Temas varios

Metafisica
Causalidad
Rational action and the complexity of causality.
Pols, Edward
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol 22(1), 2002, 1-18. doi
After a contrast of the the prima facie complexity of the causality of the rational agent with the
received scientific doctrine of causality, it is noticed that the prima facie causal authority of rational
action belongs to a macroscopic domain in which all science and philosophy takes place and in
which the formal/telic nature of that causality must be taken for granted. Any philosophical
justification or philosophical criticism of the status of that macroscopic arena must therefore take
place within that same arena. It is then argued that a justification of the ontological status of that
arena is possible by an exploitation of the reflexive resource of the rational awareness we exercise
within that arena. It is claimed (a) that this resource can be fairly described as the justification of
our direct knowing of real beings/entities other than the knower and (b) that such realistic knowing
is at the same time an exemplary mode of causality having a complexity that is both formal/telic
and hierarchical ("top down" as well as "bottom up"). In short, the rational agent is also a direct
knower, and direct knowing requires a sense of "cause' more complex than the received scientific
doctrine of causality provides. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Ontologia
Existencia de las cosas
Gold, jade, and emeruby: The value of naturalness for theories of concepts and categories.
Kalish, Charles
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol 22(1), 2002, 45-66. doi:
10.1037/h0091194
Researchers studying the psychology of concepts frequently draw distinctions between artificial and
natural concepts. Unfortunately, there is a lack of consensus regarding the foundations and
implications of the distinction. This paper provides a review and evaluation of the different ways
researchers have approached the question of conceptual naturalness. Accounts may be divided into
2 approaches described as psychologically or externally based. These characterizations motivate
distinctive sets of research questions. In addition to the particular implications, the author also
considers the general significance of a distinction between natural and artificial concepts.
On empirical realism and the defining of theoretical terms.
Slaney, Kathleen L.
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol 21(2), 2001, 132-152. doi:
The so-called "problem of theoretical terms" rests on the notion that the signifiers of theoretical
concepts cannot be completely defined for the reason that their referents are beyond the boundaries
of human perception and/or cognition. Empirical realism is a scientific tradition that was born, in
part, out of a dissatisfaction with the positivist treatment of theoretical terms. Empirical realists

generally conceive of theoretical terms as playing an essential role in scientific activity, giving it its
explanatory force, as it is such terms which denote the real, but unobservable, hypothetical entities
which are thought to underlie those observable phenomena that the scientist seeks to explain.
Despite certain consistencies that run throughout realist thought, there also exist a number of points
of divergence among empirical realists. These are examined along with 2 different and contrasting
traditions of empirical realism within psychological science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012
APA, all rights reserved)