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RONALD

ALLAN
POE
a.k.a.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Protestee.
P.E.T. CASE No. 002

FERNANDO

POE,

JR.,

Protestant,

vs.

March 29, 2005

QUISUMBING, J.:

1. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET
Rules. It provides, Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or
for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of
votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be,
by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
(30) days after the proclamation of the winner. Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the
2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers
have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election
contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted
upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2 nd or the 3rd highest number of
votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
2. However, in our application of this rule 3, Section 16 to an election contest, we have every
time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property
transmissible to the heirs upon death; Even in analogous cases before other electoral
tribunals,12 involving substitution by the widow of a deceased protestant, in cases where
the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied substitution by the wife or heirs.
3. while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election
protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that
the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings; Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real
party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit.

WHEREFORE, the motion of movant/intervenor JESUSA SONORA POE a.k.a. SUSAN ROCES to
intervene and substitute for the deceased protestant is DENIED for lack of merit.
Acting on the protest and considering the Notice of the Death, submitted by counsel of
protestant RONALD ALLAN POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., we also resolve that Presidential
Electoral Tribunal Case No. 002, entitled Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, should be as it is hereby DISMISSED on the ground that no real party in
interest has come forward within the period allowed by law, to intervene in this case or be
substituted for the deceased protestant. No pronouncement as to costs.

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/pet_002_2005.html

LEGARDA VS. DE CASTRO 542 SCRA 125


P.E.T. Case No. 003

January 18, 2008

QUISUMBING

1. the Hearing Commissioner recommended that the protestant's Motion to Resolve the First
Aspect of the Protest under consideration should be denied, and consequently, the protest
itself, be dismissed for lack of legal and factual basis, as the pilot-tested revision of ballots
or re-tabulation of the certificates of canvass would not affect the winning margin of the
protestee in the final canvass of the returns, in addition to the ground of abandonment or
withdrawal by reason of her candidacy for, election and assumption of office as Senator of
the Philippines. After thorough deliberation and consideration of the issues in this case,
this Tribunal finds the above stated recommendations of its Hearing Commissioner welltaken, and adopts them for its own.
2. Further, we are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator
and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice of, 38 has
effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to
protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of
the electorate. The most relevant precedent on this issue is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,39
a decision rendered by this Tribunal.
3. as public documents, the Congress-retrieved ER copies, used for the proclamation of the
protestee by the NBC, are authentic and duly executed in the regular course of official
business. The evidence adduced by protestee to show that the supposed security features
and markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs and the COMELEC/NAMFREL's copies are
different, did not categorically establish that the Congress-retrieved ERs are fake and
spurious. To overcome the presumption of regularity, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.
4. One cannot say that a half million votes were illegaly obtained based on unclear evidence
of cheating in less that ten thousand.

WHEREFORE, the First Aspect of the protest is hereby DISMISSED for lack of legal and factual
basis, as the pilot-tested revision of ballots or re-tabulation of the certificates of canvass would
not affect the winning margin of the protestee in the final canvass of the returns, in addition to
the ground of abandonment or withdrawal by reason of protestant's candidacy for, election to
and assumption of the office of Senator of the Philippines. The Second Aspect, having been
already DISMISSED on June 5, 2007, pursuant to Rule 33 of this Tribunal, the entire Protest is now
deemed DISMISSED and TERMINATED.
Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/jan2008/pet_003_2008.html

MACALINTAL VS. PET 635 SCRA 783


NACHURA
1. The SC has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice presidential election protest
while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
2. Powers of Presidential Electoral Tribunal is plenary
3. the conferment of additional jurisdiction to the SC, with the duty characterized as an
"awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of
necessary implication
4. the different electoral tribunals, with the SC functioning as the PET, are constitutional
bodies
5. the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the SC, albeit it had functions peculiar
only to the Tribunal.
6. The set up is embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
7. the power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts
of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
8. the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department.
9. the set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.


