REPUBLIC VS BANTIGUE

1. Bantigue filed with RTC of Batangas, an application for

original registration of title over a parcel of land,
valued at P14,920, with an area of 10,372 sq m, located
at Barangay Baluarte San Juan, Batangas.
2. RTC transmitted the records to the MTC because the
value of the property was allegedly less than 100K.
3. As support, Bantigue presented the ff to the MTC:
a. Tax Declarations
b. Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor
c. Certification from DENRs Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of Batangas that the lot is within
the alienable and disposable zone.
4. CA affirmed MTCs decision to grant Bantigues application
for original registration of a parcel of land.
5. CA found that Bantigue has had exclusive, continuous, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land even
before World War 2.
ISSUE:
W/N certification by CENRO is sufficient proof that property is
alienable and disposable land of public domain
RULING + RATIO:
NO, certification by CENRO is not sufficient proof that
property is alienable and disposable land of public domain
Lower court erred due to the absence of proof that the
property was alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
There is the principle of the regalian doctrine which
provides that, all lands of public domain belongs to
the state.
! Thus, applicant bears the burden of
overcoming that presumption of State
ownership, by establish evidence that the
subject land is alienable or disposable

BASED ON A POSITIVE ACT OF

GOVERNMENT
Required proof is:
o CENRO/PENRO Certification
o Certified True Copy of original classification
approved by DENR Secretary
Bantigue only presented CENRO certification, thus it
is not enough. Case is remanded to the court for reception
of further evidence.
La Bugal Blaan v Ramos

FACTS:
1. Before the effectivity of RA 7942 (the Philippine
Mining Act), the President signed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with
WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws,
covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in Mindanao
2. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7942, the
FTAA between the government and WMCP on the ground
that they allow fully foreign owned corporations
like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop
Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article
XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
3. Subsequently, WMC - a publicly listed Australian
mining and exploration company - sold its whole
stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by
Indophil Resources, an Australian company.
4. DENR approved the transfer of the FTAA in Sagittarius
name but Lepanto Consolidated(another Filipino
Company) assailed the same. The latter case is still
pending before the Court of Appeals.
5. Subsequently, the Court en banc promulgated its
Decision granting the Petition and declaring the
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA
7942, (IRR)DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA
executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on

the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited

by the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUES:
W/N there was a transgression of the Constitution by the transfer
of the WMCP Shares to a Filipino corporation
RULING + RATIO:
NO, there was no transgression of the Constitution by the
transfer of the WMCP Shares to a Filipino corporation
A textual analysis of the first paragraph of Section 2 of
Article XII does not support petitioners' argument.
o Nowhere in the provision is there any express
limitation or restriction regarding the
aforementioned contractual schemes are
concerned.
o There is no basis to believe that the framers of the
Constitution, a majority of whom were obviously
concerned with furthering the development
and utilization of the countrys natural
resources, could have wanted to restrict Filipino
participation in that area. This point is clear,
especially in the light of the overarching
constitutional principle of giving preference
and priority to Filipinos and Filipino
corporations in the development of our
natural resources.
Section 12 of RA 7942 provides for international
commercial arbitration after local remedies are
exhausted. This provision does not necessarily imply
that the WMCP FTAA cannot be transferred to and
assumed by a Filipino corporation like Sagittarius, in
which event the said provision should simply be
disregarded as a superfluity.
Director of Lands v IAC (1986)
FACTS:

1. Respondent Acme Plywood & Veneer Corp. is a corporation

whose acquirement of property has come into debate.
2. In 1962, when the 1935 Constitution was in effect,
Acme then bought pieces of land from Mariano Infiel and
Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe, who have
held that land since time immemorial.
3. Acme tried to register the land in 1982 to the IAC,
using Sec 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, which says that those
with an imperfect title to the land (aka not registered) may
apply for registration if they can prove that they, or their
predecessors, can prove that they have had the lands for
30 years.
4. Petitioner then disputed this, saying that the 1973
Constitution applies, specifically, section 11 of its Article XIV
which prohibits private corporations or associations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by
lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. (Note: this was not
present in 1935 Consti.)
5. The main issue of the case is that when the Infiels sold the
property to Acme in 1962, were these lands already counted as
private property, thus allowing Acme to file a judicial declaration
of their land in 1982?
ISSUES:
W/N the lands are public property
RULING + RATIO:
YES.
- There was a ruling, Meralco, that already said that corporations
may not be able to apply for declarations of public lands because
with no proof except imperfect titles, it is still considered public.
HOWEVER, SC chose to deviate from that ruling. SC
listed down jurisprudence, such as Carino (1909), Susi (1925),

