CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC

1

PART TWO: SEARCH AND SEIZURE

I.
Nature, Scope and Definitions

A. DEFINITION

RULE 126
Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search
warrant is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed by
a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before
the court.
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search
warrant.

STONEHILL VS DIOKNO
Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance
of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and the
corporation to search persons and premises of several
personal properties due to an alleged violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal
Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were
conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner
and in the corporation's premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are
null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution
and the Rules of Court for being general
warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme
Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction to prevent the seized effects from being
introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against
the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those
effects found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail
the legality of the search and seizure in both premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in
the residences but not those done in the corporation's
premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the

second situation since a corporation has a personality

separate and distinct from the personality of its officers
or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and
whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose
rights has been impaired can validly object the legality
of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be
exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to
the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents,
papers, and things seized from the offices and the
premises).

PEOPLE VS MARTI

FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law
wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders carrying Four (4)
wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and
inspect the packages. She refused and assures her that
the packages simply contained books, cigars, and
gloves.

Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of
Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(Proprietor), following the standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A
peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves
contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported
to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations.
The dried marijuana leaves were found to have
contained inside the cellophane wrappers.

The accused appellant assigns the following errors:
The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the
illegality of search and seized objects contained in the
four (4) parcels.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD:
Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule

Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any
evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search
warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier
adopted in Mercado vs Peoples Court.

The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since
the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of state authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim
that his constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure.
The contraband in this case at bar having come into
possession of the government without the latter
transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
whty the same should not be admitted.



B. CONSTITUTIONAL
AND
STATUTORY
BOUNDARIES;LIMITATION ON STATE ACTION

1. NATURE OF RIGHT PROTECTED; WAIVER OF
PROTECTED RIGHT

CONSTITUTION
ART III Section 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.


KATZ VS US

Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Katz (the
petitioner), was convicted of transmitting
wagering information over telephone lines in
violation of federal law. The government had
entered into evidence the petitioners end of
telephone conversations that the government had
obtained by placing a listening device to the phone

booth that the petitioner used. The Court of

Appeals rejected the petitioners contention that
the evidence should be suppressed.

Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth
to transmit wagering information from Los Angeles
to Boston and Miami in violation of federal law.
After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a
listening device to the top of the telephone booth
and recorded the petitioners end of the telephone
conversations which was then used as evidence
against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to
have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion
was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the
contention that the evidence is inadmissible.
Certiorari was granted.

Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution protects telephone conversations
conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded
from introduction as evidence against a person?

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Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority
opinion. The petitioner strenuously asserted that
the phone booth was a constitutionally protected
area. However, the Fourth Amendment protects
persons and not places from unreasonable
intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his person.
Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self
from public view when he entered the telephone
booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited ear. He
did not relinquish his right to do so simply because
he went to a place where he could be seen. A
person who enters into a telephone booth may
expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment of

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 3

the Constitution as he assumes that the words he
utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to
the world. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects
persons and not areas from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Governments activities in
electron
ically listening to and recording the petitioners
telephone conversations constituted a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a
search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable
cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.

Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) filed a
dissenting opinion. J. Black observed that
eavesdropping was an ancient practice that the
Framers were certainly aware of when they drafted
the United States Constitution (Constitution). Had
they wished to prohibit this activity under the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution they would
have added such language that would have
effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme
Court finds it plausible to argue that language
aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things
that can be searched and seized may, to protect
privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of
conversations.
Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) filed a
dissenting opinion. The Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a
twofold requirement for what protection is afforded
to those people. First, that a person has exhibited
an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. The critical fact in this case
is that a person who enters a telephone booth shuts
the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely
entitled to assume that his conversation is not being
intercepted. On the other hand, conversations out
in the open public would not be protected against
being overheard as the expectation of privacy
would not be reasonable.

VILLANUEVA VS QUERUBIN
In accordance with the policy to which this Court is
committed, namely, that a colorable claim of a
denial of a constitutional right should not be
ignored, petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding, succeeded in having his alleged

grievance against respondent Judge, the Honorable

Jose R. Querubin, now retired, heard. He would
have us nullify the lower court order of June 1, 1966
requiring him "to return and deliver to the
Provincial Commander, Bacolod City, the amount of
P10,350.00 and the wooden container stated in the
receipt issued by the accused dated April 1, 1966,
within forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt of this
order." 1 The money in question formed part of the
things seized in accordance with a search warrant
previously issued by respondent Judge himself.
Petitioner therefore, to lend plausibility to his plea,
was under the necessity of alleging that less than
full respect was accorded his constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 2 He
would impress on us that full fealty was not shown
to what is ordained by such a guarantee. Assertion
of such a disregard of a constitutional command is
one thing; proof is another. What is more, there is
included in the petition itself 3 a written promise of
petitioner to return such amount when required.
Accordingly, as will be explained, petitioner did fail
to show that he is entitled to the writs of certiorari
and prohibition prayed for.
It was alleged in the petition that on April 23, 1966,
in a motion filed with respondent Judge by an
assistant city fiscal of Bacolod City and a special
prosecutor of the Department of Justice, it was set
forth that on March 16, 1966, the residence of
petitioner was raided by a constabulary and police
team on the strength of a search warrant issued by
such respondent Judge, in the course of which,
there was a seizure of the amount of P10,350.00,
which was not however deposited in court, as
thereafter its possession was restored to petitioner.
It was further stated that an information for the
violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code
was filed with the City Court of Bacolod against
petitioner. 4 There was an opposition on the part of
petitioner to such motion wherein after asserting
that the lower court was without jurisdiction and
that the matter had become moot and academic,
because the money was spent in good faith by him
for the payment of the wages of his laborers, it was
contended that there was a violation of his
constitutional rights not to be deprived of property
without due process of law and to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 Subsequently,
after a reply to such opposition and a rejoinder

were submitted, the respondent Judge issued the

challenged order dated June 1, 1966, the dispositive
portion of which reads: "[In view thereof], the
accused Oscar Villanueva is hereby ordered to
return and deliver to the Provincial Commander,
Bacolod City, the amount of P10,350.00 and the
wooden container stated in the receipt issued by
the accused dated April 1, 1966, within forty-eight
(48) hours upon receipt of this order." 6
There was a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied on June 11, 1966. 7 Hence this petition. In
view of the stress laid therein as to the failure of
respondent Judge considering the circumstances of
the case to yield deference to the command of the
right against unreasonable searches and seizure,
and the assertion that unless there is a writ of
preliminary injunction issued, respondent Judge will
cause the enforcement of the challenged order,
thus exposing him to contempt proceedings and
other disciplinary actions if he could not comply
with it, this Court adopted a resolution on June 21,
1966 which reads as follows: "The respondents in L-
26177 (Oscar Villanueva vs. Hon. Judge R. Querubin,
etc., et al.) are required to file, within 10 days from
notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss)
to the petition for prohibition and certiorari; upon
petitioner's posting a bond of two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00), let preliminary injunction issue." 8
In the answer filed by the then Solicitor General
Antonio P. Barredo, now a member of this Court,
the question of the alleged violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure was squarely met, thus: "Neither
will the assailed orders result in unreasonable
search and seizure for as already said earlier the
money and wooden box in question were
confiscated during a gambling raid pursuant to a
search warrant issued by the respondent court after
due and appropriate proceedings during which the
petitioner and his witnesses were examined under
oath by the respondent court." 9 The point thus
raised was sought to be refuted in petitioner's
written memorandum, but in a manner far from
persuasive. For he did raise the specious argument
that after the service of the search warrant on
March 16, 1966, the motion of April 23, 1966 for
the return of the money came too late, ignoring
that the Rules of Court does require that the things
seized be deposited in court. 10 Moreover, to
counter the damaging effect of a written promise,
which commendably he did not omit from his
petition, that the amount of P10,350.00 "will be

returned ... if the higher authorities will require the

return of the same by legal orders,...," 11 he would
rely on his alleged rights as owner. Thus: "While he
agreed to return the money by 'legal orders', this
cannot be considered as a limitation on his right of
ownership, because when an agreement conflicts
with the provision of law, the latter must prevail.
(Article 1306, Civil Code)." 12 There was no adequate
appreciation of the controlling norms as to the
effects of a seizure under a valid search warrant or
one not so challenged. It is on the basis of such
contentions that petitioner would have us issue the
writs of certiorari and prohibition.
A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that
petitioner failed to meet the burden of
demonstrating that there was a denial of a
constitutional right sufficient to oust the court of
jurisdiction. On the contrary, what appears
undeniable is that the actuation of respondent
Judge was in accordance with law. There can be no
question then of a violation of the safeguard against
unreasonable search and seizure.
1. This constitutional right refers to the immunity of
one's person, whether citizen or alien, from
interference by government, included in which is his
residence, his papers, and other possessions. Since,
moreover, it is invariably through a search and
seizure that such an invasion of one's physical
freedom manifests itself, it is made clear that he is
not to be thus molested, unless its reasonableness
could be shown. To be impressed with such a
quality, it must be accomplished through a warrant,
which should not be issued unless probable cause is
shown, to be determined by a judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
with a particular description of the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the
core of this right, but it could be also looked upon
as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area,
primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto
confined. 13 What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his
residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality
can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall
be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he
wants around him. There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have access except
under the circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble,
is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 5

intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life. 14 In the same vein,
Landynski in his authoritative work 15 could fitly
characterize this constitutional right as the
embodiment of "a spiritual concept: the belief that
to value the privacy of home and person and to
afford its constitutional protection against the long
reach of government is no less than to value human
dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed
except in case of overriding social need, and then
only under stringent procedural safeguards." 16
2. Necessarily, then, if petitioner's alleged
grievance, consisting of a disregard of the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure, were
substantiated, he could validly raise a constitutional
question of sufficient gravity to entitle him to the
remedies sought. For a failure to respect a
constitutional command resulting in a deprivation
of a constitutional right is visited by loss of
jurisdiction. 17 Such is not the case, however. He did
not even put in issue the validity of the search
warrant, as a result of which there was a seizure of
the money in question. For what were the facts on
which the challenged order was based, facts binding
on this Court? As set forth therein: "As a result of
the raid conducted by a party of the Philippine
Constabulary led by Lt. Alexander Aguirre at 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of March 16, 1966, in virtue
of a search warrant issued by the undersigned on
March 14, 1966, the raiding party was able to arrest
eight (8) participants in the game of "Monte" held in
one of the rooms of the house of Oscar Villanueva
at 6th Street, Bacolod City. Among the gambling
paraphernalias seized during the raid is cash in the
amount of P10,570.00, which the raiding party
submitted to this Court in endorsing the search
warrant,
thus
subjecting
the
gambling
paraphernalia seized by the raiding party under the
control of this Court. On March 24, 1966 the City
Fiscal of Bacolod City filed an information for
Violation of Art. 195 of the Revised Penal Code
against the eight (8) apprehended persons named in
the endorsement of the Philippine Constabulary. All
the accused pleaded guilty and [were] convicted by
the City Court. Upon recommendation of the Fiscal,
however, only the amount of P220.00 was ordered
forfeited in favor of the government and the
amount of P10,350.00 was ordered to be returned

to Oscar Villanueva, the owner of the house, who

issued the receipt for the amount with the
condition that he will return the money if the higher
authorities will require the return of the said
amount." 18 Then respondent Judge, after referring
to Philips vs. Municipal Mayor, 19 stated further in
the order now under scrutiny: "In the light of the
aforequoted ruling of the appellate court, it is clear
that the Court of First Instance that issued the
search warrant has jurisdiction over the amount of
P10,350.00 and its wooden container. With regard
to the contention of the counsel for the accused
that the return of the amount of P10,350.00 is a
moot question because the said amount is already
spent by the accused, whatever defenses the
accused may invoke to resist the return of the
amount of money in question is futile and
untenable by estoppel. The accused in issuing the
corresponding receipt of the amount of P10,350.00
and the wooden box container, agreed to return the
said amount and the box if the higher authorities
may so require. The return of the amount of
P10,350.00 and its wooden container. With regard
to the contention money in the box is a part and
parcel of the gambling paraphernalia seized by the
raiding party of the Philippine Constabulary in the
house of the accused Oscar Villanueva who is at
present facing the charge for violation of the
gambling law." 20
Even if the recital of the antecedents of the
challenged order were less compelling in thus
lending support to what was done by respondent
Judge, still petitioner had failed to make out a case.
For, had he entertained doubts as to the validity of
the issuance of the search warrant or the manner in
which it was executed, he was called upon to
establish such a claim in court. He could rely on
authoritative doctrines of this Court precisely to
seek a judicial declaration of any illegal taint that he
could, with plausibility, assert. 21 That he failed to
do. The Rules of Court made clear what is to be
done after the seizure of the property. Thus: "The
officer must forthwith deliver the property to the
municipal judge or judge of the city court or of the
Court of First Instance which issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified
by oath." 22 The legal custody was therefore
appropriately with respondent Judge, who did
authorize the issuance of such search warrant. Even

if the money could validly be returned to petitioner,

had it happened that in the meanwhile some other
officer of the law had it in his possession, still, under
the ruling of this Court in Molo v. Yatco, 23 there
should be a motion for its restoration to petitioner
that must be affirmatively acted upon by
respondent Judge. Thus: "It appears from the
present case that the documents and other papers
belonging to the petitioner Mariano Molo, which
were seized by a special agent of the Anti-Usury
Board by virtue of a warrant issued by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, came into the possession of
said board, and while it does not appear how said
board came to have them in its possession, it is
presumed that it was by virtue of an authority given
by said court (see. 334, No. 31, Act No. 190). By
virtue of said authority the board became an agent
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the custody
of the documents in question, with the obligation to
return them to said court upon the termination of
the investigation for which the board needed them.
As the Anti-Usury Board had found no sufficient
evidence to warrant a criminal action against the
petitioner for violation of the Usury Law, and as said
board had dismissed the case under investigation, it
was duty bound to return said documents and
papers to the Court of First Instance of Rizal so that
the latter might order the return thereof to their
owner." 24
Much less could the seizure, the validity of the
search warrant being admitted, be open to
question. As was set forth by Justice Malcolm in
People v. Veloso: "The police officers were
accordingly authorized to break down the door and
enter the premises of the building occupied by the
so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they
then had the right to arrest the persons presumably
engaged in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the
evidence of the commission of the crime. It has
been held that an officer making an arrest may take
from the person arrested any money or property
found upon his person, which was used in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the
crime, or which may furnish the person arrested
with the means of committing violence or of
escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the
trial of the cause, but not otherwise." 25
3. There is an equally insurmountable obstacle to
the grant of petitioner's prayer for the writs of
certiorari and prohibition. There is included, as one
of the annexes to his petition, the following:
"Received from Assistant City Fiscal Jesus V. Ramos

the sum of [Ten Thousand Three Hundred Fifty]

(P10,350.00) Philippine Currency. This money will
be returned to him if the higher authorities will
require the return of the same by legal orders,
otherwise the same will not be returned." 26 It was
executed on April 1, 1966 and duly signed by him.
As previously noted, he would dispute the legality
of the order requiring the return to enable him to
avoid the effects of such a promise. Not only would
he thus ignore his plighted word, but what is worse,
he would impress on this Court a rather unorthodox
notion of what legality connotes. His contention as
to the failure of the challenged order to meet such a
test is that he is the owner of such an amount.
What he would conveniently ignore was the seizure
thereof under a valid search warrant. The very
constitutional guarantee relied upon does not
preclude a search in one's home and the seizure of
one's papers and effects as long as the element of
reasonableness is not lacking. It cannot be correctly
maintained then that just because the money seized
did belong to petitioner, its return to the court that
issued the search warrant could be avoided when
precisely what the law requires is that it be
deposited therein. As a matter of fact, what lacks
the element of legality is the continued possession
by petitioner. Resort to a higher tribunal then to
nullify what was done by respondent Judge is futile
and unavailing.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition and
certiorari is dismissed and the writ of preliminary
injunction under the resolution of this Court of June
21, 1966, lifted and set aside. With costs against
petitioner.


PEOPLE VS MARTI (SUPRA)

GUANZON V DE VILLA
Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the
"saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that
were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no
specific target house to be search and that there is
no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most
of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and
without nameplates or identification cards. The
residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by
banging on the walls and windows of their houses.
The residents were at the point of high-powered
guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to
strip down to their briefs for the police to examine

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 7

their tattoo marks. The residents complained that
they're homes were ransacked, tossing their
belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of
their money and valuables had disappeared after
the operation. The residents also reported incidents
of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those
who were detained also suffered mental and
physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
informations. The respondents said that such
accusations were all lies. Respondents contends
that the Constitution grants to government the
power to seek and cripple subversive movements
for the maintenance of peace in the state. The
aerial target zoning were intended to flush out
subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communities were the said drives were conducted.
They said that they have intelligently and carefully
planned months ahead for the actual operation and
that local and foreign media joined the operation to
witness and record such event.


Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive
committed consisted of violation of human rights.


Held: It is not the police action per se which should
be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the
methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities"
.Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears
to have been no impediment to securing search
warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses
were searched or individuals roused from sleep
were arrested. There is no showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial
zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of
the squatters and low income families are fully
protected. However, the remedy should not be
brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim
complaints and not one violator is properly charged.
In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is
no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can
order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no
permanent relief can be given.

In the meantime where there is showing that some
abuses were committed, the court temporary
restraint the alleged violations which are shocking
to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of

Manila.

RULE 126 Section 13. Search incident to lawful
arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.

2. SCOPE OF PROTECTION

CONSTITUION ART III Section 3.
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.

BURGOS VS CHIEF OF STAFF
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the
search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We
Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to
have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners
prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the
seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of
probable cause and that the two warrants issued
indicated only one and the same address. In addition,
the items seized subject to the warrant were real
properties.

Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify
seizure of the items.

Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the
two warrants was held by the court as a typographical
error and immaterial in view of the correct
determination of the place sought to be searched set
forth in the application. The purpose and intent to
search two distinct premises was evident in the
issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real

properties, the court applied the principle in the case of

Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant,
but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
any other person having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the
case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners
of the land and/or building on which the machineries
were placed. This being the case, the machineries in
question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and
void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the
application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the
witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on
the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of
Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant
of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate
with specification the subversive nature of the said
items.

KATZ VS US (SUPRA)

RA 4200 AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE
TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a
participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape

record, wire record, disc record, or any other such

record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the effective
date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or
to replay the same for any other person or persons; or
to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or
in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That
the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence
in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does
or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the
acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or
who violates the provisions of the following section or
of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or
causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than six months
or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if
the offender be a public official at the time of the
commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an
alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall
render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer,
who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to
execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the
two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of
treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case
of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to
rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the
Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth
Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses
against national security: Provided, That such written
order shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated
hereinabove has been committed or is being committed
or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in
cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to
sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior
proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case
may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2)
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 9

any person for, or to the solution of, or to the
prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are
no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the
identity of the person or persons whose
communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken
words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded
and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic
communications, the telegraph line or the telephone
number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the
peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or
record the communications, conversations, discussions,
or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed
or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the
authorization. The authorization shall be effective for
the period specified in the order which shall not exceed
sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order,
unless extended or renewed by the court upon being
satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public
interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall,
within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the
period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in
a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be
accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer
granted such authority stating the number of recordings
made, the dates and times covered by each recording,
the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the
deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of
the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if
made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in
the envelope or package deposited with the court. The
envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened,
or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their
contents revealed, except upon order of the court,
which shall not be granted except upon motion, with
due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or
persons whose conversation or communications have
been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood
to mean the Court of First Instance within whose
territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is
applied for are to be executed.
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this

Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,

quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 19, 1965

C. TYPES

1. THROUGH SEARCH WARRANT

RULE 126 Section 1. Search warrant defined. A
search warrant is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property described
therein and bring it before the court. (1)

PEOPLE VS ARUTA
Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off
by his informant that a certain Aling Rosa will be
arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of
marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at
the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the
bus coming from Baguio, when the informer
pointed out who Aling Rosa was, the team
approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents. When Abello asked aling Rosa
about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it
out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves
packed in a plastic bag marked cash katutak.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed
a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the
search and seizure of the items. In her testimony,
the accused claimed that she had just come from
Choice theatre where she watched a movie
Balweg. While about to cross the road an old
woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder
bag, when she was later on arrested by the police.
She has no knowledge of the identity of the old
woman and the woman was nowhere to be found.
Also, no search warrant was presented.

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of
the dangerous drugs of 1972

Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched

and seized the drugs from the accused.


Held: The following cases are specifically provided
or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements
of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by
the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still
be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted.

The accused cannot be said to be committing a
crime, she was merely crossing the street and was
not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to
conclude that she was committing a crime. There
was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of
the accuseds bag, there was no probable cause and
the accused was not lawfully arrested.

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a
search warrant and they did not do so. The seized
marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.

10

RULE 113, RULES OF COURT

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above,
the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112.


RULE 126, RULES OF COURT

Section 2. Court where application for search
warrant shall be filed. An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a
crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application,
any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of
the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been
filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending.

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect
search. The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer
or inner door or window of a house or any part of a
house or anything therein to execute the warrant or

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 11

liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein.

Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory
thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.

(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property
seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified
under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search
warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall summon
the person to whom the warrant was issued and
require him to explain why no return was made. If
the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain
whether section 11 of this Rule has been
complained with and shall require that the property
seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it
that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed
and kept by the custodian of the log book on search
warrants who shall enter therein the date of the
return, the result, and other actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt
of court.

MANANLILI VS CA

Manalili vs CA
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal
of CAs decision in affirming TCs decision on
convicting Manalili of illegal possession of
prohibited drug violating RA 6425. Police operatives
Espiritu, Lumabas and driver Enriquez conducted
surveillance along the front of Kalookan Cemetery
based on the information that drug addicts were
roaming around in the area, saw a man who
appeared to be high on drugs and introduced
themselves as policemen. Said man avoided them
and tried to resist, when they asked what the man
was holding in his hand, the man held out his wallet
and allowed Espiritu to examine it, who found what
he suspected to be crushed mj leaves. The man was
brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and turned out
to be Manalili. The substance found on
Manalilis wallet was sent to NBI Foresic Chemistry

Section and was confirmed as mj.

Manalilis version of the story was that early
afternoon he was riding in a tricycle when 3
policemen stopped the tricycle and informed them
of the suspected possession of mj, the policemen
bodily searched both Manalili and the driver and
upon finding nothing illegal on their persons, let the
driver go but brought Manalili along to the police
station. Manalili while on the way to the station saw
a neighbor whom he signaled to follow them and
when he was again searched in the station, he was
asked to strip his pants where they found nothing
illegal. Said neighbor then asked the policemen to
let Manalili go seeing as they had not found
anything illegal but Manalili was put on a cell who
was brought to a fiscal later that day and was told
not to say anything despite his saying that the
policemen had not found mj on his person. Said
tricycle driver and neighbor testified on court as to
how the 2 searches yielded nothing illegal on
Manalilis person.

Issues:
1. W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is
admissible.
2. W/N Manalilis actions constituted a waiver of his
rights.

3. W/N the evidence is sufficient to prove Manalilis
guilt.

Ruling:
I.

