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1 Alejandro Sanchez

615 Townsite Drive


2 Vista, CA 92084
760-681-4109
3 Plaintiff
4

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8 Alejandro Sanchez )
)
9 Plaintiff. ) Case No. 10cv0218 BEN WVG
) Judge: Hon. Roger T. Benitez
10 v. )
)
11 Superior Court of The State of California )
County of San Diego North County Division ) PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS
12
Civil Filling Clerks CARLOS; TONY; and ) SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
) CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
13 MARIE individually as well as in her Official ) NORTH COUNTY DIVISION'S MOTION TO
capacity; Clerk Lynn Arthur individually as ) DISMISS HIS COMPLAINT
14 well as in her Official capacity; Clerk Reporter )
Jennifer Stark; Sergeant Thomas Cleary )
15
individually as well as in his Official capacity; )
)
16 Deputy Doug Sanders individually as well as ) Date: April 19, 2010
in his Official capacity; Supervisor Nancy ) Time: 10:30 a.m.
17 Wikoff individually as well as in her Official ) Courtroom: 3 (4th Floor)
capacity. )
18
NCHS Supervisor Tiffani Mauro; Irma Cota
President and CEO, Phil Lenowsky Chief Complaint filed: January 28, 2010
19
Financial Officer, Kevin Ellis Chief Medical
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENTS
20 Officer of the North County Health Services a
Private Non Profit Corporation, Board of Directors
21 of North County Health Services George E. Lopez JURY DEMAND TRIAL
Chair, Melissa Brown Board Vice-Chair, Diane
22 Seaberg Secretary, Rick Martinez Treasurer,
Adriana Andres-Paulson Immediate Past Chair,
23
Andres Martin Board of Director, Clyde H. Beck
24
Jr. Board of Director, Emilio Lopez-Ramirez
Board of Director, Shohre Zaheri Board of
25 Director, Walt Steffen Board of Director. North
County Health Services a Corporation and does
26 1-100
Defendants,
27

