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The United States and Laos

Noam Chomsky
Available online: 02 Apr 2008

To cite this article: Noam Chomsky (1971): The United States and Laos, Journal of
Contemporary Asia, 1:3, 36-41
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The United States and Laos

What lessons have American policy-makers derived from the Indochina War?
The answer to this question will, no doubt, have far-reaching consequences.
In this connection, their experience in Laos is of considerable importance.
The American intervention in Vietnam is generally regarded as a disaster, but
the reaction to the operations in Laos is rather different.
Two specialists in counter-insurgency explained recently that "all the
dilemmas are practical and as neutral in an ethical sense as the laws of physics. ''1
The problem, in short, is a technical one. The goal is to establish the rule of
selected social groups in, the society that is subject to the experiment in counterinsurgency. A number of mi~thods are available, ranging from rural development and commodity import programmes to B-52's and crop destruction, and
the task facing the policy-maker is to combine these methods in such a manner
as to maximize the probability that the approved social order will be maintained. Many critics of the Vietnam intervention feel that the results in Laos
are encouraging. Senator Jacob Javits has commented that "This is one war
that is successful", and Senator Stuart Symington, long an advocate of air
power, regards the results in Laos as a vindication of his position: the bombardment of Norm Vietnam, he has argued, was unfair because there were too
many restrictions on the pilots, but in Laos, "we use the military w i t h o u t
shackles" and the results are more satisfactory. These critics of the Vietnam
war urge that the American successes be publicized. Symington suggests that
this will help overcome the "increasing frustration of the American people
with the war, especially among our youth. ''2
Such reactions illustrate, first of all, the extent to which opposition to the
Vietnam intervention is based on its cost and failure. Furthermore, they illustrate a continuing lack of awareness of the real situation in Laos, as this is
revealed by the testimony of refugees who do not appear at Senatorial Hearings
to contest the claim of Ambassador William Sullivan that only military targets
are attacked, that "villages or any inhabited place [are]out of bounds to the
US air activities", and that "the North Vietnamese are pushing the population
out ahead of them." 3 The evidence that these claims are false is overwhelming,
but scarcely known. In fact, contrary to the judgement of Senators Javits and
Symington, it seems that the "American successes" in Laos are, in part at least,
attributable to the secrecy of the war.
The war in Laos has been an "executive war" in a relatively pure sense.4
News coverage has been slight. Even Chairman Fulbright of the Foreign Rela36

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tions Committee states that he "had no idea we had a full-scale war going on"
until the Senate hearings of October, 1969. Senator Symington too repeatedly
expressed his surprise at the scale of the American war and at the deception of
the executive branch of the government, in this regard. The hearings, released
in April, 1970 with many deletiorjs, lifted the veil of secrecy to some extent.
By that time, the bombing of Laos had been underway for 6 years, at an extremely'high level of intensity for two years. Much of the bombing was in
Northern Laos, far removed from the "Ho Chi Minh Trail". Refugees report
that virtually everthing - towns, villages, farms - has long been destroyed in
vast areas of the country. Such reports have been corroborated by Western
observers, b Many refugees say that they lived in caves and tunnels for long
periods, moving deeper into the forests as the bombing extended in scope.
One Pathet Lao defector reports that the town of Sam Neua was destroyed by
bombing in 1965.
Refugees as well as captured prisoners report that the bombing had little
military significance in the narrow sense. This is quite understandable. PAVN
and Pathet Lao soldiers remain hidden in the forests, far from visible targets.
A Staff Report of the Kennedy Subcommittee (Sept. 28, 1970) concludes that
the purpose of the bombardment was " t o destroy the physical and social infrastructure of Pathet Lao held areas and to interdict North Vietnamese infiltration." The available evidence indicates that the first of these aims has been
substantially accomplished, though not the second. Thus the executive war has
succeeded in two respects: first, in destroying the physical and social infrastructure of Pathet Lao held areas, which still contain over 1/3 of the population; and second, in achieving this goal in relative secrecy, with no grand exposures or detailed reporting of the sort that has plagued the similar effort in
Vietnam.
In other respects, too, the American war in Laos has been a partial success.
The cost has not been high by the standards of Vietnam. The Kennedy Subcommittee Staff Report estimates that "the military was spending, at peak
periods, upwards of ~fi4,680,000 a day on bombing sorties over Laos." Direct
military assistance to Laos is classified, but it would appear to be on the order
of ~;500 million since 1962, reaching over ~;90 million in 1969 and more in
1970. 6 CIA expenditures are of course unknown. The USAID "refugee relief
programme" of several million dollars a year must also be counted as a direct
military expenditure, since it is largely "a programme to support anti-Communist guerrillas in areas which, under the Geneva Accords, were Pathet Lao controlled."7 Nevertheless, military expenditures are nothing like those in Vietnam.
The Kennedy Subcommittee Staff Report cites three "major operational
programmes in Laos" in addition to the bombardment: 1) "The creation of
an American-directed civil administration that parallels the structure of the
Royal Lao Government"; 2) "The support and supervision of a ground war
fought principally by paramilitary groups drawn from highland tribes, such as
the Meo"; 3) "The conducting and supporting of massive evacuations of local