SOURCE: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/november2010/191618.htm

MACALINTAL VS. PET 651 SCRA 239


1. We reiterate that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission, which drafted the present Constitution. The explicit reference by the framers
of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was merely statutory before is not diluted by
the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it
already is, cannot contain the specific wording required by petitioner in order for him to
accept the constitutionality of the PET.
2. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And
under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the
last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vicepresidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 191618
STANDS.

Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/june2011/191618.htm

ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO 353 SCRA 452


PUNO
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/mar2001/gr_146710_2001.html
1. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on
the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be
refined in the mills of constitutional law.
2. To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government.
3. In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution
by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of
the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo
is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath
under the 1987 Constitution. 64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and
defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the
powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
4. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the
whole government. EDSA II is an exercise ofpeople power of freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances
which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and
the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject
to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions.
5. In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in
which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without
destroying the society."
6. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements
are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment.
7.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001
after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner

resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January
20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this
totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
8. In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed
by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.
He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to
re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring
to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he
will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the part tense.
9. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice
nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the
people.
10.A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign.
Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or
criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the
dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his
resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
11.Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it
contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any
insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
12.The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming
arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the
time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the
senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private
prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of
Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely.
13.The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of
temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of
both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines.
. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

14.
n fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he
is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
15.Since the impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for former President
Estrada to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be
prosecuted.
16.Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the
periof of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond
17.The constitutionla polices on accountability of public officers- of public office being of
public trust- will be devalued if the Court sustains the claim that a non-sitting president
enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

PUBLIC INTEREST VS. ELMA 494 SCRA 53


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/G.%20R.%20No.%20138965.htm
1. The rule is that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable
of repetition, yet evading review. [9] Supervening events, whether intended or accidental,
cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.
2. The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive
official to hold more than one office only if allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position. In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta,[12] this Court ruled that, [t]here is no
legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing
the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. The crucial test in
determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out inPeople v.
Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has
the right to interfere with the other.
3. In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the
CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the
actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review
investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive

Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the
CPLC.
4. It is clear from the foregoing that the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of
them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may
have the same rank as the latter positions. It must be emphasized, however, that despite
the non-applicability of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to respondent Elma,
he remains covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and his
appointments must still comply with the standard of compatibility of officers laid down
therein; failing which, his appointments are hereby pronounced in violation of the
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court partly GRANTS this petition and declares
respondent Magdangal B. Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No costs.

PUBLIC INTEREST VS. ELMA 517 SCRA 336


1.

In response to the respondents request for clarification, the Court ruled that respondent
Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for
being incompatible offices. This ruling does not render both appointments void. Following
the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated
his first office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC.

2.

There also is no merit in the respondents motion to refer the case to the Court en banc.
What is in question in the present case is the constitutionality of respondent Elmas
concurrent appointments, and not the constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement. [2]
The mere application of constitutional provisions does not require the case to be heard
and decided en banc. Contrary to the allegations of the respondent, the decision of the
Court in this case does not modify the ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary.
It should also be noted that Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7
February 1989 clearly provides that the Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which
decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed.

WHEREFORE, the Court denies the respondents motion for reconsideration and for elevation of
this case to the Court en banc.

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS 177 SRA 668


CORTES
1. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our
well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted

principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art.
II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel
and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
2. The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to
the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the
country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are
sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute
nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression,
although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
79690-707, October 7, 1981.]
3. The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great
branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral
Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and
in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides
that "[the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec.
11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec.
11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a
separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also
confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations
provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil.
626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative
power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may
be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative
power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two
hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can
equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official the President.
4. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce
the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever
powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds
it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one
of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not
involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise ofspecific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated.
5. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of
the peace. Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the
peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence.

The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is
also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not
in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commanderin-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of
powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-inChief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain
public order and security.
6. That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from
returning has been recognized by memembers of the Legislature, and is manifested by the
Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members
urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish
gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence
to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." [House
Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's
power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the
President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country. What
we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely
similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed
to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to
the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on
the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
7. The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would
have normally left to the political departments to decide.
8. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to
supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to
determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his
family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

FERNAN: Concurring

1. Presidential powers and prerogatives are not fixed but fluctuate. They are not derived
solely from a particular constitutional clause or article or from an express statutory grant.
Their limits are likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.