28

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 I.
2 RESPONSE TO INTRODUCTION
3 Defendant Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, North County
4 Division is requesting to have Plaintiff's complaint dismiss with prejudice and advances three
5 defenses:
6 1. This action is barred by Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
7 2. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action based on the Rooker-Feldman
8 Doctrine.
9 3. This Court should exercise its discretion to abstain from intervening based on the
10 principles of Younger Abstention.
11 4. Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim against the Superior Court.
12 Defendant Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, North County
13 Division, collectively as, "Superior Court Defendants" allege Plaintiff is challenging the state
14 court judge's handling of that matter (including the order sealing documents which were
15 apparently inadvertently filed...page 1 ln. 1-10).
16 Plaintiff is not challenging the state court judge's handling of the matter at all. Superior Court
17 Defendants further believe there are very few specific allegations against the Superior Court.
18 Therefore Plaintiff will move this court to add the list of Superior Court Defendants to his
19 complaint. Further a list of exhibits that will show the court the pattern of civil rights violation
20 against Plaintiff Sanchez by the Superior Court Defendants. The exhibits will detail the ongoing
21 denial of access to the courts, violations of the American with Disabilities Act violations against
22 Plaintiff Sanchez and other similarly situated disabled persons. Additionally the racial violations
23 against Plaintiff and many more Hispanics by the Superior Court Defendants. Plaintiff will
24 summarize the previous case of Sanchez v. Bergensons Property and lodge a list of exhibits for
25 the purpose of summarizing the events that lead Plaintiff Sanchez to file this action on federal
26 court. The exhibits will demonstrate a the track record or the civil and statutory violations and
27 willful misconduct by the clerks of the Superior Court Defendants.
28 I I.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 EVENTS LEADING TO THE CLAIM AGAINST SUPERIOR COURT DEFENDANTS
2 The harassment of Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez by Superior Court Defendants begin when
3 Bergensons Property owner Berge Minasian made an unlawful detainer against Plaintiff Sanchez
4 (May 8, 2007). The harassment by the Superior Court Defendants has been ongoing since on or
5 about May 8, 2007. All Superior Court Defendants are currently employed at the Superior Court
6 Northern Division acquiesced and were culpable in the wrongful acts and violations of Plaintiff's
7 constitutional rights which, were committed against Plaintiff Sanchez. The first defendants are the
8 clerks of the Civil Filling Clerk CARLOS, TONY and MARIE. These said defendants prevented
9 Plaintiff Sanchez from filing moving and nonmoving papers at the courthouse. As a result of the
10 filling clerks CARLOS, TONY and MARIE denial of "access to the courts," Bergensons Property
11 obtained an illegal eviction against Plaintiff.1 Superior Court Commissioner Ernest Gross was the
12 presiding Commissioner in these proceedings.2 Plaintiff Sanchez was illegally evicted within two
13 weeks out of his home not 60-days or 90-days eviction process as required by state and federal
14 law. Plaintiff was not allowed to adjudicate his rights, he was not allowed to enter the courthouse
15 and when he did enter the clerks would not allow him to file documents. As an end affect
16
1
17 The initial incident stemmed from Property owner Berge retaliation for giving out his phone
number to the former tenants who wanted to recover their rental deposits and for filing
18 uninhabitable complaints against the building with the City of Vista and doctors.
Plaintiff, ‘Sanchez paid his monthly rent as customary on or about 5/2/2007 Sanchez filed a
19
formal Complaint with the City of Vista for uninhabitable conditions in the 8-unit complex;
20 Deputy Building Official Eric A. Dennis took the complaint. (See Exhibit No.1 )
Property owner Berge filed with the Superior Court as dated in the fax of May 7, 2007 at 11:52
21 a.m. a “three day notice to pay rent or quit.” (See Exhibit No. 3 ) This happened immediately
after the 60 – day notice was handed to Sanchez as well as after Sanchez had already paid his rent
22
for the month of May (See Exhibit No. 4). Declaration of Berge Minasian attorney Robert H.
23 Winter Jr. states that, “(2) Defendant Berge filed a Complaint for unlawful retainer against
Sanchez on May 8, 2007 and June 1, 2007 Default Judgment was entered in favor of Defendant
24 Berge (See Exhibit No. 5)
2 Commissioner under oath a declaration stating, "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
25
support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of
26 California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution to the State of California; that I take this
27 obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; that I will well and
28
faithfully discharge the duties of Judge of the Superior Court, the office, upon which I am about to
enter. I certify that I am aware of and will comply with applicable provisions of cannon 6 of the
Code of Judicial Ethics of California Rules of the Court. (See Exhibit No. 6)
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 Property owner Berge Minasian immediately called the Vista Sheriffs to remove the Plaintiff and
2 his entire family from the apartment (See Exhibit No. 2).
3 Plaintiff Sanchez had just arrived from the hospital with his ill daughter that morning when the
4 Sheriffs’ evicted the entire family. As a result of Superior Court Clerks and Commissioner Ernest
5 Gross wrongful, malicious and vindictive conduct and actions Plaintiff Sanchez and his family
6 including his five minor children were locked out of their apartment within seven days without
7 due process of laws. Without any of their belongings, food, clothes, bank accounts information,
8 birth certificates, Social Security Cards, pictures, school records, and many of their confidential
9 documents (See Exhibit No. 7 ). The Sanchez family was left homeless, living in a van without
10 their personal belongings for a few months. Plaintiff Sanchez, his wife and five minor children
11 have been traumatized by the wrongful illegal acts of Bergenson Property owner Berge and Mark
12 Minasian. Berge Minasian could not have succeeded in violating Plaintiff Sanchez constitutional
13 right, due process and access to the courts in this illegal eviction. Without the aid of the Superior
14 Court Clerks and Commissioner Ernest Gross. These Superior Court Defendants set in motion
15 Berge Minasian's illegal acts by their willful denial of access to the courts and by granting Berge
16 Minasian order to have the Vista Sheriff's evict Plaintiff Sanchez a disabled individual within the
17 meaning of the American with Disabilities Act and his disabled children without a due process of
18 law (seven days). What is most egregious is that Plaintiff Sanchez had paid the rent for the month
19 (See Exhibit No. 8). Plaintiff Sanchez, his wife and children were not given a 60-day or 90-day
20 eviction process as required by state law. These illegal actions were intended to injure Plaintiff
21 Sanchez, prejudice and cause harm to his family. Superior Court Defendants (clerk Tony, Carlos
22 and Marie)3 engaged in such egregious conduct, of refusing to file moving documents in the
23 superior court in order to cause injury to Plaintiff Sanchez and his entire family. Superior Court
24 Defendants subjected Plaintiff Sanchez, a disabled person, and his disabled children to cruel and
25 unjust hardship in conscious disregard of his constitutional rights, personal property and the health
26 and safety of his children (See Exhibit No. 9).
27
3
Superior Court Supervisor Holy refused to give Plaintiff the last names of these clerks. Holy
28
said superior court attorneys told her not to release the names of the clerks.
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 Furthermore, Berge Minasian illegally sold all of Plaintiff’s family belongings for the amount
2 of $200.00 including Plaintiff and all of the children’s social security cards, immigration records,
3 medical records, school records and all relevant personal documentation including a vehicle (See
4 Exhibit No. 10) Even when Plaintiff Sanchez served all Defendants including their legal counsel
5 with a Return of Personal Property Under California Civil Code § 1965 on July 23, 2007 (See
6 Exhibit No. 11) by the San Diego County Sheriffs non-levy. On July 28, 2007 Plaintiff and
7 others observed his property being taken by Bergensons Properties employees who stated to the
8 sheriffs that they had purchased the belongings but had no receipt.
9 Plaintiff Sanchez filed a claim against Bergensons Property including Berge Minasian to
10 recover his property and losses (See Exhibit No.12). Plaintiff provided to the Superior Court
11 Clerks and Judge Robert P. Dahlquist copies of his financial losses and bank statements (See
12 Exhibit No. 13). Plaintiff Sanchez had just settled his Workers disability claim and had obtained
13 a large settlement. Berge Minasian knew Plaintiff Sanchez had made large purchases including
14 computers, televisions, furniture etc. beds, couches, most of these items were locked in the garage
15 because Plaintiff Sanchez was planning to move to Mexico with his family.
16 Plaintiff Sanchez also had thousands of dollars in cash in his apartment. Property owner
17 Berge Minasian and his son Mark Minasian were aware of Plaintiff Sanchez Workers disability
18 settlement and illegally ceased Plaintiff Sanchez entire property with the aid of the named
19 Superior Court Clerks , Commissioner Ernest Gross and Judge Robert P. Dahlquist Clerks.
20 Plaintiff Sanchez lost his entire lively possessions including his Workers disability settlement
21 within a few days (less than ten days).
22 Defendant Clerk Lynn Arthur, clerk for Presiding judge Robert P. Dahlquist conduct was
23 egregious, While Plaintiff Sanchez was standing in the court during oral arguments. Defendant
24 Clerk Lynn Arthur was making mocking faces an mimicking Plaintiff Sanchez and his wife.
25 Judge Robert P. Dahlquist clerks hid the documents from judge Dahlquit. At court Presiding
26 judge Robert P Dahlquist asked Clerk Lynn for the documents but she stood silent. Defendant
27 Clerk Lynn Arthur went outside and talked to Sergeant Thomas Cleary, deputy Doug Sanders,
28 and attorney Eydith J. Kaufman chatting and discussed the declarations against Plaintiff Sanchez

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 Judge Dahlquist Clerk Reporter Jennifer Stark was also outside with the above named
2 individuals. Attorney Eydith J. Kaufman went further and visited Plaintiff Sanchez Doctor
3 Lauren Kearney M.D. to pressure Plaintiff Sanchez Doctor Kearney to hand over Plaintiff
4 confidential medical records. Plaintiff requested transcripts or the hearings and paid for them.
5 When Plaintiff Sanchez would go and ask Defendant Clerk Reporter Jennifer Stark for the
6 transcripts she was rude and began to instruct the bailiffs to kick Plaintiff Sanchez out of the
7 court. Defendant Clerk Reporter Jennifer Stark never provided the transcripts, Plaintiff Sanchez
8 paid for them and never received them. Clerk Reporter Jennifer Stark resorted to have him kicked
9 out of the court house by the bailiffs when she saw Plaintiff coming to ask for the transcripts.
10 Defendant Sergeant Thomas Cleary filed a declaration under penalty of perjury against
11 Plaintiff Sanchez . Defendant Sergeant Thomas Cleary declaration amounted to slander and
12 defamation of character and fabricated facts of evidence against Plaintiff Sanchez. Unknown to
13 Sergeant Defendant Thomas Cleary was a video tape and pictures made of the event in question,
14 along with a witness declaration which contradicted Sergeant Thomas Cleary declaration filed
15 under penalty of perjury. Defendant Deputy Doug Sanders, filed a declaration under penalty of
16 perjury against Plaintiff Sanchez. Defendant Deputy Doug Sanders declaration also amounted to
17 slander and defamation of character and fabricated facts of evidence against Plaintiff Sanchez.
18 Also unknown to Defendant Deputy Doug Sanders was a video tape made of the event in
19 question, which contradicted Defendant Deputy Doug Sanders declaration filed under penalty of
20 perjury against Plaintiff Sanchez.
21 On the July 5, 2007 Relief from Default hearing Commissioner Ernest Gross sent Officer
22 Mares and St. Mark Barnel to harass Plaintiff Sanchez his family and friends and witnesses
23 outside of the courthouse. They were asked to leave the building of the Superior Court or they
24 would be arrested and tasered the officers waited outside until Plaintiff and all witnesses left the
25 parking lot.
26 On December 19, 2007 when Plaintiff Sanchez was walking into the Superior Court
27 Supervisor of the Superior Court Sheriff Civil Office Nancy Wikoff yelled at the sheriff, "do not
28 let them in." The corporals did not let Plaintiff Sanchez into the Superior Court. Sheriff Deputy

