G.R. No.

75919 May 7, 1987

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW
LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE
MAISIP, respondents.
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution
of the Second Division of January 28,1987 and another
motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral
argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the
motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted
but the motion to set the case for oral argument is
denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing
fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended
complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They
contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing
fee should be levied by considering the amount of
damages sought in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the
present in that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land with
damages. 2While the present case is an action for torts
and damages and specific performance with prayer for
temporary restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint
seeks not only the annulment of title of the defendant to
the property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of
possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the
payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts
specified therein. 4 However, in the present case, the
prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action
against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum
of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in
question, to attach such property of defendants that
maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe
rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to
execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject
property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the
money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and
exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as
maybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees and

declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of

plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to
make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages
sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of
the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78
Million as damages suffered by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the
Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as
primarily an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated
were treated as merely to the main cause of action.
Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the
sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest
difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from the
allegations of the complaint as well as the designation
thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific
performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of
complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering
the action to be merely one for specific performance
where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary
estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total
amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of
the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the
complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00
which should be the basis of assessment of the filing
fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this
case was brought to the attention of this Court together
with similar other cases an investigation was
immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff
through another counsel with leave of court filed an
amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the
inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as coplaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the
original complaint was maintained. After this Court
issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the reassessment of the docket fee in the present case and
other cases that were investigated, on November 12,
1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the
amended complaint by stating the amounts which they
are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified
the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in
the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount
of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended
complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court
ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as

filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original

complaint as it did not consider the damages to be
merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of
ownership and possession of real property. 8 An
amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of
court to include the government of the Republic as
defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and
attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said
amended complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only
one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so
that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of
assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee
of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it
was held that since the payment was the result of an
"honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to
be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter
had were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the
amended complaint superseded the original complaint,
the allegations of damages in the amended complaint
should be the basis of the computation of the filing
fee.11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion
was possible as the allegations of the complaint, the
designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an
action for damages and specific performance. The
docketing fee should be assessed by considering the
amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled
"that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in
court . 12 Thus, in the present case the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of
the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the
Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such original
complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions
taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present
case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee
should be the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the
observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who
filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer

although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the

body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no
other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was
compounded when, even as this Court had taken
cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation,
petitioner through another counsel filed an amended
complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of
damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It
was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of
October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount
of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that
petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the
much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of
the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to
avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action
upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading
that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought
in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi
case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied
for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B.

PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge,
Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and
MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether
or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the
correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation
of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a
prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against
private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private
respondent as declared in default for failure to file the
required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private
respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against
petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps
and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint
sought, among others, the payment of actual,
compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated
damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and
costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did
not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount
may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be
about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private
respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners'
counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was
disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who
was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of
this Court, the records of said case together with twentytwo other cases assigned to different branches of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under
investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were
transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned
the said records to the trial court with the directive that
they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to
the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177
was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then
vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a
Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC
directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket
fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment.
The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue
certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants
were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the
amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.

On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to

whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily
assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court
instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the
docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of
deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary
answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, an
amended complaint was filed by private respondent
including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No.
Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption
into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental
Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on
the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in
complying with the Resolution of this Court of October
15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent
did not indicate the exact amount sought to be
recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent
filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint"
stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00
as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the
body of the said second amended complaint however,
private respondent alleges actual and compensatory
damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about
P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another
Order admitting the second amended complaint and
stating therein that the same constituted proper
compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a
copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for
the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment
by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's
claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as
docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private
respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judie
Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a
supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of
P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total claim amounts
to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some
seven months after filing the supplemental complaint,
the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P80,396.00. 1