I. In Terry vs Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as
the vernacular designation of the right of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him and pat him for weapons: W)here a police
officer observes an unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of

11

himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully

limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment, and any
weapon seized may properly be introduced in
evidence against the person from whom they were
taken.
It did not, however abandon the rule that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the
warrant procedure, excused only by exigent
circumstances. As People vs Lacerna enumerated 5
recognized exceptions to the rule against
warrantless searches and seizures: 1) search
incidental to lawful
arrest; 2) search of moving vehicles; 3) seizure in
plain view; 4) customs search; 5) waiver of the
accused of his rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures. From Espiritus experience as a
member of the Anti -Narcotics Unit of Caloocan City
Police, Manalilis suspicious behavior was
characteristic of drug addicts who were high.
II.
SGs contention that Manalili effectively waived the
inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained
when he failed to raise this issue or object during
trial. A valid waiver of right against unreasonable
searches and seizures require the concurrence of
these requisites: 1) the right to be waived existed;
2) the person waiving it had knowledge; and 3)
he/she
had actual intention to relinquish the right. In this
case however, it is deemed that Manalili has waived
such right for failure to raise its violation before the
trial court, at the earliest opportunity possible.
Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the
first time on appeal.

III.
Manalilis contention that the charge was trumped
up to extort money and testimonies of the arresting
officers were inconsistent, it held that the tri
alcourts assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses particularly when affirmed by CA is
accorded great weight and respect as it had
opportunity to observe their demeanor and
deportment as they testified before it.
The elements of illegal possession of mj are: a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which
is identified to be a prohibited drug; b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and c) the

12

accused freely and consciously possessed the said

drug. The substance found on Manalilis wallet was
identified as mj which was prohibited and
knowingly without authority.
Considering that he was high and tried to avoid and
resist, such behavior clearly shows that he knew he
was holding mj and it was prohibited by law.

B. VENUE OF APPLICATION; JURISDICTION OF
COURT

RULE 126 Section 2. Court where application for search
warrant shall be filed. An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime
was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application,
any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of
the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.

MALALOAN V CA
FACTS
- 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern
Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City an application for search
warrant. The search warrant was sought for in
connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated
at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview,
QUEZON CITY. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC
Judge of KALOOKAN CITY issued Search Warrant No.
95-90.
- On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the
CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant,
proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where
a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor
Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place.
According to CAPCOM's 'Inventory of Property Seized,'
firearms, explosive materials and subversive
documents, among others, were seized and taken
during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons
found within the premises searched were brought to
Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were
later released, with the exception of the herein
petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicted for
violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757
before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C.

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 13

Velasco.
- On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a 'Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the
Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence' before
the Quezon City court; and a 'Supplemental Motion to
the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search
Warrant and Exclusion of evidence Illegally Obtained'.
- On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City
Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject
cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the
search warrant under attack, the validity of which
warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under
the category of Writs and Processes, within the
contemplation of paragraphs 3(b) of the Interim Rules
and Guidelines, and can be serve not only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere
in the judicial region of the issuing court (National
Capital Judicial Region).
- Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, in
effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying due
course to the petition for certiorari and lifting the
temporary restraining order it had issued on November
29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of
respondent court is now impugned in and sought to be
reversed through the present recourse before us.
ISSUE
WON a court may take cognizance of an application for
a search warrant in connection with an offense
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and to issue
a warrant to conduct a search on a place likewise
outside its territorial jurisdiction.
HELD
YES - No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search
warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is
provided for warrants of arrest. The arguments of
petitioners are not inferable by necessary implication
from the statutory provisions which are presumed to be
complete and expressive of the intendment of the
framers. A contrary interpretation on whatever pretext
should not be countenanced. - A bit of legal history on
his contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule
heretofore was that writs and process of the so-called
inferior courts could be enforced outside the province

only with the approval of the former court of first

instance. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the
enforcement of such writs and processes no longer
needs the approval of the regional trial court. On the
other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the
then courts of first instance were enforceable
throughout the Philippines, under the Interim or
Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certain specified writs
issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only
within its judicial region. - PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely
difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit
information regarding the existence and location of
illegally possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is
accordingly convinced that it should not make the
requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the
confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more
onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties
of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through
decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any
instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on
objections based on territorial jurisdiction.
- We do not believe that the enforcement of a search
warrant issued by a court outside the territorial
jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located
would create a constitutional question. Nor are we
swayed by the professed apprehension that the law
enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a
permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application
for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely
be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not
an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is
translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in
Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for
the issuance of a search warrant, and all these have to
be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever
region is importuned for or actually issues a search
warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day
lifetime of the warrant would discourage resort to a
court in another judicial region, not only because of the
distance but also the contingencies of travel and the
danger involved, unless there are really compelling
reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does
seem odd that such constitutional protests have not
been made against warrants of arrest which are
enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they
involve, not only property and privacy, but persons and

13

liberty.
- On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge
that the authorities have to contend now and then with
local and national criminal syndicates of considerable
power and influence, political or financial in nature, and
so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to
obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their
sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that
to do so will necessitate the transportation of
applicant's witnesses to and their examination in said
places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense.
Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born
of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the
court a quo, as quoted by respondent court:
"This court is of the further belief that the possible
leakage of information which is of utmost importance in
the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against)
where the issuing magistrate within the region does not
hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the
region, where the place to be searched is located."
- The foregoing situations may also have obtained and
were taken into account in the foreign judicial
pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory
restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the
county may issue a search warrant to be served in
another district of the county and made returnable
before the justice of still another district or another
court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters
involved. In the present state of our law on the matter,
we find no such statutory restrictions both with respect
to the court which can issue the search warrant and the
enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.
- NONETHELESS, TO PUT DOUBTS TO REST, THE
SUPREME COURT LAID DOWN THE FOLLOWING POLICY
GUIDELINES; 1. The Court wherein the criminal case is
pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search
warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case.
An application for a search warrant may be filed with
another court only under extreme and compelling
circumstances that the applicant must prove to the
satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not
give due course to the application depending on the
validity of the justification offered for not filing the
same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a
motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be
resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper
recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party

14

aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All

grounds and objections then available, existent or
known shall be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise
they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was
filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested
party may move in the court where the criminal case is
pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal
property seized under the warrant if the same is offered
therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with
different participations are involved in this situation, a
motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to
suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion
to quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that
objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be
raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The
resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall
likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the
appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant
denies the motion to quash the same and is not
otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon,
all personal property seized under the warrant shall
forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the
criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards
and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the
same criminal offense is charged in different
informations or complaints and filed in two or more
courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the
criminal action. When the issue of which court will try
the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be
considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on
applications for search warrants incident to the criminal
case.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the
instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE VS CA
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has
perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court from the Decision promulgated on September

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 15

11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] Said judgment dismissed
the Peoples petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) the
order of Judge Caesar A Casanova of Branch 80 of the
Regional Trial Court dated February 9 1996,[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif]
as well as (ii) that dated May 28,
1996 denying the Peoples motion for reconsideration.[if
!supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Those orders were handed down in
Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession
of explosives after the accused had been arraigned and
entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. More
particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued
by Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216
of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City
on December 15, 1995,[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items
seized under the warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S.
$5,750.00 to the Court within five (5) days
to be released thereafter in favor of the
lawful owner considering that said amount
was not mentioned in the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, culled from the records by the
Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James
Brillantes applied for search warrant before
Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr.
Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail
Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong
Buhay Ave. Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte
Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search
Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain
was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at
Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent 9to0 Abigail
Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4)
Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their
personal belongings, papers and effects such
as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes,
jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and

travelling bags including cash amounting to

$3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US
$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never
mentioned in the warrant. The sum of
$5,175.00 was however returned to the
respondents upon order of the court on
respondents motion or request. Included
allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two
pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one
(1) fragmentation grenade. But without the
items described in the search warrant are: (a)
three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4)
gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e)
assorted chemical ingredients for explosives;
and (f) assorted magazine assg and
ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the
warrant was served, a return was made
without mentioning the personal belongings,
papers and effects including cash belonging
to the private respondents. There was no
showing that lawful occupants were made to
witness the search.
4. On January 22,1996, private respondents upon
arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged; ** and on the same date,
submitted their Extremely Urgent Motion (To
Quash Search Warrant and to Declare
Evidence Obtained Inadmissible), dated
January 15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their
pleading (consolidated comment on petition
for certiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an
ocular inspection of the premises searched
was conducted by respondent Judge and the
following facts had been established as
contained in the order dated January 30,
1996** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the accused is at
Apartment No. 1 which is
adjacent to the Abigails Variety

15

Store;

2) That there is no such number as 1207

found in the building as it is
correspondingly called only
Apartment No. 1, 2, 3, and 4;

3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from

the Abigails Variety Store;

4) That there are no connecting doors that

can pass from Abigails Variety
Store to Apartment No. 1;

5) That Abigails Variety Store and

Apartment No. 1 have its own
respective doors used for
ingress and egress.

That there being no objection on the said

observation of the Court, let the
same be reduced on the
records.

SO ORDERED.

6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge **

issued its order duly granting the motion to
quash
search
warrant
**;[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]

16

7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed

the concomitant motion to dismiss **;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion
on the order quashing the search
warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996,
private
respondent
filed
opposition/comment and supplemental
opposition/comment on the motion for
reconsideration **:
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued
its order denying the motion for
reconsideration **; (and on) June 11, 1996,
private respondents filed extremely urgent
reiterated motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanovas quashal Order
of February 9, 1996 above referred to, the Solicitor
General forthwith commenced a special civil action of
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The action did not
prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth
Division of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated
judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case
for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following
propositions, to wit:[
1. The place actually searched was different and
distinct from the place described in the
search warrant. This fact was ascertained by
the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection,
the findings wherein, not objected to by the
People, were embodied in an order dated
January 30, 1996. The place searched, in
which the accused (herein petitioners) were
then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a
place other than and separate from, and in
no way connected with, albeit and adjacent
to, Abigails Variety Store, the place stated in
the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutors claim -- that the sketch
submitted to Judge Bacalla relative to the
application for a search warrant, actually

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 17

depicted the particular place to be searched
-- was effectively confuted by Judge
Casanova who pointed out that said SKETCH
was not dated, not signed by the person
who made it and not even mentioned in the
Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge
(Bacalla, who) instead ** directed them to
search Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207
** in the Order ** dated December 15,
1995 -- this, too, being the address given in
the Application for Search Warrant dated
December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP.
Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader.
The untenability of the claim is made more
patent by the Peoples admission, during the
hearing of its petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, that said sketch was in
truth not attached to the application for
search warrant ** (but) merely attached to
the motion for reconsideration.
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were
the following observations of Judge
Casanova contained in his Order of May 28,
1996, viz.:
(d)** ** it is very clear that the place
searched is different from the
place mentioned in the Search
Warrant, that is the reason
why even P/SR. INSP Roger
James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco
Bella and SPO4 Cesar D.
Santiago, who were all
EDUCATED, CULTURED and
ADEPT to their tasks of being
RAIDERS and who were all
STATIONED IN BULACAN were
not even able to OPEN THEIR
MOUTH to say in TAGALOG
with Honorable Judge who
issued the Search Warrant the
words KATABI, or KADIKIT or
KASUNOD
NG
ABIGAIL
VARIETY STORE ang papasukin
namin or if they happen to be
an
ENGLISH
speaking
POLICEMEN, they were not

able to open their mouth even

to WHISPER the ENGLISH
WORDS RESIDE or ADJACENT
or BEHIND or NEXT to ABIGAIL
VARIETY STORE, the place they
are going to raid.**.

3. The search was not accomplished in the

presence of the lawful occupants of the
place (herein private respondents) or any
member of the family, said occupants being
handcuffed and immobilized in the living
room at the time. The search was thus done
in violation of the law.[
4. The articles seized were not brought to the
court within 48 hours as required by the
warrant itself; (i)n fact the return was done
after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in
violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.[if
5. Judge Casanova correctly took cognizance of the
motion to quash search warrant, pursuant
to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco
vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled
the previous ruling of the Supreme Court in
Templo vs. dela Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now
the prevailing rule that whenever a search
warrant has been issued by one court or
branch thereof and a criminal case is
initiated in another court or branch thereof
as a result of the search of the warrant, that
search warrant is deemed consolidated with
the criminal case for orderly procedure. The
criminal case is more substantial than the
search warrant proceedings, and the
presiding Judge in the criminal case has the
right to rule on the search warrant and to
exclude evidence unlawfully obtained
(Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuseof discretion cannot be imputed to
the respondent Judge, in light of Article III,

17

Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126

of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order
is an appeal, not the special civil aciton of
certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the
foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court of Appeals the
following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning the lower Courts precipitate act of
disregarding the proceedings before the
issuing Court and overturning the latters
determination of probable cause and
particularity of the place to be searched;
2) sanctioning the lower Courts conclusion that the
sketch was not attached to the application
for warrant despite the clear evidence ** to
the contrary;
3) ignoring the very issues raised in the petition
before it:
4) holding that the validity of an otherwise valid
warrant could be diminished by the
tardiness by which the return is made;
5) hastly applying the general rule that certiorari
cannot be made a substitute for appeal
although the circumstances attending the
case at bar clearly fall within the exceptions
to that rule; and
6) depriving petitioner of the opportunity to
present evidence to prove the validity of the
warrant when the petition before it was
abruptly resolved without informing
petitioner thereof.
The whole case actually hinges on the question of
whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as
regards the apartment in which private respondents
were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether
or not that particular apartment had been specifically
described in the warrant.

18

The Government insists that the police officers

who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the search
warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. It claims tha
tone of said officers, infact, had been able to
surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to
the search: this being the first of four (4) separate
apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they
were also the same police officers who eventually
effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal
knowledge of the place to be searched and had the
competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew
exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and
they had presented evidence sufficient to establish
probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the
place they had in mind -- the first of four (4) separate
apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of Abigail Variety
Store -- was not what the Judge who issued the warrant
himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately
described in the search warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from
the officers own faulty depiction of the premises to be
searched. For in their application and in the affidavit
thereto appended, they wrote down a description of
the place to be searched, which is exactly what the
Judge reproduced in the search warrant: premises
located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F,
Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del
Monte, Bulacan. And the scope of the search was made
more particular -- and more restrictive -- by the Judges
admonition in the warrant that the search be limited
only to the premises herein described.
Now, at the time of the application for a search
warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct places in
the area involved: the store known as Abigails Variety
Store, and four (4) separate and independent residential
apartment units. These are housed in a single structure
and are contiguous to each other although there are no
connecting doors through which a person could pass
from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of
the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may
be entered only through its individual front door.
Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of
all five (5) places, but only one of the residential units at
the rear of Abigails Variety Store: that immediately next
to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct
knowledge of the physical configuration of the store
and the apartments behind the store, the police officers
failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to
pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after
having received the warrant -- which directs that the

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 19

search be limited only to the premises herein described,
Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207 -- thus literally excluding
the apartment units at the rear of the store -- they did
not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem
to have simply assumed that their own definite idea of
the place to be searched -- clearly indicated, according
to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to
Judge Bacalla in support of their application -- was
sufficient particularization of the general identification
of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption
is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP,
allegedly to the effect that the executing officers prior
knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is
relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the
warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the
affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2)
search warrants which, upon perusal, immediately
disclosed an obvious typographical error. The
application in said case was for seizure of subversive
material allegedly concealed in two places: one at No.
19. Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City; and the other, at
"784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued -- No. 20-82 [a]
and No. 20-82 [b]). Objection was made to the
execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City because
both search warrants apparently indicated the same
address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the
place where the supposedly subversive material was
hidden. This was error, of course but, as this Court there
ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it was
absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two
warrants for the search of only one place. Adverting to
the fact that the application for the search warrants
specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that in fact the
address, 784 Units C&D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City appeared in the opening paragraph of
Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently,
this was the address the judge intended to be searched
when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82 [b]); and
to clear up the ambiguity caused by the obviously
typographical error, the officer executing the warrant
could consult the records in the official court file.
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the
correction of an obvious typographical erro involving
ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as
in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that

clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search

warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for
clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of
the warrants in question. In the instant case, there is no
ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a
meeting of minds as to the place to be searched
between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge
issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute
for the place that the judge had written down in the
warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in
their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither
fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place
different from that stated in the warrant on the claim
that the place actually searched -- although not that
specified in the warrant -- is exactly what they had in
view when they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is
material in determining the validity of a search is the
place stated in the warrant itself, not what the
applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in
the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the
warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the
context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment
units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store would have
been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the
warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers
own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
evidence they adduced in support of their application
for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search
warrant to particularly describe the place to be
searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It
would concede to police officers the power of choosing
the place to be searched, even if not be that delineated
in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of
search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has
precisely removed from them. The particularization of
the description of the place to be searched may
properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the
warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the
police officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for
having undertaken a review of Judge Bacallas finding of
probable cause, as if he were an appellate court. A
perusal of the record however shows that all that Judge
Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies

19

between Judge Bacalla' Order of December 15, 1995

and the warrant itself, as regards the identities of the
police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. In Judge
Casanovas view, said inconsistencies, being quite
apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of
the determination of the facts on which the search
warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had
satisfactorily established probable cause before Judge
Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this
may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the
place described in the search warrant -- which, of
course, is the only place that may be legitimately
searched in virtue thereof -- was not that which the
police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind,
with the result that what they actually subjected to
search-and-seizure operations was a place other than
that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was a
search warrant more or less properly issued as regards
Abigails Variety Store, there was none for Apartment
No. 1 -- the first of the four (4) apartment units at the
rear of said store, and precisely the place in which the
private respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution, providing that:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be serched, and the
things to be seized.,
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed
valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally
determined by the judge after examination under oath,
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly
describe the place to be searched,[ the manifest
intention being that the search be confined strictly to
the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement
of the constitutional requirement that a search warrant
particularly describe the place to be searched; and that
infringement necessarily brought into operation the
concomitant provision that (a)ny evidence obtained in

20

violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure

provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[if
In light of what has just been discussed, it is
needless to discuss such other points sought to be made
by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not
(1) the sketch of the building housing the store and the
residential apartment units -- the place to be searched
being plainly marked -- was in fact attached to the
application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had
been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the
place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the
validity of the search warrant was diminished by the
tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the
Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive
evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been denied
opportunity to present before the trial court; or (5) the
remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the
Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The
resolution of these issues would not affect the
correctness of the conclusion that the search and
seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth
in the search warrant is different from that which the
officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their
argument that anyway, the premises searched were
precisely what they had described to the Judge, and
originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The
Solicitor Generals Office opines that where a search
warrant has been issued by the court other than the
one trying the main criminal case, the proper recourse
of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it
before the issuing court and not before that in which
the criminal case involving the subject of the warrant is
afterwards filed.[In support, it cites the second of five
(5) policy guidelines laid down by this Court in Malaloan
v. Court of Appeals[] concerning possible conflicts of
jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of
jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one
court and the search warrant is issued by another court
for the seizure of personal property intended to be used
as evidence in said criminal case. Said second guideline
reads:[
2. When the latter court (referring to the court
which does not try the main criminal case)
issues the search warrant, a motion to
quash the same may be filed in and shall be
resolved by said court, without prejudice to
any proper recourse to the appropriate
higher court by the party aggrieved by the
resolution of the issuing court. All grounds
and objections then available, existent or

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 21

known shall be raised in the original or
subsequent proceedings for the quashal of
the warrant, other they shall be deemed
waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a
search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal
action based on the results of the search is afterwards
commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a
motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things
thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing
Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time for
the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which
the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is
alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking
cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of
the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to
the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-
shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy
guidelines which indeed is what properly applies to the
case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant
was filed in or resolved by the issuing court,
the interested party may move in the court
where the criminal case is pending for the
suppression as evidence of the personal
property seized under the warrant if the
same is offered therein for said purpose.
Since two separate courts with different
participations are involved in this situation,
a motion to quash a search warrant and a
motion to supress evidence are alternative
and not cummulative remedies. In order to
prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash
shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided however,
that objections not available, existent or
known during the proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant may be raised in the
hearing of the motion to suppress. The
resolution of the court on the motion to
suppress shall likewise be subject to any
proper remedy in the appopriate higher
court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for
in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court
at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court.

On the other hand, the criminal action in connection

with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in
Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this
situation, a motion to quash the search warrant, or for
the return of the personal property seized (not
otherwise contraband) could have properly been
presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever
filed. It was only after the criminal action had been
commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to
quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the
latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above
quoted in accordance with which the latter court must
be deemed to have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals of September 11, 1996 -- which
dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional
Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in
the Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 -- is, for the reasons set
out in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without
pronouncement as to costs.


C. REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE

CONSTI ART III Section 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP VS ASUNCION
FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector
Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before
the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the
management of Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in
possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered
firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the
subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in
committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept]
and conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a
Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of
the law to take possession and bring to the described

21

properties. After propounding several questions to

Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the
contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the
police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP
compound and seized a number of firearms and
explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and
the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion
to Quash before the trial court. Subsequently, they
also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to
Quash and a Motion to SuppressEvidence. On March
23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which
denied petitioners motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial
court rendered its second contested Order denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid
HELD:
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce
are personally examined by the judge, in writing and
under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on facts personally known to them;
and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. In the present
case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial
court failed to examine personally the complainant and
the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who
appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the
search warrant, had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject
firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not
described with particularity.

i.
CONCEPT OF PROPABLE CAUSE IN SEARCH
WARRANTS

ILLINOIS VS GATES
Brief Fact Summary. The police received an anonymous
letter outlining specific details about the Defendants,
Gates and others (the defendants), plans to traffic
drugs from Florida to Illinois. When the details were
corroborated by the defendants actions, police
obtained a search warrant and found drugs, weapons
and other contraband in the defendants home and
automobile.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where an anonymous tip is
corroborated with actual police findings, a totality of
the circumstances approach is an appropriate way of
determining probable cause instead of using the two-
pronged test of veracity/reliability and basis of
knowledge from Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410

22

(1969). The Fourth Amendment of the United States

Constitution (Constitution) requires no more than a
finding by an issuing magistrate that there is a
substantial basis that a search will uncover evidence
of wrongdoing.
Facts. The police received a highly detailed anonymous
tip that the defendants were trafficking drugs. The
police, following up on the tip, observed the defendants
conducting specific activities which were outlined in the
tip. On the basis of the tip and the defendants
corroborating activities, the police obtained a search
warrant. Upon execution of the warrant, the police
found drugs, weapons and other contraband in the
defendants automobile and home.
Issue. May a magistrate issue a valid warrant on the
basis of an anonymous tip where there is no indicia of
the informers basis of knowledge if the information
contained in the tip is corroborated with police
findings?
Held. When a court decides whether or not to issue a
search warrant, the elements of the informants
credibility/reliability and basis of knowledge are to
be used as guides when considering the totality of the
circumstances and are not to be exclusive
requirements applied in every case.