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 F. Waceteted Badge # 4349 would not allow Plaintiff into the Superior Court to conduct business
2 on December 21st , 2007. Sheriff Deputy F. Waceteted said he was instructed not to allow
3 Plaintiff into the Superior Court by Supervisor Nancy Wikoff.
4 On February 16, 2010 Plaintiff Sanchez was kicked out of the Superior Court along with
5 Alberto and Maria Cadena by Supervisor of the Superior Court Sheriff Civil Office Defendant
6 Nancy Wikoff. Plaintiff was accompanying Alberto and Maria Cadena to the office get
7 information about an eviction notice after the Superior Court had ruled on their favor.
8 III.
9 PLAINTIFF'S ACTIONS ARE NOT BARRED BY ELEVENTH
10 AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
11 Plaintiff will seek to move this court to add Superior Court Defendants, Office Clerks CARLOS
12 , TONY, MARIE; Clerk LYNN ARTHUR, clerk for Presiding JUDGE ROBERT P.
13 DAHLQUIST; Presiding JUDGE ROBERT P. DAHLQUIST Clerk Reporter JENNIFER
14 STARK; Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, North County Division
15 SERGEANT THOMAS CLEARY; Defendant Superior Court of the State of California, County
16 of San Diego, North County Division DEPUTY DOUG SANDERS; Superior Court of the State
17 of California, County of San Diego, North County Division COMMISSIONER ERNEST
18 GROSS; Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, North County
19 Division, Superior Court Sheriff Civil Office NANCY WIKOFF.
20 Plaintiff Sanchez is disabled as defined under the American with Disability Act. On 2002
21 Plaintiff had a left L5-S1 laminotomy and disc excision. Plaintiff had difficulties which resulted
22 in further surgical intervention an further surgical laminectomy and foraminotomies, transformal
23 interbody fusions L4 to S1*** allograft spacers L4-5 and L5-S1, posterolateral fusion, leftniliac
24 bone draft and momarch pedicle segmental fixation L4 to S1. Plaintiff is 100% disabled as can
25 be supported by Dr. Frederick W. Close M.D. , Dr. Bruce VanDam, Dr. Michael Moon and Elise
26 A. Reed. (See Exhibit No. 14)
27

28

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 Plaintiff will separate the unlawful actions of the Superior Court of the State of California,
2 County of San Diego, North County Division and its Defendants apart from the actions of North
3 County Health Services and its Defendants.
4 In Beltran v. Santa Clara County et al., No. 05-16976 the Ninth Judicial Circuit granted, "state
5 actors absolute immunity only for those functions that were critical to the judicial process itself,”
6 such as “ ‘initiating a prosecution.’ ” Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
7 banc) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431)." The court clarified that social workers (in this case court
8 workers) have absolute immunity when they make “discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions
9 but they are not entitled absolute immunity form claims that they fabricated evidence during an
10 investigation or made false statements...signed under penalty of perjury, because such actions
11 aren't similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
12 U.S. 259, 275 (1993). or makes false statements in a sworn affidavit in support of an application
13 for an arrest warrant, see Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129-30 (1997).
14 Furthermore, as prosecutors and others investigating criminal matters have no absolute
15 immunity for their investigatory conduct, a fortiori, social workers (Superior Court workers in this
16 case) conducting investigations have no such immunity. See id. at 126. Further, the touchstone of
17 the absolute immunity analysis is the “nature of the function performed, not the identity of the
18 actor who performed it.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997). Courts grant absolute
19 immunity from liability for suits arising out of the performance of functions that are necessary to
20 the judicial process. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (citing Imbler
21 v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). At early common law, this included most actions of
22 judges, grand jurors, and prosecutors. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-24. Witnesses testifying in court
23 received absolute immunity, but “complaining witnesses,” those swearing to the facts in the initial
24 complaint, did not. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130-31; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489-90 (1991).
25 As was the case with the fabrication of evidence by the Declarations of employees from the
26 Superior Court against Plaintiff Sanchez. Absolute immunity has been extended to the actions of
27 other state actors when they engage in functions that are quasi-judicial. Antoine v. Bryers &
28 Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993); see also Miller, 335 F.3d at 897. However, the Court