On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a

decision ruling, among others, as follows:
WHEREFORE,
rendered:

judgment

is

hereby

1. Denying due course to the petition in

CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it
seeks annulment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to
dismiss the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary
attachment, but giving due course to the
portion
thereof
questioning
the
reassessment of the docketing fee, and
requiring the Honorable respondent
Court to reassess the docketing fee to
be paid by private respondent on the
basis
of
the
amount
of
P25,401,707.00. 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity
with the said judgment of respondent court, private
respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90
on April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of
Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the
ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper docket
fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that
private respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90
as docket fee as herein-above related, and considering
that the total amount sought to be recovered in the
amended
and
supplemental
complaint
is
P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by
private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not
having paid the same, petitioners contend that the
complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising
therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory,
petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court
in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, 4 as
follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of
the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee

based on the amounts sought in the

amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi Case in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the
ruling in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil
Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed
in court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet.
Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable
is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v.
Ramolete, 5wherein this Court held that the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee
paid was insufficient.
The
contention
that Manchester cannot
apply
retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that
the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a
forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of the
peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a
judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice
of appeal with said court but he deposited only P8.00 for
the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within the
reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after
receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the
additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket
fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these
facts, this court held that the Court of First Instance did
notacquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal
as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified
declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen by
sending it through registered mail to the Office of the
Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was
paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of
the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled that the
declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal
requirement that such declaration should be filed at least
one year before the filing of the petition for citizenship.
Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of
petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953
produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was
paid on May 23, 1956.

In Malimit vs. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated

in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original
petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of
proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to
the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the oneweek period after the proclamation as provided therefor
by law. 10 However, the required docket fees were paid
only after the expiration of said period. Consequently,
this Court held that the date of such payment must be
deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition
and not the date when it was mailed.

prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may

determine, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the costs
of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the
amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the
amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The
trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the
additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then
challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he
paid the total docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and
that if he has to pay the additional fee it must be based
on the amended complaint.

Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the

rule that the docket fee must be paid before a court will
act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held
that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the
probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is
not required to file a separate action for each will but
instead he may have other wills probated in the same
special proceeding then pending before the same court.

The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the

plaintiff may be considered to have filed the case even if
the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We
reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed only
upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket
fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the
complaint; that there was an honest difference of opinion
as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that
as the action appears to be one for the recovery of
property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that
as the action is also one, for damages, We upheld the
assessment of the additional docket fee based on the
damages alleged in the amended complaint as against
the assessment of the trial court which was based on the
damages alleged in the original complaint.

Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling

in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date
of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land with damages filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee
and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the
complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title
issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null
and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as
owner thereof to whom the proper title should be issued,
and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of
P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property
is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages,
attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs
of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of
P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff
to pay the correct amount of the docket fee to which an
opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the
action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the
docket fee must be based on its assessed value and that
the amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The
trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as filing
fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended
complaint to include the Republic as the defendant. In
the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary
damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended

However,
as
aforecited,
this
Court
overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves
an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case
is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action against the
defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3
Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question,
the attachment of such property of defendants that may
be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be
rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order
requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase
and sale of the subject property and annul defendants'
illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also
prayed that the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff
jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and
exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as
may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The
plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender of
payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and
sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the
injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is
not specified in the prayer although the body of the
complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon
allegedly suffered by plaintiff.

Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the

amount of only P410.00 for the docket fee based on the
nature of the action for specific performance where the
amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation.
However, it was obvious from the allegations of the
complaint as well as its designation that the action was
one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this
court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct
docket fee computed against the amount of damages of
about P78 Million, although the same was not spelled
out in the prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave
of court, filed an amended complaint on September 12,
1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and
eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the
body of the complaint. The prayer in the original
complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the reassessment of the docket fee in the said case and other
cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985,
the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they were
asking for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of
the complaint the amount of damages alleged was
reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of
damages was specified in the prayer. Said amended
complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court
held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee.
Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby
vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes
there was no such original complaint duly filed which
could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting
the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings
and actions taken by the trial court were declared null
and void. 13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the
several cases of under-assessment of docket fee which
were
investigated
by
this
Court
together
with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this
case are similar toManchester. In the body of the original
complaint, the total amount of damages sought
amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount
of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for
the refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of
only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January

