Nerwin Industries Corporation vs.

PNOC-Energy Development Corporation

DOCTRINE: NCC Art. 5 and Art. 17 Paragraph 3
FACTS:
In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to prequalify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and
delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand
(20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the countrys Rural Electrification Project.
There were four (4) qualified bidders that submitted their financial bids. Among the four,
Nerwin emerged as the lowest bidder. Therefore, Nerwin won the bid for the IBP-80
contract.
However, on December 19, 2000, NEAs Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32
reducing by 50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 due to time limitations and
delivery concerns. Nerwin protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that it was a ploy to
accommodate a losing bidder.
Meanwhile, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy filed a complaint, citing
alleged false or falsified documents submitted during the pre-qualification stage which led
to the award of the IBP-80 project to Nerwin.
NEA officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel (GCC). The GCC
upheld the eligibility and qualification of Nerwin and said that there was no legal
impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to Nerwin.
Despite the advice of the GCC, NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for the
IPB-80 contract. This prompted Nerwin to pray for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
against NEA. The preliminary injunction against NEA was issued by Branch 36 of RTCManila.
Meanwhile, PNOC, purporting to be under the Department of Energy, issued an invitation
to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project
(O-ILAW Project).
This led Nerwin to file a civil action in the RTC in Manila, alleging that PNOC was
attempting to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding;
Nerwin also prayed that a TRO be issued to block PNOCs proposed bidding for the wooden
poles.
PNOC claimed that the TRO was invalid because it violated RA 8975 stating that
government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs. The RTC in Manila
disagreed and went on to issue the TRO which blocked PNOCs proposed bidding
PNOC went to the Court of Appeals (CA) and filed a special civil action for certiorari. CA
ruled that the RTC in Manila had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the preliminary injunction against NEA and in issuing the
subsequent TRO against PNOC, in violation of Rep. Act 8975. In other words, the CA
annulled both the preliminary injunction and the TRO.
Nerwin then appealed to the Supreme Court (SC).
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of RA 8975 prohibiting
the issuance of TROs and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on
government projects
HELD: SC affirms the decision of CA to annul both the preliminary injunction and the TRO
RATIO:
Section 3 of RA 8975 expressly prohibits all courts (except SC) to issue any restraining
orders/injunctions against government infrastructure projects. Section 4 of RA 8975 says that any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in
violation of Section 3 is void and of no force and effect. The RTC judge could not have been
unaware of RA 8975 considering that the SC had itself instructed all judges and justices of the
lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with the prohibition of

TROs/injunctions against contracts and projects of the government. Although judges have, in
their favour, the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of their judicial
functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this
presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative sanctions. In resolving matters in
litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws.
Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. Also, they are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules
and the circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted and which affect the disposition of cases
before them.
VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 151258
February 1, 2012, Sereno
FACTS: In 1991, Leonardo Lenny Villa died from the beatings and injuries he sustained while taking part in the initiation
rites of the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity. He was pronounced death on arrival when rushed to the hospital on the second
night of the 3-day initiation rites. Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans, including
Fidelito Dizon.
Initially, on November 8, 1993, Dizon was one of the 26 accused judged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide by the trial court. On January 10, 2002, the CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified
the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accordingly, 19 of the 26 accused
appellants were acquitted; 4, found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries; and two, one of which is Dizon were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
Aggrieved of the CAs decision, Dizon filed a petition for review claiming that (a) he was denied due process when the CA
sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence which is granted by Section 14 (2) od Article 3 of the
Constitution; and (b) he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same ratio decidindi that
served as basis of acquittal of the other accused.
For the first issue, the trial court in its order dated July 28, 1993 set the dates for the reception of evidence for Dizon on
the 8th, 15th and 22nd of September and 5th and 12 of October 1993. Said order also provided that the court will not
entertain any postponement, all accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all
times down the line and that failure on their to present evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to
present evidence.
The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on August 25, 1993 since one of the other accused, Antonio General,
no longer presented separate evidence during trial. However, Dizon was not able to present his evidence. The trial court
thus, considered such a waiver of that right.
Dizon proffers that he was justified in asking for postponement he did not ask for a resetting of any hearing dates and he
was ready to present evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule. The trial court erred in accelerating the presentation
of evidence.
Anent the second issue, Dizon contends that he should have likewise been acquitted since his acts in the additional
paddling session were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives.
ISSUES
WON the forfeiture of Petitioner Dizons
right to present evidence constitutes denial
of due process

DECISION
YES. The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner
to present evidence as a waiver of his right to present evidence.
Citing Crisostomo vs Sandiganbayan: while constitutional rights may
be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an
actual intention to relinquish the right. The petitioner did not voluntarily
waive in person or even through counsel the right to present
evidence.
The court should have considered the excuse of the counsel justified
and if it wants its order strictly enforced, the most it could have done
is to forfeit one of the days set for Dizons testimonial evidence.
Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a

ISSUES

DECISION
patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.

Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)

Facts:
RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the formation of
ARMM. Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact date for the regional
elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted to provide for the date of the
election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140November 26, 2001, RA 9333
2nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but sometime in
June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the synchronization of the elections in
ARMM with the national and local elections.
Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said enactment.
Issue/s:
1.
WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore should not
be required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the constitution.
2.
WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the power to
appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions be filled during the May 2013
elections.
Held:
1.
No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the
synchronization of election. SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the
enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading Local Government
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the
forms of local governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the national government and the local governments, and
does not make a distinction between the local government and the regional government, is
particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of government, but as political units
which, while having more powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain
under the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local
governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local
elections.
2.
Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there
is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and
autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA

No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower
officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power of
control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter.
The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control over the OICs is
rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment power includes the power to remove these
officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to
the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The provision
states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials
will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013
elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the
appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent
than real.

Virtucio v. Alegarbes G.R. No. 187451 - August 29, 2012

Gavieta, Kevin Anthony A.

Topic: Acquisition of ownership through acquisitive prescription

Facts:

Alegarbes filed homestead application for a 24-hectare land in Basilan in 1949. His application was
approved on 1952 but the land was later on subdivided into three lots as a consequence of a public land
subdivision. Lot Nos. 139 and 140 were allocated to Custodio and Virtucio respectively.

Alegarbes opposed the Homestead Applications filed by them but the Director of Lands denied the
protest. He appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources but was dismissed. He
sought relief from the Office of the President but the office affirmed the dismissal order of the SANR.

The Lands Management Bureau enforced the decision of the OP ordering Alegarbes to vacate the lot, but
he refused. Virtucio then filed a complaint before the RTC. The RTC rendered its decision in favour of
Virtucio ordering Alegarbes to vacate Lot No. 140 and surrender the possession and ownership to
plaintiff.

Alegarbes appealed his case before the CA. The CA ruled in favour of Alegarbes declaring him as the
ipso jure owner of Lot No. 140 through acquisitive prescription thereby reversing and setting aside the
decision of the RTC. Virtucio filed petition.

Issues:

Whether the decision of CA regarding the acquisition of ownership by Alegarbes through acquisitive
prescription can set aside the judgement of the RTC.

Whether the CA erred in disregarding the decision in CA-G.R. CV-26286 which contains same factual
circumstances as in the case and ruled against Alegarbes.

Whether the CA erred in deleting the award of attorney's fees to the petitioner

Held:
Petition denied.
Ratio:
On Acquisitive Prescription

Virtucio's reliance on Art. 1155 for purposes of tolling the period of acquisitive prescription is
misplaced. Art. 1155 refers to the Interruption of Prescription of Actions while Art. 1120-1125 refers to
the Interruption of Acquisitive Prescription

Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his homestead application interrupted the
thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive prescription however, the law and jurisprudence dictates that only a
judicial summons can effectively toll the period and only cases filed before the courts may judicial
summons be issued and thus, interrupt possession.

The conclusion made by the RTC was not substantially supported. Records reveal that there was no
issuance of any patent in favor of either parties. It means that the land subject of the controversy remains
to be in the name of the State. Therefore, there was no substantial and legal basis for the RTC to declare
that Virtucio was entitled to possession and ownership of Lot 140.

Alegarbes had applied for homestead patent as early as 1949. He had been in exclusive, open,
continuous and notorious possession of Lot 140 for at least 30 years.

The CA declared Alegarbes as owner ipso jure of Lot 140 and entitled to retain possession of it.

On the CA Decision involving a similar case

The subject property in the Custodio v. Alegarbes case was Lot 139 allocated to Custodio and Virtucio
was not party to that case. He cannot enjoy whatever benefits said favorable judgment may have had just
because it involved similar factual circumstances.

The court also found from the records that the period of acquisitive prescription in that case was
effectively interrupted by Custodio's filing of a complaint, which is wanting in this case.

The decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent. The Court agrees with the position of
Alegarbes that by Virtucio's insistence that it was erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier decision in

CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls upon this Court to adhere to that decision by invoking the stare
decisis principle, which is not legally possible because only final decisions of this Court are considered
precedents.

