J.

Loss

Prev.

Proress

Ind.

Vol.

8. No.

5. pp.

291-297,

Elsevier
Printed

0950-4230(95)00035-6

09504230/95

Fires, explosions and related incidents

work in 1992-1993

1995

Science

in Great

Ltd

Britain

S IO.00

+ 0.00

at

K. A. Owens and J. A. Hazeldean

Technical
and Health Sciences
Division,
House, Bootle, Merseyside,
L20 3QZ

Health

and

Safety

Executive,

Magdalen

Incidents in Great Britain reported to the Health and Safety Executive during 1992-1993
involving fires, explosions,
runaway
chemical
reactions and unignited
releases of flammable
materials
are reviewed.
Statistical
comparisons
are made against previous years based on the materials
involved,
and a number
of common
themes and causes are identified.
Keywords: fires; explosions;

unignited

releases; exothermic

This paper summarizes fires, explosions and related incidents reported to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
in 1992-1993. It originally formed part of a review submitted to the Advisory Committee
on Dangerous
Substances by the Explosives
and Flammables
Unit of
HSEs Technology
and Health Sciences Division.
The information
was compiled from an analysis of
accidents
and dangerous
occurrences
reported to the
HSE under Regulation
3 of the Reporting
of Injuries,
Diseases and Dangerous
Occurrences
Regulations
1985
(RIDDOR).
An HSE booklet describes
the types of
accidents and injuries reportable under RJDDOR. This
paper
also includes
information
on incidents
that
involved
the manufacture,
keeping
and carriage
of
explosives.
These incidents were reported to the HSE
under Section 63 of the Explosives Act 1875 and Regulation 12(2) of the Road Traffic (Carriage of Explosives)
Regulations
1989.
The HSE investigates
accidents and seeks to ensure
that any safety lessons are learned by the company concerned to prevent similar accidents from occurring again.
Additionally,
the HSE communicates
findings from accident reports and investigations
more widely in guidance
booklets and other forms of advice. The information
collected may also be used to identify the need for new
guidance and research, and to support national and international standards. The purpose of publishing this report
is to draw further attention to the hazards of flammable
materials and common accident scenarios in the hope
that readers may recognize particular situations and take
action before an accident occurs.

reactions; carriage

releases of flammable materials. They occurred during

work activities at premises and sites where the Field
Operations
Division
(Factory, Agriculture
and Quarry
Inspectorates)
and the Explosives
Inspectorate
of the
HSE enforce the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act
1974. The 675 injuries
(including
2 1 fatalities)
that
resulted from fires or explosions are a subset of 147 374
injuries (including 405 fatalities) suffered in all types of
accidents reported to the HSE.
There are an estimated 700000 fixed premises and
an additional
unquantifiable
number of transient sites
where the Field Operations
Division has enforcement
responsibility.
An estimated
15 million
people are
employed at these locations, and, of these, around 4.5
million
are employed
in manufacturing
industries.
Explosives
are manufactured
in about 124 licensed
explosives
factories,
varying
in size from
those
employing
one or two people to those employing
over
1000 people. In addition,
explosives
are held in 98
magazines licensed by the Explosives Inspectorate,
and
around 200 companies are involved in carrying explosives by road.
Some of the main types of accidents, and those that
caused or had the potential
to cause serious consequences, have been broken down into the main categories reported below and the overall ranking is shown in

Table 1 Categories of accidents

Category
Flammable liquids
Flammable gases
Flammable solids
Liquefied petroleum gas
Exothermic reactions
Explosives

Overall statistics
The accidents reported in this review occurred in the
period 1 April 1992 to 31 March 1993 and involved fires,
explosions,
runaway chemical reactions and unignited

291

% of total incidents

Fatalities

32%
23%

18%

6%
3%
5%

0
5
1

292

Fires, explosions

and related incidents at work in 1992-1993:

Table 1. The overall numbers

these categories
are presented
five years.

