Note10 payable within six months or up to November 7, 1999.
Comandante also issued to petitioner postdated checks to secure
payment of said loan.
Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998,
Comandante, for a valuable consideration ofP600,000.00, which
amount formed part of the abovementioned secured loan, executed
in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and

Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided),11 the pertinent

portions of which read:
I, REINA D. COMANDANTE, of legal age, Filipino, married, with
residence and postal address at No. 6, Road 20, Project 8, Quezon
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, for a valuable consideration of SIX
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00) which constitutes
my legal obligation/loan to Pedro M. Ferrer, likewise of legal age,
Filipino, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, with residence and postal
address at No. 9, Lot 4, Puerto Rico Street, Loyola Grand Villas,
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, by virtue of these presents,
do hereby WAIVE, and/or REPUDIATE all my hereditary rights and
interests as a legitimate heir/daughter of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and
Imelda G. Diaz in favor of said Pedro M. Ferrer, his heirs and assigns
over a certain parcel of land together with all the improvements
found thereon and which property is more particularly described as
follows:
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887
xxxx
and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents
Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT 6604 (82020) PR-18887.
(sgd.)
REINA D. COMANDANTE
Affiant
On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim12 which he caused to be annotated at the back of TCT
No. RT-6604 on May 26, 1999.

The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks

issued by Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite
repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused to settle
the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 1999 a
Complaint13 for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate
Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 and raffled to Branch 224 of RTC,
Quezon City.
Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an
alternative relief the Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage14 and, second,
by impleading as additional defendants the Pangans as the
mortgaged property covered by TCT No. RT-6604 was already
transferred under their names in TCT No. N-209049. Petitioner
prayed in his second amended complaint that all the respondents be
ordered to jointly and solidarily pay him the sum ofP1,118,228.00,
exclusive of interests, and/or for the judicial foreclosure of the
property pursuant to the Real Estate Mortgage Contract.
Version of the Respondents
In her Answer15 to petitioners original complaint, Comandante
alleged that petitioner and his wife were her fellow members in the
Couples for Christ Movement. Sometime in 1998, she sought the
help of petitioner with regard to the mortgage with a bank of her
parents lot located at No. 6, Rd. 20, Project 8, Quezon City and
covered by TCT No. RT-6604. She also sought financial
accommodations from the couple on several occasions which
totaledP500,000.00. Comandante, however, claimed that these loans
were secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to
several postdated checks she issued in favor of petitioner.
As she could not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and
his wife, presented to Comandante sometime in May 1998 a
document denominated as Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests

Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a waiver of her

hereditary share over her parents abovementioned property.
Purportedly, the execution of said waiver was to secure
Comandantes loan with the couple which at that time had already
ballooned to P600,000.00 due to interests.
A year later, the couple again required Comandante to sign the
following documents: (1) a Real Estate Mortgage Contract over her
parents property; and, (2) an undated Promissory Note, both
corresponding to the amount ofP1,118,228.00, which petitioner
claimed to be the total amount of Comandantes monetary obligation
to him exclusive of charges and interests. Comandante alleged that
she reminded petitioner that she was not the registered owner of the
subject property and that although her parents granted her SPA,
same only pertains to her authority to mortgage the property to
banks and other financial institutions and not to individuals. Petitioner
nonetheless assured Comandante that the SPA was also applicable
to their transaction. As Comandante was still hesitant, petitioner and
his wife threatened to foreclose the formers taxi units and present
the postdated checks she issued to the bank for payment. For fear of
losing her taxi units which were the only source of her livelihood,
Comandante was thus constrained to sign the mortgage agreement
as well as the promissory note. Petitioner, however, did not furnish
her with copies of said documents on the pretext that they still have
to be notarized, but, as can be gleaned from the records, the
documents were never notarized. Moreover, Comandante claimed
that the SPA alluded to by petitioner in his complaint was not the
same SPA under which she thought she derived the authority to
execute the mortgage contract.
Comandante likewise alleged that on September 29, 1999 at 10:00
o clock in the morning, she executed an Affidavit of
Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests
Over A (Still Undivided) Real Property,16 which she caused to be
annotated on the title of the subject property with the Registry of

Deeds of Quezon City on the same day. Interestingly, petitioner filed

his complaint later that day too.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, Comandante asserted in
her Answer to the amended complaint17 that said complaint states no
cause of action against her because the Real Estate Mortgage
Contract and the waiver referred to by petitioner in his complaint
were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her; that the Waiver
of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still
Undivided) is a useless document as its execution is prohibited by
Article 1347 of the Civil Code,18 hence, it cannot be the source of any
right or obligation in petitioners favor; that the Real Estate Mortgage
was of doubtful validity as she executed the same without valid
authority from her parents; and, that the prayer for collection and/or
judicial foreclosure was irregular as petitioner cannot seek said
remedies at the same time.
Apart from executing the affidavit of repudiation, Comandante also
filed on October 4, 1999 a Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim
(P.E. 2468) Under The Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No.
RT-6604 (82020) PR-1888719 docketed as LRC Case No. Q-12009
(99) and raffled to Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon City. Petitioner who
was impleaded as respondent therein moved for the consolidation of
said case20 with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. On June 24, 2000,
Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon City ordered the consolidation of LRC
Case No. Q-12009 (99) with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. Accordingly,
the records of the former case was forwarded to Branch 224.
For their part, the Diazes asserted that petitioner has no cause of
action against them. They claimed that they do not even know
petitioner and that they did not execute any SPA in favor of
Comandante authorizing her to mortgage for the second time the
subject property. They also contested the due execution of the SPA
as it was neither authenticated before the Philippine Consulate in the
United States nor notarized before a notary public in the State of

New York where the Diazes have been residing for 16 years. They
claimed that they do not owe petitioner anything. The Diazes also
pointed out that the complaint merely refers to Comandantes
personal obligation to petitioner with which they had nothing to do.
They thus prayed that the complaint against them be dismissed. 21
At the Pangans end, they alleged that they acquired the subject
property by purchase in good faith and for a consideration
of P3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999 from the Diazes through the
latters daughter Comandante who was clothed with SPA
acknowledged before the Consul of New York. The Pangans
immediately took actual possession of the property without anyone
complaining or protesting. Soon thereafter, they were issued TCT
No. N-209049 in lieu of TCT No. RT-6604 which was cancelled. 22
However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being
informed by petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to
him by the Diazes. Upon inquiry from Comandante, the latter readily
admitted that she has a personal loan with petitioner for which the
mortgage of the property in petitioners favor was executed. She
admitted, though, that her parents were not aware of such mortgage
and that they did not authorize her to enter into such contract.
Comandante also informed the Pangans that the signatures of her
parents appearing on the SPA are fictitious and that it was petitioner
who prepared such document.
As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of
petitioners adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their
rights as new owners of the subject property. They claimed that the
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still
Undivided) upon which petitioners adverse claim is anchored cannot
be the source of any right or interest over the property considering
that it is null and void under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil
Code.

Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real Estate Mortgage

Contract cannot bind them nor in any way impair their ownership of
subject property because it was not registered before the Register of
Deeds.23
All the respondents interposed their respective counterclaims and
prayed for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees in
varying amounts.
After the parties have submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the
Diazes filed on March 29, 2001 a Motion for Summary
Judgment24 alleging that: first, since the documents alluded to by
petitioner in his complaint were defective, he was not entitled to any
legal right or relief; and, second, it was clear from the pleadings that
it is Comandante who has an outstanding obligation with petitioner
which the latter never denied. With these, the Diazes believed that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact against them and,
hence, they were entitled to summary judgment.
On May 7, 2001, petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment,25 claiming that his suit against the respondents is
meritorious and well-founded and that same is documented and
supported by law and jurisprudence. He averred that his adverse
claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604, which was carried
over in TCT No. 209049 under the names of the Pangans, is not
merely anchored on the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante, but
also on the Real Estate Mortgage likewise executed by her in
representation of her parents and in favor of petitioner. Petitioner
insisted that said adverse claim is not frivolous and invalid and is
registrable under Section 70 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.
In fact, the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City had already
determined the sufficiency and/or validity of such registration by
annotating said claim, and this, respondents failed to question.
Petitioner further averred that even before the sale and transfer to

the Pangans of the subject property, the latter were already aware of
the existence of his adverse claim. In view of these, petitioner prayed
that his Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After the filing of the parties respective Oppositions to the said
motions for summary judgment, the trial court, in an Order dated May
31, 2001,26 deemed both motions for summary judgment submitted
for resolution. Quoting substantially petitioners allegations in his
Motion for Summary Judgment, it thereafter rendered on June 14,
2001 a Summary Judgment27 in favor of petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, summary judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants by:
a) ORDERING all defendants jointly and solidarily to pay
plaintiff the sum of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT
PESOS (P1,118,228.00) which is blood money of plaintiff;
b) ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of Quezon
City that the rights and interest of the plaintiff over subject
property be annotated at the back of T.C.T. No. N-209049;
c) SENTENCING all defendants to pay plaintiffs expenses of
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) and to pay the costs
of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.28
The Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the
CA.29 The Pangans faulted the trial court in holding them jointly and
severally liable with the Diazes and Comandante for the satisfaction

of the latters personal obligation to petitioner in the total amount

of P1,118,228.00. The Diazes and Comandante, on the other hand,
imputed error upon the trial court in rendering summary judgment in
favor of petitioner. They averred that assuming the summary
judgment was proper, the trial court should not have considered the
Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Promissory Note as they
were defective, as well as petitioners frivolous and non-registrable
adverse claim.
In its Decision30 dated December 12, 2003, the CA declared
Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights null and void. However, it
found the Real Estate Mortgage executed by Comandante on behalf
of her parents as binding between the parties thereto.
As regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract
was not binding upon them as they were purchasers in good faith
and for value. The property was free from the mortgage
encumbrance of petitioner when they acquired it as they only came
to know of the adverse claim through petitioners phone call which
came right after the formers acquisition of the property. The CA
further ruled that as Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights and
interests upon which petitioners adverse claim was based is a
nullity, it could not be a source of any right in his favor. Hence, the
Pangans were not bound to take notice of such claim and are thus
not liable to petitioner.
Noticeably, the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the
issuance of the Summary Judgment as raised by the Diazes and
Comandante. In the ultimate, the CA merely modified the assailed
Summary Judgment of the trial court by excluding the Pangans
among those solidarily liable to petitioner, in effect affirming in all
other respects the assailed summary judgment, viz:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil Case No. Q99-38876 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and
Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum of
Php 1,118, 228.00; and

therefore, not purchasers in good faith. Thus, petitioner maintains

that the Pangans should be held, together with the Diazes and
Comandante, jointly and severally liable to him in the total amount
of P1,118,228.00.
Petitioners contentions are untenable.
The Affidavit of Adverse Claim executed by petitioner reads in part:

2. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and

Spouses Diaz to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the amount
of Php10,000.00 plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.31
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration32 having been denied by the
CA in its Resolution33 dated September 10, 2004, he now comes to
us through this petition for review on certiorari insisting that the
Pangans should, together with the other respondents, be held
solidarily liable to him for the amount of P1,118,228.00.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner merely reiterates his contentions in the Motion for
Summary Judgment he filed before the trial court. He insists that his
Adverse Claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 is not
merely anchored on Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Interests Over A Real Property (Still Undivided) but also on her being
the attorney-in-fact of the Diazes when she executed the mortgage
contract in favor of petitioner. He avers that his adverse claim is not
frivolous or invalid and is registrable as the Registrar of Deeds of
Quezon City even allowed its annotation. He also claims that even
prior to the sale of subject property to the Pangans, the latter already
knew of his valid and existing adverse claim thereon and are,

xxxx
1. That I am the Recipient/Benefactor of compulsory heirs
share over an undivided certain parcel of land together with
all the improvements found therein x x x as evidenced by
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A Real
Property, executed by REINA D. COMANDANTE (a
compulsory/legitimate heir of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda
G. Diaz), x x x.
2. That in order to protect my interest over said property as a
Recipient/Benefactor, for the registered owners/parents
might dispose (of) and/or encumber the same in a fraudulent
manner without my knowledge and consent, for the owners
duplicate title was not surrendered to me, it is petitioned that
this Affidavit of Adverse Claim be ANNOTATED at the back
of the said title particularly on the original copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is
on file with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to attest (to) the
truth of the foregoing facts and to petition the Honorable
Registrar of Deeds, Quezon City, to annotate this Affidavit of
Adverse Claim at the back of the said title particularly the
original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604
(82020) PR-18887 which is on file with the said office, so

that my interest as Recipient/Benefactor of the said

property will be protected especially the registered
owner/parents, in a fraudulent manner might dispose (of)
and/or encumber the same without my knowledge and
consent. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, petitioners Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based solely on
the waiver of hereditary interest executed by Comandante. This fact
cannot be any clearer especially so when the inscription of his
adverse claim at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 reads as follows:
P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - Executed under oath by PEDRO M. FERRER, married to Erlinda B.
Ferrer, claiming among others that they have a claim, the
interest over said property as Recipient/Benefactor, by virtue of
a waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a real property x
x x34 (Emphasis ours)
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners assertion that the adverse
claim was also anchored on the mortgage contract allegedly
executed by Comandante on behalf of her parents.
The questions next to be resolved are: Is Comandantes waiver of
hereditary rights valid? Is petitioners adverse claim based on such
waiver likewise valid and effective?
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioners adverse claim
should have been determined by the trial court after the petition for
cancellation of petitioners adverse claim filed by Comandante was
consolidated with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876.35 This is in
consonance with Section 70 of PD 1529 which provides:
Section 70. Adverse Claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in
registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent
to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is

made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in

writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or
under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of
title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a
description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the
adverse claimants residence, and a place at which all notices may
be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration
as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall
be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration.
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may
be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in
interest: Provided, however, That after cancellation, no second
adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the
same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may
file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated
for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of validity of such adverse claim,
and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the
adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall
be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and
hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was
frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one
thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion.
Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his
adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to
that effect. (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the third paragraph of the afore-quoted provision, it has
been held that the validity or efficaciousness of an adverse claim
may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an interested
party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing

thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may
warrant. And, it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that
the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled.36
As correctly pointed out by respondents, the records is bereft of any
showing that the trial court conducted any hearing on the matter.
Instead, what the trial court did was to include this material issue
among those for which it has rendered its summary judgment as
shown by the following portion of the judgment:
x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse Claim annotated at the
back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887,
and carried over to defendants-Sps. Pangans Title No. N-20909, is
not merely anchored on defendant Reina Comandantes "Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property" but also on her
being the Attorney-In-Fact of the previous registered
owners/parents/defendants Sps. Alfredo and Imelda Diaz about the
Real Estate Mortgage Contract for a loan of P1,118,228.00 which is
a blood money of the plaintiff. Moreover, subject Adverse Claim in
LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is NOT frivolous and invalid and
consequently, REGISTRABLE by virtue of Section 110 of the Land
Registration Act (now Section 70 of Presidential Decree No.
1529). 37 (Emphasis ours)
It does not escape our attention that the trial court merely echoed the
claim of petitioner that his adverse claim subject of LRC Case No. Q12009 (99) is not frivolous, invalid and is consequently registrable.
We likewise lament the apparent lack of effort on the part of said
court to make even a short ratiocination as to how it came up with
said conclusion. In fact, what followed the above-quoted portion of
the summary judgment are mere recitals of the arguments raised by
petitioner in his motion for summary judgment. And in the dispositive
portion, the trial court merely casually ordered that petitioners
adverse claim be inscribed at the back of the title of the Pangans.
What is worse is that despite this glaring defect, the CA manifestly

overlooked the matter even if respondents vigorously raised the

same before it.
Be that as it may, respondents efforts of pointing out this flaw, which
we find significant, have not gone to naught as will be hereinafter
discussed.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante is null and void for being violative of Article 1347 of the
Civil Code, hence, petitioners adverse claim which was based upon
such waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any
right or interest over the property.
We agree with the respondents.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code,
no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be
considered "future", the succession must not have been opened at
the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract
upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of
Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the
inheritance; and,
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an
expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. 38
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of
Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parents

properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living.
With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present
considering that the property subject matter of Comandantes waiver
concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit
from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as
shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner
entered into a contract involving the formers future inheritance as
embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a
Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioners favor.
In Taedo v. Court of Appeals,39 we invalidated the contract of sale
between Lazaro Taedo and therein private respondents since the
subject matter thereof was a "one hectare of whatever share the
former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona,
Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of
Deeds of Tarlac." It constitutes a part of Taedos future inheritance
from his parents, which cannot be the source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation between the parties.
Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this case
that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real
Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of
petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any
right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the
second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioners adverse claim, it is
provided in Section 70 of PD 1529, that it is necessary that the
claimant has a right or interest in the registered land adverse to the
registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to registration.
Here, as no right or interest on the subject property flows from
Comandantes invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon petitioner, the
latter is thus not entitled to the registration of his adverse claim.

Therefore, petitioners adverse claim is without any basis and must

consequently be adjudged invalid and ineffective and perforce be
cancelled.
Albeit we have already resolved the issues raised by petitioner, we
shall not stop here as the Diazes and Comandante in their
Comment40 call our attention to the failure of the CA to pass upon the
issue of the propriety of the issuance by the trial court of the
Summary Judgment in favor of petitioner despite the fact that they
have raised this issue before the appellate court. They argue that
summary judgment is proper only when there is clearly no genuine
issue as to any material fact in the action. Thus, where the defendant
presented defenses tendering factual issue which call for
presentation of evidence, as when he specifically denies the material
allegations in the complaint, summary judgment cannot be rendered.
The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in
the case which they claim should have precluded the trial court from
issuing a summary judgment in petitioners favor. First, the execution
of the SPA in favor of Comandante referred to by petitioner in his
complaint was never admitted by the Diazes. They assert that as
such fact is disputed, trial should have been conducted to determine
the truth of the matter, same being a genuine issue. Despite this, the
trial court merely took the word of the plaintiff and assumed that said
document was indeed executed by them. Second, although
Comandante acknowledges that she has a personal obligation with
petitioner, she nevertheless, did not admit that it was in the amount
of P1,118,228.00. Instead, she claims only the amount
of P500,000.00 or P600,000.00 (if inclusive of interest) as her
obligation. Moreover, the Diazes deny borrowing any money from
petitioner and neither did the Pangans owe him a single centavo.
Thus, the true amount of the obligation due the petitioner and how
each of the respondents are responsible for such amount are
genuine issues which need formal presentation of evidence. Lastly,
they aver that the trial court ignored factual and material issues such

as the lack of probative value of Comandantes waiver of hereditary

rights as well as of the SPA; the fact that Comandante signed the
mortgage contract and promissory note in her personal capacity;
and, that all such documents were prepared by petitioner who acted
as a lawyer and the creditor of Comandante at the same time.
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the
pertinent provisions of which are the following:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to
recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer
thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions
or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.

there are no genuine issues of facts to be tried, the Rules of Court

allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary
judgment. That is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is
allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the
material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine
issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such fact
which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a
sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.41
Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the
case from the coverage of summary judgment. The variance in the
allegations of the parties in their pleadings is evident.

Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A party

against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.

Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial

foreclosure on the alleged real estate mortgage over the subject
property allegedly entered into by Comandante in behalf of her
parents to secure payment of a loan amounting to P1,118,228.00. To
support this claim, petitioner attached to his complaint (1) the SPA
alleged to have been executed by the Diazes; (2) the Real Estate
Mortgage Contract pertaining to the amount ofP1,118,228.00; and,
(3) a Promissory Note.

Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be

served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing.
After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on
file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Comandante, in her Answer to petitioners Amended Complaint,

assailed the validity and due execution of the abovementioned
documents. She asserted that the same were not duly, knowingly
and validly executed by her and that it was petitioner who prepared
all of them. Also, although she admitted owing petitioner, same was
not an absolute admission as she limited herself to an obligation
amounting only to P600,000.00 inclusive of charges and interests.
She likewise claimed that such obligation is her personal obligation
and not of her parents.

As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary judgment is

a procedural devise resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out
litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that

The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA
authorizing their daughter to mortgage their property to petitioner as
well as having any obligation to the latter.

Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the
presentation of evidence. For one, it is necessary to ascertain in a
full blown trial the validity and due execution of the SPA, the Real
Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Notes because the
determination of the following equally significant questions depends
on them, to wit: (1) Are the Diazes obligated to petitioner or is the
obligation a purely personal obligation of Comandante? and, (2) Is
the sum of P1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real Estate Mortgage and
the Promissory Note, the amount which is really due the petitioner?
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary
judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine
issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial.42 From the foregoing, it is
apparent that the trial court should have refrained from issuing the
summary judgment but instead proceeded to conduct a full blown
trial of the case. In view of this, the present case should be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and proper
disposition according to the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits
and not through an abbreviated termination of the case by summary
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated December 12, 2003 insofar as it excluded the
respondents Spouses Bienvenido Pangan and Elizabeth Pangan
from among those solidarily liable to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer,
is AFFIRMED. The inscription of the adverse claim of petitioner Atty.
Pedro M. Ferrer on T.C.T. No. N-209049 is hereby
ordered CANCELLED. Insofar as its other aspects are concerned,
the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED. The case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
224 for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179859

August 9, 2010

IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND

TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO,
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO, Petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS
OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO,
HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO, Respondents.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO
SOCO, GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF CONSOLACION
SOCO, Oppositors.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriagesthe first to
Bibiana Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia
Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and
Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila,
Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano,
Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all
surnamed Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein
petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago. 1
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the
second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bulacan2 a petition for the probate of Basilios will,
docketed as SP No. 1549-M. The will was admitted to probate by
Branch 10 of the RTC and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN,
IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking
mga nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng sumusunod:
xxxx
c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at
mamamahala ng balutan na nasa Santiago, Malolos,
Bulacan, na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y);

d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng

hayop at lupat bahay sa Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa
danay ng daang Malolos-Paombong na nasa Malolos,
Bulacan, kasali at kasama ang palaisdaan na nasa likuran
niyon, ay ililipat sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente;
ngunit ang kita ng palaisdaan ay siyang gagamitin nila sa
lahat at anomang kailangang gugol, maging majora o
roperacion [sic], sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na
nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa
itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar
at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang
sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan
ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais
na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng
hayop ay ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan,
at mga anak na Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad,
Eugenia, Clemente, at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit,
sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng aking
kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni
Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping kikitain ay si Ma.
Pilar na siyang magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang ay ang
kita ng mga iyon matapos na ang gugol na kakailanganin
niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay
maawas na. Ninais ko ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa
kanila at pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, bukod sa
yaon ay sa kanila ding kapakinabangan at kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng
Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing asawa,
Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar,

Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde

nang pare-pareho. Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan,
makina at gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi
papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa aking
pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente.
Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o ani ng nasabing mga
pag-aari matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba
pang mga gugol na kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak
ng ani o salaping manggagaling dito. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)3
The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio and his first
wife, were, on their motion, allowed to intervene. 4
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a "Final Accounting,
Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will," 5 the probate
court approved the will by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the
registers of deeds of Bulacan and Manila to register the certificates
of title indicated therein.6 Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837,
7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila
were transferred in the name of petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente. 7
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention 8 with the
probate court, alleging that Basilios second wife was not Irene but a
certain Maria Arellano with whom he had no child; and that Basilios
will violates Articles 979-981 of the Civil Code.9
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its
previous approval of the "Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution
in Accordance with the Will."10
The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint
for completion of legitime before the Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 562-M-90,11 against the heirs of the second and third
marriages.