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 has not recognized absolute immunity for acts that are “further removed from the judicial phase of
2 proceedings than the act of a prosecutor in seeking an indictment.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 128
3 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
4 IV.
5 SUPERIOR COURT DEFENDANTS FILED DEFECTIVE DOCUMENTS
6 SUBMITTED BY NORTH COUNTY HEALTH SERVICES
7 Along with the documented facts, Superior Court Declarations and omissions mentioned
8 above. On January 15, 2010 Defendant North County Health Services Employee Tiffany Mauro4
9 filed an application for restraining order [WV-1 and WV-120]. The application was filed by
10 Tiffani Mauro Vice President of Operations for North County Health Services [page 4 of 4 of
11 WV-100 9Rv. January 1, 2005]. (See Exhibit No. 15)
12 Tiffani Mauro Vice President of Operations for North County Health Services filed the
13 applications on behalf of North County Health Services representing all employees of North
14 County Health Services (See Exhibit No. 16). North County Health Services is a 501C3 for Profit
15 Corporation. Tiffani Mauro is not a licensed attorney in the state of California to practice law and
16 represent a “Corporation.” Tiffani Mauro is not a licensed attorney to practice law in the State of
17 California to represent, “employees” of a Corporation. The Clerk of the Court for the Superior
18 Court of California, County of San Diego North County Division accepted both [WV-1 and WV-
19 120] applications (See Exhibit No. 17). The documents were entered on January 15, 2010 at 3:12
20 P.M. On the same day the temporary order for a restraining order was signed and dated January
21 15, 2010 by Judge Adrienne A. Orefield (See Exhibit No. 18).
22 Judge Orefield ordered North County Health Services to serve the documents on Plaintiff
23 Sanchez on January 15, 2010 (See Exhibit No. 19) . Plaintiff Sanchez was not served with these
24 documents until after the January 27, 2010, 8:30 a.m ex parte hearing in which North County
25 Health Services tried to cover up the defective application and made the appearance of counsel,
26 attorney Cynthia Sandoval (See Exhibit No. 20). Further Judge Brown ordered the documents to
27 be sealed after the documents were made public on the day they were filed. Judge Brown ordered
28
4 Plaintiff Sanchez will move to add North County Health Services employee Tiffany Mauro to the list of Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 the sheriff to return to the Court the documents filed on January 15, 2010 and not serve them on
2 Plaintiff Sanchez (See Exhibit No. 21).
3 The documents were never served on Plaintiff Sanchez prior to the ex parte hearing. Plaintiff
4 Sanchez was never serviced with the Notice of Complaint or the Memorandum of the Complaint
5 or any supporting documents. On January 26, 2010 Plaintiff Sanchez was notified via overnight
6 mail [letter] of Defendant North County Health Services ex parte scheduled for January 27, 2010
7 at 8:30 a.m. in the morning at Department 7 Judge David Brown presiding (See Exhibit No. 22).
8 Plaintiff Sanchez was never served with a timely Notice of the ex parte Motion or Memorandum
9 of Ex Parte Motion a Proof of Service of either the Notice or the Memorandum of the Ex Parte
10 Communication.5 Further Plaintiff Sanchez was not allowed to participate in the North County
11 Health Services Ex Parte hearing of January 27, 2010 at 8:30 a.m. Plaintiff Sanchez was never
12 served with any moving documents, Notices, Memorandum, proof of service or any supporting
13 documents or notifications of Defendants North County Health Services Ex Parte hearing of
14 January 27, 2010 at 8:30 a.m. 6
15 The Complaint was never served on Plaintiff Sanchez. Plaintiff Sanchez was never served
16 with the Notice of Complaint or the Memorandum of the Complaint or any supporting documents
17 until after the January 27, 2010 at 8:30 a.m. Ex Parte hearing. At the Ex Parte Hearing of January
18
5
Cal Rule (s) 3.1206 No hearing may be held unless applicant serves parties appearing at Ex Parte
19
hearing with Ex Parte Application and any written opposition.
20
6
2010 California Rules of Court Rule 3.1201. Required documents
21 A request for ex parte relief must be in writing and must include all of the following:
(1)An application containing the case caption and stating the relief requested;
22 (2)A declaration in support of the application making the factual showing required under rule
3.1202(c);
23 (3) A declaration based on personal knowledge of the notice given under rule 3.1204;
(4) A memorandum; and
24 (5) A proposed order.
Rule 3.1201 adopted effective January 1, 2007.
25 Rule 3.1202. Contents of application
Rule 3.1203. Time of notice to other parties
26 Rule 3.1204. Contents of notice and declaration regarding notice
(a) Contents of notice
27 (b) Declaration regarding notice
28

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 27 Judge Brown ordered that the documents not be served on Plaintiff Sanchez. Plaintiff Sanchez
2 went into the Superior Court on several occasions to view the file against him but he was denied to
3 view the file by the Superior Court Clerks. The actions of all of the above Superior Court
4 Defendants (clerks) violated Plaintiff’s right to have access to the courts, to view his court record,
5 to be served with the documents, notices, memorandums, declarations and all relevant
6 documentation submitted to the Superior Court against Plaintiff by Defendant North County
7 Health Services employee and Defendant Tiffany Mauro.
8 V.
9 NO HEARING WAS CONDUCTED WITHIN 15 DAYS [FORM CH-150]
10 The Ex Parte hearing of January 27, 2010 at 8:30 a.m. was conducted for the sole purpose of
11 sealing the records filed by North County Health Services Tiffani Mauro. Judge Brown granted
12 these records to be sealed denying Plaintiff the opportunity to defend himself in court. After the
13 Ex Parte hearing Plaintiff was served with the application for restraining order [WV-1 and WV-
14 120]. On the WV-120 application of Tiffani Mauro section page 3 of 4 on section 11 it says:
15 SERVICE ON DEFENDANT (See Exhibit No. 23).
16 The document listed bellow must be personally served on defendant.
17 a. Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining order (CLETS) (Workplace Violence)
18 (form WV-120).
19 b. Petition and Employer for injunction Prohibiting Violence or Threats of Violence Against
20 Employee (Workplace Violence WV-100).
21 c. Blank Response to Petition of Employer for injunction Prohibiting Violence or Threat of
22 Violence Against Employee (Workplace Violence WV-110).
23 d. Blank Proof of Service by Mail or Completed Response (Workplace Violence WV-131).
24 e. Blank Proof of Sale of Turning In Firearms (WV-145).
25 f. Other (specify).
26 12. ORDER SHORTNING TIME
27 Application of an order shortening time is granted and the documents listed in Item 11
28 shall be personally served on the defendant by the date specified in Item 4a.

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1 [4a. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
2 a. Plaintiff shall serve this ORDER to show Cause, the attached Petition for Employer
3 for Injunction Prohibiting violence or threat of violence against Employee
4 (Workplace Violence) (Form WV-100), and any other supporting papers by (specify
5 manner of service):
6 b. Any Opposition papers shall be filed and served on Plaintiff (specify manner of service):
7 c. Any reply papers shall be filed and served (specify manner of services):
8 d. Proof of Service of Plaintiff’s papers shall be delivered to the court hearing the Order to
9 show cause no later than date: 1/15/ 10 signed by JUDGE ADRIENNE A. OFRIELD.
10 All of the Superior Court above Defendants violated all of the procedure mentioned above
11 when Plaintiff Sanchez was not served with the papers ordered by Judge Adrienne Orefield.
12 Further when Judge David Brown ordered the documents above to be sealed January 27, 2010 the
13 violation further became egregious against Plaintiff Sanchez. Plaintiff was not allowed to view
14 the documents filed against him by the clerks of the Superior Court of The State of California
15 County of San Diego North County Division.
16 These said actions violated Plaintiff right to have access to the Superior Court of California
17 North County Division. Further all defendants knew Plaintiff was a disabled man and chose
18 among other things to discriminated against Plaintiff violating his rights under the Americans
19 With Disability Act “ADA.” Along with Plaintiff right to have Due Process and Equal Protection
20 of Laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
21 VI.
22 SUPERIOR COURT DEFENDANTS SUED IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
23 DO NOT HAVE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
24 Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state is not subject to suit by its own citizens in
25 federal court. United States Constitution Amend. XI; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63
26 (1974). Congress can, however abrogate a state’s immunity to suit, or the state can waive it.
27 Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1985). Congress properly abrogated
28 the immunity of the state from suit by applying Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).

