Ind

***Insider Threats Neg Wave 1
CFFP***
!!!!Counterplans!!!!
Reform the FDA CPs
Funding and FDA Reform CP

Text: The United States federal government should double the budget for
the United States Food and Drug Administration for 2015 and
provide that funding level as a budget floor in fiscal years 20162020.
The counterplan restores FDA credibility by creating budget independence
for the FDA it doubles funding and eliminates the need for
business and political influences on future budget levels.
Dr. Feder 9
(The FDA's Deadly Gamble with the Safety of Medical Devices, pg online
@ http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2009/ph-fda20090218.html#Recommendations //um-ef)
1. Budget and independence of the FDA. The FDA, more than most government agencies,
needs markedly increased support by the administration and Congress. This
includes increasing the FDA budget considerably and shielding it

from excessive political and business influence . At least a doubling of the
budget by 2012, as recommended by the authors of the FDA Science and Mission at Risk
report, is needed. Strong leadership at the top is also essential. Until these reforms are
implemented, correcting the worsening problems at the FDA will be very difficult.
2NC Solvency
Counterplan solves lack of funding is the reason for the lack of Agency
credibility
Modern Healthcare 13
(FDA credibility hurting due to budget issues, commissioner says, pg
online @
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20131105/NEWS/311059963/fdacredibility-hurting-due-to-budget-issues-commissioner-says //um-ef)
Federal budget cuts and budget uncertainty are hurting the credibility of the Food and Drug
Administration, agency Commissioner Dr. Margaret Hamburg said Tuesday. At a conference hosted by Bloomberg Government, Hamburg
said the stakeholders regulated by the FDA expect predictability and transparency in how
the agency conducts its oversight. And that's been hard to deliver given the
continuing federal budget wars. One problem has been the freeze on user fees paid
by manufacturers who want their products approved for safety and efficacy. Because of the budget sequestration cuts, the FDA is set to
You can't run

agency as important as the FDA if you don't have predictability, if you don't
know what budget you'll be given during the year, or if you don't know whether you can draw from
lose $85 million in user fees in fiscal 2013, even though that money comes from regulated businesses, not from taxpayers.
certain resources or not, she said. Increased
responsibilities, such as regulating medical mobile apps, also have made

the agency's work more challenging. She said the FDA has been stretched thin for
decades.
User Fees CP
User fees make FDA accountable to Big Pharma rather than the public.
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE 07 (US Senator Chuck Grassley, R- Iowa- Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee; (TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2007; House Of Representatives,
Subcommittee On Oversight And Investigations,Committee On Energy And Commerce;
Washington, D.C., The Adequacy Of Fda To Assure The Safety Of The Nations Drug Supply;
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg35502/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg35502.pdf; 07/10/15) JG
Mr. STUPAK. Last month the FDA proposed an increase in annual user fees paid to the agency by
pharmaceutical companies to improve drug safety oversight, the post-marketing surveillance we speak of, to speed approval time for the new drugs
and monitor direct to consumer advertising. Do
you think user fees give companies too much influence

over the FDA? Senator GRASSLEY. Well, from that standpoint, it is kind of, since money is fungible, I suppose it shouldnt, but when
you have got an agency getting their money directly from the industry that they are regulating, it is
hard for the public and maybe for us, and it causes us to be a little more suspicious here in the Congress, but for the public that is
unsophisticated about how Government works, it is sure going to appear to them of undue influence . But more
importantly than just the user fees, I can make reference to a lot of e-mails that we have had access to from within the FDA that would say things
along this line, and I dont have a specific reference. I could have my staff get you a specific reference, but things that said well, if there is any
It is almost
like the pharmaceutical companies feel like they have a seat at the table and maybe this fee
business makes them feel that way. I dont know for sure. But the point is, there should only be one person across the
table from the FDA and that is John Q. Public, not members of the pharmaceutical
industry. Mr. STUPAK. Senator, you went all the way to the Department of Health and Human Services to talk to an agent regarding Ketek.
question about this or that, some specific drug they would mention, talk to us first or let us have an opportunity to explain, et cetera.
Has HHS finally given you access to that agent? Senator GRASSLEY. Absolutely not and there is not reason to, but their excuse is that there is a
criminal investigation or there is an investigation generally, see, an investigation generally. And I will tell you how absurd this gets. Now, they referred
to the fact that the Department of Justice is advising them accordingly, see? So I am sitting in Judiciary Committee in the United States Senate on
an entirely different issue and Senator Kennedy, with more seniority, goes ahead of me and he says something to somebody from the Department of
Justice, I want to ask these line agents some questions. Well, you can have access to these line agents. Well, a light bulb goes off that Chuck
Grassley cant have access to a line agent because somebody in the Justice Department told HHS that I couldnt talk to Agent West. So I talked to
the Justice Department about the situation right after Senator Kennedy gets done and they said I could have access the same way Kennedy had
access, to other agents in some other department. I still dont have access to Agent West. So if the Justice Department is advising VerDate 11-SEP98 15:43 Jun 06, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-5 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1 21 HHS that you cant have
access to Agent West but the Justice Department, in a similar case of a line agent says Senator Kennedy has, well, what is the policy of this
administration on having access to line agents? Is it one policy for Kennedy, a Democrat, and another policy for Grassley, a Republican?
Ptix Net Benefit

And, politics is a net benefit the cp is bipartisan and wont be
controversial
AP 9
(Is the FDA a broken agency?, pg online @
http://www.today.com/id/29495269/43136851%20In%20the%20five%20years
%20since%20the%20AP%20article%20was%20published,%20more
%20disasters%20%20have%20occurred.#.VaiIwflVgSV //um-ef)
Congress has been pumping more money into the FDA the last couple of years. And the Obama administration seems willing to
consider big changes, especially on food safety. The two leading candidates for FDA commissioner are physicians from outside the agency. One is Baltimore health
commissioner Joshua Sharfstein, a pediatrician who has taken on the FDA over risks in childrens cough and cold drugs. The other is Margaret Hamburg, a bioterrorism expert
One area where we could see bipartisan

cooperation might be the strengthening of the FDA, said Dr. Paul Stolley, a former department head at the University of
Maryland medical center who had a stint as a visiting scientist at the FDA. I dont think ideological differences should
interfere.
who served in the Clinton administration and as New Yorks health commissioner.
Other Reform CPs

Alt causes to FDA failure- CP solves better
Senate Judiciary Committee; (TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2007; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE; Washington, D.C., THE ADEQUACY OF FDA TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF
THE NATIONS DRUG SUPPLY; http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110hhrg35502/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg35502.pdf; 07/10/15) JG
Even so, what I have learned about what happened with Ketek troubles me. I have learned that FDA gave its advisory committee
questionable data on Ketek and did not tell them about problems with that data. I sent a letter to the FDA in December regarding
my findings on this matter and I am still awaiting a response. The FDA approved Ketek without much safety data from the U.S.
The agency relied almost exclusively on foreign post-marketing safety data. And lastly, Keteks sponsor, in all likelihood, was
aware of the fact that it submitted some questionable data to the FDA regarding its large safety study. The sponsor was informed
of probVerDate 11-SEP-98 15:43 Jun 06, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-5 SCOM1
PsN: SCOM1 17 lems with one of the study sites prior to the date of submission to the FDA. However, according to the FDA
reviewers, the sponsor never raised these problems with the FDA. FDA learned about them after his own investigators inspected
the site. During the last 3 years, I have also tried to work in a productive way with the Commissioners and Acting Commissioners
of the FDA. It will take bold leadership to get on top of the FDAs problems and to turn the
agency around. So far, lip service has been fine; the reality has been a lot less. Last month,
Senator Chris Dodd and I introduced two reform bills that we proposed in 2005 to get the safety, to fix the safety
shortcomings at FDA. Our first bill would elevate and empower the office with the FDA that is
responsible for monitoring FDA-approved drugs after they are on the market. It would
make the postmarket safety function within the FDA independent, but within the FDA,
instead of under the thumb of the office and the center that puts the drugs on the market
in the first place and that is the way it is today. I want to point your attention to the Wall Street Journal in
regard to Chairman Dingell. It is reported that he is intrigued by the idea of drug safety center
within the FDA. I appreciate that view. It doesnt make any sense that the FDA officials
who are supposed to monitor the safety of a drug on the market serve only as
consultants to the FDA officials who approve the drug in the first place. The officials
who approve the drug would obviously be conflicted in making a judgment that approval
is no longer appropriate or was a mistake in the first place. Kind of like having egg on your face. A
separate center for drug safety within the FDA is a vital lynchpin when it comes to meaningful
reform and improvement of the agencys post-marketing surveillance. The second bill that
Senator Dodd and I have introduced would expand an existing public data base by mandating the
registry of all clinical trials and the results of those trials. This reform is key to
establishing greater transparency regarding clinical trials, the good ones and the bad ones, and to hold drug makers
and drug regulators accountable and to give doctors all the information they can to their patients. Both of these legislative
initiatives would make drug information used by doctors and patients more complete and more accessible. American
consumers should not have to second guess the safety of pills in their cabinet.
Only CP can solve FDA circumvention- plan doesnt go far enough