In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially

maintained that they were partially preterited by Basilios will
because their legitime was reduced.12 They thus prayed, inter alia,
that an inventory and appraisal of all the properties of Basilio be
conducted and that Ma. Pilar and Clemente be required to submit a
fresh accounting of all the incomes of the properties from the time of
Basilios death up to the time of the filing of Civil Case No. 562-M90.13
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of
legitime) in favor of the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage.
On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of Appeals,
by Decision of January 25, 2002,14 annulled the decision of RTCBranch 17, holding that the RTC Branch 17 dismissal of the
Complaint-in-Intervention in SP No. 1549-M and its August 14, 1978
Order approving the probate of the will constitute res judicata with
respect to Civil Case No. 562-M-90.15 Thus the appellate court
disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision in Civil Case No. 562-M-90 is hereby
ANNULLED on the ground of res judicata. Let the Decree of
Distribution of the Estate of Basilio Santiago remain UNDISTURBED.
SO ORDERED.16 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the appellate courts
decision in CA G.R. No. 45801 by petition for review, docketed as
G.R. No. 155606, which this Court denied.17 The denial became final
and executory on April 9, 2003.18
In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of the
second marriage filed before the probate court (RTC-Branch 10) a
Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for

Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees.19 Citing the earlier

quoted portions of Basilios will, they alleged that:

3) Zoilo
4) Ma. Pilar

x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject properties

should be under administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente
Santiago expired on September 16, 1993.

5) Ricardo
6) Cipriano

Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should

have ceased as such administrator[s] way back on September 16,
1993 and they should have transferred the above said titles to the
named legatees in the Last Will and Testament of the testator by
then. Said named legatees in the Last Will and Testament are no[ne]
other than the following:

7) Felicidad
8) Eugenia
9) Clemente at

xxxx

10) Cleotilde

Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have also
rendered an accounting of their administration from such death of the
testator up to the present or until transfer of said properties and its
administration to the said legatees.

(all surnamed SANTIAGO)

x x x x20
Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:
1) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in
their names to [the] Honorable Court and to transfer the
same in the names of the designated legatees in the Last
Will and Testament, to wit:
1) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
2) Tomas

2) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of

subject properties, including any and all improvements
thereon, to said legatees.
3) To render an accounting of their administration of said
properties and other properties of the testator under their
administration, from death of testator Basilio Santiago on
September 16, 1973 up to the present and until possession
and administration thereof is transferred to said legatees. 21
Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of the
Final Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the
Will, and with the subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering
the properties involved, the case had long since been closed and
terminated.22

The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be

transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of
administration only, granted the motion, by Order of September 5,
2003,23 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Termination of
Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the
Names of the Legatees dated October 3, 2000 filed by some heirs of
the testator Basilio Santiago xxx is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the administratrix [sic] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Mr. Clemente Santiago
are hereby DIRECTED, as follows:
a.) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in
their names to this Honorable Court and to transfer the same
in the names of the designated legatees in the Last Will and
Testament, to wit: 1.) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan at mga anak
na 2.) Tomas 3). Zoilo 4.) Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo 6.) Cipriano
7.) Felicidad 8.) Eugenia 9.) Clemente and 10.) Cleotilde all
named SANTIAGO.
b.) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of
subject properties including any and all improvements
thereon, to said legatees; and
c.) To render an accounting of their administration of subject
properties, including any and all improvements thereon, to
said legatees; and
d.) To submit an accounting of their administration of the
above-mentioned estate of the testator or all the above said
lots including the rice mill, animal feeds factory, and all
improvements thereon from August 14, 1978 up to the
present.

e.) To submit a proposed Project of Partition, indicating how

the parties may actually partition or adjudicate all the above
said properties including the properties already in the name
of all the said legatees xxx.
x x x x.
Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are hereby DIRECTED to
cancel and consider as no force and effects Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-249177 (RT-46294) [Lot No. 786], T-249175 (RT-46295)
[Lot No. 837], T-249174 (RT-46296) [Lot No. 7922], T-249173 (RT46297) [Lot No. 836], and T-249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No. 838] in the
names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue
new ones in the lieu thereof in the names of Cecilia LomotanSantiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo Santiago, Ma. Pilar Santiago,
Ricardo Santiago, Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago, Eugenia
Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde Santiago.
Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby DIRECTED to
cancel and consider as no force and effect Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 131044 [Lot No. 8-C] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago
and Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in lieu thereof in the
names of the Heirs of Bibiana Lopez, the Heirs of Irene Santiago,
and the Heirs of Cecilia Lomotan.
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon, Leonila, Ma.
Concepcion, Ananias, Urbano and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco,
dated December 3, 2002, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 24
Respecting petitioners argument that the case had long been closed
and terminated, the trial court held:
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that subject
properties cannot actually be partitioned until after 20 years from the
death of the testator Basilio Santiago x x x x. It is, therefore, clear

that something more has to be done after the approval of said Final
Accounting, Partition, and Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago
died on September 16, 1973, hence, the present action can only be
filed after September 16, 1993. Movants cause of action accrues
only from the said date and for which no prescription of action has
set in.
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present probate
proceeding which is continuing in character, and terminates only
after and until the final distribution or settlement of the whole estate
of the deceased in accordance with the provision of the will of the
testator. The Order dated August 14, 1978 refers only to the
accounting, partition, and distribution of the estate of the deceased
for the period covering from the date of the filing of the petition for
probate on December 27, 1973 up to August 14, 1978. And in the
said August 14, 1978 order it does not terminate the appointment of
petitioner[s] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago as executrix
and administrator, respectively, of the estate of the deceased
particularly of those properties which were prohibited by the testator
to be partitioned within 20 years from his death. Since then up to the
present, Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago remain the
executor and administrator of the estate of the deceased and as
such, they are required by law to render an accounting thereof from
August 14, 1978 up to the present; there is also now a need to
partition and distribute the aforesaid properties as the prohibition
period to do so has elapsed. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)25
Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for
reconsideration,26 which the probate court denied, drawing them to
appeal to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. No.
83094.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate
court,27 hence, the petition28 which raises the following grounds:

I.
"CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE ITSELF"
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT BINDING
ITSELF WITH ITS PREVIOUS DECISION INVOLVING THE
SAME PARTIES AND SAME PROPERTIES;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RTC AS IT AGREED WITH THE RTC THAT THIS CASE IS
NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;
C. IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HELD THAT THERE WAS RES JUDICATA; IN
C.A.-G.R. CV NO. 83094, THERE WAS NO RES JUDICATA.
II.
"GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALL THE
COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION TO REVERSE ITSELF, STILL
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS
ORDER TO TRANSFER THE MANILA PROPERTY COVERED BY
TCT NO. 131004 TO THE NAMES OF CECILIA LOMOTAN, TOMAS,
ZOILO, MA. PILAR, RICARDO, CIPRIANO FELICIDAD, EUGENIA,
CLEMENTE AND CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED
SANTIAGO."29 (emphasis in the original)
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners argument that the decision of the appellate court in the
earlier CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No.
155606) constitutes res judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No.
83094 (the subject of the present petition for review) fails.

Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b)
and 47 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.30 The first,
known as "bar by prior judgment," proscribes the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action
already settled in a prior action.31 The second, known as
"conclusiveness of judgment," ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future
case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action.32
Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the
present case. The final judgment regarding oppositors complaint on
the reduction of their legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent
the present petition, which solely tackles the propriety of the
termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in the
names of the legatees-heirs of the second and third marriages.
There is clearly no similarity of claim, demand or cause of action
between the present petition and G.R. No. 155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of parties,
"conclusiveness of judgment" cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would only serve as an estoppel as
regards the issue on oppositors supposed preterition and reduction
of legitime, which issue is not even a subject, or at the very least
even invoked, in the present petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the
judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors
only. The records reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal
the decision of the appellate court in this case and were only
impleaded pro forma parties.
Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate
court in CA G.R. No. 45801 that the decree of distribution of the
estate of Basilio should remain undisturbed. But this directive goes

only so far as to prohibit the interference of the oppositors in the

distribution of Basilios estate and does not pertain to respondents
supervening right to demand the termination of administration,
accounting and transfer of titles in their names.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting
respondents Motion for Termination of Administration, for
Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees
is a proper and necessary continuation of the August 14, 1978 Order
that approved the accounting, partition and distribution of Basilios
estate. As did the appellate court, the Court notes that the August 14,
1978 Order was yet to become final pending the whole settlement of
the estate. And final settlement of the estate, in this case, would
culminate after 20 years or on September 16, 1993, when the
prohibition to partition the properties of the decedent would be lifted.
Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in
Manila, covered by TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred
to the legatees-heirs as it would contravene the testators intent that
no one is to own the same.1avvphi1
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he
intended the house and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners
names for administration purposes only, and that the property be
owned by the heirs in common, thus:
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa
itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar
at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang
sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan
ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais
na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa medaling
salita, ang bahay at lupang itoy walang magmamayari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng sinomang

magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng

karunungan sa paaralan sa Maynila at katabing mga lunsod
x x x x33 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

MARIANO C. DEL
CASTILLO*
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

But the condition set by the decedent on the propertys indivisibility is

subject to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with
the ruling of the appellate court, viz:
For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]s
contention, is to go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles
494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code, which provide that the
prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last for
twenty (20) years x x x x

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

xxxx
x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the
indivision of a property for more than twenty years, it would be
contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period
expressly mandated by the Civil Code x x x x34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD**
Associate Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON,
JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA
DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
TEEHANKEE, J.:

WE CONCUR:
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga

approving the Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of
Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition. 1

On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died

in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory
heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V.
Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee),
Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter
named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of
these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrixappellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960
and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will
were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other
legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez
and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her
properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of
land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at
P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of
Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among
her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order
dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent
was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina
Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and
upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were
duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido
Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to
appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his
report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower
court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her
death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the

legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to

P129,362.11. 3 (/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime
of legitimate children and descendants). 4 In her will, the testatrix
"commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her
testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed
specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her
estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The
appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by
the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P
98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ......................................
52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon .......................................
131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon ..............................................
72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon .....................................
1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................
69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in
substance adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a
basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas
(appellant) are admittedly considered to have
received in the will more than their respective
legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely,
Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia
received less than their respective legitime;

(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the

properties respectively given them in the will, plus
cash and/or properties, to complete their respective
legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand,
Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties
that they received in the will less the cash and/or
properties necessary to complete the prejudiced
legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the
grandchildren remain untouched.<re||an1w>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own
counter-project of partition dated February 14, 1964,
wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate
on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were
proportionally reduced to the value of one-half () of
the entire estate, the value of the said one-half ()
amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the
Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their
legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally
reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the
appellants in the entire estate, the properties
devised to them plus other properties left by the
Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and
(d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory
heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively
devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert
D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in
their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary
disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of
P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the
amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and
devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:

1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P

49,485.56
2. Angelina Dizon .........................................
53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon .......................................
26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon ..........................................
26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon .........................................
65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon ..................................................
36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ...........................................
576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. .........................................
34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et
al .......... 36,452.80
Tota
l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as
constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositorsappellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of
P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix'
project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil
Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or
prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is
true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two
projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the
oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or
portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime.
The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in
a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of
the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor
certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted.
This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as

aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some

P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of
the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding
Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court
ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper
adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to
legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and
valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."

Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,

overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention
and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at
the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise." 8

From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants

have filed this appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal
law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and
precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must
imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors,
heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties
nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will.
Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court
finds for the appellee.

1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix'

will are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her
estate, and therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their
legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their
legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in
cash on account of their legitime, instead of some of the real
properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings
below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed
intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will." 5 In
consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions
found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico 6 for violation of these rules of
interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of

1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix'

testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate
by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that
upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last
illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and
for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid,
she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my
property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately
thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her
estate and designated the particular heir among her seven
compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she
bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of
the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of
his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is
subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The
Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such
compulsory heirs:

ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator

has left by any title less than the legitime belonging
to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or
diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be
reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may
be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrixappellee's project of partition, wherein the five
oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita,
Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to
them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to
complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11
each were taken from the cash and/or properties of
the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their cooppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were
favored by the testatrix and received in the partition
by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized
even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced
now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment
in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a
testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by actinter
vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing
doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an actinter
vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by
law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the
amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a
clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which
perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the
provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal
provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as
approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of
partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would
reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix
to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere

devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free

portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the
legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would
amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro
tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code.
It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the
Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in
the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut
plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse
claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which
should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil
Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the
plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which
was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled
that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute
owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon
each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him'
(Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors,
subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be
deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by
law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could,
as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the
proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the
present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and
her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary
dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property,
citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her
assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective
heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally
erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs
passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only
dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after
deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all
testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or

of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the

testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and
assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs
cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole
context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole
estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at
the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition
her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I
bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal
significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken
solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate.
Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions
were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as
mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account
of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne
out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her
testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise:
"FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as
my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his
forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall
inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary
dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory
heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the
estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the
Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory
heirsmay dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And
even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second
paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the
executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with
the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is
entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property,provided its value
does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share
pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the
usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might
as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions

by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of

Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions
upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have
to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the
other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty
left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not
otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain
unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some
authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really
means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it
may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no
application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a
distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without
her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which
would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor
having left merely some properties by will which would call for the
application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.
The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and
undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositorsappellants, the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved.
Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under
Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the
approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed
and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being
completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in
cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not
available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned
and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as
far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the
testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish
of transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries,
principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the
properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by

the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties,
and hence, there cannot be said to be any question and none is
presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the
legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The
plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso
has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961
provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and
intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article
777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned
as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were
to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of
the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the
record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors,
Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her
inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any
way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of
either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that she
should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by
way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the
requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to
give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed
of and sanctioned. 21 That her co-oppositors would receive their cash
differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined
further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like
Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition and
when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own
decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed.
Without cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15737

February 28, 1962

LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of
the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809,
dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the recovery of certain
properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's granduncle,
Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to his widow, Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion mientras viva y
no se case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don
Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a
will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in
favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real
and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don
Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las
leyes, instituyo per mis unicos y universales herederos de
todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto

Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que

partan todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales
partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las
donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea
voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa
Da. Fausta Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y carino,
los bienes, alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se
expresan; .
OCTAVO: Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida
esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su uso y posesion
mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias, de la
contrario, pasara a ser propiedad estos dichos legados de
mi sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and
7th thereof would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any
child with Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as
follows: .
DUODECIMO: Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de
este testamento que tratan de institucion de herederos y los
legados que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi
esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar
con hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados, pues estos,
conforme a ley seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any
child with his wife Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a
widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court
of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's
estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial
administratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted a
project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24,
1924, now exhibit "C", the probate court approved the project of
partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the project of
partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doa Fausta Nepomuceno received

by virtue thereof the ownership and possession of a considerable

amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of the said project
of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and
personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the
will. The order approving the project of partition (Exh. "C"), however,
expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo
dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno died without having
contracted a second marriage, and without having begotten any child
with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in
Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the
defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial
administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the
same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as
his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the
administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on
February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said
plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal
properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his
will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted
by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became
absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the
fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the
testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his
widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in
the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the
appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon
cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to
have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did
not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the
deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession while
alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of

"dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva").

The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these
particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use
(or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the
remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir
together with the testator's brother (clause 6). 1wph1.t
SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las
leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y universales herederos de
todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto
Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que
parten todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales
partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las
donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea
voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as
reversionary legatee, could succeed to the properties bequeathed by
clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow remarried,
has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and
considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio"
(ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all
provisions. In the construction of an instrument where
there are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to
all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the
conditions contained in clause 7 of his testament should not be

allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain

words, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It
is well to note that if the testator had intended to impose as sole
condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y
posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the
widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889),
expressly enjoins the following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their
ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to
use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other
can be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical
sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary
intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was
drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted
with such technical sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the
doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention
and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at
the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain
(TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero
1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente
expresada al ordenar su ultimo voluntad, es ley unica,
imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir
fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus
sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha
menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor
duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no ofrece la menor duda,

pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los

interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of
Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14070

March 29, 1961

The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable,

because they involve cases where the only condition imposed on the
legatee was that she should remain a widow. As already shown, the
testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided
that his widow should have the possession and use of the legacies
while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by the
express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should
pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the
widow's death, even if the widow never remarried in her lifetime.
Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the
reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due to
fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third
parties have intervened.

MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS,

LEONCIO GERVACIO BLAS and LODA GERVACIO
BLAS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ROSALINA SANTOS, in her capacity as Special
Administratrix of the Estate of the deceased MAXIMA
SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS, in Sp. Proc. No. 2524, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, defendants-appellants. MARTA GERVACIO
BLAS and DR. JOSE CHIVI, defendants-appellants.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed,

and the appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared
entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties described in
clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doa
Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the
court of origin for liquidation, accounting and further proceedings
conformably to this decision. Costs against the Administratorappellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera,

Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Teofilo Sison and Nicanor Sison for plaintiffs-appellants.

De los Santos, Caluag, Pascal and Felizardo for defendantsappellees.

This action was instituted by plaintiffs against the administration

of the estate of Maxima Santos, to secure a judicial declaration
that one-half of the properties left by Maxima Santos Vda. de
Blas, the greater bulk of which are set forth and described in the
project of partition presented in the proceedings for the
administration of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas, had
been promised by the deceased Maxima Santos to be delivered
upon her death and in her will to the plaintiffs, and requesting that
the said properties so promised be adjudicated to the plaintiffs.
The complaint also prays for actual damages in the amount of
P50,000. (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-65.) The alleged promise of
the deceased Maxima Santos is contained in a document
executed by Maxima Santos on December 26, 1936 attached to
the complaint as Annex "H" and introduced at the trial as Exhibit
"A". (Ibid., pp. 258-259.) The complaint also alleges that the
plaintiffs are entitled to inherit certain properties enumerated in
paragraph 3 thereof, situated in Malabon, Rizal and Obando,

Bulacan, but which properties have already been in included in

the inventory of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and
evidently partitioned and conveyed to his heirs in the proceedings
for the administration of his (Simeon Blas) estate.
Defendant, who is the administratrix of the estate of the deceased
Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, filed an answer with a
counterclaim, and later, an amended answer and a counterclaim.
The said amended answer admits the allegations of the complaint
as to her capacity as administratrix the death of Simeon Blas on
January 3, 1937; the fact that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz begot
three children only one of whom, namely, Eulalio Blas, left
legitimate descendants; that Simeon Blas contracted a second
marriage with Maxima Santos on June 28, 1898. She denies for
lack of sufficient information and belief, knowledge edge of the
first marriage of Simeon Blas to Marta Cruz, the averment that
Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz acquired properties situated in
Obando, Bulacan, that said properties were utilized as capital,
etc. As special defenses, she alleges that the properties of the
spouses Blas and Santos had been settled and liquidated in the
project of partition of the estate of said Simeon Blas; that
pursuant to the project of partition, plaintiffs and some defendants
had already received the respective properties adjudicated to
them; that the plaintiffs and the defendants Marta Geracio and
Jose Chivi are estopped from impugning the validity of the project
of partition of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and from
questioning the ownership in the properties conveyed in the
project of partition to Maxima Santos as her own exclusive
property; that the testament executed by Maxima Santos is valid,
the plain plaintiffs having no right to recover any portion of
Maxima Santos' estate now under administration by the court. A
counterclaim for the amount of P50,000 as damages is also
included in the complaint, as also a cross-claim against Marta
Gervacio Blas and Jose Chivi.
Trial of the case was Conducted and, thereafter, the court, Hon.
Gustave Victoriano, presiding, rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint, with costs against plaintiff, and dismissing also the

counterclaim and cross-claim decision ,the plaintiffs filed by the

defendants. From this district have appealed to this Court.
The facts essential to an understanding of the issues involved in
the case may be briefly summarized as follows: Simeon Blas
contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before
1898. They had three children, only one of whom, Eulalio, left
children, namely, Maria Gervacio Blas, one of the plaintiffs, Marta
Gervacio Blas, one of the defendants, and Lazaro Gervacio Blas.
Lazaro died in 1950, and is survived by three legitimate children
who are plaintiffs herein, namely, Manuel Gervacio Blas, Leoncio
Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio Blas. Marta Cruz died in 1898,
and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second
marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of this second
marriage, no liquidation of the properties required by Simeon Blas
and Marta Cruz was made. Three of the properties left are
fishponds located in Obando, Bulacan. Maxima Santos does not
appear to have apported properties to her marriage with Simeon
Blas.
On December 26, 1936, only over a week before over a week
before his death on January 9, 1937, Simeon Blas executed a
last will and testament. In the said testament Simeon Blas makes
the following declarations:
I
2. Sa panahon ng aking pangalawang asawa, MAXIMA
SANTOS DE BLAS, ay nagkaroon ako at nakatipon ng
mga kayamanan (bienes) at pag-aari (propriedades) na
ang lahat ng lupa, palaisdaan at iba pang pag-aari ay
umaabot sa halagang ANIM NA RAAN PITONG PU'T
WALONG DAAN LIBO WALONG DAAN WALONG PUNG
PISO (678,880-00) sang-ayon sa mga halaga sa
amillarimento (valor Amillarado.)
II

1. Ang kalahati ng lahat ng aming pag-aari, matapos

mabayaran ang lahat ng aking o aming pag-kakautang na
mag-asawa, kung mayroon man, yayamang ang lahat ng
ito ay kita sa loob ng matrimonio (bienes ganaciales) ay
bahagi ng para sa aking asawa, MAXIMA SANTOS DE
BLAS, sang-ayon sa batas. (Record on Appeal, pp. 250251.)
The above testamentary provisions may be translated as follows:
I
2. During my second marriage with Maxima Santos de
Blas, I possessed and acquired wealth and properties,
consisting of lands, fishponds and other kinds of
properties, the total assessed value of which reached the
amount P678,880.00.