Guitierrez : Dissenting
1. For a political question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested
exclusively in the President or Congress, the exercise of which the court should not
examine or prohibit.
Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/sep1989/gr_88211_1989.html

SARMIENTO VS. MISON 156 SCRA 549


PADILLA
1. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force
is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
themselves.The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them
construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.
2. Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political
history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the
1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horsetrading" and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent
with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive
amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any
check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935
Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle
ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for
the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation,
the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as
those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
3. In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent
of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing
that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President
alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint
officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in
the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the
second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.

4. Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the
case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the
President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In
short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the
1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments
5. Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first
group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.
As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of
bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the
position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments.
6. Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional
authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and
functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED.
Without costs. SO ORDERED.
Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/dec1987/gr_79974_1987.html

PIMENTEL VS. ERMITA (472 SCRA 587)


1. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
2. Even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise
of its powers is executive and not legislative.
3. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President,
such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego
of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume
office.

4. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
5. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter
5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a
person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.
6. Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both
of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
SOURCE: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/164978.htm

KIDA VS.SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES 659 SCRA 270


1. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the
Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
2. The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion
gave full recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153.
3. The Presidents power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.[73] The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
4. Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the
third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution.

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No.
10153, we must support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity
of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise
LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No
costs

Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/196271.htm

GANZON VS. CA 200 SCRA 271

ISSUE:
Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend
to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or
remove local officials?
1. It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local
officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing
more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress'
"control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of
local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.
2. The Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of
local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing
Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
3. Under the Local Government Code, the suspension of local officials cannot exceed sixty days,
which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise
sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their
purpose in a shorter span.
4. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, has no
authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be president of the
federation of barangay councils.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the
petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of

any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to
August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative
cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SOURCE: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/aug1991/gr_93252_1991.html

KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. ERMITA ET AL.,


(April 19, 2006 and June 20, 2006)
UNIFIED IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO 420
1.Under the constitutional power of control of the President, he or she can direct all government
entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience
to the public.
2.The fact that EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing
laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a
national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is
compulsory for all branches of government.
3. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of control over
the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make,
alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws---- EO 420 is simply
an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
4.EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system.
5. There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary.
The same is true for government entities under the Executive department.
6. With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and
recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under Section 6(d) of EO 420.
These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the
1987 Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
7.Ople v. Torres, is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that
case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled
solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation.
8.The assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National
Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior to

the assailed executive issuance while in the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national
ID system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS,
PhilHealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user friendly to the public.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing
sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more
efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive
issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control over government entities in the
Executive department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID.
Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.%20No.%20167798.htm

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS


GR 167324 JULY 17, 2007.
PRESIDENCY:
1.This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive
Department.[29] This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: [T]he president shall
have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Section 31, Book III,
Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of
1987 reads:
SEC. 31.
Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take
any of the following actions:
(1)
Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including
the immediate offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;
(2)
Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments or
Agencies; and
(3)
Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or
agencies.

2. The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition
of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency.
3. Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is under the supervision and control of the President
and, thus, part of the Office of the President.
4. Executive Order No. 102 which effected the reorganization of the Department of Health (DOH)
is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue --- it is an exercise of the
Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the
provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by
this Court.
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY
5.The acts of the DOH Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are presumed to be the acts of
the President. The members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of the
President since they are merely his alter egos. Thus, their acts, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved by the President, presumptively acts of
the President.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring both the
HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No costs.
Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/july2007/167324.htm
LOUIS BAROK BIRAOGO VS. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
GR 192935 DECEMBER 7, 2010
PUBLIC OFFICERS; PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION (PTC)
1. The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created
as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and
context of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a
countrys past.1[9] They are usually established by states emerging from periods of
internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional
justice.
2.Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1)
they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period
of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work
with the submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are
officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State. Commissions members are usually
empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to
prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover
and learn more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the
way for prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms.
PRESIDENCY
1

3. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section
31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term
restructure an alteration of an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the
structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.
4. The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated
by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;"
"to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or
with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."
5.The power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is
inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from
Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
6. The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to
create a public office------------ P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus
oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution.
7. The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17
reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
8. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.
One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionallymandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.
9. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land
10. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate
funds where there is only allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order
No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RANDOLF S. DAVID VS GLORIA MACAPAGAL- ARROYO


May 3, 2006 (489 SCRA)
1. It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such.
2. As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the
test that judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents
decision is correct, but that the President did not act arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down
is not correctness, but arbitrariness.[83] In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further
ruled that it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally
bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then this
Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.
3. Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power,
by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist
leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners
presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
4. In times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount
of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges
him to operate within the carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
5. President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not
written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the
States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business
affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal
significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
6. Under the calling-out power, the president may summon the armed forces to aid
him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.

7. PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law- it is plain therein that what the President invoked
was her calling-out power.
8. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted[120] from Former
President Marcos Proclamation No. 1081. We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted
President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: to enforce obedience to all the
laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
9. President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to Executive Orders, Administrative
Orders, Proclamations, Memorandum orders, Memorandum Circulars, and General or
Special Orders she cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Ferdinand Marcos
under IP 1081.
10. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that [t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees.
11.Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the
military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that
these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot
call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing
family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order
the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
12. President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in
the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the
taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a
different matter.
13.Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate
to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise
of emergency powers.
14. While the President alone can declare a
state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no
power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest.
15. General orders are acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They are internal rules issued by the executive
officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law.
16. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent
or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the

Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the
AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted.


The Court rules that PP 1017 is
CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017
commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in
PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is
CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privatelyowned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

SOURCE: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20171396.htm

AMPATUAN VS. PUNO 651 SCRA 228


GR. NO. 190259 JUNE 7, 2011
ISSUES PRESENTED:
1.
Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle
of local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1,
Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act;
2.
Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when
she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City; and
3.

Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions.

RULINGS OF THE COURT:


1. The claim of petitioners that the subject proclamation and administrative orders violate the
principle of local autonomy is anchored on the allegation that, through them, the President
authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct
governmental powers over the region.
But, in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM.
After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged
complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin
Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession
found in Article VII, Section 12,[14] of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then

Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM ViceGovernor.[15] In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of
the ARMM.
2. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she
ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation.
[16] But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under
Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by
Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that
the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.
3. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from
the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides.
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of
the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court
acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the
President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out
the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that
such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord
respect to the Presidents judgment.
PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
NOTE:
View that the Constitution does not expressly grant executive power to the President
but courts have long recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary and
proper in carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the Executive
under the Constitution. (Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations)

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the
subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the Presidents actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.


Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/june2011/190259.htm

FORTUN VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (668 SCRA)


March 20,2012
THE CASE:
These are consolidated petitions for the writs of certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1959, which declared state of martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Province of Maguindanao, except for
identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
1. The pertinent provisions of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution state:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
xxxx
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress. Thus:
1.

The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;

2.
He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person
or in writing to Congress;
3.
Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the
proclamation or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4.
The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or
suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems
warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a
sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of
the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
2. If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the
proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can
step in, hear the petitions challenging the Presidents action, and ascertain if it has a
factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the suspension.
But what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves inadequate? Justice Carpio himself
offers the answer in his dissent: that 30-day period does not operate to divest this Court of its
jurisdiction over the case. The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the
case has been terminated.
-The present cases do not present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in this case, unlike similar Presidential acts in the late 60s and early 70s, appear more like saberrattling than an actual deployment and arbitrary use of political power.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that the same
have become moot and academic.
Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/march2012/190293.htm