Senate Judiciary Committee; (TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2007; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE; Washington, D.C., THE ADEQUACY OF FDA TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF
THE NATIONS DRUG SUPPLY; http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110hhrg35502/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg35502.pdf; 07/10/15) JG
Mr. STUPAK. I understand. I want to respect your time. I am done with my 10 minutes. Any comments, Mr. Green? Ms. DeGette?
Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Whitfield, please, for 10 minutes. Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Stupak, and I have one question and
then we will let the other Members on our side expend the 10 minutes. Senator, we appreciate you being here. In your testimony,
you brought attention to one of the basic tenets of our Government and that is the
responsibility of oversight by the legislative branch and I would just ask you a question because I think
you have touched on a significant issue, just the difficulty that you had in obtaining information from a branch of the Government
on the executive side. Did you consider using a subpoena at any time to, not only a subpoena, but holding
them in contempt? Senator GRASSLEY. In the Senate, you get to this place. We
considered that, yes. But you
have to have a majority vote of the committee. You have to have a majority vote of the Senate for that to happen
and so we did not decide to go that route because we thought there were other routes we could go. Obviously,
the other routes have not been successful, either. Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, we appreciate very much your bringing attention to this
issue and we look forward to working with you as we try to address it and Senator GRASSLEY. Well, let me suggest to you,
Chairman, or Ranking Member Whitfield, that you can be very helpful. This double standard in this administration, that a
Democratic Senator, supposedly not as friendly with the administration as I am, maybe they dont consider me friendly anymore,
but the point is if Senator Kennedy can get access to line agents why cant Senator Grassley get access to a line agent, when I
have already had access to line agents over the years? So some sort of new policy? Mr. WHITFIELD. Yes, I understand. I get
frustrated. I find the appropriators sometimes have access to things I dont have access to and it is very frustrating. Since I guess I
am controlling the time on our side, at this time I recognize Mr. Ferguson, Mr. Burgess and then Mr. Walden. Mr. FERGUSON.
Thank you, Mr. Whitfield. Senator, thank you very much for being here today. I can fully identify with your frustration in not always
getting information that you are looking for. I know you were commenting before on whether the administration considers you a
friend or not, we all certainly here consider you a friend and we very much appreciate your being here. Senator GRASSLEY. Well,
sometimes I wonder why I spent 2 days in the car with President Bush riding around the cold of Iowa to help him get nominated in
the year 2000, as an example. Mr. FERGUSON. I wish I could shed more light on that for you but maybe I ought to stick to my
topic. Senator, you mentioned before the Mosholder investigation on SSRIs with children. That was a VerDate 11-SEP-98 15:43
Jun 06, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-5 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1 22 very, very
important topic for this subcommittee, something that I was very involved with personally and really highlights the
importance of this topic, this issue of post-market analysis and I know, in your bill, your
approach in the bill that you have introduced would move this issue of post-market
review out of CDER, out of the Center for Drug Education or Evaluation and Research. Would you just comment on the
differences between your approach and the approach that was suggested by the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine? I
dont want to bring up Senator Kennedys name, because that seems to raise your ire, but I know in the bill that Senator Kennedy
has introduced, his approach seems to be, anyway, more consistent with the recommendation that the Institute of Medicine had
suggested. Would you just comment on those differences, please? Senator GRASSLEY. In a very general way, I think that the
main difference is that I want, within FDAbecause some people think we are setting up something
outside FDA, so I want to emphasize, we are doing it within FDAreport directly to the Director
so that there is no doubt that even though, on a chart of organization, the Office of New Drugs is
separate from the post-marketing, the Office of Drug Safety, but as I indicated, it is not really so.
So I want to get this box over here, wherever this box is located, I want it not to be under the thumb of this
agency, even though the chart doesnt show it that way, reporting directly to it. And I think that Senator Kennedys approach,
and it is probably a bipartisan bill, so it is not a political, partisan issue, is that we are going to still have a cloudy relationship, not
the black and white separation that I call for under the bill that came out of committee last year. Now, I dont know whether Senator
Kennedy, in his new bill, is going the same direction this year or not, but last year, that is the way it was and we just want
guaranteed independence in reporting directly so that we dont have these people in the Office of New Drugs that says this drug is
safe, trying to quash out here when somebody says it isnt safe. And I dont want what happened to some of
your witnesses who are patriotic Americans, wanted to make sure the scientific process
works, being blackballed and ruined professionally because of that. It doesnt need to be. It
compromises too much and there is too much found out in post-marketing surveillance
that needs to have an independent judgment of it. And I dont think that in the bill that Senator Kennedy has
that it goes far enough. Mr. WHITFIELD. We have less than 4 minutes left. Dr. Burgess, did you have a question? Mr.
BURGESS. Yes, Mr. Whitfield. Senator, thank you for being here. On perhaps just a side note. Yesterday in the Wall Street Journal
there was an op-ed article about clinical trials and patients who have reached the end of their therapeutic ropes, if you will, who
are denied access to drugs that are in phase 2 trials. It raises a separate issue with the FDA, but physicians and clinical staffs who
apply for exceptions to get their patients into these clinical trials find the statistical issues raised by the FDA staff aimed at the
applying physician can sometimes rival receipt from the IRS. Clearly, that is an interference in getting new cutting edge
medications to patients, again, who have exhausted all therapeutic acVerDate 11-SEP-98 15:43 Jun 06, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO
00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-5 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1 23 tivity, so I hope, Mr. Chairman, we can perhaps
spend some time looking at that, as well. I guess I am most interested, Senator, and I do agree with you, the proper respect for the
scientific process needs to be paramount in our minds. Line Agent West, whom you referenced, were you ever able to establish
contact with this individual and if not, Mr. Chairman, are we planning on asking for similar access to Line Agent West? Senator?
Senator GRASSLEY. Well, I have not personally had access to him in the way that makes any difference. I think maybe I better
not speak beyond that because I dont want to get anybody in trouble, but we have some information, but we need to get the
information in an open, transparent way. And I dont want to imply we got information, that we just want to be more transparent.
We dont have all the information we can get if we can talk to him. Mr. BURGESS. But I judged from your tone and demeanor you
felt that this individual had some pretty important information? Senator GRASSLEY. Oh, absolutely. Without a doubt. Mr.
BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield. Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Walden. Senator GRASSLEY. Can I? On the first thing you
brought up, I dont think you meant to imply this, but just in case; I dont want any misunderstanding. I hope, in all of my testimony,
that I dont want to interfere with the things that you were bringing up that were in the Wall Street Journal in the sense of special
opportunities for people who are willing to be guinea pigs because it is the end of the life, it might save their life, it might not save
their life. Where an individual is totally aware of every gamble he is taking and he is educated in that and he is will to take it and
everything is transparent, I dont want to stand in the way of that. Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Walden. Mr. WALDEN. Thank you. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Senator, welcome. We appreciate your work on this issue. I want to touch on one topic and that is that
Memorandum of Understanding that I understand exists between the IGs office and HHS and the FDA. Senator GRASSLEY.
Yes. Mr. WALDEN. To allow the FDA to investigate itself, basically, on employee misconduct issues. And I am just curious. I know
that is an issue you have been concerned about, Senator, and I wondered if you or your staff has learned anything new regarding
the status of that MOA? Senator GRASSLEY. Well, I think I better look at my staff, but I dont think we have anything more than
we are just recommending that it should be reviewed and rewritten. I dont know that were in the process of thinking it is being
reviewed and rewritten. Yes. We have asked the IG to examine it. He has come up with some recommendations. But your
question to me is, is it being rewritten and the answer is no. OK? Mr. WALDEN. All right. It is just a concern I think we share.
Senator GRASSLEY. Well, yes, and it would be nice ifthis is an extremely powerful committee you have here and the extent to
which you can push that, it would be much appreciated by me, but more importantly, the peoples safety is at stake here and
independence from industry being regulated would be enhanced by it, as well, I think. VerDate 11-SEP-98 15:43 Jun 06, 2007 Jkt
000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-5 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1 24 Mr. WALDEN. I think we concur with
that. Senator GRASSLEY. And maybe less pressure brought against whistleblowers, too. Mr. STUPAK. Well, Senator, there
is concern on that memorandum that the FDA is using it under a criminal pretext to
suppress scientific opinion on drugs that are being approved. It appears, from the SSRI, Vioxx
and others, when a scientist within the FDA or a whistleblower is going to speak out, they
suddenly find themselves under some kind of criminal investigation from the FDA
underneath this Memorandum of Understanding. It seems like it is a form of retaliation and harassment on
scientists willing to speak up and speak out. Senator GRASSLEY. Yes. And let me tell you, you have stated it better than I could
and as a matter of emphasis, and more importantly, because you are chairman of this subcommittee, I hope people listen, from
that point of view, and you pursue that because you are absolutely right. Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. Mr. Dingell, anything for
Senator Grassley? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, only this. I want to thank our old friend for coming over here. Thank you,
Senator, very much for being here. I would ask that perhaps if I send you a little letter requesting some information on your
statement today and your comments on some questions before us related to this matter. Perhaps maybe you would respond and I
would ask unanimous consent that that response be put in the record. Senator GRASSLEY. Yes, we will do that, Chairman
Dingell, and thank you for your leadership and I look forward to a return to the days of your aggressive oversight work where
almost every agency knew that you were going to get to the bottom of things and that they ought to cooperate. The CHAIRMAN.
Thank you. Well, you have set a good example and I will certainly try to follow it, but we have an outstanding chairman in this
subcommittee, Senator, in the person of Mr. Stupak and he will do a superb job of helping folks understand that we all work for the
taxpayers and the people, as do you, sir. Thank you very much for being here. Senator GRASSLEY. That last statement he made,
if I could comment on it. We all work for the taxpayers and we have got institutions, not just
FDA. Maybe the example I always use is the FBI more than the FDA in this manner, but we have got too many agencies around
here that talk about it as our agency or our institution. In the case of the FBI, it was our institution. I got tired of the director saying
that all the time at a meeting we were in, our institution, and I said that is what is wrong with the FBI and maybe that is what is
wrong with the FDA, although I havent heard that from them, but the point is that I said we all work for
the American people. It is not your agency, it is not my agency, it is the peoples agency
and we are all working for the American people and the sooner we understand we are working for the American people and not for
our institution, the better we are going to do our job. VerDate 11-SEP-98 15:43 Jun 06, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028
Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-5 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1 25 Mr. STUPAK. Well said. Any other comments? Senator, thank you
once again. Thank you for your time and thank you for your work and we look forward to working with you. Senator GRASSLEY.
Thank you. Mr. STUPAK. We will call our second panel up to testify. Mr. BURGESS. Mr. Chairman, while the second panel is
seating, can I ask for a unanimous consent request? I ask unanimous consent that yesterdays op-ed from the Wall Street Journal
be submitted as part of the record? Mr. STUPAK. Hearing no objection, it will be made part of the record. Mr. STUPAK. The
second panel will consist of Dr. David Ross, National Clinical Health Programs, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs; Ann Marie
Cisneros, Independent Clinical Research Associate; and Dr. John Powers, Scientific Applications International Corporation. If they
would come forward, please. It is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised that
witnesses have the right, under the rules of the House, to be advised by counsel during testimony. Do any of the witnesses before
us, this panel, have counsel at this time? Do you want to introduce your counsel, Dr. Ross? Dr. ROSS. My counsel is Mr. Mark
Cohen of the Government Accountability Project. Mr. STUPAK. OK. Ms. Cisneros? Ms. CISNEROS. My counsel is the same. Mr.
STUPAK. Same. Dr. Powers? Dr. POWERS. Same. Mr. STUPAK. OK. Please rise and raise your right hand to take the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.] Mr. STUPAK. OK, record shall reflect the witnesses have been sworn and Dr. Ross, we will begin with your
opening statement, please.
Insider Threats CP
1NC Reform CP
Text: The United States federal government should create a common
definition of an insider threat. The United States federal
government should amend the Insider Threat Policy to include
insider threat training that focuses on threat psychology and proper
use of Employee Assistance Programs.
The Counterplan competes it doesnt increase congressional oversight
And, it solves it creates a training program to help employees better
understand and interact with the program and it prevents insider
threats avoids the threats disad and the collapse of the
Intelligence Program caused by the Affs substantial overhaul of the
system
Porter 14
(Michael Lawrence, Master in Security Studies, Combating Insider
Threats: An Analysis Of Current United States
Insider Threat Policies And Necessary Improvements, pg online @
http://repositories.tdl.org/asu-ir/bitstream/handle/2346.1/30135/PORTERTHESIS-2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y //ghs-ef)
Given the many insider threat-related challenges the CI Community faces, the United
States has done a great deal to confront this dangerous enemy Nonetheless, the CI
Community must make additional changes due to weaknesses in the current legislative
processes
The everpresent threat posed by insiders means that the US CI Community must routinely
evaluate the process it operates under and look to better itself
.
, organizational interactions, and other issues involved in this effort 99. As addressed in Chapter 3, the structure of the CI Community has adapted over the years, but the sad reality is that these changes happened largely as a result of
failures in the system and kneejerk reactions designed to address specific instances of failure100. Even then, the changes that do occur often do not come easily and are the result of extensive reform processes throughout the IC.
. Our CI specialists must address a range of persistent vulnerabilities to help
strengthen the American security apparatus. The problem is that substantive reform is often very difficult to accomplish in the IC, and subsequently the CI Community, for two reasons. First, intelligence reform is usually more politically motivated than it is focused on,
and motivated by, the need for substantive change101. Second, since the IC is a tool of the policy makers, who ultimately oversee these organizations, this often means that the people making decisions for the IC have little to no real understanding of the
Intelligence process102. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, there were multiple reforms over the past 20 years that have helped mold the CI Community into an organization that could fight the insider threat. These changes however, were not the result of planned reform,
they were reactionary movements to larger community failures that allowed insiders like Ames, Hanssen, and Hassan to exist. Politicians do not like huge failures for political reasons, so large high-profile events act as motivation for change, and to show their
constituents that they are making things better103. Policymakers drive the intelligence cycle. As the driving force, they should continually evaluate the systems in place, judging their effectiveness and adapting them as need be104. Unfortunately, this is often not the
priority of those in the policy community105. The absolute certainty of the need for reforms in the CI Community begs the question, why have major substantive reforms not happened yet106? The answer to this question relates to the challenges that intelligence
reform faces: time, concession of power, and consensus. Time is a valuable commodity and one that has a dramatic impact on the actions of people everywhere. Whether it is rushing to meet a deadline or hanging on for the long run, time seems to dictate our lives,
and this idea could not be truer for both the IC and the policy community. The reason that time is such a significant challenge to reform has to do with the nature of the IC and CI communities, the policy community, and the dramatically different understandings they
have of time. First, in the IC there has traditionally been less sense of time-urgency, because before 9/11 intelligence was seen mostly as a long-run game, an endurance race. The challenges posed by agile extremist organizations have forced the IC to face a new
paradigm in this arena. However, when it comes to collecting, analyzing, and exploiting so much information from the enemy, whether that is an insider threat, a nation-state he spies for, or an ITO supporting him, the operations tend to last for years. As intelligence
professionals see it, steady analysis not rushed by political pressure is the key to success. Conversely, in Congress and the White House, politicians are rushed to make their mark by showing their constituents what they have accomplished. In this sense, they often
view intelligence as a tool to gain large results in a short period of time. With the two operating under a different time frame there are bound to be confrontations107. The second and most important way that time holds back reform is in the reform process itself.
Given that reform will be drafted and incorporated by the policy community, the US Congress cannot simply change. Rather, there have to be bills written, voted on, debated, passed, and signed into law. This all takes timea very long time. To make matters
worse, it is the legislatures right to conduct an investigation into failures, or reasons for reform108. As Berkowitz states, Commissions take months to convene, staff, and complete their work. Experience shows that commissions require, on average, a year or two to
report their resultsand even more time to declassify their reports so they can be released for public discussion. During this time, any passion officials might have had for fixing intelligence ebbs and the publics attention wanders to other matters. Just one example
of this is the September 11th Commission, which was formed a year after the attacks, releasing results two years later, and passing changes through Congress 10 months later109. The problem here is that the IC has its most fervent reform supporters immediately
after the failure, as was the case with Ames, Hanssen, and Manning, yet as time drags on, the supporters of reform begin to become busy with other things, and the intended reforms do not come to fruition110. The next major barrier to reform is cession of power,
because giving up power is not what any agency, or leader, wants to do111. This desire to maintain power often results in nothing more than long debates and very weak results, if any at all. An example of this is clear within the IC. In 2002, with the creation of the
position of the NCIX, the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 tasked the NCIX with developing the annual National CI Strategy. Developing this strategy would be based on the NTIPA as stated in Chapter 3. The problem is that the NTIPA and the CI
Strategy are not based on the Director of National Intelligences National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), nor does the NIS say anything about CI112. This is because with the creation of the NCIX in 2002, it was given the power of drafting the CI Strategy, while the DNI,
created in 2004, does not have the power to develop any part of the CI strategy. This is one area where a small cession of power and cooperation between organizations could go a long way to unifying the role that the DNI has within the IC113. This tight hold on
the CI Community has had drastic consequences for the office of the DNI, which was originally designed to provide leadership and guidance for all of the IC, but left weak and limited. Like time, consensus is a chief barrier to reform for the IC and policy community
because of how the intelligence cycle works. However, consensus is probably the most important barrier because of the ways in which it can affect other barriers to reform. One of the key ways in which consensus is a challenge to reform has to do with the fact that
consensus implies that both sides come to an agreement. As Berkowitz discusses, political compromise allows opponents to sabotage the creation of any new agency from the start by simply not agreeing to certain aspects of potential future laws114. This truly is a
hurdle for reform because while politicians, and heads of agencies, can come with hands outstretched under the banner of reform, a nay vote or even language inserted into a bill that passes through the legislature can destroy consensus and weaken any real
reforms. Another major barrier to consensus is the secret nature of the IC. The reality is that the majority of the work that the IC does is classified, which can be a problem for the policy community. The reason this level of secrecy is such a major issue is that
members of the policy community do not normally have the clearance to see all the information necessary to make proper decisions about CI or any other reforms. This lack of information basically leaves the IC asking Congress to go along with their plans with a
minimum amount of information and understanding of what the plans actually are115. In this way a call to reform without all the necessary components is not asking for consensus, but rather asking for acceptance by the few who have access to the intelligence,
which in the case of the Senate is a Select Committee of 15 individuals and in the House, 21 individuals. Finally, for the proper cession of power there must be consensus on the level of gains or losses, which can end up being a problem, especially for agencies or
individuals not wishing to lose power. For example, when the office of the Director of National Intelligence was created, the policy makers and the Department of Defense never could gain consensus as to the level of power the DNI would have, and the result of this
was a DNI with very little power116. Ultimately, time, power struggles, and consensus will remain barriers to reform and until those barriers are overcome, the IC, the CI Community, and the policy community will continue to experience problems like those already
seen. This continuing failure will waste time and efforttime that is already in short supply and could be used to stop insiders instead of allowing them to continue damaging the United States In light of these challenges and the problems that still exist, we must
this work focuses on reform efforts at the

strategic level
top-down reform is critical when it comes to addressing an enemy
like the insider threat where a unified approach is needed
reform suggestions for
evaluate the kinds of changes required for the continued fight against insider threats. As has been previously mentioned,
for three reasons. First,
. Second,
individual agencies look too deeply at specific tactics.

Finally, the sheer number of differences between the different operational agencies
and their different mission sets would inundate researchers and not allow adequate
analysis of weaknesses at any other level.
Addressing weaknesses would have very real security implications due to the nature of the sensitivity of
the mission.
In order properly to look at each problem, this work will first define the problem within the CI Community that interested parties must
address. Next, it will outline steps for proper implementation of the reforms. Inherent to this is how implementation will address the aforementioned barriers to reform. Lastly, for each reform effort this work will offer some evaluation criteria, which may be used to
Sweeping reform
efforts generally do not work. Often, in the effort to fix problems policy
makers will make massive and revolutionary changes These risk throwing out
identify strengths/successes or weaknesses of the reform efforts. Before presenting recommendations, understanding what type of reform is best for the IC is essential to ensuring the best changes.
117.
the good organizational structures, procedures, and systems in place along with the bad
ones The changes proposed in this work are intended to limit the pendulum swings
and to offer minor corrections that will benefit CI in its continued missions to
stamp out insider threats
.
that
Richard Betts refers to,
118. Lastly, one important issue to highlight for evaluation is that intelligence reform evaluations are difficult to assess due to the nature of intelligence. By definition, intelligence helps to
inform. Good intelligence may help to inform leaders of decisions needed to prevent negative outcomes. In this case, decisions made will yield little to no visible result. However, when intelligence does not inform, and disaster occurs, policy makers will tend to say
there was a failure in intelligence119. Failures are always visible, and the IC is almost always held accountable. The root of this problem rests in the fact that the only true success is 100-percent success120. The next time a spy is caught or a violent extremist blows
himself and American citizens up, policy makers will begin looking at the system as a failure. The reason this is seen as a failure is because of the misunderstanding of what intelligence is and what it does. Intelligence is not predictive and it cannot catch 100 percent
of the problems, especially when it comes to insider threats. As with all things in this world, everyone and everything has a say, to include our enemies, for every action that we take our enemies can be expected to take two. Knowing this, policy makers must
The first improvement that is