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1 The Seminole test contains two parts.” (a) Whether Congress has ‘unequivocally expressed its
2 intent to abrogate the immunity,’ and (b) whether Congress has acted ‘pursuant to a valid exercise
3 of power’ in abrogating the immunity. Id. At 1123 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68
4 (1985). Based on the actions of the above named Superior Court Defendants it is unlikely that they
5 had received any training, followed any practices, policies or procedures (see sample of cases).
6 In Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 708 A.2d 937, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 684 (1998), the
7 Court determined that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not apply to the local board of
8 education in their capacity of supervising students. Id. at 112. The Court reasoned that "[t]he duty
9 to supervise students is performed for the benefit of the municipality," id. (citing Burns v. Bd. of
10 Educ., 228 Conn. 640, 638 A.2d 1, (1994)), and hence did not "operate to control or interfere with
11 activities of the state." Id. (internal citations omitted). Historically, municipal employees have
12 been held personally liable for their own torts. However, the doctrine of governmental immunity
13 has been offered to these employees while "in the performance of a governmental duty, but [they]
14 may be liable if [they] misperform. A ministerial act, as opposed to a discretionary act ... The
15 word `ministerial' refers to a duty which is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the
16 exercise of judgment or discretion." Burns, 228 Conn. at 645 (internal citations omitted).
17 In cases "where the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to
18 act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm" the doctrine of
19 governmental immunity does not apply. Id., 228 Conn. at 645.
20 VII.
21 PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
22 Superior Court Defendants are challenging, "jurisdiction" and believe this court lacks
23 jurisdiction to review state court judgments or rulings under the Rooker-Fedman Doctrine. The
24 Rooker-Fedman Doctrine, was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court twice before Exxon
25 Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries (03-1696) 544 U.S. 280 (2005) 364 F.3d 102. First in
26 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, and in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
27 Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 . In Rooker, plaintiffs previously defeated in state court filed suit in a
28 Federal District Court alleging that the adverse state-court judgment was unconstitutional and

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1 asking that it be declared “null and void.” 263 U.S., at 414—415. In Rooker, the Supreme Court
2 recognized, federal courts as empowered to exercise only original, not appellate, jurisdictions. Id.,
3 at 416. The doctrine has been held to apply to any state court decisions that are judicial in nature.
4 In Feldman, two plaintiffs brought federal-court actions after the District of Columbia’s highest
5 court denied their petitions to waive a court Rule requiring D. C. bar applicants to have graduated
6 from an accredited law school. Recalling Rooker, the United States Supreme Court observed that
7 the District Court lacked authority to review a final judicial determination of the D. C. high court
8 because such review “can be obtained only in this Court.” 460 U.S., at 476. this Court held that 28
9 U.S. C § 12577 did not bar the District Court from addressing the validity of the Rule itself, so
10 long as the plaintiffs did not seek review of the Rule’s application in a particular case, 460 U.S., at
11 486.
12 Since Feldman, The United States Supreme Court has never applied Rooker-Feldman to
13 dismiss an action for want of jurisdiction. However, the lower federal courts have variously
14 interpreted the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and
15 Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with
16 jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law
17 under 28 U.S. C. § 1738.8
18 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, is held as, is confined to cases of the kind from which the
19 doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
20 state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
21 district court review and rejection of those judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise
22 override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal
23
7 28 U.S. C § 1257 (a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may
24 be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in
question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
25 treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
26 (b) For the purposes of this section, the term “highest court of a State” includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
8 § 1738 C. Certain acts, records, and proceedings and the effect thereof No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
27 Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession,
or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State,
28 territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.

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1 courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions. Exxon Mobile Corp. v.
2 Saudi Basic Industries (03-1696) 544 U.S. 280 (2005) id. 284.
3 Unlike Rooker or Feldman Plaintiff Sanchez did not and is not inviting the USDC to “null and
4 void,” or waive court Rules or review the application of the court rules in Sanchez v. Bergensons
5 Property. Defendants further allege Plaintiff statutes of limitations expired for Sanchez v.
6 Bersonsons Property dfts. motion to dismiss pg. 14 footnote 7.9 The Sanchez v. Bergensons
7 Property claims are different than the claims against the Superior Court Defendants. The named
8 Superior Court Defendants were never a party to Sanchez v. Bergensons Property and all alleged
9 violations are different between Sanchez v. Bergensons Property and Superior Court Defendants.
10 Simply because Plaintiff filed a state court action against Bergensons Property in State Court,
11 does not mean that the federal court is forever "off limits." Or that Plaintiff cannot sue court
12 clerks for their wrongful and discriminatory actions against Plaintiff Sanchez that are currently
13 accruing. Even years after Sanchez v. Bergensons Property was disposed by the Superior Court.
14 Since Feldman, the United States Supreme Court has never applied Rooker-Feldman to dismiss an
15 action for want of jurisdiction. The few decisions that have mentioned Rooker and Feldman have
16 done so only in passing or to explain why those cases did not dictate dismissal. See Verizon Md.
17 Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md.,535 U.S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002) (Rooker-Feldman does not
18 apply to a suit seeking review of state agency action) Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic
19 Industries (03-1696) 544 U.S. 280 (2005) 364 F.3d 102.
20 In Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries (03-1696) 544 U.S. 280 (2005) 364 F.3d
21 102. The United States Supreme Court ruled that:
22 "When there is parallel state and federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by the
23 entry of judgment in state court. This Court has repeatedly held that “the pendency of an action in
24 the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having
25 jurisdiction.” McClellan v. Carland, 217, U.S. 268 (1910); accord Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
26 U.S. 922, 928 (1975); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 398 U.S., at 295. Comity or abstention doctrines
27
9
Statute of limitations actually expires on or about June of 2010 and June 2011 under 28 USC
28
Sec. 1658.
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1 may, in various circumstances, permit or require the federal court to stay or dismiss the federal
2 action in favor of the state-court litigation. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
3 United States, 422 U.S. 800 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil
4 Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
5 But neither Rooker nor Feldman supports the notion that properly invoked concurrent
6 jurisdiction vanishes if a state court reaches judgment on the same or related question while the
7 case remains sub judice in a federal court. The Sanchez v. Bergensons Property is not a bar to
8 this court exercising jurisdiction over this case. The Sanchez v. Bergensons Property case was
9 closed in 2007 and the current claims and parties are completely separate and distinct.
10 If Defendants believed the claims in this action were the same as Sanchez v. Bergensons
11 Property they did not raised the res judicata defense. The Rooker Feldman doctrine is not a bar to
12 this court exercising jurisdiction over this case. The only matter pending before is the TRO filed
13 by NCHS and by state law this TRO was supposed to be heard within 15 days (See Court
14 Transcripts Exhibit No. 24). The Superior Court has refused jurisdiction over the TRO and is
15 waiting for the USDC to declare jurisdiction. The TRO pending is irrelevant to the distinct claims
16 against the Superior Court Defendants. Plaintiff had a right to file a removal to this court. The
17 TRO was never heard and no judgment was rendered to the contrary.
18 The NCHS attorney Cynthia Sandoval sent an ex parte letter to Plaintiff Sanchez dated January
19 25, 2010 in an informal notice of an ex parte hearing. The letter states that the NCHS intends to
20 appear ex parte on January 27, 2010 ......to request the following: (See Exhibit No. 25)
21 1. That the original four (4) pages of internal notes attached to NCHS's Petition for Injunction
22 and Application for Temporary Restraining Order ("Application"), as well as any copies
23 made, be returned to NCHS; or, in the alternative,
24 2. That the Court grant NCHS leave to withdraw its Application and the four (4) pages of
25 internal notes attached thereto, return these documents and any copies to NCHS, and
26 permit NCHS to re-file an amended Application without the attached four (4) pages of
27 internal notes; or, in the alternative,
28 3. That the Court permit NCHS to file attached four (4) pages of internal notes under seal.

