Diosdado Guzman vs.

National University
Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent
National University, seek relief from what they described as their school's "continued and
persistent refusal to allow them to enrol."
In their petition on August 7, 1984 for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they
were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners failure to enroll for the first
semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged
exercise of their constitutional and human rights. As regards to Guzman, his academic showing
was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. They said that Guzman is facing
criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in
connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University.
The petitioners have failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.
Issue:
Whether or Not there is violation of the due process clause.
Held:
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that
they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitionersstudents had indeed led or participated in activities within the university premises, conducted
without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein or
perpetrated acts of vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts
showing disdain for and defiance of University authority. The pending civil case for damages and
a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish
sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also, apparent is the
omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students
may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
To satisfy the demands of procedural due process, the following requisites must be met:
the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;
they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
RULING:
The petition was granted wherein the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners (students)
to re-enrol without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings.

Alcuaz vs PSBA GR 76353 02 May 1988

Facts: Petitioners are all bonafide students of PSBA-QC who conducted demonstrations. The
said demonstrations were tumultuous. During the regular enrolment period, petitioners and other
students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second

semester of school year 1986-1987. The President of the Student Council filed a complaint with
the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrolment of the Student Council
Officers and student leaders. The student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees,
requesting for a written statement of the schools decision regarding their enrolment. Another
demand letter was made by Counsel for the students to the President, Board of Trustees, to enrol
his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming,
hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not students were denied of due process for failing to give notice and hearing
(procedural) and failing to decide without bias or prejudice (substantive)?
Decision: Petition dismissed. a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for
one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that
when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester. Thus after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing
contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. The charge of denial of due
process is untenable, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to
enter into another contract with said students and teachers.
Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings
may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the
minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case. Records show that the proceedings in the case at bar, at the outset satisfied conditions No. 1
and 2, but, without a hearing, conditions No. 3, 4 and 5 had evidently not been completed with.
Non v. Dames [GR 89317, 20 May 1990]
Facts: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes
Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon,
Luis Santos and Daniel Torres, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were
not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or
participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. They thus filed
a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their readmission or reenrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August
1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24
February 1989; stating that they waived-their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with
respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester
of school year 1988-89. In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide
and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College
Department or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, the affected students filed the petition for
certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades when the cause for the
action taken against them relates to possible breaches of discipline.
Held: The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued
with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the
grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. The
authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has
a term of one semester, has already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion on
the admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the academic freedom
guaranteed to institutions of higher learning. The right of an institution of higher learning to set
academic standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise
their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their
right to equal protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its
students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student

commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he
forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the discretion of university
authorities. Excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken
against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due
process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Further, the failures in one
or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic deficiency. Neither can the
academic deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of the school due to insufficiency of
information. Herein, the students could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in
connection with the mass actions, but the penalty that could have been imposed must be
commensurate to the offense committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements of
procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145, Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools). But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative
sanctions have become moot and academic; as the students have been refused readmission or reenrollment and have been effectively excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been more
than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led
and participated in the mass actions that resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them
to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the
strained relations between the students and the officials of the school which necessarily resulted
from the heated legal battle.

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA
644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious
physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis.
Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure
occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner
Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent
students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although
respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of
several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of
the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file
their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear
the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating
Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing
activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the
penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent
students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled.
This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents.
A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special
Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This
was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special
Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was
granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the
Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement

on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel,
copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under
Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial
court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law,
as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded
procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS TELAN
FACTS: THE UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one year,
non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as
Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum and
non issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the
university. The disciplinary action is meted after finally rendering a guilty verdict on Nadals
alleged willfull withholding of the following information in his application for scholarship
tantamount to acts of dishonesty, viz: (1) that he has and maintains a car and (2) the income of
his mother in the USA in support of the studies of his brothers. Nadal complained that he was not
afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting on his case on March 28, 1993 that resulted
in a decision of NOT GUILTY in his favor, the Chairman of the UP Board of Regents, without
notice to the petitioner, called another meeting the following day to deliberate on the Chairmans
Motion for Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a decision of GUILTY. Upon petition,
Nadal was granted his action for mandamus with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON Nadal was denied due process.
HELD: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of
the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR
meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. At no time
did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special
BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Let it not be forgotten that respondent
aspires to join the ranks of professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may
prevail. Nadal has sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge all information
needed when he applied for the benefits of the STFAP. Unlike in criminal cases which require
proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judiciall
proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, that which means a reasonable mind might
accept a relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.