needed is the establishment of a common definition of an insider threat Currently, there
are over 15 different definitions
Such a broad list of definitions
leaves many questions in the minds of the different IC agencies as to what an insider
threat is, and who has jurisdiction regarding collection, analysis, and apprehension
This vague language creates confusion as to who has
jurisdiction over potential insiders
This current lack of
specificity can cause confusion when it comes to handling insider threats, because over
utilization of CI and LE on areas outside of their jurisdiction leaves them both overexerted and stretched thin
understand that there will always be uncertainty in intelligence and that failure is not necessarily failure there is always more that is accomplished that is never seen121.
as outlined in the NCIXs Official Terms & Definitions of Interest List122.
. Most
importantly, the definition in the 2012 National Policy lacks any sort of tie to a foreign nexus123.
. According to the policy definition, CI would have been responsible for identifying and handling any threat, to include domestic law enforcement cases. The
problem is that if these threats are American citizens, not working for extremist organizations or foreign nations, then CI does not have jurisdiction as assigned in EO 12333124.
125. Furthermore, establishing a definition will be difficult with as many different and divergent definitions as we already have throughout the government. As was mentioned, consensus is
important and right now there is none. Changing this will require the NITTF to build common ground and push past the differences. The important thing to remember is that words have meanings and, as the 2009 NIS states, insider threats are the priority for CI126.
An open-ended definition will tax a stressed organization. Specificity allows work to be spread across the spectrum of CI and Law Enforcement cases and thus increase the amount of success. Chapter 1 of this paper outlined the authors definition of an insider
threat as an individual with placement and access to critical infrastructures, military units, and the government and their supporting agencies who have allegedly turned against and targeted their parent organization, thus aiding a foreign power or international
terrorist organization. This definition is based on a conglomeration of multiple different definitions used across the IC. It encompasses all of the critical elements of the threat and leaves no question in the minds of the different agencies as to who has jurisdiction.
Simply adopting a new definition does not mean that jurisdiction battles will be solved. Inherent to any definition is the constant need for cooperation amongst the different organizations of CI and in the case of uncertainty, to allow for joint investigations and the
sharing of potentially valuable information between the different disciplines127. Evaluation will be more than just the success or failure of a standard definition. The definition itself will be tied to a broader evaluation of the National Threat Policy. Accordingly, the ITAG
and the JITTF would be primarily responsible for the evaluation of current policies. In order to do this, an evaluation of classified and unclassified reporting and investigations, at the national level, will identify increases in reporting, opening of investigations, opening
of joint investigations, prosecutions, and operations conducted. An increase in these numbers would be a strong indication that programs are working, at least in the short-term. This data would be compiled and presented by the NCIX to the DNI and policy makers
as an indicator of the change that is occurring with new policies. Granted this information would not be shown to all policy makers, but there are representatives in Congress and the White House that would be privy to this information, and that serve as
The second improvement needed is that the CI Community should

realign insider threat training to focus toward preventing threats, not simply
identifying them The National Insider Threat Policy
programs standards have addressed many
of the issues relating to insider threats except one key issue: prevention.
Identifying threats is useful, but the problem with insider
threats is that they are often unidentifiable more is needed in the form of
representatives for the broader policy community128.
includes a set of Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs. These minimum standards
are the current guidelines promulgated by the executive branch, the NCIX, and the JITTF regarding Insider Threat Programs129. The
The minimum standards read more like a list of
training for identification of a current threat, and less like a set of preventative measures.
prevention.
The major problem with passing changes such as these is, once again, the problem of time. As previously stated, policy makers like to see fast results. Preventative measures will not get nearly the same results as fast as
.
Not much needs to be added to
current CI training, but an understanding of the basic threat psychology
A key element of this preventative measure is the provision of information
regarding where developing threats can seek assistance, how coworkers can report
suspected problems for assistance, and how supervisors can refer to assistance These
identification. Focusing training on identification can give quantifiable numbers to policy makers about how successful a program has been by catching bad guys
One can hope that politics is not all that is at play when it comes to determining how these programs
are organized, but these changes will need to be made quickly because the longer they wait the longer the system goes without preventative measures.
, as addressed in Chapter 2, should be a part of the
Minimum Standards.
insights would be crucial both for impacting the potential downward spiral
and the apprehension of an individual
all
. The one major outlet that exists is in Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs). As stated in EO 12968,
individuals working for agencies with access to classified information are eligible to use
EAPs for assistance concerning issues that may affect their eligibility for access to
classified information
EAPs are counseling services for those in
the IC who need an extra support structure to get personal help130 The problem is
, such as financial matters, mental health, or substance abuse. Essentially
that often there is a stigma placed on anyone for using these services. The
proper use of these programs is crucial for serving this preventative

measure and should be included in training as a healthy outlet free of
judgment or damage to ones career.
in the earliest
One thing that the Spy cycle and the Radicalization cycle both underscored was that
stages of the development of an insider threat, there was a need for help
By focusing training on identification at the
later stages of development, we are skipping an important step in the progression of an
insider threat Ignoring the early stages does nothing to prevent those potential future
threats sitting on the edge of right and wrong from making bad choices. By adding to the
current training a focus of earlier detection then the potential to remove the future
insiders from their support structure and offer them a healthy outlet is possible
. The spy found that help in the solace of a foreign
intelligence service, while the future violent extremist found it in the support network of an international terrorist organization.
. Additionally, teaching this
training to everyone will turn personnel into sensors for future threats, not just current ones131.
2NC Solvency
Reform key overhaul collapses the prevention of insider threats
Porter 14
http://repositories.tdl.org/asu-ir/bitstream/handle/2346.1/30135/PORTERTHESIS-2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y //um-ef)
These four changes, while not dramatic, offer insights into a few things that the IC can do to fix the fractured systems in the CI Community. They
maintain that there
are valuable systems in the IC and that the changes should not be so
dramatic as to throw out potentially good processes. The insider threat is too important
to be tossed aside because of political inconveniences, only to be looked at when there
have been failures. The increase in insider activity in the past few years is an
indication that policy makers and the IC should place serious consideration
on what needs to happen to the insider threat framework. It is sad that it must come down to
the loss of some of the nations most important secrets for this to happen, so we must continue to work toward meaningful reform.
WB CP
1NC Incentives CP
Text: The United States federal government should consolidate
environmental whistleblower programs under the Environmental
Protection Agency and establish a program that provides financial
incentives for successful whistleblowers based on government
recovery benefits in the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
whistleblower program.
That solves and avoids politics it incentivizes whistleblowers to come
forward despite the potential risks
Warren 15
(Christopher K. Warren, Senior Note Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review,
2014-2015, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 40 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 195,
Blowing The Whistle On Environmental Law: How Congress Can Help The Epa Enlist Private
Resources In The Fight To Save The Planet, pg lexis//um-ef)
C.
Models to Follow: The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Programs The alignment of
government and whistleblower interests can provide significant

advantages for the enforcement of environmental statutes , but it must be achieved through an
In light of the adoption of the SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) whistleblower
programs under the Dodd-Frank Act (the "Act"), it appears Congress has recognized and embraced
the agency-wide program model to monitor financial malfeasance. n256 [*223] Agency
programs, such as those implemented by the Act, serve as an effective and useful alternative to
successful litigation-based whistleblower statutes, such as the False Claims Act (FCA). n257 Most environmental crimes, like
effective mechanism. n255
most financial crimes, generally do not involve claims submitted to the government for payment, which precludes them from falling under the qui tam provisions of the FCA.
the government can, and has, pursued other avenues to provide the incentives
needed for whistleblowers to spearhead enforcement actions, through agency-mandated
n258 Nevertheless,
programs. n259 In all likelihood, the government's willingness to create more

whistleblower incentive programs has largely been spurred by the successful outcomes
produced by the FCA qui tam provisions. n260 Before the Act's programs, the prototype of
the agency enforcement model was the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) whistleblower program. n261 The
program was the first federal agency effort to incentivize whistleblowers to come forward, and it incentivized such action with a set financial award for any financial recovery.
The value of
this information can be seen in Congress' choice to strengthen the program so
that the agency awards are now mandatory, not discretionary. n264 Although the IRS program has been the
n262 As a result, both the government and the whistleblower had some incentive to pursue high quality claims and recover illegally held funds. n263
archetype for agency whistleblower enforcement, it lacks some key features that make other whistleblower programs successful. n265 Most notably, it fails to adequately protect
Dodd-Frank programs however,

improved upon the IRS whistleblower program. n267 As an initial matter, the programs emulated the IRS program by providing the
[*224] whistleblower confidentiality and it does not have an expressly authorized whistleblower protection program. n266 The
set, mandatory financial awards that whistleblowers can expect for providing specific, previously unknown information that leads to a successful case. n268 The programs then
went further by strengthening whistleblower protections by ensuring confidentiality and creating the possibility for greater financial awards in successful retaliation claims. n269
Congress included whistleblower programs in the Act because it recognized the massive
threat posed by financial crimes, and the valuable part that insiders could play in curbing
it. n270 The programs seek to address the problem, using a combination of financial incentives and well-structured protection and confidentiality programs. n271 A
similar approach in the environmental realm could be just as, if not more valuable to the
public and the common good. n272 For that reason, Congress should adopt an agency-wide
whistleblower program under the EPA, similar to those adopted under the
SEC and the CFTC in the Act. n273 Set financial awards can bring those with direct knowledge of
environmental violations to the forefront. n274 Making such awards mandatory
would [*225] incentivize these parties to come forward and encourage

competent legal representation to engage these claimants. n275 Furthermore,
whistleblower protection under the umbrella of the EPA would ensure prospective
whistleblowers know there is a single source for their protection that can instill uniform
guidelines. n276 An EPA program could also help ensure anonymity for whistleblowers and
ensure greater financial rewards against retaliators than those provided by OSHA. n277
2NC Solvency (Short)

Counterplan solves
Warren 15
several substantial government settlements in whistleblower cases

have led to whistleblower suits becoming increasingly mainstream and lucrative for
whistleblowers and their attorneys. n7 Both positive and negative effects for the whistleblowers themselves have accompanied the growth of
Over the past several years,
this area of the law. n8 Although there are major success stories, such as that of a former UBS AG executive recovering over $ 100 million for reporting
a tax evasion scheme, there are also chilling reports that highlight the risks of coming forward, such as financial ruin, loss of work, industry resentment
To ensure that whistleblowers [*197] continue to be

willing to come forward, the government must ensure that they receive adequate
financial incentives and protection against retaliation. n10 At present, the state of
environmental whistleblower law is fractured between various statutes that have
differing levels of financial incentive and protection. n11 Recent legislative measures
undertaken by Congress in other areas, however, may present the opportunity for wider reform to
increase whistleblower engagement in the environmental law arena. n12 In 2010, Congress
adopted agency-wide whistleblower programs for the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to deal with the fallout from the
2008 financial crisis and to prevent financial fraud in the future. n13 The programs combine economic
incentives for whistleblowers with measures to protect against retaliation, in an effort to
compel whistleblowers with knowledge of financial fraud to come forward. n14 The purpose of the
programs being to enlist private interests into the fight against serious threats to the U.S. economy. n15 Using this model, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should consider a similar program to incentivize
whistleblowers to take actions to protect the environment, thereby confronting a problem that not only
and protracted litigation with varying degrees of success. n9
threatens the U.S. economy, but every aspect of daily life. n16
2NC Solvency
The counterplan solves the whistleblowers advantage it provides
financial incentives for environmental whistleblowers to come
forward and consolidates environmental whistleblowing in a central
program whistleblowing is chilled in the status quo because
whistleblowers are hunted by the government and the risk is much
higher than the reward for potential discoveries and public
disclosure the counterplan makes it worthwhile for whistleblowers
to come forward and disclose criminal acts within the federal
government thats enough incentive
Warren 15
Whistleblower programs provide assistance to the U.S. government

and regulatory agencies by aligning public and private interests. n224 When private instruments of justice are
Advantages of Whistleblower Programs
undertaken in the interest of the common good, they can produce beneficial tools, such as legal talent, investigative resources, and inside information. n225
Wrongdoing can often be difficult to detect, and therefore, an insider with intimate
knowledge of a company or a potentially liable party's actions, can be invaluable in
prosecuting enforcement actions without expending prohibitively large amounts of resources. n226 1. Aligning Public-Private Interests Through
Monetary Awards The fact that citizen suits and other enforcement mechanisms limit the alignment of
interests between private parties and the government deters those private parties from
coming forward to further litigation that could be beneficial to the public. n227 Although these suits may
account for attorneys' fees, costs, and potentially punitive damages, their application may be limited to specific instances and their rewards too minimal
to attract significant attention from the most sophisticated and knowledgeable legal organizations. n228 Furthermore, they provide
little incentive for insiders to come forward with knowledge of violations, in
light of the risks posed in doing so. n229 By comparison, incentivizing potential whistleblowers
through programs that allow them to share in government recoveries, such as qui tam
actions and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) program, have proven
extremely [*220] successful. n230 These types of suits attract skilled legal talent--driven by
the incentive of large fees--to represent the whistleblower's interests and to assist the
government prosecution. n231 These large fees are the result of certain statutes that provide for potentially significant damages and penalties. n232
Legal talent--whatever its motivation--can provide expert analysis and careful research in assessing highly complex claims, which in turn, have the potential to be lucrative. n233
These whistleblower attorneys can also help analyze the merits of the claims and
determine whether there are viable legal remedies and regulatory mechanisms in place.
n234 Whistleblowers also provide the government with a tremendous service throughout
prosecutions because they often know important inside information. n235 Such information is extremely
valuable because it is often intimate knowledge of complex and highly technical matters. n236 Insiders can also point to violations of
the law that the gov-ernment would have no other way of ascertaining, such as illegal dumping at sea.
n237 Whistleblower programs recognize this inside information as a valuable asset. n238 Whistleblower programs can also be of
substantial value to the government by generating publicity for private enforcement
programs. n239 Multiple news outlets have covered stories about the large payouts available to whistleblowers, which
alerts people with knowledge of potential misconduct that they too can be rewarded if
they come forward and expose crime. n240 Given the substantial [*221] risks facing whistleblowers, knowledge that
there are also financial incentives and programs that provide protection can be invaluable to bringing those
with potential claims forward. n241 While there is a significant public benefit that comes with environmental whistleblowing,
whistleblowers put themselves at potentially serious risk. n242 Thus, the law should
adequately reflect the cost-benefit analysis that each whistleblower must

do by offsetting the risk with adequate awards. n243 Although there are currently whistleblower
awards under select environmental statutes, they are wholly inadequate in light of the possible risks. n244 Some statutes, such as the Clean Air Act
(CAA) provide only nominal awards when compared to the risks that whistleblowers would be taking, and others, such as the Clean Water Act (CWA) provide no financial
Without significant changes to these statutory

schemes--such as the proposed whistleblower programs-those with inside information about environmental crimes
will be unlikely to come forward when facing the risks
involved with doing so
Although many environmental
incentive whatsoever. n245
. n246 2. Streamlining Whistleblower Protection
statutes provide whistleblowers with protection against retribution, there is room for
improvement. n247 Currently, whistleblower protection in environmental statutes is only
available to whistleblowers who file complaints with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). n248
While OSHA protects employee-whistleblowers against retaliation, it is required to conduct an investigation to satisfy a common law [*222] framework before doing so. n249
individual statutes have varying procedural hurdles that must be met for a
successful claim. n250 A whistleblower program that is consolidated under the
Furthermore,
EPA could avoid the pitfalls of the current scheme by strengthening the
language of a whistleblower provision, providing uniformity in
enforcement, and extending to potential whistleblowers that are not
employees. n251 All claims could be submitted under one organization, which would then handle enforcement of the alleged violation and protect the
whistleblower against any potential retaliation. n252 Furthermore, a consolidated environmental whistleblower
program could gain publicity through the payment of big awards, which in
turn could make whistleblowers more aware that such incentives and protections are
available. n253 Implementing a new statutory provision could also allow for the construction of more meaningful whistleblower awards when retaliatory measures can
be shown. n254
General Incentives Solvency

