G.R. No.

L-44360 March 31, 1977

REGINA S. BIBOSO
vs.
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC..
FACTS: Individual complainants herein were employed by respondent as academic teachers in respondent's school,
the St. Mary Mazzarello School, which is operated by respondent. On or about April 14, 1973, complainants were
notified by the school Directress that they (complainants) were not going to be rehired for the school year 1973-74.
The necessary report for such action was filed by respondent with the Department of Labor on May 28, 1973,
informing that complainants' services were thus terminated after the business hours on June 30, 1973.

Complainants were hired as teachers of the school on a year-to-year basis and that they reapplied before the
expiration of the contracts and/or signed new ones, as the case may be, if the school decided to renew the
same.Thus, under 'Status of Employment' of said contracts, the complainants were hired as 'temporary as and
when required until June 30, 1973,' or whatever year the contract is supposed to terminate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the guarantee on security of tenure covers the case of the nine petitioners, whose
employment admittedly were on a basis.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that petitioners were well aware all the time that their tenure was for a
limited duration. Upon its termination, both parties to the employment relationship were free to renew it or to
let it lapse. It was the decision of private respondent that it should cease. The Office of the President could find
nothing objectionable when it determined that the will of the parties as to the limited duration thereof should be
respected. That was all that was decided.

G.R. No. L-63316 July 31, 1984

ILUMINADA VER BUISER
vs.
HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR
FACTS: Petitioners Iluminada Ver Buiser and Ma. Mercedes P. Intengan entered into an "Employment Contract (on
Probationary Status for 18 months)" on May 26, 1980 with private respondent, a corporation engaged in the
business of publication and circulation of the directory of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company.
Petitioner Ma. Cecilia Rillo-Acuna entered into the same employment contract on June 11, 1980 with the private
respondent. Corollary to this, the private respondent prescribed sales quotas to be accomplished or met by the
petitioners. Failing to meet their respective sales quotas, the petitioners were dismissed from the service by the
private respondent. The records show that the private respondent terminated the services of petitioners Iluminada
Ver Buiser and Cecilia Rillo-Acuna on May 14, 1981 and petitioner Ma. Mercedes P. Intengan on May 18, 1981 for
their failure to meet their sales quotas.
Thus, on May 27, 1981, petitioners filed with the National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment, a
complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for backwages, earned commissions and other benefits.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners are validly dismissed.
RULING: Yes, Generally, the probationary period of employment is limited to six (6) months. The exception
to this general rule is When the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the
same is established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be performed
by the employee. The petitioners' failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them constitute a just cause
of their dismissal, regardless of the permanent or probationary status of their employment. Failure to observe
prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause
for dismissal. Such inefficiency is understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by failing to
complete the same within the alloted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. This management
prerogative of requiring standards availed of so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employer's interest. where the employee must learn a particular kind of work such as selling, or when the job
requires certain qualifications, skills, experience or training.

G.R. No. 109114 September 14, 1993

HOLIDAY INN MANILA
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS: Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was on April 15, 1991, accepted for "onthe-job training" as a telephone operator for a period of three weeks. For her services, she received food and
transportation allowance. 2 On May 13, 1992, after completing her training, she was employed on a "probationary
basis" for a period of six months ending November 12, 1991. Her employment contract stipulated that the Hotel
could terminate her probationary employment at any time prior to the expiration of the six-month period in the event
of her failure (a) to learn or progress in her job; (b) to faithfully observe and comply with the hotel rules and the
instructions and orders of her superiors; or (c) to perform her duties according to hotel standards. On November 8,
1991, four days before the expiration of the stipulated deadline, Holiday Inn notified her of her dismissal, on the
ground that her performance had not come up to the standards of the Hotel. Through counsel, Honasan filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that she was already a regular employee at the time of her separation and
so was entitled to full security of tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Elena Honasan is considered a regular employee. If in affirmative, whether not her she
validly dismissed.
RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court held that Honasan was placed by the petitioner on probation twice, first during her
on-the-job training for three weeks, and next during another period of six months, ostensibly in accordance with
Article 281. Her probation clearly exceeded the period of six months prescribed by this article. Probation is the
period during which the employer may determine if the employee is qualified for possible inclusion in the
regular force. In the case at bar, the period was for three weeks, during Honasan's on-the-job training. When her
services were continued after this training, the petitioners in effect recognized that she had passed probation and
was qualified to be a regular employee. The consequence is that she could no longer be summarily separated on
the ground invoked by the petitioners. As a regular employee, she had acquired the protection of Article 279 of the
Labor Code. The grounds for the removal of a regular employee are enumerated in Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the
Labor Code. The procedure for such removal is prescribed in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code. These rules were not observed in the case at bar as Honasan was simply told that her services
were being terminated because they were found to be unsatisfactory. No administrative investigation of any kind
was undertaken to justify this ground. She was not even accorded prior notice, let alone a chance to be heard.