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1 The NCHS defendants have not filed an amended Application and the Superior Court has not
2 ruled or held a hearing except of the ex parte hearings. In the ex parte hearing the court has
3 refused jurisdiction and under law the TRO was supposed to be heard within 15-days.
4 In Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries (03-1696) 544 U.S. 280 (2005) 364 F.3d
5 102. The United States Supreme Court noted in its opinion:
6 "28 U.S. §1257 does not stop a district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply
7 because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court. If a
8 federal plaintiff “present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that
9 a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party … , GASH Assocs. v. Village of
10 Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (CA7 1993); accord Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163—1164 (CA9
11 2003)." In the TRO the matter has not been litigated and there has been no conclusion or
12 judgment. Both the TRO and the claims against the Superior Court Defendants are matters of first
13 impression to both courts. As in Exxon Mobile Plaintiff Sanchez case surely is not the “paradigm
14 situation in which Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal district court from proceeding.” 364 F.3d,
15 at 104 (quoting E. B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1090—1091 (CA3 1997)).
16 Most of the cases as to, "inextricably interwined," and lack of jurisdiction cited by Superior
17 Court Defendants are pre dated before the United States Supreme Court ruling of Exxon Mobile
18 Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been overused by most courts
19 in the United States.
20 The Exxon Supreme court decision noted that Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or
21 supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to
22 stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions. This decision essentially had the
23 effect of cabining the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and limiting its application, defining it as separate
24 and distinct from both preclusion and abstention doctrine. Furthermore, in the opinion Justice
25 Ginsburg went on to explain that parallel litigation in both state and federal courts does not
26 automatically trigger Rooker-Feldman, and that federal courts must give state court judgments
27 preclusive effect under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S. C. § 1738.
28 VIII.

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1 YOUNGER ABSTENTION IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CLAIM
2 Superior Court Defendants defense is that this court should abstain from intervening in this
3 ongoing state court matter. Yet fail to mention exactly which court state matter the Sanchez v.
4 Bergensons Property or the TRO. In any case Plaintiff Sanchez explained that a pending state
5 court action does not bar federal courts from exercising jurisdiction.
6 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that abstention should be invoked only
7 rarely because federal courts have a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction
8 conferred on them by Congress. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996)
9 (collecting cases); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992); Colorado River Water
10 Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
11 Further in Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries (03-1696) 544 U.S. 280 (2005) 364
12 F.3d 102. The United States Supreme Court noted, "28 U.S. §1257 does not stop a district court
13 from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal
14 court a matter previously litigated in state court. If a federal plaintiff “present[s] some independent
15 claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he
16 was a party … , GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (CA7 1993); accord
17 Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163—1164 (CA9 2003)."
18 Superior Court Defendants position is that this court should abstain based upon the three-
19 pronged principles in Gartrell Construction. The first prong they claim is ongoing judicial
20 proceedings. Sanchez v. Bergensons Property is not an ongoing judicial proceeding. As
21 explained the matter in the body of this answer to Superior Court Defendants the case was
22 adjudicated and finalized on or abut June 2007. What is on going is Superior Court Defendants
23 constitutional violations of denial of access to the courts, violations of ADA and racial
24 discrimination. The claims of violations against Superior Court Defendants presented to this court
25 in this pending action are outside of Defendants absolute immunity and outside of their quasi-
26 judicial duties. There are no judicial proceedings on Sanchez v. Superior Court or any of the
27 Superior Court Defendants in State Court. In the TRO the Superior Court has not exercised
28 jurisdiction but is waiting for this court to take up the matter.

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1 In the second-prong Superior Court Defendants state that, "California has a strong interest in
2 providing and a mechanism to obtain preliminary and ultimately permanent injunction in
3 accordance with the procedures established by the Superior Court. Plaintiff disagree the Superior
4 Court Defendants only interest here is to deny judicial review of the dirty laundry in State Court.
5 Further Superior Court Defendants claim this filed federal case revolves around orders, discovery,
6 disputes and sealing of court records. These issues mentioned by Superior Court Defendants are
7 not at bar here they are minute to the overall claims of civil rights violations committed by the
8 Superior Court Defendants against Plaintiff Sanchez and other disabled persons seeking
9 information of access to the Court. Plaintiff Sanchez has mentioned the incidents as an example of
10 the dysfunction and egregious behavior by the Superior Court Clerks against him.
11 Because Younger is based on the relationship of trust between the federal and state judiciaries
12 and the need to avoid interfering with state tribunals. “Interference” is a key component of the
13 Younger analysis. Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1097-99 (9th Cir. 2001). See, e.g.,
14 Joseph A. v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002). The district court “should not abstain
15 from exercising its jurisdiction based merely on the presence of parallel state and federal suits.” Id.
16 A plaintiff has Section 1983 standing to sue when: “(a) some person has deprived him of a
17 federally protected right, and (b) the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color
18 of state law.” Houston v. Reich, 932 F.2d 883, 890 (10th Cir. 1991).
19 When due process does not obligate the state to establish an avenue of judicial redress (as it
20 holds true in this case based on the lack of response from state regulatory agencies to plaintiff
21 complaints of denial of access to the courts see declarations enclosed), once the state does so,
22 “these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal
23 access to the courts.” Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966). see also Wilkinson v. Austin,
24 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005) (“A liberty interest may arise . . . from an expectation or interest created by
25 state laws or policies”). The Supreme Court has recognized that plaintiffs may suffer an injury in
26 fact when an agency fails to follow specific procedural requirements. Colo. Envtl. Coalition v.
27 Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2004) (Ebel, dissenting) (citing Lujan, infra at 573 n.7 (“There
28 is much truth to the assertion that ‘procedural rights’ are special: The person who has been