Lao Gi v CA (1989) 180 SCRA 756

Facts:
Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of Opinion 191 by the Secretary of
justice. However, this was revoked when his fathers citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and
misrepresentation.
Charges of deportation were filed against the Chias. Charges also alleged that they refused to
register as aliens and that they committed acts of undesirability.
The Chias said that the CID has no authority to deport them which was denied by the CID.
They filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of preliminary injunction which was
dismissed for lack of merit. Their MFR was also denied.
Earlier, Manuel Chias case of falsification of public documents in alleging he was a Filipino
citizen. He was alleged to have done this for the sale of real property. The trial court acquitted
him by saying that Opinion 191 was res judicata and cant be contravened by Opinion 147.
The CID set the hearing for the deportation case against the Chias and told them to register as
aliens. The Chias tooks further action. Their petition for injunctive relief was denied by the CFI
of Manila.
They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias mfr was denied.
In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They argued that they werent subject
to immediate deportation, the presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CAs overstepping of
appellate jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didnt make a ruling that the petitioner entered
the Philippines by false pretenses.
Issue:
1. Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the deportation?
Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine if they are really aliens
Ratio:
Section 37 of the Immigration act states:
SEC. 37. (a)
The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
(1)
Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of
false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration
authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry.
(As amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ...
There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged, particularly illegal entry
into the country. Only after the hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive
finding from the CID that they are aliens before compelling them to register as such. This power
is the police power to protect the state from undesirable aliens injurious to the public good.
Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same law, it is
provided that:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor
without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of
Immigration.
The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary language for the person to be
informed and for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst must be in
accordance with the rules on criminal procedure.
On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is the sole concern of the
state. There is no justification for a private party to intervene.

Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs Jose Luis Alcuaz

180 SCRA 218 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as
needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and
ground terminal or terminals in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to
companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has
placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to
acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC
gave the necessary permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by
15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said
directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for
public service communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were
constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly
the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO
546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196,
placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by
any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a
reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to
NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the
requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which
conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon
the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act
must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate
be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process
since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.

Radio Communications v NTC G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987

Facts:
RCPI operated a radio communications system since 1957 under legislative franchise granted by
Republic Act No. 2036 (1957). The petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon,
Sorsogon (1968). in San Jose, Mindoro (1971), and Catarman, Samar (1983).
Kayumanggi Radio, on the other hand, was given the rights by the NTC to operate radio
networks in the same areas.
RCPI filed a complaint in the NTC and sought to prohibit Kayumanggi Radio to operate in the
same areas. The NTC ruled against the RTCs favor and commanded RCPI to desist in the
operation of radio telegraphs in the three areas.
RTC filed a MFR in 1984. This was denied.
In the SC, Petitioner alleged that the Public Service Law had sections that was still in effect even
if the Public Service Commission was abolished and the NTC was established.
These were S13- the Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public
services and their franchises
S 14- Radio companies are exempt from the commissions authority except with respect to the
fixing of rates
And S 15-no public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and
subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of public
convenience,"
Issue: Whether or not petitioner RCPI, a grantee of a legislative franchise to operate a radio
company, is required to secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity before it can
validly operate its radio stations including radio telephone services in the aforementioned areas
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Presidential Decree No. 1- the Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions were
transferred to three specialized regulatory boards, as follows: the Board of Transportation, the
Board of Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks. The functions so transferred
were still subject to the limitations provided in sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law, as
amended.
The succeeding Executive Order No. 546- the Board of Communications and the
Telecommunications Control Bureau were abolished and their functions were transferred to the
National Telecommunications Commission
Section 15- b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of
public service communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the
operation of such public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates are
established by international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating
member or by bodies recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such
charges or rates;
c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph systems
and radio communication systems including amateur radio stations and radio and television
broadcasting systems;
The exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission and the Board of Communications no longer exists because of the changes effected
by the Reorganization Law and implementing executive orders.
The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive Order No. 546 on the
ground that it has long been in operation since 1957 cannot be sustained.

Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and
owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police
power through its administrative agencies. Pangasinan transportation Co.- statutes enacted for
the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the State of its police power, are
applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise
to those already established and in operation .
Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends the
Public Service Law (CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound
by its provisions.
The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can
operate a radio communications system anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous.
Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder be exercised by the
grantee until the Secretary of Public works and Communications shall have allotted to the
grantee the frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee a license for such
case.
Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas
where it desires to operate.
The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public
Works and Communications before the petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone
services in San Jose, Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio telephone services
opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983. No certificate of public
convenience and necessity appears to have been secured by the petitioner from the public
respondent when such certificate,was required by the applicable public utility regulations.
The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise be
granted except that it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature
when the common good so requires.

Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission [G.R. No.143964. July

26, 2004]
23 Nov
FACTS

Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to effect
the interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe).
Globe pointed out procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I
also pointed out that another network, Islacom, was allowed to provide such service without
prior NTC approval. The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) ruled that both
Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy and issued an Order penalizing both on the
ground of providing SMS under Value Added Services (VAS) without prior approval from the
NTC. The Court of Appeals sustained the NTC Order.
ISSUES
Whether or not:
(1) Globe may be required to secure prior NTC approval before providing SMS or texting
services;
(2) SMS is a VAS under Public telecommunications Act (PTA) of 1995;
RULING
(1) NO. The NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue
providing SMS. This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to
classify it as VAS. However, the move should be implemented properly, through unequivocal
regulations applicable to all entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-handed manner.
This should not be interpreted, however, as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and
review by the NTC. The NTC will continue to exercise, by way of its broad grant, jurisdiction
over Globe and Smarts SMS offerings, including questions of rates and customer complaints.
Yet caution must be had. Much complication could have been avoided had the NTC adopted a
proactive position, promulgating the necessary rules and regulations to cope up with the advent
of the technologies it superintends. With the persistent advent of new offerings in the
telecommunications industry, the NTCs role will become more crucial than at any time before.
(2) NO. There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the
NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether
SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA.
The Court realizes that the PTA is not intended to constrain the industry within a cumbersome
regulatory regime. The policy as pre-ordained by legislative fiat renders the traditionally
regimented business in an elementary free state to make business decisions, avowing that it is
under this atmosphere that the industry would prosper. It is disappointing at least if the
deregulation thrust of the law is skirted deliberately. But it is ignominious if the spirit is defeated
through a crazy quilt of vague, overlapping rules that are implemented haphazardly.

Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 88353, May 8, 1992
MARCH 16, 2014LEAVE A COMMENT
The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may be set aside by
a court: (1) The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record representing the
majority of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading must be filed
within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of the order placing the
bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the
action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
Facts: Central Bank discovered that certain questionable loans extended by Producers Bank of
the Philippines (PBP), totalling approximately P300 million (the paid-in capital of PBP
amounting only to P 140.544 million, were fictitious as they were extended, without collateral, to
certain interests related to PBP owners themselves. Subsequently and during the same year,
several blind items about a family-owned bank in Binondo which granted fictitious loans to its
stockholders appeared in major newspapers which triggered a bank-run in PBP and resulted in

continuous over-drawings on the banks demand deposit account with the Central Bank; reaching
to P 143.955 million. Hence, on the basis of the report submitted by the Supervision and
Examination Sector, the Monetary Board (MB), placed PBP under conservatorship.
PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB which proposed the transfer to PBP of 3 buildings
owned by Producers Properties, Inc. (PPI), its principal stockholder and the subsequent mortgage
of said properties to the CB as collateral for the banks overdraft obligation but which was not
approved due to disagreements between the parties. Since no other rehabilitation program was
submitted by PBP for almost 3 years its overdrafts with the CB continued to accumulate and
swelled to a staggering P1.023 billion. Consequently, the CB Monetary Board decided to
approve in principle what it considered a viable rehabilitation program for PBP. There being no
response from both PBP and PPI on the proposed rehabilitation plan, the MB issued a resolution
instructing Central Bank management to advise the bank that the conservatorship may be lifted if
PBP complies with certain conditions.
Without responding to the communications of the CB, PBP filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati against the CB, the MB and CB Governor alleging that the resolutions
issued were arbitraty and made in bad faith. Respondent Judge issued a temporary restraining
order and subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction. CB filed a motion to dismiss but was
denied and ruled that the MB resolutions were arbitrarily issued. CB filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders of the trial court but CA affirmed the said
orders. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of cause of action
and declaring the MB resolutions as arbitrary.
Held: The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may be set
aside by a court: (1) The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record
representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading
must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of the
order placing the bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after
hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
In the instant case, the original complaint was filed more than 3 years after PBP was placed
under conservator, long after the expiration of the 10-day period deferred to above. It is also
beyond question that the complaint and the amended complaint were not initiated by the
stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock.