On deleting the award of attorney's fee

The Court need not dwell on the complaint since it is ludicrous for the CA to order Alegarbes to pay
after finding him to have acquired ownership over the property by acquisitive prescription.

Alonzo vs. IAC

Facts
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal a pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in
the name of their deceased parents
In 1963, Celestino Padua sold his undivided share to the petitioners for the sum of P550
In 1964, Eustaquia Padua sold her share to the petitioners for the sum of P440
Tecla Padua filed a complaint invoking her right of redemption to the said property
Trial court dismissed the case on the ground that the right had lapsed not having been
exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written
notice the co heirs have actual knowledge of the sales
The respondent court reversed the decision and declared that actual notice would not suffice as
substitute citing the cases of De Conejero and Butte, both cases conformed to a similar requirement
under Art. 1623 of NCC which provides that the notice must be in writing
Issue

W/N the SC should the case based on the strict letter of the law or to the spirit or intent of the
lawmakers in enacting the said law?
Ruling
SC deviated from the strict letter of the law .
They emphasized that themselves did not abandoned the DE Conejero and Buttle doctrines
they merely adopted an exception to the general rule.
The right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made.
Sc declared that by requiring written proof of such notice they will be favoring the palpable
false claim of ignorance of the petitioners, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose.
CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007
FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of
income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because
they suffered losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However,
despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding
tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999,
revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents to which
Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a
petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyonf the
2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC.
According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since
Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year,
the petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the
reglementary period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period
HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be
12 calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar
without regard to the number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of
1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled
for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period.

ATCIOverseasCorporationvs.Echin
Petition to review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners: ATCI Overseas Corporation, Amalia G. Ikdal, and Ministry of Public Health
Kuwait Respondent: Ma. Josefa Echin
FACTS:
Josefina Echin was hired by ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner,
the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of a two-year contract medical
technologist, with a monthly salary of $1,200.00. A Memorandum of Agreement was duly

signed, stating that all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one year, and
are covered by Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Echin was deployed in February 2000 and later on terminated February 2011 from
employment, not having, allegedly, passed the probationary period. Having been denied, she
returned to the Philippines, shouldering her own fare.
On July 2001, Echin then filed with the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC), a
complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI as the local recruitment agency, Amalia Ikdal, the
representative and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
In 2002, it was decided that respondent was illegally dismissed since the petitioners cannot
show that there was a just cause to warrant respondents dismissal or that she failed as a
qualified regular employee. Petitioners were ordered to pay US$3,600 representing her salary
for the three months unexpired portion of the contract.
In 2004, petitioners appealed to the CA, contending that the Ministry, being a foreign
government agency, is immune from suit and that respondent is validly dismissed because
her performance rating fall short of the standard set in the Kuwait Civil Service Laws. They
also contend that Ikdal, as an officer of ATCI, should not be liable.
The appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution. Under the law, a private employment
agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment
of an OW, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal. As for Ikdals,
it was held that under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, corporate officers, directors and partners of a
recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily viable. Thus, having been denied
by appellate court, they file another petition for review.
ISSUES:
Petitioners arguments are as follows:
1.

Since the respondents employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall
be governed by the CivilServiceLawandRegulationsofKuwait, application of the Labor Code
provisions by the labor tribunals and appellate court, is a patent error.

2.

That, even though, if the case is that the Philippine labor laws are applicable, petitioner ATCI

HELD:
cannot be held as jointly and solidarily liable taking into note that the foreign principal is
immune from suit.
Petition was denied.
RATIO:
ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of

Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of
claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit.
Republic Act No. 8042 protects and assures OFWs of immediate and sufficient payment of
what is due them.
As to petitioners contention that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not
applicable since the respondents contract specifically state that the terms of her employment
shall be governed by the Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations, the same was not
substantiated.
It is hornbook principle, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden
of proving the law, under the doctrine of processualpresumptionwhich, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge.
...Whereaforeignlawisnotpleadedor,evenifpleaded,isnotproved,thepresumptionisthatforeign
lawisthesameasours.Thus,weapplyPhilippinelaborlawsindeterminingtheissuespresented
beforeus.

RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE (2008)

[ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ]
FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton
W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines
for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured
a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and
Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of
employment contract.