of reported incidents in
in Table 2 for the last

Flammable solids and dusts

The reported
incidents
(n = 200) in this category
occurred across a wide range of work activities.
The largest number of incidents relates to drying or
heating processes that go wrong. The range of materials
involved is wide, and includes clothing in a commercial
tumble drier, paper dust in a paper-making
machine, biscuits and bread in large ovens, an adhesive coating in
a shoe factory, foam backing in an oven at a carpetmanufacturing
plant, and soya and linseed grain products. Many of these incidents cause no injuries but may
cause extensive damage to the plant and prolonged shutdown.
Seven incidents involved aluminium
or magnesium
metals, and of these six involved the metal dust. This
appears to be a disproportionate
number considering
the
relatively
small number of premises that handle these
dusts, and highlights the significant
risks in processing
these substances.
Metal dust fires are characterized
by
intense heat and rapid fire growth, and it is extremely
difficult to extinguish
large tires before the powder has
burnt out. Often the fire damage is so severe that there
is little prospect of confidently
identifying
the ignition
source. A recurring theme is that dust builds up around
the process area or in extraction
ducts. The HSE has
recently published
guidance2 on the safe handling
of
combustible
dusts, which highlights the need for good
housekeeping,
including
the frequent emptying of dust
extraction equipment and the regular inspection and cleaning of ducts.
Nine incidents
involved
substances
described
as
chemicals. The most notable led to the loss of 820 tonnes
of molten sulfur from a 900 tonne storage vessel. It was
suspected that corrosion under the lagging resulted in a

Table2
Accident
included)

statistics for fires and explosions

1987/1988

Category
Flammable

Flammable

Liquefied

Flammable

Exothermic

Explosives
carriage

from 1987/1988

solids

liquids

petroleum

gas

gases and oxygen

chemical

reactions

manufacture,

storage,

K. A. Owens and J. A. Haze/dean

small hole at the base of the tank. The sulfur did not
ignite but the leak continued for seven hours.
The only incident that caused offsite risks was a
fire at a plant that was making chlorinated
rubber. The
contents of a hot air drier caught fire, and a large plume
of smoke drifted offsite. There were reports of nose and
throat irritation caused by the fumes.
Spontaneous
combustion was identified as the cause
of a number of incidents even where the hazard was well
understood in advance. One example involved a fire during the unloading of a bulk ships cargo of raw cotton.
Three incidents occurred in carbon bed absorbers,
due to spontaneous
combustion.
Such absorbers
are
likely to become more common due to environmental
controls requiring a reduction in the emission of organic
solvents.
Fires in these units can be difficult
to
extinguish because they may start deep within the carbon
bed, but instrumentation
is available that allows fires to
be detected at an early stage and appropriate action to
be taken. As a result, although fires in these units are
reported every year, there is no significant
record of
associated injuries.
Although not strictly a hazard derived from work
activities,
arson remains a serious risk to many businesses. A notable incident involved a fire that started in
an outside storage area for garden furniture and boxes.
Hundreds of tonnes of polypropylene
goods and a large
factory were destroyed,
but fortunately
no-one
was
injured.

Flammable liquids
The reported incidents
(n = 359) involving
flammable
liquids resulted in 172 injuries, including seven fatalities.
These figures continue to show a downward trend in line
with the overall trend for all types of accidents reported
to the HSE. The high number and wide variety of incidents within this category
reflect the extensive
and
diverse uses that are found for flammable liquids within

to 1992/1993

1988/1989

(see text for the source and scope of accidents

1989/1990

1990/1991

Incidents
Injuries
Fatalities

223
144
7

263
154
7

258
157
5

223
158

Incidents
Injuries
Fatalities

522
325
9

232
9

Incidents
Injuries
Fatalities

124
125
0

Incidents
Injuries
Fatalities

291

1991/1992

1992/1993

106
101
5

200
113
5

469
247
11

447
232
12

411
217
8

359
172
7

95
83
1

89
73
1

90
92
1

75
66
3

61
46
0

228
0

332
232
1

295
195

299
209

277
194
4

251
139
1

Incidents
Injuries
Fatalities

63
25
0

38
13
0

52
34
1

60
24
0

50
25
1

37
23
5

Incidents
Injuries
Fatalities

65
34
2

45
141
3

58
18
0

50
20
1

42
17
1

48
26
1

Fires, explosions

and related incidents at work in 7992-1993:

industry. Although flammable liquids are often stored or

used in large quantities,
where the potential for major
accidents exists, it is small-scale use or misuse that continues to give rise to the highest numbers of injuries
and fatalities.
The motor vehicle repair industry is associated with
a small proportion (7%) of the overall incidents reported,
yet these incidents were the cause of four fatalities. Two
were mechanics who were caught up in fires when spilt
petrol ignited during the draining of vehicle fuel tanks.
In another accident, the proprietor,
who was the sole
worker in a garage, accidentally
cut through a vehicle
fuel line with an oxyacetylene
torch and received fatal
burns in the ensuing fire. The fourth fatality occurred
when a garage owner used flammable liquids near to a
lit stove. The liquids ignited and the owner was engulfed
in flames. The hazards and precautions
in these circumstances are well-documented.
The HSE has conducted
special initiatives relating to this industry, and, although
there has been a noticeable
reduction
in incidents,
significant accidents still occur.
The small-scale
manual handling of highly flammable liquids across all industries accounts for approximately 15% of the incidents in this category. Operations
within this group include the use of solvents for cleaning, decanting liquids between containers, filling the fuel
tanks of portable equipment
with petrol, and solvent
handling
in laboratories.
In most instances,
an easily
identifiable
ignition source, such as a naked flame or
unprotected
electrical equipment,
was present, but the
operators either ignored or were unaware of the hazard.
Although these appear to be relatively minor incidents,
the consequences
can often be severe. There is clearly
a lack of understanding
or appreciation
of the risks
involved, especially in small businesses, and the HSE is
preparing guidance on the safe use of flammable liquids.
The brightening
of fires with flammable liquids and
other deliberate misuse, including horseplay, account for
a further 10% of incidents,
further demonstrating
the
ignorance
and contempt
that many people have with
regard to the hazards
and properties
of flammable
materials.
The use of flammable
liquids in coating operations,
either with hand-held
equipment
or with continuous
plant, gave rise to 22 fires (6%) but generally only a few
injuries. However, one incident resulted in fatal burns to
the operator who was spraying a flammable liquid-based
wood preservative in the loft of a domestic building. The
liquid that was being sprayed in the confined space was
ignited by unprotected electrical equipment (either a live
junction box or a hand lamp that was used to provide
light for the work) despite the preservative
can being
marked with appropriate warnings.
Poor work procedures during maintenance
activities
were directly responsible
for 18 Aammable liquid fires
(5%). Hot work was listed as the source of ignition in
the majority of fires associated with maintenance.
In one
accident, a highly experienced
plant fitter was fatally
injured when a fine mist of hydraulic oil was released
from a valve and ignited after an oxypropane
torch was
used to cut off bolts during the overhaul of hydraulically
powered plant. In another incident, where fortunately noone was injured, a storage tank exploded after it had

