The discourse connective after all:

A historical pragmatic account.

Elizabeth Closs Traugott
Stanford University, USA, traugott@csli.stanford.edu
Paper prepared for ICL, Paris, July 1997

0. Introduction.1
After all has been discussed by Blakemore (1987), Blass (1990), Carston (1993),
and others as a prime example of a non-truth-conditional "procedural marker" (also
called "discourse marker" (Schiffrin 1987), "pragmatic marker" (Fraser 1996),
"connector", "(discourse) connective", "argumentative operator" in much European
work, e.g. Jakobson 1971[1957], Ducrot 1972, Anscombre and Ducrot 1977). In my
view, the purpose of such markers is to "combine viewpoints into structure" (Nølke
1992: 197) and to express the discourse relationship intended by the speaker between
two utterances (by contrast, in relevance-theoretic terms, the purpose is to guide the
hearer toward certain contextual effects--I return briefly to the difference in theoretical
stance at the end). Using constructed examples of the type
(1) a. He is brave; he is after all an Englishman.
b. Tom has left. After all, his wife is not here.

Blakemore proposes that after all in p after all q constructions provides evidence to the
hearer for the truth of p and serves as a reminder of q (Blakemore 1987: 81-82). Blass
adds that q is known to the hearer (Blass 1990: 129). Roulet (1990) highlights the
multiplicity of uses of après tout and after all (he says they behave identically), as a
concessive ("nevertheless"), and as a connective meaning "of course" in some contexts,
"because" in others. He points out that it is often used "in a refutational context" ("dans
une contexte refutative") (342), a point on which I especially build. After all in all its
uses as a fixed phrase is strongly "dialogic" and "polyphonic" (Ducrot 1984: Chap. 8): it
involves "'crystallized' dialogues, and "incompatible viewpoints" (Nølke 1992: 191,
Schwenter, In Progress).
My purpose today is:
a) to further develop a multifunctional profile of after all, with reference to
contemporary American English, in keeping with the increasingly widely accepted view
that "not all expressions which encode non-truth-conditional meaning play the same
kind of role in ... the utterances that contain them" (Blakemore 1996: 326),2
b) to trace the development of after all from a temporal adverb referring to a sequence
conceived as a unitary whole to a discourse marker signaling justification of an attitude
expressed in p, and
c) to argue that a production-, discourse- and coherence-based approach is adequate and
appropriate for an account of the development of after all.

1Thanks to Scott Schwenter for inspiration to study the development of pragmatic

markers, and for illuminating discussion of adversatively. Academic Information
Resources, Stanford University provided the computerized databases.
2See also Kroon (1994), Traugott (1995a), Brinton (1996), Ferrara (1997), among many

others.
I. The synchronic situation.
The following account of contemporary after all is based on a computerized corpus
of top stories issued by United Press International in the years 1990-92; these stories
contain quotations of speeches and also newspaper reporting. In this corpus there are 45
tokens of after all. The usages appear to be entirely characteristic.
Of these 45 tokens, 10 are of the preposition after followed by all NP and are
temporal adverbials, e.g.
(2) It seems incredible that after all these years we're still debating civil rights.
(UPI 4 June 1991)
Two are concessive adverbs meaning "however, nonetheless, despite what was
expected" by some locutor or (hypothetically) the addressee:
(3) The federal fund that finances presidential campaigns should have enough money
to pay for the 1992 race after all, but by 1996 the could be depleted, a new report
said Wednesday.
The Federal Election Commission issued a new projection on how much money
will be available to finance the 1992 primaries, party and general election that is
more optimistic than some previous estimates. (UPI 14 Aug. 1991)

This particular example has no antecedent p, but after all evokes one (there won't be
enough money to pay for the 1992 race), and confirms it later. The concessive presents
an argument q (the proposition), and invites the conclusion r that p (which is implicit in
this case) is not true in the socio-physical world, i.e. it is backward-looking and
epistemic:
(4) concessive after all ("nevertheless") (concerns epistemic truth);
+> q is true
r = p is ~true'
q not expected to be true given p 3

There are two examples that share some of the features of (3), but are purely
procedural connectives, and not restricted to final position (in fact, they are preferred in
proximity with the finite verb). Like the concessive, they signal epistemic counter-
expectation, but they are more complex (both positive and negative aspects of p are
brought into focus), and the logical connection between p and q is less obvious:
(5) Grodin [an actor] also captures the movie star's obsessive concern with his image,
which is, after all, what he has to sell. In a diminishing market, he will do whatever
can to protect it. (UPI, 19 June 1990)

Here q (his image is what he has to sell) must be understood to be not only plausible but
acceptable in a social world of norms given an aspect a of p (a movie-star is being
represented), despite some other aspect b in p (obsessive) which might have led to a

3The usual account as in König (1986: 234):

a. typical form: even though/although p, q
b. entailments: p, q
c. presupposition: if p, then normally ~q
can only be invoked in examples like (3), where p is not represented.