[G.R. No. 145417. December 11, 2003]

FLORENCIO M. DE LA CRUZ, JR. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS: On May 27, 1996, petitioner Florencio M. de la Cruz, Jr. was hired by private respondent Shemberg
Marketing Corporation (Shemberg) as senior sales manager with a monthly salary of P40,500. Shemberg was
engaged in the business of manufacturing, trading, distributing and importing various consumer products. However,
on September 14, 1996, Shembergs human resource department manager, Ms. Lilybeth Y. Llanto, summoned
petitioner and informed him of the managements decision to terminate his services. Petitioner asked Llanto for the
reason but the latter merely informed him that it had something to do with the drop in the companys sales. Petitioner
then requested a meeting with Shembergs vice president, Ernesto U. Dacay, Jr., but was told that the decision of the
management was final. His request to be furnished a 30-day written notice was also denied by the
management. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary, backwages, 13 th month
pay and damages against Shemberg, Ernesto Dacay, Jr. and Lilybeth Llanto. Respondents answered that
petitioners dismissal was premised on the following: (1) his poor performance as evidenced by the steady and
substantial drop in company sales since his assumption as senior sales manager; (2) the dissatisfaction of his
subordinates over his management style and dealings with the companys distributors which resulted in the low
morale of Shembergs sales force, as evidenced by the joint affidavit of two of his subordinates, Ruel O. Salgado and
Joel D. Sol; (3) his unauthorized use of company cellular phone for overseas personal calls and (4) the
unauthorized reimbursement of the plane tickets of his wife and child. In short, petitioner was terminated for his
failure to meet the required company standards and for loss of trust and confidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Florencio M. de la Cruz is a regular employee.
RULING: No, The Supreme Court held that petitioner was well informed of the standards to be met before he could
qualify as a regular employee as stated in the contract (under probation for a period of 6 months or more). A
probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is under observation and evaluation to
determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. During the probationary period, the
employer is given the opportunity to observe the skill, competence and attitude of the employee while the
latter seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for
permanent employment. The length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both the
employer and the employee in dealing with each other during said period.
There is no dispute that petitioner, as a probationary employee, enjoyed only temporary employment status. In
general terms, this meant that he was terminable anytime, permanent employment not having been attained in the
meantime. The employer could well decide he no longer needed the probationary employees services or his
performance fell short of expectations, etc. As long as the termination was made before the expiration of the sixmonth probationary period, the employer was well within his rights to sever the employer-employee relationship. A
contrary interpretation would defect the clear meaning of the term probationary. In this case, respondent Shemberg
had good reason to terminate petitioners employment and that was his dishonesty.
G.R. No. 70705 August 21, 1989

MOISES DE LEON vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS: Petitioner was employed by private respondent La Tonde;a Inc. on December 11, 1981, at the
Maintenance Section of its Engineering Department in Tondo, Manila. His work consisted mainly of painting
company building and equipment, and other odd jobs relating to maintenance. He was paid on a daily basis through
petty cash vouchers. In the early part of January, 1983, after a service of more than one (1) year, petitioner
requested from respondent company that lie be included in the payroll of regular workers, instead of being paid
through petty cash vouchers. Private respondent's response to this request was to dismiss petitioner from his
employment on January 16, 1983. Having been refused reinstatement despite repeated demands, petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioner alleged that he was dismissed following his request to be treated as a
regular employee; that his work consisted of painting company buildings and maintenance chores like cleaning and
operating company equipment, assisting Emiliano Tanque Jr., a regular maintenance man; and that weeks after his
dismissal, he was re-hired by the respondent company indirectly through the Vitas-Magsaysay Village Livelihood
Council, a labor agency of respondent company, and was made to perform the tasks which he used to do. Emiliano
Tanque Jr. corroborated these averments of petitioner in his affidavit. On the other hand, private respondent claimed
that petitioner was not a regular employee but only a casual worker hired allegedly only to paint a certain building in
the company premises, and that his work as a painter terminated upon the completion of the painting job.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a regular employee.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the primary standard of determining a regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of
the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if
the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous
or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is
also considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.
In the case of petitioner, the painting and maintenance work given him manifest a treatment consistent with a
maintenance man and not just a painter, for if his job was truly only to paint a building there would have been no
basis for giving him other work assignments In between painting activities. It is not tenable to argue that the painting
and maintenance work of petitioner are not necessary in respondent's business of manufacturing liquors and wines,
just as it cannot be said that only those who are directly involved in the process of producing wines and liquors may
be considered as necessary employees. Otherwise, there would have been no need for the regular Maintenance
Section of respondent company's Engineering Department, manned by regular employees like Emiliano Tanque Jr.,
whom petitioner often worked with.
G.R. No. 105538 September 5, 1994