K. A. Owens and J. A. Hazeldean

293

been cleaned for maintenance

but flammable
liquids
were able to re-enter from the supply pipes which had
not been correctly disconnected.
Inadequate
or lack of maintenance
of plant led to
a number of fires and potentially serious leaks at process
and storage facilities. Leaks of highly flammable liquids,
some of which developed
into fires, were reported as
resulting
from poorly
maintained
hoses, pipes and
valves. Other similar incidents occurred when plant had
been returned
to service after maintenance
but with
faulty workmanship
including missing blanking plugs or
plates, open valves and the use of incorrect gaskets or
seals. In one incident, approximately
5 tonnes of hexane
were released from a polymerization
process when a
transfer line failed after it had been removed to clear a
blockage and then replaced incorrectly.
Incidents
also
occurred due to the lack of inspection or planned maintenance. As examples, 2 tonnes of petroleum were released
during a manufacturing
process when a section of pipe
sheared off at a joint, 4 tonnes of isopropanol
were
released during transfer when flexible bellows split, and
fires occurred during other processing
operations when
bearings failed.
Another noticeable feature of a number of incidents
relates to the maintenance
of control systems and monitoring devices. During the bulk transfer of 60% ethanol,
approximately
20 tonnes of product were spilt because
of a broken level indicator and a malfunctioning
automatic trip-out system. In two separate incidents, bitumen
storage tanks exploded
when the low-level
cut-off
switches failed to operate, allowing the heating coils to
be exposed and ignite the bitumen vapour. Other incidents included releases of between 1 and 10 tonnes of
flammable
liquids during tank filling when contents
gauges failed to give correct readings.
The failure to follow process instructions
or procedures
correctly
during chemical
manufacturing
or
other processes where highly flammable
liquids were
being used resulted in six reportable incidents.
Five reported incidents involved flammable liquids
at petrol refineries but these were dealt with safely and
did not escalate into fires. In one incident. approximately
700 tonnes of high-flash point oil were released through
an atmospheric relief valve during the start-up of a distillation system. The distillation
column was overfilled as
a result of a malfunctioning
level recorder, and product
flowed out from the column for several hours before it
was discovered.
In another incident,
approximately
2
tonnes of highly flammable
liquid were released from
leaking flanges that had failed due to the hydraulic shock
waves generated when a pump was started. A significant
near miss, where no product was released, occurred
when a 0.5 m diameter flare line was displaced 2 m from
its raised supports. The incident occurred during startup when an operator neglected to reset some interlocks,
with the result that the flare knock-out pot overfilled and
sent a slug of liquid down the flare line. The incident
had training and design implications.
A fatality
associated
with oil-fired
equipment
occurred when a stove, fuelled by waste oil, caught fire.
Two people escaped from the fire but one of them reentered the workshop,
probably
to telephone
the fire
brigade, and was trapped. The person suffered 20%

294

Fires, explosions

and related

burns and died after being critically

three weeks. The reason that the stove
not be determined,
but the incident
speed at which fires develop and the
buildings quickly and prevent re-entry
is safe by the fire brigade.

Liquefied

petroleum

incidents

at work in 1992-1993: K. A. Owens

ill in hospital for

caught fire could
demonstrates
the
need to evacuate
unless told that it

gases (LPG)

The number of incidents (n = 61) in this category has

again fallen, and is now half the number recorded in
1987/1988. The number of injuries (n = 46) has also
fallen, to less than 40% of the 1987/1988 figures.
Almost 25% of incidents occurred during start-up
of equipment and a further 13% occurred at times other
than normal operation,
such as during maintenance.
These figures highlight the need for extra care during
such operations. Typically,
injuries resulted from flashbacks that occurred when there was a delay between
turning on the gas and igniting it. The incidents usually
resulted in burn injuries to the hand and face. Another
common type of incident involved the leakage of LPG,
overnight,
into a confined space such as a Portacabin.
When the gas eventually
found an ignition source, the
result was a flash fire or explosion.
Several cases of blatant misuse demonstrated
a lack
of understanding
of the hazards associated with LPG.
These include an incident where a propane torch was
used to thaw out a propane cylinder that had begun to
frost over when it was used to supply gas for the removal
of road markings. A pipe blew off the cylinder, the gas
ignited and the subsequent
fire caused significant damage to a lorry cab and cylinder rack.
Several incidents resulted from leaks of LPG from
poorly maintained
or damaged flexible hoses. In one
incident, a burning-machine
operator received burns to
his arm and hand when a hole developed in the flexible
hose feed line and the released propane
ignited. In
another incident, a welder was using a propane torch to
preheat a piece of work when hot metal was projected
onto the hose and caused it to leak. As the welder picked
up the hose, the hole became larger and the propane
ignited. The resultant jet flame caused burns to his face.
Fires have resulted when cylinders and cartridges
were changed
in unsafe locations.
For example,
an
employee
at a dental practice was changing
a small
butane cylinder close to the main gas central heating
boiler. Butane ignited and the employee suffered burns
to the hand and face. In another incident, an operator
was changing a gas cartridge on a hot air gun. He had
placed the new cartridge in the gun and was fastening
the retaining plate when he dropped the plate and the
cartridge fell out. The cartridge had already been punctured and leaking gas was ignited by a gas torch on a
nearby bench. The operator jumped out of the way of
the flames but not before his clothing had caught fire.