23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended

complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be
awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the
amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately
P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted
and the private respondent was reassessed the
additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer
of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he
paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a
supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of
P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is
approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986,
private respondent paid an additional docket fee of
P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the
respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private
respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional
docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and
after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988,
private respondent paid an additional docket fee of
P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to
have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket
fee considering the total amount of his claim in the
amended and supplemental complaint amounting to
about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private
respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in
the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud
the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not
only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the
filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any
additional docket fee until] the case was decided by this
Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the
fraud committed on the government, this Court held that
the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
and that the amended complaint could not have been
admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null
and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the
rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester,
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required. The promulgation of the decision in
Manchester must have had that sobering influence on
private respondent who thus paid the additional docket
fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his
change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay
such additional docket fee as may be ordered.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee

that was paid is still insufficient considering the total
amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of
court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket
clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter,
if any amount is found due, he must require the private
respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del Norte,
Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon. Marcial Fernandez
and Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively, PATSITA
GAMUTAN, Clerk of Court, and GODOFREDO

PINEDA, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del
Norte, 1 three
(3) actions for recovery of possession (acciones
publicianas 2 ) were separately instituted by Godofredo
Pineda against three (3) defendants, docketed as
follows:
1) vs. Antonia Noel Civil Case No. 2209
2) vs. Ponciano Panes Civil Case No. 2210

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,

third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not
be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in
no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim
by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of
the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby
instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing
fee that should be paid by private respondent
considering the total amount of the claim sought in the
original complaint and the supplemental complaint as
may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer
thereof and to require private respondent to pay the
deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs.

3) vs. Maximo Tacay Civil Case No. 2211.

Civil Cases Numbered 2209 and 2211 were raffled to
Branch I of the Trial Court, presided over by Judge
Marcial Hernandez. Civil No. 2210 was assigned to
Branch 2, presided over by Judge Jesus Matas.
The complaints 3 all alleged the same essential facts (1)
Pineda was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 790
square meters, his ownership being evidenced by TCT
No. T-46560; (2) the previous owner had allowed the
defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere
tolerance; (3) having himself need to use the property,
Pineda had made demands on the defendants to vacate
the property and pay reasonable rentals therefor, but
these demands had been refused; and (4) the last
demand had been made more than a year prior to the
commencement of suit. The complaints prayed for the
same reliefs, to wit:
1) that plaintiff be declared owner of the
areas occupied by the defendants;
2) that defendants and their "privies and
allies" be ordered to vacate and deliver
the portions of the land usurped by
them;

G.R. Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989

3) that each defendant be ordered to

pay:

MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA

NOEL, petitioners,

1 ) P 2,000 as monthly rents from

February, 1987;

2 ) Actual damages, as proven;

3 ) Moral and nominal damages as the
Honorable Court may fix ;
4) P30,000.00, "as attorney's fees, and
representation fees of P5,000.00 per
day of appearance;" 4
and
4) that he (Pineda) be granted such
"further relief and remedies ... just and
equitable in the premises.
The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten
notation (evidently made by plaintiff's counsel) reading,
"P5,000.00 as and for," immediately above the
typewritten words, "Actual damages, as proven," the
intention apparently being to make the entire phrase
read, " P5,000.00 as and for actual damages as
proven. 5
Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the
defendants by common counsel . 6 Every motion alleged
that the Trial Court had not acquired jurisdiction of the
case
. . . for the reason that the ... complaint
violates the mandatory and clear
provision of Circular No. 7 of the ...
Supreme Court dated March 24,1988,
by failing to specify all the amounts of
damages which plaintiff is claiming from
defendant;" and
. . . for ... failure (of the complaint) to
even allege the basic requirement as to
the assessed value of the subject lot in
dispute.
Judge Matas denied the motion to dismiss filed in Civil
Case No. 2210 but ordered the expunction of the
"allegations in paragraph 11 of the ... complaint
regarding moral as well as nominal damages . 7 On
motion of defendant Panes, Judge Matas later ordered
the striking out, too, of the "handwritten amount of
'P5,000. 00 as and for.' including the typewritten words
'actual damages as proven' ... in sub-paragraph b of
paragraph 4 in the conclusion and prayer of the
complaint ..." 8
The motions to dismiss submitted in Civil Cases
Numbered 2211 and 2209 were also denied in separate