And, comprehensive studies prove incentives mean whistleblowers are
more likely to come forward
Employment Law Daily 13
(Wolters Kluwer Employment Law Daily, Whistleblower reward laws play
critical role in fraud detection, study finds, pg online @
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/whistleblowerreward-laws-play-critical-role-in-fraud-detection-studyfinds/#sthash.XTBp6CUG.dpuf //um-ef)
Whistleblower reward or qui tam laws work remarkably well and should be exploited in
order to protect individuals and businesses that play by the rules and do not cheat in
order to gain a competitive advantage, according to a recent report analyzing the
impact of such legislation on the willingness of employees to report fraud

or misconductboth internally and externally. The report, released on Friday, December 6,
by the National Whistleblowers Center, was based on a review of statistical studies on
employee-reporting behaviors. Its authors urged Congress not only to reject
watering down any current whistleblower laws but to expand the scope of their coverage .
The authors note that their findings echo prior independent studies that have reached the same
conclusion as to the importance of legislation that provides financial incentives for
whistleblowers. For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2009 reviewed the 25-year history of the False Claims Act, the oldest
modern qui tam law, and reached the unanimous (bipartisan) conclusion that a considerable amount of fraud would go
undetected absent the willingness of qui tam relators to come forward. The existence of
qui tam or whistleblower rewards programs are an absolutely essential component for a
successful fraud detection program, the report notes. Without strong incentives the vast majority of fraud will neither be
detected nor reported to the appropriate authorities. Currently, a plurality of employees fail to disclose misconduct to anyone, and less than 2 percent
of employees are willing to disclose misconduct, fraud or violations of law to a government agency. Despite this real crisis in employee-reporting
behaviors, however, employees remain the key source of fraud detection. And whistleblower reward laws are a key factor in their willingness to report
Among the reports

recommendations: Congress should enact a general False Claims Act to provide for
whistleblower rewards in areas that are not covered under current law. Such rewards should be based
allegations of misconduct, both internally to corporate compliance programs and externally to law enforcement.
on a percentage of monies actually recovered by the United States based on the documented contribution of the whistleblower. Moreover, the authors
urged the Department of Justice to undertake efforts to stimulate the filing of more FCA cases, as the current number of cases filed each year is
dramatically low.
AT: Disads to the CP (short)

And, the counterplan can overcome their disads just minor blips that are
fixed with the construction of the program
Warren 15
D. Perceived Challenges That Must Be Overcome

As with any major system overhaul, there are challenges that must be overcome in order
to implement an EPA whistleblower program of this sort. n278 There will be fears and
concerns about an overload of low-quality or vindictive whistleblower complaints, an
inability to adequately provide financial incentives or overcome agency capture, and of
giving monies paid by violators to private parties, rather than using the funds to help the public.
n279 Nevertheless, most of these issues will not realistically materialize,
and those that do can be overcome. n280
AT: Lawsuit overload

No risk of overload or overstretch program will build in protections to
prevent it
Warren 15
For example, although
there may be an influx of whistleblower claims to begin with, the EPA

and other enforcing agencies should be able to readily distinguish between those that
are viable and those that are frivolous. n281 Further, competent lawyers will likely only be
willing to work with claimants they deem credible, which will serve as a signal to the
agencies who will work [*226] closely with these lawyers. n282 Although there may be a risk that extra
staff will have to be devoted to investigating these claims, those resources would still be expended in furtherance of alerting the EPA
of potential risks that threaten the environment and further, may uncover truly dire situations. n283
AT: No Funds
SEC program provides a model that solves funding issues
Warren 15
Given the fact that many current environmental statutes provide such low rewards, or no
rewards at all to whistleblowers, there may be a concern about the ability of the EPA to
allocate funds to pay significant awards for successful claims. n284 This can be rectified by
paying into a fund--similar to those employed by the SEC and the CFTC--that can ensure
successful payments to worthy whistleblowers. n285 These funds can be bolstered by
any recoveries from convicted environmental violators. n286 Furthermore, many
statutes that do not have whistleblower awards, such as the CWA, actually have
extremely significant monetary sanctions that can amount to millions of dollars over the
course of only a few days. n287 For statutes such as these, a set percentage of the recovery
would provide the funds needed to adequately reward whistleblowers. n288
AT: Agency Capture

Dodd-Frank proves it wont happen
Warren 15
Some may also argue that these statutes will be ineffective at overcoming the problem of
agency capture because there is no private recourse for citizens beyond the
administrative apparatus. n289 Although these concerns are legitimate, there are reasons to
believe that agency capture will not become a systemic issue. n290 Even though whistleblowers may not have private judicial recourse, they can pressure and embarrass
agencies through the media. n291 Further, competent legal counsel will also likely
advise their clients on how to press their cases with the agency. n292 Giving
whistleblowers access to the enforcement [*227] apparatus is still better than the other option,
which is to have the agencies act with nearly complete autonomy. n293 The same concern is
applicable to the Dodd-Frank whistleblower programs, but the programs have still had
success and been met with optimism. n294
AT: Money for Envt Key

Need for whistleblower incentives outweighs
Warren 15
Lastly, there will be some who argue that any recovery received from environmental
polluters should be reserved strictly for government cleanup efforts and preventative
activities. n295 The government, however, may never obtain these recoveries in the first
place if not for the prospective whistleblowers. n296 Therefore, despite merit of any
concerns about giving private parties a portion of the recovery, the fact remains that it is more
important to get the recovery in the first place, and thus rewarding
whistleblowers with a portion of recoveries is warranted and encourages
future whistleblowers to come forward, which must ultimately be the primary goal.
n297
Alternate WB Counterplan
Human Rights Watch, June 18, 2013
(Human Rights Watch, nonprofit, nongovernmental human rights organization made up of roughly 400 staff members around the
globe. Its staff consists of human rights professionals including country experts, lawyers, journalists, and academics of diverse
backgrounds and nationalities. Established in 1978, Human Rights Watch is known for its accurate fact-finding, impartial reporting,
effective use of media, and targeted advocacy, often in partnership with local human rights groups. Each year, Human Rights Watch
publishes more than 100 reports and briefings on human rights conditions in some 90 countries, generating extensive coverage in
local and international media. With the leverage this brings, Human Rights Watch meets with governments, the United Nations,
regional groups like the African Union and the European Union, financial institutions, and corporations to press for changes in policy
and practice that promote human rights and justice around the world, June 18, 2013, US: Statement on Protection of
Whistleblowers in Security Sector, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/18/us-statement-protection-
whistleblowers-security-sector, Accessed: July 7, 2015, YDEL)

Moving Forward to Protect Whistleblowers and Democratic Accountability In
light of these specific facts, Human Rights Watch urges the Obama administration not to
prosecute Edward Snowden or other national security whistleblowers until it is prepared to
explain to the public, in as much detail as possible, what the concrete and specific harms to
national security his disclosures have caused, and why they outweigh the publics right to know.
If the administration truly welcomes a debate on issues of privacy, rights, and security, as
President Obama has said it does, then prosecuting the man who sparked the debate is not the
way to show it. In addition, the government should cease using the Espionage Act to charge
those who disclose classified information to the public that shows wrongdoing or unethical
government programs or policies. In this regard, we note that the penalties for disclosures under
the Espionage Act, whose charges carry 10-year prison terms, are significantly heavier than
what many other democracies impose on government agents who expose secrets, and that the
European Court of Human Rights has ruled in favor of protecting security sector whistleblowers
when the public interest in their disclosures outweighs other important state interests.[22]
Finally, Congress should provide effective protections for confidential
disclosures and legal rights that security sector whistleblowers can invoke
in case of retaliation. Congress has authority to demand greater transparency from
the executive branch, and to inform citizens of the scope of secret surveillance
programs. It should set firm limits on not only what sort of data may be collected for
what purpose, but also how long the NSA and other agencies may retain data not directly
connected to an ongoing investigation. All branches of government have a responsibility to
minimize the amount of information that is withheld from the public, so that the
functioning of government does not have to rely on leaks to be visible to the governed.
Congress has the power to provide oversight for whistleblowers

Human Rights Watch, June 18, 2013
(Human Rights Watch, nonprofit, nongovernmental human rights organization made up of roughly 400 staff members around the
globe. Its staff consists of human rights professionals including country experts, lawyers, journalists, and academics of diverse
backgrounds and nationalities. Established in 1978, Human Rights Watch is known for its accurate fact-finding, impartial reporting,
effective use of media, and targeted advocacy, often in partnership with local human rights groups. Each year, Human Rights Watch
publishes more than 100 reports and briefings on human rights conditions in some 90 countries, generating extensive coverage in
local and international media. With the leverage this brings, Human Rights Watch meets with governments, the United Nations,
regional groups like the African Union and the European Union, financial institutions, and corporations to press for changes in policy
and practice that promote human rights and justice around the world, June 18, 2013, US: Statement on Protection of
Whistleblowers in Security Sector, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/18/us-statement-protection-
whistleblowers-security-sector, Accessed: July 7, 2015, YDEL)
We believe US authorities should exercise discretion when considering prosecuting such

leaks under US laws governing classified information. They should not bring charges
against whistleblowers who expose government wrongdoing unless they can make a
compelling case that the harm to national security caused by the disclosure is so
significant that it overrides the publics right to know and are prepared to make that case
publicly, providing as much detail as possible on the actual harm. Any law that respects rights
should place the burden of this argument on the government, not the whistleblower, and
the simple fact that information is classified should never be sufficient on its own to
defeat protection for disclosures that are in the public interest. In particular, the
Espionage Act, which was framed to punish the passing of sensitive information to a foreign
enemy, should never be distorted beyond its intended purpose and used to punish
whistleblowers. Congress should live up to its responsibility to provide effective
protection and meaningful recourse to whistleblowers. To start, it should enact
meaningful laws on which they can rely, both to challenge official retaliation and to
defend themselves from criminal and civil liability. It should insist on greater disclosure from
security agencies and share information concerning the dimensions and modalities of security
surveillance with the public. And it should work with the administration to cut back on the
overwhelming growth of classified information and protect the publics right to know.
Both Congress and the Obama administration should rethink surveillance
programs and reform them to ensure that they intrude no more than necessary on the
private communications of all people, not just US citizens. The United States has been a
strong proponent of Internet freedom, but it risks its reputation when it fails to respect the rights
of Internet and phone users.
DOD PIC
1NC CP Shell
Sternstein 15
(Aliya Sternstein. Nextgov.com, Jun 4, 2015, Watchdog Says Pentagon
Needs to Crank Up 'Insider Threat' Monitoring, pg Proquest //um-ef)
Work to rein in some post-Sept. 11 domestic surveillance practices ended with passage of a bill that limits the National Security Agency's collection of
U.S. call records. But regular
Joes inside the Pentagon -- or at least those with access to sensitive or classified information -expect even greater scrutiny on their workplace digital activities. Just before the Senate
cleared the USA Freedom Act, the Government Accountability Office released a report recommending the Defense
Department take new steps to set up so-called "insider threat" programs, which aim to
stop information leaks by disgruntled employees. The unclassified version of the report found only half of military
components GAO reviewed have logged system and user behaviors to develop "a baseline of normal activity patterns." The purpose of
tracing the activities of Pentagon personnel is to zero in on network "anomalies,"
computer usage that might be indicative of a leaker, the watchdogs said. NSA is part of the Defense
Department. The employee insider threat program was borne out of various laws and
White House policies issued since 2010 that require all departments to do a better job of
fortressing classified information. That year, former soldier Chelsea Manning shared top secret files with the WikiLeaks
website. The ability of ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden to reveal classified intelligence in
2013 suggests anti-leak programs need more muscle, Patricia Larsen, co-director of the
governmentwide National Insider Threat Task Force, said last December. This week, GAO agreed. A key element of the
Pentagon's program has not consistently been incorporated Defensewide, the auditors said, noting
should
"three of the six components [evaluated] have developed a baseline of normal activity" on Defense networks. They did not identify the organizations by
name. "Anomalous activities are network activities that are inconsistent with the expected norms, the watchdogs added. "These activities, such as
network activity outside of normal work hours or changes in typical data download patterns, could indicate the exploitation of cyber vulnerabilities,
among other things." To detect anomalies, three of the components GAO examined plan to buy or upgrade analytic tools that allow them to monitor
user behavior suggesting insider-threat activities. One entity that already has such technology said the enhanced model it expects to obtain will be able
to watch a user's behavior across unclassified, secret and top-secret networks. A handful of policies published between 2000 and 2012 call for
establishing a normal activity baseline. Auditors also pointed to a post-Snowden, nonpublic February 2014 directive on protecting national security
systems from insider threats. The U.S. military's 2000 Final Report of the Insider Threat Integrated Process Team instructs organizations to come up
with a specific list of employee behaviors that should be tracked online, because otherwise managers will suffer information overload. It will be
impossible to baseline normal activity patterns "with the sheer volume of user characteristics data" unless supervisors establish an "inventory of
behavior attributes and patterns grounded in counterintelligence experience and stored to allow for rapid automatic analysis and monitoring," the
authors of that Defense report wrote. Once a Pentagon organization has selected which employee and system activities to keep tabs on, those
attributes should be studied for more than a couple of days. A December 2012 Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute manual, Common
Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, states "the longer the organization monitors the chosen data points, the more reliable the baseline will be."
Recommended data points to observe include: Communications between devices: the

devices a workstation communicates with and the devices a server communicates with;
Bandwidth consumed, especially noting the differences between bandwidth use during
and after business hours;. Virtual private network users: times of access, bandwidth
consumed, geolocation information; Ports and protocols; Normal firewall and IDS alerts--Normal alerts may
occur when business processes change (e.g., there is increased website traffic). The Carnegie Mellon researchers note, "Organizations may find it
challenging to maintain employee privacy while collecting data to establish a baseline."
!!!Disads!!!
Insider threat D.A.
Top Shelf
1NC Shell
A. Counterintelligence efforts in federal agencies prevents insider leaks
nowInsider Threats program protects vital security information
Washington Post 14
("Federal agencies embrace new technology and strategies to find the
enemy within," Washington Post, 3/7, pg lexis//um-ef)
After a string of high-profile incidents from the Ft. Hood shooter to Wikileaks and NSA
contractor Edward Snowden, government agencies and contractors have started
monitoring their own employees and networks with unprecedented scrutiny After years of focusing on outside
threats, the federal government and its contractors are turning inward, aiming a
range of new technologies and counterintelligence strategies at their own employees to root out
spies, terrorists or leakers. Agencies are now monitoring their computer networks with
unprecedented scrutiny, in some cases down to the keystroke, and tracking employee behavior for signs of deviation from routine. At the Pentagon,
new rules are being written requiring contractors to institute programs against insider
threats, a remarkable cultural change in which even workers with the highest security
clearances face increased surveillance. The if you see something, say something mind-set of the post-9/11 world has fully arrived in the
workplace, with new urgency following high-profile leaks such as the revelations of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden . Peoples
sensitivity to this has changed substantially, said Lynn Dugle, president of a Raytheon business unit that markets an insider threat
detection system called SureView. I can tell you five years ago, when we were talking to agencies or companies about insider threat, we would normally be talking to (chief
information officers) who were under budget stress. ... And that was a very tough sell. Now we see boards of directors and CEOs really understanding what the threat can
President Obama in
2011 issued an executive order that established a National Insider Threat Task Force and
required all federal agencies that handle classified material to institute programs
designed to seek out saboteurs and spies. While corporate security has long been part of Beltway culture, the
heightened focus and the emergence of new monitoring technology touched off a
burgeoning industry. In addition to Raytheon, Lockheed Martin has developed an insider-threat detection service, as have several start-ups in the
mean to them, and the risk it poses to them. In response to the breach by former Army intelligence analyst Pfc. Bradley Manning,
Washington area. Even Booz Allen Hamilton, which faced national embarrassment when Snowden, one of its employees, walked off with some of the countrys most guarded
secrets, counsels its clients on how to detect rogue employees. A recent job posting said the company was looking for an insider threat analyst, which required a security
clearance and more than five years of experience in counterintelligence. The posting spread on the Web and sparked ridicule over the notion that the company that employed
Snowden was now looking to help turn the historic breach into a profitable lesson learned. Raytheons SureView program allows agencies to create all sorts of internal alerts
indicating when something may be amiss. A company could, for example, program the software to detect whenever a file containing the words top secret or proprietary is
downloaded, e-mailed or moved from one location on the system to another. Once that wire is tripped, an alert almost immediately pops up on a security analysts monitor, along
with a digital recording of the employees screen. All the employees actions the cursor scrolling over to open the secure file, the file being copied and renamed can be
watched and replayed, even in slow motion. Its the cyber equivalent of the security camera that records robbers sticking up a convenience store. Lockheed Martin provides a
At its broadest use, the service can

monitor mountains of data on the Web Facebook, Twitter, news sites or blogs to
help predict everything from a foreign coup or riot to political elections. But it can also be
turned inward, at employees online habits, to predict who within the organization might
go rogue. Counterintelligence officials use Wisdom to evaluate employee behavior
patterns, flagging individuals who exhibit high risk characteristics, the company
says in a brochure. I like to think of it as a digital intuition that is being developed, said
service called Wisdom, which acts as your eyes and ears on the Web, according to a company official.
Jason OConnor, Lockheeds vice president for analysis and mission solutions.
B. Insider threat ensures a cyber attack on the nations grid