GUDANI VS. SENGA 498 SCRA 671


Presidency; Commander in Chief clause; Civilian Supremacy
1. A most dangerous general proposition is foisted on the Court that soldiers who defy
orders of their superior officers are exempt from the strictures of military law and discipline if
such defiance is predicated on an act otherwise valid under civilian law. Obedience and
deference to the military chain of command and the President as commander-in-chief are the
cornerstones of a professional military in the firm cusp of civilian control. These values of
obedience and deference expected of military officers are content-neutral, beyond the sway of
the officers own sense of what is prudent or rash, or more elementally, of right or wrong. A selfrighteous military invites itself as the scoundrels activist solution to the ills of participatory
democracy.
2. Senate turned on the nature of executive privilege, a presidential prerogative which is
encumbered by significant limitations. Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive
branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of
executive control also comes into consideration.[25] However, the ability of the President to
require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress pertains to a
wholly different and independent specie of presidential authoritythe commander-in-chief
powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the
President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to
executive privilege or executive control.

3. The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is
most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the
general stability of our representative system of government. The Constitution reposes final
authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member of
the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic
duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature. Civilian
supremacy over the military also countermands the notion that the military may bypass civilian
authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searches and
seizures.
4. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII,
which begins with the simple declaration that [t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x[37] Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as
those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as
commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the
armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement
and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
5. The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the
soldier desires to speak freely on political matters. The Constitution requires that [t]he armed
forces shall be insulated from partisan politics, and that [n]o member of the military shall
engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote. [47] Certainly, no
constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldiers ability to form a
personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one,
political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife
is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For
another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active
dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers
are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. This fundamental
principle averts the country from going the way of banana republics.
6. We have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces
from testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional
authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to
testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined,
the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military
officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty
to faithfully execute.
7. COURTS RULING- Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military
officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based
foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the
President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed
forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank
promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the

position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed
forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between
obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm
that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is
the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
8. The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation.[53] Inasmuch as it is illadvised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly
detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today
that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the
clash may soon loom or actualize.
9. Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to
allow a member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking
such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such judicial action
should be directed at the heads of the executive branch or the armed forces, the persons who
wield authority and control over the actions of the officers concerned. The legislative purpose of
such testimony, as well as any defenses against the same whether grounded on executive
privilege, national security or similar concerns would be accorded due judicial evaluation. All
the constitutional considerations pertinent to either branch of government may be raised,
assessed, and ultimately weighed against each other. And once the courts speak with finality,
both branches of government have no option but to comply with the decision of the courts,
whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or disfavor.

-Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of
their Commander-in-Chief and Commanding General in obeisance to a paramount idea formed
within their consciences, which could not be lightly ignored. Still, the Court, in turn, is guided by
the superlative principle that is the Constitution, the embodiment of the national conscience. The
Constitution simply does not permit the infraction which petitioners have allegedly committed,
and moreover, provides for an orderly manner by which the same result could have been
achieved without offending constitutional principles.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP 568 SCRA 402


http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/oct2008/gr_183591_2008.html
CARPIO MORALES
1. As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the statutory right to
examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional
status.

2. That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public
concern114 faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is
indeed of public concern.115 In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real
estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, 116 the need for adequate notice to
the public of the various laws, 117 the civil service eligibility of a public employee, 118 the
proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, 119 the
recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, 120 and the identity of party-list
nominees,121 among others, are matters of public concern.Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD
subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does
thesovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives
of the public at large.
3. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue was the authority of the President to declare a
state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The
Court held thus: "In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into
jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to
forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on
the President's . . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of
executive power and which arenecessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed
intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a
limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commanderin-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.Thus, the
President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her
powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x
4. It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, 178 only
to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however,
extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes
and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her
mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
5. In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of
states that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are
Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have
since become independent states. 153
6. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the

Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of Philippine territory for independence.
7. Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and
international organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in
it a binding character under international law.
8. In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of
Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to
be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to
hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to
manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have
come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally bound to
the international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the
signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of
that commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss
of face for the Philippine government before the international community, which was one
of the difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal
agreement with other countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal
agreement suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the international community.
On that ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration under
international law.

WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions
are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law
and the Constitution.