Dissent. Aguilar and the elaboration in Spinelli sets forth
the analysis magistrates should follow on
determinations of probable cause. To sufficiently
uphold Fourth Amendment rights, magistrates must
look at both the credibility/reliability and basis of
knowledge of the informant. Basis of knowledge
cannot fully be supported solely on the basis that some
factual assertions corroborate with actual police
findings.
Since some of the anonymous tips were not
corroborated and actually proved false, the informants
credibility/reliability was undermined and therefore
the warrant should not have been issued. Police cannot
use findings of an illegal search to substantiate a
previously issued warrant.
Concurrence. Even if the factual findings by police were
only corroborated by innocuous behavior, a valid
warrant could still have been issued because the
defendants actions were suspicious. The main focus
should be whether there is an inference, based upon
the suspects actions, that the informant is credible and
the information was obtained in a reliable manner.
Discussion. Credibility/reliability and basis of
knowledge of an informant are very relevant in
determining the value of a tip. These elements alone do
not form the entire basis of inquiry in deciding whether

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 23

probable cause exists. So long as the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding a search would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment is not
violated.

PEOPLE VS ESTRADA
The People of the Philippines, through this
petition for review, seeks the reversal of the order of
respondent Judge Estrella T. Estrada, dated December
7, 1995, which granted private respondent Aiden
Lanuzas motion to quash Search Warrant No. 958 (95),
as well as the order dated April 1, 1996 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the earlier
order.
On June 27, 1995, Atty. Lorna Frances F.
Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and
Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and
Drugs (BFAD), filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the issuance
of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza of 516 San
Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, for
violation of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act 7394 (The
Consumer Act of the Philippines).
In her application for search warrant, Atty.
Cabanlas alleged, among others, as follows:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V
and Chief of LICD, I received reports from SPO4 Manuel
P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV,
Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said Officer Cabiles various
drug products amounting to Seven Thousand Two
Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P 7,232.00) on May 29,
1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de
la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has no license to
operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug products from
the BFAD;
1.c. Distribution, sale or offer for sale or transfer of drug
products without license to operate from BFAD is in
violation of Art. 40 (k) of RA 7394 (or the Consumer
Act).
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of
Mr. Cabiles, his report and the various drug products
sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags
marked Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2 of 2 were
enclosed; and the same are likewise submitted
herewith.
xxx xxx xxx. [if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] (Emphasis supplied)

The application, however, ended with the

statement that the warrant is to search the premises of
another person at a different address:
3. This is executed to support affiants application for a
search warrant on the premises of Belen Cabanero at
New Frontier Village, Talisay Cebu.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
(Emphasis supplied)
In support of the application, the affidavit of
SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles, a member of the Regional
Intelligence Group IV of the PNP Intelligence Command,
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, was attached
thereto, wherein he declared that:
1. Upon the request for assistance by BFAD, he
conducted surveillance for persons distributing, selling
or transferring drug products without license to operate
from BFAD.
2. On May 29, 1995, a certain Aiden Lanuza of 516 San
Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City sold to him
various drug products amounting to P7,232.00 and
3. Upon further verification in the BFAD registry of
licensed persons or premises, the said person and place
have in fact no license to operate.
4. Earlier than May 29, 1995, affiant saw a delivery of
drug products from the residence of Mrs. Lanuza in 516
San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City to
another person.
5. Accompanying this affidavit are the various products
sold to/and purchased by the affiant contained in two
(2) plastic bags marked Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza
Bag 2 of 2.
This is executed in support of the affiants report to
BFAD and for whatever legitimate purpose this may
serve. [if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] (Emphasis supplied)
The BFAD also submitted with the application a
copy of the sketch[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] of the location of
Aiden Lanuzas residence at her stated address.
On the same day the application was filed, the
respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 958 (95),
which reads in full:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 83 QUEZON CITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA,
Defendant.
X---------------------------X
SEARCH WARRANT

23

It appears to the satisfaction of this Court, after

examining under oath Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas,
Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division
(LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) and her
witness, Manuel P. Cabiles, member of the Intelligence
Group IV, Intelligence Command, PNP, Camp Vicente
Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a violation of Article 40(k) in
relation to Article 41 of Republic Act No. 7394
(Consumer Act) has been committed or about to be
committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to
believe that Ms. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose dela
Montana Street, Cebu City has in her possession and
control at said address the following described
properties:
medicines and drugs of undetermined quantity among
which are Bricanyl Tablet, Bisolvon Tablet, Buscopan
Tablet, Buscopan Ampoule, Mucosolvan Ampoule,
Persantin Tablet, Tegretol Tablet, PZA-Ciba Tablet,
Voltaren Tablet, Zantac Ampoule, Ventolin Tablet,
Ventolin Inhaler, Dermovate Cream, Fortum Vial,
Zinacef Vial, Feldene 1M Ampoule, Norvasoc Tablet,
Bactrim Forte Tablet, Rochephin Vial, Tilcotil Tablet,
Librax Tablet, Methergin Tablet and Tagamet Tablet
which she is selling, distributing and transferring
without the necessary license from the Department of
Health.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate
search at any time of the DAY or NIGHT of the premises
above-described and forthwith seize and take
possession of the undetermined amount of drugs and
medicines subject of the offense and to bring the same
to this Court to be dealt with as the law directs.
You are further directed to submit a return of this
Search Warrant within ten (10) days from today.
This Search Warrant is valid within a period of ten (10)
days from the date of issue.
GIVEN UNDER THE HAND AND SEAL of this Court this
27th day of June 1995 at Quezon City.
(Sgd.)ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA
econd Vice Executive Judge[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Emphasis supplied)
On June 28, 1995, the search warrant was served
at private respondent Lanuzas residence at the
indicated address by a composite team of policemen
from the PNP 7th Criminal Investigation Command,
Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City.
How the search warrant was implemented was
briefly
narrated
in
the
Joint
Affidavit,[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
dated June 29, 1995, of SPO2

24

Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Marckbilly Capalungan,

both members of the search and seizure team. They
stated in their affidavit that their team, armed with the
search warrant, conducted a raid at the premises of one
AIDEN LANUZA of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street,
Cebu City x x x; that the raid was witnessed by Luis
Rivera, Demetrio Panimdim and Francisco Ojales, both
(sic) Brgy. Tanod of Kasambagan, Cebu City; that the
service of the (search) warrant resulted in the
confiscation of fifty-two (52) cartoons (sic) of assorted
medicines from the possession and control of AIDEN
LANUZA; and that the said items were brought to the
7CICRO office for detailed inventory headed by Atty.
Lorna F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and
Compliance Division of the BFAD, Manila.[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif]
(Emphasis supplied)
The present petition, however, narrates a
different account of what actually happened during the
implementation of the search warrant. Paragraph 5 of
the petition states: At the commencement of the
search, the members of the team discovered that the
premises described as 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City was actually a five thousand (5,000)
square meter compound containing at least fifteen (15)
structures which are either leased residences, offices,
factories, workshops or warehouse. The policemen
proceeded to search the residence of private
respondent Lanuza at Lot No. 41 of said address. Finding
no drug products thereat, they proceeded to search a
nearby warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same
compound and address above stated. This search
yielded fifty-two (52) cartons of assorted drug products
which were then inventoried in due course. x x x.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
(Emphasis supplied)
In an order[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] dated July 3,
1995, the respondent Judge noted the inventory of the
seized drugs and authorized the BFAD to retain custody
of the same, to have samples of the drugs analyzed and
be brought to the registered drug manufacturers for
parallel testing.
On
S August 22, 1995, private respondent Aiden
Lanuza filed a verified motion[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
praying
( that Search Warrant No. 958 (95) be quashed
and that the seized articles be declared inadmissible in
any proceeding and ordered returned to the warehouse
owned by Folk Arts Export & Import Company located at
Lot No. 38 inside the compound at 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Cebu City. The motion is based on the
grounds that the search warrant is illegal and null and
void because: (1) it was applied to search the premises
of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay,
Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of private

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 25

respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Cebu City; (2) it was issued for a non-existing
offense; (3) Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas was not duly
authorized by applicant BFAD to apply therefor; (4) it
failed to particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized; (5) the applicant's witnesses
had no personal knowledge of the facts upon which it
was issued; and (6) its implementation was
unreasonable as it was enforced on a different or wrong
place which was lawfully occupied by a different or
wrong person.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas, who appeared for
the BFAD, opposed[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] the motion to
quash the search warrant, to which the private
respondent countered with a reply.
After the contending parties had submitted their
respective positions without further oral arguments, the
respondent Judge issued the assailed order[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif]
dated December 7, 1995, quashing
Search Warrant No. 958 (95). Accordingly, the order
dated July 3, 1995 was revoked and all the articles
seized were declared inadmissible in any and all
proceedings against private respondent Aiden Lanuza.
Also, the BFAD was ordered to return at its expense all
the seized items to the warehouse of Folk Arts Import &
Export Company at Lot No. 38, 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City within a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice of the said order.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
December 7, 1995 order was denied in an order[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif]
dated April 1, 1996, impelling
petitioner to file the present petition asserting that the
respondent Judge erred:
a) In holding that the defect appearing in BFAD's
application for a search warrant is so "grave" in nature
as to warrant quashal of the search warrant issued
thereunder, considering that such variance is actually a
harmless clerical error.
b) In holding that Atty. Cabanlas was not authorized by
the BFAD to apply for a search warrant concerning the
unlicensed distribution of drugs, considering that the
grant of BFAD authorization upon her to investigate
fake, misbranded, adulterated or unregistered drugs
necessarily contemplates the authority to investigate
the unlicensed activities above noted.
c) In holding that applicant BFAD had failed to discharge
the burden of proving probable cause for issuance of a
search warrant, by failing to present documentary proof

indicating that private respondent had no license to sell

or distribute drug products, considering that under the
authority of Carillo v. People (229 SCRA 386) the BFAD
only had the burden of proving the negative ingredient
of the offense charged on the basis of the best evidence
procurable under the circumstances.
d) In holding that the place sought to be searched had
not been described with sufficient particularity in SW
No. 958 (95), considering that Aiden Lanuza's residence
at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City was not so conspicuously or notoriously
represented to the public as such by her as to contradict
the investigating and serving officers' perception of the
outward appearance of her dwelling, which led them to
believe that the more general address of 516 San Jose
de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City referred to her
dwelling.
e) In ordering the return of the things seized, the
possession of which is
prohibited.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
We granted the petitioners application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order in a
resolution[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] dated June 26, 1996 and
restrained the implementation of the assailed orders,
effective immediately and until further orders from this
Court.
Private respondent Aiden Lanuza later filed her
comment[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] on the petition, but
petitioner's reply thereto was not admitted by this
Court in a resolution[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] dated January
13, 1997, for failure by the Solicitor General to file the
same within his first extension of thirty (30) days, that
was granted, but with a warning that no further
extension would be given. Instead of filing his reply, the
Solicitor General asked for two (2) more extensions of
time, which were denied.
Now to the assigned errors of the respondent
Judge raised by petitioner.
The requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant are inscribed in Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
"SEC. 2. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN
THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF
WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE
INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT
OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE

25

CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE

AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION
OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY
PRODUCE, AND PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE
TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE
SEIZED." (Emphasis supplied)
In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the
finding of the respondent Judge that the application for
its issuance suffered from a grave defect, "which
escaped (her) attention," considering that it was applied
to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New
Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search
the residence of herein private respondent Aiden
Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Cebu City.[if
!supportFootnotes][20][endif]

We nonetheless find such error in the application
for search warrant a negligible defect.
The title of the questioned application, which
reads:
"PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA, For: Violation of Article
516 San Jose de la 40 (k) in relation to
Montana Street, Mabolo, Article 41 of Republic
Cebu City, Act No. 7394 (or the
Defendant. Consumer Act).
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x"[if
!supportFootnotes][21][endif]
(Emphasis supplied)
and the allegations contained therein, pertinent
portions of which we quote:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V
and Chief of LICD, I received reports from SPO4 Manuel
P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV,
Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said Officer Cabiles various
drug products amounting to Seven Thousand Two
Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P 7,232.00) on May 29,
1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de
la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has no license to
operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug products from
the BFAD;
x x x x x x x x x
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of
Mr. Cabiles, his report and the various drug products
sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags
marked Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2 of 2 were
enclosed; and the same are likewise submitted

26

herewith.
x x x x x x x x x.

[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]

(Emphasis
supplied)
unmistakably reveal that the said application was
specifically intended against private respondent Aiden
Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City. She has been the only one identified in the
application, as well as in the aforequoted affidavit of
SPO4 Manuel Cabiles upon which the application was
based, as having allegedly sold to said SPO4 Cabiles
various drugs amounting to P7,232.00 on May 29, 1995,
without any license to do so, in alleged violation of
Article 40 (k) of R.A. 7394. It is noteworthy that, as
stated in the above-quoted paragraph 2 of the
application, the plastic bags which contained the seized
drugs and which were submitted together with the
application, were marked as "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and
"Lanuza Bag 2 of 2." These markings with the name
"Lanuza" obviously refer to no other than the herein
private respondent. And when the respondent Judge
issued the search warrant, it was directed solely against
private respondent Aiden Lanuza at her address: 516
San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The Solicitor General explained the error in the
application by saying that on the same day applicant
Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas filed the questioned
application on June 27, 1995, another application for
search warrant was also filed against one Belen
Cabanero at her residence at New Frontier Village,
Talisay, Cebu City. This can be deduced from the
following examination conducted by respondent Judge
on Atty. Cabanlas:
"(COURT)
Q. And who is your respondent?
A. Mrs. Aiden Lanuza and the other one is Belen
Cabanero.
Q. Where are they situated?
A. Mrs. Lanuza is situated in No. 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
Q. About the other?
A. New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu.
Q. Do you have any specific address at New Frontier
Village?
A. It was reported by Mr. Manuel Cabiles.
Q. Will he be testifying?
A. Yes Ma'am. Your Honor, this is the vicinity of the New
Frontier Village, Cebu (witness presenting a sketch) (sic)
Q. How about this San Jose de la Montana. This is just in
Cebu City?
A. At 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City."[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 27

the name and address of one Belen Cabanero were
erroneously copied in paragraph 3 of the application in
question. Such defect, as intimated earlier, is not of
such a gravity as to call for the invalidation of the search
warrant.
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to
quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for
nullifying the search warrant as she was not convinced
that there was probable cause for its issuance due to
the failure of the applicant to present documentary
proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza
had no license to sell drugs.
It must be noted that in the application for search
warrant, private respondent is charged with the specific
offense of selling drugs without the required license
from the Department of Health, which is in violation of
Article 40 (k) of R. A. 7394, and penalized under Article
41 thereof. The said application was supported by the
affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles where, in paragraph 3
thereof, he declared that he made a "verification in the
BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises" and
discovered that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had
"no license" to sell drugs.
We agree with the respondent Judge that
applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas should have
submitted documentary proof that private respondent
Aiden Lanuza had no such license. Although no
explanation was offered by respondent Judge to
support her posture, we hold that to establish the
existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the
issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must show
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched."[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
The facts and circumstances that would show
probable cause must be the best evidence that could be
obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of
such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the
issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the
offense charged - for instance, the absence of a license
required by law, as in the present case - and such
evidence is within the knowledge and control of the
applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the
best evidence could not be secured at the time of
application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason
therefor during the examination by the judge. The

necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards

before a search warrant can be issued is to give
meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the
privacy of his home and personalties. As well stated by
this Court through former Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando
in
Villanueva
vs.
Querubin:[if
!supportFootnotes][25][endif]

It is deference to ones personality that lies at the core
of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a
recognition of a constitutionally protected area,
primarily ones home but not necessarily thereto
confined (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
[1966]). What is sought to be guarded is a mans
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his
residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be
welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however powerful, does
not as such have access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his
house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is
called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling
and to respect the privacies of his life (Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757, Brennam, J. and Boyd v. United
States, 116 US 616, 630). In the same vein, Landynski in
his authoritative work, Search and Seizure and the
Supreme Court (1966), could fitly characterize this
constitutional right as the embodiment of a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home
and person and to afford its constitutional protection
against the long reach of government is no less than to
value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and
then only under stringent procedural safeguards (Ibid,
p. 47). (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable
under the circumstances to prove that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is
the certification to that effect from the Department of
Health. SPO4 Manuel could have easily procured such
certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from
the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable
reason was introduced why such certification could not
be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a
license by private respondent is not sufficient to
establish probable cause for a search warrant. The
presumption of regularity cannot be invoked in aid of
the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.[if

27

!supportFootnotes][26][endif]

We apply by analogy our ruling in

20 Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
et. al.:[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted
films from which the pirated films were allegedly
copied, was necessary for the validity of search
warrants against those who have in their possession the
pirated films. The petitioners argument to the effect
that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of
application may not be necessary as these would be
merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of
whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The
court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes
were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it
owns.
The application for search warrants was directed
against video tape outlets which allegedly were
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant
to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity
or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated
works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant
must present to the court the copyrighted films to
compare them with the purchased evidence of the
video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the
latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former.
This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films
must be established to satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of
the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had
not been described with sufficient particularity in the
questioned search warrant, considering that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located
at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were
found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same
compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different
person. Again, the respondent Judge is correct on this
point.
This Court has held that the applicant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it
is feasible.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] In the present case, it
must be noted that the application for search warrant
was accompanied by a sketch[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]of the
compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential
house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in
th

28

a square. Within the same compound are residences of

other people, workshops, offices, factories and
warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have
been very easy to describe the residential house of
private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to
segregate it from the other buildings or structures
inside the same compound. But the search warrant
merely indicated the address of the compound which is
516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This
description of the place to be searched is too general
and does not pinpoint the specific house of private
respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of
the residence of private respondent sought to be
searched has characterized the questioned search
warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the
constitutional requirement.
While the questioned search warrant had all the
characteristic of a general warrant, it was correctly
implemented. For, the searching team went directly to
the house of private respondent Aiden Lanuza located
at Lot No. 41 inside the compound known as 516 San
Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. However,
the team did not find any of the drug products which
were the object of the search. Frustrated, and
apparently disappointed, the team then proceeded to
search a nearby warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import
Company owned by one David Po located at Lot No. 38
within the same compound. It was in the warehouse
that drug products were found and seized which were
duly receipted. In the Joint Affidavit of SPO2 Fructuoso
Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Markbilly Capalungan, members of
the searching team, is a statement that the confiscated
52 cartons of assorted medicines were found in the
possession and control of private respondent Aiden
Lanuza. This is a blatant falsehood and is aggravated by
the fact that this was committed by officers sworn to
uphold the law. In searching the warehouse of Folk Arts
Export & Import Company owned by one David Po, the
searching team went beyond the scope of the search
warrant. As the trial court aptly observed:
x x x. The verified motion to quash and reply also show
that the search at the house of defendant-movant
yielded negative result and the confiscated articles were
taken from another place which is the warehouse of
Folk Arts Import and Export Company owned by
another person. In the return of the search warrant, it is
stated that Search Warrant No. 958 (95) was served at
the premises of 516 San Jose dela Montana St., Cebu
City and that during the search, drug products were
found and seized therefrom which were duly receipted.
Accompanying said return is the Joint Affidavit of two
(2) members of the searching team, namely: SPO2

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 29

Froctuoso Bete and SPO2 Markbilly Capalingan, both of
the 7th Criminal Investigation Command, PNP, with
station at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gerardo Avenue, Cebu
City which also mentioned only the address as 516 San
Jose dela Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City and the
confiscation of 52 cartoons(sic) of assorted medicines
purportedly from the possession and control of
defendant-movant. However, as indicated in the sketch
attached to the application for search warrant, said Folk
Arts Import and Export Company is owned by one David
Po, which is a concrete proof that the searching team
exceeded their authority by conducting a search not
only in the residence of defendant-movant Lanuza but
also in another place which the applicant itself has
identified as belonging to another person, David Po. The
foregoing are strong reasons to support the conclusion
that there has been an unreasonable search and seizure
which would warrant the quashal of the search
warrant.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif]
The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting
the motion to quash the search warrant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued in a resolution
dated June 26, 1996 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS SYJUCO
Facts:
The crime alleged is fraud of revenue against the
Government. Pursuant to a search warrant issued, the
officers searched the building occupied by Santiago Sy
Juco. In the process, the authorities seized, among
others, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Atty. Remo
to be his and contained some letters, documents and
papers belonging to his clients. Also, books belonging to
Salakam Lumber Co., Inc., were seized.
Issue:
1. Is the search warrant in question valid or not, taking
into consideration the provisions of the law and of the
Constitution relative thereto?
2. Does the art metal filing cabinet seized by the agents
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue belong to Santiago Sy
Juco or to Teopisto B. Remo?
Ruling:
The search and seizure was not valid. It is not stated in
the affidavit that the books, documents or records
referred to therein are being used or are intended to be
used in the commission of fraud against the
Government and, notwithstanding the lack of such

allegation; the warrant avers that they are actually

being used for such purpose.
Also, it assumes that the entire building is occupied by
Santiago Sy Juco, when the only ground upon which
such assumption is based is the BIR agent's statement
which is mere hearsay (coming from an informant) and
when in fact part thereof was occupied by Atty. Remo.
It was not asked that the things belonging to Atty. Remo
and to others also be searched and seized.
For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors
assigned by the appellant are very well founded, the
appealed judgment is reversed, and it is ordered that
the art metal filing cabinet, together with the key
thereof seized by the internal revenue agent by virtue
of the judicial warrant in question, which is hereby
declared null and void, be immediately returned
unopened to the appellant; and that a copy of this
decision be sent to the Solicitor-General for him to take
action, if he deems it justified, upon careful
investigation of the facts, against the internal revenue
agent or agents who obtained and executed the
warrant in question, in accordance with the provisions
of article 129 of the Revised Penal Code, without special
pronouncement as to costs.


BURGOS VS CHIEF OF STAFF (SUPRA)

STONEHILL VS DIOKNO (SUPRA)

COLUMBIA PICTURES INC VS CA(1994)
Facts:
07 April 1998: NBI filed with the RTC of Pasig 3
applications for SW against private respondent
(Tube Video Enterprises Edward C. Cham;
Blooming Rose Tape Center Ma. Jajorie T. Uy;
Video Channel Lydia Nabong) charging them
with violations of Sec. 56 of PD 49 (Decree on
the Protection of Intellectual Property) as
amended by PD 1988.
RTC Judge Austria consolidated the 3
applications and conducted a joint hearing
where she made a personal examination of the
applicant (NBI Agent Reyes) and his witnesses.
Finding just and probable cause, Judge Austria
issued the search warrants.
Private Respondents filed their Motion to
Quash the SW citing as grounds that there was
no probable cause; the films in question are not

29

protected by PD 1988 in that they were never

registered in the National Library as a condition
precedent to the availment of the protection;
the Motion Picture Association of America have
not proven nor established their ownership
over the films; etc.
Judge Austria reversed her former stand initially
finding probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrants and ordered their quashal:
o Private complainants uncertain of their
ownership over the titles;
o Complainants did not comply with the
requirement that master tapes should
be presented during the application for
search warrants;
o Complainants failed to comply with the
deposit and registration requirements
of PD 49 as amended by PD 1988.
Judge Austria also ordered the return of the
items seized by virtue of the warrants.
CA affirmed the quashal of the SWs.

Issue: WON the SWs were issued with probable cause.
NO

Ratio:
BASIC REQUIREMENT for the validity of search warrants
(in cases of this nature) is the presentation of the
master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the
pirated films are supposed to have been copied (20th
Century Fox Film Corp. vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655).

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity
or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated
works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant
must present to the court the copyrighted films to
compare them with the purchased evidence of the
video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the
latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former.
This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films
must be established to satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of
the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.

According to the CA, in which the SC concurs:
It is not correct to say that "the basic
fact" to be proven to establish probable
cause in the instant cases is not the
"unauthorized transfer" of a motion
picture that has been recorded but the
"sale, lease, or distribution of pirated

30

video tapes of copyrighted films."