Agabon vs. NLRC / Riviera Home - GR No. 158693 Case Digest

FACTS:
Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum board and cornice installers from
January 1992 to February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was decided in their favor by the Labor
Arbiter. Riviera appealed to the NLRC contending just cause for the dismissal because of
petitioners abandonment of work. NLRC ruled there was just cause and petitioners were not
entitled to backwages and separation pay. The CA in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal
because they have abandoned their work but ordered the payment of money claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also
enjoins the employer to give the employee the right to be heard and to defend himself.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.
For a valid finding or abandonment, two factors are considered: failure to report for work
without a valid reason; and, a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship with the
second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be
deduced that the employees has no more intention to work.
Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due
process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an
indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil Doctrine of the Belated Due
process Rule.
Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not for any of the justifiable or authorized by
law. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify
the dismissal but the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory
rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay
later which we sought to deter in Serrano ruling. The violation of employees rights warrants the
payment of nominal damages.

US vs. Toribio
Post under case digests, Political Law at Sunday, February 26, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind
Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the
province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be
slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein
it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large
cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large
cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer.
Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he
slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use
in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners,
and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of
the enjoyment of their private property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large
cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.
Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.
Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may interfere with
personal liberties. To justify the state in the exercise of its sovereign police power it must appear
(1) that the interest of the general public requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, For to
do otherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law and the intent of the law makers. The act
primarily seeks to protect large cattle against theft to make it easy for the recovery and return to
owners, which encouraged them to regulate the registration and slaughter of large cattle.
Several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struck the Philippine islands
which threatened the survival of carabaos in the country. In some provinces seventy, eighty and
even one hundred percent of their local carabaos perished due to the said epidemic.
This drove the prices of carabaos up to four or five-fold, as a consequence carabao theft became
rampant due to the luxurious prices of these work animals. Moreover, this greatly affected the
food production of the country which prompted the government to import rice from its
neighboring countries.
As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use for the
production of crops, the government was prompted to pass a law that would protect these work
animals. The purpose of the law is to stabilize the number of carabaos in the country as well as to
redistribute them throughout the entire archipelago. It was also the same reason why large cattles
fit forfarm work was prohibited to be slaughtered for human consumption. Most importantly, the
respondents carabao was found to be fit forfarm work.
These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise of police power.
Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not
constitute the taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serves as a mere regulation for the
consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public interest.
Thus, the demand for compensation of the owner must fail.

JAKA Food Processing vs. Pacot - GR No. 151378 Case Digest

FACTS:
Respondents were hired by JAKA until their termination on August 29, 1997 because the
Corporation was in dire financial straits. It was not disputed that they were terminated without
complying with the requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of notice
upon the employees and DOLE at least one month before the intended date of termination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not full backwages and separation pay be awarded to respondents when employers
effected termination without complying with the twin notice rule.
RULING:
The dismissal of the respondents was for an authorized cause under Article 283. A dismissal for
authorized cause does not necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the
employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employers exercise of his
management prerogative, i.e. when the employer opts to install labor-saving devices, when he
decides to cease business operations or when he undertakes to implement a retrenchment
program.
Accordingly, it is wise to hold that:
1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal was
initiate by an act imputable to the employee.
2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause but the employer fails to comply with the
notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by
the employers exercise of his management prerogative. Thus, dismissal was upheld but ordered
JAKA to pay each of the respondents the amount of PhP 50,000.00 representing nominal
damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.

Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty

32 Phil. 580 (1915)
In re: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case involves a
dual question one involving the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the
tax in question and the other relating to the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove
any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is
otherwise a nuisance.
The focus of this digest is to highlight the cases latter aspect as correlated to the police power of
the State.
Facts
Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business,
particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province
of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of
Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is
offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question in
no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of
the community, or of any persons. Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due
investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant
decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a
nuisance.
Issue
1. Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate
of the police power of the Government?

exercise

Held
The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards
which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public.
This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle to further
application. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and
economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included
within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police
power. Judgmentreversed.

People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958

J. B. L . Reyes
Facts:
Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that
prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it
redirects the grant of permission to the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station
near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction
under the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a
typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing
view.
He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the
ordinances constitutionality.
Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?
Held: No, petition granted.
Ratio:
The ordinance doesnt state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an
arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and
which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The
ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power,
and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may
eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do
this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The municipal council shall
have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging
a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two
pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected
under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either
established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings
to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear
that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243
(c)

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. 14078, March 07, 1919
Facts: The provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Pursuant to the provisions
of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the vicinities of the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubis place in Calapan are directed to take up their habitation on the
site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province
of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Mangyanes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.
Issue: Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty of abode
and is therefore unconstitutional
Held: No. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. The court further ruled that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power and thus constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the. Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed.
To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a
law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit
the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must
be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA (G.R.