orders promulgated by Judge Marcial Fernandez. 9 His

Order in Case No. 2209 dated March 15, 1989 (a)
declared that since the "action at bar is for
Reivindicatoria, Damages and Attorney's fees ...
(d)efinitely this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction," (b)
that the claims for actual, moral and nominal damages
"are only one aspect of the cause of action," and (c)
because of absence of specification of the amounts
claimed as moral, nominal and actual damages, they
should be "expunged from the records."
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges
Matas and Fernandez in the rendition of the Orders
above described, the defendants in all three (3) actions
have filed with this Court a "Joint Petition" for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction," praying essentially that said orders be
annulled and respondent judges directed to dismiss all
the complaints "without prejudice to private respondent
Pineda's re-filing a similar complaint that complies with
Circular No. 7." The joint petition (a) re-asserted the
proposition that because the complaints had failed to
state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and
nominal damages, the Trial Courts a quo had not
acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in
question-indeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should
not have accepted the complaints which initiated said
suits, and (b) it was not proper merely to expunge the
claims for damages and allow "the so-called cause of
action for "reivindicatoria" remain for trial" by itself. 10
The joint petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
It should be dismissed for failure to comply with this
Court's Circular No. 1-88 (effective January 1, 1989).
The copies of the challenged Orders thereto
attached 11 were not certified by the proper Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized representative. Certification
was made by the petitioners' counsel, which is not
allowed.
The petition should be dismissed, too, for another
equally important reason. It fails to demonstrate any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
Judges in rendering the Orders complained of or, for that
matter, the existence of any proper cause for the
issuance of the writ of mandamus. On the contrary, the
orders appear to have correctly applied the law to the
admitted facts.
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts
being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages. It
is also true, however, that the actions are not basically

for the recovery of sums of money. They are principally

for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature
of an accion publiciana. Determinative of the court's
jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature thereof,
not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or
connected with the issue of title or possession, and
regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously,
an action for recovery of possession of real property
(such as an accion plenaria de possesion) or the title
thereof, 12or for partition or condemnation of, or the
foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property 13 - in
other words, a real action-may be commenced and
prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual,
moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an
action would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter
alia over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts." 14 The rule applies regardless of the value of the
real property involved, whether it be worth more than
P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also applies even
where the complaint involving realty also prays for an
award of damages; the amount of those damages would
be immaterial to the question of the Court's jurisdiction.
The rule is unlike that in other cases e.g., actions simply
for recovery of money or of personal property, 15 or
actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 16 in which
the amount claimed, 17 or the value of the personal
property, is determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of
the personal property or the amount claimed should
exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in order to
be cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988,
cannot thus be invoked, as the petitioner does, as
authority for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That
circular, avowedly inspired by the doctrine laid down
in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (May 7, 1987), has but limited
application to said actions, as shall presently be
discussed. Moreover, the rules therein laid down have
since been clarified and amplified by the Court's
subsequent decision in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February
13, 1989.

Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain

parties who omit from the prayer of their complaints "any
specification of the amount of damages," the omission
being "clearly intended for no other purposes than to
evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to
mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing
fee." The following rules were therefore set down:
1. All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement
shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought
in the amended pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, supra, read as
follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment of
the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not
be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in
no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim
by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of
the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified, the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute
a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the

Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce

said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that
complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is
the rule that subsequent "amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based
on the amount sought in the amended pleading," the trial
court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing
awards of claims not specified in the pleading - i.e.,
damages arising after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading-as to which the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are
assessed on the basis of the "sum claimed," on the one
hand, or the "value of the property in litigation or the
value of the estate," on the other. 18 There are, in other
words, as already above intimated, actions or
proceedings involving real property, in which the value of
the property is immaterial to the court's jurisdiction,
account thereof being taken merely for assessment of
the legal fees; and there are actions or proceedings,
involving personal property or the recovery of money
and/or damages, in which the value of the property or
the amount of the demand is decisive of the trial court's
competence (aside from being the basis for fixing the
corresponding docket fees). 19
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or
damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of
the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of
interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar
pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this
Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case."
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or
similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or
damages and there is no precise statement of the
amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the
pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record." In other words,
the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the
claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be

expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on

motion, permit amendment of the complaint and
payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the
meantime become time-barred. The other is where the
pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the
fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is
that the court may allow a reasonable time for the
payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof,
and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the
court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless
in the meantime prescription has set in and
consequently barred the right of action.
Where the action involves real property and a related
claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be
assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the
property and (b) the total amount of related damages
sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if
the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the
payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid
at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of
full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as
the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has
set in the meantime. But where-as in the case at bar-the
fees prescribed for an action involving real property have
been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related
damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded
are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The
Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action
involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of
the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the
prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by
the circumstance that it may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages
because of lack of specification thereof. What should be
done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as
to which no amounts are stated, which is what the
respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable
time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege
the precise amount of each item of damages and accept
payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant
prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge

in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the SC
are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the
intention of the Congress as expressed in the
sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of

B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to
mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule65.
Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be
initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance
of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.

REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent alleges that he started working as
Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral
Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no
contract of employment executed between him and
petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly
payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00.
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private
respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of
Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St.Martins
Funeral Home and in January 1996, the mother of
Amelita passed away, so the latter took over the
management of the business.
Amelita made some changes in the business operation
and private respondent and his wife were no longer
allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a
consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that
petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. The
labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner
declaring that no employer-employee relationship
existed between the parties and therefore his office had
no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: WON the decision of the NLRC are appealable
to the Court of Appeals.
RULING:
The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since
appeals from the NLRC to the SC were eliminated, the
legislative intendment was that the special civil action for
certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial
review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the
word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances
we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae
because appeals by certiorari and the original action for
certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to
the appellate courts. The important distinction between
them, however, and with which the Court is particularly
concerned here is that the special civil action for
certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of

G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986

REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO
BINONGCAL & FERNANDO CALION, respondents.
FERIA, J.:

The Court rules that the application of the totality rule

under Section 33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and
Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the
requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under
Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows:
Permissive
joinder
of
parties.-All
persons in whom or against whom any
right to relief in respect to or arising out
of the same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
may, except as otherwise provided in
these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined
as defendants in one complaint, where
any question of law or fact common to
all such plaintiffs or to all such
defendants may arise in the action; but
the court may make such orders as may
be just to prevent any plaintiff or
defendant from being embarrassed or
put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no
interest.
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of
Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which
dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
did not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in

the erroneous belief that the entire original record of the

case shall be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 39 of BP129. This
provision applies only to ordinary appeals from the
regional trial court to the Court of Appeals (Section 20 of
the Interim Rules). Appeals to this Court by petition for
review on certiorari are governed by Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (Section 25 of the Interim Rules).
However, the order appealed from states that the first
cause of action alleged in the complaint was against
respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the
amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires
which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various
occasions from August to October, 1981; and the second
cause of action was against respondent Fernando
Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of
P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he
purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions
from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent
Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against
said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under
Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of
the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that
although another person, Fernando Calion, was
allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of
P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct
from that of the other respondent. At the hearing of said
Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined
in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner
opposed the Motion to Dismiss. As above stated, the trial
court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction
over the case following the "novel" totality rule
introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of
the Interim Rules.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as
follows:
... Provided,That where there are
several claims or causes of action
between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the

causes of action arose out of the same

or different transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides
thus:
Application of the totality rule.-In actions
where the jurisdiction of the court is
dependent on the amount involved, the
test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate
sum of all the money demands,
exclusive only of interest and costs,
irrespective of whether or not the
separate claims are owned by or due to
different parties. If any demand is for
damages in a civil action, the amount
thereof must be specifically alleged.
Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with
the pertinent portion of the former rule under Section 88
of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads as
follows:
... Where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same
parties embodied in the same complaint,
the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the demand in all the causes
of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same
or different transactions; but where the
claims or causes of action joined in a
single complaint are separately owned
by or due to different parties, each
separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test. ...
and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the
former rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and
brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the
claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions.
This argument is partly correct. There is no difference
between the former and present rules in cases where a
plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate
causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions. If
the total demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then
the regional trial court has jurisdiction. Needless to state,
if the causes of action are separate and independent,