In applying for the search warrants the
NBI charged violation of the entire
provisions of Section 56 of P.D. No. 49
as amended by P.D.No. 1988. This
included not only the sale, lease or
distribution of pirated tapes but also
the transfer or causing to be transferred
of any sound recording or motion
picture or other audio visual work.

But even assuming, as appellants argue,
that only the sale, lease, or distribution
of pirated video tapes is involved, the
fact remains that there is need to
establish probable cause that the tapes
being sold, leased or distributed are
pirated tapes, hence the issue reverts
back to the question of whether there
was unauthorized transfer, directly or
indirectly, of a sound recording or
motion picture or other audio visual
work that has been recorded

Petitions denied.




COLUMBIA PICTIRES ENTERTAINMENT VS CA (1996)
In 1986, the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) applied
for a warrant against Jose Jinco (Jingco), owner of
Showtime Enterprises for allegedly pirating movies
produced and owned by Columbia Pictures and other
motion picture companies. Jingco filed a motion to
quash the search warrant but the same was denied in
1987. Subsequently, Jinco filed an Urgent Motion to Lift
the Search Warrant and Return the Articles Seized. In
1989, the RTC judge granted the motion. The judge
ruled that based on the ruling in the 1988 case of 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation vs CA, before a search
warrant could be issued in copyright cases, the master
copy of the films alleged to be pirated must be attached
in the application for warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 20th Century Fox ruling may
be applied retroactively in this case.
HELD: No. In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of 20th
Century Fox was not yet promulgated. The lower court
could not possibly have expected more evidence from
the VRB and Columbia Pictures in their application for a
search warrant other than what the law and

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 31

jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted,
required with respect to the finding of probable cause.
The Supreme Court also revisited and clarified the ruling
in the 20th Century Fox Case. It is evidently incorrect to
suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to
do, that in copyright infringement cases, the
presentation of master tapes of the copyright films is
always necessary to meet the requirement of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that
such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit
that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the
controverted fact is made through demonstration
involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding
magistrate. Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not
rule out the use of testimonial or documentary
evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of
evidence tending to prove the factum probandum,
especially where the production in court of object
evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or
expenses out of proportion to is evidentiary value.
In fine, the supposed pronouncement in said case
regarding the necessity for the presentation of the
master tapes of the copy-righted films for the validity of
search warrants should at most be understood to
merely serve as a guidepost in determining the
existence of probable cause in copy-right infringement
cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between
the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective
and careful reading of the decision in said case could
lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was
hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible
requirement in all or similar copyright infringement
cases.


II.
DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE
A. PERSON RESPONSIBLE

CONSTI 1987 ARTICLE III Section 2. The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

RULE 126: Section 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.

B. PROCESS

RULE 126 Section 5. Examination of complainant;
record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements, together with the affidavits
submitted

PAPER INDUSTRY CORP VS CA (SUPRA)

ROAN V GONZALES
FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the
respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioner's
house was searched two days later but none of the
articles listed in the warrant was discovered. However,
the officers conducting the search found in the premises
one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets
which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the
charge against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P.
Quinosa personally filed his application for a search
warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in
the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada
and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to
him their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V.
Lining, a police investigator. As the application was not
yet subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine
Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain,
among others, if he knew and understood the same.
Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same
before him.

ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply
with the proper procedure in issuing the Search
Warrant.

31


HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the Judge may be able to properly determine
the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted
with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the
search warrant invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no
need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken
considering that he was applying for a search warrant
on the basis of the information provided by the
witnesses whose depositions had already been taken by
the undersigned.
In other words, the applicant was asking for the
issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to
him, as required by settled jurisprudence.

ALIH VS CASTRO
Respondents who were members of the Philippine
marine and defense forces raided the compound
occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after
petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents,
killing a number of men. The following morning, the
petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger
printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite
their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and
ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to
have the items illegally seized returned to them and
invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done
without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting
under superior orders and that operation was necessary
because of the aggravation of the peace and order
problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking
of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners
and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of

32

the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence

against them.

Held:
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion
that the respondents had against petitioners did not
excuse the former from observing the guaranty
provided for by the constitution against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to
due process and should be protected from the arbitrary
actions of those tasked to execute the law.
Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation
was urgent nor was there any showing of the
petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit
approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court.

The items seized, having been the fruits of the
poisonous tree were held inadmissible as evidence in
any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation
by the respondents was done without a warrant and so
the items seized during said operation should not be
acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence
should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the
provision against self-incrimination, the court held that
the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to
testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in
Holt v. United States, 18 The prohibition of compelling
a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself
is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material.

III.
DESCRIPTION OF THING BEING SEIZED


KHO VS MACALINTAL
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for
the issuance of search warrants by the respondent
Judge against Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his
residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., BF
Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo
T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same
court for the issuance of search warrants against the
said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy.
Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search warrants were
applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a
personal surveillance and investigation in the two

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 33

houses referred to on the basis of confidential
information they received that the said places were
being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms
and chop-chop vehicles. On the same day, the
respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination
of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he
issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14,
and 90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, NBI conducted the
simultaneous searches on the said residences of the
petitioner (Kho) and they were able to confiscate the
above mention objects stated in the warrant and the
simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation
of various radio and telecommunication equipment. The
confiscated items were verified in Camp Crame and
were proven that all of them are unlicensed.
Petitioner (Kho) question the validity of the warrant and
filed a Motion to Quash the previous decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issuance of the search
warrant by the respondent Judge valid?
2. Whether or not the Motion to Quash filed by the
petitioner (Kho) alleging that there was an abuse
enforcement of the challenge search warrant valid?
3. Whether or not the Petitioners sought to restrain
the respondent National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
from using the objects seized by virtue of such
warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed against
them and to return immediately the said items valid.
RULING:
The Court believes, and so holds, that the said
warrants comply with Constitutional and statutory
requirements. The law does not require that the things
to be seized must be described in precise and minute
detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually
impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they
would not know exactly what kind of things they are
looking for. Since the element of time is very crucial in
criminal cases, the effort and time spent in researching
on the details to be embodied in the warrant would
render the purpose of the search nugatory.
The question of whether there was abuse in the
enforcement of the challanged search warrants is not
within the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a Motion to
Quash, what is assailed is the validity of the issuance of
the warrant. The manner of serving the warrant and of
effecting the search are not an issue to be resolved
here. As aptly opined and ruled by the respondent

Judge, petitioners have remedies under pertinent penal,

civil and administrative laws for their problem at hand,
which cannot be solved by their present motion to
quash.
Considering that cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Explosives and Violation of Section 3 in relation to
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known
as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, have been
instituted against the petitioners, the petition for
mandamus with preliminary and mandatory injunction
to return all objects seized and to restrain respondent
NBI from using the said objects as evidence, has
become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit and on the ground that
it has become moot and academic, the petition at bar is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.

iv. DESCRIPTION OF PLACE TO BE SEARCHED

PAPER INDUSTRIES V ASUNCION (SUPRA)

D. PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED

RULE 126 Section 3. Personal property to be seized. A
search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure
of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of
the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense. (


PEOPLE VS SYJUCO (SUPRA)

BURGOS VS CHIEF OF STAFF (SUPRA)

E. FORM AND CONTENT OF WARRANT; LIFETIME

RULE 126
Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant
is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the
court. (1)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the
judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which
the application is based or that there is probable cause

33

to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant,

which must be substantially in the form prescribed by
these Rules.
Section 10. Validity of search warrant. A search
warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date.
Thereafter it shall be void.

BACHE VS RUIZ
On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal
Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting
the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for
violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72,
73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de
Leon make and file the application for search warrant
which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon
and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search
warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case;
so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio.
After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed
that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and
thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the
oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to
be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for
perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search
warrant and Logronios deposition. The search was
subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search
warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant
and his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant
and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable
cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one
specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least
four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in
Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities
committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section
3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the

34

things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized
are described in the Search Warrant
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers,
journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books,
customers ledgers); receipts for payments received;
certificates of stocks and securities; contracts,
promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications, accounting and
business records; checks and check stubs; records of
bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art
III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should
particularly describe the things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe
the things to be seized when the description therein is
as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not
of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation
to the offense for which the warrant is being issued

MUSTANG LUMBER VS CA
Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber dealer with
the Bureau of Forest Development. The Special Actions
and Investigation Division of the DENR were informed
that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs
were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner. The
SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and
sent it to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof,
the team members saw coming out from the
lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since
the driver could not produce the required invoices and
transport documents, the team seized the truck
together with its cargo and impounded them at the
DENR compound. The team was not able to gain entry
into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.
The team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue
thereof, the team seized on that date from the
petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra
lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga
and supa. On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the
premises of the petitioner's lumberyard and placed
under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of
311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 35

produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of
lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and
delivery receipts from the source of the invoices
covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their
source and origin. Parenthetically, it may be stated that
under an administrative seizure the owner retains the
physical possession of the seized articles. Only an
inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the
owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited
from disposing them until further orders. On 10 April
1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to the
Chief of SAID Robles requesting an extension of fifteen
days to produce the required documents covering the
seized articles because some of them, particularly the
certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the
Province of Quirino. Robles denied the petition.
Subsequently, the Sec. of DENR Factoran issued an
order confiscating the woods seized in the truck of the
petitioner as well as those found in their lumberyard.
Issue:
Whether or not that a lumber cannot be considered a
timber and that petitioner should not be held for illegal
logging.
Held:
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner,
be construed as an affirmance of the respondent
Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the
coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
and thus possession thereof without the required legal
documents is not a crime. On the contrary, the SC rules
that such possession is penalized in the said section
because lumber is included in the term timber. The
Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either
timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest
products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in
the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs
and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wall bond, block board, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood products. This simply
means that lumber is a processed log or processed
forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term
lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or
logs after being prepared for the market." Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in

the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words

and phrases used in a statute should be given their
plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And
insofar as possession of timber without the required
legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or
processed timber.


F. VALIDITY OF WARRANT
STONEHILL VS DIOKNO (SUPRA)

PEOPLE VS ESTRADA (SUPRA)

PEOPLE VS CA (SUPRA)

2. WARRANTLESS
A. SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST
RULE 126 Section 13. Search incident to lawful
arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.

US VS VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ
FACTS
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen and
resident of Mexico. In cooperation with the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), Mexican police officers
apprehended and transported him to the U.S. border,
where he was arrested for various narcotics-related
offenses. Following his arrest, a DEA agent sought
authorization to search Verdugo-Urquidez's residences
for evidence. The Director General of the Mexican
Federal Judicial Police authorized the searches, but no
search warrant from a U.S. magistrate was ever
received. At trial, the district court granted Verdugo-
Urquidez's motion to suppress the evidence on the
ground that the search violated the Fourth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution.

ISSUE: Does the Fourth Amendment apply to the search
and seizure by United States agents of property that is
owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign
country?

HELD: No. The text of the Fourth Amendment concerns
"the people," suggesting a concern with persons who
are part of the national community, as contrasted with

35

aliens without any substantial connection to the U.S.

Moreover, extraterritorial aliens are not even entitled
to rights under the Fifth Amendment, which speaks in
the relatively more universal term of "person." And
non-"fundamental" rights are not even guaranteed to
inhabitants of unincorporated territories under U.S
sovereign control, much less aliens. Therefore, any
restrictions on searches and seizures of nonresident
aliens and their foreign property must be imposed by
the
political
branches
through
diplomatic
understanding, treaty or legislation.

PEOPLE VS PADILLA
Facts: High-powered firearms with live ammunitions
were found in the possession of petitioner Robin
Padilla:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-
32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with
four (4) long and one (1) short magazine with
ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip
and eight (8) ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of
.38 caliber revolver.
Appellant voluntarily surrendered item no. 3. and a
black bag containing two additional long magazines and
one short magazine.
PNP Chief Espino, Record Branch of the Firearms and
Explosives Office issued a Certification which stated that
the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16
Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver
Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta
SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C.
Padilla. A second Certification stated that the three
firearms were not also registered in the name of
Robinhood C. Padilla.
Issue: Whether or not his arrest was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in
the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under
the exclusionary rule
Held: No. There is no dispute that no warrant was
issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did
not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following
instances:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

36

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,

and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i)
after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has
been established that petitioners vehicle figured in a hit
and run an offense committed in the presence of
Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest
petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that
presence does not only require that the arresting
person sees the offense, but also when he hears the
disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to
the scene. As testified to by Manarang, he heard the
screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the
sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident
to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring
Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to
apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to
the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the
Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near
the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of
his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and
run. We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to
seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were
nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting
petitioners arrest, did not in any way affect the
propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most
prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than
collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen
are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in
effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner)
who , in all probability, could have put up a degree of
resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able
to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover,
it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more
success when law enforcers function in collaboration
with private citizens. It is precisely through this
cooperation, that the offense herein involved
fortunately did not become an additional entry to the
long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect,

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 37

like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which
has been set in motion in a public place for want of a
warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need
to render aid or take action. The exigent circumstances
of hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the
public place and the raining nighttime all created a
situation in which speed is essential and delay
improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority
to make the forcible stop since they had more than
mere reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity. Moreover,
when
caught
in flagrante
delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith
& Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine),
petitioners warrantless arrest was proper as he was
again actually committing another offense (illegal
possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in
the presence of a peace officer.
Besides, the policemens warrantless arrest of
petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph
(b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There
was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of
time between the hit and run and the actual
apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed
themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to
Manarangs report, the policemen saw for themselves
the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling
plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and
the dented hood and railings thereof. These formed
part of the arresting police officers personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that petitioners Pajero was
indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run
incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted
upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable
hearsay information.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence,
any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his
plea. Petitioners belated challenge thereto aside from
his failure to quash the information, his participation in
the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him
in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise,
by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such
irregularities and defects.
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized
from petitioner without a search warrant, the
admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless
search and seizure of property is valid, are as follows:

warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence,
Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements
of which are:
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent,
and
(d). plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.
3 search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity.
4 consented warrantless search, and
5 customs search.
In conformity with respondent courts observation, it
indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon
petitioners firearms and ammunitions without even
undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly
understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which
is concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson
revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for
they came within plain view of the policemen
who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine
tucked in petitioners waist and back pocket
respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting
from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which
was immediately apparent to the policemen as they
took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle
lying horizontally near the drivers seat. Thus it has been
held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the
commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers
should happen to discover a criminal offense being
committed by any person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for the
apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of
the corpus delicti.
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law
inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure

37

even without a warrant.

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag
containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of
petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash
the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect.
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions
were products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their
seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still
be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest
(first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the
police may undertake a protective search of the
passenger compartment and containers in the
vehicle which are within petitioners grabbing distance
regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied
the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item
to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestees
custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search
was contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of
that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the
exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a
moving vehicle (third instance). In connection
therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally
permissible when, as in this case, the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with
respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of
the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject
matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.


PEOPLE VS CHUA HO SAN
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms
and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of
Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the
Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring
the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a
radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain
Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for
police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the
latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel
looked different from the boats ordinarily used by
fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1
Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao
beach and there conferred with Almoite. Cid then
observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male
passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San.

38

When the speed boat landed, the male passenger

alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked
towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the
man changed direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to
prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced
themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not
understand what theyre saying. And by resorting of
sign language, Cid motioned with his hands for the
man to open his bag. The man acceded to the request.
The said bag was found to contain several transparent
plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances,
which was later identified to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to
Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an
interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search
and seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute
a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.
RULING: The Court held in the negative.
The Court explains that the Constitution bars State
intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or
residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a
valid search warrant issued in accordance with the
Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted
in the following cases, to wit:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

search of moving vehicles,

seizure in plain view,
customs searches,
waiver or consent searches,
stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
search incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the

arresting officer must have personal knowledge of
such facts or circumstances convincingly indicative
or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause
means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on
record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of
CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise
that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not
identified as a drug courier by a police informer or
agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to
shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of
the area did not automatically mark him as in the
process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 39

Court held that there was no probable cause to
justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The Court likewise did not appreciate the
contention of the Prosecution that there was a
waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not
understand what was orally articulated to him, how
could he understand the police's "sign language?"
More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred
from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language"
that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously
waived his right against such an intrusive search.
Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject
regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in
evidence.
Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence
was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.


OCA VS BARRON
Judge Barron was arrested during an entrapment
operation when he tried to solicit bribes from an
American national in exchange for ruling in the latters
favor in a pending case.
In his defense, respondent judge proferred several
arguments to support his innocence to wit: (1) what
happened was not an entrapment but a frame-up; (2)
that he never made any gesture of voluntarily accepting
the bribe money flourescent powder notwithstanding;
(3) the NBI relied on the signal of David Crear, not on
their personal discernment of what transpired in the
car; and (4) that his car was subjected to an illegal
search by the NBI agents. In addition to the
aforementioned arguments, the respondent judge also
presented the affidavits[of Judge Teopisto Calumpang
and SPO Avelino Burlaza.
Held: Judge dismissed. A judge should always be a
symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself
in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about
his honesty. The conduct of respondent shows that he
can be influenced by monetary considerations. His act
of demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant
constitutes serious misconduct in office. It is this kind
of gross and flaunting misconduct, no matter how
nominal the amount involved, which erodes the respect
for the law and the courts.
In an effort to escape criminal liability, the

respondent judge shifts the burden on the NBI by

raising the defense of frame-up. Frame-up as a defense
has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor
for it can just easily be concocted but is quite difficult to
prove.And the defense of frame-up must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence because it is of the same
category as alibi.In the case at bar, the respondent
judge failed to present any convincing evidence to
substantiate his claim. He advances the theory that the
NBI had carefully mapped out a frame-up operation
against him as a retaliatory measure for all those cases
which the NBI had filed and for which he (Judge Barron)
caused the dismissal thereof. This cannot be given
credence. There is no evidence on record that NBI
harboured a personal grudge against the respondent
judge. Clearly what transpired was an entrapment and
not a frame-up as claimed by respondent. Entrapment
has received judicial sanction as long as it is carried out
with due regard to Constitutional and legal safeguards.
Furthermore, there is no scintilla of evidence that the
manner by which the NBI agents conducted the
operation was tainted with illegality. This Court has held
in case of Mallari vs. Court of Appealsthat Absent strong
and convincing proof to the contrary, this Court is
bound by the presumption that the arresting officers
were aware of the legal mandates in effecting an arrest
and strictly complied with the same.
The respondent judge insinuates that the search
conducted on his car was illegal. We do not think so.
Where the arrest of the accused was lawful, having
been caught in flagrante delicto, there is no need for a
warrant for the seizure of the fruit of the crime as well
as for the body search upon him, the same being
incidental to a lawful arrest.There being a lawful arrest
upon the person of the respondent judge, the NBI
agents were authorized to conduct a warrantless
search. In People vs. De Lara, we held: A
contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the
person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity
where the arrest was made.
We have previously held that the warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting
officer to make a search upon a person of the person
arrested. Moreover, the individual being arrested may
be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used
against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles
found in his person, or within his immediate control
may be seized.

39


CHIMNEL VS CALIFORNIA
rief Fact Summary. The defendant, Chimel (the
defendant), was arrested inside his home and police
asked him for consent to search the home. The
defendant refused the request. The police proceeded
nonetheless, incident to the lawful arrest and searched
in different rooms. The police also had the defendants
wife open various dresser drawers and remove their
contents.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Incident to a lawful arrest, a
search of any area beyond the arrestees immediate
control, is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution (Constitution), unless there
is a clear danger that evidence may be destroyed or
concealed or there is an imminent threat of harm to the
arresting officers.
Facts. The police came to Defendants home with an
arrest warrant for an alleged burglary. The police asked
permission to look around the house. The defendant
refused the request and the police proceeded to search
the home anyways. The police also made the
defendants wife remove contents of various dresser
drawers. The police seized coins and medals which were
later used to convict the defendant of burglary.

Issue. Where a defendant is lawfully arrested inside his
home, is a warrantless search of the area beyond the
defendants immediate control constitutional?
Held. Any search in an arrestees home beyond
arrestees person and the area within his immediate
control is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution.

Dissent. Where there is probable cause to search and
there is a clear danger that the items which are the
subject of the search may be removed prior to police
obtaining a search warrant, a warrantless search of the
area beyond an arrestees immediate control is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution.

Concurrence. Given the variety of circumstances which
police encounter, this decision will create additional
burdens on law enforcement. Whether or not the
warrant requirement will protect individual rights in
each and every local situation is uncertain.
Discussion. Contemporaneous searches incident to a
lawful arrest are reasonable to seize weapons as well as
prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence.
Searches beyond the scope of these justifications are

40

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the

Constitution.


NOLASCO VS PANO (1987)
Facts:
The case at bar is for the motion for partial
reconsideration of both petitioners and respondents of
the SCs decision that the questioned search warrant by
petitioners is null and void, that respondents are
enjoined from introducing evidence using such search
warrant, but such personalities obtained would still
be retained, without prejudice to petitioner Aguilar-
Roque. Respondents contend that the search warrant
is valid and that it should be considered in the
context of the crime of rebellion, where the warrant
was based. Petitioners on the other hand, on the part
of petitioner Aguilar-Roque, contend that a lawful
search would be justified only by a lawful arrest.
And since there was illegal arrest of Aguilar-Roque,
the search was unlawful and that the personalities
seized during the illegal search should be returned to
the petitioner. The respondents, in defense, concede
that the search warrants were null and void but the
arrests were not.
Issue: WON the articles seized were illegally obtained.
Ruling: Yes.
RD: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . .
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate
expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by
historical experience to be the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all
evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the
incentive on the part of state and police officers to
disregard such basic rights. What the plain language
of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of
the courts to change or modify. All the articles thus
seized fag under the exclusionary rule totally and
unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the
three petitioners.



NOLASCO VS PANO (1985)
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together
with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security
Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high
ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at
11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day,
her premises were searched and 428 documents, a

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 41

portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search
warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roques leased
residence allegedly an underground house of the
CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized,
charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were
filed by but the fiscals office merely charged her and
Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials.
Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on
the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the
search warrant is void because it is a general warrant
since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity
the things subject of the search and seizure, and that
probable cause has not been properly established for
lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicants witness.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?
HELD:
NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees
the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search
Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant
authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely
described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing
description which includes everything conceivable
regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and
the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what
the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to
make them subversive or to enable them to be used for
the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might
be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as,
in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and
infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized. In the
recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar
description were considered null and void for being

too general.


POSADAS VS CA
Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the
Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task
Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar
conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao
City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges
they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they
noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached
the petitioner and identified themselves as members of
the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to
get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the
"buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1)
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No.
770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38
caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the
petitioner to the police station for further investigation.
In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to
show the necessary license or authority to possess
firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but
he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao
Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles
recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the
officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City.


Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.


Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag
then carried by the petitioner, argues that under
Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of
an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged
that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was
lawful under the circumstances.

in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is
reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis
of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when
the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was

41

the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the

same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only
after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the
purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless,
futile and much too late.

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained
under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence,
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures has not been violated.