and Herico (1980) that developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the

doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession
of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period (30 years) ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to
be public land and becomes private property.
-

Thus, when the Infiels sold it to Acme, them being owners

of the land since time immemorial, it was already a private
property, and nowhere in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
prohibit corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Cruz v. Sec. of DENR

ground that it grants ownership over natural

resources to indigenous peoples.
ISSUE:
Whether or not IPRA is constitutional?
RULING + RATIO:
YES. The vote of the Supreme Court is equally divided at
7-7. Thus, the case was DISMISSED.
Points raised for YES

FACTS:
1. Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, as citizens and
taxpayers, assailed the constitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and
its IRR on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine.
2. They say that this law provides an encompassing
definition of ancestral domains which violates the
rights of private landowners.
3. They also question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral
lands.
4. DENR Secretary and DBM Secretary filed through the
Solicitor General a consolidated comment wherein it
stated that IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the

Ancestral domains: all areas beloning to IPP under a claim

of ownership since time immemorial. Not limited to
those who merely occupied but also those who utilized
areas.
In Carino case, native title land is private and was
never public to begin with. Thus, it never belonged to
the state.
Certificate of Ancestral Title is only a formality as
ownership is recognized under customary law and
it can co-exist with civil law.
EXCEPTION that all lands not acquired by government
are public domain Should have been in possession of
occupants since time immemorial.
Natural resources are still owned by the state and
not included in IPRA. Law merely grants management
over natural resources.

Points raised for NO

Law amounts to abdication of state authority over

significant area of the countrys patrimony
Relinquishes full control of natural resources in favor
indigenous people
Law contravenes the provision which says that all natural
resources belong to the state

RAMIREZ v. VDA DE RAMIREZ

FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino nation, died in Spain.
Only his widow, Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez, is the
compulsory heir.
The administratrix Palacios then submitted a project of
partition. In the free portion thereof, 2/3 of it would
be for Wanda's usufruct. Wanda de Wrobleski is a
companion of Ramirez.
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (grandnephews) opposed
this. The issue concerned is that of Wandas usufruct,
which they because it allegedly violates the
constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of
lands by aliens.
The lower court approved the project of partition.
Hence, this petition.
It must be noted that the court a quo upheld the validity of
the usufruct given to Wanda claiming that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation
of law but also testamentary succession.
ISSUE:
WoN the usufruct in favor of Wanda should be considered void
RULING+RATIO: NO.
The Court believes that the Constitutional provision which
enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend
to testamentary succession.
Otherwise, the prohibition would be meaningless
because any alien could circumbent this by paying money
to a Filipino landowner.
However, a usufruct, albeit a real right, does NOT vest title
to the land in the usufructuary. And what is prohibited in the
Constitution is vesting of title of the land in favor of aliens.
HALILI v. CA
FACTS:
1.

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died

sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the

Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow,
Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, David Rey
Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens.
2.
Helen executed a deed of quitclaim,
assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey
all her rights, titles and interests in and over six
parcels of land that they inherited from Simeon.
3. David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to
Emiliano Cataniag.
4. Halili who are owners of the adjoining lot,
filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality
and validity of the two conveyances:
a.
between Helen Guzman and David
Rey Guzman, and
b.
between David Rey Guzman and
Emiliano Cataniag
ISSUES: W/N the sale of land to Cataniag was valid
RULING: Yes. The sale of the land to Cataniag is valid.

non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to

private lands or to lands of the public domain, except
only by way of legal succession

if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who

subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a
citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap

o x x x [I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not
only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed
by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve

the nations lands for future generations of

Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but achieved by making lawful the
acquisition of real estate by aliens who
became Filipino citizens by naturalization.