their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not

mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of
the demand is twenty thousand pesos or less may be
the subject of a separate complaint filed with a
metropolitan or municipal trial court.
On the other hand, there is a difference between the
former and present rules in cases where two or more
plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a
defendant join in a single complaint. Under the former
rule, "where the claims or causes of action joined in a
single complaint are separately owned by or due to
different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test" (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of
1948 as amended, supra). This was based on the ruling
in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace,
99 Phil. 693. As worded, the former rule applied only to
cases of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. However,
it was also applicable to cases of permissive joinder of
parties defendant, as may be deduced from the ruling in
the case of Brillo vs. Buklatan, thus:
Furthermore, the first cause of action is
composed of separate claims against
several defendants of different amounts
each of which is not more than P2,000
and falls under the jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace court under section
88 of Republic Act No, 296. The several
claims do not seem to arise from the
same
transaction
or
series
of
transactions and there seem to be no
questions of law or of fact common to all
the defendants as may warrant their
joinder under Rule 3, section 6.
Therefore, if new complaints are to be
filed in the name of the real party in
interest they should be filed in the
justice of the peace court. (87 Phil. 519,
520, reiterated in Gacula vs. Martinez,
88 Phil. 142, 146)
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to
cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate
causes of action against a defendant join in a single
complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has
separate causes of action against two or more
defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the
causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or
against the two or more defendants should arise out of
the same transaction or series of transactions and there
should be a common question of law or fact, as provided
in Section 6 of Rule 3.

The difference between the former and present rules in

cases of permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated
by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de
Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace (supra) as exceptions
to the totality rule. In the case of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose
(86 Phil. 523), where twenty-nine dismissed employees
joined in a complaint against the defendant to collect
their respective claims, each of which was within the
jurisdiction of the municipal court although the total
exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that
under the law then the municipal court had jurisdiction.
In said case, although the plaintiffs' demands were
separate, distinct and independent of one another, their
joint suit was authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and
each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test. In
the case of International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90
Phil. 470), where twenty-five dismissed teachers jointly
sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court also
held that the municipal court had jurisdiction because the
amount of each claim was within, although the total
exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive
joinder of parties plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3.
Under the present law, the two cases above cited
(assuming they do not fall under the Labor Code) would
be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
Similarly, in the abovecited cases of Brillo vs. Buklatan
and Gacula vs. Martinez (supra), if the separate claims
against the several defendants arose out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there is a
common question of law or fact, they would now be
under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties,
whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6
of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the
jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of
joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions
are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded
in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of
parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful
scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a
misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims
against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate
and distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 149227

the pleas of [respondent] thru his counsel so that he

could catch up with the bulk of the school days of the
semester and could graduate.

December 11, 2003

LA SALETTE COLLEGE, Represented by Its President,

FR. ROMEO GONZALES, MS; and JESUS T. BAYAUA,
Dean of Student Services, petitioners,
vs.
VICTOR C. PILOTIN, respondent

"Because of the adamant refusal of [respondent] school

in re-admitting him and his defiance to the order and
because the period of the second semester [was]
already about to close, [respondent] amended his
complaint and concentrate[d] on damages, hence, this
case.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
An appeal is not perfected by the mere filing of a Notice
of Appeal that has been served on the adverse party.
The docket fees must likewise be paid within the
reglementary period. Petitioners have failed to show why
they merit an exception to these stringent rules.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the November 16,
20002 and the June 22, 2001 Resolutions3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV UDK No. 0236C. The
November 16, 2000 Resolution disposed as follows:
"In view of the foregoing, Appellees Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution, dated
March 14, 2000, is hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE
and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED."4
The June 22, 2001 Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
5

The facts of the case are narrated by the trial court as

follows:
"[Respondent] is a bonafide student of [petitioner]
College dating back [to] the school year 1988-1989
taking up the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Commerce. In the enrollment period for the second
semester held on October 22 to November 5, 1993,
[respondent] was denied re-enrollment, despite repeated
pleas by x x x himself and by other interested parties
and his lawyer.
"On November 16, 1993, he filed his complaint and
asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to compel [petitioner college to] re-admit him.
On December 28, 1993, an order was issued directing
[petitioner college] to admit [respondent] for the second
semester but still [petitioner college] refused to re-admit
[respondent], despite implementation of said order and

