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CA
FACTS:
July 17, 1982: Agro Conglomerates,
Inc. (Agro) sold 2 parcels of land to
Wonderland Food Industries, Inc
(Wonderland) for P 5M under terms
and conditions:
HELD:YES. CA affirmed.
First, there was no contract of sale
that materialized. The original
agreement was that Wonderland
would pay cash and Agro would
deliver possession of the farmlands.
But this was changed through an
addendum, that Agro would instead
secure a loan and the settlement of
the same would be shouldered by
Wonderland. contract of surety
between Woodland and petitioner was
extinguished by the rescission of the
contract of sale of the farmland
MACHETTI V. HOSPICIO
Facts: By a written agreement,
Machetti undertook to construct a
building for Hospicio de San Jose. One
of the conditions was that Machetti
obtain the guarantee of Fidelity &
Surety Co. to the amount of 12K. It
was subsequently found out that the
work had not been carried out in
accordance with the specifications.
Hospicio refused to pay therefore
Machetti brought an action to recover
the amount.
Held:
Yes, he may be held liable. Order
dismissing the complaint against
respondent Chua reversed and set
aside. Case remanded to court of
origin with instruction to set aside
motion to dismiss and to require
defendant Chua to answer the
complaint.
Ratio:
The comprehensive surety agreement
executed by Chua and Go, as
president and general manager,
respectively, of Daicor, was to cover
existing as well as future obligations
which Daicor may incur with RCBC.
This was only subject to the proviso
that their liability shall not exceed at
any one time the aggregate principal
DINO V. CA
In 1977, Uy Tiam Enterprises and
Freight Services (UTEFS), thru its
representative Uy Tiam, applied for
and obtained credit accommodations
(letter of credit and trust receipt
accommodations) from the
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company.
To secure the aforementioned credit
accommodations, Norberto Uy and
Issue:
WON respondent Chua may be held
liable with Go and Daicor under the
promissory note, even if he was not a
signatory to it, in light of the
provisions of the comprehensive
surety agreement wherein he bound
himself with Go and Daicor, as solidary
debtors, to pay existing and future
debts of said corporation.
limit of its
logic. The argument of respondents ha
s been debunked in the cases of Natio
nal Rice and CornCorporation (NARIC)
v. Jose A. Fojas and Alto Surety Co.,
Inc. and in Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation v. Arro.
In NARIC v Fojas: This defense
is untenable, because in its complaint
the NARIC averred, and the appellant
did not deny that these bonds were
posted to secure the additional
credit that Fojas has applied for, and
the credit increase over his original
contract was sufficient consideration
for the bonds. That the latter were
signed and filed before the additional
credit was extended by the NARIC is
no ground for complaint. Article 1825
of the Civil Code of 1889, in force in
1948, expressly recognized that 'a
guaranty may also be given as
security for future debts the amount of
which is not yet known.
In RCBC v Arro: The surety agreement
which was earlier signed by Enrique
Go., Sr. and private respondent, is an
accessory obligation, it being
dependent upon a principal one which,
in this case is the loan obtained by
Daicor as evidenced by a promissory
note. What obviously induced
petitioner bank to grant the loan was
the surety agreement whereby Go and
Chua bound themselves solidarily to
guaranty the punctual payment of the
loan at maturity. By terms that are
unequivocal, it can be clearly seen
that the surety agreement was
executed to guarantee future debts
which Daicor may incur with
petitioner, as is legally allowable
under the Civil Code.
These cases rejected the distinction
which the Court of Appeals in the
case at bar sought to make with
respect to Article 2053, that is, that
payments, in 1989 it
requestedSecurity Bank a complete re
structure of its indebtedness, which w
asapproved without prior notice to, or
prior consent of Cuenca. Still it was
unable to pay.
DURAN V. IAC
Doctrine: The fraudulent and forged
document of sale may become the
root of a valid title if the certificate
has already been transferred from the
name of the true owner to the name
indicated by the forger.
Facts:
Circe Duran owned 2 parcels of land in
Caloocan City which she had
purchased form the Moja Estate. She
left the Philippines in June 1854. A
Deed of Sale of the 2 lots was made in
favor of Circes mother, Fe. In
December 1965, Fe mortgaged the
same property to Erlinda MarceloTiangco. When Circe came to know
about the mortgage, she wrote to the
Register of Deeds (RD) of Caloocan
informing that she had not given her
mother any authority to sell or
mortgage any of her properties. She
failed to get an answer from the RD.
So she returned to the Philippines in
May 1966.
Meanwhile, Fe failed to redeem the
mortgaged properties and foreclosure
proceedings were initiated by MarceloTiangco.
Circe claims that the sale in favor of
her mother is a forgery saying that at
the time of its execution in 1963, she
was in the US. Fe alleges that the
signatures of Circe in the Deed are