Since the disputed land is now owned by Private

Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid
transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the
constitutional provision -- to keep our land in Filipino
hands -- has been served.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Respondent spouses bought 2 parcels of land from a certain
Belen. At the time of the purchase, they were then
natural-born Filipino citizens.
Years after, they filed an application for registration of
title of the 2 parcels of land. They were no longer
Filipino citizens at this time as they became Canadians
through naturalization. A house was already built on
the property and it housed respondent's mother.
The RTC approved the application, and the CA merely
affirmed this on the ground that both applicants were
still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in
question.
The Republic maintains that:
lands in question are part of the public domain
in the case of private lands, aliens may not acquire
it
ISSUE:
WoN private respondents could be granted the registration of
title of the lands

RULING+RATIO: YES.
It must be noted at first that the lands in question are
PRIVATE. Section 48 of the Public Land Act turns
public lands to private property if those personally

using it (or through predecessors) have been in open and

exclusive possession of the land for at least 30 years.
This was met in this case.
Regarding the main issue, BP 185 is applicable. This allows
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who has lost
his Philippine citizenship to be a transferee of
property as long as they stay within the limitations of
the law. (1,000 sq. m if urban; 1 hectare if rural)
What is important to note is that private respondents were
formerly NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS (at the time they
acquired the land) of the Philippines. Hence, they could apply
for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section
8, Article XII.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v GSIS
FACTS:
1. GSIS pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 decided
to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC).
2. Only two bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at 41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the
same number of shares at 44.00 per share.
3. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the
winning bidder, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid
price.
4.
In a subsequent letter, Manila Prince Hotel sent a
managers check issued by Philtrust Bank as bid security to
match the bid of the Malaysian Group, which respondent GSIS
refused to accept.

5. The Manila Prince Hotel invoked Section 10 of Article

12 stating that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the
Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of the Philippine heritage
and culture. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part
of the national patrimony.
6. Petitioner also stated that since Manila Hotel is part of the
national patrimony and its business also unquestionably
part of the national economy, petitioner should be
preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian
firm.
ISSUES:
Whether the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad violated the
Constitutional provision on Filipino First Policy
RULING + RATIO:
Yes

Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987

Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement, thus self
executory.

[i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions

covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.

51% of the equity of the MHC comprises the majority

and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management
of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the
hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not

applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding

shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land
upon which the building stands.
ARMY AND NAVY CLUB, INC. v. CA (1997)
FACTS:
The Army and Navy Club. Inc. (petitioner) occupies the
Army and Navy Building in Luneta, Manila.
A Contract of Lease was executed between the said
company and the City of Manila (respondent) where
petitioner was to build a hotel, but failed to do so.
In said their lease contract, both parties agreed to: 1) Pay
an annual a rent of P250,000.00 with a 10% increase
every two years; 2) Pay the realty tax due on the land;
and 3) Construct a modern multi-storey hotel provided for
therein within five years which shall belong to the City
upon expiration or termination of the lease without right of
reimbursement.
Petitioner failed to pay the rents for seven consecutive
years. A total amount of PhP 7.2 million for rent, and
PhP6.5 million for real estate tax was left unpaid.
Petitioner also failed to erect a multi-storey hotel in the
site.
Respondent had no other choice but to file the action for
illegal detainer and demand for eviction.
Petitioner invokes that the Army and Navy Club has
been declared a national historical landmark by the
National Historical Commission (NHC). Thus,
parties are required by law to preserve its existence
in the site.
ISSUES:
WON Army and Navy Club, Inc. be ejected on the ground
that it has been declared a national historical landmark?
RULING + RATIO:
NO. The petitioner did not comply with the
procedures of the Cultural Properties Preservation

and Protection Act.