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1 accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting
2 all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy”).
3 Superior Court Defendant advance their third-prong, that the "requirement of adequate
4 opportunity to raise a federal issue" has been satisfied because this ongoing matter will be
5 scheduled for a permanent injunction." Yet since January 27, 2010 there is no scheduled hearing
6 and no hearing took place within fifteen days has required by law. Three Superior court Judges
7 (Brown, Orefield, Pressman) have decline to hear the case and they have not declared jurisdiction
8 over the TRO matter (same as federal judges this case was sent to a third judge Rodger T.
9 Benitez). Further, NCHS defendants have not filed the Amended complaint they said they were
10 going to file in their ex parte hearing of January 27, 2010. Based on all of these facts and other
11 facts contained in the body of this response, to Superior Court Defendants motion to dismiss and
12 in addition to all of the exhibits enclosed. Superior Court Defendants have not satisfied the first-
13 prong, second-prong or the third-prong under the principles in Gartrell Construction.
14 IX.
15 PLAINTIFF SANCHEZ HAS STANDING TO RAISE AN ADA CLAIM IN THIS COURT
16 Plaintiff Sanchez is a disabled individual within the meaning of the Americans with Disability
17 Act. Plaintiff alleges Superior Court Defendants denied him access to the courthouse, he was
18 denied access to receive forms, to file moving and non moving papers, the clerk Carlos yelled at
19 him and they were and have been rude to him and other disabled individuals. These actions have
20 prejudiced Plaintiff as well as dozens of other disabled individuals. Plaintiff will submit
21 declarations of other disabled individuals who have been present and witness the events and were
22 subject to the same discrimination themselves.
23 This present claim of discrimination under ADA is separate and distinct form the claim in
24 Bergensons Property. In Bergensons Property Plaintiff claimed that he was discriminated because
25 he is a disabled individual his children are disabled as well and Bergenson's Property owner Berge
26 Minasian discriminated against him because he was evicted when Plaintiff had just paid his rent.
27 Right after Plaintiff paid the rent for the month Berge Minasian went to the Superior Court and he
28

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1 got an order to evict the Plaintiff within seven days. Berge Minasian knew the law required that
2 he give Plaintiff a 60-90-days notice (90-day-notice for disabled in the State of California.)
3 Plaintiff was never given a 60-90-day eviction notice as required by state law. Plaintiff and
4 his children were illegally evicted within seven days by the Vista Sheriffs. Plaintiff filed a claim
5 against Bergensons Property for Disability Discrimination Under Fair Employment and Housing
6 Act "FEHA", Violation of Implied Waranty of Habitability, Economic Damages, Breach of the
7 Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and Inteintional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
8 In this claim at bar Plaintiff has submitted exhibits in support of the fact he is filing an action
9 against Superior Court Defendants not for their, “discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions."
10 Rather for the action outside of their discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions. Once again in
11 the Ninth Circuit Beltran ruling the court that state actors have absolute immunity only for the
12 actions that were critical to the judicial process itself. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 896 (9th
13 Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431)."
14 The actions of the Superior Court Clerks were outside of their discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial
15 decisions. In Phillips v. Hust No. 04-36021 the court ruled that, Under the First and Fourteenth
16 Amendments to the Constitution, state prisoners have a right of access to the courts. Lewis v.
17 Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). “[A]ccess to the courts means the opportunity to prepare, serve
18 and file whatever pleadings or other documents are necessary or appropriate in order to commence
19 or prosecute court proceedings affecting one’s personal liberty.” Id. at 384 (quoting Hatfield v.
20 Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 637 (9th Cir. 1960)). This right “requires prison authorities to assist
21 inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with
22 adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith,
23 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). Jail library Clerk Hust prevented Phillips from using a comb binding
24 machine to bind his Supreme Court Certiorari. By the time Phillips was able to access the comb
25 binding machine and send his certiorari it was too late. The Supreme Court Returned the
26 Certiorari since it was filled late. Phillips sued Hust and won a judgment for denial of access to
27 the courts. The same situation exists in this case when the Superior Court Defendants denied
28

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1 Plaintiff Sanchez access to his records, denied him access to the courts whereby he was stopped
2 by the bailiffs before he entered the court and denied documents essential to move proceedings.
3 When Defendants Sergeant Cleary and Deputy Sanders even filed false declarations against
4 Plaintiff Sanchez they were acting outside of their discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial immunity and
5 powers . When Superior court Defendant Nancy Wikoff does not allow Plaintiff Sanchez to come
6 into the Superior Court. When Superior court Defendant Nancy Wikoff who is the Supervisor of
7 the Superior Court Sheriff Civil Office instructs the superior court bailiffs not to allow Plaintiff
8 Sanchez to come into the courthouse, she is acting outside of her discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial
9 immunity and powers. These actions prejudiced the Plaintiff and his family and caused them
10 irreparable harm. In this federal action Plaintiff asked for a removal into federal court to show a
11 pattern of Superior Court Defendants unlawful actions against him by the Superior Court
12 Defendants who do not follow state law, processes, practices or procedures in accordance with
13 state or federal law.
14 As in Phillips v. Hust No. 04-36021 (9th cir. 2007) the court required three-prongs:
15 "Where a prisoner asserts a backward-looking denial of access claim — one, as here, seeking a
16 remedy for a lost opportunity to present a legal claim — he must show: 1) the loss of a
17 “nonfrivolous” or “arguable” underlying claim; 2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and 3)
18 a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit.
19 See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-14 (2002). The exhibits on submission with this
20 response and attached to this memorandum will support Plaintiffs viable claim of denial of access
21 to the court and actual injuries, damages and statement of the bills (See Exhibit No. 26 ) he
22 sustained due to Superior Court Defendants actions outside of their discretionary, quasi-
23 prosecutorial immunity and powers.
24 Plaintiff Sanchez has satisfied the first prong that he has the right to bring this claim to federal
25 court because it is not a review of judicial proceedings or judgments against him he is asking the
26 USDC to review rather the denial of access to the court and discrimination under the ADA by
27 Superior Court state actors conduct outside of their discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial immunity
28 and powers and as a result of said actions Plaintiff's entire family sustained injuries. Lewis v.

