COMMENTARY

Indias Electoral System

Notes from the Law Commissions
2015 Report
Geoffrey Macdonald, Babak Moussavi

Indias first-past-the-post electoral

system has generated a series
of political deficiencies that
have prompted discussion of
institutional change. In March
2015, the Law Commission of
India concluded that a hybrid
electoral system that includes
proportional elements should be
considered. Yet, the commissions
recommendations have not
gained traction. Changing
election rules is not easy. But
there are important international
examples of successful
institutional shifts. Altering
Indias electoral system has the
potential for rectifying some of
the countrys destructive
political trends.

Geoffrey Macdonald (gpmacdonald@gmail.

com) is a university lecturer and research
consultant based in the US. Babak Moussavi
(babakmoussavi@gmail.com) is a researcher
at a consulting firm in London, the UK, and
writes in his personal capacity.

16

n March 2015, the Law Commission

of India reopened the question of
electoral reform. Its report concluded that significant changes to Indias
electoral system should be considered.
Given the various deficiencies of the current first-past-the-post (FPTP) system,
the commissioners reasserted their 1999
proposal to expand the Lok Sabha and
introduce elements of proportional
representation. This article will briefly
outline the problems of the FPTP system
for Indias democracy, model the 2014
election results according to different
electoral arrangements, and consider
the prospects for electoral reform in the
light of international experiences.
FPTP and Reform
FPTP is associated with a series of electoral anomalies, which most likely
helped India in the short run, but have
created negative trends over time. Personalised rule, single-party governments, and large seat bonuses, which
give the winning party seats disproportional to its vote share, enhanced political stability in post-independence India
under the Congress Partys dominance.
Yet, since at least 1977, when Indian politics began to fragment into a multitude
of national and regional parties, the
benefits of majoritarianism have eroded.
The increased number of competing
parties has lowered the natural threshold for victory. This allows parties to win
district elections or control Parliament
with significantly less than a majority.
The election in 2014 of Narendra
Modis Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
exemplifies such minoritarian rule
(Macdonald and Moussavi 2015). The
BJP won over 50% of parliamentary
seats with only 31% of the vote. Shreyas
Sardesai (2014) notes that Muslims, who
constitute 15% of the population, were

rendered ineffective during the BJPs

victory92% voted for another party,
predominantly the Congress. While
Sardesai describes this as a paradox
present in our democracy, it can largely
be explained by the mechanics of the
electoral system. This disproportional
outcome was replicated in districts
throughout the country in 2014.
Low thresholds for victory exacerbate a
common idiosyncrasy of FPTPwasted
votes. In some districts in 2014, victorious
candidates won with less than 30% of the
vote. Such results effectively disenfranchise over 70% of voters, who receive no
representation for their vote.1 A high degree of wasted votes is not only undemocratic, but can undermine broad-based
constituency servicesa common and
positive feature of the FPTP systems. Parties that win with a small percentage of
the vote have little incentive to provide
public goods to the broader population.
Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) argue
that parties are more likely to resort to
vote bank politics in Indian states that
feature multiparty competition.
In March, the Law Commission of India
released an extensive report considering
changes to the FPTP system and other
election rules. Although focused primarily on curbing political corruption and
criminalisation, the report also addressed the merits and demerits of a
switch to proportional representation in
India. While noting some positives, the
commission argued that full proportional
representation would lead to unstable
coalition governments. Furthermore,
proportional representations structural
focus on parties rather than constituencies would dilute the relationship between a voter and the candidate (Law
Commission of India 2015: 84). Consequently, the commissioners recommended a hybrid model that they originally
proposed in 1999. The number of Lok
Sabha seats would be expanded by 136,
which would be filled through List proportional representation, while the current 543 seats would remain under FPTP.
Alternatives
The Law Commissions recommendations implicitly acknowledge that FPTP
might not be ideal for India any longer.