The signatories of the certificate are officers and
members of the Club, not the NHC.
The declaration was conferred three years after the action
for ejectment which is obviously an attempt to thwart any
legal action against petitioner.
Even if such certification was genuine, nowhere in the law
does it state that NHC was given the authority to vest right
of ownership or possession of a private property. The
proper officer should have been the Director of the
National Museum.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

and the decision

modifications.
Hence, this petition.

RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all

municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry
out at their own expense the reclamation of any
foreshore lands bordering them in consultation with
the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed
by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore
lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an
agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation
(RREC) for the said project. This involves 300 hectares
of land in Pasay.
Republic questioned the agreement.
o It contended, among others, that the agreement
between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for
the object of the contract is outside the
commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question
is within the commerce of man because RA 1899
gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore
land than that in the definition provided by the
dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pasay City and RREC,

affirmed

by

the

CA

with

Issues:

WoN the term foreshore land includes the submerged

area.

Ruling and Ratio:

NO.
o

Facts:

was

The term "foreshore lands" refers to: The strip of

land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternately wet and
dry according to the flow of the tide.
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling
Act, RA 1899. In so doing, the meaning of the term
cannot be broadened; much less widen the
coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were
to include submerged areas, it should have
provided expressly. That Congress did not so
provide could only signify the exclusion of
submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.
The subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No.
121 have been found to be outside the intendment
and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires
and null and void.

Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization

FACTS:
1. PETRON was originally registered with SEC under Esso Phils
Inc. However, in 1973, due to the world-wide oil crisis, the Phil
government acquired PETRON through PNOC. Esso became a
government owned company. --- Later on, Pres Cory Aquino
issued Proclamation 50 which provided for the
PRIVATIZATION of GOCCs.

2. There were petitions seeking to nullify the bidding

conducted for the sale of a block of shares constituting
40% of PETRON's capital stock. The 40% block was awarded
to Aramco Overseas Company (foreign company based in
Netherlands). Another set of petitions sought to stop the sale to
Aramco. --- President Ramos, prior to the bidding, approved the
proposal to privatize PETRON.
3. Petitioners argue that under Sec 11 Article XII of the
Constitution, 60% of the shares of public utilities should be owned
by Filipinos and that representation in the board must be
proportional to the percentage of stocks. In the case,
ARAMCO had 5 board members out of 10 (should be limited to
4 since they only have 40%)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 11 Article XII of the Constitution has been
violated.
RULING + RATIO: No.
A "public utility" under the Constitution and the Public Service Law
is one organized "for hire or compensation" to serve the
public, which is given the right to demand its service. PETRON is
not engaged in oil refining for hire and compensation to
process the oil of other parties.
Likewise, the activities considered as "public utility" under Section
7 of R.A. No. 387 refer only to petroleum which is
indigenous to the Philippines. Hence, the refining of
petroleum products sourced from abroad as is done by Petron,
is not within the contemplation of the law.
Francisco v. Toll Regulatory Board
FACTS:

1. President Marcos issued PD 1112 authorizing the

establishment of toll facilities on public improvements. It
acknowledged the huge financial requirements and the necessity
of tapping the resources of the private sector to implement the
government's infrastructure programs.
2. Phil National Construction Corporation (PNCC) was
created the same day (thru PD 1113) - it was a franchise to
construct, maintain and operate toll facilities in the North Luzon,
South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways, with the right to
collect toll fees at such rates as the TRB may fix and/or authorize.
The Toll Regulatory Board and PNCC signed a Toll
Operation Agreement on the NLEX, SLEX tollways providing the
detailed terms and conditions. - President Marcos had authority to
create such rights and privileges conferred under a franchise may
be assigned if authorized by a statute. (Exercise of his legislative
powers)
3. TRB, PNCC, as operator, and the new corporation, as
investor/concessionaire, with its lender, as the case may be, then
execute a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) to
implement the TOA previously issued. Once the requisite STOA
approval is given, project prosecution starts and upon the
completion of the toll road project or of a divisible phase thereof,
the TRB fixes or approves the initial toll rate after which, it
passes a board resolution prescribing the periodic toll rate
adjustment.
The STOA defines the scope of the road project coverage,
the terminal date of the concession, and includes
provisions on initial toll rate and toll rate adjustments.
STOA with MMEX contained a proviso providing for the extension
of the concession period beyond 50 years.
4. Petitioners Francisco and Hizon, as taxpayers and expressway
users, seek to nullify the various STOA above and the TRB
resolutions fixing initial rates and/or approving periodic toll rate
adjustments claiming that the STOAs and the toll rate-fixing
resolutions violate the Constitution in that they veritably