CARPIO: Separate Concurring


1. The initialed MOA-AD between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is patently unconstitutional. The Executive
branch's commitment under the MOA-AD to amend the Constitution to conform to the
MOA-AD violates Sections 1 and 4, Article XVII of the Constitution. The Executive branch
usurps the sole discretionary power of Congress to propose amendments to the
Constitution as well as the exclusive power of the sovereign people to approve or
disapprove such proposed amendments. Sections 1 and 4, Article XVII of the Constitution
provide: Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or (2) A
constitutional convention. Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the approval of such amendment or revision.
2. Indisputably, the Executive branch has no power to commit to the MILF that the
Constitution shall be amended to conform to the MOA-AD. Such commitment is a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

PUNO: SCO
1. In dealing with the MILF rebellion, the President may, however, opt not to use
force but negotiate peace with the MILF. Undoubtedly, the President as Chief
Executive can negotiate peace with rebels, like the MILF. Article VII, section 1 of the
Constitution vests in the President the entire panoply of executive power, to reach peace
with rebels. But undoubtedly too, the exercise of executive power to secure
peace with rebels is limited by the Constitution. All these are due to the preeminent
principle that our government is fundamentally one of limited and enumerated powers.
As well stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,[44] viz But in the main, the
Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping
and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In
times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution
are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof. In fine, there is no power in the Constitution that can run riot.
There is no power in the Constitution that is unbounded. There is no power in the
Constitution that can be exercised if it will destroy the Constitution. For all powers in the
Constitution are designed to preserve the Constitution. In other words, the President as
Chief Executive can negotiate peace with the MILF but it is peace that will insure that our
laws are faithfully executed. The President can seek peace with the MILF but without
crossing the parameters of powers marked in the Constitution to separate the other
branches of government to preserve our democracy. For even in times of war, our system
of checks and balances cannot be infringed. [45] More so in times where the only danger
that faces the State is the lesser danger of rebellion. Needless to stress, the power of the
President to negotiate peace with the MILF is not plenary. While a considerable degree of
flexibility and breadth is accorded to the peace negotiating panel, the latitude has its
limits -- the Constitution. The Constitution was ordained by the sovereign people and its
postulates may not be employed as bargaining chips without their prior consent.

BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO 641 SCRA 244


1. Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 13
Specifically, it is "a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" 14 of the act being challenged, and "calls
for more than just a generalized grievance." 15 The term "interest" refers to material
interest, as distinguished from one that is merely incidental. 16 The rationale for requiring a
party who challenges the validity of a law or international agreement to allege such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure the concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

2. In another perspective, the terms "exchange of notes" and "executive agreements" have
been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive
agreement that becomes binding through executive action. 29 On the other hand, executive
agreements concluded by the President "sometimes take the form of exchange of notes
and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or
protocols."
3. Petitioners reliance on Adolfo47 is misplaced, said case being inapplicable owing to
different factual milieus. There, the Court held that an executive agreement cannot be
used to amend a duly ratified and existing treaty, i.e., the Bases Treaty. Indeed, an
executive agreement that does not require the concurrence of the Senate for its
ratification may not be used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution, is the product
of the ratifying acts of the Executive and the Senate. The presence of a treaty, purportedly
being subject to amendment by an executive agreement, does not obtain under the
premises. Considering the above discussion, the Court need not belabor at length the third
main issue raised, referring to the validity and effectivity of the Agreement without the
concurrence by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. The Court has, in
Eastern Sea Trading,48 as reiterated in Bayan,49 given recognition to the obligatory effect of
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate: x x x [T]he right of the
Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our
history, we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and
consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity
of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts
4. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines
national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, as explained
above, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to
prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try "persons" of the US, as the
term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system. Or it may
opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US "persons"
committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of
the ICC over them.
5. In the context of the Constitution, there can be no serious objection to the Philippines
agreeing to undertake the things set forth in the Agreement. Surely, one State can agree
to waive jurisdictionto the extent agreed uponto subjects of another State due to the
recognition of the principle of extraterritorial immunity.
6. In thus agreeing to conclude the Agreement thru E/N BFO-028-03, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, represented by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acted within the scope
of the authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution. At the end of the day, the
Presidentby ratifying, thru her deputies, the non-surrender agreementdid nothing more
than discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a prerogative that pertains to her office.
7. Moreover, RA 9851 clearly: (1) defines and establishes the crimes against international
humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes against humanity; 70 (2) provides penal
sanctions and criminal liability for their commission; 71 and (3) establishes special courts for