DECEMBER 12, 2015

vol l no 50

EPW

Economic & Political Weekly

COMMENTARY
Figure 1: Party Seat Allocations in the Lok Sabha under Proportional
Representation
400
Actual result

Full PR (1 seat threshold)

PR-3% threshold

Others

PR-5% threshold

AIDMK

Parallel PR (136)

CPM

Parties

Seats

300

Figure 2: Results from Parallel Voting System with 20% Proportional

Representation Votes

200

FPTP seats won (543)

SP
AITC
BSP

100

Congress
BJP

0
BJP

Congress

BSP

AITC
Parties

SP

AIDMK

CPM

Source: Authors own calculations based on Election Commission data (Archive of General
Election 2014).

Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

DECEMBER 12, 2015

50

100

150
Seats

200

250

300

350

Source: Authors own calculations based on Election Commission data (Archive of General
Election 2014).

parties, producing Figure 3: Party Seats and Seat Share under Proposed Parallel System
400
outcomes similar to
49%
FPTP.
300
Indias 2014 election results cannot
be translated with
200
24%
perfect accuracy to
reflect those gener100
11%
6%
ated by a hypothe6%
2%
2%
1%
tical proportional
0
BJP Congress BSP
AITC P i SP
AIDMK
CPM
Others
system. This is
Parties
largely because few Source: Authors own calculations based on Election Commission data (Archive of General
parties fielded can- Election 2014).
didates outside of
Given that this grouping would include
their core geographic areas, given the the centre-right BJP and the left-wing
limits of their appeal. Only six parties Communist Party of India (Marxist),
are considered national by the Elec- which too would be unlikely, implying
tion Commission, and only seven fielded that the coalition would expand further.
candidates in more than 100 of Indias
India has had mixed experiences with
543 constituencies (Archive of General large coalitions. Imposing a threshold
Election 2014). This places a ceiling on would limit their likelihood, and avoid a
their potential vote share.2 This is ironic, cluttered Parliament. With a 3% threshas one merit of FPTP that the law com- old, the 2014 Lok Sabha would contain a
mission cites is that it does encourage mere seven parties. At 5%, however,
political parties themselves to have there would be just two (Figure 1).
Proportional representation and FPTP
more broad-based participation (Law
can be used togethereither in parallel
Commission of India 2015: 82).
Nevertheless, it is precisely because of or as a mixed system. The aim is broadly
this limited appeal that we can assume to acquire the best of both systems: stable
vote shares would be roughly similar in governments, with representatives tied
a proportional system. If these votes to districts, but without severely disprotranslated proportionally into seat share, portional outcomes.
Indeed, this was the law commissions
Indias Lok Sabha would have 36 parties.3
That is just one more than the number proposal. With an increase of 136 seats
of parties at present, but with the in the Lok Sabha size to allow for 20% of
two largest parties (BJP and Congress) representatives to be elected proportiontogether only forming a narrow majority ally, representativeness would improve
with 52% of the seats. Based on current slightly (Figures 2 and 3). The BJP would
attitudes, such a partnership seems in- be 10 seats short of a majority, now set
conceivable, so the next possible majority at 341. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP),
grouping would involve six parties meanwhile, would have seven seats;
and would have a majority of one seat. seven more than at present. A higher share
Seats share/number of seats

Necessary to any decision to change the

system, however, is a debate on what
could replace it. We consider various alternatives below, including pure proportional representation, the hybrid model
proposed by the law commission, and a
preferential system.
Proportional representation is the most
common alternative to FPTP. On the positive side, proportional systems typically
aim to guarantee that each community
has a voice commensurate with its stature
in society. By ensuring that representation
is reflective of support, disenfranchisement
stemming from wasted votes for fragmented opposition parties is prevented.
Second, proportional systems tend to
promote more consensual political cultures. By reducing the possibility of a
single-party majority rule, proportional
systems can align political incentives to
encourage inter-party collaboration. In
order to realistically govern, a party knows
that it needs partners. Although they
compete at elections, the prospect of postelection partnership tends to ensure that
rivalries between parties are less fierce.
On the negative side, proportional
systems can be just as prone to gridlock
as plurality systems, if not more so. This
may render such a system unattractive
for the often-deadlocked Indian context.
To avoid such scenarios, proportional
systems regularly have thresholds built in,
limiting the number of parties to those
that have gained a moderate share of
support (for example, 0.67% in the
Netherlands). This deviates from maximal proportionality, but tends to increase
functionality. Setting the threshold requires proper deliberation, however. If it is
too high it can strongly favour larger