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villagers from Pathet Lao regions in order to deny the enemy population resources."
These programmes, like the massive bombardment, have had a certain
success. The Staff Report concludes that the American-directed civil administration has managed " t o keep the government afloat" and " t o preserve the
shell, if not the substance, of a neutralist government in Vientiane" with
nominal authority "at least in the strategic Mekong Valley region bordering
Thailand." This serves longer range American purposes. US Administration
spokesmen more or less concede that one of the goals of the American effort
in Laos has been to buy time for the Thai elite, which has served as the main
support for American aims in Southeast Asia. 8
As to the ground war, this has been only a partial success. Communist
forces seem stronger on the ground than ever before, and the Meo have been
virtually decimated. It appears that only about half of the Meo population,
400,000 a decade ago, have survived their service in the American-sponsored
ground war. But American casualties have been light, and, consequently, there
is little reaction or concern at home - a necessary component of successful
counterinsu rgency.
The third major operational programme, massive evacuation of civilians,
has contributed to "generating" hundreds of thousands of refugees, many of
whom barely subsist in miserable refugee camps in government-controlled areas.
But this programme has, no doubt, denied certain "population resources" to
the enemy, although many men and women who are capable of bearing arms
have chosen to remain with the Patheo Lao.
In short, though it may be an exaggeration to say that "this is one war that
is successful", nevertheless the combination of secrecy and raw power has
achieved results that have eluded the American forces in Vietnam.
The official position of the US government is that it was drawn into the
war in Laos in response to North Vietnamese aggression, and US government
sources seek to demonstrate that the Pathet Lao are entirely controlled by the
DRV. The supporting evidence is meager and unconvincing.9 The bombardment of the Southern Laos is of course related to the American effort in South
Vietnam, but it appears that the intensive attack on Northern Laos is an effort
to destroy the social base of the Pathet Lao.
Evidence concerning the Pathet Lao and its programmes is scanty, and must,
for the moment, largely be derived from the reports of refugees. 10 In April,
1970, I interviewed refugees who had recently been brought from the Plain of
Jars, and several urban intellectuals who had lived in that area, 1 t and obtained
-nany detailed transcriptions of interviews with refugees from both Southern
and Northern Laos. The information derived from such sources must be treated with caution. Some informants are openly sympathetic to the Pathet Lao.
Most refugees tend to give rather stereotyped responses, and are reluctant to
speak openly to people whom they assume to be representatives of the Ameri38

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can government (or, as one commented, American soldiers in civilian dress).