2
different conclusion. On this view, after all marks q as an argument to the conclusion:
"so you shouldn't be concerned about the star's obsessive worries".4
This type is particularly often associated with an implicature of reminder (Blakemore
and Blass seem to overgeneralize the implicature of shared knowledge), because appeal is
made to obvious, inter-personally recoverable, largely societal, norms. There is also an
implicature that the speaker regards q as a decisive factor (see Roulet 1990) that should lead
others to the same conclusion, somewhat like "you know, as we all know, of course" --
"obsessive concern with his image, which is, of course, as we all know, what he has to sell".
I will call this the epistemic "as we know" connective:
(6) epistemic connective after all ("as we all know") (concerns belief/acceptability):
+> q is plausible/acceptable, given some aspect a of p
p is not expected to be acceptable, given some aspect b of p
q is accessible to SP and AD because it is a norm
q is a decisive argument to the conclusion r
r = aspect b of p is to be ignored

By far the most common use in contemporary American English of after all is a
different kind of connective, in which the conclusion is oriented toward p. This is a true
discourse marker in the sense of Fraser (1988), a "deictic discourse marker" (Schiffrin
1990) that is metatextual in function and signals the speaker's discourse strategy:
(7) a comment specifying the type of sequential discourse relationship that holds
between the current utterance--the utterance of which the discourse marker is a
part--and the prior discourse" (Fraser 1988: 21-22).

While richer than: (1a) He is brave; after all he is an Englishman, it has some the flavor
of this constructed example (I have found nothing like (1b)). There are 26 examples in
the UPI data base:
(8) a. The president ... may be able to show strong leadership and strengthen
himself for 1992. Democrats, meanwhile, cannot at this point seriously
attack the president simply for saying taxes are needed. After all, they have
spent more than a year pushing him to take that very stand. (UPI, 26 June
1990).
b. The notion that bombs can strike military targets without killing and
maiming innocent women and children is absurd. If there is war, the Iraqi
dictator can be expected to employ chemical weaponry. After all, he killed
his own people, including Kurdish women and children, with poison gas.
(UPI, 8 Oct. 1990)

4Note that this analysis of after all as selecting aspects a and b for differential evaluation
(a is grounds for acceptability of q, b is grounds for expecting that p would not be
acceptable) differs from Rossari's of a similar situation in French with respect to en fait;
she, however, suggests that the effect of acceptability or at least non-contrastiveness, is
a function of a (in the case cited, a modal), not to the marker en fait itself (1994: 150);
my analysis assumes that selection of the marker (rather than 0) is pragmatically
meaningful, as would be expected from the Manner-heuristic which predicts that what
is specially marked is marked to convey a special meaning.

3
This kind of Discourse Marker use can as a first pass be said (and has been said, see
Blakemore 1987, Blass 1990) to serve to signal that q is a justification for p (the
speaker's reason for saying p--Sweetser might call this a "speech act" use (Sweetser
1990), but I prefer to call it a locutionary use).
Though partially correct, this characterization misses an important point. The
justification is actually not of p, but of some expression of the speaker's subjective
attitude in p, often negative and/or modal (cannot and may be able in (8a), can in (8b))
or an evaluative lexeme (seriously in (8a), absurd, dictator in (8b)). q is marked as the
justification of the speaker's subjective attitude expressed in p to another locutor's
(including the speaker's own in another role) point of view (expressed by the bare, non-
evaluated proposition in p).
Although it may conversationally imply that information in q is known to the
addressee, it does not necessarily do so. The strongest implicature is "You might have
thought of this in relation to p". Information in q typically comes from a different
lexical, experiential, and knowledge-based set than the bare proposition stripped of the
speaker's subjective modality and attitude. The further the logical distance of the
content of q is from p, the higher the likelihood the speaker will convey a sense of
superiority and condescension, even dismissiveness or verbal play ("despite the fact that
you can't put these two things together, I can!" and "aren't I being funny/clever/cute?").
This is one of the things that differentiates it from locutionary because (which can be
substituted (Blakemore 1987) but which conveys none of the subjective attitude of after
all):