Others

vol l no 50

17

COMMENTARY

of seats elected proportionally would

further improve representativeness, and
reduce the prospect of a majority.
Preferential Systems
Electoral systems can also be built around
preferences. Typically, these i nvolve voters
ranking candidates by preference, rather
than assigning a single vote next to one
name. Initially, all first-preference votes
are counted. If no candidate wins 50% of
the votes, the candidate who receives
the least number of first-preference
votes is eliminated and their votes are
redistributed to other candidates based
on the listed second preference. This
process continues until one candidate
reaches the 50% threshold.
Indias former Chief Election Commissioner, S Y Quraishi, criticises such systems,
claiming, a lead of even one vote is valid
and justifies victory (2014: 385). But,
under such a system, the problem of
vote-splitting and wasted votes is allayed,
as voters rank multiple parties that they
find appealing. In states such as U
ttar
Pradesh (UP), where 166 parties competed and four won seats, this would likely
have had a substantial effect on the
r
esults. There were 16 candidates per

EW

constituency in UP, slightly higher than

the national average (15), but lower than
Haryanas 23. Vote-splitting was thus inevitable; 61 constituencies (76%) were
won with vote shares of less than 50%.
Indeed, the BJP won an overall 42% of
the votes in this state, but 89% of the
seats (Archive of General Election 2014).
Survey data would be required to
assess the moderating effect that a

preferential system might have had on

this 47% seat bonus. But, the prima facie
evidence suggests that the outcome is
unlikely to have corresponded precisely
with voter preferences.
Can Countries Change?
Countries often tinker with their electoral arrangements. Some adjust their
representation thresholds (as Israel did in
2014, raising it from 2% to 3.25%), or apply
artificial seat bonuses (as in Greece,
which awards the victor 50 seats). Moreover, district boundaries are often redrawn
(occasionally for partisan ends, known
as gerrymandering), and legislature sizes
and term lengths can fluctuate.
Electoral systems are rarely overturned, however. Once established, they
often remain fairly constant as political

interests solidify around and respond to

the incentives presented by them
(Reynolds et al 2005: 1). Parties win
office if they have understood and navigated the mechanics of an electoral system. They, therefore, have little desire to
change the status quo; it tends to be parties without power that call for change.
This is broadly the case in the UK. The
historically under-represented Liberal
Democrats recently announced that
they would only join a future coalition
on condition of switching the electoral
system to proportional representation.
This follows their 201015 coalition experience with the Conservatives, when
they were offered a referendum on the
adoption of a preferential voting system.
Relatively few countries use preferential systems: Australias parliament, or
French presidential elections, for example.4 They are more frequent at the subnational level, as in the London mayoralty. The Conservative Party itself uses
such a system. Had they used the simple
plurality rule, David Cameron would not
have won the party leadership.
Despite this, the Conservatives cam
paigned strongly against change in the
referendum, emphasising the apparent

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DECEMBER 12, 2015 vol l no 50 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

