ALAWI V.

ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing
loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his
consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against
him. One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney
Held:
He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members
of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who
has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine
Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who
are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

CUI V. CUI
Facts:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the
spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge,
of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons. It acquired corporate
existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to
the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to such persons as they
may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the
spouses deed of donation)
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the
sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna
Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of
Antonio Cui pursuant to a convenio entered into between them that was embodied on
a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the convenio or
of his brothers assumption of the position.
Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother
Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not
complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicios administrator.
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred
pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be,
applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil
engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the
Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about
two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.
The term titulo de abogado means not mere possession of the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelors degree alone, conferred by a law
school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to
exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university,
officially approved by the Secretary of Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of
the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the
office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was
disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he
was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is
recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his
admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of
lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were
wiped out.

In Re: Almacen
FACTS:
Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title, filed on
Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is a great injustice
committed against his client by Supreme Court. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as
a tribunal peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity. His clients he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by
this Courts unjust judgment, has become one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy.
He ridicules the members of the Court, saying that justice as administered by
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.
He then vows to argue the cause of his client in the peoples forum, so that people
may know of the silent injustices committed by this court and that whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated. He ends his
petition with a prayer that: a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to
receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in
the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the
practice of the noblest profession.
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in
which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment
agains his client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision.
Twenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the
time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff
moved for execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of service, the trial court denied
both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion
for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966,
upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had
already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of
Appeals.
HELD:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this
right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen.Atty. Almacen
is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

In Re Garcia
2 SCRA 985
Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils.
without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers
among others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He
finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in
spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of
profession
between
the
republic
of
the
phils.
Issue:
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.
Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic
degrees between the republic of the Philippines and Spanish state cannot be invoked
by the applicant. The said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to
practice their profession in Spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the
laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for
the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the
Philippines. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to
the congress of the Philippines.