Angerholzer et al 2014 [MA international affairs, CEO and president of Center for the Study of
the Presidency and Congress]
(Maxmillian, Securing the US electrical Grid: Understanding the Threats to the Most Critical of
Critical Infrastructure, While Securing a Changing
Grid"https://www.thepresidency.org/sites/default/files/Grid%20Report%20July%2015%20First
%20Edition.pdf)
Major problems can occur when an employeepurposefully or inadverntantlygains access to an
infected USB or is able to plant a virus that destroys a system. The threat of this issue is
heightened in the case of many decentralized, local power grids accompanied with minimal
physical security and detection systems. An insider may be able to gain access to the
physical components of a power station, thus having the ability to cause serious physical
damage. Actors posing threats may be disgruntled employees following termination or
employees experiencing financial pressures and stress.103 Job-related stress and unfortunate events can cause
employees to extract revenge or open up insider secrets to third party inquirers.104 Many of these events are on a situational basis and apply
differently to each company; however, it
should be made more of a priority that businesses and utilities
increase security and employee screening. Individual attacks can have major effects
on communities due to dependencies on the power grid. An individual was arrested in Arkansas for a series of
attacks on power lines stationed in Arkansas. He acted alone, and did not seem to be involved in a larger terrorist organization. On August 21, 2013, a
shackle that secured a 500,000-volt electricity line was cut, and over 100 bolts of the support tower were removed.105 The tower collapsed, causing
power lines to be severed by a passing train and leaving the town of Cabot, Arkansas, without power. On September 29, 2013, the Entergy electricity
station in Scott, Arkansas, was set on fire, causing over $2 million in damages.106 The third and final attack occurred in Jacksonville, Arkansas. Two
power poles were cut, one of which was then pulled down by a tractor. This attack caused a 115,000-volt transmission line to fall, causing an outage for
9,000 people.107 103 Byron Acohido, Disgruntled employees, insiders pose big hacking risk, USA Today,
March 15, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/03/15/insider-threat-matthew-keys-anonymous/1991265/ 104 Ibid 105 Arrest made over
Arkansas power grid attacks, CBS News, October 14, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/arrest-madeover-arkansas-power-grid-attacks/ 106 Ibid.
Insider threats oftentimes pose a greater risk than outsider

attacks. In an FBI and Computer Security Institute joint Computer Crime and Security Survey, 80 percent of enterprises that
107 Ibid. July 2014 First Edition 49
responded to the survey cited disgruntled or dishonest employees as most likely to attack .108
Additionally, 55 percent of enterprises that responded reported unauthorized access by insiders. While security measures have increased over time,
insider threat incidents continue to occur. In 2012, Homeland Securitys Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) was
called to a power generation system that had been targeted by an insider threat. An employee was discovered with an infected USB device after he
took the device to the IT department. The infected USB left several machines at the power plant subject to the virus. Fortunately, the ICS-CERT and
Sometimes, an attacker will recruit

an insider to assist in launching an attack. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security issued a report titled Insider
Threat to Utilities. In this report, they stated that vio lent extremists have, in fact, obtained insider positions,
and that outsiders have attempted to solicit utility-sector employees for damaging
physical and cyber-attacks.110 In 2010 an alleged American recruit to al Qaeda was arrested in Yemen. Sharif Mobley, of New
the anti-virus software already existing in the system were able to eliminate the virus.109
Jersey, had been employed at five different U.S. nuclear power plants in Pennsylvania after successfully passing federal background checks.
must remain priority
Fortunately, insider threats to the power grid have been fairly containedstill, internal security
a
..
There should be periodic risk assessment throughout an enterprise, as well as increased security awareness training for employees. Companies can
issue strict passwords for employees, monitor online actions, and note suspicious behavior. The company should separate duties and limit access
amongst different employees to ensure that one person does not have the ability to cause major damage. Following termination or transfer, any
previous computer access must be deactivated. Additionally, up-to-date anti-virus software and backup and recovery processes should be implemented
for all online systems.111
C. Extinction
Habiger, 2/1/2010
(Eugue Retired Air Force General, Cyberwarfare and Cyberterrorism, The

Cyber Security Institute, p. 11-19)
A modestly advanced enemy could use a cyberattack to shut down (if not physically damage) one or
more regional power grids. An entire region could be cast into total darkness, powerdependent systems could be shutdown. An attack
on one or more regional power grids could also cause cascading effects that could jeopardize our
entire national grid. When word leaks that the blackout was caused by a cyberattack, the
specter of a foreign enemy capable of sending the entire nation into darkness would only increase the fear,
turmoil and unrest. While the finance and energy sectors are considered prime targets for a cyberattack, an attack on any of the 17
delineated critical infrastructure sectors could have a major impact on the United States. For example, our healthcare system is already technologically
driven and the Obama Administrations ehealth efforts will only increase that dependency. A cyberattack on the U.S. ehealth infrastructure could send
our healthcare system into chaos and put countless of lives at risk. Imagine if emergency room physicians and surgeons were suddenly no longer able
to access vital patient information. A cyberattack on our nations water systems could likewise cause widespread disruption. An attack on the control
systems for one or more dams could put entire communities at risk of being inundated, and could create ripple effects across the water, agriculture, and
energy sectors. Similar water control system attacks could be used to at least temporarily deny water to otherwise arid regions, impacting everything
from the quality of life in these areas to agriculture. In 2007, the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit determined that the destruction from a single wave of
cyberattacks on critical infrastructures could exceed $700 billion, which would be the rough equivalent of 50 Katrinaesque hurricanes hitting the United
States all at the same time.29 Similarly, one IT security source has estimated that the impact of a single day cyberwar attack that focused on and
disrupted U.S. credit and debit card transactions would be approximately $35 billion.30 Another way to gauge the potential for harm is in comparison to
other similar noncyberattack infrastructure failures. For example, the August 2003 regional power grid blackout is estimated to have cost the U.S.
economy up to $10 billion, or roughly .1 percent of the nations GDP. 31 That said, a cyberattack of the exact same magnitude would most certainly
have a much larger impact. The origin of the 2003 blackout was almost immediately disclosed as an atypical system failure having nothing to do with
terrorism. This made the event both less threatening and likely a single time occurrence. Had it been disclosed that the event was the result of an
attack that could readily be repeated the impacts would likely have grown substantially, if not exponentially. Additionally, a cyberattack could also be
Many
military leaders actually believe that such a disruptive cyber preoffensive is the most
effective use of offensive cyber capabilities. This is, in fact, the way Russia utilized cyberattackerswhether government
used to disrupt our nations defenses or distract our national leaders in advance of a more traditional conventional or strategic attack.
assets, governmentdirected/ coordinated assets, or allied cyber irregularsin advance of the invasion of Georgia. Widespread distributed denial of
service (DDOS) attacks were launched on the Georgian governments IT systems. Roughly a day later Russian armor rolled into Georgian territory. The
cyberattacks were used to prepare the battlefield; they denied the Georgian government a critical communications tool isolating it from its citizens and
degrading its command and control capabilities precisely at the time of attack. In this way, these attacks were the functional equivalent of conventional
air and/or missile strikes on a nations communications infrastructure.32 One interesting element of the Georgian cyberattacks has been generally
overlooked: On July 20th, weeks before the August cyberattack, the website of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was overwhelmed by a more
narrowly focused, but technologically similar DDOS attack.33 This should be particularly chilling to American national security experts as our systems
undergo the same sorts of focused, probing attacks on a constant basis. The ability of an enemy to use a cyberattack to counter our offensive
capabilities or soften our defenses for a wider offensive against the United States is much more than mere speculation. In fact, in Iraq it is already
happening. Iraq insurgents are now using offtheshelf software (costing just $26) to hack U.S. drones (costing $4.5 million each), allowing them to
intercept the video feed from these drones.34 By hacking these drones the insurgents have succeeded in greatly reducing one of our most valuable
sources of realtime intelligence and situational awareness. If our enemies in Iraq are capable of such an effective cyberattack against one of our more
sophisticated systems, consider what a more technologically advanced enemy could do. At the strategic level, in 2008, as the United States Central
Command was leading wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, a cyber intruder compromised the security of the Command and sat within its IT systems,
monitoring everything the Command was doing. 35 This time the attacker simply gathered vast amounts of intelligence. However, it is clear that the
attacker could have used this access to wage cyberwaraltering information, disrupting the flow of information, destroying information, taking down
systemsagainst the United States forces already at war. Similarly, during 2003 as the United States prepared for and began the War in Iraq, the IT
networks of the Department of Defense were hacked 294 times.36 By August of 2004, with America at war, these ongoing attacks compelled then
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to write in a memo that, "Recent exploits have reduced operational capabilities on our networks."37 This
wasnt the first time that our national security IT infrastructure was penetrated immediately in advance of a U.S. military option.38 In February of 1998
the Solar Sunrise attacks systematically compromised a series of Department of Defense networks. What is often overlooked is that these attacks
occurred during the ramp up period ahead of potential military action against Iraq. The attackers were able to obtain vast amounts of sensitive
informationinformation that would have certainly been of value to an enemys military leaders. There is no way to prove that these actions were
purposefully launched with the specific intent to distract American military assets or degrade our capabilities. However, such ambiguitiesthe inability
to specifically attribute actions and motives to actorsare the very nature of cyberspace. Perhaps, these repeated patterns of behavior were mere
coincidence, or perhaps they werent. The potential that an enemy might use a cyberattack to soften physical defenses, increase the gravity of harms
from kinetic attacks, or both, significantly increases the potential harms from a cyberattack. Consider the gravity of the threat and risk if an enemy,
rightly or wrongly, believed that it could use a cyberattack to degrade our strategic weapons capabilities. Such an enemy might be convinced that it
effect of this would be to undermine our

deterrencebased defenses, making us significantly more at risk of a major war.
could win a warconventional or even nuclearagainst the United States. The
Uniqueness
Uniq: Insider Threats High

U.S. internal threats are the most dangerous unpredictable, irreparable
Hall, 2014, [Strategic Intelligence Graduate]
(Caitlin Squire, March 20, The Trusted Shadow and Trojan Horse of the United States
Government http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-trusted-shadow-and-trojan-horse-of-theunited-states-government)
An insider threat is irrefutably one of the greatest threats to United States national
security. Greg Chung, Chi Mak, Robert Philip Hanssen, and Edward Snowden are a few of
the dozens of personalities who have leaked or passed secrets to foreign governments over the past thirty
years. Rita M. Barrios elaborates on the significance of the insider threat stating, The theft and exposure of the critical
data components that resides in a relational database by the authorized insider is on
the rise (Barrios 2013, 54).
In comparison to threats such as weapons of mass destruction, cyber, and nuclear, the insider threat can often be
threat of the insider is not the method of attack, rather the threat is the
individual (Blades 2010, 32). The insider threat is comparable to a Trojan horse and is identifiable as a trusted
shadow of the government who, despite the extensive background checks, obtains a
security clearance providing access to classified information. Furthermore, the United States can
strategically mission plan for all divisions of the military, yet it takes one individual to take those plans
and pass that information to the enemy, or make it public knowledge. One individual can obtain classified information on
overlooked; however, the
the location of United States submarines, specs on the B-2 stealth bomber, or tactics, techniques, and procedures of the United States military and
pass that intelligence to a news agency or foreign government easily. With the ever growing world of electronics and advancements in technology, a
young adult could walk in and out of the work place with dozens of classified documents saved on a CD. In addition, with websites like Wikileaks,
secrets can be published anonymously adding to the elusive nature of an insider threat.
These factors make all government employees with a security clearance dangerous as there is no patch to an insider
threat, only prevention and minimization. But is that what makes an insider threat so challenging to acknowledge and
track? Or is it the fact that these individuals are a trusted shadow whose motivation is prompted by unknown factors? Ellen Messmer highlights this
noting, While
the U.S. military is building up defenses to fend off network-based attacks from
enemy states and terrorists, some say the more-insidious security problem is the threat is
an insider bent on sabotage or stealing data (Messmer 2003, 12). Messmer, in a sense, simply acknowledges that the
motivation of an individual can be as minuet as I felt like it. That being said, is it only the fault of the insider for a leak or do co-workers impact the
process of detection as well? This realm of threat to a government entity is challenging due to the fact that, for any organization, they are dealing with
the unknown.
Uniq: Insider Threat High

insider threats real even subtle threats escalate
Deputy chief of naval operations, 2014
("what is 'insider threat'" January-March, CHIPS: The Department of the Navy's Information
Technology Magazine, www.doncio.navy.mil/CHIPS/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=4890
**we dont endorse ableist language
According to a 2011 Presidential Executive Order, an Insider Threat is a person with authorized access who uses that access to harm national security interests or national
security through unauthorized disclosure, data modification, espionage, terrorism, or kinetic actions resulting in loss or degradation of resources or capabilities. Put simply,
Insider Threat means the unauthorized disclosure of classified information that damages
national security, or violence that results in injury/loss of life and damage to operational
resources. Although the Navy has experienced a number of destructive and debilitating insider incidents over the years (the Walker-Whitworth espionage case of the
1980s, for example), the recent spate of information disclosures and workplace violence has
compelled a more focused institutional examination of the threat. The tragic events at the Washington Navy Yard
in September, the shooting at Fort Hood in 2009, the damage to USS Miami (SSN-755) in 2012, during a shipyard availability, and massive classified information disclosures by
the actions of these

perpetrators could likely have been prevented had their colleagues been alert and attentive
to their behaviors and reported it. Why is This Such a Big Threat? With the most powerful military and
the largest economy in the world, the United States is an attractive target not only to our
adversaries, but to insiders who seek to harm us. Insiders are particularly pernicious because
they have managed to gain our confidence and, with that trust, obtained access to systems,
capabilities or people they would otherwise not be authorized to access. To cause damage, insider threats
a National Security Agency contractor in 2013 and Army Pfc. Bradley Manning in 2010, all clearly fall within the definition. In each case,
to cyber security may target specific sensitive information on programs or operations and reveal what they perceive to be an unjust policy or disclose intelligence. And, as the
systems administrators with privileged user accounts, the ubiquity of our