A Don Simeon Blas asked me to prepare this

document (referring to Exhibit "A"), (t.s.n., Sarmiento to,
P. 24).
The reason why the testator ordered the preparation of Exhibit
"A" was because the properties that the testator had acquired
during his first marriage with Marta Cruz had not been liquidated
and were not separated from those acquired during the second
marriage. Pascual's testimony is as follows:
Q To whom do you refer with the word "they"?
A Simeon Blas and his first wife, Marta Cruz. When
Marta Cruz died they had not made a liquidation of their
conjugal properties and so all those properties were
included all in the assets of the second marriage, and that
is the reason why this document was prepared. (t.s.n.,
Sarmiento, p. 36.)

II
1. One-half of our properties, after the payment of my and
our indebtedness, all these properties having been
acquired during marriage (conjugal properties),
constitutes the share of my wife Maxima Santos de Blas,
according to the law.
At the time of the execution of said will, Andres Pascual a son-inlaw of the testator, and Avelina Pascual and others, were present.
Andres Pascual had married a descendant by the first marriage.
The will was prepared by Andres Pascual, with the help of his
nephew Avelino Pascual. The testator asked Andres Pascual to
prepare a document which was presented in court as Exhibit "A",
thus:
Q Was there anybody who asked you to prepare this
document?

The above testimony is fully corroborated by that of Leoncio

Gervacio, son-in-law of Simeon Blas.
Q Please state to the Court?
A My children were claiming from their grandfather
Simeon Blas the properties left by their grandmother
Marta Cruz in the year 1936.
Q And what happened with that claim of your children
against Simeon Blas regarding the assets or properties of
the first marriage that were left after the death of Marta
Cruz in 1936?
A The claim was not pushed through because they
reached into an agreement whereby the parties Simeon
Blas Maxima Santos, Maria Gervacio Bias, Marta
Gervacio Blas and Lazaro Gervacio Blas agreed that

Simeon Blas and Maxima Blas will give one-half of the

estate of Simeon Blas. (t.s.n., Sarmiento, pp. 143-144).

(Fdo.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS

The document which was thus prepared and which is marked as

Exhibit "A" reads in Tagalog, thus:
and which, translated into English, reads as follows:
MAUNAWA NG SINO MANG MAKABABASA:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
Na akong si MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, nasa hustong
gulang, kasal kay SIMEON BLAS, taga bayan ng
Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang ito ay malaya kong ipinahahayag:
Na aking nabasa at naunawa ang testamento at huling
kalooban na nilagdaan ng aking asawa, SIMEON BLAS,
at ipinahahayag ko sa ilalim ng aking karangalan at sa
harap ng aking asawa na igagalang at pagpipitaganan
ang lahat at bawa't isang bahagi ng nabanggit na
testamento at ipinangangako ko pa sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang ito na ang lahat ng maiiwang pag-aari at
kayamanan naming mag-asawa, na nauukol at bahaging
para sa akin sa paggawa ko naman ng aking testamento
ay ipagkakaloob ko ang kalahati () sa mga herederos at
legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na
asawa, SIMEON BLAS, sa kaniyang testamento, na ako'y
makapipili o makahihirang na kahit kangino sa kanila ng
aking pagbibigyan at pamamanahan sang-ayon sa
paggalang, paglilingkod, at pakikisama ng gagawin sa
akin.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO ay nilagdaan ko ang
kasulatang ito ngayon ika 26 ng Diciembre ng taong
1936, dito sa San Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal,
Philippines. (Exh. "A", pp. 29-30 Appellant's brief).

That I MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, of legal age, married

to SIMEON BLAS, resident of Malabon, Rizal, Philippines,
voluntarily state:
That I have read and knew the contents of the will signed
by my husband, SIMEON BLAS, (2) and I promise on my
word of honor in the presence of my husband that I will
respect and obey all and every disposition of said will (3)
and furthermore, I promise in this document that all the
properties my husband and I will leave, the portion and
share corresponding to me when I make my will, I will
give one-half () to the heirs and legatees or the
beneficiaries named in the will of my husband, (4) and
that I can select or choose any of them, to whom I will
give depending upon the respect, service and treatment
accorded to me.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I signed this document this
26th day of December, 1936 at San Francisco del Monte,
San Juan, Rizal, Philippines. (Exh. "A", pp. 30-31,
Appellant's brief).

(Sgd.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS

The court below held that said Exhibit "A" has not created any
right in favor of plaintiffs which can serve as basis for the
complaint; that neither can it be considered as a valid and
enforceable contract for lack of consideration and because it
deals with future inheritance. The court also declared that Exhibit
"A" is not a will because it does not comply with the requisites for
the execution of a will; nor could it be considered as a donation,
etc.
Both the court below in its decision and the appellees in their brief
before us, argue vehemently that the heirs of Simeon Blas and
his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim for the
unliquidated conjugal properties acquired during said first
marriage, because the same were already included in the mass
of properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas
and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will, and that the
action to recover the same has prescribed. This contention is
correct. The descendants of Marta Cruz can no longer claim the
conjugal properties that she and her husband may have required
during their marriage although no liquidation of such properties
and delivery thereof to the heirs of Marta Cruz have been made,
no action to recover said propertied having been presented in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas.
But the principal basis for the plaintiffs' action in the case at bar is
the document Exhibit "A". It is not disputed that this document
was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that
the conjugal properties of me on Blas for the reason his first
marriage had not been liquidated; that it was prepared at the
same time as the will of Simeon Blas on December 26, 1936, at
the instance of the latter himself. It is also not disputed that the
document was signed by Maxima Santos and one copy thereof,
which was presented in court as Exhibit "A", was kept by plaintiffs'
witness Andres Pascual.
Plaintiffs-appellants argue before us that Exhibit "A" is both a trust
agreement and a contract in the nature of a compromise to avoid
litigation. Defendants-appellees, in answer, claim that it is neither

a trust agreement nor a compromise a agreement. Considering

that the properties of the first marriage of Simeon Blas had not
been liquidated when Simeon Blas executed his will on
December 26, 1936', and the further fact such properties where
actually , and the further fact that included as conjugal properties
acquired during the second marriage, we find, as contended by
plaintiffs-appellants that the preparation and execution of Exhibit
"A" was ordered by Simeon Blas evidently to prevent his heirs by
his first marriage from contesting his will and demanding
liquidation of the conjugal properties acquired during the first
marriage, and an accounting of the fruits and proceeds thereof
from the time of the death of his first wife.
Exhibit "A", therefore, appears to be the compromise defined in
Article 1809 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force at the time of the
execution of Exhibit "A", which provides as follows:
Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in
interest, by giving, promising, or retaining something
avoids the provocation of a suitor terminates one which
has already the provocation been instituted. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Exhibit "A" states that the maker (Maxima Santos) had read and
knew the contents of the will of her husband read and knew the
contents of the will Simeon Blas she was evidently referring to
the declaration in the will(of Simeon Blas) that his properties are
conjugal properties and one-half thereof belongs to her (Maxima
Santos) as her share of the conjugal assets under the law. The
agreement or promise that Maxima Santos makes in Exhibit "A" is
to hold one-half of her said share in the conjugal assets in trust
for the heirs and legatees of her husband in his will, with the
obligation of conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees
as she may choose in her last will and testament. It is to be noted
that the conjugal properties referred to are those that were
actually existing at that time, December 26, 1936. Simeon Blas
died on January 9, 1937. On June 2, 1937, an inventory of the
properties left by him, all considered conjugal, was submitted by

Maxima Santos herself as administratrix of his estate. A list of

said properties is found in Annex "E", the complete inventory
submitted by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, is administratrix of the
estate of her husband, dated March 10, 1939. The properties
which were given to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal
properties are also specified in the project of partition submitted
by said Maxima Santos herself on March 14, 1939. (Record on
Appeal, pp. 195-241.) Under Exhibit "A", therefore, Maxima
Santos contracted the obligation and promised to give one-half of
the above indicated properties to the heirs and legatees of
Simeon Blas.
Counsel for the defendant-appellee claims Exhibit "A" is a
worthless piece of paper because it is not a will nor a
donation mortis causa nor a contract. As we have in indicated
above, it is a compromise and at the same time a contract with a
sufficient cause or consideration. It is also contended that it deals
with future inheritance. We do not think that Exhibit "A" is a
contract on future inheritance. it is an obligation or promise made
by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal
properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated
or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband.
The conjugal properties were in existence at the time of the
execution of Exhibit "A" on December 26, 1936. As a matter of
fact, Maxima Santos included these properties in her inventory of
her husband's estate of June 2, 1937. The promise does not refer
to any properties that the maker would inherit upon the death of
her husband, because it is her share in the conjugal assets. That
the kind of agreement or promise contained in Exhibit "A" is not
void under Article 1271 of the old Civil Code, has been decided
by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of October 8,
19154, thus:
Que si bien el art. 1271 del Codigo civil dispone que
sobre la herenciafutura no se podra celebrar otros
contratos que aquellos cuyo objecto seapracticar entre
vivos la division de un caudal, conforme al articulo
1056, esta prohibicion noes aplicable al caso, porque la

obligacion que contrajoel recurr en contrato privado de

otorgar testamento e instituir heredera a su subrina de
los bienes que adquirio en virtud de herencia,
procedentes desu finada consorte que le quedasen
sobrantes despues de pagar las deudas, y del ganacial
que se expresa, asi como de reconocer, ademas, con
alguna cosaa otros sobrinos, se refiere a bienes
conocidos y determinados existentes cuando tal
compromisi se otorgo, y no a la universalidad de una
herencia que, sequn el art. 659 del citado Codigo civil, as
determina a muerte, constituyendola todos los bienes,
derechos y obligaciones que por ella no sehayan
extinguido: ..." (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a
contract under Article 1271 of the Civil Code is "future
inheritance." To us future inheritance is any property or right not in
existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract,
that a person may in the future acquire by succession. The
properties subject of the contract Exhibit "A" are well defined
properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which Simeon
Blas declares in his statement as belonging to his wife as her
share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share
in the conjugal properties may not be considered
as future inheritance because they were actually in existence at
the time Exhibit "A" was executed.
The trial court held that the plaintiffs-appellants in the case at bar
are concluded by the judgement rendered in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas for the reason that the
properties left by him belonged to himself and his wife Maxima
Santos; that the project of partition in the said case, adjudicating
to Maxima Santos one-half as her share in the conjugal
properties, is a bar to another action on the same subject matter,
Maxima Santos having become absolute owner of the said
properties adjudicated in her favor. As already adverted to above,
these contentions would be correct if applied to the claim of the
plaintiffs-appellants that said properties were acquired with the