On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for

damages before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint named as
defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two
corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written
agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as Special Sales
Representative Agreement, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by
thelaws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds
of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of
compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid
choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute namely, the
parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be
presented is located outside the Philippines that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS?
RULING:
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and
theres, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the
convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative
of the country where the case is filed.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein
respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in
court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by
the lawsof the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other
foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and
choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application
of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.The choice
of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case
develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioners averments of the foreign
elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of
defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on
this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the courts desistance.

G.R. No. 193902: June 01, 2011

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SAMSON R.
PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a
Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites
before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their
marriage was confirmedy theShari'aCircuitDistrictCourt,which issued a Decree of Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in her first nuptial to De
Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs
where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to strengthen the
ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before
Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De
Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam
Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the two
were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter
battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise
agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial
rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos
including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal and disbarment from the
civil service.
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor
Quiones, issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.
Consequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a decision in
favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan
City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage,
whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum was bigamous.
HELD: NO.
CIVIL LAW: Bigamous marriages, Muslim Divorce Law
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made
by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the
decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts.
The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Shari'a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over
the subject matter thereof.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken
cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim,

whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact,
the same court further declared that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage
ties.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is
evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites.
Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasum's claim that
Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously
far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower
courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while a
prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
should haveuspendedtheproceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De
Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been
dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective participation of the National
Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in
the formulation and implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense
defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition
bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable
talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and
Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled
her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try
Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao

CITATION: 34 SCRA 132
FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan
City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and
intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs
supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed
for support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed
by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff
moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby
girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint
averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive
donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were
already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn
violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not
his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she
is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against
appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

TITLE: Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante

CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission
issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing
said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims
that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the
Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the
purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the
exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of
Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending
application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No.
4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and
citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent
of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged
and decreed.

Marcos VS Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the
Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to
enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power
although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing
power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after

conviction by final judgment (Section 19),treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section
20), budgetary power(Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

Catalan VS Basa
G.R. No. 159567
July 31, 2007

FACTS
Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his psychological incapacity of schizophrenia on
October 20, 1948. He married Corazon Cerezo on September 1949. On June 1951 he donated a parcel of land to
his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano was declared incompetent and BPI was appointed as his
guardian. Mercedes sold the properties to herein respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian
filed an action or declaration of nullity od documents and recovery of possession and ownership alleging that the
donation to Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he effected the donation, ipso facto,
the sale to herein respondents are void ab initio.

ISSUE
Whether or not Felicianos donation is void for lack of consent due to incapacity.

RULING
In order for a donation to be valid, the donors capacity to give consent at the time of the donation is existing. There
lies no doubt that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However the burden of proving such incapacity rests
upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence
presented by petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he
donated the property in question. A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be
presumed capable of attending to his rights.

L-No. 1720. March 4, 1950

SIA SUAN AND GAW CHIAO, petitioners vs.RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent
Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao v. Alcantara
PETITION for review on certiorari a decision of the Court of Appeals Ponente: Paras, J.Topics: Minority, civil capacity,
restrictions on capacity to act FACTS
On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara, and his sons Damaso and Ramon conveying five (5)
parcels of land to Sia Suan.
At that time, Ramon was only 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old.
On August 27, 1931 (after 24 days), Gaw Chiao, husband of Sia Suan, received a letter from Atty. Francisco Alfonso
(Ramons attorney) informing that Ramon was a minor. Thus, the contract is void. (NCC Article 1327: The following
cannot give consent to a contract: (1) unemancipated minors; (2) insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not
know how to write.)
Gaw Chiao responded by requiring Ramon to execute a ratification of the sale while still a minor. Ramon received P500
from Gaw Chiao after ratifying the deed of sale.
On August 8, 1940, Ramon went to the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale (with
regard to parcels covered by title 751 and 752).
o The court absolved the defendants (Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao). Ramon went to the Court of Appeals (CA).
o The CA reversed the decision of the trial court given that the contract is not binding in view of Ramons minority
Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao took no step for nine years to protect their interest. o ordered Sia Suan
to pay Ramon P1,750 with legal interest to convey to Ramon an undivided 14 interest of the lot covered by title 752
cover the costs of suit
Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao went to the Supreme Court to appeal by certiorari. ISSUE
W/N the deed of sale is valid despite minority of Ramon Alcantara
HELD
Decision of CA is reversed. The contract is given binding effect.
RATIO
Ramons misrepresentation estopped him from disavowing the contract which he ratified.o Further, his choice to

disaffirm will not invalidate the contract until the court adjudges the contract to
be invalid.
o Estoppel is defined as a legal bar to alleging or denying a fact because of ones own previous actions or words to the
contrary (Merriam-Webster).
The decision of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil 215) also held that The courts, in their interpretation of
the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact
they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to be excused themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them...
US v. Vaquilar, 27 Phil 88
FACTS: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and daughter, as well as injuring other persons with a
bolo. Witnesses testified that he appeared to be insane prior to the commission of the crime. Alleged evidence of
defendants insanity was shown when his eyes were very big and red and he looked like crazy.
ISSUE: W/N Vaquilar is suffering from insanity during the commission of the crime
HELD: Evidence was insufficient. Being crazy is not equal to being insane