all greatly compound
this problem. What Motivates Someone to Consider Acting in This Way? A feeling of injustice, a loss of something
valuable, the need to feel important, or an antithetical moral obsession could transform
an otherwise trustworthy service member or employee into a disgruntled insider or potential target for an adversary to exploit.
Equally threatening are those who may be stressed by circumstances beyond their control, and who
may choose violence in retaliation for some perceived wrongdoing. Criminal behaviors that may
manifest as a consequence of these motivations include espionage, unauthorized disclosure of sensitive
information, sabotage against the United States, and workplace. The Navy Insider Threat Program To combat
recent high profile cases have demonstrated,
information systems, our workforce's broad access to these systems, and the comparative ease with which data can be transferred
the Insider Threat, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus recently signed SECNAV Instruction 5510.37, implementing the Department of the Navy (DON) Insider Threat Program
(InTP). According to the instruction, the DON shall: Ensure existing and emerging insider threat training and awareness programs are developed, updated and implemented.
Enhance technical capabilities to monitor user activity on all systems in support of a continuous evaluation program. Leverage Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP),
Counterintelligence (CI), Human Resources (HR), Information Assurance (IA), Law Enforcement (LE), Security and other authorities to improve existing insider threat detection
and mitigation efforts. Detect, mitigate, and respond to insider threats through standardized processes and procedures. Ensure legal, civil and privacy rights are safeguarded.
Promote awareness and use of employee assistance programs to enhance interventions for employees in need. This link provides additional information, resources and
guidance available through the Navy Insider Threat Program: http://www. militaryonesource.mil. In support of SECNAVs policy and to elevate attention Navywide on this issue,
the Chief of Naval Operations has organized a team to address the Insider Threat. CNOs InTP team will focus on measures aimed at preventing future workplace violence as
well as the intentional disclosure of classified information. In close coordination with stakeholders from across the Navy, this team will issue directives and recommend policy
changes that reinforce the safety and security of both our people and our information. A core member of the team, OPNAV N2/N6 will focus on the cyber security aspects of
Insider Threat. Under this initiative, OPNAV N2/N6 recently established an Insider Threat to Cyber Security (ITCS) Office to lead the focus on the intelligence,
counterintelligence, information assurance, anomaly detection, and continuous evaluation elements of Navy Insider Threat. The ITCS Office is charged with overseeing Insider
Threat activities within these specific areas, and coordinating with related efforts across the antiterrorism/force protection, human resources, law enforcement, security and other
mission areas within the operational Navy. The ITCS Office is also charged with improving information sharing on insider threat deterrence, detection and mitigation efforts.
Major elements of ITCS Mission To deter, detect, assess, exploit and deny the activities of insider threats operating against DON programs, information, and operations, while
fostering a workforce environment in which employee issues are identified and addressed prior to the advent of inappropriate behavior. Vision To implement and execute the full
scope of ITCS, consisting of policies and procedures; a governance structure, employee assistance activities, enhanced continuous evaluation, centralized user activity
monitoring, and an analytic and response capability that provides a timely response to potential threat information derived from AT/FP, CI, IA, HR, LE, security, and other
sources, as necessary. Guiding Principles We will effectively and efficiently develop and execute U.S. Navy ITCS. We will also align it with national, Department of Defense,
SECNAV, and the larger U.S. Intelligence Community Insider Threat activities, while partnering to increase effectiveness and efficiencies. The Effort <="" p=""> Deterrence and
sustained vigilance. Taking immediate actions to enhance safeguards and decrease the likelihood of insider activity, focusing on the compromise or loss of sensitive or classified
information. These actions include: Enhanced continuous evaluation of those in trusted positions; Security review and update; Network upgrades and network hardening efforts;
Deploying Two-Person Integrity in case of sensitive networks and critical infrastructure; Expanded random polygraphs for privileged users and system administrators;
Revalidating the need for privileged user accounts; Training the workforce; and Creating an environment of trust. Compliance: An All Hands issue. Sailors, civilians and
contractors have been entrusted with unique access to information and information systems, most of which are directly or indirectly related to our national security. As a
consequence they must adhere to appropriate security policies and procedures designed to safeguard personnel, facilities, information and the systems. Compliance with
governing law, policies and procedures is a command responsibility and commanders will be held accountable for ensuring security policies, processes and procedures are
followed. Insider Threats Are Real The highly publicized Insider Threat incidents discussed earlier represent extreme cases where lives were lost and classified information was
leaked on an unprecedented scale. A successful Insider Threat incident, however, doesnt have to be as dramatic or explosive as these to cause serious or grave damage to the
national security.
The threat can be much more subtle, and still have crippling consequences. But no matter
we must be both cognizant of the motivations and vigilant of
how subtle it may be, it is still real and
behaviors that could lead a Sailor or employee to become Insider Threats. This is particularly
the case in times of fiscal uncertainty and declining budgets when the impacts of
sequestration and work furloughs may stress otherwise stable and highly dependable
people. The fact that SECNAV has instituted an Insider Threat program for the department reinforces the concern.
insider threats are the greatest must understand psychological motives

Messmer, 2003, [senior editor, network world]
(Ellen, "Security experts: Insider threat looms largest," NetworkWorld
www.networkworld.com/article/2329002/lan-wan/security-experts--insider-threat-loomslargest.html)
WASHINGTON, D.C. - While the U.S. military is building up defenses to fend off network-based attacks from enemy states and
terrorists, some say the more-insidious security problem is the threat of an insider bent on
sabotage or stealing data. Winn Schwartau explains. At last week's Forum on Information Warfare, researchers from
the FBI and George Washington University emphasized the insider threat during presentations that drew military personnel and
academics from around the world. In particular, IT systems administrators increasingly are seen as the
most potentially dangerous insider threat - and military concern - because of their power
over networks. In his keynote speech, Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minihan, former head of the National Security Agency
(NSA), compared today's systems administrators to the encryption-code clerks of past
wars who broke enemy secrets. He said systems administrators deserve greater
attention from the military and should be better paid. Some researchers say they have seen the systems
administrator go bad and see it as the Achilles' heel of national defense. FBI and George Washington researchers have studied the
case histories of criminal computers use, including interviews with prisoners. "The systems administrator
responsible for designing computer systems has the extraordinary ability to do damage,"
said Jerrold Post, professor of psychiatry, political psychology and international affairs at George Washington. He cited cases
that occurred at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, and in banking and other industries, to
underscore the danger posed by IT insiders who exploit power over networks. Post noted that
computer-based crimes, such as fraud, extortion, sabotage and espionage, have a
variety of motivations, including revenge and financial gain. He said it is critical to
understand the psychology of IT administrators in general to recognize possible
danger signs. IT specialists are "overwhelmingly represented by introverts" who "internalize stress and express themselves
only online," he said. A study of IT specialists caught for computer-based crimes reveals them typically to share some character
traits. Post said close analysis of work histories of IT administrators who sabotaged their employers' networks or did other damage
reveals that they often first commit less-serious infractions, such as refusing to train their
backup. Intervention by management early on could help prevent problems from

escalating, because introverted people usually don't seek help. The FBI has started its own study of those who commit
computer crimes - not necessarily focusing on IT administrators - by interviewing those now in jail, said John Jarvis, an FBI
is primarily an insider phenomenon," Jarvis said. Only a

quarter can be classified as "outsider," he said.
behavioral research scientist. "Cybercrime
insider threat reform key more serious than outsider threats

Acohido, 2013, [USA TODAY tech reporter who specializes in Internet security and privacy.
Acohido won the Pulitzer Prize]
(Byron, March 15, "Disgruntled employees, insiders pose big hacking
risk"www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/03/15/insider-threat-matthew-keysanonymous/1991265/)
SEATTLE -- In today's networked world, a disgruntled employee can pose a greater
corporate risk than an outside hacker. That's one big lesson drawn from the indictment of
Matthew Keys, the Reuters web editor who in late 2010 allegedly conspired with members of
the hacktivist collective Anonymous to deface the website of his former employer. A survey last
year by network security firm AlgoSecfound that security managers consider threats from
low-level insiders more worrisome than the threat of a sophisticated hack by well-funded,
external criminal organization. Some 29% of the survey takers said they were most
concerned about the lack of visibility into applications and networks, while 28% said their top
concern was insider threats. Both of those concerns relate to how a disgruntled employee, or an
insider aligned with criminals, could disrupt a company's network, or steal valuable intellectual
property. By contrast, just 14% said financially-motivated hackers worried them most, while 6%
cited political hacktivists. "As serious as external threats are, only one out of five
respondents saw external threats as their top risk," says Sam Erdheim, AlgoSec senior
security strategist. Poor internal processes, such as failing to revoke network access to
a fired employee, or making firewall changes that don't apply system wide, can translate
into opportunities for current or ex-employees with malicious intent. "Organizations need
to have effective policies in place, and the real key is to enforce them," says Erdheim.
"This doesn't completely solve the problem, of course, but it certainly takes away low hanging
fruit." Protecting websites and restricting access to sensitive data have become much trickier in
today's increasingly networked and cloud-based business environment, observes Pravin
Kothari, CEO of encryption firm CipherCloud. "With information moving and residing across a
combination of on-premise and off-site servers, often in various geographies, access points
have multiplied -- leaving more gaps for both insider and external threats," Kothari says.
Keys, 26, of Secaucus, N.J., has been charged with one count each of transmitting information
to damage a protected computer, attempted transmission and conspiracy. He was let go from
Sacramento television station KTXL Fox40 in October 2010. A few weeks later, he is alleged to
have provided members of the hacker group Anonymous with log-in credentials to a computer
server at the station's parent company. The hackers then defaced at least one of the station's
news stories posted on a website. Stricter data loss disclosure regulations are being
discussed in the U.S., Europe and Australia. At the same time, more organizations are turning
to data storage and computing power supplied by a third party over the Internet cloud. That
adds up to a bigger burden of responsibility on network managers to protect company systems
and data -- from insiders and outsiders alike. Advises Kothari: "Use military grade encryption to
protect information before it is sent to the cloud. That way, even when they breach the solution,
unauthorized viewers see only gibberish and cannot make use of the data. For tighter control,
give enterprises the encryption keys for deciphering the information instead of leaving the keys
with the cloud provider."
terrorism by an insider is the most probable scenario easy access

Ross et al 2011 [ABC chief investigative correspondent]
(Brian, "New Terror Report Warns of Insider Threat to Utilities"abcnews.go.com/Blotter/terroralert-warns-insider-threat-infrastructure/story?id=14118119)
Sabotage by an insider at a major utility facility, including a chemical or oil refinery,
could provide al Qaeda with its best opportunity for the kind of massive Sept. 11
anniversary attack Osama bin Laden was planning, according to U.S. officials. A new
intelligence report from the Department of Homeland Security issued Tuesday, titled Insider
Threat to Utilities, warns "violent extremists have, in fact, obtained insider positions," and
that "outsiders have attempted to solicit utility-sector employees" for damaging physical
and cyber attacks. "Based on the reliable reporting of previous incidents, we have high
confidence in our judgment that insiders and their actions pose a significant threat to the
infrastructure and information systems of U.S. facilities," the bulletin reads in part. "Past
events and reporting also provide high confidence in our judgment that insider information on
sites, infrastructure, networks, and personnel is valuable to our adversaries and may increase
the impact of any attack on the utilities infrastructure." Watch the full report tonight on ABC
News "World News With Diane Sawyer". In the materials recovered after the Navy SEAL
operation that killed Osama bin Laden in May, officials found evidence bin Laden sought to
repeat the carnage of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks on or around its ten year anniversary.
"The only way you can actually kill the large scale number of Americans that [bin Laden] literally
was calculating was through the use of this critical infrastructure," Chad Sweet, former DHS
chief of staff and co-founder of the Chertoff Group, told ABC News. After gaining access to
such sites, causing mayhem could be relatively easy, according to former White House
counter-terrorism advisor and ABC News consultant Richard Clarke. "There are a lot of very
sensitive facilities where someone can get a job on the inside, get access to a control
room, flip a switch, which causes an electric power grid to short circuit, causes a
pipeline to explode," Clarke said.
Links
Links: Psychology
insider threat program key understanding psychology will prevent
attacks
McCalley, 2014, [producer at federal news radio]
(Sean, April 28, "Understanding psychology of insider threats could stop the next one"
federalnewsradio.com/federal-drive/2014/04/understanding-psychology-of-insider-threats-couldstop-the-next-one/
When an Energy Department contractor found himself swimming in debt, he hatched a plan to make a secondary income and pay his bills: Try to sell
uranium equipment used to build atomic weapons. The sensitivity of his position allowed access to the materials, which he stole and marketed to
foreign government agents for $200,000. Through interviews and record analysis, the FBI and DoE set up a sting operation to catch the contractor at
the point of sale. Roy Oakley made off with a six-year prison sentence and the notorious honor as a DoE Spy of the Month. Oakleys attempt was
From a number of recent shootings at military bases to the

infamous leaks by former contractor Edward Snowden, the federal government struggles
to mitigate insider threats. In many instances, whether its violence or the exploitation of some type of information, an
individual has access, has a particular crisis and has a disposition to [attack], said Dr. Michael
foiled, but others still manage to get away.
Gelles, former chief psychologist for the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, on the Federal Drive with Tom Temin and Emily Kopp. Gelles co-authored
understanding the psychology

behind seemingly disgruntled or disloyal colleagues should be part of every agencys insider
threat prevention plan. The report preaches employee engagement with their colleagues to take notice to strange behavior or events
that could warn of a future attack. If we can understand and begin to pay attention to those behaviors,
and looking at them as data elements, we can begin to identify these behaviors and look at how
theyre different from baseline behavior of an employee, and interrupt forward motion, Gelles said. The report
identifies some key personality traits of an at risk employee: Not impulsive Has a history of managing
Mitigating the Insider Threat, a report released by Deloitte in 2012. In the report, he said
crises inefficiently Displays a pattern of frustration, disappointment and inadequacy Constantly seeks validation Has an exaggerated view of own
abilities and achievements A strong sense of entitlement Views self above the rules Needs immediate gratification, validation and satisfaction For
example, if an employee with access to sensitive data starts complaining about salary and lower-than-expected bonuses, thats a red flag. If the
employee has a pattern of working on holidays but complains about it anyway, thats another flag. If the employee has access to an agency from a
personal computer, three red flags. Add to those a criminal background including burglary, assaults or drug charges, Deloitte says the agency needs to
The standard psychology behind new

and younger federal employees could foretell an increase of insider attacks, according to Deloitte.
As of 2009, more than 40 percent of the federal workforce was older than 50 . As theyre
replaced by a younger generation with stronger backgrounds in computers and social
media, the overall value placed on classified data might shift. It used to be that wed do business in the world of
raise shields and move to full red alert. Risk-Prone Generation of Federal Employees
bricks and mortar, Gelles said. Now that were in an environment where most business is done virtually, were seeing that theres an increase in the
new federal employees might be at particular risk of