MALACAT VS CA
On August 29, 1990 at about 6:30 in the evening,
allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven
days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District,
Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National
Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot
patrol with three other police officers (all of them in
uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near
the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced
upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each
group, comprised of three to four men, posted at
opposite sides of the corner of stop and frisk, where a
warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose
object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily
while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information; and that the seizure of the grenade from
Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court
thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion
Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat
filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing
to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case
was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR
15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition
for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant
to the exception of stop and frisk.
Ruling:
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and
seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk,
where a warrant and seizure can be effected without

42

necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose

object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily
while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information. Probable cause was not required as it was
not certain that a crime had been committed, however,
the situation called for an investigation, hence to
require probable cause would have been premature.
The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were
confronted with an emergency, in which the delay
necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the
destruction of evidence and the officers had to act in
haste, as petitioner and his companions were acting
suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported
cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly
ran away in different directions as they saw the
arresting officers approach, thus it is reasonable for an
officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of
which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime,
but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation
without fear of violence. The trial court then ruled that
the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was
incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner later
voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator
for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store,
concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the
Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable
doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and
petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby
ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from
detention, unless his further detention is justified for
any other lawful cause.

B. CONSENTED SEARCH
PEOPLE VS MALASUGUI
Facts: On March 5, 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese merchant,
a resident of Cotabato, a victim of robbery was found
lying on the ground, with several wounds in the head,
on a path leading to the barrio of Carcar, Cotabato.
Shortly before the victims death he was able to
mention the appellants first name, Kagui, when he
was asked about assailant.
Appellant was later searched by the investigating
police, without opposition or protest on his part, and it
was discovered that he also had the victims
pocketbook, containing P92 in bills, the victims
identification card and a memorandum of amounts with

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 43

some Chinese characters. In one of the pockets of his
pants was found some change, making the total amount
of money found in his possession P92.68. The said
search was conducted after the appellant had
voluntarily produced the bracelets Exhibit A and placed
them on Lieutenant Jacaria's table, because, upon being
asked if he had anything, he tremblingly answered in
the negative.
The appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant
Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut had forcibly and through
intimidation taken from him the bracelets the
pocketbook and all the money which he and that, but
for the printing thereon, the identification card found in
the pocketbook then was blank and there was no
memorandum of the kind, in Tan Why's handwriting,
inside the pocketbook, thereby, insinuating that it was
Lieutenant Jacaria who typed or caused to be
typewritten on the card Tan Why's name and personal
data and who placed the memorandum in the
pocketbook.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted on the
accused legal?
ruling: Yes. The SC held that When the search of the
person detained or arrested and the seizure of the
effects found in his possession are incidental to an
arrest made in conformity with the law, they cannot be
considered unreasonable, much less unlawful. To hold
that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime
without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large
extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert,
and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their
escape in many instances.

The record shows that before proceeding
with the trial in the lower court, the appellant
asked for the return of said effects to him on the
ground that they were unlawfully taken away from
him. Leaving aside the foregoing considerations, his
testimony cannot prevail against nor is it sufficient
to counteract that of the government witnesses,
Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut, who
testified that when Lieutenant Jacaria asked him
what other things he carried, after having
voluntarily placed the two pairs of bracelets,
Exhibit A, on the table, and Sergeant Urangut felt
his body, he did not show the least opposition. It

follows, therefore, that the lower court committed

no error in accepting as evidence the items taken
from the accused, not only because the appellant
did not object to the taking thereof from him when
searched, but also because the effects found in his
possession of a person detained or arrested are
perfectly admissible as evidence against him, if
they constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent
or relevant thereto. It is certainly repugnant to
maintain the opposite view because it would
amount to authorizing the return to the accused of
the means of conviction seized from him,
notwithstanding their being eloquent proofs of
crime, for him to conceal, destroy or otherwise
dispose of, in order to assure his impunity.



ALVAREZ VS CFI
acts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice
presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a
certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books,
receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer
charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant
Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt say that the
information was based on his personal knowledge but
was only received by him from a reliable source.
Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the
search of Alvarez house. On June 4, 1936, the agents
raided the subject place and seized different documents
namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills
of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles
seized was not brought immediately to the custody of
the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the
agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and
prays that all articles in question be returned to him
because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand,
the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to
retain custody of the articles seized for further
investigation. When the judge sustained the latters
motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and
prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of
the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain
custody be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for
having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in
whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal
knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for
the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge

43

thereof only through information secured from a person

whom he considered reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58
require that there be not only probable cause before
the issuance of a search warrant but that the search
warrant must be based upon an application supported
by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any
form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is
bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and
truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward
pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation
or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has
been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages
caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive
basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath
was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other
papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this
jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the
applicant or complainant to the application. It is
admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant
in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made
by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take
the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution
does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to
take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented
by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring
the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to
satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may
dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the
affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely
hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the
affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant
the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit
of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts

44

within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient

if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause;
when the applicants knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the
warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based
only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts

1. PEACEFUL SUBMISSION NOT CONSENT TO
SEARCH
GARCIA VS LOCSIN
Facts: Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary
Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac,
a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to
search the person, house or store of the petitioner at
Victoria, Tarlac, for certain books, lists, chits, receipts,
documents and other papers relating to her activities as
usurer. The search warrant was issued upon an
affidavit given by the said Almeda.
On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda,
accompanied by a captain of the Philippine
Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner in
Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to
the petitioners bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without
the presence of the petitioner who was ill and confined
at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof
The papers and documents seized were kept for a
considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and
thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent
fiscal who subsequently filed six separate criminal cases
against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-
Usury Law.
The legality of the search warrant was challenged by
counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases and
the devolution of the documents demanded. The
respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for
the reason that though the search warrant was illegal,
there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner.
HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures is declared a popular right and for a search
warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by
the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other
person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized.
In the instant case the existence of probable cause was
determined not by the judge himself but by the

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 45

applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true
the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide
for himself. It does not appear that he examined the
applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the
description of the properties to be seized to be
sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued
is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law,
the properties seized were not delivered to the court
which issued the warrant, as required by law.
Instead, they were turned over to the resp. provincial
fiscal & used by him in building up cases against
petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was
issued, there was no case pending against the
petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued
primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis.

2. EFFECT OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
PEOPLE VS AGBOT
Charged with murder in the Court of First Instance of
Davao Oriental, Antonio Agbot was, after due trial,
convicted of the crime charged, and sentenced to death
and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased,
Leona Agbot Subat, in the sum of P12,000.00. Hence
this mandatory review of the death sentence.:onad
The facts upon which appellant was convicted, as
quoted from the Peoples brief are as follows:
At about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of October 8,
1972, the accused Antonio Agbot went to the
house of his sister Leona Agbot, married to
Asisclo Subat, in sitio Panganudan, barrio
Lamiawan, Carraga, Davao Oriental, and
demanded from her the return of his twelve-
year old daughter Milagrosa, who bad been
under the care and custody of Leona Agbot
Subat since she was two years old. Leona
refused to surrender the child to the accused
because of her sacrifices and expenses in the
upbringing and education of Milagrosa. The
accused left angrily, saying tighten your
belt, a phrase which, in the custom of the
Mandayan tribe to which they belong, meant
something bad will be forthcoming to you
not
long
from
now. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(tsn, pp.
45-47, Mar. 26, 1973).
At about 7:30 oclock in the evening of October 8,
1972, while Asisclo Subat and Francisco
Baucan, step-son of the victim, were relaxing
at the porch of their house, and Leona Agbot

Subat was preparing supper in the kitchen, a

gun explosion was heard. Asisclo Subat and
Francisco Baucan tried to ascertain where
the gun report came from. Suddenly,
Francisco called out - Mama, mama,
directing his call to his step-mother Leona
Subat who came rushing from the kitchen,
wounded and bleeding on the right breast. In
a few seconds, the latter dropped on the
floor and expired. cranad(tsn, pp. 48-50, Mar.
26, 1973).
At about 5:00 oclock in the following morning,
October 9, 1972, Francisco Baucan, who was
a councilor of the place, went to barrio
captain Pacifico Sobiaco and reported the
incident. The latter sent a note to Patrolman
Manuel Quiros who was assigned in a nearby
police checkpoint and, together, they
proceeded to the house of the victim.
cranad(tsn, pp. 5-6, Mar. 26, 1973) A joint
investigation was conducted by Sobiaco and
Pat. Quiros. They found the cadaver already
dressed up and ready for burial. They also
saw gunshot wounds on the right breast of
the deceased. cranad(tsn, pp. 6-7, id.)
Patrolman Quiros drew a sketch cranad(Exh.
D) indicating the place where the victim was
found dead and the location of the wounds
sustained by the deceased. cranad(tsn, pp.
117-118, June 21, 1973) No post-mortem
examination was conducted on the cadaver
of Leona Subat.
While thus conducting their investigation in the house
of the victim, the accused arrived thereat and
admitted to Sobiaco that he was the one who
shot the victim using a paltik shotgun.
cranad(tsn, pp. 11-12, 16-18, Mar. 26, 1973)
Whereupon, Sobiaco ordered two of his
barrio councilmen, Luis Ligasan and Adolfo
Benaming, who were present to proceed to
the house of the accused and get the firearm.
After getting the firearm, the same was
shown to the accused who identified it as the
weapon he used in shooting the deceased.
cranad(tsn, pp. 8-13, Mar. 26, 1973)
Thereafter, Barrio Captain Sobiaco turned
over the shotgun and empty shell, as well as
the person of the accused to Patrolman
Quiros cranad(tsn, pp. 23-24, Mar. 26, 1973).

45

On October 16, 1972, appellant executed an

extrajudicial confession before the police
authorities of Caraga cranad(Exh. C) which
was subscribed and sworn to by him before
Municipal Judge Manuel B. Castro.
cranad(tsn, pp. 107-108, June 21, 1973; pp.
34-35, Mar. 26, 1973)
From the fact that no post-mortem examination was
made, nor was a ballistic examination conducted,
appellant would dispute the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his conviction. Thus, he would claim that no
competent proof was adduced that the wounds were
caused by a gunshot, or that assuming that they were,
the home-made gun cranad(paltik) belonging to
appellant was the gun that fired the shots.:onad
That a gun explosion was heard just seconds before the
deceased was wounded while she was alone in the
kitchen is by itself an almost undisputable evidence that
the wounds were caused by that same gunshot. No one
was seen near her who could have inflicted the wounds
with a weapon that could find its mark only if the victim
was within physical reach of the assailant. Only a gun
could have caused the wounds which can reach its
target even from an appreciable distance.
The wounds themselves, as seen by the state witnesses,
particularly Barrio Captain Pacifico Sobiaco and
Patrolman Manuel Quiros, were readily described by
them as gunshot wounds, one as big as one and one-
half inches in diameter and six cranad(6) smaller ones
obviously caused by pellets of a bullet fired from
appellants kind of a gun, a shotgun. There can hardly
be any ground for doubt as to their competence in
identifying the wounds as caused by a gun as
distinguished from one caused by a sharp-bladed
weapon, much less a blunt instrument. The existence of
exits of the wounds, as testified to by Patrolman Quiros
1 bolsters the conclusion or finding that the wounds
sustained by the victim were gun-inflicted.
In an effort to discredit the testimony of Patrolman
Quiros and Barrio Captain Sobiaco, appellant points to
Patrolman Quiros allegedly saying that he saw one
cranad(1) big penetrating wound while Barrio Captain
Sobiaco, as well as Asisclo Subat, declared he saw six
cranad(6). An examination of Patrolman Quiros
testimony will show that he did NOT say that he saw
only one cranad(1) wound with no other wounds
sustained by the deceased. The small wounds caused
evidently by tiny pellets bursting out of a shotgun bullet
may not have been noticed by Patrolman Quiros, and
so, he made mention only of the one cranad(1) big
penetrating wound.
The lack of ballistic examination can neither detract

46

from the weight of the evidence presented showing

that appellants gun was the offending weapon. It fits
the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased,
being a shotgun whose bullet emits pellets, and the
empty shell which was found with the shotgun
cranad(paltik) taken from appellants house. Ballistic
experts are not needed to establish the relation
between the wounds and appellants paltik shotgun in
the face of the evidence that the weapon is admittedly
one that belonged to appellant, and the empty shell
found in his house even smelled gun powder which was
proof of recent firing. The shotgun cranad(Exh. A) and
the empty shell cranad(Exh. B) were indeed retrieved
from appellants house the morning following the night
of the shooting made possible by appellants own
admission of authorship of the shooting, without which
these objects could not have been traced to, and
recovered from, his house.
Appellants denial of having made the foregoing
admission and of having mentioned anything about the
shotgun to Barrio Captain Sobiaco is unworthy of belief.
If he did not make the admission when confronted by
the barrio captain at the victims own house, how could
the two cranad(2) barrio councilmen, Luis Ligasan and
Adolfo Benaning, have been sent to recover appellants
firearm at the latters house? A fact related to what part
the weapon had in the killing and the person who
actively played the role in using it, must have surfaced.
No other fact suggests itself more than the appellants
owning the shooting when confronted by the barrio
captain to whom report of the shooting had been
earlier made, and to whom the only suspect was
mentioned, together with the circumstance that drew
suspicion to appellant the threat of harm befalling
the deceased with. the meaningful words tighten your
belt.
The verity of appellants admission of guilt having been
firmly established, the contention that the confiscation
or seizure of the gun was illegal, there being no search
warrant and its use as evidence is not permissible,
clearly becomes devoid of factual or legal basis. With his
confessions, his voluntarily surrendering the weapon
with which he committed the offense would be but a
natural consequence of his having admitted guilt. The
taking of the gun from his house was, therefore, with
consent and acquiescence that would not constitute a
violation of the constitutional guaranty against the
admissibility of illegally seized objects as evidence
against an accused. 2
Appellants claim of his confession having been
extracted by force and maltreatment would, likewise,
be completely unbelievable. Having readily admitted his

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 47

guilt when confronted by the investigators right in the
house of the victim, the very presence of his own
departed sister lying in state perhaps unnerving him in
his vile desire to conceal the truth, how could he still try
to deny and turn back from his earlier admission made
to a barrio official when he later was formally
investigated by the police? No less than the Municipal
Judge Manuel B. Castro, testified to appellant having
answered in the affirmative when asked if he was
willing to swear to the truth of his confession. 3
The confession itself, by the facts with which it is so
replete, which appellant alone could have supplied and
the obvious attempt to mitigate his liability by alleging
that the did not act in fit of vengeance because the
victim was the one who ordered the killing of his
brother Ansog Agbot, bears the earmarks of
voluntariness. 4 The police investigators could not have
just conceived of this alleged fact from pure imagination
to be placed in appellants confession, considering the
extreme improbability of a sister order the killing of a
brother. For the motive of the killing, what should have
found its way to the confession is the incident just
before the shooting when appellant hurled a threat at
his sister, as narrated by the victims husband to the
barrio captain, had appellant not been allowed full
freedom to tell his story.:onad
With appellants confession fulfilling all elements of
admissibility, and supported as it is by independent
evidence of corpus delicti, which is the fact of the crime
having been committed, 5 together with the finding in
appellants house of the weapon that undisputably
inflicted the fatal wounds sustained by the deceased, it
would be futile to argue against the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, as
counsel had tried to do, and commendably so, had it
not been for his manifest misreading of the evidence.
Thus, he would aver that corpus delicti has not been
proven 6 when the fact of death due to foul means has
been so undeniably established by the lifeless body
bearing wounds that undisputably caused the death to
the victim.
The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery
and with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling 7
and relationship, the victim being the sister of
appellant. 8
Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated against
appellant it appearing that no time sufficient for calm
reflection of the consequences of the crime committed
intervened between planning and execution. 9 Neither

sex could be taken against appellant there being no

proof that there was deliberate intention to offend or
insult the sex of the victim. 10
While lack of instruction may not be appreciated in
favor of appellant as argued by counsel, the offense of
taking ones life being forbidden by natural law and
therefore within the instinctive knowledge and feeling
of any human being not deprived of reason 11 appellant
being a member of the cultural minority may be
considered in his favor, pursuant to Sec. 106 of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu and entitle
him, regardless of the attending circumstances, to life
imprisonment instead of death. 12 It is no legal obstacle
to accord to him this benefit of the law because he
failed to invoke same in the court a quo, for in an
appeal of a criminal case, same is thrown open for a
complete review of all errors, by commission or
omission, as may be imputable to the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is affirmed,
but the death sentence is hereby reduced to life
imprisonment, taking also into account the length of
time he had already been in the death row. Cost de
oficio.

3. EFFECTS OF POSTING BAIL
RULE 126
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to
suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a
search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained
thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the
court where the action has been instituted. If no
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be
filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search
warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the
motion and a criminal case is subsequent filed in
another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter
court.
RULE 114
Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest,
lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. An
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the
accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the
legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing
the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his plea.
The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable
but not later than the start of the trial of the case.

47

C. STOP AND FRISK AUTOMOBILE ROADBLOCKS,

AND OTHER LESS INTRUSIVE SEARCHES

TERRY V OHIO
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the
Petitioner), was stopped and searched by an officer
after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly
casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer
approached the Petitioner for questioning and decided
to search him first.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a
search for weapons without a warrant, even without
probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes
that the person may be armed and dangerous.

Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with
another individual on a street corner while repeatedly
walking up and down the same street. The men would
periodically peer into a store window and then talk
some more. The men also spoke to a third man whom
they eventually followed up the street. The officer
believed that the Petitioner and the other men were
casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer
decided to approach the men for questioning, and given
the nature of the behavior the officer decided to
perform a quick search of the men before questioning.
A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed
weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a
concealed weapon.

Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable
cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(Constitution)?
Held. The Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) held that it is a reasonable search
when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited
search for weapons on a person that the officer
reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat
officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited
from searching individuals that the officer suspects to
be armed.
Discussion. The facts of the case are important to
understand the Supreme Courts willingness to allow
the search. The suspicious activity was a violent crime,
armed robbery, and if the officers suspicions were
correct then he would be in a dangerous position to
approach the men for questioning without searching
them. The officer also did not detain the men for a long
period of time to constitute an arrest without probable
cause.

48

2ND DIGEST
Facts: Martin McFadden, a Cleveland police detective,
on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for
many years, observed two strangers (Terry and Richard
Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed
alternately back and forth along an identical route,
strolling down Huron Road, pausing to stare in the same
store window, which they did for a total of about 24
times. Each completion of the route was followed by a
conference between the two on a corner, at one of
which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left
swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-
up," the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the
third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store.
The officer approached the three, identified himself as a
policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled
something," whereupon McFadden spun Terry around,
patted down his outside clothing, and found in his
overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol.
The officer ordered the three into the store. He
removed Terry's overcoat, took out a revolver, and
ordered the three to face the wall with their hands
raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton
and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside
overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the
outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in
his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or
under Terry's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt
the guns. The three were taken to the police station.
Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed
weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons.
Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory
that the guns had been seized during a search incident
to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to
suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on
the ground that the officer had cause to believe that
Terry and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their
interrogation was warranted, and that the officer for his
own protection had the right to pat down their outer
clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they
might be armed. The court distinguished between an
investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a
"frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-
blown search for evidence of crime. Terry and Chilton
were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court
affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional
question" was involved.
Issue: Whether it is always unreasonable for a

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 49

policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited
search for weapons unless there is probable cause for
an arrest.
Held: The Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects
people, not places," and therefore applies as much to
the citizen on the streets as well as at home or
elsewhere. The issue in this case is not the abstract
propriety of the police conduct but the admissibility
against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the
search and seizure. The exclusionary rule cannot
properly be invoked to exclude the products of
legitimate and restrained police investigative
techniques; and this Court's approval of such
techniques should not discourage remedies other than
the exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which
that is not an effective sanction. The Fourth
Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such
as those followed here. Whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has "seized" that person within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. A careful exploration of the
outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to
find weapons is a "search" under that Amendment.
Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the
circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety
or that of others is endangered, he may make a
reasonable search for weapons of the person believed
by him to be armed and dangerous regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual
for crime or the absolute certainty that the individual is
armed. Though the police must whenever practicable
secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, that
procedure cannot be followed where swift action based
upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat is required. The reasonableness of any particular
search and seizure must be assessed in light of the
particular circumstances against the standard of
whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in
believing


DELAWARE VS PROUSE
A Delaware patrolman stopped William Prouse's car to
make a routine check of his driver's license and vehicle
registration. The officer had not observed any traffic

violation or suspicious conduct on the part of Prouse.

After stopping the car, the officer uncovered marijuana.
The marijuana was later used to indict Prouse.

ISSUE: Did the officer's search of Prouse's automobile
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment?

HELD: Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the
privacy interests of travelers outweighed the state
interests in discretionary spot checks of automobiles.
The Court found that random checks made only
marginal contributions to roadway safety and
compliance with registration requirements; less
intrusive means could have been used to serve the
same ends. Officers must be held to a "probable cause"
standard for searches, otherwise individuals would be
subject to "unfettered governmental intrusion" each
time they entered an automobile.

CABALLES VS CA
Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino
Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine
patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna,
spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with
"kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded
with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes
y Taio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he
did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous.
With Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the
cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively
owned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The
conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at
P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires
came from and Caballes answered that they came from
Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from
Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with
the high- voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan
Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes
and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned
over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan,
Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the
Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of
theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During
the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence,
trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional

49

Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment,

finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998,
the trial court denied Caballes' motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes
appealed the decision by certiorari.
Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the
statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter "will look at the
contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive"
be considered as waiver on Caballes part on
warrantless search and seizure.
Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable
right of the people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and seizures,
as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of such right. The constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4)
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant
is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution
and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied
with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not
necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when
the latter cannot be performed except without a
warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched and the character of the articles
procured. It is not controverted that the search and
seizure conducted by the police officers was not
authorized by a search warrant. The mere mobility of
these vehicles, however, does not give the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate
searches without warrants if made within the interior of
the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a
visual search or visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle.
They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati

50

leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able
to see the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a
simple routine check. Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged
down because the police officers who were on routine
patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back
of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which,
according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The
fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it
is not common for such to be covered with kakawati
leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would
justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In
addition, the police authorities do not claim to have
received any confidential report or tipped information
that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his
vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their
suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases
where tipped information has become a sufficient
probable cause to effect a warrantless search and
seizure. UnfortunatEly, none exists in the present case.
Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable
searches. The manner by which the two police officers
allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to
conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When
Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja
approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the
contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive."
By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police
officers were asking or requesting for permission that
they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all
intents and purposes, they were informing, nay,
imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle.
The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where the
Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no
uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be
searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof. Neither can
Caballes' passive submission be construed as an implied
acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside
the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on
record are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction.
His guilt can only be established without violating the
constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable
search and seizure.

VALMONTE VS DE VILLA
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 51

Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Ricardo C.
Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People's Right (ULAP) filed a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order witht the Supreme Court, seeking the
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila
or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling
and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct
the respondents to formulate guidelines in the
implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of
the people. They aver that, because of the installation
of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,
considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially
at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search
warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their
safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988,
Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold
blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit
himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed
off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Valmonte
also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru
these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car
subjected to search/check-up without a court order or
search warrant. They further contend that the said
checkpoints give Gen. Renato de Villa and the National
Capital Region District Command a blanket authority to
make searches and/or seizures without search warrant
or court order in violation of the Constitution. In the
Supreme Court's decision dated 29 September 1989,
Valmontes and ULAPs petition for prohibition, seeking
the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional
and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed.
Valmonte and ULAP filed the motion and supplemental
motion for reconsideration of said decision.
Issue: Whether checkpoints serve as a blanket authority
for government officials for warrantless search and

seizure and, thus, are violative of the Constitution.