FERROCHROME PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS: Private respondent Horst Bartsch was initially employed as a consultant-engineer of the Austrian company
Voest-Alpine. While thus employed, Bartsch was assigned to the Philippines as a consultant-engineer of petitioner
Ferrochrome, a subsidiary of Voest-Alpine. His contract of employment 1 provided that he would be employed at
Ferrochrome for a period of three (3) months, i.e., from February 15, 1988 to May 15, 1988, extendible for a term
mutually agreeable to the parties. After Bartsch's employment expired on May 15, 1988, his services were still
engaged by petitioner Ferrochrome. However, his continued employment was no longer covered by any written
contract. From July 12-15, 1988, Bartsch was confined at the Capitol College General Hospital in Misamis Oriental
for treatment of a psychological disorder. On July 15, 1988, Bartsch was transferred to the Makati Medical Center
where he was confined until July 29, 1988. Thereafter, petitioner granted Bartsch a vacation leave. Bartsch returned
to the Philippines on September 28, 1988. On October 1, 1988, he assumed his former position at Ferrochrome.
Ferrochrome terminated his services in a letter, dated January 30, 1989. Bartsch filed a complaint against
petitioners for unpaid salary, non-payment of vacation leave, separation pay and 13th month pay, plus damages and
attorney's fees before the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. X, Cagayan de Oro City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Batsch is considered as a regular employee.
RULING: Yes. As defined under the law, an employment shall be deemed regular if the employee performs
activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business and trade of the employer OR if the employee
has rendered at least one (1) year of service, whether the service be continuous or broken. Applying these
two (2) tests, we find that contrary to the suppositions of petitioner, Bartsch was a regular employee of the latter.
(T)he complainant under the definition of his power and duties has been an ordinary technical staff employee. The
term "consultant" is merely more of a matter of nomenclature as he is required under the contract to observe regular
office hours. It therefore precludes the hiring of a mere "consultant" who is supposed to render part-time service to
the principal employer. Being a regular employee, private respondent is entitled to security of tenure and his
services may be terminated only for causes provided by law. Thus, under the circumstances, petitioner should
have complied with the due process requirements of notice and hearing before terminating the services of private
respondent. An employee should be notified of his employer's intent to dismiss him and the true reasons
therefor. Unfortunately, these basic requisites were not met. It was not shown that private respondent was informed
of the alleged "real" reason for his dismissal. Neither was he given an opportunity to air his side and defend himself.

[G. R. No. 148492. May 9, 2003]

BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN vs. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKING MEN (N.O.W.M)