"On the other hand, the [petitioner college] alleged that it

opened its enrollment period for the second semester of
school year 1993-1994 on 11 October 1993 up to 22
October, 1993 to 05 November, 1993. However, classes
for the second semester of that school year commenced
on 25 October, 1993. During these periods for
enrolment, [respondent] never enrolled with the x x x
College and neither did he accomplish the basic
requirements for enrolment. However, on 05 November,
1993, the x x x College was in receipt of a letter from
Atty. Quirino L. Pilotin dated on that same date
requesting for a reconsideration of an alleged decision
denying enrolment to the [respondent]. Upon receipt of
the said letter, it was endorsed to [Respondent] Bayaua
who in turn wrote Atty. Pilotin explaining among others
that was not denied enrolment but rather [the] latter did
not enroll with the said College. Considering, however,
that the x x x College started its regular classes on 25
October, 1993, in the event [respondent] was able to
enroll on 6 November, 1993, he would have then
exceeded the required absences for his supposed
enrolled subjects.
"Since plaintiff failed to enrol on the last day for
enrolment, there is no reason why the x x x College
should relax its rules to accommodate [respondent]. The
x x x College merely imposed its disciplining authority
when it sets dates for the period to enrol and the matter
of admission of students is within the ambit of academic
freedom and beyond the province of the Courts to
decide."6
On November 17, 1998, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of respondent.7 Petitioners received
the Decision on November 26, 1998. On the same date,
they filed a Notice of Appeal, which the RTC approved
on December 2, 1998.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration thereof on the
ground of petitioners failure to pay the docket fees within
the reglementary period. The trial court, however, denied
the Motion in its April 23, 1999 Order.8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its November 29, 1999 Resolution, the CA dismissed
the appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay "the
required docketing fee within the period for filing an
appeal."9 But, upon their motion, the CA granted, in a
Resolution dated March 14, 2000, reconsideration of
their appeal, which it reinstated "in the interest of
substantial justice and considering that [petitioners]
already paid the docket fees." 10 Respondent moved for a
reconsideration on March 29, 2000.
After reexamining the records of the case, the CA, in the
challenged November 16, 2000 Resolution, dismissed
the appeal filed by petitioners, because "the docket fees
were only paid after one (1) year and eleven (11) months
from the filing of the notice of appeal." 11 It deemed it
imperative to reverse the March 14, 2000 Resolution "to
conform with the law and long settled jurisprudence" 12 on
the matter. Thus, in the June 22, 2001 Resolution, it
denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.13

The payment of docket fees is not a trivial matter. These

fees are necessary to defray court expenses in the
handling of cases.15 For this reason, and to secure a just
and speedy disposition of every action and
proceeding,16 the Rules on Civil Procedure 17 mandates
the payment of docket and other lawful fees within the
prescribed period.1awp++i1 Otherwise, the jurisdiction of
the proper court to handle a case is adversely affected. 18
The above rule applies squarely to this case, in which
the judgment issued by the RTC, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, was elevated to the CA for review.
Rule 41 of the Rules on Civil Procedure provides the
essential requirements for making such an appeal, as
follows:
"SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
"(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
copy thereof upon the adverse party.

Issues
Petitioners submit
consideration:

the

following

issues

for

our

"1. Whether or not the appeal was seasonably

filed;
"2. With all due respect, the Court of Appeals did
not have the authority to dismiss the appeal."14
In the main, the case revolves around the timeliness of
the payment of the docket fees.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Timeliness of Payment of
Appellate Court Docket Fees

"SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall

be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from.
"SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall
pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of
payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the
appellate court together with the original record or the
record on appeal.
"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys
appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to
him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties.
Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a
decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, the following requirements must be
complied with. First, within 15 days, a notice of appeal
must be filed with the court that rendered the judgment
or final order sought to be appealed; second, such notice
must be served on the adverse party; and third, within

the same 15-day period, the full amount of appellate

court docket and other legal fees must be paid to the
clerk of the court that rendered the judgment or final
order.

failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within

the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake,
excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty,
without fault on the part of the appellant." 27

It should be noted that full payment of the appellate

docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory,19 even jurisdictional,20 for the perfection of
the appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would not be
able to act on the subject matter of the action, 21 and the
decision or final order sought to be appealed from would
become final and executory.22

In the present case, petitioners have not shown any

satisfactory reason to warrant the relaxation of the
Rules. In fact, the manner in which they presented their
case before us leaves too much to be desired. Indeed,
we are almost tempted to say that they tried to mislead -nay, deceive -- this Court as well as the appellate court.