(9) DM after all 'because' (concerns metatextual stance)

+> q justifies some evaluative aspect of p
(at the metatextual level) q is an argument for the validity of the
speaker's reasoning

In summary, I have identified the following uses of after all:

(10) a. temporal (only as preposition introducing all NP) (2)
b. concessive adverb (3) "nevertheless"; concerns epistemic truth
c. epistemic connective (5) "as we all know"; concerns epistemic belief/
acceptability
d. discourse marker (7) "because"; justification of some aspect a of p

II. The diachronic development

I turn now to the question of how these uses came into being (for related studies see
Traugott 1989, Powell 1992, Brinton 1996, Rossari 1996, Jucker 1997 among others).
After was a spatial ("behind") and temporal ("later") preposition in Old English. In the
context of certain nouns it could indicate "in conformity with":
(11) Hou that men schal the wordes pike after the forme of eloquence.
'How people shall pick the words according to the form of eloquence'
(c. 1393 Gower, Confessio Amantis 4.2651 [MED after 8])

4
The first example in my data base of after all as an adverb is from the 16thC, and it is
temporal:

Stage I: Temporal Adv

(12) [about the funeral of the Bishop of Winchester] and my lord bysshope Bonar
of London did syng masse of requiem, and doctur Whyt bysshope of Lynkolne
dyd pryche at the sam masse; and after
'... and after it was all over they went to his place to dinner'
(c1560 Machyn, Diary p. 97)

Here there is an implicature of normative sequence or "natural order". This non-adversative

meaning of 'finally', 'on top of all that' occurs sporadically in the data, with reference not
only to time but to sequences of argument, but is always preceded by and. An early
example comes from a long "apology" by Dryden concerning his play, The Conquest of
Granada, that he feels was misunderstood. Over the course of two pages he shows how
earlier criticism of the play had been addressed, goes on to say that the most recent charge
is that one of the characters, Almanzor, "performs impossibilities", and finally claims:
(13) but, 'tis far from being impossible. Their King had made himself contemptible
to his people, as the History of Granada tells us. And Almanzor, though a
stranger, yet, was already known to them, by his gallantry in the Juego de
toros, his engagement on the weaker side, and, more especially, by the
character of his person, and brave actions, given by Abdalla just before. And,
after all, the greatness of the enterprise consisted only in the daring: for, he had
the King's guards to second him.
(1672 Dryden, Dedication, Conquest of Granada, p. 30)

Here and, after all, can only mean 'and in the end' (in terms of the temporality of the plot) or
'finally' (in terms of Dryden's argument).5 There may be a conversational implicature from
after all of adversativity, but it is derived largely from the general discourse strategy. The
adverbial does not paraphrase as 'nonetheless', or 'as we all know', or 'because'.
However, by the beginning of the seventeenth century a few uses can be found of the
temporal preposition after followed by NP, in which the sequence of events can indeed be

5Carston (1993: 39-40) argues that after all is not "embeddable in an and-conjunction".
Her example is *He'll pass the French exam and after all he is a native speaker. The 22
instances of and after all in my data are either of the type in (13), or of a type not
usually mentioned: signals of topic resumption (cf. the major function of anyway
according to Ferrara 1997), e.g.
I wish him very happy; and I am so sure of his always doing his duty, that though
now he may harbour some regret, in the end he must become so. Lucy does not
want sense, and that is the foundation on which every thing good may be built. ---
And after all, Marianne, after all that is bewitching in the idea of a single and
constant attachment, and all that can be said of one's happiness depending entirely
on any particular person, it is not meant --- it is not fit --- it is not possible that it
should be so. ---(1811 Austen, Sense, Vol. III, p. 263)
This is a topic-resumption, picking up the thread of the justification for saying I wish
him very happy.