COMMENTARY

unfamiliarity and complexity of preferential systems. The proposal was subsequently defeated, as constitutional experts
had predicted, because the public know
nothing about electoral systems, and
care even less (Hazell 2011).
But, the issue has not disappeared.
Following the 2015 election, two other
smaller parties have joined the Liberal
Democrats campaign, after their combined 25% of the vote share culminated
in just 10 seats (or 1.5% of the seat share).
Some countries have successfully overturned their electoral systems, though.
New Zealand switched from FPTP in the
early 1990s, after experiencing extreme
electoral disproportionality in the preceding decades. In 1986, a Royal Commission on the Electoral System published its report that advocated changing to a mixed-member proportional
(MMP) system, which bears similarities
to the parallel system. The new system
was adopted in 1996, after a two-stage
referendum in the early 1990s. Subsequent results have been significantly
more proportional.
The commission considered various
criteria before reaching its conclusion.
These included fairness between political parties, effective representation of
minority and special interest groups,
effective government, and an effective
parliament (Royal Commission on the
Electoral System 1986: 1112). On these
criteria, reform has proven to be successful; representativeness has improved,
while governments have remained effective and the parliament more so. Representation of minorities and women has
increased too (Reynolds et al 2005).
Other countries, such as Indonesia,
have slowly and steadily overturned
their electoral systems. After the dictator Suhartos fall in 1998, a group of
technocrats was charged with changing
election procedures to ensure political
unity and stability amid the increasing
ethnic conflict. Through these initial
alterations and subsequent legislation,
Indonesia has designed an extraordinarily
complex electoral arrangement, which
combines open-list proportional representation, single non-transferable vote,
two-round FPTP for presidential elections, and a set of strict party rules
Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

DECEMBER 12, 2015

that mandate vote distribution requirements, party headquarter locations, and

other obligations. Indonesias institutional change demonstrates the potential for
gradual and consensual improvements
to election rules to address specific
political challenges.
Can India Change?
A common complaint prior to the 2014
election was that India lacked a strong
government. It would seem odd, therefore, to consider changing the system to
reduce the prospect of parties winning
electoral majorities. But, as shown above,
there are numerous reasons to be cautious
of majority rule in fragmented electorates.
The alternatives examined above offer
more representative government, with
potentially more effective governance.
These at least merit consideration.
Reynolds et al note, however, that
discarding a long-established voting system is never an easy process politically,
nor is it likely to appeal to entrenched
interests or to most incumbent politicians (2005: 103). But, it is not impossible.
New Zealand offers a precedent for
breaking away from FPTP and adopting
a replacement adjudged to improve
legitimacy and effectiveness. Indonesia
shows electoral change is both possible
and beneficial for the functioning of
democracy under conditions of diversity
and conflict.
A prerequisite to the overhaul of the
electoral system is informed debate. In
this regard, the impact of the law commissions report remains to be seen. Previous commission reports have made
similar recommendations, to little effect.
Quraishi, meanwhile, devotes just two
pages of his book on Indian elections to
FPTP, claiming that it is advantageous for
the reasons we question above and because it is easy to understand for electors
and counting is simple (2014: 384).
Questions of political reform in India
tend to be kept within the parameters of
the existing voting system. Quraishi (2015)
describes the focus as being directed on
the three Cs of communalism, casteism
and corruption. Other frequent debates
are on how to enhance Parliaments
effectiveness, and improve the behaviour
of the Members of Parliament (MPs).
vol l no 50

These are undoubtedly vital problems

that need to be tackled. But, our contention is that these phenomena are not isolated from the electoral system itself.
Electoral systems produce incentives
that impact behaviour, effectiveness and
representativeness. If the best defence
for Indias FPTP system hangs on its simplicity, it might be time to reconsider.
Notes
1
2

Just four Members of Parliament (MPs) (0.7%)

won the explicit support of a majority of total
electors in their constituencies.
Contrast the performance of the All India
N R Congress, which ran and won in one
constituency, gaining 2,55,826 votes, with the
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which ran in 503
constituencies, but won zero, despite gaining
43,27,460 votes.
Apportioning of votes proportionally can be
conducted in various ways, yielding minor differences. We distribute seat share by vote share,
and only for parties that won votes equivalent
to one seat (party votes > total votes/543).
Independents (who collectively won 3%) lose
out, as they did not constitute an electoral bloc.
Other examples include Papua New Guinea,
Fiji and Estonia.

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http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/statistical_reportge2014.aspx.
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Hazell, Robert (2011): Five Reasons Why the AV
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