No. L-24693)
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of
the due process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or
oppressive but also vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right
to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination.
Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:
1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed
form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue
also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in
this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the
presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail
over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no
question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only
discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of
the LGU concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well.
The due process contention is likewise untenable, There is no controlling and precise definition
of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free
the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged
failure to meet the due process requirement.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It
was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the Ordinance in
question

Restituto Ynot Vs IAC GR NO 74457 March 20 1987 CASE DIGEST

Facts
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits
of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality
issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld
the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court
do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in
one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried
out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying due process.

Balacuit vs Court of First Instance GR L-38429 30 June 1988

Facts: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No 640 on 21 April 1969,
penalizing any person , group of persons , entity or engeged in the business of selling admission
tickets to any movie to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay full payment for
ticket should only be charged one half. Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as managers of theaters
assailed the validity and constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favour of
the respondents hence the petition for review. Petitioners contend that it violates due process
clause of the Constitution for being oppressive , unfair , unjust, confiscatory and an undue
restraint of trade.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 640 prohibiting selling of theatre admission tickets to children
7-12 y/o at full price is constitutional or not?
Decision: Decision reversed. Ordinance 640 declared unconstitutional. For the assailed ordinance
be held constitutional it must pass the test of police power. To invoke the exercise the police
power, it must be for the interest of the public without interfering with private rights and
adoptive means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be
within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its
provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be
sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the
due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in
their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that
any person who did not approve could stay away.

Agustin vs Edu, 88 SCRA 195, L- 49112, February 22, 1979

Facts : This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an early
warning device mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as
being violative to the constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as the rules and regulations
for its implementation are concerned.
The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Ferdinand Marcos aimed to prevent road
accidents and in the interest of safety on all streets, highways including expressways. All
motorist and motor vehicle owners shall have at all times one pair of early warning device. These
hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Roads and Signs and the United
Nations Organization (UN). Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207 ratified the said Vienna
convention requiring the installation of road signs and devices.
Herein respondent Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the
implementing rules and regulations of the said instruction.
Issue : Whether or not the assailed Letter of Instruction is invalid and violated constitutional
guarantees of due process.
Held : The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no
unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police
power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was
clearly intended to promote public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: The Philippines ------ adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the nation. Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this
country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our countrys word was
resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions
thru P.D. No. 207 . The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude
which is, moreoever, at war with the principle of international morality.
In Santiago vs Far Eatern Broadcasting Company , it was held that the constitutionality of the
law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon and adequately
argued. Equal protection is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a
lawsuit can rightfully expect success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.
Petition is DISMISSED and the restraining order is lifted.

Maranaw hotels and resort corp vs NLRC

G.R. No. 123880 February 23 1999
303 SCRA 540

Labor Law

Labor Standards

Working Conditions and Rest Periods

IllegalDismissal
Eddie Damalerio was a roomboy for Maranaw Hotels. One day, he was cleaning the room of
one ofthe guests when he saw the private stuff of the guest scattered all over the floor. So he took
it upon
him to pick those up and put in the guests bag but then when he was doing so the guest (Jamie
Glas
er) entered the room and saw Damalerios hand inside Glasers bag. Glaser filed a complaint
against Damalerio. After investigation by the hotel, Damalerio was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Damalerio was illegally dismissed.
HELD:
Yes. Although it was not completely proper for Damalerio to be touching the things of a
hotelguest while cleaning the hotel rooms, personal belongings of hotel guests being off-limits
toroomboys, under the attendant facts and circumstances, the dismissal of Damalerio
wasunwarranted. To be sure, the investigation held by the hotel security people did not unearth
enoughevidence of culpability. It bears repeating that Glaser lost nothing. Although Maranaw
Hotels mayhave reasons to doubt the honesty and trustworthiness of Damalerio, as a result of
what happened,absent sufficient proof of guilt, Damalerio,
who is a rank-and-file employee
, cannot be legallydismissed. As for the service charges received by Maranaw Hotels during the
period where he was not able to
work hes entitled to the shares therefrom. But if he chooses not to be reinstated by reason of
theestranged relations with the hotel, hes entitled to separation pay but without the shares from
the
service charges anymore.

Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties and PAGCOR (G.R. No 111097. July 20, 1994)
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlunsod enacted Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the operation of casino
followed by Ordinance No. 3375-93 providing penalty therefor. Petitioners also attack gambling
as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of
this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State
policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinace No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlunsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid.
HELD:
NO. Petition was denied. Decision of respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed.
RATIO:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is
left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the
legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit
some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus,
it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In
making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority
to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be
valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress,
from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the
mandate of the statute.

Blas Ople vs Ruben Torres

G.R. no. 127685, July 23, 1998
Facts:
On December 12, 1996, then President Ramos enacted Administrative order
no. 308, which laid down the ground work for the implementation of a National

ID system. The A.O. mandated major government agencies to pool their

resources together to implement a centralized data bank of all citizens which
shall be used to streamline day to day government transactions and minimize
rampant red taping and corruption among government employees.
Herein petitioner Senator Blas Ople, filed the case at bar questioning the said
A.O. on 3 grounds 1) implementation of a national ID system requires a
legislative act, as such A.O. no. 308 is usurpation of legislative functions. 2)
that said A.O. tends to infringe the right to privacy of citizens 3) the
appropriation of funds for the implementation of said A.O. is also an exclusive
legislative function.
On the other hand, herein respondent as Executive Secretary refutes all said
arguments.
Issue:
Whether or not A.O. no. 308 is a valid exercise of the Executive power.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
In holding the A.O. no. 308 as an invalid exercise of the Presidents Executive
power, the Court provided the following:
1. As raised by petitioner, A.O. no. 308 does indeed infringe upon the
legislatures exclusive function as it laid down a system whereby
compliance therewith is a condition to transact with the government.
2. A.O. no. 308 is a potential threat to the Constitutional right to Privacy
as it allows the government to pool various data regarding an individual
without any clear concise direction as to the manner to keeping,
safeguards against improper use, and any definite answer as to what
type of information may or may not be used.
But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth
of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy
in clear and present danger.
3. A.O. no. 308 failed to substantiate any justifiable reason to allow the
would be infringement. To streamline government transactions and to
remove red taping was not sufficiently shown to be valid reasons to
counter act the strict protection of the individuals right to privacy.

Estrada v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001.

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2
wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin
but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly
clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
AND THE REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt
OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.
RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00)
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT
OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA
PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Ratio:
In view of vagueness and ambiguity
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the
words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law
so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To
combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial
and temporal succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for
"pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently
defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a
'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or
criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall
unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the
term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal
accused and public officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid
common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or
methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy
to attain a common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free
from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however,
that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to
be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the
"void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in
various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
In view of due process
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder
Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of
overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this
reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all

other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in
the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
In view of mens rea
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se
which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion . . .
Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven
in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime
of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to
its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an
actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it
governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effect and repercussions of crimes
like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause
further destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P.
Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the
acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080,
on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray
38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect,
assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
In view of presumption of innocence
At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare
what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been is judicial.
Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with mathematical precision how
the law should be interpreted under any and all given situations. The application of the law will
depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which will then be considered,
weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the constitutionally mandated function of the
courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would give flesh and blood to the true meaning
of legislative enactments.
A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that
does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the
ends that are sought to be attained by its enactment. Viewed broadly, "plunder involves not just
plain thievery but economic depredation which affects not just private parties or personal
interests but the nation as a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of "a crime against
national interest which must be stopped, and if possible, stopped permanently."

In view of estoppel
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080. The case at
bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact
that one of petitioner's counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself
voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question
its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law. Moreover,
estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is
estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its
passage would result in injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under
this statute.
What is RICO
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United States federal law that
provides for extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of
an ongoing criminal organization. RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970). RICO is codified
as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. 19611968. While its intended
use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who were actively engaged in organized crime,
its application has been more widespread.
In view of facial challenge
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.'
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone,
the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area
of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
In view of burden of proof (accused) according to PANGANIBAN, J.
In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally repugnant to the Constitution
before this Court may declare its unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a
clear showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute allows to be done. 40 To
justify the nullification of the law, there must be a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution;
not a doubtful, argumentative implication. 41 Of some terms in the law which are easily clarified
by judicial construction, petitioner has, at best, managed merely to point out alleged ambiguities.
Far from establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any patent and glaring conflict with the
Constitution, the constitutional challenge to the Anti-Plunder law must fail. For just as the
accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence in the absence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, so must a law be accorded the presumption of constitutionality without the same requisite
quantum of proof.
Petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law "eliminates proof of each and every
component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself to establishing just the pattern
of over or criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often perceived to be the reality
with respect to the crime of plunder that "the actual extent of the crime may not, in its breadth
and entirety, be discovered, by reason of the 'stealth and secrecy' in which it is committed and the