complacency. Similar to how many people immediately click Accept when confronted by the terms and conditions of a software update, they
way people are sharing and moving information. Gelles said
might not follow the necessary security measures to keep data from falling into the wrong hands. If there arent hard set policies, rules and the
appropriate training, people arent going to do things they dont feel are important, Gelles said. Or theyre going to do things because theyre
ignorant. Deloitte said members of Generation Y and younger naturally view information as readily available and accessible, and shared across a
larger community. Combined with personal connections to social media outlets and a less passive attitude about information sharing, the
incoming federal workforce is already creating its own set of risk factors based on how
they typically (and sometimes constantly) use the Internet. Creating Prediction Models for Insider Threats In its report, Deloitte
offered agencies a model to try and predict which employee is most likely to become an insider threat. It calculates risk based on four different criteria:
Internal Data: Employee interviews Interviews with coworkers Computer log-in histories Expense reports External Data: Posts on social media
accounts Public filings (court cases, permits, etc.) Behavior Patterns: Noticeable mood changes Increasing negativity Attempts to undermine coworkers
External Precursors: Not getting a bonus or promotion Workplace dispute Personal issue outside of work Natural disaster affecting employee or family
Combining those elements with the length of an employees career, the employees
amount of access to classified data and a background check, Deloitte argues that agencies
should have a fair idea of which employees are most likely to commit an insider attack.
But
that doesnt mean federal employees should fear a guilty before proven innocent policy or that good-intentioned whistleblowers should stop pursuing
a call to action: What
were not doing here is looking to profile anyone, Gelles said. What were not doing here
is pointing the finger at anyone. What were trying to do is look for anomalous behavior. Those are behaviors
that begin to look very different than what a person has been normally doing. By being able to identify that, [it then] leads to having a conversation with
that person [and to]
interrupt forward motion.
Links: ITP
current policies fail need to account for the complexity behind motivation
What then are these motivations provoking an individual to commit such an act of betrayal to the United States and what makes detection difficult? The Office of the Director of
National Intelligence acknowledged in the 2012 Report on Security Clearance Determinations that as of October 1, 2012, there were 4,917,751 individuals who held and were
approved for a secret or top secret security clearance. There is no way, technologically, to combat against 4,917,751 individuals; therefore,
awareness in the
work place is crucial for detection. There are personal, organizational, and behavioral factors and indicators that motivate an individual to
become an insider. The FBI identifies an insider may steal solely for personal gain, or that insider may be a spysomeone who is stealing company information or products in
the Insider Threat Program which

exhorts not only the insider, but co-workers and managers who fail to report suspicious
activity. This encourages profiling in the work environment, which as a country, we have
been trying to prevent for decades. The underlying complexities making an insider threat dangerous is not just at the hands of the insider now;
order to benefit another organization or country (2013). As a result, President Barack Obama implemented
rather, in the hands of co-workers as well. Despite the fact that the insider threat has been an issue since the Revolutionary War and the present day technological
there are also economic, personal, and organizational

motives that must be taken into consideration. These motives provoke consideration of government employees with a security
clearance to take part in the act of espionage. Recognizing these motives and taking into account the state of
the economy at any given time is crucial when assessing the potential for a co-worker to be
involved in espionage. Having a comprehensive understanding of the big picture must first
be identified in order to not only successfully analyze the complexities that make an insider threat dangerous, but to conduct predictive
advancements open the doors to espionage,
analysis on the impact over the next decade based on the current economy. There are major limitations preventing the ability to detect and avert an insider threat
from becoming a reality at all government installations. As aforementioned, the threat of an insider is not the method of attack, rather the individual therefore it is difficult to
develop a profile. Whereas the nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threat has strategic indications and warnings via various forms of intelligence, such is not the case for
the insider threat. There is no movement of foreign naval vessels or forward deployment of aircraft that can be observed or tracked provoking the United States to increase the
heightened alert level. Additionally, there is no perimeter defense that has to be bypassed seeing as the insider is a decentralized threat, a Trojan horse. That is the limitation in
behavior, both psychological and

sociological, must be assessed. In order to overcome these limitations, qualitative and quantitative data must
be analyzed in order to draw commonalities, make assessments and determine what the
specific underlying complexities are motivating someone to become an insider threat.
The most prevalent types of qualitative data include analyzing case studies, and
assessments made by subject matter experts. Case studies allow for the ability to draw conclusions and make assessments based on what is
obtaining information on the insider threat as the insider could be anyone with a security clearance; therefore,
known as a result of past insider threat successes. Case studies acknowledge the underlying complexities that not only make an insider threat dangerous but highlight motives,
psychological and behavioral factors, as well as identify level of invol vement in espionage and explain how an insider ultimately became an insider. Additionally, quantitative
data is important as it allows for ability to fully obtain an accurate perception of the insider threat. Quantitative data adds to the value of the qualitative data provided by
identifying the length in time an individual has been committing espionage and the amount of damage done as a result. Furthermore, quantitative data identifies how big a threat
the insider is by highlighting the number of individuals in the United States that have a security clearance and provides probabilities that aid in grasping the big picture.
After taking all of this information into account, assessments and predictive analysis can
be conducted so that complexities can be identified.
insider threat program has been a success but further enforcement is key
Porter, 2014 [MA security studies]
(Michael Lawrence, May, thesis "Combating Insider Threats: An Analysis of Current United
States Insider Threat Policies and Necessary Improvements")
As this paper has shown, in the years since the end of the Cold War, the United States has
spent nearly 13 years fighting international terrorism. The efforts spent overseas were a part of
a larger mission to protect the American people and ensure global peace stability. The problem
is that while the United States was fixated on the fight against al-Qaeda, foreign
governments and international terrorist organizations were reorganizing, targeting the
weaknesses that remained on the US homeland. Many governments took this as an
opportunity to exploit weak intelligence security, through the use of spies.
Additionally, terrorists, who had been stopped overseas, set their sights on America and
began working with US citizens to conduct their attacks. These two threats, the American
terrorist and the American spy, comprise what is known collectively as insider threats.
This is not a new threat, it is one that is as old as nation-states, but it is one that is once again
becoming a chief concern for policy makers as Americas wars come to an end and a renewed
focus is placed on internal security. This paper has sought to answer one main question: How
successful has the United States Intelligence Community (IC) been in responding to the
increase of insider threats? As the last four chapters have shown, given the nature of
Intelligence work, a clear evaluation is not possible for operational successes and failures. As
was previously stated, the purpose of intelligence is to inform leaders of current situations and
to provide them with the best understanding of policy actions. When intelligence does not fully
inform, and bad policies are made, the results are often dramatic and result in policy makers
blaming intelligence for these failures. Additionally, any correct decisions made will yield little to
no visible results of success. What is apparent is that the United States has made many
strategic reforms needed to better posture the IC to defeat the Insider Threat. These
reforms 65 have been strategic successes by altering IC structures and
organizations. These reforms are addressing insider threats from the top down for the
first time in history and have been very beneficial to the strategic makeup of the CI
Community. What effect these changes will have on the operational level is yet to be seen, and
will in fact not be realized for several years. Despite these successful changes there are still
reforms that are needed to bolster previous actions. This assessment is based on the answers
to the 5 sub-questions that each chapter looked at in detail. Chapter 1 provided a more in-depth
description of an insider threat. It did so in an effort to identify the best definition and to
demonstrate that there is a certain amount of disparity in the IC about the definition of an insider
threat. In this discussion, greater detail and understanding of the different types of insider
threats revealed just how similar the threats really are. This Chapter was essential to provide
the reader a complete understanding of what the threat is and why the threat exists. Building on
this definitional effort, Chapter 2 looked at the theoretical process by which people become
insider threats. This chapter sought to answer where insider threats come from and highlighted
the many studies that have been conducted recently focusing on insider threat psychology.
Identifying the answer to this question relied heavily on the psychological aspects of insider
threats and explaining why some people decide to betray their country. While the goals of the
two types of threats may be different, the radicalization/spy lifecycle processes are very
similar. Additionally, this chapter is significant because it reveals various key considerations that
must be understood when determining how to deal with insider threats. Chief among these
considerations is understanding how insider threats develop. Understanding an insider
threats origins offers 66 insights into possible preventative measures that the CI
Community can use to develop proactive policies.
And, co-workers are the best chance to catch insider-threats

Porter 14
Finally, at
the tactical level, individual agents for the different organizations are on the
streets daily, confronting the threat, and catching the bad guys. This final level, however, is not just
Due to the threat posed by insiders, the person best

suited to catch insider threats before or during their acts is the person
sitting to their right or left, their friends, coworkers, or neighbors. Because an insider
agents. It also includes the general public.
a knowledge and understanding of the threats, by

the general population, is very important. Countering this threat is not one where the agents can do all of the work. Every
by definition is no different in appearance than any other person,
person must do his or her part to help.
Links: Adaptation
must continue to adapt policy to emerging threats the plan reverses
years of progress
Porter, 2014 [MA security studies]
(Michael Lawrence, May, thesis "Combating Insider Threats: An Analysis of Current United
States Insider Threat Policies and Necessary Improvements")
The last and largest NITTF benefit to the IC is a new collection of country threat briefings
and threat analyses they produce. These briefings will be created by the NITTF and used as apart of regular threat
briefings to IC personnel traveling outside the United States. The analysis will be conducted by IC analysts and given
from the NITTF to IC agencies regularly to ensure that there is a clear, coherent, and current threat
analysis for every country in the world. These provide government agencies a general CI
threat picture. This information is important because it gives leaders in the Army, Navy, Air Force, or one of the 17 intelligence
agencies information on threats that will be seen by all organizations. This is a good starting point for deeper
analysis by the CI Community on their mission-specific threats. By forcing the CI Community to
operate together and create unified policies, 97 In the past year, the Air Force, Navy, and DIA have all drafted
new Insider Threat programs, which conform to the new standards of the NITTF. The Army devised their training in
2011. 98 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 381-12, Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, 1993. 45 different
. Continual adaptation means increased awareness of

and sensitivity to emerging threats, which in turn equates to greater success. The
perspectives of CI will drive future changes
Counterintelligence Community has come a long way from its beginnings. It has changed
and adapted over the years to meet the challenges it has faced. The NITTF and the ITAG are very
useful additions to the CI Community, but will they accomplish their goals? The unified policy now in its second year is already
making strides to fix problems, but there are still changes to be made. These will not be easy, as is the case with most reform,
whether it is with the Intelligence Community as a whole or just the CI Community.
Links: Leaks
strong insider threat programs prevent huge leaks Hoffman proves
AdvantageSci 2014 [professional security and counterintelligence firm]
(Volume 2, Issue 5, Spring, "Stopping a Dangerous Insider Threat"advantagesci.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/Spring-CI-Newsletter.pdf)
On February 10, 2014, Robert Patrick Hoffman, II, 40, of Virginia Beach, Virginia, was sentenced to 30 years in
prison for attempting to commit espionage on behalf of the Russian Federation. Hoffman
served for 20 years in the U.S. Navy as a Cryptologic Technician-Technical. In that capacity, he worked aboard or in conjunction with
U.S. submarines for much of his naval career. While deployed, Hoffman operated electronic sensors and systems designed to
collect data and information about potential adversaries, scanned the operating environment for threats to the submarine, and
provided technical and tactical guidance to submarine commanders. As a sailor with a top secret clearance, a sensitive job on a
submarine, and 20 years of service in the Navy, Robert Hoffman possessed a tremendous amount of knowledge about the U.S.
nuclear fleet and its operationsknowledge he was willing to sell to the Russians. Its almost impossible to say why someone
would become a spy, said Special Agent James Dougherty, who investigated the case from our Norfolk Division, but Hoffman
represents a classic example of the insider threat. When a U.S. citizen with classified
information threatens to betray his country, Dougherty explained, the resulting damage to
national security and loss of American lives can be catastrophic. Investigators speculate that
Hoffman may have blamed his divorce on the Navy, along with his failure to gain promotion. The FBI and the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS) became concerned in 2011 when, nearing retirement, Hoffman told friends he was going on a mancation to Belarus to see Russian women he had previously met when he was stationed in Bahraineven though he knew the
women would not be there. He had some sort of motivation to travel to Belarus that didnt seem
logical, said Dougherty. In addition, Hoffman ignored the requirement to alert military security
officers that he would be traveling out of the country, and he failed to adhere to other
security rules of reporting any suspicious incidents while overseas . However, Hoffman did post items
on social media channels saying he met the president of Belarus. All of that added to our suspicion, Dougherty noted. Using courtauthorized surveillance, wiretaps, and other investigative tools, FBI and NCIS investigators began monitoring Hoffmans movements
at his home in Virginia Beach following his retirement from the Navy in late 2011. Soon after, our undercover operatives
made contact with him to assess his intentions. Then, in September 2012, a female FBI undercover agent
posing as a Russian operative knocked on Hoffmans door and delivered a message ostensibly from Russian intelligence officials.
He received instructions from the woman, who asked him to respond by e-mail within one week, Dougherty said. We didnt want
to pressure him. We wanted him to make a conscious decision, knowing he would be dealing with the Russian intelligence service.
Hoffman didnt wait a weekhe responded within hours. He agreed to answer a series of questions on an encrypted thumb drive
that was to be left in a hollow tree in a parka hiding place known in the spy world as a dead drop. On the third such drop, Hoffman
divulged top secret national defense information. American lives could have been lost based on the
information he was willing to give up, Dougherty said. He had access to things that were
highly, highly sensitive. In August 2013, a jury in Norfolk found Hoffman guilty of attempted espionage; in February, the
40-year-old was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
The insider threat is very real, said Dougherty, explaining
that in
these types of cases, there are often people who are suspicious of a friend or
colleagues statements or behavior but who dont act on those suspicions. One of the things
we teach in insider threat training, Dougherty said, is that if you see something, say something. Often, people dont want to rock
the boat, he added, but if you see something that doesnt seem right, its your legal obligation to report it. Let the FBI sort it out.
Thats what we get paid for.
Links: Monitoring
specifically, colleague monitoring is the most effective
AdvantageSci 2014 [professional security and counterintelligence firm]
(Volume 2, Issue 5, Spring, "Stopping a Dangerous Insider Threat"advantagesci.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/Spring-CI-Newsletter.pdf)
The message is actually simple, insiders are a big threat. Do not ignore signs of
questionable behaviors. The message tagline could be the organizational equivalent of "If you see something, say
something." The message should highlight to be on the lookout for violations of policies and procedures. It is also critical to
remind employees that it is people, just like themselves, who have stopped major insider crimes.
You must however avoid manifesting a modern day Salem. The focus of your guidance should be telling employees to look for
behaviors that are clear violations of policies and procedures. Examples include observing people looking through other people's
desks, asking for passwords, being in areas that they do not belong, and attempting to access other people's computer accounts.
There are also financial and other wrongdoings related to job roles and industry sector. A more delicate, but just as important, aspect
of awareness is for people to be comfortable reporting uncomfortable feelings. This is admittedly vague, but uncomfortable feelings
have resulted in catching malicious insiders in a variety of incidents. In one case we are personally familiar with, an employee felt
uncomfortable that one of her coworkers was speaking Chinese a lot on the telephone at work, and they did not work with any
Chinese people. The woman reported the incident and an FBI investigation uncovered that the employee in question was funneling
information to Chinese intelligence operatives. Everyone violates policies and procedures at some point in time, without malicious
intent. However, people need to know that some of the most harmful incidents were stopped because
of observant employees. Again though, the focus is on reporting of incidents, and not of the individuals committing the
violations. This is important for a wide variety of reasons. The action that employees need to take is to
simply report the questionable incidents to Human Resources, their management or the
security team. A However, you need to remember to allow for anonymous reporting and have strong measures in place to
protect the identity of the employee reporting the incident. Reporting another employee can clearly result in negative consequences
for all involved. The anonymity is critical even if it potentially means that it is impossible to gather criminal evidence. The
goal is to detect incidents and stop the loss. Most organizations should already have an established incident reporting structure.
Those that do not should consult with the legal and human resources departments to create one. Clearly, when trying to motivate
employees to inform the organization about the violations of other employees, you should get the Human Resources and Legal
departments involved in at least approving the awareness materials that are distributed. They very likely will be able to provide
guidance on how to best implement other aspects of the program as well. The Snowden crimes triggered an interest in
organizations to examine what technological controls that they can put in place to stop their own Snowden. Yet much like NSA
realized that Snowden's coworkers should have detected his crimes, all organizations must proactively
strengthen their non-technical security measures, including especially awareness.