Held: Nowhere in the Supreme Court's decision of 24
May 1990 did the Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at
all times and under all circumstances. What the Court
declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus,
under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival
of organized government is on the balance, or where
the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the
government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when
the situation clears and such grave perils are removed,
checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.
Recent and on-going events have pointed to the
continuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by
either military or police forces. Although no one can be
compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with
the present government its ideological beliefs and
practices, or commend its political, social and economic
policies or performance; one must concede to it the
basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while
in power, to pursue its program of government
intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those
objectives, the government has the equal right, under
its police power, to select the reasonable means and
methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is
evidently one of such means it has selected. Admittedly,
the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain
extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without
interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it
involves only a brief detention of travellers during which
the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief
question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search. These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed
area, are even less intrusive. Further, vehicles are
generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a
routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are
stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some
probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the
men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-
offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been
instruments of some offense. By the same token, a
warrantless search of incoming and outgoing
passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of an
international airport, is a practice not constitutionally

51

objectionable because it is founded on public interest,

safety, and necessity. Lastly, the Court's decision on
checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone
security operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and
order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the
abuses committed by the military manning the
checkpoints. The Court's decision was concerned with
power, i.e. whether the government employing the
military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once
that power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases.
True, power implies the possibility of its abuse. But
whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a
different "ball game" to be resolved in the
constitutional arena. In any situation, where abuse
marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not
helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the
law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme.
Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who
abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their
authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly
for their abusive acts.

MANALILI VS CA
At about 2:10 p.m. of 11 April 1988, policemen from the
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station
were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street,
Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger
Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was
driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of
the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was
being made because of information that drug addicts
were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery. Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery,
the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then
chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery
who appeared high on drugs. The male person was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid
the policemen, the latter approached him and
introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen
then asked the male person what he was holding in his
hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo
Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said
male person had in his hands. The latter showed the
wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the
same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He
found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He

52

kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. The male

person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of
the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was turned
over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat.
Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the
confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana
contents. The man turned out to be Alain Manalili y
Dizon. On 11 April 1988, Manalili was charged by
Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with
violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act 6425.
Upon his arraignment on 21 April 1988, Manalili
pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. With the agreement
of the public prosecutor, Manalili was released after
filing a P10,000.00 bail bond. After trial in due course,
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124,
acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on 19 May
1989 a decision convicting appellant of illegal
possession of marijuana residue. Manalili remained on
provisional liberty. Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for
the defense, filed a Notice of Appeal dated 31 May
1989. On 19 April 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the
appeal and affirmed the trial court. The appellate court
denied reconsideration via its Resolution dated 20
January 1994. Manalili filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a search and seizure could be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest.
Held: In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-
frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the
right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s). In allowing
such a search, the interest of effective crime prevention
and detection allows a police officer to approach a
person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even though there is insufficient probable cause to
make an actual arrest. What justified the limited search
was the more immediate interest of the police officer in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances. In
Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a
search and seizure must be validated by a previously
secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and
seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this
guarantee. This right, however, is not absolute. The

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 53

recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless
search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a
lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure
in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the
accused themselves of their right against unreasonable
search and seizure." In People vs. Encinada, the Court
further explained that in these cases, the search and
seizure may be made only with probable cause as the
essential requirement. Stop-and-frisk has already been
adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court
of Appeals, the Court held that there were many
instances where a search and seizure could be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of
which was stop-and-frisk. To require the police officers
to search the bag only after they had obtained a search
warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too
late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was
reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious
individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo while obtaining more
information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders
and allow a crime to occur. Herein, Patrolman Espiritu
and his companions observed during their surveillance
that Manalili had red eyes and was wobbling like a
drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout
of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such
suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts
who were "high." The policemen therefore had
sufficient reason to stop Manalili to investigate if he was
actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they
found marijuana in his possession. The search was valid,
being akin to a stop-and-frisk.


PEOPLE VS LASERNA
Exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest; Search
of luggage inside a vehicle requires existence of
probable cause; Consented search valid if intelligently
made; To be punishable, to give away a prohibited
drug should be with the intent to transfer ownership;
Elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs; Criminal
intent need not be proved in prosecution of acts mala
prohibita ; Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to
commit the crime necessary in prosecution of acts

prohibited by special laws

Facts:

Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi
when the group of Police Officer Carlito Valenzuela of
the Western Police District signaled the taxi driver to
park by the side of the road in lieu of a police
checkpoint. P03 Valenzuela asked permission to search
the vehicle. The officers went about searching the
luggages in the vehicle. They found 18 blocks wrapped
in newspaper with a distinct smell of marijuana
emanating from it. When the package was opened, P03
Valenzuela saw dried marijuana leaves. According to
Noriel and Marlon, the bag was a padala of their
uncle. Marlon admitted that he was the one who gave
the 18 bundle blocks of marijuana to his cousin Noriel as
the latter seated at rear of the taxi with it. He however
denied knowledge of the contents of the package.

Marlon was charged before the RTC for giving
away marijuana to another. Noriel on the other hand
was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The court
noticed that Noriel manifested probinsyano traits and
was, thus, unlikely to have dealt in prohibited drugs.

Marlon objected on the RTCs decision, stating
that the lower court erred in saying that the act of
giving away to another is not defined under R.A. 6425
or the Dangerous Drugs Act. He also said that he was
not aware of the contents of the plastic bag given to
him by his uncle. Marlon also raised that his right
against warrantless arrest and seizure was violated.

Held:
Exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest
1. Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against
warrantless arrest have been judicially formulated as
follows:

(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest

(2) search of moving vehicles

(3) seizure in plain view,

(4) customs searches,

(5) waiver by the accused themselves of their
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
2. Search and seizure relevant to moving vehicles are
allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing
a warrant under said circumstances. In such cases,
however, the search and seizure may be made only
upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably
arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains an
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure

53

and destruction. Military or police checkpoints have also

been declared to be not illegal per se as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected
to body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely visual.
Search of luggage inside a vehicle requires existence of
probable cause
3. In this case, the taxi was validly stopped at the police
checkpoint. Such search however is limited to visual
inspections without occupants being subjected to a
physical or body searches. A search of a luggage inside
the vehicle should require the existence of probable
cause.
4. In several decisions, there was probable cause in the
following instances:

(a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana
emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused

(b) where an informer positively identified the
accused who was observed to have been acting

suspiciously

(c) where the accused fled when accosted by
policemen

(d) where the accused who were riding a
jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who

had earlier received confidential reports that
said accused would transport a large quantity of

marijuana

(e) where the moving vehicle was stopped and
searched on the basis of intelligence information

and clandestine reports by a deep penetration
agent or spy one who participated in the drug

smuggling activities of the syndicate to which
the accused belonged that said accused were

bringing prohibited drugs into the country.
5. Probable cause in this case is not evident. The mere
act of slouching in the seat when the taxi passed along
P03 Valenzuelas checkpoint does not constitute
probable cause to justify search and seizure.
Consented search valid if intelligently made
6. Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC outlawed a search based on
an implied acquiescence, because such acquiescence
was not consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty, but was merely passive
conformity to the search given under intimidating and
coercive circumstances.
7. In this case, Marlon was "urbanized in mannerism
and speech" when he expressly said that he was
consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to
hide and had done nothing wrong. This declaration is a
confirmation of his intelligent and voluntary
acquiescence to the search. The marijuana bricks were,
therefore, obtained legally through a valid search and

54

seizure, thus admissible.

To be punishable, to give away a prohibited drug
should be with the intent to transfer ownership
8. As distinguished from "delivery," which is an incident
of sale, "giving away" is a disposition other than a sale.
It is, therefore, an act short of a sale which involves no
consideration. The prohibited drug becomes an item or
merchandise presented as a gift or premium (giveaway),
where ownership is transferred.
9. By merely handing the plastic bag to Noriel, Marlon
cannot be punished for giving away marijuana as a gift
or premium to another. Intent to transfer ownership
should be proven.
Elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs
10. The elements of illegal possession of prohibited
drugs are as follows

(a) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug

(b) such possession is not authorized by law

(c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the prohibited drug.
11. Evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that
Marlon was in possession of the plastic bag containing
the prohibited drugs without the requisite authority. He
cannot deny knowledge of the package as its smell is
pervasive.
Criminal intent need not be proved in prosecution of
acts mala prohibita
12. Criminal intent need not be proved in the
prosecution of acts mala prohibita. The prohibited act is
so injurious to the public welfare that, regardless of the
person's intent, it is the crime itself.
Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to commit the
crime necessary in prosecution of acts prohibited by
special laws
13. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate
the act must be distinguished. A person may not have
consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he did
intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very
nature of things, the crime itself, then he can be held
liable for the malum prohibitum.
14. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a
criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is
sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally
done. Thus in illegal possession of prohibited drugs, the
prosecution is thus not excused from proving that the
act was done freely and consciously, which is an
essential element of the crime.
15. In this case, Marlon failed to overcome the
presumption of his knowledge of the contents of the
package. He was thus held liable for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 55



D. MOVING VEHICLES/ HOT PURSUIT

CAROLL VS US
The National Prohibition Act, also known as the
Volstead Act, was passed by Congress in 1919 and
prohibited the manufacturing, transportation, and sale
of alcoholic beverages. On January 16, 1920, the
Volstead Act came into force as the Eighteenth
Amendment, later repealed in 1933 by the Twenty-first
Amendment.
George Carroll and John Kiro were indicted and
convicted for transporting intoxicating spirituous liquor
in an automobile in the amount of 68 quarts of whiskey
and gin in violation of the National Prohibition Act.
Carroll and Kiro contended that the search of their
automobile and the discovery of the alcohol was the
product of an illegal search and seizure in violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights.
On September 21, 1921, three men, Carroll, Kiro, and
Kruska entered an apartment in Grand Rapids,
Michigan, and met three undercover federal prohibition
agents, Cronewett, Scully, and Thayer. Cronewett, using
an alias, was introduced to Carroll and Kiro, and stated
he wanted to buy three cases of whiskey. Carroll and
Kiro stated that they had to go east of Grand Rapids to
obtain the alcohol and would be back in about an hour.
After the time had passed, Kruska returned in an
Oldsmobile roadster, the registration number of which
Cronewett noted, and stated they could not get the
alcohol that night but would return the following day to
deliver it. The sellers never returned.
Cronewett and his colleagues maintained patrol on the
road between Grand Rapids and Detroit, looking for
violators of the National Prohibition Act as part of their
regular duties. On October 6, 1921, Carroll and Kiro
passed Cronewett and Scully, who were breaking for
lunch, in the same Oldsmobile Roadster the agents had
noticed a month prior. The agents engaged in a pursuit,
but lost the men in East Lansing. More than two months
later, on December 15, 1921, Carroll and Kiro again
passed the agents. This time the agents were able to
catch the two men east of Grand Rapids. Upon stopping
them, the agents searched the roadster and found 68
bottles of liquor behind the upholstery of the seats. The
two men were arrested.
The question before the Supreme Court was whether
the search and seizure of the alcohol in this case

violated Carroll and Kiros Fourth Amendment rights.

Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the Court,
including an extensive review of statutory and case law.
These references demonstrated that the guaranty of
the Fourth Amendment right against illegal search and
seizures had long recognized a distinction between the
search of a home or structure and that of a vehicle or
ship. The distinction is based on the practicability of
obtaining a search warrant. The Court demonstrated
that it was easier to obtain a warrant for a structure,
whereas it was not practicable to secure a warrant for a
moveable object like a vehicle, because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.
Next the Court determined under what circumstances
a warrantless search of a vehicle might be made. The
majority stated that it would be intolerable and
unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to
stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor,
and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways
to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.
Those entitled to use the public highways have a right
to free passage without interruption or search unless
probable cause for believing that their vehicles are
carrying contraband or illegal merchandise is known to
a competent official who is authorized to make
searches. In this case, the agents had probable cause or
reasonable basis to believe that Caroll and Kiro were
transporting alcohol. They appeared in the same vehicle
that they had used in October; were followed into a
neighborhood notorious for manufacturing and
importing illegal spirits; and, had been seen on different
occasions making the trip between Detroit and Grand
Rapids. It was clear, according to the Court, that in this
case the officers had justification for the search and
seizure. The facts and circumstances within their
knowledge and the trustworthy information were
sufficient in themselves to establish a reasonable belief
that liquor was being transported in the automobile
which they had stopped and searched. Therefore, in this
case, Carroll and Kiros Fourth Amendment rights were
not violated. The search and seizure of the vehicle were
warranted by the inherent mobility of the vehicle and
by the probable cause the officers had that the two men
were transporting alcohol.

PAPA VS MAGO
Facts: Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence

55

unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a

reliable information received on 3 November 1966 to
the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be
released the following day from the customs zone of
the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon
orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a
duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs,
conducted surveillance at gate 1 of the customs zone.
When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4
November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence
unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the
Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two
trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two
trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of
Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership
of the goods and showed to the policemen a
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of
Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and
detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios
Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Manila a petition "for mandamus
with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil
Case 67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining
order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs
authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and
examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the
return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a
judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in
their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion
Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining Ricardo
Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile
(as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496.
However, when the restraining order was received by
Papa. et. al., some bales had already been opened by
the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence
of officials of the Manila Police Department, an
assistant city fiscal and a representative of Remedios
Mago. Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed an
amended petition, including as party defendants
Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila
and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department.
At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the lower court,
with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an
inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in
the presence of the representatives of the claimant of
the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-
Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On
23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to
release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of

56

the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited

importation, the same should be released as per
agreement of the parties upon her posting of the
appropriate bond that may be determined by the court.
On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing
the goods to Mago upon her filing of a bond in the
amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his
own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of the court releasing the goods under bond,
upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had
been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the
seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the court's
action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging
that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action
for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction
before the Supreme Court.
Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department,
Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by
the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes
of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws,
effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his
duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo,
articles or other movable property when the same may
be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed
under customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open
and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other
container wherever found when he had reasonable
cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable
articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law;
and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be
doubted, therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila,
could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods
in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes
him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect
said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty
to render said assistance. This was what happened
precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his
unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks
loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the
Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of
Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin
Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by
a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does
not require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes
persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 57

search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building,
not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search
and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope or any person on board, or
stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable
or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling
house may be entered and searched only upon warrant
issued by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the
case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may
effect search and seizure without a search warrant in
the enforcement of customs laws. Herein, Martin
Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to
make any search before they seized the two trucks and
their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still
authority to the effect that no search warrant would be
needed under the circumstances obtaining herein. The
guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a dwelling house or
other structure in respect of which a search warrant
may readily be obtained and a search of a ship,
motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant,
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. Having declared that the seizure by the
members of the Manila Police Department of the goods
in question was in accordance with law and by that
seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction
over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of
the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the
Court of First Instance of Manila.

ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ VS US
Petitioner, a Mexican citizen and holder of a valid work
permit, challenges the constitutionality of the Border
Patrol's warrantless search of his automobile 25 air
miles north of the Mexican border. The search, made
without probable cause or consent, uncovered
marihuana, which was used to convict petitioner of a
federal crime. The Government seeks to justify the
search on the basis of 287(a)(3) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, which provides for warrantless
searches of automobiles and other conveyances "within

a reasonable distance from any external boundary of

the United States," as authorized by regulations to be
promulgated by the Attorney General. The Attorney
General's regulation defines "reasonable distance" as
"within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the
United States." The Court of Appeals upheld the search
on the basis of the Act and regulation.
Held: The warrantless search of petitioner's automobile,
made without probable cause or consent, violated the
Fourth Amendment. Pp. 413 U. S. 269-275.
(a) The search cannot be justified on the basis of any
special rules applicable to automobile searches, as
probable cause was lacking; nor can it be justified by
analogy with administrative inspections, as the officers
had no warrant or reason to believe that petitioner had
crossed the border or committed an offense, and there
was no consent by petitioner. Pp. 413 U. S. 269-272.
(b) The search was not a border search or the functional
equivalent thereof.

CABALLES VS CA (SUPRA)

ASUNCION VS CA
On 6 December 1993, in compliance with the order of
the Malabon Municipal Mayor to intensify campaign
against illegal drugs particularly at Barangay Taong,
the Chief of the Malabon Police Anti- Narcotics Unit
ordered his men to conduct patrol on the area with
specific instruction to look for a certain vehicle with a
certain plate number and watch out for a certain drug
pusher named Vic Vargas. Pursuant thereto, SPO1
Advincula, PO3 Parcon, PO3 Pilapil and a police aide
were dispatched at around 11:45 p.m.. The team
proceeded to Barangay Taong where they were joined
by their confidential informant and the latter informed
them that a gray Nissan car is always parked therein for
the purpose of selling shabu. While patrolling along
Leoo Street, the confidential informant pointed the
gray Nissan car to the policemen and told them that the
occupant thereof has shabu in his possession. The
policemen immediately flagged down the said car along
First Street and approached the driver, who turned out
to be Jose Maria Asuncion y Marfori, a movie actor
using the screen name Vic Vargas and who is also
known as Binggoy. Advincula then asked Asuncion if
they can inspect the vehicle. As Asuncion acceded
thereto, Advincula conducted a search on the vehicle
and he found a plastic packet containing white

57

substance suspected to be methamphetamine

hydrochloride beneath the driver's seat. Asuncion told
the policemen that he just borrowed the said car and he
is not the owner thereof. Asuncion was thereafter taken
at the police headquarters for the purpose of taking his
identification. However, when he was frisked by
Advincula at the headquarters, the latter groped
something protruding from his underwear, which when
voluntarily taken out by the accused turned out to be a
plastic packet containing white substance suspected to
be methamphetamine hydrochloride. A press
conference was conducted the following day presided
by Northern Police District Director Pureza during which
Asuncion admitted that the methamphetamine
hydrochloride were for his personal use in his shooting.
On the other hand, Asuncion denied the charges against
him. He claimed that on that day, "between 8:00 and
9:00 p.m., he was abducted at gun point in front of the
house where his son lives by men who turned out to be
members of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit;
that he was told to board at the back seat by the
policemen who took over the wheels; that he acceded
to be brought at the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon for
drug test but only his blood pressure was checked in the
said hospital; that he was thereafter brought at the
Office of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; and
that he is not aware of what happened at 11:45 p.m. as
he was then sleeping at the said office." On 14 June
1994, a decision was rendered by the trial court finding
Asuncion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged, adn sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of 1 year 8 months and 20 days as minimum, to
3 years 6 months and 20 days, as maximum, and to pay
a fine of P3,000.00. On 29 June 1994, a Notice of Appeal
was filed and the records of the case were transmitted
by the trial court to the Court of Appeals. On 30 April
1996 a decision was rendered by the appellate court,
modifying the penalty imposed (reducing the sentence
to 6 months of arresto mayor in its maximum period as
minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional in its medium period as maximum and
deleting the fine of P3,000.00 imposed on Asuncion).
On 6 August 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by Asuncion. Asuncion
filed a petition for review on certiorari Supreme Court.

sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental

law of the land ordains it. However, the rule that search
and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not
absolute. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except
by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause. The
prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear
out the fact that the search in question was made as
regards a moving vehicle Asuncion's vehicle was
"flagged down" by the apprehending officers upon
identification. Therefore, the police authorities were
justified in searching Asuncion's automobile without a
warrant since the situation demanded immediate
action. The apprehending officers even sought the
permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the
latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered
by virtue of a valid warrantless search and Asuncion
himself freely gave his consent to said search, the
prohibited drugs found as a result were admissible in
evidence.

ROLDAN VS ARCA

Issue: Whether the search upon Asuncions vehicle is

valid.

On 20 July 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested

the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI
and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie
and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some
provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder. On August 5 or 6,

Held: Well-entrenched in this country is the rule that no

arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by competent judicial authority. So

58

Facts: On 3 April 1964, Morabe, De Guzman & Company

filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a
civil case (56701) against Fisheries Commissioner
Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel
Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by
the Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine
Navy. On 10 April 1964, the company prayed for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction with the CFI, but
said prayer was denied. On 28 April 1964, the CFI set
aside its order of 10 April 1964 and granted the
company's motion for reconsideration praying for
preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, the company
took possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from the
Philippine Fisheries Commission adn the Philippine Navy
by virtue of the said writ. On 10 December 1964, the CFI
dismissed Civil Case 56701 for failure of the company to
prosecute as well as for failure of the Commission and
the Navy to appear on the scheduled date of hearing.
The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie however,
remained in the possession of the company.

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 59

1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for
illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite
and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two
vessels. On 18 August 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner
requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal
charges against the crew members of the fishing
vessels. On 30 September 1965, there were filed in the
CFI of Palawan a couple of informations, one against the
crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the
crew members of Tony Lex VI both for violations of
Act 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts 462, 659
and 1088, i.e., for illegal fishing with the use of
dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte
motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and
therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the
Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels. On
October 2 and 4, likewise, the CFI of Palawan ordered
the Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody. On 2
October 1965, the company filed a complaint with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil
Case 62799) with the CFI of Manila against the
Commission and the Navy. Among others, it was alleged
that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in
issue, the same were engaged in legitimate fishing
operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of
the offer of compromise dated 13 September 1965 by
the company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws,
if any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled.
On 18 October 1965, Judge Francisco Arca issued an
order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ
upon the filing by the company of a bond of P5,000.00
for the release of the two vessels. On 19 October 1965,
the Commission and the Navy filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ
on 18 October 1965 on the ground, among others, that
on 18 October 1965 the Philippine Navy received from
the Palawan CFI two orders dated October 2 and 4,
1965 requiring the Philippine Navy to hold the fishing
boats in custody and directing that the said vessels
should not be released until further orders from the
Court, and that the bond of P5,000.00 is grossly
insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case the
two vessels, which are worth P495,000.00, are placed
beyond the reach of the Government, thus frustrating
their forfeiture as instruments of the crime. On 23
November 1965, Judge Arca denied the said motion for
reconsideration. The Commission and the Navy filed a

petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary

injunction to restrain Judge Arca from enforcing his
order dated 18 October 1965, and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction thereunder issued.
Issue: Whether the Fisheries Commissioner and the
Navy can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the
vessels of the company for illegal fishing by the use of
dynamite and without the requisite licenses.
Held: Section 4 of Republic Act 3512 approved on 20
March 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to
carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as
amended, and all rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, to make searches and seizures personally
or through his duly authorized representatives in
accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such
as dynamites and the like; including fishery products,
fishing equipment, tackle and other things that are
subject to seizure under existing fishery laws"; and "to
effectively implement the enforcement of existing
fishery laws on illegal fishing." Paragraph 5 of Section 4
of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to
and vested in the Philippine Fisheries Commission "all
the powers, functions and duties heretofore exercised
by the Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy and
Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery
matters." Section 12 of the Fisheries Act, otherwise
known as Republic Act 4003, as amended, prohibits
fishing with dynamites or other explosives which is
penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less
than P1,500.00 nor more than P5,000.00, and by
imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6)
months nor more than five (5) years, aside from the
confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats,
tackles, apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in
fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act."
Section 78 of the same Fisheries Law provides that "in
case of a second offense, the vessel, together with its
tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to
the Government." The second paragraph of Section 12
also provides that "the possession and/or finding, of
dynamite, blasting caps and other explosives in any
fishing boat shall constitute a presumption that the said
dynamite and/or blasting caps and explosives are being
used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section,
and that the possession or discover in any fishing boat
or fish caught or killed by the use of dynamite or other
explosives, under expert testimony, shall constitute a

59

presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing

boat, or the fishing crew have been fishing with
dynamite or other explosives." Under Section 78 of the
Fisheries Act, as amended, any person, association or
corporation fishing in deep sea fishery without the
corresponding license prescribed in Sections 17 to 22
Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other order or
regulation deriving force from its provisions, "shall be
punished for each offense by a fine of not more than
P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for not more than one
year, or both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided,
That in case of an association or corporation, the
President or manager shall be directly responsible for
the acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven that
the latter acted with his knowledge; otherwise the
responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is
concerned: Provided, further, That in the absence of a
known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or
person in charge of such vessel shall be responsible for
any violation of this Act: and Provided, further, That in
case of a second offense, the vessel together with its
tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to
the Government." Under Section 13 of Executive Order
389 of 23 December 1950, reorganizing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the
function, among others, "to assist the proper
governmental agencies in the enforcement of laws and
regulations pertaining to Fishing. Section 2210 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD 34 of 27
October 1972, authorized any official or person
exercising police authority under the provisions of the
Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft as well
as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to
search any person on board for any breach or violation
of the customs and tariff laws. Herein, when the
Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries
Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965 the
fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise
known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie,
these vessels were found to be without the necessary
license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and
Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure under
Section 2210 of the same Code, and illegally fishing with
explosives and without fishing license required by
Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law. Search and
seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts
for violations of the customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement
of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
search warrant must be sought before such warrant
could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a

60

search warrant before such search or seizure can be

constitutionally effected. The same exception should
apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery
laws: They are usually equipped with powerful motors
that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the
Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.