the prosecution of these crimes and for the State to exercise primary criminal
jurisdiction.72 Nowhere in RA 9851 is there a proviso that goes against the tenor of the
Agreement.
8. More importantly, an act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be
afforded great respect. The power to enter into executive agreements has long been
recognized to be lodged with the President. As We held in Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, "[t]he power to enter into an executive
agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence." 120 The rationale behind this principle is the
inviolable doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of the government. Thus, absent any clear contravention of the law, courts
should exercise utmost caution in declaring any executive agreement invalid. In light of
the above consideration, the position or view that the challenged RP-US Non-Surrender
Agreement ought to be in the form of a treaty, to be effective, has to be rejected.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.
SOURCE: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/feb2011/gr_159618_2011.html#fnt17

CONSTANTINO

VS.

CUISIA

472

SCRA

505

1. Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency, later adopted in
Villena v. Secretary of the Interior[55] from American jurisprudence, viz: With reference to
the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear
and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the
Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the
principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This
means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political
positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson,
"should be of the President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the
language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the
direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various
departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.
Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court
of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego
in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise
authority" (Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U. S., 52 at 133; 71
Law. ed., 160).
2. Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not
be delegated to or exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in

his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear: Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification
may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain
acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of
the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no
amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any
other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign
prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).
3. With constitutional parameters already established, we may also note, as a source of
suppletory guidance, the provisions of R.A. No. 245. The afore-quoted Section 1 thereof
empowers the Secretary of Finance with the approval of the President and after
consultation[59] of the Monetary Board, to borrow from time to time on the credit of the
Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and to
issue therefor evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government. Ineluctably then,
while the President wields the borrowing power it is the Secretary of Finance who normally
carries out its thrusts.
4. Similarly, in the instant case, the Constitution allocates to the President the exercise of the
foreign borrowing power subject to such limitations as may be provided under law.
Following Southern Cross, but in line with the limitations as defined in Villena, the
presidential prerogative may be exercised by the Presidents alter ego, who in this case is
the Secretary of Finance.
5. That the means employed to achieve the goal of debt-relief do not sit well with petitioners
is beyond the power of this Court to remedy. The exercise of the power of judicial review
is merely to checknot supplantthe Executive, or to simply ascertain whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction but not to exercise the power vested in
him or to determine the wisdom of his act. [78] In cases where the main purpose is to nullify
governmental acts whether as unconstitutional or done with grave abuse of discretion,
there is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of the assailed acts. The heavy onus
is in on petitioners to overcome the presumption of regularity.

PANGANIBAN: Separate Opinion

1. Indubitably, former President Corazon C. Aquinos decision to honor the outstanding debts
of the Republic at the time she assumed the presidency was a policy matter well within
her prerogative. It was purely an executive call; hence, beyond judicial scrutiny. The
Petition has failed to show grave abuse of discretion that would warrant judicial
intervention. I agree with the ponencia of the distinguished Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga: not
only was the act of President Aquino impliedly granted via her vast executive powers; it
was also explicitly authorized under Section 20[1] of Article VII of the Constitution.