JALOSJOSV.COMELEC
G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012
Petitioner: Rommel Apolinario Jalosjos Respondents: Commission on Elections, Dan Erasmo Sr.
SPECIALCIVILACTIONINTHESUPREMECOURT.CERTIORARI.
This case is about the proof required to establish the domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen
who seeks election as governor of a province.
FACTS
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He migrated to Australia when he was
eight, acquired an Australian citizenship and live there for 26 years. He returned to the
Philippines and lived with hi sbrother in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. He took an allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, and thus, was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and later on renounced his Australian citizenship.
Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he lives and a fishpond in
San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He also applied as a registered voter in the same
municipality and was approved by the Election Registration Board. Such approval became
final and executory as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, after a certain Dan Erasmos
petition against his inclusion in the Comelecs voters list.
In 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province for the May 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to cancel Jalosjos COC
on the ground that:

3.

He failed to comply with the requirements of R.A. 9225

4.

And the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code.

The Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that he failed to present ample proof of a bona
fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. COMELEC en banc,
affirmed this decision ruling that he is just a mere guest or transient visitor in his brothers
house.
However, the Court resolved on May 7, 2010 a statusquoanteorder, enjoining the COMELEC
from enforcing its resolution pending further orders. MEANWHILE, Jalosjos won and
proclaimed the winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race in the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bonafideintention to
establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
HELD:
The Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division and COMELEC en banc that disqualified Rommel Jalosjos from seeking election as
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay province.

RATIO:
Jurisprudence has laid down the following principles:

Every person has a domicile or residence somewhere

Where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one;

A person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is then inevitable under these guidelines, that Jalosjos has met the residency requirements
for provincial governor:

1.

Quezon City, as what the COMELEC assumed as his domicile, has been his original domicile,
his place of birth, and he effectively changed it when he moved to Australia and acquired
citizenship therein. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
However, upon his return to the Philippines, is acts proved that he intend to change his
domicile for good by renouncing his allegiance to that country an giving up his Australian
citizenship. He has since lived nowhere else since then but in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. To
hold that he has not establish a domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite loss of original
domicile and is domicile by operation law, would violate the maxim that a person must have a
domicile or residence somewhere.

2.

COMELEC concluded that his mere stay in the house of his brother does not constitute a

settlement of his domicile. This is an error on the COMELECs judgment, as the COURT has
repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish
his residence or domicile in a particular place. This would lead to having property a
qualification for public office. It is sufficient that he should live there either in a rented house or
in friend, family or relatives house. In this case, what matters is that Jalosjos has proved two
things: 1. Actual physical presence in Ipil and 2. An intention in making it his domicile.

Cordora VS Comelec
Petitioner: Gaudencio M. CordoraRespondents: Commission on Elections and Gustavo S.
Tambunting
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Facts:
5.

Cordora filed a complaint against Tambunting stating that the latter made false claims in his
Certificate of Candidacy regarding his citizenship and residency. He asserted that Tambunting was a
naturalized citizen of America and therefore lost his residency when the naturalization occurred.

6.

The COMELEC Law Department and COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordoras complaint convinced
that Cordora failed to substantiate his claims against Tambunting. Issue: WON Tambuntings dual
citizenship is a ground to disqualify him from the elections. WON Tambunting met the residency
requirements. Held / Ratio:

No. Tambunting acquired his American citizenship by virtue of his father being an American. He did
not have to go through the naturalization process since his American citizenship was a birth right.
Further, dual citizenship should be understood to mean as dual allegiance in this case. Dual
allegiance means that an individual simultaneously owes loyalty to more than one state. Dual
citizenship alone is not a ground for disqualification. Dual citizenship is involuntary and is a result of
the laws of two states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, may be acquired through the naturalization
process.

No. Tambunting did not acquire his American citizenship through the naturalization process.
Therefore, Cordoras claim did not hold. Also, residency, in light of election laws, is a factor of residing
in a fixed place and intention to return there permanently. Petition dismissed.
.