5
interpreted as implying that the expected order of events has been violated and that the
outcome is not normative:
(14) a. (the Duke has disguised himself to test Angelo, and has said treasonable
things about himself)
Lucio: Do you remember what you said of the Duke? ... was the Duke a flesh-
monger, a fool, and a coward, as you then reported him to be? ... Did
not I pluck thy nose for thy speeches?
Duke: I protest I love the Duke as I love myself.
Angelo: Hark how the villain would close now, after his treasonable abuses!
(1604 Shakespeare Measure for Measure V. 1. 330)
b. Really, Madam, says Robin, I think 'tis hard you should Question me upon
that Head, after all I have said.
(1722 Defoe, Moll Flanders, p. 54)

Over the course of the century, this dialogic, adversative and concessive of after all
develops from a contingent conversational implicature into a generalized one; it is the
crucial step toward the concessive adverbial and epistemic connective, which are attested at
about the same time.6 By the end of the century we find:

Stage IIa: Concessive (sentential adverb ["IPAdv"])

(15) Why, if she should be innocent, if she should be wronged after all?
(1700 Congreve, Way of World, Act V)

The use of after all, with its generalized quantifier all and temporal after has lexical
properties in common with two of the major cross-linguistic sources7 for concessives
identified by König (1985: 10-11), cf. in English al-be-it, although, however, nevertheless
(see also Rudolph 1996: 381 on the frequency with which temporality "can adopt a
secondary adversative meaning which in some cases can become so strong that it covers the
original meaning"). From a temporal perspective, the move is from 'at the end' > 'in the

6Note we cannot derive the concessive and justifcational after all's in any natural way from
after all that has been said and done in the way that Blass (1990: 129) seems to suggest. The
latter, out of context, implies a normative sequence. As (14b) shows, in context "after all
(that) has been said" is adversative in use, cf. also:
(14) c. Such a difference of prices, which it seems is not always sufficient to transport a
man from one parish to another, would necessarily occasion so great a transportation
of the most bulky commodities, not only from one parish to another, but from one
end of the kingdom, almost from one end of the world to the other, as would soon
reduce them more nearly to a level. After all that has been said of levity and
inconstancy of human nature, it appears evidently from experience that a man is of
all sorts of luggage the most difficult to be transported.
(1776 Smith, Wealth of Nations Bk I, Ch. 8. Par. 31)
7The others are: conditionals (Gm. ob-gleich), expressions of co-existence or similarity
in space or time, (Gm. gleichwohl, Fr. tout de même, Turk bununla beraber 'together
with this'), or obstinacy, spite (despite, Arab. ragman < 'compel'. $$macron over g).

6
end'; the quantifier specifies "re-examination" of all that preceded, not just the immediately
prior p (Rossari 1994: 20).

Stage IIb: Epistemic connective (sentential adverb)

(16) a. This I am certain, I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any
authority in the ensuing discourse: Truth has been my only aim, and wherever
that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without
minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or no. Not that I want
("lack") a due respect to other men's opinions; but, after all, the greatest
reverence is due to truth.
(1690 Locke, Essay Hum Und, Bk 1, Chap. 4, Sect 23)

Note here after all follows adversative but: "I don't lack a due respect to others' opinions;
however, as we all know, the greatest reverence is due to truth". This is an argument to the
conclusion that people who think he lacks due respect for other people's opinions are
wrong.
(16) b. Mill: Prithee, don't look with that violent and inflexible wise face, like
Solomon at the dividing of the child in an old tapestry hanging.
Mir: You are merry, madam, but I would persuade you for one moment to
be serious.
Mill: What, with that face? No, if you keep your countenance, 'tis impossible
I should hold mine. Well, after all, there is something very moving in
a love-sick face. Ha, ha, ha!. Well, I won't laugh. Don't be peevish.
(1700 Congreve, Way of the World, Act II)

"I can't be serious because you look so ridiculous; however, as we all know, there is
something moving in a love-sick face (joke! because that's a cliché); so I won't laugh". Note
these early examples are more strongly truth-oriented than the later ones, which are
weakened, partly by generalization to non-negative contexts, but they already focus on
some aspect a of p (due in (16a), should (= be able) in (16b), and they invoke social norms.