FACTS: Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., herein petitioner, engaged the services of respondent workers as sales
route helpers for a limited period of five months. After five months, respondent workers were employed by petitioner
company on a day-to-day basis. According to petitioner company, respondent workers were hired to substitute for
regular sales route helpers whenever the latter would be unavailable or when there would be an unexpected
shortage of manpower in any of its work places or an unusually high volume of work. The practice was for the
workers to wait every morning outside the gates of the sales office of petitioner company. If thus hired, the workers
would then be paid their wages at the end of the day.
Ultimately, respondent workers asked petitioner company to extend to them regular appointments. Petitioner
company refused. On 07 November 1997, twenty-three (23) of the temporary workers (herein respondents) filed
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for the regularization of their employment with
petitioner company. The complaint was amended a number of times to include other complainants that ultimately
totaled fifty-eight (58) workers. Claiming that petitioner company meanwhile terminated their services, respondent
workers filed a notice of strike and a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent workers considered as regular employees of the petitioner.
RULING: Yes. In determining whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular, the
applicable test is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The standard, supplied by the law itself, is whether the
work undertaken is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, a fact that can be
assessed by looking into the nature of the services rendered and its relation to the general scheme under
which the business or trade is pursued in the usual course. It is distinguished from a specific undertaking that is
divorced from the normal activities required in carrying on the particular business or trade. But, although the work
to be performed is only for a specific project or seasonal, where a person thus engaged has been
performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or is merely intermittent,
the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as being sufficient to indicate the
necessity or desirability of that activity to the business or trade of the employer. The employment of such
person is also then deemed to be regular with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.
The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing need for their services clearly attest to the
necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct of the business or trade of petitioner company.

G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION vs HON. BLAS F. OPLE

FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a foreign corporation
licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila two (2) separate contracts of employment, one with
private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other with private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig. The contracts,
which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of three (3) years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties.
6. TERMINATION
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any
time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu
thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's salary.
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi,
Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.

On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment,
PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters both dated 1
August 1980 to private respondents Farrales and Mamasig advising both that their services as flight stewardesses
would be terminated "effective 1 September 1980, conformably to clause 6 (b) of the employment agreement [they
had) executed with [PIA]." On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a
complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are validly dismissed.
RULING: No. The critical consideration is the presence or absence of a substantial indication that the period
specified in an employment agreement was designed to circumvent the security of tenure of regular
employees which is provided for in Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. This indication must ordinarily rest
upon some aspect of the agreement other than the mere specification of a fixed term of the employment agreement,
or upon evidence aliunde of the intent to evade. Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment
agreement between petitioner PIA and private respondents, we consider that those provisions must be read
together and when so read, the fixed period of three (3) years specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to have been
effectively neutralized by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement. For petitioner PIA claims to be authorized
to shorten that term, at any time and for any cause satisfactory to itself, to a one-month period, or even less by
simply paying the employee a month's salary. Because the net effect of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement
here involved is to render the employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically
employment at the pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to
prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents even during the limited period
of three (3) years, and thus to escape completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code.

G.R. No. 105033 February 28, 1994

PHILIPPINE VILLAGE HOTEL vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS: Private respondents were employees of petitioner Philippine Village Hotel. However, on May 19, 1986,
petitioner had to close and totally discontinue its operations due to serious financial and business reverses
resulting in the termination of the services of its employees. Thereafter, the Philippine Village Hotel Employees
and Workers Union filed against petitioner a complaint for separation pay, unfair labor practice and illegal lockout but was dismissed. On February 1, 1989, petitioner decided to have a one (1) month dry-run operation to
ascertain the feasibility of resuming its business operations. In order to carry out its dry-run operation,
petitioner hired casual workers, including private respondents, for a one (1) month period, or from February 1,
1989 to March 1, 1989, as evidenced by the latter's Contract of Employment. After evaluating the individual
performance of all the employees and upon the lapse of the contractual one-month period or on March 2,
1989, petitioner terminated the services of private respondents. On April 6, 1989, private respondents and
Tupas Local Chapter No. 1362 filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are casual employees.
RULING: Yes. The two guidelines by which fixed contracts of employments can be said NOT to
circumvent security of tenure, are either:
1. The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, without
any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other
circumstances vitiating his consent; or
2. It satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal
terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former on the latter."
In the instant case, private respondents were validly terminated by the petitioner when the latter had to close
its business due to financial losses. Following the directives of the NLRC to give priority in hiring private
respondents should it resume its business, petitioner hired private respondents during their one (1) month dryrun operation. However, this does not mean that private respondents were deemed to have continued their
regular employment status, which they had enjoyed before their aforementioned termination due to petitioner's
financial losses. It should be borne in mind that when complainants were first terminated as a result of the
company's cessation from operation in May, 1986 the employer-employee relationship between the parties
herein was totally and completely severed. Such being the case, respondent acted well within its discretion
when in rehiring the private respondents it made them casual and for a specific period. The complainants are
no better than the new employees of petitioner for the matter of what status or designation to be given them
exclusively rests in the discretion of management.