first wife of Simeon Blas, Marta Cruz. But the main ground upon
which plaintiffs base their present action is the document Exhibit
"A", already fully considered above. As this private document
contains the express promise made by Maxima Santos to convey
in her testament, upon her death, one-half of the conjugal
properties she would receive as her share in the conjugal
properties, the action to enforce the said promise did not arise
until and after her death when it was found that she did not
comply with her above-mentioned promise. (Art. 1969, old Civil
Code.) The argument that the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants
herein to oppose the project of partition in the settlement of the
estate of Simeon Blas, especially that portion of the project which
assigned to Maxima Santos one-half of all the conjugal properties
bars their present action, is, therefore, devoid of merit. It may be
added that plaintiffs-appellants did not question the validity of the
project of partition precisely because of the promise made by
Maxima Santos in the compromise Exhibit "A"; they acquised in
the approval of said project of partition because they were relying
on the promise made by Maxima Santos in Exhibit "A", that she
would transmit one-half of the conjugal properties that she was
going to receive as her share in the conjugal partnership upon her
death and in her will, to the heirs and legatees of her husband
Simeon Blas.
Neither can the claim of prescription be considered in favor of the
defendants. The right of action arose at the time of the death of
Maxima Santos on October 5,1956, when she failed to comply
with the promise made by her in Exhibit "A". The plaintiffsappellants immediately presented this action on December 27,
1956, upon learning of such failure on the part of Maxima Santos
to comply with said promise. This defense is, therefore, also
without merit.
It is next contended by the defendant-appellee that Maxima
Santos complied with her above-mentioned promise, that
Andres Pascual, Tomasa Avelino, Justo Garcia, Ludovico Pimpin
and Marta Gervacio Blas were given substancial legacies in the
will and testament of Maxima Santos. To determine whether she

had actually complied with the promise made in Exhibit "A", there
is herein set forth a list only of the fishponds and their respective
areas as contained in the list of properties she acquired as her
share in the conjugal partnership, which list includes, besides
many ricelands as well as residential lots, thus:

31. Paco, Obando, Bulacan

5.8396 has.

32. Pangjolo, Obando

3.5857

"

34. Batang Pirasuan, Lubao, Pampanga

11.9515

"

35. Calangian, Lubao, Pampanga

30.2059

"

38. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga

215.4325

"

39. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga

8.3763

"

23.0730

"

6.8692

"

34.2779

"

40. Bangkal, Sinubli

41. Tagulod,

44. Bangkal Pugad

(a)

(b)

51.7919

"

(c)

2.5202

"

45. Magtapat Bangkal, Lubao, Pampanga (a)

18.0024

"

(b)

7.3265

"

(c)

53.5180

"

46. Pinanganakan, Lubao, Pampanga

159.0078

"

47. Emigdio Lingid, Lubao, Pampanga

34.5229

"

48. Propios, Lubao, Pampanga

80.5382

"

49. Batang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan,

Pampanga

43.3350

"

50. Binatang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan,

Pampanga

51. Sapang Magtua, Sexmoan, Pampanga

52. Kay Limpin, Sexmoan, Pampanga

53. Calise Mabalumbum, Sexmoan,

Pampanga

3.5069

"

56,8242

"

5.0130

"

23.8935

(f)

10.4412

"

(g)

3.9033

"

(h)

11.9263

"

(i)

6.0574

"

23.3989

"

147.1242

"

10.000

"

81. Don Tomas, Sexmoan, Pampanga

21.6435

"

82. Matikling, Lubao, Pampanga

16.0000

"

1045.7863

"

"
55. Dalang, Banga, Sexmoan, Pampanga

54. Messapinit Kineke, Sexmoan,

Pampanga

(a)

5.2972

"

(b)

5.9230

"

(c)

1.4638

"

(d)

1.4638

"

(e)

2.8316

"

62. Alaminos, Pangasinan

80. Mangasu Sexmoan, Pampanga

Total area ...............................

(See Record on Record, pp.

195-241.)

In her will, Maxima Santos devised to Marta Gervacio Blas the

80-hectare fishpond situated in Lubao, Pampanga. The fishpond
devised is evidently that designated as "Propios" in Lubao,
Pampanga, item No. 8 in the list of properties adjudicated to her
in the project of partition. (Record on Appeal, p. 215.) Considering
that the total area of the fishponds amount to 1045.7863
hectares, the 80 hectares devised to Marta Gervacio Blas is not
even one-tenth of the total area of the fishponds. Add to this the
fact that in the will she imposed upon Marta Gervacio Blas de
Chivi an existing obligation on said fishponds, namely, its lease in
1957 and the duty to pay out of the rentals thereof an obligation
to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation RFC (Ibid., pp. 262263.) Angelina Blas was given only a lot of 150 square meters in
Hulong Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, and Leony Blas, the sum of
P300.00 (Ibid., p. 264.)
It is evident from a consideration of the above figures and facts
that Maxima Santos did not comply with her obligation to devise
one-half of her conjugal properties to the heirs and legatees of
her husband. She does not state that she had complied with such
obligation in her will. If she intended to comply therewith by giving
some of the heirs of Simeon Blas the properties mentioned
above, the most that can be considered in her favor is to deduct
the value of said properties from the total amount of properties
which she had undertaken to convey upon her death.
All the issues in the pleadings of the parties and in their
respective briefs, have now been fully discussed and considered.
Reiterating what we have stated above, we declare that by
Exhibit "A", a compromise to avoid litigation, Maxima Santos
promised to devise to the heirs and legatees of her husband
Simeon Blas, one-half of the properties she received as her share

in the conjugal partnership of herself and her husband, which

share is specified in the project of partition submitted by herself
on March 14, 1939 in the settlement of the estate of her husband,
and which is found on pages 195 to 240 of the record on appeal
and on pages 27 to 46 of the project of partition, submitted by
Maxima Santos herself before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in Civil Case No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don
Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos Vda. de Bias, Administradora"; and
that she failed to comply with her aforementioned obligation.
(Exhibit "A")
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed
and the defendant-appellee, administratrix of the estate of
Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver one-half of the
properties adjudicated o Maxima Santos as her share in the
conjugal properties in said Civil Case No. 6707, entitled
"Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos
Vda. de Blas, Administradora", to the heirs and the legatees of
her husband Simeon Blas. Considering that all said heirs and
legatees, designated in the will of Simeon Blas as the persons for
whose benefit Exhibit "A" had been executed, have not appeared
in these proceedings, the record is hereby remanded to the court
below, with instructions that, after the conveyance of the
properties hereinabove ordered had been effected, the said heirs
and legatees (of Simeon Blas) file adversary pleadings to
determine the participation of each and every one of them in said
properties. Costs against the defendant- appellee Rosalina
Santos.
Padilla, Parades and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., concur in a separate opinion.
Bengzon, C.J., reserves his vote.
Concepcion, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Labrador, and would only
add that the doctrine in the decision of 8 October 1915 of the
Supreme Court of Spain, applied in the main opinion, is not a
mere accident nor an isolated instance, but one of a series of
decisions reaffirming the legal proposition therein laid down.
Thus, the Presiding Justice Castan of the Spanish Tribunal
Supremo, in volume 3 of his Treaties on Civil Law (1951 Edition,
page 344, footnote 2), observes that:
(2) IA sentencia de 16 de mayo de 1940 declare que
segun la doctrina sentada por el Tribunal Supremo en sua
fallos de 8 de Octubre de 1915 y 26 de Octubre de 1926
y por la Direction de los Registros en au resolution de 19
de mayo de 1917, la prohibition contenida en el art. 1271
se refiere unica y exclusivamente a los paetos sobre la
universalidad de una heren cia que, segun el art. 659, se
determine a la muerte del cau sante constituyendola
todos los bienes, derechos y obligaciones que por ella no
se hayan extinguido y no al pacto sobre bienes conocidos
y determinados, existentes cuando tal compromiso se
otorgo, en el dominio del cedente.
And in a later decision of 25 April 1951, the Supreme Court of
Spain once ore insisted on the rule that a successional
agreement concerning property already owned by the grantor at
the time the contract was perfected is not banned by, Article 1271
of the Spanish Civil Code according to Article 1847 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines):
CONSIDERANDO: Que el tercer motive del recurso de
doa M. G. G., y el sexto del formulado por doa D. G.
G., hacen roferencia a la ultima de las tres cuestiones
que son ob jato del debate en ambos recurso

interpuestos esto es la dis cutida cesion que las

hermanas senoras G. G., hoy recurrentes, hicieron a
doa C. A. de la mitad de los bienes muebles e innuebles
que recibiesen por herencia de doa M. P.,procedentes
de la de doa M. A. P., antes N., consignada en
documents privado de fecha 2 de noviembre de 1929,
firmado y reconocida su autenticidad por las tres senoras
interesa das, cuya validez y eficacia es objeto de la
cuarta pieza de los presentee autos acumulados y si se
examination con determiento el documento aludido y el
acto que en el se consigna habra de advertirse de modo
notorio que se halla afectado de vicio de nulidad porque
su objeto son unos bienes que clara mente se petpresa
que han de entrar en el patrimonio de las cendentes
mediantes una transmission hereditaria, lo que conatituye
el pacto sobre herencia futura prohibido por el parrafo
segundo del articulo 1271 del Codigo Civil, ya que no se
concreta sobre bienes conocido y determinados,
existentes en el del cedents cuando el compromiso de
otorgo, sino que se refiem a la universalidad de que
habrian de adra la muerte del causante sentido en el que
conforme a la jurisprudencia de esta Sala es de plena
aplicacion la norma a tiva antes citada, y al no haberio asi
entendido la Sala de instancia, ha incurrido en la
infmccion de interpreter erro to y por ello ha hecho
aplicacion de indebida de dicho precepto y precede la
estimacion de los motivo que aprincipio se citan y que
denuncian la estimada infraccion, produciendo la
casacion de la sentencia recurrida en el extremo a que
los dichos motives se refieren. (Sentencia 25 abril 1951)
(Emphasis Supplied)
It can thus be seen that the constant authoritative in interpretation
of the prohibition against agreements involving future inheritance
requires not only that a future succession be contemplated but
also that the subject matter of the bargain should be either the
universality or complex or mass of property owned by the grantor
at the time of his death, or else an aliquot portion thereof. Castan,

in his Treaties already mentioned, sums up the rulings in this

wise:
Por otra parte, se ha de entender: 1. Que la cesion
oenajenacion de los derechos hereditarios puede bacerse
una vez falle cido el causante, aunque no se haya
entrado en possession matetrial de los bienes 2. Que la
prohibition legal se refiere solo a los contratos concluidos
sobre la herencia misma o alguna de sus cuotas, no
sobre objetos aislados que, eventualmente, hayan de
adquirirse a virtud de la herencia.
It has been contended that the doctrine thus stated confuses
future inheritance (herencia futura) with futureproperty (bienes
futuros). This is a misapprehension. In construing the term "future
inheritance" as the contingent universality or complex of property
rights and obligations that are passed to the heirs upon the death
of the grantor, the rule advocated merely correlates the
prohibition against contracts over "future inheritance" with the
definition of "inheritance" given in Article 659 of the Spanish Civil
Code, which is now Article 776 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by
his death.
The inheritance of a person may, and usually does, include not
only property that he already owns at a given time, but also his
future property, that is to say, the property that he may
subsequently acquire. But it may include only future property
whenever he should dispose of the present property before he
dies. And future inheritance may include only property he already
owns at any given moment, if he should thereafter acquire no
other property until his death. In any case, the inheritance or
estate cons of the totality of and liabilities he holds at the time of
his demise, and not what he at any other time. If the questioned
contract envisages all or a fraction of that contingent mass, then it