Flammable

gases and oxygen

The incidents
(n = 25 1) in this category
under two sub-categories:
piped natural
flammable gases and oxygen.

are discussed
gas and other

and J. A. Haze/dean

Piped natural gas

Nearly two-thirds of the reported incidents in the flammable gases and oxygen category are associated with
piped supplies of natural gas. The number of incidents
in this sub-category
(n = 156) is approximately
the same
as for the last two years. However, there has been a small
reduction in the number of injuries sustained (n = Sl),
and there was only one fatality.
The fatality occurred when an experienced
service
engineer was commissioning
a burner unit on a new
horizontal
gas-fired
multi-tubular
steam boiler. After
several failed attempts to ignite the burner, a modification was attempted without an assessment of the risks
from any failures, and, on a subsequent attempt to ignite
the burner, the boiler exploded. Incidents have occurred
during the commissioning
of gas-fired equipment and it
has been recognized
that there is a need for adequate
instructions
and recommendations
for this activity. The
Institution of Gas Engineers has recently published Utilisation Procedures
IGE/UP/4
Commissioning
of gasfired plant on industrial
and commercial
premises
(available
from the Institution
of Gas engineers,
17
Grosvenor Crescent, London SW 1X 7ES).
A common cause of gas leaks is accidental damage
to the mains pipework during excavation work. Most of
these leaks are dealt with without incident, but all have
the potential to cause subsequent
injuries. In one such
incident,
a gas technician
was carrying out remedial
work on a flanged joint in order to replace a damaged
section of 14 low-pressure cast iron main. The escaping
gas ignited and the technician suffered burns to the hands
and face.
Gas is able to travel within the ground, in an unpredictable way, some distance from a leak to adjacent
buildings. The following incident illustrates the potential
consequences
of this phenomenon.
A passer-by informed
the gas supplier about a suspected leak and an emergency team attended to carry out a site investigation.
All
properties in the vicinity were checked and found to be
clear of gas, and excavation
work was started to locate
the source of the leak. On several occasions, buildings
were monitored and found to be free of gas. However,
during the excavation work, a supervisor entered one of
the buildings, and, as he was leaving, gas ignited within
the building and he suffered burns to the hands, face and
hair. Neither the route the gas took into the building or
the source of ignition could be identified.
Other flammable gases and oxygen
Of the incidents (n = 95) in this sub-category,
20, mainly
associated with gas welding equipment,
resulted from
leaking or burst acetylene, fuel gas and oxygen hoses.
A guidance note on gas welding is in preparation and it
contains advice on appropriate standards for hoses and
other equipment and gives guidance on maintenance
of
the equipment.
Seven further incidents
occurred when acetylene
hoses burst or became detached as a result of a flashback.
The problem in this type of incident is that the gas continues to flow from the cylinder. Heat-sensitive
cut-off
devices are available to stop the passage of acetylene
after a flashback and are therefore recommended
to prevent escalation of the incident.

Fires, explosions

and related incidents at work in 1992-1993:

The next largest group of accidents occurred during

battery charging, jump starting, and connection
and disconnection
of battery leads. Battery explosions
usually
occur when hydrogen,
evolved
during
charging,
is
ignited by a spark. The explosion usually results in injuries from acid burns and fragments of the battery casing.
Most of the accidents could be avoided by following the
guidance contained in a HSE leaflet on electric storage
batteries. The leaflet was produced in 1993 which was
too late to have had any impact on the accident statistics
for 1992/1993.
Four incidents
occurred during the operation
of
valves on oxygen cylinders.
Ignition is usually caused
by adiabatic compression,
contamination
with grease or
particle impact. Regular maintenance
and prevention
of
contamination
are important to minimize such accidents.
The vulnerability
of gas cylinders to fire engulfment
continues
to be demonstrated.
In 1992/1993, two fires
resulted in the bursting of oxygen cylinders
and one
resulted in the bursting of an acetylene cylinder. In one
of these incidents, a fire in the engine of a rescue vehicle
spread rapidly to involve oxygen cylinders
that were
carried on the vehicle.
One incident, which involved hydrogen, illustrates
that hazards can arise in unexpected
situations.
A wet
pick-up vacuum cleaner exploded while it was being
used to clean up aluminium
swarf. It is thought that the
aluminium
reacted with the cleaning fluid, which contained hydrochloric
acid, to produce hydrogen
which
ignited The use of the cleaning fluid was subsequently
proh:>tted on the site and the matter was taken up with
th,: supplier.
Several incidents involved the release of significant
quantities of flammable gases during bulk storage, transport and use. There is a need for adequate maintenance
of equipment and for proper systems to ensure that maintenance and modifications
are carried out safely and
without threatening
the integrity of the plant or equipment. The following
incidents
illustrate
the consequences when defects occur.
A leak occurred on a ship that was being loaded with
1100 tonnes of propylene. The leak occurred when a
valve assembly blew out and left a 20 mm hole. It
took 11 hours to stop the leak, and 7-l 0 tonnes of
propylene were lost during this time. Fortunately
the
gas did not ignite and there were no injuries.
Approximately
25 kg of ethylene
exploded
in a
high-pressure
polyethylene
plant. The investigation
showed that there had been a leak through holes at
the base of the reactor that had not been plugged following modification
work. Two operators
suffered
shock, and there was onsite damage to lightweight
structures and cladding and some breakage of glass
offsite.
In another incident,
14 tonnes of butadiene escaped
through a pressure relief valve on a cryogenic storage
vessel following
the failure of a pressure
switch
which allowed excess nitrogen into the vessel. The
gas did not ignite but the incident was exacerbated
because the control room was unmanned and the leak
was undetected for one hour.

K. A. Owens and J. A. Hazeldean

295

4. During maintenance
of a storage sphere, air leaked
into the pneumatic supply line to a valve and caused
the valve to open. It was estimated that 1-2.5 tonnes
of vinyl chloride monomer were released. No injuries
were sustained.

Exothermic chemical reactions and

energetic substances
Incidents
in this category
include runaway
chemical
reactions
and unintended
chemical
interactions
and
decompositions.
They generally involve the release of
dangerous chemicals but are not necessarily
associated
with fires or explosions.
The total number of incidents
(n = 37) showed a decrease on the previous years figures. However, two of these incidents clearly fulfilled
the potential of certain chemical reactions and decompositions to have serious consequences,
in terms of both
human life (five fatalities) and environmental
damage.
The five fatalities and one major injury all occurred
in one major incident at a large chemical company during the cleaning out of a still. The still residues were
being heated, to aid removal, using a steam coil. The
temperature
of the coil was not adequately
controlled
and this lead to the violent decomposition
of the still
residues, which consisted of unstable nitro-compounds.
The incident was attributed to a change from the original
process and the failure to plan and implement a safe system of work. The process change lead to an increase in
the rate of deposition of thermally unstable materials. A
flame, in excess of 55 m long, issued from an access
hatch on the still, burnt through a control cabin in its
path, and impinged on an office block. Four people in
the control cabin were killed and one in the office block.
As a result of this incident, companies are being advised
to review the design and location of control and other
buildings near chemical plants which process significant
quantities of flammable or toxic substances. The review
should be based on an assessment
of the potential for
fire and explosion or toxic releases. The HSE have published a report4 on this incident and the report highlights
further important lessons to prevent similar incidents.
Another major incident in this category occurred at
a top-tier
major hazard site. In this incident,
the
decomposition
of a self-reactive
substance
led to an
intense fire in a storeroom in the raw materials warehouse. The fire spread rapidly to the remainder
of the
warehouse and outdoor chemical drum storage area and
destroyed
about 2500 tonnes of various
chemicals.
Although none of the company employees were injured,
33 people, including three residents and 30 emergency
services personnel,
were taken to hospital, where they
were primarily treated for smoke inhalation.
This incident has been reported as a major accident to the European Commission,
as required by the Seveso Directive,
and is the subject of a published HSE reporP. The HSE
report emphasizes
the need to include storage areas in
the assessment of safety-related
matters.
The need to carry out a risk assessment
when
departing from accepted techniques for the synthesis of
chemicals is well illustrated by an incident that resulted
in laceration injuries to a postgraduate
research student.
The student was synthesizing
tertiary-butyl
peroxynitrate
by reacting tertiary-butyl
hydroperoxide
with dinitrogen