On several occasions, discussions in a refugee camp were terminated by bystanders when sensitive issues arose. Nevertheless, the reports of personal experiences give a fairly consistent and, I believe, plausible picture of life in the
Pathet Lao zones.
The programmes described by the refugees were rather moderate and lowkeyed. A mild land reform was carried out in the Plain of Jars, a land-rich
area, in 1965. It was followed by efforts to encourage some co-operation
among peasants, leading to mixed collective-private farming, which seems to
have been widely practiced by 1967. There were significant educational reforms. A literacy campaign appears to have been quite successful, and an "
adult education programme was undertaken that included arithmetic and
other skills as well as literacy. The language of instruction in the schools was
changed from French to Lao. Teachers were instructed to introduce what
was called "a liberated style of education" that would "teach people to love
their country". A USAID worker reports that peasants regard the pathet Lao
as "traditionalists", and the emphasis on "the national culture", folk culture,
and so on was stressed by many informants. Teachers report that the level of
instruction was raised in language and mathematics, and that four grades were
introduced for everyone, in principle. A plan to extend education to 7 years
could not be implemented because of the bombardment, which emptied towns
and villages by 1968-9. Mechanical teaching of reading was replaced by instruction with content, dealing primarily with agriculture and practical matters,
and an emphasis on "building our own country and not working for foreign
people".
Some men and women were taken to the nearby town of Phonesavan (first
bombed in 1965 and completely destroyed in January, 1969) for training as
teachers, civil administrators, and health workers. Opinions vary as to the
efficacy of the training. American sources (see note 10) report that Lao and
mountain tribesmen were brought to North Vietnam for technical and medical
training.
A t the same time, peasants were urged to improve production. A wealthy
peasant, rather unsympathetic to the Pathet Lao, said that they were always
made to study:
"They taught us mainly agriculture. One must produce more. Build the economy.
One man should do the work of 10. If you produce more, you can exchange it for
clothes and money. Then we can exchangethe produce with other countries."
Another wealthy peasant complained that "they only respect you if you
have torn clothing." And indeed, the Pathet Lao reforms seem to have primarily benefitted the poor. Peasants were urged to abandon the use of honorific
phrases and to act, and treat each other, as equals. Women were to be treated
equally, and many were trained as nurses and soldiers. Money seems to have
been largely eliminated. Cadres who returned to the village after training were
supported by taxation. All sources agree that the Pathet Lao administration
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was honest, even those who complained of the taxation, study, and other
changes. Refugees commonly refer to the incessant efforts of cadres to persuade, and their avoidance of force or coercion. The major complaint voiced
b~, refugees against the Pathet Lao concerns the compulsory porterage, which
became an onerous burden on the peasants after the bombing drove the
soldiers to remote areas where they could not be supplied by trucks.
Refugees generally report little contact with North Vietnamese, soldiers or
civilians, or even with Pathet Lao soldiers. In 1967, outsiders were replaced
in the Phonesavan area by local cadres drawn from "awakening groups" in the
villages, which were responsible for local implementation of Pathet Lao programrhes.
Villages had a multitude of organisations: administrative, defence, youth,
women, education, irrigation, agriculture, and so on. These elected their own
leaders, and chose representatives to deal with outside experts on such matters
as irrigation.
Apart from Pathet Lao textbooks, which are rather impressive, I have seen
no documentary evidence concerning Pathet Lao programmes. From the evidence available to me, it seems a fair judgement that the Pathet Lao are the
only organized indigenous force in Laos that has any realistic or comprehensive plan for social and economic development, any programme that might
mobilize the mass of the peasantry or provide them with a means for participation in social and political institutions. One can only speculate as to how
successful these programmes might have been, had it not been for the relentless American attack that has, very largely, replaced the hope for progress with
a prayer'for survival.
In the only real elections in Laos, in 1958, the Pathet Lao won a major
electoral victory. By 1961, despite (or perhaps because of) intensive American
efforts at subversion, the political party of the Pathet Lao, the Neo Lao Haksat "appeared to be in a position to take over the entire country." 12 The
counterinsurgency efforts and the massive bombardment have forestalled this
consequence. The cost to the United States has not been great, though the
cost to the people of Laos is incalculable. Furthermore, American policymakers may conclude that such "executive wars", carried out with secrecy,
mercenary troops, CIA subversion, and massive bombardment from impregnable sanctuaries, constitute a successful technique of counterrevolutionary
intervention. This appears to be the meaning of the "Nixon doctrine". If so,
the potential cost to developing countries elsewhere may be immense.

FOOTNOTES
1.Geor9e K, Tanham and Dennis J. Duncanson, "Some dilemmasof counterinsurgency",
Foreign Affairs. October 1969.
2. Hearingsbefore the Symmgton Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Part 3, November 1969, pp.790-2
4O

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3. Hearings of the Kennedy Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Judiciary

Committees May 7, 1970, p.54, 67. For many similar statements, see the Hearings
of the Symington Subcommittee, Parts 2 (October 1969) and 3 (November 1969).
4. For a detailed and persuasive development of this thesis, see Fred Branfman, "Many
more Laoses? Presidential War in Laos; 1964-70" in N.S. Adams and A.W. McCoy.
editors, Laos: Warand Revolution, Harper & Row, 1971.
5.See particularly the reports of Jacques Decorno in Le Monde, June 1968, from Sam
Neua province in Northeastern Laos. Harrison Salisbury of the N. Yo Times transmitted
similar second-hand reports from Hanoi in 1966-7, but they were not generally believed.
Given the information now available, they appear to have been accurate.
6.Syrnington Subcommittee Hearings, October 1969, pp.526, 553.
7.Kennedy Subcommittee Staff Report, p.23. John Hannah, the director of USAID,
has conceded publicly that USAID serves as a CIA "cover" in Laos. June 7, 1970.
8.See the Symington Subcommittee Hearings, p. 564.
9.1 have reviewed what there is in my A t War With Asia, Chapter 4, Pantheon, 1970.
10.There are several American government reports: E.T. McKeithen, Life Under the P.L.,
undated; The Rote of North Vietnamese Cadres, April 1970; P.F. Langer and J.J.
Zasloff, Revolution in Laos, RAND Corporation, 1969. Though heavily biased in
interpretation, these present some data, not inconsistent with the reports of refugees.
See A t War With Asia for some discussion.
11. One verbatim interview appears in Adams and McCoy, op.cit.
12. US State Department Background Notes, March 1969.

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