involvement of 'so many persons here and abroad and [the fact that it] touches so many states
and territorial units."'
"The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a
law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt. 'The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality . . . To doubt is to
sustain.'
In view of burden of proof (State) according to KAPUNAN, J.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A criminal
statute should not be so vague and uncertain that "men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. There are three distinct considerations for
the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that individuals are properly
warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct. This "fair notice" rationale was
articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated
by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall
be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be
proscribed.
While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress to spell out with
mathematical certainty the standards to which an individual must conform his conduct, it is
necessary that statutes provide reasonable standards to guide prospective conduct. And where a
statute imposes criminal sanctions, the standard of certainty is higher. The penalty imposable on
the person found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to death. Given such
penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness required of R.A. No. 7080 is unarguably higher
than that of other laws.
It has been incorrectly suggested that petitioner cannot mount a "facial challenge" to the
Plunder Law, and that "facial" or "on its face" challenges seek the total invalidation of a statute.
Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed to several problematical portions of the law that were left
unclarified. He posed the question: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements
that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" The meanings of
"combination" and "series" as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.
To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that
are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" Because of this, it is easier to
convict for plunder and sentence the accused to death than to convict him for each of the
component crimes otherwise punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are
bailable offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the constitutional guarantees
of due process and equal protection.
The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and
immoral, are patently mala in se, even if punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal
intent must clearly be established together with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no
crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes a lesser
burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paying the way for the imposition of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on
the balance the life and liberty of the accused against whom all the resources of the State are
arrayed. It could be used as a tool against political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by

whoever wields the levers of power.

In view of due process according to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and excitement, when the desire to do
justice is tarnished by anger and vengeance, there is always the danger that vital protections
accorded an accused may be taken away.
Substantive due process dictates that there should be no arbitrariness, unreasonableness or
ambiguity in any law which deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other procedures
leading to conviction may be fair and proper. But if the law itself is not reasonable legislation,
due process is violated. Thus, an accused may not be sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or
life imprisonment for an offense understood only after judicial construction takes over where
Congress left off, and interpretation supplies its meaning.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Substantive
due process requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and uncertain. More explicitly
That the terms of a penal statute. . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject
to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a well-recognized
requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process.
In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 9
A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be valid. A statute is
vague or overbroad, in violation of the due process clause, where its language does not convey
sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the prohibited conduct. A statute is
unconstitutionally vague if people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.
In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an important
element of the criminal acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed.
Equally disagreeable is the provision of the Plunder Law which does away with the requirement
that each and every component of the criminal act of plunder be proved and instead limits itself
to proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or conspiracy. 18 In
effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy,
and does away with the rights of the accused insofar as the component crimes are concerned. In
other words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime of plunder, because the law requires
merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial court may allow the
specifications of details in an information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. An
information cannot rise higher than the statute upon which it is based. Not even the construction
by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous provision can supply the missing ingredients of
the Plunder Law. The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him is most often exemplified in the care with which a complaint or
information should be drafted. However, the clarity and particularity required of an information
should also be present in the law upon which the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any
particularity in the information will come from the prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the
role of Congress.
In view of vagueness according to SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused of a crime possesses
inviolable rights founded on the Constitution which even the welfare of the society as a whole
cannot override. The rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to political
bargaining or to the calculus of social interest. Thus, no matter how socially-relevant the purpose
of a law is, it must be nullified if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused.
When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the
enumerated "criminal acts" under Section 1 (d) merely as means and not as essential elements of
plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed and repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play.
As a matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. The State may not
specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. 8 With more reason, it should not be
allowed to go around the principle by characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a
"means" of committing the crime. For the result is the reduction of the burden of the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must be convinced of the
existence of a "combination or series." As to which criminal acts constitute a combination or
series, the Justices need not be in full agreement. Surely, this would cover-up a wide
disagreement among them about just what the accused actually did or did not do. Stated
differently, even if the Justices are not unified in their determination on what criminal acts were
actually committed by the accused, which need not be proved under the law, still, they could
convict him of plunder.
The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three of the acts enumerated
under Section 1(d) thereof." 33 But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at
least three times. And the Office of the Solicitor General, invoking the deliberations of the House
of Representatives, contends differently. It defines the term series as a "repetition" or pertaining
to "two or more."
A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts already
punished with lesser penalties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness
cannot be cured by judicial construction.
In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr. Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080. The
issue before this Court is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but the constitutionality of the
law. I vote to grant the petition, not because I favor Mr. Estrada, but because I look beyond today
and I see that this law can pose a serious threat to the life, liberty and property of anyone who
may come under its unconstitutional provisions. As a member of this Court, my duty is to see to
it that the law conforms to the Constitution and no other. I simply cannot, in good conscience,
fortify a law that is patently unconstitutional.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a
petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6
of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5
imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT
rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners
argue that the law is unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28(2) of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III
Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
RULING:
1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments
to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate
income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution
of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope
of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward.
3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of
taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation
and collection, the States power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary
will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or
arbitrariness.