Stage III: DM, justification

Justification appears a short time later:
(17) a. You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this way of explaining
things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any reasonable man.
(1713 Berkeley, Dial. 2, p. 210)

Here after all justifies you need not, and follows for, which signals locutionary 'because'.
Later after all can occur in this meaning without for:
(17) b. He told himself he was too pampered, too spoilt by civilization, ever to
inhabit nature again; and that made him sad, in a not unpleasant bitter-sweet
sort of way. After all, he was a Victorian.
(1969, Fowles, French Lieut's woman, p. 63 [Rudolph 1996: 449])8

8Rudolph suggests a contrast here, but after all subjectively justifies too ... to inhabit
nature again.

7
 As in the case of the development of other DM's like indeed, in fact, actually,
besides, and especially anyway (Traugott 1995a), an originally VP adverbial operating
truth-conditionally with reference to the socio-physical world, was recruited for use at
the sentential level as an epistemic, and then at the locutory level as a DM. The changes
once again illustrate shifts of the kind Sweeter (1990) identified for modals and
connectives like because from what she calls socio-physical > epistemic > speech acts
world. Once again they illustrate subjectification from objective meanings of sequence
to subjective meanings ostensibly presented as normative, to fully personal, subjective
meanings "I know" (Traugott 1995b). And once again they illustrate the role of
redundancy in changes -- implicatures that became salient in the community, such as
non-normative outcomes of sequences, led in certain types of dialogic discourse (games
of wit in the Congreve case, philosophical monolog of a dialogic kind) to new uses in
contexts that unambiguously highlighted the intended meaning (but for concessive of
course, for for causal 'because"). Explicit redundancy is a necessary factor in early
stages of development! So is change in the constraints on syntactic behavior, but I
cannot go into that here, except to note that temporals are VP adverbs (typically in
clause-final position), epistemics are sentential adverbs (often in clause-medial position,
and certainly after the complementizer), and markers of justification are discourse
markers (in initial position).

(18) Stage I Stage II Stage III

Temporal Epistemic Locutionary
IIa: concessive
IIb: connective
Objective Subjective/Normative Subjective/Personal
VPAdv IPAdv DM

III. Conclusion
A study of historical texts suggest that the agents of change are individuals post-
puberty developing discourses based on reasoning and dialogic use, whether in dialog
or monolog (see Bakhtin 1981, Roulet 1984 inter alia for these distinctions). The
motivating factor is strategic use of extant adverbs to respond to points of view, or to
set up points of view and then refute them. Here is no change of point of view (Roulet
1990), but deliberate strategic dialectic.
Relevance theorists and others who focus on interpretation (e.g. Wilson & Sperber
1993, Rouchota 1996, Moeschler 1993, 1996) have argued that their theory is more
adequate to an account of pragmatic markers than discourse- and coherence-based
approaches (e.g. Ducrot 1980, Halliday & Hasan 1976, Fraser 1988). Reasons given
include the claim that relevance-theory conceptualizes discourse, especially
conversation, as process, and context as non-linguistic as well as linguistic, to which
hearers have access to interpretation via inferences. By contrast, discourse- and
coherence-based approaches are said to conceptualize discourse as sequence or text (i.e.
type-unit or product) and context as linguistic.
The historical data show that the contexts in which new uses of old form-meaning
pairs arise are clearly linguistic: the new meanings (new exploitation of implicatures)
are reinforced by juxtaposition with connectives that sharply constrain the implicatures.
This may be surprising to those who think of change as "discourse > syntax" or

8
"parataxis > hypotaxis" "asyndetic > syndetic" (see Givón 1979, Lehmann 1995[1982];
for arguments against such points of view, see Harris and Campbell 1995, Tabor and
Traugott, In Press). However, as we have seen, where individual lexemes or
constructions are concerned, implicatures that arise in on-line verbal utterances or
writings are initially recruited to extant linguistic contexts for discourse purposes. In
these contexts they are largely redundant. Once the new usage has been accepted by the
community, such redundant cues may be reduced or allowed to be less directly explicit
(though as we have seen from the contemporary data, they tend to be very much part of
the fabric of the discourse and of the context in which interpretation is to occur).9
Absent direct collocation with redundant cues signaled by other connectives or DM's
they "actively help to construct that very context" (Hansen 1996: 108). Ultimately, they
may even come to be used in the absence of an overt prior p (see Roulet 1990 on après
tout, Blakemore 1996 on after all, so, but), or even serve as a whole turn (indeed, so,
because--this is restricted to older discourse markers; newer ones like after all, in fact
cannot do this).10
Discourse- and coherence-based approaches can focus on process. They can also
define discourse markers as linking overt or presupposed discourse units. Historical
pragmatics certainly does, with focus on how coherent textuality can arise through the
exploitation of such processual neo-Gricean heuristics as such as "Say no more than
you must and mean more thereby" (Grice's Quantity 2, variously called the
I(nformation) Principle (Atlas & Levinson 1981, Levinson 1983) or the R(elevance)
Principle (Horn 1984, Traugott and König 1991)). I suggest that, using the principle of
Occam's razor, which is frequently referred to in relevance-theoretic discussions, but for
a different purpose, the most adequate theory is the one that accounts for the most
aspects of language, including language change, in other words, a theory based on
speakers producing discourse, rather than on hearers processing it. The ultimate
theoretical distinction to be made, I believe, is not between process and product, but
between interpretation (espoused especially by relevance theorists) and production
(espoused especially by neo-Griceans). This issue is not merely one of perspective,
since both theories must of course consider speakers and hearers, but one of who does
the work, speaker or hearer. The historical data point over and over again to the
speaker.11