is a contract over herencia futurall otherwise it is not. The

statutory prohibition, in other words, is not so much concerned
with the process of transfer as with the subject matter of the
bargain. It is addressed to "future inheritance", not "future
succession".
Of course, it can be said that every single item of property that a
man should hold at any given instant of his life may become a
part of his inheritance if he keeps it long enough. But is that mere
possibility (or even probability) sufficient to do upon a contract
over an individual item of existing property the outlaw brand of
"contract over future inheritance"? If it should ever be, then no
agreement concerning present property can escape the legal
ban. No donation inter vivos, no reversionary clause, no
borrowing of money, and no alienation, not even a contract of
sale (or other contract in praisenti for that matter), with or without
deferred delivery, will avoid the reproach that it concerns or
affects the grantor's "future inheritance". It is permissible to doubt
whether the law ever contemplated the sweeping away of the
entire contractual system so carefully regulated in the Code.
The restrictive interpretation given by the Spanish Supreme Court
to the codal prohibition of agreements involving future inheritance
is justified not only by the fact that the prohibition limits
contractual freedom (and therefore, should not be given extensive
interpretation), but also because there is no real or substantial
difference between (1) an agreement whereby a person, for a
valuable consideration, agrees to bequeath some of the property
he already owns, and (2) a contract whereby he dispose of that
property, subject to the condition that he will be entitled to its
usufruct until the time he dies. The court has repeatedly
sanctioned even donations inter vivoswherein the donor has
reserved to elf the right to enjoy the donated property for the
remainder of his days, and riders the actual transfer of on to the
time of his death (Guzman vs. Ibea 67 Phil. 633; Balagui vs
Dongso, 53 Phil. 673; Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil. 668). Whatever
objection is raised against the effects of the first kind of contracts
can be made to apply to the second.

Mature reflection will show that where present (existing) property

is the object of the bargain, all arguments brandished against
Conventions over future succession (post mortem) are just as
applicable to other contracts de praesenti with deferred
execution, the validity of which has never been questioned. Thus,
the loss of the power to bequeath the bargained property to
persons of the grantor's choice, and the awakening of the
grantee's desire for the early death of the grantor (the Roman
"votum mortis captandae") in order to obtain prompt control of the
contracted goods, occur in both cases. In truth, the latter ground
would bar even a contract of life insurance in favor of a stated
beneficiary. It may also be noted that since the later part of the
nineteenth century, the civilists have recognized that the progress
in social relations has rendered such objections obsolete (Puig
Pea, Derecho Civil, Vol. V, part I, 613 et seq.).
But where the contract involves the universality of the estate that
will be left at a person's death (the "herencia future" as
understood by the Spanish Tribunal Supreno), there is another
reason which I believe to be the true justification for the legal
interdiction, and it is this: that if a man were to be allowed to
bargain away all the property he expects to leave behind (i.e., his
estate as a whole), he would practically remain without any
incentive to practice thrift and frugality or to conserve and invest
his earnings and property. He would then be irresistibly drawn to
be a wasteful spend-thrift, a social parasite, without any regard
for his future, because whatever he leaves belong to another by
virtue of his contract. The disastrous effects upon family and
society if such agreements were to be held binding can be readily
imagined. Hence, the interpretation given to Article 1271 (now Art.
1347) by the Supreme Court of Spain appears amply supported
by practical reasons, and there is no ground to deny its
application.
Much emphasis has been placed on the provisions of the contract
Exhibit "A" that the widow, Maxima Santos de Blas, would
execute a testament in favor of the appellees. To me this is purely
secondary, since it is merely the method selected by the parties

for carrying out the widow's agreement to convey to the appellees

the property in question without her losing its enjoyment during
her natural life, and does not affect the substance or the validity
of the transaction. To ensure the widow's possession of the
property and the perception of its fruits while she was alive the
means logically selected was to return it by will, since such a
conveyance could only be operative after death. There might be a
doubt as to the validity of this arrangement if the widows promise
had been purely gratuitous, because then it could be argued that
the promise involved a hybrid donation mortis causa yet
irrevocable;1 but here the obligation to return is concededly
irrevocable and supported by adequate consideration duly
received in advance.
Since the agreement in the instant case did not refer to the future
estate of the widow of Blas, but only to part of her present
property at the time the contract was made; since the promise to
retransfer one-half of her conjugal share was supported by
adequate consideration as shown in the main decision; since the
contract obviated protracted litigation and complicated accounting
in settling the conjugal partnership of Blas and his first
(deceased) wife; and since the testament that the widow
promised to make was merely the mode chosen to perform the
contract and carry out the promised devolution of the property,
being thus of secondary importance, I can see no reason for
declaring the entire arrangement violative of the legal interdiction
of contracts over future inheritance, and disappoint the legitimate
expectation held by the heirs of the first wife during all these
years.

BARRERA, J., concurring:

It seems to me clear that the document Exhibit "A", basis of the
action of the plaintiffs-appellants, refers specifically to and affects

solely the share of the grantor Maxima Santos in the conjugal

properties as determined and specified in the will of her husband
Simeon Blas, whose provisions, which she expressly
acknowledged to have read and understood, constitute the raison
d'etre of her promise to deliver or convey, by will, one-half of that
specific share to the heirs and legatees named in her husband's
will (who are his heirs by his first marriage). Nowhere in the
document Exhibit "A" is there reference, to hereditary estate that
she herself would leave behind at the time of her own demise
which legally would be her "future inheritance." For this reason, I
believe the contractual obligation assumed by Maxima Santos in
virtue of Exhibit "A" does not come within the prohibition of Article
1271 of the Spanish Civil Code, now Article 1347 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
I, therefore, concur in the opinions of Justices Labrador and
Reyes.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., dissenting:

While I agree with the theory that the document Exhibit "A" does
not involve a contract on future inheritance but a promise made
by Maxima Santos to transmit one-half of her share in the
conjugal property acquired during her marriage to Simeon Blas to
the heirs and legatees of the latter, I am however of the opinion
that herein appellants have no cause of action because Maxima
Santos has Substantially complied with her promise.
It should be noted that Maxima Santos' promise to transmit is
predicated on the condition that she can freely choose and select
from among the heirs and legatees of her husband those to
whom she would like to give and bequeath depending on the
respect, service and companionship that they may render to her.
Her commitment is not an absolute promise to give to all but only

to whom she may choose and select. And here this promise has
been substantially complied with.
Thus, it appears that Maxima Santos selected eight such heirs
and legatees instituted in the will of her husband. Note that
appellant Marta Gervacio Bias, who has given a legacy of only
P38,000.00 in the will of Simeon Blas, who was given by her a
legacy worth around P400,000.00, appellants Loida Gervacio
Blas (or Luding Blas) and Leoncio (Leony) Gervacio Blas were
given a legacy of P300.00 each every year to last during their
lifetime; And Lorenzo Santos was given a legacy of two fishponds
and one-tenth of the whole residuary estate. It may be stated that
although appellant Maria Gervacio Blas was not given any legacy
in Maxima Santos' will, yet her son Simeon Dungao was given a
legacy of a residential land in Tonsuya, Malabon.
I, therefore, consider not in keeping with the nature of the pledge
made by Maxima Santos the decision of the majority in ordering
her administratrix to convey and deliver one-half of her share in
the conjugal property to all the heirs and legatees of her husband
Simeon Blas, because only such heirs and legatees are entitled
to share in the property as may be selected by Maxima Santos,
and this she has already done. For these reasons, I dissent.
--------------

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 12099 October 30, 1997

MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN

AGAPE, ESTEBANA GALOLO, and CELSA
AGAPE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondent.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Unless legally flawed, a testator's intention in his last will and
testament is its "life and soul" which deserves reverential
observance.
The controversy before us deals with such a case.
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes,
Lyn Agape, Marites Agape, Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape,
the oppositors in Special Proceedings No. 112 for the probate of
the will of Torcuato J. Reyes, assail in this petition for review the
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated November 29, 1995, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, the judgment
appealed from allowing or admitting the will of
Torcuato J. Reyes to probate and directing the
issuance of Letters Testamentary in favor of
petition Julio A. Vivares as executor without bond
is AFFIRMED but modified in that the declaration
that paragraph II of the Torcuato Reyes' last will
and testament, including subparagraphs (a) and
(b) are null and void for being contrary to law is
hereby SET ASIDE, said paragraph II and
subparagraphs (a) and (b) are declared VALID.
Except as above modified, the judgment appealed
from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 2
The antecedent facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and
testament declaring therein in part, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion
"Oning" R. Reyes the following properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties
consisting among others of jewelries, coins,
antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures
and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or
50% of all the real estates I own in common with
my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of
Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in
Camigiun; real estates in Lunao, Gingoog,
Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc,
Kinoguitan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Talisay, all in the
province of Misamis Oriental. 3
The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato
Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria
Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A.
Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or
incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private
respondent filed a petition for probate of the will before the
Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The petition was set
for hearing and the order was published in the Mindanao Daily
Post, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three

consecutive weeks. Notices were likewise sent to all the persons

named in the petition.
On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato
Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all
surnamed Reyes, and the deceased's natural children with Celsa
Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with
the following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of
Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the
formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted
undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the
execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes
was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the
woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter
was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and
their marriage was never annulled. Thus, Asuncion can not be a
compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was
violative of public morals.
On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an order declaring that it
had Acquired jurisdiction over the petition and, therefore, allowed
the presentation of evidence. After the presentation of evidence
and submission of the respective memoranda, the trial court
issued its decision on April 23, 1993.
The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law. It, however, ruled that
Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was
never married to the deceased Reyes and, therefore, their
relationship was an adulterous one.
Thus:

The admission in the will by the testator to the

illicit relationship between him and ASUNCION
REYES EBARLE who is somebody else's wife, is
further bolstered, strengthened, and confirmed by
the direct testimonies of the petitioner himself and
his two "attesting" witnesses during the trial.
In both cases, the common denominator is the
immoral, meretrecious, adulterous and illicit
relationship existing between the testator and the
devisee prior to the death of the testator, which
constituted the sole and primary consideration for
the devise or legacy, thus making the will
intrinsically invalid. 4
The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for
paragraph II (a) and (b) of the will which was declared null
and void for being contrary to law and morals. Hence,
Julio Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals
with the allegation that the oppositors failed to present
any competent evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally
married to another person during the period of her
cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.
On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals
promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed the trial
court's decision admitting the will for probate but with the
modification that paragraph II including subparagraphs (a)
and (b) were declared valid. The appellate court stated:
Considering that the oppositors never showed any
competent, documentary or otherwise during the
trial to show that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes'
marriage to the testator was inexistent or void,
either because of a pre-existing marriage or
adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely
erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of
the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for

being contrary to law and morals. Said

declarations are not sufficient to destroy the
presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to
overcome the very declaration of the testator that
Asuncion Reyes is his wife. 5
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
oppositors filed this petition for review.
Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusion of the
Court of Appeals was contrary to law, public policy and
evidence on record. Torcuato Reyes and Asuncion
"Oning" Reyes were collateral relatives up to the fourth
civil degree. Witness Gloria Borromeo testified that Oning
Reyes was her cousin as her mother and the latter's
father were sister and brother. They were also nieces of
the late Torcuato Reyes. Thus, the purported marriage of
the deceased Reyes and Oning Reyes was void ab
initio as it was against public policy pursuant to Article 38
(1) of the Family Code. Petitioners further alleged that
Oning Reyes was already married to Lupo Ebarle at the
time she was cohabiting with the testator hence, she
could never contract any valid marriage with the latter.
Petitioners argued that the testimonies of the witnesses
as well as the personal declaration of the testator, himself,
were sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. To
further support their contention, petitioners attached a
copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and
Lupo Ebarle. 6
The petition is devoid of merit.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are
limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated. 7 Thus, the court merely inquires on
its due execution, whether or not it complies with the
formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity
of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication

prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will's provisions. 8 The

intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration
thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved
and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances
wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when
the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate
of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is
intrinsically invalid. 9 The intrinsic validity of a will may be
passed upon because "practical considerations" demanded it
as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary
provisions are of doubtful legality. 10 Where the parties agree
that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate
court may also do so. 11 Parenthetically, the rule on probate
is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what
the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the will. 12