GSIS v. MONTESCLAROS
FACTS: Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process
and equal protection clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship
pension. GSIS denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension.
HELD: There is denial of due process when it outrightly denies the claim for survivorship. There
is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to
be heard. There is also violation of equal protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years
of togetherness in marriage before the employees death is valid to prevent sham marriages
contracted for monetary gains. Here, it is 3 years before pensioner qualified for the pension.
Under this, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than 3 years before the
pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the
marriage took place within 3 years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose intended.

Mirasol vs. DPWH

Facts: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works
and Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited
access highways. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001
wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances.
Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of
North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway
under DO 215.

Issue: Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the right to travel? Are all
motorized vehicles created equal?

Held: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain
expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to
administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate
related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in
the first place.
We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable
classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all
motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other
light vehicles. The first may be denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive.
Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models.46 We find that real and
substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to
justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of
motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car,
a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle
is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.

Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD, 526 SCRA 130 (2007)

Post under case digests, Political Law at Wednesday, February 08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind
Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the
Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known
as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent
(20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is
unconstitutional
because
it
constitutes
deprivation
of
private
property.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional
Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power
of
eminent
domain,
has
general
welfare
for
its
object.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the legislature
by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.

HON. SEC. PEREZ (AS DOE SECRETARY) V. LPG REFILLERS ASSOC OF THE PHILS.
Facts: B.P. Blg. 33 penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery,
and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum
products and of underfilled LPG cylinders. The law set the monetary penalty for violators to a
minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. To implement the law the DOE issued
Circular No. 2000-06-010. Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (LPG
Refillers) asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. DOE denied the
request. LPG Refillers then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment of the Circular with the
RTC. RTC nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the
law (per RTC: the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation,
might exceed the maximum penalty under the law). DOE argued: penalties for the acts and
omissions enumerated in the Circular are sanctioned by B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 8479.
Issue: W/N the DOE Circular is void on the ground that it introduced new offences not punished
under B.P. Blg. 33?
Held & Ratio: DOE Circular is valid. For an administrative regulation to have the force of penal
law (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating
statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself. The
Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration,
underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under this general description of
what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various
modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no
weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no
trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed
identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and
unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are obviously within
the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum
merchants. As for the second requirement: B.P. Blg. 33, provides that the monetary penalty for
any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a
maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is
P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, the Circular is silent as to any
maximum penalty for the refillers, marketers, and dealers. This mere silence, does not amount to
violation of the statutory maximum limit. The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a
per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes
are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties. It is B.P. Blg. 33, which defines what
constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and
maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law,
albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers.
Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to
provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with which to effectively
curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving petroleum products,
which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular would be to render inutile
government efforts to protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of
some unscrupulous LPG traders. Note: LPG Refillers filed an MR with the SC on Aug. 28, 2007
(G.R. NO. 159149) contending that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis, is
no longer regulatory, but already confiscatory in nature. MR denied. Circular is not confiscatory.
The penalties do not exceed the ceiling prescribed in B.P. Blg. 33, which penalizes any person
who commits any act [t]herein prohibited. Violation on a per cylinder basis falls within the
phrase any act. To provide the same penalty for one who violates a prohibited act in B.P. Blg.
33, regardless of the number of cylinders involved would result in an indiscriminate, oppressive
and impractical operation of B.P. Blg. 33. The equal protection clause demands that all persons
subject to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in
the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.