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1 Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) the first element, requiring the loss of a nonfrivolous underlying
2 claim, goes to the plaintiff’s standing to bring suit. To have standing to assert a claim of denial of
3 access to the courts, an inmate must show “actual injury.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. In order to
4 establish actual injury, the inmate must demonstrate that official acts or omissions “hindered his
5 efforts to pursue a [nonfrivolous] legal claim.” Id. at 351, 353, 353 n.3. in order to establish actual
6 injury, a plaintiff “need not show, ex post, that he would have been successful on the merits had
7 his claim been considered.” Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1994).
8 In a § 1983 case, Plaintiff Sanchez will show that the alleged violation of his rights was
9 proximately caused by Superior court Defendants, the state actor. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947
10 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). The
11 touchstone of proximate cause in a § 1983 action is foreseeability. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
12 Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 784-85 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
13 Arnold v. IBM Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981)).
14 If the Constitution requires that prison officials make it possible for inmates to prepare, file,
15 and serve pleadings and other documents essential for pleading their causes. Lewis, 518 U.S. at
16 346. than surely the Constitution should also require that when a Plaintiff represents himself in
17 court the court clerks would allow him to have access to the courts, access to obtain forms, expect
18 that his moving papers be filed not tossed in the trash or belittled by the court clerks or be
19 prevented from walking into the courthouse, or that employees of the Superior Court file falsified
20 Declarations of events that did not occur under penalty of perjury against Plaintiff Sanchez. He
21 had the right to be treated with respect and not be mocked or laughed at while he is standing
22 before Judge Dahlquist.
23 The Court held that an inmate’s constitutional rights, including the right of access to the
24 courts, may be violated by the arbitrary and selective enforcement of otherwise valid policies.
25 For example, in Baumann v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 1985), the
26 state denied an inmate a work furlough on the grounds that the policy establishing his eligibility
27 was not part of a published regulation as required by state law. We held that, although the
28

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1 publication requirement was otherwise valid, “the state cannot arbitrarily deny privileges based on
2 the lack of regulations if it grants privileges under unfiled regulations to other prisoners.” Id.
3 such selective enforcement of regulations could constitute a violation of the inmate’s due process
4 rights if it resulted in a deprivation of a prisoner’s liberty interests. Id. Similarly, in Gluth v.
5 Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1508 (9th Cir. 1991), we held that arbitrarily denying access to a prison
6 library despite space availability could constitute a violation of the right of access to the courts,
7 even if the regulations governing access were arguably facially valid. Leeds v. Watson, 630 F.2d
8 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1980). Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 964 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding selective
9 enforcement of hair length rules against some groups asserting religious exemption but not others
10 could constitute violation of equal protection, despite the general validity of the rules).10
11 This Court has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345, 42 U.S.C. § 12133,
12 and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
13 X.
14 SUPERIOR COURT DEFENDANTS HAVE NO ELEVENTH
15 AMENDMENT IMMUNITY FOR VIOLATIONS UNDER THE ADA
16 Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the State’s immunity under both
17 the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, § 42 U.S.C. § 122002 of the ADA explicitly states, “A State
18 shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment.” See also Duffy v. Riverland, 98 F.3d 447,
19 452 (9th Cir. 1996). Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (1) of the Rehabilitation Act explicitly
20 states, “A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the
21 United States from suit in federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation act of
22 1973. The Supreme Court has previously held that discrimination against the disabled is a form of
23 discrimination protected under the Equal Protection Clause. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
24
10

25
SEC. 202. DISCRIMINATION. 42 USC 12132. Subject to the provisions of this title, no
26
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
27
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
28
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
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1 450. The purpose of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is to prohibit
2 discrimination against the disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 701 (b) (1) (F)
3 (Rehabilitation Act). In both acts, Congress explicitly found that persons with disabilities have
4 suffered discrimination, See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (5) (Rehabilitation
5 Act). Both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act therefore are within the scope of appropriate
6 legislation under the Equal Protection Clause as defined by the Supreme Court. In enacting the
7 ADA, Congress announced that it was acting pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers. See
8 42 U.S.C. 12101 (b) (4). Although “the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not
9 depend on recitals of power which it undertakes to exercise,” Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333
10 U.S. 138,144 (1948), There is great deference to congressional statements. See, e.g., Wilson-Jones
11 v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a clear indication from congress is the
12 simplest way to show that a statute is enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment), amended on
13 other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1997. Even if Congress has not abrogated a state’s immunity
14 under the Eleventh Amendment, a state may waive it. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. One
15 way for a state to waive its immunity is to accept federal funds where the funding statute
16 “manifest[s] a clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded under the Act on a
17 State’s consent to waive its constitutional immunity.” Atascadero 473 U.S. at 247.
18 The amended Rehabilitation Act provides: (1) A State shall not be immune under the
19 Eleventh Amendment…from any suit in Federal Court for a violation of section 504 of the
20 Rehabilitation Act of 1973…. or the provisions of any other Federal Statute prohibiting
21 discrimination by recipients of Federal Financial assistance. 42 U.S.C § 2000-7 The Supreme
22 Court has characterized this section as “an unambiguous waiver of the States’ Eleventh
23 Amendment immunity.” Lane v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092, 2100 (1996) Because California accepts
24 federal funds under the rehabilitation Act, California has waived any immunity under the Eleventh
25 Amendment. The Supreme Court has defined the Equal Protection Clause to mean “that no State
26 shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is
27 essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’ City of Cleburne
28 v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). (Quotation

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1 from Derrick Clark v. State of California, case No. 96-16952D.C. No. CV-96-1486-FMS brief
2 from The United States of America as the intervener). Similarly the Ninth Circuit, held the state
3 waived immunity under 504 by accepting federal funds. Douglas v. California Youth Authority,
4 2001 WL 1412937 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2001). See Exhibits No. 132, 133 134, 135, 36).
5 In Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004) A policy, custom, or
6 practice may also be inferred where "the municipality so failed to train its employees as to
7 display a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those within its jurisdiction." Id.
8 (citing Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). A
9 plaintiff can show municipal policymakers acted with deliberate indifference when they
10 "deliberate[ly] [chose] . . . from among various alternatives" not to provide adequate training.
11 Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Canton v. Ohio, 489 U.S.
12 378, 388, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989)). Such a choice can be shown when "in light
13 of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more training is so obvious,
14 and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the
15 policymakers of the [municipality] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to
16 the need." Id. (citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 389). Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239
17 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2001).
18 XI.
19 CONCLUSION
20 Plaintiff requests that this court deny Superior Court Defendants motion to have his complaint
21 dismissed in its entirety. In the alternative if this Court determines that the TRO is a bar to
22 jurisdiction than Plaintiff asks this court to take up jurisdiction of the other claims not related to
23 the TRO for Superior Court Defendants only.
24 Dated: March 30, 2010
25 _____________________
26 Alejandro Sanchez
27

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