PEOPLE VS LO HO WING
- Lo and another one was charged under Dangerous
Drugs Act for transporting shabu. The trial court
convicted them.
- The facts are the accused were from China and on
their way home, they were apprehended by authorities
and were to be searched. The authorities found shabu
inside the tin cans which are supposed to contain tea.
The trial court in convicting them said that the search
and seizure was valid.
SC: The appellant contends that the authorities could
have procured a warrant search. As correctly averred by
appellee, that search and seizure must be supported by
a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least
three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set
forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a
search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence
in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of
the case clearly show that the search in question was
made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid
warrant was not necessary to effect the search on
appellant and his co-accused. , We cite with approval
the averment of the Solicitor General, as contained in
the appellee's brief, that the rules governing search and
seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search
on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that
before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things
and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judgea requirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity. AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE VS BALINGAN
On 31 August 1988, the Narcotics Intelligence Division
of the Baguio City Police Station received a telephone
call from an unnamed male informant. He passed the
information that Jean Balingan y Bobbonan was going to
Manila with a bag filled with marijuana. Acting on the
information, then P/Lt. Manuel Obrera formed a

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 61

surveillance team to monitor Balingan's movements.
The team as deployed at different places in Baguio City,
including Balingan's house on Brookside and bus
stations. Cpl. Garcia soon reported seeing Balingan
move out from her residence at Brookside and board a
taxicab which proceeded to the direction of Bonifacio
Street. Balingan was wearing a pink dress and carrying a
gray luggage with orange or yellow belts. She also
reported the make and plate number of the taxicab
which Balingan boarded. Upon receiving the report, Lt.
Obrera ordered Cpl. Garcia to proceed to the Philippine
Rabbit Terminal in case Balingan would go there. Pat.
Kimay, who must have intercepted Cpl. Garcia's
message, also reported that the taxicab described by
the latter passed along Bonifacio Rotunda. Lt. Obrera
instructed him to move out and proceed to the Police
Checkpoint at Kennon Road going to the Philippine
Military Academy. From his post at the Dangwa Bus
Station, Pat. Bueno informed Lt. Obrera that Balingan
boarded a Dangwa Bus with plate number NTU-153
bound for Manila. Lt. Obrera promptly proceeded to the
bus station to verify the report. There, he went up the
bus described by Pat. Bueno, and he saw Balingan on
the third or fourth seat behind the driver's seat. In the
luggage carrier above her head was the gray luggage
earlier described by Cpl. Garcia. He then left and
positioned himself with Ong at the Lakandula burned
area to wait for the bus to depart. At about 11:00 a.m.,
the bus moved out (on its way) to Manila via Kennon
Road. Lt. Obrera instructed Pat. Kimay, who was at the
Kennon Road Checkpoint, to stop the bus when it
reaches the place. Meanwhile, Lt. Obrera and Lt. Ong
tailed the bus at about 15 to 20 meters behind. As
instructed, Pat. Kimay stopped the bus at the Kennon
Road Checkpoint. That was already at 11:30 a.m. Lt.
Obrera and Pat. Ong arrived at the Checkpoint less than
a minute after the bus did and immediately boarded it.
Lt. Obrera announced a routinary check-up. Pat. Ong
identified himself as a policeman to Balingan and asked
her permission to check her luggage, she did not
respond and just looked outside the window. He
opened the luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and
above Balingan and found suspected marijuana in it. He
pulled out the luggage and turned it over to Lt. Obrera.
Thereupon, Lt. Obrera tried to arrest Balingan but the
latter resisted and tried to bite his hand and
furthermore held tightly onto the window pane. Lt.
Obrera asked Pat. Ong to fetch Cpl. Garcia from the
Philippine Rabbit Terminal in the City proper, so that

she would be the one to bring out Balingan from the

bus. In the meantime, he remained inside the bus
holding the confiscated luggage while the other
passengers alighted from the bus. After some 30
minutes, Garcia arrived and pulled Balingan out of the
bus and brought her to the Baguio City Police Station
and there locked her up in jail. On 24 October 1988,
Balingan was charged with Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of
Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous
Drugs Act. On 4 April 1989, Balingan was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. After trial, Balingan was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4, and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment; to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to
pay the costs. Balingan appealed.
Issue: Whether the search conducted in the Dangwa
bus, subsequent to police surveillance pursuant to an
informants tip, is valid.
Held: The search and seizure herein happened in a
moving, public vehicle. The rules governing search and
seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search
on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that
before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things
and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought." Unquestionably, the
warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable
cause. The Baguio INP Narcotics Intelligence Division
received an information that Balingan was going to
transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their
surveillance operations revealed that Balingan, whose
movements had been previously monitored by the
Narcotics Division, boarded a Dangwa bus bound for
Manila carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag.
When the moving, public bus was stopped, her bag,
upon inspection, yielded marijuana. Under those
circumstances, the warrantless search of Balingan's bag
was not illegal.

61


OBRA VS CA
Petitioner Benjamin Obra was Regional Director of the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS) in Baguio.
On jun 26, 1985, Jeannette Grybos wrote him a letter on
behalf of the Gillies heirs complaining that private
respondents (Sps. James and June Brett) had been
conducting illegal mining activities in Bgy. Palasa-an,
Mankayan, Benguet, belonging to Gillies family. On the
same day, Obra wrote Brig. Gen Tomas Dumpit1
requesting assistance in apprehending a truck2
allegedly used by Sps. Brett in illegal mining. The next
day, Obra wrote Sps Brett and Grybos informing them
that BMGS was going to conduct an ocular inspeciton
and field investigation and requesting them to be
present so that all matters shall be gathered and
collated in order for this Office to take appropriate
action. Elements of RUC under Maj. Densen seized the
truck3 as it was entering Mamakar mining area. It was
impounded by the military and prevented from leaving
the area except on mercy missions4. Private
respondents filed a complaint for injunction and
damages with the RTC as the truck was seized without
due provess in violation of their constitutional rights
under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners (Obra and Dumpit) were
authorized to seize the vehicle in the absence of any
finding of probably cause
HELD
NO.Although peittioners have authority to order seizure
and confiscation via PD. 1281, Art IV, S3 of the 1973
Constitution merely validated the grant by law to
nonjudicial officers of the power to issue warrants but
did not in any way exempt them from the duty of
determining the eixstence of probable cause. Petitioner
Obras letters to private respondents and Grybos clearly
stated that an investigation was to be held on July 2-5,
1985 to determine the veracity of the allegations of
Grybos complaint. His only basis was an alleged
certification from the BMGS that no mining permit had
been issued to the Sps. However, such certification was
not presented in evidence. The seizure cannot be
justified under the moving vehicle doctrine as there is
no existence of probable cause. The doctrine does not
give poblice officers umliminted discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of
PC. Therefore, the CA is correct in affirming the RTCs
decision that petitioners are liable for damages
(P100,000) and attorneys fees (P10,000) in violation of
the Sps. Rights under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.

62

E. IN PLAIN SIGHT

HARRIS VS US
Petitioner, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop
with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side,
was arrested for violating, inter alia, 18 U.S.C.
924(c)(1)(A), which provides in relevant part that a
person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses
or carries a firearm shall, in addition to the punishment
for such crime (i) be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm
is brandished, be sentenced to not less than 7 years;
and (iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to
not less than 10 years. Because the Government
proceeded on the assumption that the provision defines
a single crime and that brandishing is a sentencing
factor to be found by the judge following trial, the
indictment said nothing about brandishing or
subsection (ii), simply alleging the elements from the
principal paragraph. Petitioner was convicted. When his
presentence report recommended that he receive the
7-year minimum sentence, he objected, arguing that
brandishing was an element of a separate statutory
offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. At
the sentencing hearing, the District Court overruled his
objection, found that he had brandished the gun, and
sentenced him to seven years in prison. Affirming, the
Fourth Circuit rejected petitioners statutory argument
and found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,
foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a
sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466. In Apprendi, this
Court held that other than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum is, in effect, an
element of the crime, which must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (and, in
federal prosecutions, alleged in an indictment handed
down by a grand jury). But 14 years earlier, McMillan
sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty
for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum,
when the judge found that the defendant had
possessed a firearm.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
243 F.3d 806, affirmed.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to Parts I, II, and IV, concluding:
1. As a matter of statutory interpretation,
924(c)(1)(A) defines a single offense, in which
brandishing and discharging are sentencing factors to
be found by the judge, not offense elements to be
found by the jury. Pp. 49.

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 63

(a) The prohibitions structure suggests that
brandishing and discharging are sentencing factors.
Federal laws usually list all offense elements in a single
sentence and separate the sentencing factors into
subsections. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 125.
The instant statutes lengthy principal paragraph lists
the elements of a complete crime. Toward the end of
the paragraph is the word shall, which often divides
offense-defining provisions from sentence-specifying
ones. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 233. And
following shall are the separate subsections, which
explain how defendants are to be sentenced. Thus
this Court can presume that the principal paragraph
defines a single crime and its subsections identify
sentencing factors. Pp. 45.
(b) As Jones illustrates, the statutes text might
provide evidence to the contrary, but the critical textual
clues here reinforce the single-offense interpretation.
Brandishing has been singled out as a paradigmatic
sentencing factor, Castillo, supra, at 126. Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, moreover, brandishing and
discharging are factors that affect sentences for
numerous crimes. The incremental changes in the
minimum penalty at issue here are precisely what one
would expect to see in provisions meant to identify
matters for the sentencing judges consideration.
Pp. 57.
(c) The canon of constitutional avoidancewhich
provides that when a statute is susceptible of two
constructions, the Court must adopt the one that avoids
grave and doubtful constitutional questionsplays no
role here. The constitutional principle that petitioner
says a single-offense interpretation of the statute would
violatethat any fact increasing the statutory minimum
sentence must be accorded the safeguards assigned to
elementswas rejected in McMillan. Petitioners
suggestion that the canon be used to avoid overruling
one of this Courts own precedents is novel and, given
that McMillan was in place when 924(c)(1)(A) was
enacted, unsound. Congress would have had no reason
to believe that it was approaching the constitutional
line by following the instruction this Court gave in
McMillan. Pp. 79.
2. Reaffirming McMillan and employing the approach
outlined in that opinion, the Court concludes that
924(c)(1)(A)(ii) is constitutional. Basing a 2-year
increase in the defendants minimum sentence on a
judicial finding of brandishing does not evade the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments requirements. Congress simply

dictated the precise weight to be given to one

traditional sentencing factor

ROAN VS GONZALES (SUPRA)

PEOPLE VS MUSA
On 13 December 1989, the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) in Zamboanga City conducted surveillance
and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville,
Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian
informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place. The Narcom agent (Sgt. Ani)
was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried
marijuana for P10.00, which was turned over to the
Narcom office. The next day, a buy-bust was planned
with Sgt. Ani being the poseur-buyer. NARCOM teams
proceeded to the target site in 2 civilian vehicles. Ani
gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa returned
to his house and gave Ani 2 newspaper wrappers
containing dried marijuana. The signal to apprehend
Musa was given. The NARCOM team rushed to the
location of Ani, and a NARCOM officer (Sgt. Belarga)
frisked Musa but did not find the marked money. The
money was given to Musas wife who was able to slip
away. Later, Belarga found a plastic bag containing
dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen.
Musa was placed under arrest and was brought to the
NARCOM office. One newspaper-wrapper marijuana
and the plastic bag containing more marijuana was sent
to the PC Crime Laboratory, the test of which gave
positive results for the presence of marijuana. On the
other hand, Mari Musa alleged that the NARCOM
agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside his house
without any search warrant, neither his permission to
enter the house. The NARCOM agents searched the
house and allegedly found a red plastic bag whose
contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did
not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother,
Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was
living in another house about ten arms-length away.
Mari Musa was handcuffed and was taken to the
NARCOM office where he was joined by his wife. Musa
claimed that he was subjected to torture when he
refused to sign the document containing details of the
investigation. The next day, he was taken to the fiscals
office to which he was allegedly made to answer to a
single question: that if he owned the marijuana. He
allegedly was not able to tell the fiscal that he had been

63

maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was

afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office. Mari
Musa was brought to the City Jail. Still, an information
against Musa was filed on 15 December 1989. Upon his
arraignment on 11 January 1990, Musa pleaded not
guilty. After trial and on 31 August 1990, the RTC
Zamboanga City (Branch XII) found him guilty of selling
marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425.
Musa appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the contents of the red plastic bag
found in the kitchen may be admitted as evidence as
evidence acquired incidental to a lawful arrest.
Held: Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon
the person of the person arrested. An officer making an
arrest may take from the person arrested and money or
property found upon his person which was used in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or
which might furnish the prisoner with the means of
committing violence or of escaping, or which may be
used as evidence in the trial of the cause. Hence, in a
buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher,
the law enforcement agents may seize the marked
money found on the person of the pusher immediately
after the arrest even without arrest and search
warrants. The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to include the premises
or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in
the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence. When the discovery of
the evidence did not constitute a search, but where the
officer merely saw what was placed before him in full
view, the warrantless seizure of the object was legal on
the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the
admissibility of said evidence. The "plain view" doctrine,
however, may not be used to launch unbridled searches
and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the
police officer in each of them had a prior justification
for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification whether it be a warrant for another

64

object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or

some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused
and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only
where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. The "plain view" doctrine
neither justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from
the "plain view" of the object. Thus, the exclusion of the
plastic bag containing marijuana does not, however,
diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other
pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
By virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt.
Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by
Musa to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the
guilt of Musa of the crime charged has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE VS DORIA
In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan
District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics
Command (Narcom), received information from 2
civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in
illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom
agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust
operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting
between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled
on 5 December 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in
Mandaluyong City. On 5 December 1995, at 6:00 a.m.,
the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust
operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha
composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and
PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4)
other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated
PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as
his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter
security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the
North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team
P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this
sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 a one
thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills
as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price
of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3
Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 65

their serial numbers in the police blotter. The team rode
in two cars and headed for the target area. At 7:20 a.m.,
"Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as
interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3
Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth
P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for
him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street
while he got the marijuana from his associate. An hour
later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3
Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting.
"Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic
and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith
arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the
arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked
bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left
the money at the house of his associate named
"Neneth." "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's"
house nearby at Daang Bakal. The team found the door
of "Neneth's" house open and at woman inside. "Jun"
identified the woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua
asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit
looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door,
PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining
table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and
inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The
plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the
marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion
aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and
took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and
found that it contained 10 bricks of what appeared to
be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box's
discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
"Neneth." The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took
"Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents
and the marked bills and turned them over to the
investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the
police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado
while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The 1 brick
of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the
10 bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were
examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. The bricks were
found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various
weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. On 7 December 1995,
Doria and Gadda were charged with violation of Section
4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972. After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig City convicted Dorria and Gaddao. The trial court
found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime
group" and sentenced both to death and pay a fine of

P500,000.00 each. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether the warrantless arrests of Doria and
Gaddao are legally permissible.
Held: It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a
certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the
persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every
deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law
forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the
"seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a
criminal career. Where the criminal intent originates in
the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is
lured into the commission of the offense charged in
order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no
conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal
intent originates in the mind of the accused and the
criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person
acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials
furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of
the offense, or that the accused is aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence
necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and
the accused must be convicted. The law tolerates the
use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal. The
warrantless arrest of Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless
arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit: "A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx" Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person
may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense." Herein, Doria was caught in the act
of committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-
bust operation, the police are not only authorized but
duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. The
warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person

65

and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana

and marked bills, however, are different matters. Our
Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a
judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without
such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search
and seizure may be made without a warrant and the
evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search
in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be
lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must
fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Gaddao was not caught red-handed during
the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest
under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing
any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court,
there was no occasion at all for Gaddao to flee from the
policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact,
she was going about her daily chores when the
policemen pounced on her. Neither could the arrest of
Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule
113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without
warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based
upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion." Gaddao was arrested
solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by
her co-accused, Doria. Save for Doria's word, the
Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe
that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no
showing that the person who effected the warrantless
arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a
criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it
follows that the search of her person and home and the
subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana
cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.


PEOPLE VS BOLASA

An informer told the police that an illegal transaction of
prohibited drugs were being conducted at a certain
house in Sta. Brigida St. Karuhatan Valenzuela Metro
Manila. PO3 Salonga and Carizon together with SPO1
Fernando Arenas immediately proceed to the said
house. Upon reaching the house, they peeped through
a small window and saw a man and woman repacking

66

suspected marijuana. They enter the house and

introduce themselves as police officers and confiscated
the tea bag and other drug paraphernalia.Afterwhich,
the police officers arrested the two,Zenaida Bolasa and
Roberto de los Reyes. Upon examination by the NBI, the
tea bags were confirmed as marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa
and Roberto de los Reyes were charged with violation of
Sec.8 of Article II of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known
as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The RTC convicted
them of the crime charged. Accused Bolasa asserts that
the search and her arrest was illegal. She insists that the
trial court should not regard the testimony of PO3
cCarizon credible because he does not have personal
knowledge regarding the conduct of the arrest and
search making his testimony a hearsay. Issue: Whether
or not the arrest and seizure were valid Ruling: No. The
Supreme Court held that the arrest was invalid because
the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at
the time of their arrest, accusedapellants had just
committed, were committing or about to commit a
crime. The arresting officers also have no personal
knowledge that a crime was committed nor have a
reasonable ground to believe that the accused
committed the crime. And accused appellants were not
prisoners who have escaped from a penal
establishment. With respect to the seizure of the tea
bags,the court held that it is also invalid because the
objects were not seized in plain view. There was no
valid intrusion and the evidence was not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped
through the window to ascertain the activities of
appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search
cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless arrest, a customs search, or a
stop and frisk situations. The court stated that the
arresting officers should have first conducted a
surveillance considering that the identities and
addressed of the suspected culprits were already
ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and
determining the existence of probable cause, they
should have secured a warrant prior to effecting a valid
arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the
accompanying search was also illegal. Every evidence
thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used
against the accused-appellants. The Court held that the
State cannot in a cavalier fashioni ntrude into the
persons of its citizens as well as into their houses,
papers and effects. The constitutional provision protects
the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against
unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. The Court
held that the State cannot in a cavalier fashioni ntrude
into the persons of its citizens as well as into their

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 67

houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision
protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself
against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint
The Court enumerated the exceptions as follows: 1.
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2.
Search of evidence in 9plain view.9The elements of the
plain view doctrine are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based
on the valid warrantless arrest in which the policeare
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b)
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who havethe right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain
view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search. 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated
by the government, the vehicle9s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable causethat
the occupant committed a criminal activity ;4.
Consented warrantless search ;5. Customs search ;6.
Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances. Citing the Rules of Criminal Procedure
on lawful warrantless arrest, the Court stated that an
arrest is lawful even 9in theabsence of a warrant9 :(a)
when the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in
his presence;( b) when an offense has in fact been
committed and he has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested hascommitted it; and, (c)
when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement toanother. (A person
charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense

f. private searches

PEOPLE VS MARTI

to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the

contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein
his name, passport number, the date of shipment and
the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages
as Marti refused, who assured the former that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and
were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's
representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside
a brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the
bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with
masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the
Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and
took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes
forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to
the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At
the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages
was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-
like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents
made an inventory and took charge of the box and of
the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon,
the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail,
inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila
Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed
against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special
Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of
violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to
Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law

wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-
wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no
relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages

Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly

in violation of the accused's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State.

Held: In the absence of governmental interference, the

liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State. The contraband herein,

67

having come into possession of the Government

without the latter transgressing the accused's rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted
against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert
the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which
is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that
which is open, where no trespass has been committed
in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the part of
the arresting officer, there is not the search that is
prohibited by the constitution. The constitutional
proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the
search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass
the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a
private establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search
and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.

WATERHOUSE DRUG VS NLRC
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a
pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at
P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320
per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a
total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a
refund for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an
envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of
Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw
that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of
Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents
(check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue
of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v.

68

Marti, the constitutional protection against

unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the
immunity of ones person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence
Held: Yes.
Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights
does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the
citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion
gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite
this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of
cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment
Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the
Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

G. EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE VS DE GRACIA
The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat
staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements
headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-
Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the
Government. At that time, various government
establishments and military camps in Metro Manila
were being bombarded by the rightist group with their
"tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of 30 November
1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine
Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout
Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine
Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the
government television station. Also, some elements of
the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay
occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan,
Metro Manila. On 1 December 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of
the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region
Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car
conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office
located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in
Quezon City, together with his team composed of Sgt.
Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry
Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The
surveillance, which actually started on the night of 30
November 1989 at around 10:00 p.m., was conducted
pursuant to an intelligence report received by the
division that said establishment was being occupied by
elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication
command post. Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 69

car, parked the vehicle around 10 to 15 meters away
from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt.
Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to
conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then
gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going
bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while a
group of 5 men disengaged themselves from the crowd
and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At
that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front,
saw the approaching group and immediately ordered
Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they
passed by the group, then only 6 meters away, the
latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the
team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt.
Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance
team was able to retaliate because they sought cover
inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or
bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a
consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989,
searching them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as
team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio
Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion
under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales
Office. They were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons
of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, and
Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar
building. They were then made to sign an inventory,
written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition
confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was
secured by the raiding team because, according to
them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being
mopped up by the rebel forces and there was
simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar
office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed. The group was able to confirm
later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr.
Gutierrez and that de Gracia is supposedly a "boy"
therein. de Gracia was charged in two separate
informations for illegal possession of ammunition and
explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for
attempted homicide (Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-
90-11756, respectively), which were tried jointly by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103. During
the arraignment, de Gracia pleaded not guilty to both
charges. However, he admitted that he is not
authorized to posses any firearms, ammunition and/or
explosive. The parties likewise stipulated that there was
a rebellion during the period from November 30 up to 9

December 1989. On 22 February 1991, the trial court

rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of attempted
homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia appealed.
Issue: Whether the military operatives made a valid
search and seizure during the height of the December
1989 coup detat.
Held: It is admitted that the military operatives who
raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a
search warrant at that time. The raid was actually
precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was
being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the
raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the
premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by
a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.
When the military operatives raided the place, the
occupants thereof refused to open the door despite the
requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the
former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office
is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an
armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for
explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely
engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an
unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably
explained. In addition, there was general chaos and
disorder at that time because of simultaneous and
intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by
rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were
obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and
houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing
circumstances, the case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking
into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more than
sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the
raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure
a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself
manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency
and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could

69

lawfully be dispensed with.