We find that petitioners have not sufficiently established any basis for the Court to declare the
acts of respondents as unconstitutional. WHEREFORE the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
SOURCE: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/106064.htm

PEOPLE VS. SALLE, JR. 250 SCRA 581


1. Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at
any time after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different
where the requirement is " final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of Section
14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed
in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended
before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
2.A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when
the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived
in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the
accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. 12 Where the judgment of
conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant
case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
3. The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final judgment"
requirement, reviving in effect the original provision of the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning
power, was, as expounded by Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent the President from
exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power.
4. Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate
court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of separation of powers demands that such exclusive
authority of the appellate court be fully respected and kept unimpaired. For truly, had not the
present Constitution adopted the "conviction by final judgment" limitation, the President could,
at any time, and even without the knowledge of the court, extend executive clemency to any one
whom he, in good faith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential mercy.
5. It cannot be denied that under the Jones Law and the 1981 amendments to the 1973
Constitution on the pardoning power which did not require conviction, the President had
unimpeded power to grant pardon even before the criminal case could be heard. And under the
1935 Constitution which required "conviction" only, the power could be exercised at any time
after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In either case, there could be the

risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration of the system of administration of
justice in view of the derogation of the jurisdiction of the trial or appellate court. Where the
President is not so prevented by the Constitution, not even Congress can impose any restriction
to prevent a presidential folly. 16 Hence, nothing but a change in the constitutional provision
consisting in the imposition of "conviction by final judgment" requirement can change the rule.
The new Constitution did it.
6. Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the
withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality.
7. We now declare that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII
of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an
accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application
therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be
begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his
conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification
issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the
pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an
accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an
appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in
custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the
accused from confinement.
SOURCE : http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/dec1995/gr_103567_1995.html

LAUREL VS. GARCIA 187 SCRA 797


GUTIERREZ
1. Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of
funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government
in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of
public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties
which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657,
therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely
enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian
Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any property outside of the
commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds.
2. It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own
sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
3. Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the
Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its
sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of the
Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting hearings on
Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding

investigation of the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government
properties in Japan.

PADILLA : Concurring Statement


1. It is Congress which can decide and declare the conversion of Roppongi from a public
dominion property to a state patrimonial property. Congress has made no such decision or
declaration. It is therefore, clear that the President cannot sell or order the sale of Roppongi thru
public bidding or otherwise without a prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi
from a public dominion property to a state patrimonial property, and, second, authorizing the
President to sell the same.

SARMIENTO : Concurring
1. In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
property from public domain to make it alienable and a land for legislative authority to allow the
sale of the property" 7 the majority lays stress to the fact that: (1) An affirmative act executive
or legislative is necessary to reclassify property of the public dominion, and (2) a legislative
decree is required to make it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties brought about by earlier
interpretations that the nature of property-whether public or patrimonial is predicated on the
manner it is actually used, or not used, and in the same breath, repudiates the Government's
position that the continuous non-use of "Roppongi", among other arguments, for "diplomatic
purposes", has turned it into State patrimonial property.

source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/jul1990/gr_92013_1990.html

LAUREL VS. GARCIA 187 SCRA 797


GUTIERREZ
1. Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of
funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government
in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of
public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties
which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657,
therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely
enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian
Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any property outside of the
commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds.
2. It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own

sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
3. Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of
the Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize
its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of
the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting hearings
on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a factfinding investigation of the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government
properties in Japan.
PADILLA : Concurring Statement
1. It is Congress which can decide and declare the conversion of Roppongi from a public
dominion property to a state patrimonial property. Congress has made no such decision or
declaration. It is therefore, clear that the President cannot sell or order the sale of Roppongi thru
public bidding or otherwise without a prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi
from a public dominion property to a state patrimonial property, and, second, authorizing the
President to sell the same.
SARMIENTO : Concurri1. In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal declaration to
withdraw the Roppongi property from public domain to make it alienable and a land for
legislative authority to allow the sale of the property" 7 the majority lays stress to the fact that:
(1) An affirmative act executive or legislative is necessary to reclassify property of the
public dominion, and (2) a legislative decree is required to make it alienable. It also clears the
uncertainties brought about by earlier interpretations that the nature of property-whether public
or patrimonial is predicated on the manner it is actually used, or not used, and in the same
breath, repudiates the Government's position that the continuous non-use of "Roppongi", among
other arguments, for "diplomatic purposes", has turned it into State patrimonial property.
source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/jul1990/gr_92013_1990.html

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