296

Fires, explosions

and related

incidents

at work in 1992-7993:

pentoxide,
and, for analytical
reasons,
used toluene
rather than carbon tetrachloride
as a solvent. The nitrating solution probably reacted with the toluene to produce
trinitrotoluene
which exploded in a glass vial.
The importance
of the correct labelling of chemicals was demonstrated
in another incident which caused
major chemical
burn injuries.
A plating
technician
poured liquids from two separate drums, both labelled
96% sulfuric acid, into a beaker. One of the drums had
been mislabelled
by the supplier and contained
50%
caustic soda. Consequently,
there was a violent reaction
between the concentrated
acid and alkali, and corrosive
chemicals were ejected out of the beaker onto the technician, who was not wearing protective equipment.

Explosives
The number of incidents (n = 48) that occurred during
the manufacture,
storage and carriage of explosives
increased
slightly over the previous year (n = 42). In
addition, there was one fatality. No significant
trends
were discernible,
although there was an increase in the
incidents
associated
with the manufacture
of military
propellant.
In one accident, a man was killed and seven others
who were present in the building were lucky to escape
injury when a fire occurred and consumed about 720 kg
of rocket propellants.
In the subsequent
investigation,
serious shortcomings
were found in the systems of work
and maintenance
of plant. In particular,
nitroglycerine
(NC) could evaporate from propellant as it was heated
in metal tanks and condense on the underside of the lids.
The lids were not being cleaned properly and therefore
deposits of NG could accumulate,
especially around the
hinges. In addition, some years previously, the material
of construction
of the tanks had been changed from
wood to aluminium.
No reasons for the change of
material or any assessment
of any possible new risks
involved could be found. However, one of the consequences was that metal-to-metal
impact between the lid
and the tank body became possible. Such an impact is
more likely to cause NG to explode than a wood-onwood impact. It is thought that the employee who died
was opening or closing the lid of a heated tank when a
deposit of NG exploded. The explosion ignited the propellant in the tank and the decomposition
spread to the
remainder
of the propellant
in the room and through
open doors, which should have been kept shut, to
adjacent work rooms where the other employees
were
working.
In a second incident in the propellant
sector, two
men suffered burns when they were cleaning a shredder
plate used in the preparation
of composite
propellant.
They were engulfed in a fireball from residual propellant.
In one of the incidents in the pyrotechnic
sector,
about 16.5 tonnes of fireworks were consumed in a fire
in a licensed magazine. The fire burned for more than
24 hours. The source of ignition was a spark from a
welding operation that was being undertaken
by a contractor to repair a weather strip on the door. Initially, the
fire only involved fireworks contained in a single box.
However, first-aid fire-fighting
failed to extinguish
the
fire, which spread to other boxes of rockets and other

K. A. Owens

and J. A. Hazeldean

fireworks. Fortunately,
nobody suffered harm and the
fire caused only minor damage to the building and the
local environment.
The fire was not able to spread to
adjacent
buildings,
which also contained
explosives,
because of the separation of the buildings required by
the site licence.
Incidents also arose during the use of explosive and
pyrotechnic
devices. A volunteer helper at a firework
display
was badly injured
when a display
mortar
exploded whilst it was being handled after it had failed
to go off. Seven spectators at another display received
slight burns when a display mortar exploded at low level
after a misfire. Two further accidents occurred during
quarrying and tunnelling operations. Three men received
major injuries when they were clearing debris after a
blasting operation in a tunnel and their mechanical tools
detonated an unexploded device. In the other incident, a
man was knocked unconscious
when he was struck by
a stone during blasting at a quarry despite being outside
the declared danger zone. He was saved from worse
injuries by his safety helmet. Other incidents reported as
being due to the use of explosives involved the disposal
by burning of a small quantity of surplus gunpowder and
the laboratory preparation
of a new substance.