impose on the public the burden of financing tollways by

way of exorbitant fees and thus depriving the public of property
without due process.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the TRB is vested with the power and authority
to grant what amounts to a franchise over tollway facilities
2. Whether or not the extension of the concession period beyond
50 years as provided in the STOA with MMEX is unconstitutional.

Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to

grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate
its legislative authority, under the power of subordinate
legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to some
administrative agencies.
2. Yes. The extension of the concession period (which in no case
shall exceed a maximum period of 50 years) is MMEX STOA is void
and unconstitutional.

RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes. The TRB is empowered to grant authority to operate
toll facility.
The concerned petitioners maintain that only Congress has, under
the 1987 Constitution, the exclusive prerogative to grant franchise
to operate public utilities. -Court disagrees. The Constitution
does not necessarily imply that only Congress has the
power to grant such authorization. Statute books are replete with
laws granting specified agencies in the Executive Branch
the power to issue such authorization for certain classes of
public utilities.
The limiting thrust of the foregoing constitutional provision on the
grant of franchise or other forms of authorization to operate
public utilities may, in context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant
shall be made only in favor of qualified Filipino citizens or
corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises,
as contracts; and (c) no such authorization shall be
exclusive or exceed fifty years.
A franchise is basically a legislative grant of a special
privilege to a person. Franchise includes not only
authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of
statute, but also those granted by administrative agencies to
which the power to grant franchise has been delegated by
Congress.

While the TRB is vested by law with the power to extend the
administrative franchise or authority that it granted, nevertheless,
it cannot do so for an accumulated period exceeding fifty years.
GAMBOA V TEVES
FACTS:

In 1928, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436

which granted PLDT a franchise and the right to engage in
telecommunications business.

PTIC owns a substantial amount of shares in PLDT.

111,415 shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the
outstanding capital stock, were declared by the Court to be owned
by the Republic of the Philippines.

In 1999, First Pacific, a Hong Kong-based

investment firm, acquired the remaining 54 percent of the
outstanding capital stock of PTIC.

The 46.125 percent share was sold through a public

bidding wherein Parallax won with a bid of P25.6 billion or US$510
million.

With the sale, First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT

increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing
the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about
81.47 percent.
ISSUE:
WoN the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the

Constitution refers to the total common shares only or to the total

outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and nonvoting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility.
RULING+RATIO:
The term "capital" refers to the total common shares only
and not to the total outstanding capital stock. The intent of
the framers of the Constitution in imposing limitations and
restrictions on fully nationalized and partially nationalized activities
is for Filipino nationals to be always in control of the
corporation undertaking said activities.
Foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which
class of shares exercises the sole right to vote in the election of
directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; Filipinos own only
35.73% of PLDTs common shares, constituting a minority of the
voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT. In
short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting
stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of
PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution that "[n]o franchise, certificate,
or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to corporations organized under the
laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens."
DAVID V ARROYO
FACTS:
1. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, PGMA issued PP
1017 declaring a state of national emergency, and G. O. No. 5
implementing it.
2. PGMA, as President of the Philippines and Commander-inChief of the AFP, commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately
carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence, and
the alleged plans to overthrow the government
3. Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of
Representatives, claim that PGMAs inclusion of Art. 12, Sec. 17 in
PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures emergency

powers.
ISSUE:
WoN PP 1017 authorizes President Arroyo during the emergency
to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress (Art 12 Sec 17)
RULING+RATIO:
NO. Art 12 Sec 17 refers to the emergency powers of
Congress, not the President. Power to take over requires
delegation from Congress.