In the present case, petitioners insist that they

seasonably paid the docket fees. After resolving thrice
the timeliness of the payment of the docket fees, the CA
finally found that these had been paid one (1) year and
11 days from the filing of their notice of appeal.
To recapitulate, on November 26, 1998, petitioners
received the November 17, 1998 RTC Decision.
Consequently, they had 15 days to file their Notice of
Appeal. They did so on November 26, 1998, but failed to
pay the docket fees. A review of the records shows that
they paid these only on July 8, 1999,23 or after almost
seven (7) months from the mandated last day for
payment, which was December 11, 1998. Clearly, the
November 17, 1998 RTC Decision, which petitioners
sought to appeal, had long become final and executory.
Relaxation of the Rule on
Nonpayment of Docket Fees
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the
requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we
also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the
following: first, failure to pay those fees within the
reglementary period allows only discretionary, not
automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be
used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of
sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice
and fair play, as well as with a great deal of
circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances.24
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Mangubat,25 the payment of the docket fees was delayed
by six (6) days, but the late payment was accepted,
because the party showed willingness to abide by the
Rules by immediately paying those fees. Yambao v.
Court of Appeals26 saw us again relaxing the Rules when
we declared therein that "the appellate court may extend
the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant is
able to show that there is a justifiable reason for x x x the

The present case calls for the adjudication of whether

petitioners paid the docket fees on time. Hence, it is
essential that they specify the exact dates when they
filed their notice of appeal and paid the corresponding
docket fees. But nowhere in their pleadings did they do
so. All they said was that the appeal had been
seasonably filed.
In accordance with the requisites for the perfection of an
appeal as enumerated earlier, petitioners should have
(1) filed a notice of appeal with the RTC of Santiago,
Isabela, within 15 days from the issuance of the trial
court Decision being appealed; (2) paid the docket fees
within the same period; and (3) served the notice to the
adverse party.
True, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the
prescribed period, but they paid the docket fees only
seven (7) months thereafter. They adamantly insisted on
page 6 of their Petition28 that "the appeal was
seasonably filed," but later said that the "the appeal fee
was paid immediately after 23 April 1999 when the court
a quo denied the respondents motion for
reconsideration and approved the appeal. x x x. With the
foregoing therefore, the notice of appeal was seasonably
filed with the payment of docket fees on time." 29
They admitted, though, that because of the "excusable
negligence or mistake" of their counsel, the official
receipts for the Notice of Appeal had not been attached.
They reasoned that they had failed to transmit the proof
of payment of the docket fees to the CA, because such
"provision of civil procedure was relatively new x x x at
that time."30 At any event, respondent denies being
served such notice.31
Assuming arguendo that the period of appeal was
interrupted by respondents motion for reconsideration of
the RTCs approval of petitioners notice of appeal, the
required docket fees for the latter were still not paid on
time. From November 23, 1998, when petitioners filed
their Notice of Appeal, until April 23, 1999, when the trial

court approved it with finality, they made no effort to pay

those fees. It took them more than two (2) months to
"immediately pay" the docket fees after being informed
of the April 23, 1999 Order denying respondents motion
for reconsideration of the RTC Order approving
petitioners Notice of Appeal. This lapse of time hardly
reflected sincere willingness to abide by the Rules,
especially when respondent had raised the very issue of
nonpayment of docket fees as early as December 28,
1998.
On this point, petitioners counsel is reminded of the role
that lawyers play in the dispensation of justice. Bayas v.
Sandiganbayan32 held thus:
"Lawyers are not merely representatives of the parties
but, first and foremost, officers of the court. As such, one
of their duties -- assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice -- is more significant than that of
[the cause of] their client, rightly or wrongly. x x x. We
stress that candor in all dealings is the very essence of
membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are obliged
to observe rules of procedure in good faith, not to
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice." 33

We stress that the payment of docket fees is not a mere

technicality of law or procedure, but an essential
requirement for the perfection of an appeal. 34 Without
such payment, the appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, and the
decision or final order sought to be appealed from
becomes final and executory.35 As laid down
in Barangay 24 of Legazpi City v. Imperial:36
"The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process. It is purely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. Well-rooted is the principle that
perfection of an appeal within the statutory or
reglementary period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned
decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less
to entertain the appeal."37
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.