Carriage

of dangerous

goods

These incidents
are included
under the appropriate
material category in Table 2 but are discussed separately
here because of their relevance to specific legislation and
their potential to involve the general public in major
accidents.
The reported incidents (n = 89) associated with the
carriage and transport of dangerous substances resulted
in only one minor injury, although the accidents detailed
below could have had more severe consequences.
These
incidents exclude road traffic accidents where the load
was not affected,
as they are not reportable
under
RIDDOR. Of these incidents, 60 occurred during loading
or unloading of the product and 29 occurred during transit. The majority of incidents involved spills or leakage
of product,
with fire occurring
in only one of the
unloading
incidents and in six of the transit incidents.
The injury occurred during a delivery of LPG as a result
of a cryogenic
burn from contact with spilt product
rather than from a fire or explosion.
Overfilling during the loading of petrol tankers continues to account for the greatest proportion of incidents,
and, although the terminals are designed to cope with
such incidents, many could have been prevented by the
provision of overfill protection systems. Six tankers were
reported as having overturned
during transit, and, of
these, one resulted in the spillage of 3 tonnes of petrol
onto the public highway.
Fortunately
there was no
ignition of the spilt product. In another incident, a compartment containing petrol ruptured when the tanker collided with a parked lorry, but, although the contents were
lost, again there was no ignition of the product. In contrast, at another accident involving the carriage of diesel
fuel, which is not classified by regulations as a dangerous substance for carriage, there was a large fire when
product released from an overturned tanker ignited.
A fire occurred during the unloading
of a white
spirit-based resin for paint manufacture.
The product was

Fires, explosions

and related

incidents

at work in 7992-7993:

normally discharged under air pressure from an on-board

compressor,
but a number of difficulties
were experienced on this occasion and eventually
a second compressor on another tractor unit had to be used. During
the many attempts to move the product, white spirit
entered the compressor and was ignited by carbon particles. Flames spread to the tanker causing an explosion
and an ignition of the resin in the tanker. The fire was
brought under control without any injuries but the tanker
hatches were projected
150 m by the explosion.
This
incident demonstrates
the need to assess the hazards
when deviations are made from standard procedures.
Four spills, which did not ignite, occurred during
the off-loading of ships, with the most significant involving the loss of 19 tonnes of benzene. The incident was
caused by the regular and improper use of a spare connection
point valve to take a sample, and on this
occasion the valve was not closed properly.
Another significant incident involved the loss of 2.5
tonnes of carbon disulfide, which, despite its low flash
point and auto-ignition
temperature,
did not ignite. In
this incident, an atmospheric
vent valve was inadvertently left closed during loading, causing a build-up of
pressure in the tanker. When the delivery pipe was disconnected to investigate the reason why the product was
not loading properly, the pressure caused the product to
be discharged out of the tanker and into the loading bay.
The product was safely contained
in the water-filled
bund and recovered.
In another incident, the driver of a tanker of LPG
swerved to avoid an articulated
lorry that was coming
towards him in the centre of the road, and then attempted

K. A. Owens

and J. A. Hazeldean

297

to steer the tanker away from a bank at the side of the

road. The nearside wheels appeared to lose grip and the
tanker veered across the road and rolled onto its side.
When the tanker hit the road, the housing that encased
the valve assemblies was seriously damaged and gas was
released. The tanker was subsequently
hit by a car but
fortunately
the gas did not ignite.

Other incidents
These are incidents which are not appropriate to any of
the categories
above. Twenty-four
of these incidents
occurred as a result of people burning themselves
with
cutting and welding equipment.
The main lesson from
these incidents is that the use of suitable protective clothing, e.g. hand and arm protection, could reduce the number of injuries sustained by welders. Other incidents that
arose due to hot work are recorded in the most appropriate material category. However, it is convenient
to note
here that a total of 136 incidents occurred as a result of
hot work which either ignited other materials or caused
burns from the flame of a torch.

References
A Guide to the Reporting
of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous
Occurrences
Regulations
1985. HS(R)23, HSE Books, Sudbury,
UK
Safe Handling of Combustible Dusts, HS(G)l03,
HSE Books, Sudbury, UK, 1994
Electric Storage Batteries, HSE Leaflet, IND(G) 139L, HSE Books,
Sudbury, UK, 1994
The Fire at Hickson and Welch Limited, HSE Books, Sudbury,
UK, 1994
The Fire at Allied Colloids Limited, HSE Books, Sudbury, UK,
1994