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to Scott Schwenter for inspiration to study the development of

pragmatic markers, and for illuminating discussion of adversativity.
Academic Information Resources, Stanford University provided the
computerized data bases.

9See Blass (1996) on redundancy.

10This would take me too far afield, but I doubt that there is a real distinction to be
based on whether a DM can or cannot initiate a turn, despite efforts to find such a
distinction in Rossari 1994, Blakemore 1996).
11In a sociolinguistic synchronic study, Ferrara distinguishes speaker- and hearer-

triggered uses of anyway; she finds that the major function of DM anyway is speaker-
triggered management of the discourse (1997: 374).

9
 REFERENCES

Anscombre, Jean-Claude and Oswald Ducrot. 1989. Argumentativity and informativity.

In Michael Meyer (ed.), From Metaphysics to Rhetoric. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Bakhtin, M. M. 1981. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, ed.
Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University
of Texas Press.
Blakemore, Diane. 1987. Semantic Constraints on Relevance. Oxford: Blackwell.
Blakemore, Diane. 1988. So as a constraint on relevance. In Ruth Kempson (ed.), Mental
Representation: The Interface between Language and Reality, 183-195. Cambridge:
CUP.
Blakemore, Diane. 1996. Are apposition markers discourse markers? Journal of Linguistics
32: 325-48.
Blass, Regina. 1996. Relevance Relations in Discourse. Cambridge, UK: CUP.
Brinton, L. J. 1996. Pragmatic Markers in English: Grammaticalization and Discourse
Functions. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Carston, Robyn. 1993. Conjunction, explanation and relevance. Lingua 90: 27-48.
Ducrot, Oswald. 1972. Dire et ne pas dire. Paris: Hermann.
Ducrot, Oswald. 1984. Le dire et le dit. Paris: Minuit.
Ferrara, Kathleen W. 1997. Form and function of the discourse marker anyway:
implications for discourse analysis. Linguistics 35: 343-78.
Fraser, Bruce. 1988. Types of English discourse markers. Acta Linguistica Hungarica
38: 19-33.
Fraser, Bruce. 1996. Pragmatic markers. Pragmatics 6: 167-190.
Givón, Talmy. 1979. On Understanding Grammar. N. Y.: Academic Press.
Grice, H. Paul. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan, eds.
Syntax and Semantics III: Speech Acts, 41-58.
Halliday, M. A. K. and Ruqaia Hasan. 1976. Cohesion in English. London: Longman.
Hansen, Maj-Britt Mosegaard. 1996. Discourse particles in spoken French. In Hansen
and Skytte, eds., 105-49.
Hansen, Maj-Britt Mosegaard and Gunver Skytte, eds. 1996. Le discours: Cohérence et
connexion. Actes du Colloque international Copenhague le 7 Avril 1995.
Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
Harris, A. C. and L. Campbell. 1995. Historical Syntax in Cross-Linguistic Perspective.
Cambridge, UK: CUP.
Jakobson, Roman. 1971[1957]. Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian verb".
Selected Writings, II: 130-147. The Hague: Mouton.
Jucker, Andreas H. 1997. The discourse marker well in the history of English. English
Language and Linguistics 1: 91-110.
König, Ekkehard. 1985. On the history of concessive connectives in English diachronic
and synchronic evidence. Lingua 66: 1-20.
König, Ekkehard. 1986. Conditionals, concessive conditionals and concessives: Areas
of contrast, overlap and neutralization. In Elizabeth Closs Traugott, Alice ter
Meulen, Judy Snitzer Reilly, and Charles A. Ferguson, eds., On Conditionals, 229-
46. Cambridge, UK: CUP.

