People

v Delantar
G.R. No. 169143 | February 2, 2007
J. Tinga

FACTS
In August 1996, accused Simplicio Delantar was
indicted for violating RA 7610 for selling in
prostitution his putative daughter, AAA, to an
Arab national and for pimping and delivering
AAA, who was then 11 years of age to
Congressman Jalosjos. He entered a plea of not
guilty and trial proceeded in due course. The
RTC found accused guilty, for two counts, of
violation of RA 7610. The CA upheld the decision
except that the appellate court ruled Delantar
should be convicted for one count only. The case
reached the SC where accused appellant decried
the imposition of the maximum penalty when in
fact there was no showing of the qualifying
circumstance of filial relationship between him
and AAA.
ISSUE
WON there is a filial relationship between
Delantar and AAA
HELD
No. The SC held that the birth certificate of AAA,
which did not contained Delantars signature, is
prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth
and not of her relation to appellant. After all, it is
undisputed that appellant is not AAAs biological
father. Further, according to the maxim noscitur
a sociis, the correct construction of a word or
phrase susceptible of various meanings may be
made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is found or with
which it
is associated 87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610
contains a listing of the circumstances of
relationship between the perpetrator and the
victim which will justify the imposition of the
maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator
is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or
collateral relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that
the words with which "guardian" is associated in

the provision all denote a legal relationship.

From this description we may safely deduce that
the guardian envisioned by law is a person who
has a legal relationship with a ward. This
relationship may be established either by being
the wards biological parent (natural guardian)
or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is
neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs
adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the
"guardian" contemplated by law.

San Pablo Manufacturing Corp v CIR
GR. No 147749 | June 22, 2006
J. Corona

FACTS
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) is
a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of milling, manufacturing and exporting of
coconut oil and other allied products. It was
assessed and ordered to pay by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue millers tax
and manufacturers sales tax, among other
deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987
particularly on SPMCs sales of crude oil to
United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM)
while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its
sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured
products. SPMC opposed the assessments. The
Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed
the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition for review.
docketed as CTA Case No. 5423. It insists on the
liberal application of the rules because, on the
merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for
the 3% millers tax. It maintains that the crude
oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually
exported by UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty
acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to millers
tax pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax
Code. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMCs
milled products, subsequently exported said
products, SPMC should be exempted from the
millers tax.

ISSUE
Whether or not SPMCs sale of crude coconut oil
to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% millers task.
HELD
Yes. The language of the exempting clause of
Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The
tax exemption applied only to the exportation of
rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products
and dessicated coconuts, whether in their
original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products, by the
proprietor or operator of the factory or by the
miller himself. Where the law enumerates the
subject or condition upon which it applies, it is
to be construed as excluding from its effects all
those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not
included in the enumeration is excluded
therefrom and a meaning that does not appear
nor is intended or reflected in the very language
of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature
would not have made specific enumerations in a
statute if it had the intention not to restrict its
meaning and confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned. The rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive
interpretation. Its application in this case is
consistent with the construction of tax
exemptions in strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer. To allow SPMCs claim for tax
exemption will violate these established
principles and unduly derogate sovereign
authority.

People v Tamani
GR Nos. L-22160-61 | January 31, 1974
J. Aquino

FACTS
On February 14, 1963, the lower court found
Tamani guilty of consummated and attempted
murder. On February 25, 1963, Tamanis counsel
received a copy of the decision and consequently
filed for a motion for reconsideration on March

1, 1963. It was denied. On July 13, 1963, the

lower court sent a denial order to the counsel
through his wife via registered mail. On
September 10, 1963, the said counsel appealed
the lower courts decision. Then, the appellees
argued that the appeal should be dismissed
contending that the appeal should have been
made up to July 24, 1963 which is the 15 day
period of appeal from the date of notice and not
from the date of promulgation. Thus, the
appellees claimed that the appeal was filed 47
days late.
ISSUE
Whether the 15-day period should commence
from the date of promulgation or from the date
of notice of the decision.
HELD
No. The 15-day period should commence from
the date of promulgation. Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court provides, an appeal must be taken
within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or
notice of the judgment or order appealed from.
This period for perfecting an appeal shall be
interrupted from the time a motion for new trial
is filed until notice of the order overruling the
motion shall have been served upon the defendant
or his attorney. The assumption that the fifteenday period should be counted from February 25,
1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly
served on appellant's counsel by registered mail,
is not well-taken. The word "promulgation" in
section 6 should be construed as referring to
"judgment" while the word "notice" should be
construed as referring to "order". That
construction is sanctioned by the rule of
reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to
each; referring each phrase or expression to its
appropriate object", or "let each be put in its
proper place, that is, the words should be taken
distributively". Therefore, when the order
denying appellant's motion for reconsideration
was served by registered mail on July 13th on
appellant's counsel, he had only 1 day within
which to file his notice of appeal and not 11
days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed
on September 10, 1963, was 58 days late.