II. PROCEDURE FOR SERVICE OF WARRANT; POST-
SERVICE PROCEDURE

A. SERVICE WARRANT
1. Time of search
Rule 126 Section 9. Time of making search.
The warrant must direct that it be served
in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts
that the property is on the person or in the
place ordered to be searched, in which case
a direction may be inserted that it be served
at any time of the day or night
2. Two witness rule
Rule 126 Section 8. Search of house, room,
or premise to be made in presence of two
witnesses. No search of a house, room,
or any other premise shall be made except
in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in
the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality
PEOPLE VS GESMUNDO
According to the prosecution, in the morning of Nov. 17,
1986, PO Jose Luciano gave money and instructed his
civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at
the Cocoland Hotel. He actually saw the accused selling
marijuana to his civilian informer and that same day
Luciano applied for a search warrant.

About 2pm that day, a police raiding team armed with a
search warrant went to the Brgy captain for them to be
accompanied in serving the said warrant at the
residence of the accused. The police was allowed to
enter the house upon the strength of the warrant
shown to the accused. The accused begged the police
not to search and to leave the house. The police still
searched the house and was led to the kitchen. She
pointed a metal basin on top of a table as the hiding
place of died marijuana flowering tops contained in a
plastic bag marked ISETANN. The police also recovered
from a native uway cabinet dried marijuana flowering
tops wrapped in 3 pieces of komiks paper.

According to the accused, when the police arrived at
her house, she saw Sgt. Yte and PFC Jose Luciano. She
invited Sgt. Yte to enter her house while Luciano was
left in the jeep that was parked near the house. While
inside the house Yte showed the accused something he
claimed as a search warrant, when someone coming
from the kitchen uttered eto na They proceeded to

70

the kitchen and saw Luciano holding a plastic bag with

four other companions. They confronted the accused
and insisted that the bags belonged to her. Accused
denied the accusation and told them that she doesnt
know anything about it. She was made to sign a
prepared document. She was brought to the police
station and was detained.

The court renders judgment finding the accused guilty.


Issue: Whether or Not the evidence was properly
obtained by the police.


Held: In the investigation report prepared by Luciano
stated that during the search they discovered a hole at
the backyard of the house of the suspect, there was a
big biscuit can inside the hole and on top of the cover a
flower pot was placed wherein the marijuana was kept.
However, there was no mention of any marijuana
obtained from a flower pot in any of their testimonies.
There were inconsistencies insofar the prosecution is
concerned, as to what was recovered and where, the
trial court concluded that these inconsistencies are
trivial. There must sufficient evidence that the
marijuana was actually surrendered by the accused. As
held in PP vs. Remorosa, Irreconcilable and unexplained
contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses cast doubt on the guilt of appellant and his
culpability to the crime charged.

The claim that the marijuana was planted was
strengthen as the police violated sec 7, rule 126 rules of
the court provides no search of a house, room or any
other premise shall be made except in the presence of
the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of
two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. This requirement is
mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the
search warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact
punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.

The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to
the court as the accused was not informed of her right
not to sign the document neither was she informed that
she has the right to the assistance of a counsel and the
fact that it may be used as evidence against her. It was
not proved that the marijuana belonged to her. Not
only does the law require the presence of witnesses
when the search is conducted, but it also imposes upon

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 71

the person making the search the duty to issue a
detailed receipt for the property seized. He is likewise
required to deliver the property seized to the judge who
issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate
inventory thereof duly verified under oath. Again, these
duties are mandatory and are required to preclude
substitution of the items seized by interested parties.

The guilt of the accused was has not been established.
Judgment is reversed.


3. BREAKING OF DOOR OR WINDOW TO
EFFECT SEARCH
RULE 126 Section 6. Issuance and form of
search warrant. If the judge is satisfied of
the existence of facts upon which the
application is based or that there is
probable cause to believe that they exist, he
shall issue the warrant, which must be
substantially in the form prescribed by
these Rules.

B. POST-SERVICE PROCEDURE

PEOPLE VS GESMUNDO (SUPRA)

1. Issuance of Receipt
RULE 126 Section 11. Receipt for the property
seized. The officer seizing property under the
warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to
the lawful occupant of the premises in whose
presence the search and seizure were made, or in
the absence of such occupant, must, in the
presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a
receipt in the place in which he found the seized
property.

PEOPLE V LACBANES
Facts: Cesar Lacbanes was convicted by the Palo,
Leyte RTC for violating Art. II Sec. 4 of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act). In this appeal he claims
entrapment was never clearly established by the
prosecution's evidence. The prosecution relied on
the testimony of PFC Rosales, member of the
Tacloban Police Station Narcotics Section.

Events according to Rosales: his command received

info that Lacbanes had been selling marijuana

cigarettes in Tacloban City. Surveillance was done,
then a buy-bust operation was set up. 4:15
p.m.,Oct. 3, 1986 at the corner of Burgos and
Tarcela Streets, Tacloban City, their confidential
agent told PFC Rosales and team members
Patrolmen Arpon and Buena, Sgt. Madriaga and Lt.
Saranza, that he contacted Lacbanes. The team
positioned themselves to see the sale clearly. The
agent talked to Lacbanes, handed him 2 marked
P5.00 bills and received suspected marijuana
cigarettes. The team approached, said they were
members of the Narcotics Section and arrested
Lacbanes. They found the bills and 3 sticks of
suspected marijuana cigarettes with him. He was
brought to the station. Lacbanes was informed of
his rights prior to investigation, and he understood
them. He admitted that the marijuana with him was
for sale and that his friend was the source. But they
forgot to put the admission of guilt down in writing.

Events according to Lacbanes: he was sleeping at
home from 2-4 p.m., and woken up by his dad, who
told him that Lt. Saranza, (with Arpon and Buena)
wanted to take him to the station. He was asked if
he knew the whereabouts of Cresencio de la Cruz
upon denial, he was forced to sign a paper which
turned out to be a receipt for seized property (the
bills and marijuana). He denied knowing Rosales
and said he was not there. Since the agent was not
presented in court, he also claims that Rosales
testimony was equivalent to hearsay, and it
amounted to a violation of his constitutional right to
know the witnesses against him and meet them in
court. He also alleged that the marked bills werent
presented as proof before the trial court.

Issue: Is the conviction still valid?

Held: Yes. RTC AFFIRMED. The marked bills were
presented as proof during Rosales direct
examination, and the agents testimony would only
be used to corroborate Rosales testimony, since
Rosales saw the entire exchange and the bills and
cigarettes are there as proof. The testimony of a
lone prosecution witness, as long as it is positive
and clear and not arising from an improper motive
to impute a serious offense to the accused,
deserves full credit. Lacbanes denial is not

71

enoughif he wanted to use his alibi of being at

home, he shouldve presented his father to testify.
The defense of frame up is not valid here either
because theres no clear or convincing evidence of
it. However, the Court said that the receipt
purportedly signed by Lacbanes was inadmissible
as evidence, because the prosecution failed to
prove that he was assisted by counsel at the
timemaking it a violation of his right to remain
silent.


2. DELIVERY OF PROPERTY AND INVENTORY;
RETURN AND PROCEEDINGS ON THE RETURN

RULE, SEC 126 Section 12. Delivery of property and
inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings
thereon. (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the
property seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified
under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant,
the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been
made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom
the warrant was issued and require him to explain why
no return was made. If the return has been made, the
judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has
been complained with and shall require that the
property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see
to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and
kept by the custodian of the log book on search
warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return,
the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute
contempt of court
PEOPLE VS GESMUNDO (SUPRA)

III.
REMEDIES
AGAINST
UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

RULE 126 Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant
or to suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to
quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence
obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only
by the court where the action has been instituted. If no
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be
filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search
warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the
motion and a criminal case is subsequent filed in
another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter
court

72

RA 8493 Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal
Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the
justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-
trial conference to consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of Facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and
expeditious trial.

RULE 118
Section 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In
all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the court shall after arraignment and
within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a
shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars
of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to
consider the following:
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;


STONEHILL VS DIOKNO (SUPRA)


BACHE VS RUIZ

RAKAS V ILLINOIS
Brief Fact Summary. Passengers in a car attempted to
suppress shotgun shells found in the car.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Rights assured by the Fourth
Amendment are personal rights [which] . . . may be
enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance
of one whose own protection was infringed by the
search and seizure, not vicariously.
Facts. Police officers stopped a car matching the
description of the getaway car in a robbery. Petitioners
were passengers; neither owned the car. A shot gun and
ammunition were found in the car. Petitioners motion
to suppress was denied for lack of standing.

Issue. [W]hether standing [can] be established in the
absence of ownership of the property seized.
eld. No. Despite the petitioners arguments, the Court

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 73

did not accept the target theory, and reaffirmed Jones
v. United States. The petitioners had no standing. The
Court further distinguished from Jones in that the
petitioners did no have a legally sufficient interest in a
place other than his own home. The petitioners could
[not] legitimately expect privacy in the areas which
were the subject of the search and seizure each sought
to contest.
Discussion. The capacity to claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right
in the invaded place, but upon whether the person who
claims

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP VS ASUNCION (SUPRA)
B. RETURN OF PROPERTY ILLEGALLY SEIZED

UY KHEYTHIN V VILLAREAL
-On April 30, 1919, one Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the
Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for search
warrant, the said Ramon Gayanilo stating in his
application; "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto.
Nio St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his
store, there is kept a certain amount of opium."
- Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S.
Torralba, on the same day (April 30th) searched the
house of the petitioner Uy Kheytin and found therein 60
small cans of opium. They wanted to search also the
bodega on the ground-floor of the house, but Uy
Kheytin positively denied that it was his or that he
rented it. Lt. Torralba wanted to be sure, and for this
reason, he placed a guard in the premises to see that
nothing was removed therefrom, and then went away
to find out who the owner of the bodega was. The next
morning he learned from the owner of the house, one
Segovia, of the town of Molo, that the Chinaman Uy
Kheytin was the one who was renting the bodega.
Thereupon Lt. Torralba and his subordinates resumed
the search and then and there found and seized articles
which were all with connection to the using of opium.
- A criminal complaint was filed in the court of the
justice of the peace of Iloilo against all the petitioners
herein, charging them with a violation of the Opium
Law. They were duly arrested.
-Defendants urged: (1) that the search warrant of April
30 was illegal because the requisites prescribed by the
General Orders No. 58 had not been complied with in its
issuance (specifically (a) because it was not issued upon
either of the grounds mentioned in section 96 of General

Orders No. 58, and (b) because the judge who issued it
did not determine the probable cause by examining
witnesses under oath); (2) that the searches and
seizures made on May 1st had been made without any
semblance of authority and hence illegal; and (3) that
the seizure of the defendants' books and letters was a
violation of the provisions of the Jones Law providing
that no person shall be compelled to testify against
himself, and protecting him against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Issue: WON the defendants positions are with merit.
Ruling (s):
1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in
question the judge did not comply with the
requirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58,
the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the
opium and its paraphernalia which were found and
seized under said warrant, and much less are they
entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of
the judge.
2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation
of the search begun on the previous day, and,
therefore, did not require another search warrant.
3. That the seizure of the petitioner's books, letters,
telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent
relation with opium and the possession of which is not
forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the
petitioners' constitutional rights.
RD:
(Contention # 1)
-SEC. 96. of General Orders No. 58 provide: It (a search
warrant) may be issued upon either of the following
grounds: 1. When the property was stolen or
embezzled. ; 2. When it was used or when the intent
exists to use it as the means of committing a felony.
-Suffice it to say that, whatever may be the technical
common-law meaning of the word "felony", which is
used in paragraph 2 of sec. 96 above quoted, the Court
believes it would be the height of absurdity to hold,
upon technical grounds, that a search warrant is illegal
which is issued to search for and seize property the very
possession of which is forbidden by law and constitutes
a crime. Opium is such property.
- Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to
search for material so kept as to endanger the public
safety.
- A search warrant may be likened to a warrant of
arrest. The issuance of both is restricted by the same
provision of the Jones Law (sec. 3) which is as follows:

73

That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,

supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized.
- In the present case there was an irregularity in the
issuance of the search warrant in question in that the
judge did not first examine the complainant or any
witnesses under oath. But the property sought to be
searched for and seized having been actually found in
the place described by the complainant, reasoning by
analogy from the case of an improper arrest, we are of
the opinion that that irregularity is not sufficient cause
for ordering the return of the opium found and seized
under said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating
the latter.
(Contention # 2)
- While it is true that a warrant is good for 10 days after
the date of issuance, this cannot be interpreted to mean
that a search warrant can be used every day for 10 days,
and for a different purpose each day. This would be
absurd.
-It appears from the oral evidence adduced during the
hearing of the petitioners' motion in the court below
that the search for opium, the property mentioned in
the warrant, was not completed on April 30th; it was
interrupted by the necessity to ascertain who the owner
of the bodega on the ground-floor was, because the
petitioner Uy Kheytin falsely disclaimed ownership
thereof. In other words, the search of May 1st was not
made "for a different purpose," nor could it be
considered "another search," but was really a
continuation of the search begun on April 30th. This is
shown by the fact that during the interval between the
two searches the premises in question were guarded by
Constabulary soldiers, and the petitioners were made to
understand on April 30th that the authorities were not
yet through with the search and would continue the
same as soon as they found out that the bodega was
also occupied by the petitioner Uy Kheytin.
(Contention # 3)
- In order to comply with the constitutional provisions
regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property
to be seized under a warrant must be particularly
described therein and no other property can be taken
thereunder.
- That the officers of the law believed that the books,
papers, etc., which they seized might be used as
evidence against the petitioners herein a criminal action
against them for a violation of the Opium Law, is no
reason or justification under the law for the seizure:
First, because they were not "particularly described" or
even mentioned in the search warrant; second,

74

because, even if they had been mentioned in the search

warrant, they could not be legally seized, for a search
warrant cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining
evidence; and third, because to compel a person to
produce his private papers to be used in evidence
against him would be equivalent to compelling him to
be a witness against himself.


MAGONICA V PALACIO
Facts: Zacarias Magoncia was arrested for the crime of
robbery gang committed in the house of Hilario
Enovejas Ariston in the neighborhood of the town of
Asingan, Pangasinan. Without search warrant, they
made the seizure, the wife of accused rebuked them
"why search the house when my husband is away?"The
cops found in the home a paltik , shotgun clandestine
manufacture a hand grenade, a box that contained 42
bullets and some pieces of cotton cloth Hilario Property
Enovejas, homeowner assaulted. In this criminal case
for illegal possession of firearms, the defendant filed a
motion on January 8, 1947 asking the court to order the
return of illegally seized the effects of the four
policemen of Asingan, Pangasinan and an order that the
Provincial Prosecutor desist from using such defects as
evidence at the hearing. Confident reports received,
the Chief of Police instead of asking for a search warrant
from a judge ordered four policemen recording the
defendant's home and found stolen pieces of fabric
together with a paltik, ammunition and hand grenade

Issue: WON the items seized may be returned

Held: No. The search of the house of Zachary Magoncia
made by four police officers, on orders of the chief of
police of Asingan, over the objections of Magoncia's
wife who protested that the search was being made in
her husband's absence, was absolutely illegal. The
searching officers did not have any search warrant
provided. In the course of the illegal search, the
searching officers found in Magoncia's house to paltik ,
a gun, a hand grenade, and a container containing forty-
two case ammunitions, the possession of all of Which is
punishable by law and prohibited. An information for
illegal possession of firearms was filed against
Magoncia. His motion, dated January 8, 1947, praying
That the above effects be returned to him. To order the
return of the prohibited weapons to Magoncia is to
justify an illegality or criminal offense. The illegality of
the search is independent from the illegal possession of
prohibited arms. The illegality of the search did not
make legal an illegal possession of firearms. Do not

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 75

confuse the possession of a thing which is susceptible to
legal appropriation and is the subject of free trade, like
watch, a box of firearms whose possession is prohibited.
Possession of a firearm without a license is a flagrant
violation of law and is subject to an arrest the possessor
and contraband can be seized

COLLECTOR VS VILLALUZ
Facts: Petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T.
Mascardo filed against Cesar T. Makapugay, a letter
complaint with respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal
Court for violation of NIRC, Central Bank Circular 265
and RA 1937 claiming that Cesar T. Makapugay "with
malicious intention to defraud the government
criminally, willfully and feloniously brought into the
country FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed blue seal"
Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny Walker
Scotch Whiskey, also "untaxed", without the necessary
permit from the proper authorities. The respondent
submitted a Baggage Declaration Entry which did not
declare the said articles. Respondent Judge assumed
jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary
investigation, and on July 6, 1971, issued the challenged
order, dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering
the return to private respondent the amount of
P2,280.00, his passport No. Ag-2456 FA - No. B103813,
and one (1) box of air-conditioning evaporator only, as
well as the forfeiture of forty (40) cartons of untaxed
blue seal Salem cigarettes and five (5) bottles of Johnny
Walker Scotch Whiskey" (p. 13, rec.). Armed with said
order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that
petitioner release the articles so stated. Petitioner
Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to
the "prior institution of seizure proceedings thereon."
The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to file a
complaint for "Open Disobedience" under Article 231 of
the Revised Penal Code, before the City Fiscal of Pasay
City. Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction, seeking to annul and set aside the order
dated July 6, 1971 on the ground that respondent Judge
has no power to conduct a preliminary investigation of
criminal complaints directly filed with him, cannot
legally order the dismissal "with prejudice" of a criminal
case after conducting a preliminary investigation
thereon, and is without authority to order the return of
articles subject of seizure proceedings before Customs
authorities. In these six cases, one common legal issue is
whether a Circuit Criminal Court possesses the power to
conduct preliminary investigations which is significant

to determine whether items may be returned or not.

Issue: WON the items seized may be returned

Held: The dismissal of a case, even with prejudice,
during the stage of preliminary investigation does not
bar subsequent prosecution and conviction if the
evidence warrants the re-filing of the same becomes
next to impossible. For the enforcement of such order
would virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector of
Customs of the evidence indispensable to a successful
prosecution of the case against the private respondent.
Worse, the order nullified the power of seizure of the
customs official. Respondent Judge ignored the
established principle that from the moment imported
goods are actually in the possession or control of the
Customs authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had
previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the
Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the
Customs laws, subject to an appeal only to the Court of
Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme Court.
Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of First
Instance as well as the Circuit Criminal Court from
assuming cognizance of the subject matter and divests
such courts of the prerogative to replevin properties
subject to seizure and forfeiture proceedings for
violation of the Tariff and Customs Code because
proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally
imported are not criminal in nature since they do not
result in the conviction of wrongdoer nor in the
imposition upon him of a penalty.


MATA VS BAYONA
Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree
(PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information
against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took
and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal
tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any authority
from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation
or from the government authorities concerned." Mata
claimed that during the hearing of the case, he
discovered that nowhere from the records of the said
case could be found the search warrant and other
pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the
same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its

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whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K.

Bayona, presiding Jufe of the City Court of Ormoc
replied, "it is with the court". The Judge then handed
the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the
records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and
annul the search warrant and for the return of the
articles seized, citing and invoking, among others,
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979,
stating that the court has made a thorough
investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo
U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II
INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that
effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the
search warrant were not attached immediately to the
record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering
that the rule does not specify when these documents
are to be attached to the records. Mata's motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been
denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the
petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the
Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the
articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible
as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the
matter.
Issue: Whether the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Held: Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The
Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order

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that the Judge may be able to properly determine the

existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false. We,
therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing
and attaching them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.

C. CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CIVIL DAMAGES

REVISED PENAL CODE
Section Two. Violation of domicile
Art. 128. Violation of domicile. The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon any public officer or employee who, not being
authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling
against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or
other effects found therein without the previous
consent of such owner, or having surreptitiously
entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the
premises, shall refuse to do so.
If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any
papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime
be not returned immediately after the search made by
the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and
abuse in the service of those legally obtained. In
addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the
commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall procure a search warrant without
just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall
exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in
executing the same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. The
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or
employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall
search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any
person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his
family, or in their default, without the presence of two
witnesses residing in the same locality.

CRIMPROMIDTERMS-CADC 77

Art. 206. Unjust interlocutory order. Any judge who
shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or
decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period and suspension; but if he shall have
acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance
and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly
unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.
MHP GARMENTS V CA
MHP Garments was granted by the Boy Scouts of the
Phils. an exclusive franchise to sell and
distribute official boy Scout uniforms, supplies,
badges and insignias. It was also given authority
to undertake the prosecution in court of all
illegal sources of scout uniforms and other
scouting supplies.
Accordingly, MHP tasked its employee, Larry de
Guzman to undertake surveillance and report to
the PC of the activities of the respondents who
were reported to selling Scout uniforms and
paraphernalia without authority.

The members of the PC raiding team should have been

included in the complaint for violation of the
respondents constitutional rights. Still, the omission
will not exculpate MHP Garments and De Guzman.
TC was correct in granting damages to respondents.
MHP Garments and De Guzman were indirectly involved
in transgressing the right of respondents against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Raid was conducted with the active participation of
employee De Guzman. He did not lift a finger to stop
the seizure of the boy and girl scout items. By standing
by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to
the same extent as the officers themselves.
So with the MHP Garments which even received for
safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC
raiding team and De Guzman, and refused to surrender
them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its
complaint against respondents.
If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they
should have filed a 3rd party complaint against the

De Guzman and 3 constabulary men went to the

stores of respondents and seized Scout
uniforms without warrant, causing commotion
and embarassment to respondents.

raiding team for contribution or any other relief. They

did not.

Subsequently, a criminal complaint for unfair

competition was filed against respondents.
Fiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the
return of the seized articles.

3. Defamation, fraud, and physical injuries

Thereafter, the respondents filed a civil case against

petitioners for sums of money and damages. TC ordered
petitioners to pay. CA affirmed.

Judgment affirmed with modification.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical

injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

ISSUE: WON petitioners should be held liable

HELD: Yes

SC held that the evidence did not justify the warrantless

search and seizure of respondents goods:

progression of time between the receipt of the

information and the raid of the stores shows there was
sufficient time to apply for a judicial warrant. no
probable cause for the seizure

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