10
Kroon, Caroline. 1995. Discourse Particles in Latin: A Study of Nam, Enim, Autem,
Vero and At. (Amsterdam Studies in Classical Philology 4.). Amsterdam: J.C.
Gieben.
Lehmann, C. 1995[1982]. Thoughts on Grammaticalization. Munich: LINCOM
EUROPA (originally published as Thoughts on Grammaticalization: A Programmatic
Sketch, Vol. 1. University of Cologne: Arbeiten des Kölner Universalienprojekts 49).
Levinson, Stephen C. 1995. Three levels of meaning. In F. R. Palmer, ed., Grammar
and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Sir John Lyons, 90-115. Cambridge: CUP.
Moeschler, Jacques. 1993. Relevance and conversation. Lingua 90: 149-71.
Moeschler, Jacques. 1996. Les connecteurs pragmatiques et la cohérence
conversationelle. In Hansen and Skytte, eds., 15-32.
Nølke, Henning. 1992. Semantic constraints on argumentation: From polyphonic micro-
structure to argumentative macro-structure. In F. H. van Eemeren et al., eds.,
Argumentation Illuminated. Amsterdam: SICSAT.
Powell, M. J. 1992. "The Systematic Development of Correlated Interpersonal and
Metalinguistic Uses in Stance Adverbs. Cognitive Linguistics 3: 75-110.
Rossari, Corinne. 1994. Les opérations de reformulation: Analyse du processus et des
marques dans une perspective contrastive français - italien. Bern: Peter Lang.
Rossari, Corinne. 1996. Considérations sur la méthodologie contrastive français-italien:
A propos de locutions adverbiales fonctionnant comme connecteurs. In Hansen and
Skytte, eds., 55-68.
Rouchota, Villy. 1996. Discourse connectives: What do they link? Paper given at the
International Conference on Pragmatics, Mexico City, July.
Roulet, Eddy. 1984. Speech acts, discourse structure, and pragmatic connectives.
Journal of Pragmatics 8: 31-47.
Roulet, Eddy. 1990. Et si, après tout, ce connecteur pragmatique n'était pas un marqueur
d'argument ou de prémise impliquée? Cahiers de linguistique française 11: 329-43.
Rudolph, Elisabeth. 1996. Contrast: Adversative and Concessive Relations and their
Expressions in English, German, Spanish, Portuguese on Sentence and Text Level.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Schiffrin, Deborah. 1987. Discourse Markers. Cambridge: CUP.
Schiffrin, Deborah. 1990. Between text and context: Deixis, anaphora, and the meaning
of then. Text 10: 245-270.
Schwenter, Scott. In Progress. The Pragmatics of Conditional Marking: Implicature,
Scalarity, and Exclusivity. Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University.
Sweetser, Eve E. 1990. From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural
Aspects of Semantic Structure. Cambridge, UK: CUP.
Tabor, W. and E. C. Traugott. Forthcoming. "Structural Scope Expansion and
Grammaticalization". In A. G. Ramat and P. J. Hopper, eds., The Limits of
Grammaticalization. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1989. On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: An
example of subjectification in semantic change, Language 57: 33-65.
Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1995a. The role of discourse markers in a theory of
grammaticalization. Paper presented at the Twelfth International Conference on
Historical Linguistics, Manchester, UK, August 1995.

11
Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1955b. Subjectification in grammaticalization. In Dieter
Stein and Susan Wright, eds., Subjectivity and Subjectivisation in Language, 31-54.
Cambridge, UK: CUP.
Traugott, Elizabeth Closs and Richard Dasher. In Progress. Regularity in Semantic
Change.
Traugott, Elizabeth Closs and Ekkehard König. 1991. The semantics-pragmatics of
grammaticalization revisited. In Elizabeth Closs Traugott and Bernd Heine, eds.,
Approaches to Grammaticalization, I: 189-218. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. 1993. Linguistic form and relevance. Lingua 90: 1-
25.

12