The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition

for the probate of the will of the late Torcuato Reyes.
Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said
proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator
had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of consent
attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether or not
the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus,
the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic
validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result,
the declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning"
Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during
the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of
Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already
involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and which
need not be inquired upon by the probate court.
The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling
in Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 206) in
the instant case. In the case aforesaid, the testator
himself, acknowledged his illicit relationship with the
devisee, to wit:

Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as

man and wife, with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno,
whom I declared and avow to be entitled to my
love an [sic] affection, for all the things which she
has done for me, now and in the past; that while
Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge
and consent, did comfort and represent myself as
her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in
the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in
the holy bonds of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage.
Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing of the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage. 13 To remand the case would only be a waste
of time and money since the illegality or defect was already
patent. This case is different from the Nepomuceno case.
Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was
bequeathing some of his personal and real properties to his
wife, Asuncion "Oning" Reyes. There was never an open
admission of any illicit relationship. In the case of
Nepomuceno, the testator admitted that he was already
previously married and that he had an adulterous
relationship with the devisee.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that
Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the
time she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of
the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain
as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the
supposed husband of Asuncion. Thus:
The foregoing testimony cannot go against the
declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning"
Reyes is his wife. In Alvarado v. City Government
of Tacloban (supra) the Supreme Court stated that

the declaration of the of the husband is competent

evidence to show the fact of marriage.
Considering that the oppositors never showed any
competent evidence, documentary or otherwise
during the trial to show that Asuncion "Oning"
Reyes' marriage to the testator was inexistent or
void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or
adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely
erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of
the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for
being contrary to law and morals. Said
declarations are not sufficient to destroy the
presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to
overcome the very declaration of the testator that
Asuncion Reyes is his wife. 14
In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written
decades ago, he
said
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its
provisions have substantially the same force and
effect in the probate court as if the testator stood
before the court in full life making the declarations
by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That
was the special purpose of the law in the creation
of the instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after they were
dead and the law, by the creation of that
instrument, permitted them to do so. . . . All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's
having meant just what he said. (Santos vs.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of
Appeals by presenting belatedly a copy of the marriage
certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their

failure to present the said certificate before the probate

court to support their position that Asuncion Reyes had an
existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a waiver and the
same evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal,
much less in this petition for review. This Court would not
try the case anew or settle factual issues since its
jurisdiction is confined to resolving questions of law which
have been passed upon by the lower courts. The settled
rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court will
not be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the
evidence on the record, which petitioners have not shown
in this case. 15
Considering the foregoing premises, we sustain the
findings of the appellate court it appearing that it did not
commit a reversible error in issuing the challenged
decision.
ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed from dated November
29, 1995, is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition for
review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
--------------

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ,
OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO,respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now intermediate
Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the
resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null and void the
devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated
December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last
Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the Will on
page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in
the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and
Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the
attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of
the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the
Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary
Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting
witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein
petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of
his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was
legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had
been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living
with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5,
1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.
Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice

of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his
legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his
entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The
Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs,
namely: my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina
Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter
Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare
and admit to be legally and properly entitled to
inherit from me; that while I have been estranged
from my above-named wife for so many years, I
cannot deny that I was legally married to her or
that we have been separated up to the present for
reasons and justifications known fully well by
them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living,
as man and wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno,
whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love
and affection, for all the things which she has
done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia
J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and
consent, did comport and represent myself as her
own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the
eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the
holy bonds of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate
of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and
asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez
and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the
execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the

execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that
petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the
testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary
should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the
Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to
cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death
on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle
exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its
intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will.
The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the
devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article
739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set
aside, the will in question declared valid except
the devise in favor of the appellant which is
declared null and void. The properties so devised
are instead passed on in intestacy to the appellant
in equal shares, without pronouncement as to
cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children
filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the
word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of
the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The
properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to
the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to
costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on
August 10, 1982.

On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court in a
resolution dated December 28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the
respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after
declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin
Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after

declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the
petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area
of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the
extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary

provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the
probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the
only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively
as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities
required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity to
execute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could
only be made by the proper court in a separate action brought by
the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of
the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the
person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or
concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the
last Will and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its
face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the
petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the
presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil
status of the testator, which led private respondents to present
contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine
enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449)
and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al.(G.R. No. L39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the
admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and
the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise. We agree with
the respondents.

... It is elementary that a probate decree finally

and definitively settles all questions concerning
capacity of the testator and the proper execution
and witnessing of his last Will and testament,
irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v.
Dimagiba,21 SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of a Will,
the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic
validity thereof. The testators testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the formal
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the
only questions presented for the resolution of the
court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality
of any devise or legacy is premature.
xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the
dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is
one thing; the validity of the testamentary
provisions is another. The first decides the
execution of the document and the testamentary
capacity of the testator; the second relates to

descent and distribution (Sumilang v.

Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone,
and once for all, the facts that a will was executed
with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the
only purpose of the proceedings under the new
code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The
judgment in such proceedings determines and
can determine nothing more. In them the court
has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for
example, that a certain legacy is void and another
one valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to
do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the
testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely
preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no
matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and
void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court
in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the
validity of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred

in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will,
before ruling on its allowance or formal validity,
and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain
unusual provisions of the will, which are of
dubious legality, and because of the motion to
withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower
court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted
correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity
even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become
an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs.
Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21
SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30,
1965, 13 SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the
extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will
of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by
law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his
Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the
respondent court when in resolving the question of whether or not
the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's
last Will and Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn.
(Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the
Court of Appeals' decision in toto.

The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent

court to declare the testamentary provision in favor of the
petitioner as null and void.

(2) Those made between persons found guilty of

the same criminal offense, in consideration
thereof;

We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated

in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):

(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife,

descendants and ascendants, by reason of his
office.

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be

remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the
record, in the record, in the event of probate or if
the court rejects the will, probability exists that the
case will come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we
might as well meet head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question.
(Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v.
Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the
nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that
purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does
not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty
of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation;

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for

declaration of nullity may be brought by the
spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the
donor and donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or
almost six years before the testator's death on July 16, 1974,
Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal
wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He
also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo
were his legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated that he had
been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952.
Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love
and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as
her own husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of
the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony
because of my aforementioned previous marriage.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior
existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is
also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in
an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.

It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia

J. Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the Justice of the
Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while
the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in
good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to
the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith.
As argued by the private respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly
admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and petitioner,
the devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the
presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance
of the true civil status of the testator, which led
private respondents to present contrary evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the
intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to
petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of
the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin
Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and wife,
as already married, was an important and specific
issue brought by the parties before the trial court,
and passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic
validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to
present evidence on her alleged good faith in
marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner,
TSN of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).

Private respondents, naturally, presented

evidence that would refute the testimony of
petitioner on the point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased
testator, testified at length on the meretricious
relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of
August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option
of the parties made a decisive issue right at the
inception of the case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to
make a ruling on the question.
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin
Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty of
adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that
petitioner was not the innocent woman she
pretended to be.
xxx xxx xxx
3. If a review of the evidence must be made
nonetheless, then private respondents
respectfully offer the following analysis:
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner
with the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac
where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If
there was nothing to hide from, why the
concealment' ? Of course, it maybe argued that
the marriage of the deceased with private
respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in
secrecy. But it should be remembered that Rufina
Gomez was already in the family way at that time

and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo

were not in favor of the marriage so much so that
an action in court was brought concerning the
marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of
August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)

Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez,

considering that the houses of the parents of
Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years)
and that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a
few meters away?

SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the

deceased testator when they were still both
single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo
married respondent Rufina Gomez on November
29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator
only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of
about 30 years in between. During those 30
years, could it be believed that she did not even
wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor
contact her anymore after November, 1923 - facts
that should impel her to ask her groom before she
married him in secrecy, especially so when she
was already about 50 years old at the time of
marriage.

Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno

are unbelievable. They are, to say the least,
inherently improbable, for they are against the
experience in common life and the ordinary
instincts and promptings of human nature that a
woman would not bother at all to ask the man she
was going to marry whether or not he was already
married to another, knowing that her groom had
children. It would be a story that would strain
human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not
know that Martin Jugo was already a married man
in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely
his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led
petitioner to break off with the deceased during
their younger years.

THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from

Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive
demonstration that she new that the man she had
openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a
married man with already two children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the
children of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it
possible that she would not have asked Martin
Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or
legitimate children and by whom? That is unFilipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the
residence of the parents of the deceased testator,
is it possible that she would not have known that
the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and

Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against

the making of a donation between persons who are living in
adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void.
The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may
receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to
a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate
Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
--------------

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7188

August 9, 1954

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND

SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitionersappellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G.
Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of
Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will
and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of
Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of
Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties
estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres
Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its
probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and
nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left
no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two
being dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence
and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out
in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and
understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the

front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the

document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic
numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at
the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said
three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the
attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each
other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a
holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and
that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still,
because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be
decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code
permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view,
and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to
the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect
in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted
to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father
Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision;
and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the
case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810
thereof provides that a person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator
himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at
the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time
that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not
permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements
for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each
page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand
margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses,
requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A"
because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not
signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not

numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only
by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case
of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the
failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand
margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the
testament. It is not enough that the signatures
guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios
or leaves; three pages having been written on, the
authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by
the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the
same requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it
appears that the left margins of the six pages of the
document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The
noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the
attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator
at the left margin of each of the five pages of the
document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a
fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply
the provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic
wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the
appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795
of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a
will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in
force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an
expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect
that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at
the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is

presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by

the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates
upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator
about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the
legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is
executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a
completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the
case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine
and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator
should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate
remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to
carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the
execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the
formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said
subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of
execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the
death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees
and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under
the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent
change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution
of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning,
when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe
and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then
upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having
died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate
succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to
execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and
thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by
intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can
not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and
Exhibit "A" is denied probate. With costs.

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