Snowden's coworkers should have been able to more effectively detect his actions than
any technical countermeasure could have. Therefore, companies that are truly interested in
preventing the insider threat should focus on making their employees the primary
detectors of insider abuse. The insider threat is too important a subject to shy away
from, no matter how sensitive the implications may be. Unfortunately, history has shown us that the
risk is too great.

NSA leaders confirm insider threat programs top of their agenda
Kopan, 14 [reporter for Pro Cybersecurity.]
(Insider threats top to-do lists - New Snowden docs link NSA surveillance, cyber mission Today: CJS debate should finally
begin"www.politico.com/morningcybersecurity/0614/morningcybersecurity14345.html]
Stopping the next Edward Snowden requires deploying technology and human resources
intelligence at machine speed, said top defense intelligence officials at a panel discussion
yesterday. Unfortunately, perhaps we all havent put as much attention into the insider
threat as the NSA or I can raise my hand and say we were burned by that as much as
anyone in recent memory, said Philip Quade, chief operating officer of the information
assurance directorate of the National Security Agency, acknowledging the former intelligence
contractor by name at yesterdays MeriTalk Cybersecurity Brainstorm. Theres no badguy.com
and theres no stupidguy.com, where theres this one corner of your network [you can] say, This
is where Im going to optimize my hunting for the insider or remote threat. The good
news, is thats where computing can come in, where analysis and big data analysis and
behavior-based analysis can really, really directly address this problem, he said. More
from Quade and officials at the Defense Intelligence Agency and Defense Security Service, from
your host:
Internal Links
Internals: Chinese Threat Real

Chinese insider threat real
Wortzel, 2013 [seven-term Commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission of the United States Congress]
(Larry M., May 16, "Espionage Threats at Federal Laboratories: Balancing Scientific
Cooperation while Protecting Critical Information" Testimony before the House of
Representatives, Committee on Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on
Investigations and oversight,origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Wortzel_Espionage
%20Threat%20at%20Federal%20Laboratories05.16.13.pdf)
Science and technology cooperation programs are vital to Chinas own long-term goals, but they
also help foster bilateral cooperation between China and the United States. However, there
also is a substantial espionage threat posed by the large number of Chinese
nationals working at U.S. laboratories and academic institutions. The counterintelligence
education web site maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation highlights the
insider threats posed by foreign intelligence collection to research, technologies, and
intellectual property ostensibly protected by export controls.4 Indeed, of the ten incidents of
insider threat espionage cited by the FBI, six cases are related to China. Three
former U.S. officials, Mike McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence; Michael Chertoff,
former Secretary of Homeland Security; and William Lynn, former Deputy Secretary of Defense,
said in a January 27, 2012 Wall Street Journal opinion piece that: The Chinese government
has a national policy of espionage in cyberspace, pointing out that it is more efficient for
the Chinese to steal innovations and intellectual property than to incur the cost and time
of creating their own. This cyber espionage takes place alongside or in conjunction with
other forms of espionage. 3 The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commissions
annual report of 2007 reviews how China acquires foreign equipment and technology to support
its defense industrial base and documents six espionage prosecutions related to China.5 That
annual report recommended that Congress provide additional funding and emphasis on
export control enforcement and counterintelligence efforts to detect and prevent
espionage. In 2009, the Commissions annual report to Congress addressed espionage
conducted by Chinese statecontrolled research institutes and commercial entities.6 In 2012, the
Commission recommended that Congress ask the National Academy of Sciences for an
assessment of Chinese strategies to acquire technology and to identify the extent to which
industrial espionage has been used as a tool to advance Chinas interests. According to the
National Counterintelligence Executive, of the seven cases that were adjudicated under the
Economic Espionage Act (18 USC 1831 and 1832) in Fiscal Year 2010, six involved China.
An article in a March 2012 manufacturing newsletter notes that there have been at least 58
defendants charged in federal court related to Chinese espionage since 2008.7 Chinas
targets have included are stealth technology, naval propulsion systems, electronic
warfare systems for our ships and aircraft, and nuclear weapons. There is a certain
natural tension between the goal of preventing espionage by China (or any other country) and
maintaining scientific openness. National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD 189), of
September 21, 1985, makes it clear that U.S. national policy is that to the maximum extent
possible, the products of fundamental research remain unrestricted; when restrictions are
needed, the answer is that the products be classified as national security information according
to U.S. statute.8 The directive went on to define fundamental research as basic and applied
research, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly 4 within the scientific
community, as distinguished from proprietary research from industrial design, production, and
product utilization, the results of which are restricted for proprietary or national security
reasons. In a 2010 memorandum to defense agency heads and military department
secretaries, then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Ashton
B. Carter restated Department of Defense policy on fundamental research to ensure that it
followed NSDD 189. He also instructed the Department of Defense that where controls are
needed, classification of the product is the only appropriate mechanism.9
only strict gov action prevents Chinese infiltration

Wortzel, 2013 [seven-term Commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission of the United States Congress]
(Larry M., May 16, "Espionage Threats at Federal Laboratories: Balancing Scientific
Cooperation while Protecting Critical Information" Testimony before the House of
Representatives, Committee on Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on
Investigations and oversight,origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Wortzel_Espionage
%20Threat%20at%20Federal%20Laboratories05.16.13.pdf)
When you look at China, you must consider the political environment in the home
country of a particular researcher. You are dealing with a citizen of an authoritarian state
that is ruled by a single political party. The Chinese Communist Party runs the country,
the police, intelligence agencies, the university heads, as well as members of the
judiciary, who are all members of the Communist Party. All residents are potential hostages to
party dictates in a nation that has no rule of law. People in China applying for passports and
permission to study or conduct research overseas may be interviewed by the security services.
The future employment of these individuals, their place or residence, and the residences and
employment of their family 7 or loved ones is subject to Party dictates. A foreign national from
China, or a state like China, is vulnerable to coercion and to having his or her loved ones
held hostage. And there is no right of refusal for citizens of these states when the
government asks them to gather information. No policy on fundamental research will resolve
this problem, however. It is up to American government security services and the
FBI to appropriately administer programs that involve classified or export controlled
information. And it is up to the government to ensure that foreign nationals do not
get access to information that should not be disclosed to them.
Impacts
2NC Impacts: Cyber War

Cyber war causes nuclear lashout
Fritz 9
(Jason - former Captain of the U.S. Army, July, Hacking Nuclear Command
and Control)
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical
stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch
order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear
launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM
change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these
work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed
the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital
format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and,
at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication
a potential electronic
back door into the US Navys system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to
Trident submarines (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially
infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to elaborate new instructions for
methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed
validating launch orders (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in
2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows
This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary

reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct
role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the
insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges,
tracking, valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate
a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UKs nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed.
Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could
also be used to engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a
XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is.
system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the
event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If
nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send
low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders
to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos
and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to
activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance
could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level officialsanyone who has reportedly worked on such a
project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central
southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch
Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect
information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and

control centres, or shut down these centres computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early
warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz
was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identifieda considerable
Creating a false signal in these early

would be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they
are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry
point, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for
gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be
followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet
they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making process, and if coordinated
precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear
missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far
amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000).
warning systems
greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer
radar
stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser
network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example,
beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning
devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are
the very nature of asymmetric

warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially
available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within
the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it
back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could
also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. In
designed to protect against the worlds most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and
June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of Indias Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page
showing a mushroom cloud and the text If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided
by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point
towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his
political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.
Escalates to global war

Lawson 9 (Sean, Assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University
of Utah, Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict, p.
http://www.seanlawson.net/?p=477, June 13, 2009)
At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk
recently, The Problem with Cyber War, that took a critical look at a number of the assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the United States. He
addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue of conflict escalationi.e. the possibility that offensive use of
cyber attacks could
escalate to the use of physical force. As I will show, his concerns are entirely legitimate as current U.S. military cyber doctrine
assumes the possibility of what I call cross-domain responses to cyberattacks. Backing Your Adversary (Mentally) into a Corner Based on the premise that completely blinding
The best thing that you could

possibly do if you want to start World War III is launch a cyber attack. [...] When people talk about
a potential adversary is a good indicator to that adversary that an attack is iminent, Ranum has argued that
cyber war like its a practical thing, what theyre really doing is messing with the OK button for starting World War III. We need to get them to sit the f-k down and shut the f-k
up. [2] He is making a point similar to one that I have made in the past:
Taking away an adversarys ability to make rational
decisions could backfire. [3] For example, Gregory Witol cautions that attacking the decision makers ability to perform rational calculations may cause
more problems than it hopes to resolve Removing the capacity for rational action may result in
completely unforeseen consequences, including longer and bloodier battles than may otherwise have been. [4]
Cross-Domain Response So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns are well founded. But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater
concern. Its not just worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and therefore trigger an irrational response from the
current U.S. policy indicates that kinetic attacks (i.e. physical use of force)
are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks. Most worrisome is that current
U.S. policy implies that a nuclear response is possible, something that policy makers have not denied in recent
adversary. What is also cause for concern is that
press reports. The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has increasingly come to see cyberspace as a domain of warfare equivalent to air, land, sea, and
space. The definition of cyberspace as its own domain of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-space/cyberspace boundary. But thinking logically
about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting conclusions. If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define cyber
attacks (whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war. But
what happens if the U.S. is attacked in any of the other domains? It
retaliates. But it usually does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked. Rather, responses are typically cross-domain responsesi.e. a massive
bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g. think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor) might lead to air strikes against the attacker. Even more likely given a U.S. military way of
warfare that emphasizes multidimensional, joint operations is a massive conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all domains (air, land, sea, space),
simultaneously. The possibility of kinetic action in response to cyber attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006) National Military Strategy
for Cyberspace Operations [5]: (U) Kinetic Actions. DOD will conduct kinetic missions to preserve freedom of action and strategic advantage in cyberspace. Kinetic actions can
the possibility that a

cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply constitutes possibly the ultimate in cross-domain response.
And while this may seem far fetched, it has not been ruled out by U.S. defense policy makers and is, in fact, implied in
be either offensive or defensive and used in conjunction with other mission areas to achieve optimal military effects. Of course,
current U.S. defense policy documents. From the National Military Strategy of the United States (2004): The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities
that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more
asymmetrical weapons. They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or
attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent. [6] The authors of a 2009 National
Coupled with the declaratory policy on nuclear

weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the United States will regard certain kinds of
cyberattacks against the United States as being in the same category as nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with
Academies of Science report on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying,
may be possible
devastating impacts)
. It also sets a relevant scalea cyberattack that has an impact larger than that associated with a relatively small
release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or greater seriousness. [7]
Impacts: Cyber War = Space War

Cyberwarfare draws in space war
Coleman 10 (Kevin Coleman, Defense Tech Chief Cyber War Correspondent, Cyber War =
Space War, http://defensetech.org/2010/03/01/cyber-war-space-war/#ixzz1948Fvj1r, March 1,
2010)
While the satellite broadband market slowed in 2009 because of the poor economy, it still increased. The market continues to expand after U.S.
regulators outlined the national broadband plan that allows satellite operators to use their radio spectrum for Internet traffic. That is why cyber security
any future war

between modern militaries would be both a space war and a cyber war, in fact, they
would be one and the same. Russia, China, and the U.S. have all stated they dont want a space war, but are all preparing for one if
professionals are so concerned about the convergence of cyber space and space. Its becoming increasingly evident that
one occurs. That sounds so familiar oh wait a minute, didnt Russia, China and the U.S. say the same thing about cyber war? Yes, they did. Satellites
satellites and their computer

control ground stations present a viable target for offensive cyber actions. A hacker
could disrupt or interfere with satellite control communications and could disrupt the
delivery of broadband services. In the absence of such command signals, a satellite
would malfunction. Worldwide attention focused on Chinas successful anti-satellite missile test. While military officials question the scale
in geostationary orbits provide broadband connectivity to businesses and customers. Those
and progress of the Chinese anti-satellite program, one has to wonder if China has already tested their anti-satellite cyber weapon. Military leaders are
military operations occur in cyber

space and are integrated with and dependent on communication satellite systems in
outer space.
all too aware of the convergence of space and cyber space. An increasing percentage of
Space war causes extinction

Mitchell et al 1
(Dr. Gordon, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of
Pittsburgh, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic
Diplomacy at a Crossroads, No. 6 July,
http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html, July 2001)
The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense use or lose pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks
creating incentives to rig orbiting. Death Start with automated hair trigger devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable
endowing computers with

authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict.
space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and
Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed complexlyinteractive, tightly coupled industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many
this interlocking complexity

makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, [t]he odd term normal accident
sophisticated components that all depend on each others flawless performance. According to Perrow,
is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable.36 Deployment of space
weapons with predelegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of
such systems to normal accidents. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman,
even
a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that
it can do enormous damage- even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same
size!.37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing
offensive weapons ever conceived: One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people. Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to
imagine that any
nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum

force, including use of nuclear biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war
sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive
military conflict ever seen.
Impacts: Terror
insider threats real and preventing them k2 stop terror
the insider threat, as defined above, is one of the
greatest challenges facing companies and government organizations. This statement is
backed by dozens of publications, articles, and speeches made by government officials;
furthermore, each new study that is released further confirms that the malicious
insider continues to pose a major threat to organizations in both the public and private
sectors (Blades 2010, 32). The Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defense Security Service,
and the President of the United States all acknowledge the significant threat an insider poses to
the welfare and safety of the nation as a whole, especially as the government continues to accumulate intelligence. Therefore,
From Department of Defense organizations to Fortune 500 companies,
expanding knowledge on arguments and assessments that aid in defining an insider threat is important in order to understand and develop mitigations
elaborating on what and who an insider could be identifiable as in

the United States must be conducted. There are two categories of insider threats, the non-employee whom by virtue of technology is
tactics for the insider threat. First,
able to gain intelligence via a cyber-attack and then the employee. Due to the idea that a company can often detect or control when an outsider (nonemployee) tries to access company data either physically or electronically, and can mitigate the threat of an outsider stealing company property, the
unpredictable nature of the employee is the bigger threat (FBI 2013). The FBI acknowledges the thief who is harder to detect and who could cause the
most damage is the insiderthe employee with legitimate access (2013). Because of the threat an employee insider poses, namely with Greg Chung,
Chi Mak, Robert Philip Hanssen, and Edward Snowden, President Barack Obama issued a national-threat policy in November 2012 putting individuals
whom leak intelligence on par with terrorist activity and double agents. That being said, some experts and business executives argue that an insider
threat is not always bad and that often times, the measures to prevent an insider attack is not worth the cost. Furthermore, there are numerous
assessments provided by different agencies and subject matter experts regarding the reasons behind why an individual may be provoked to become
an insider. An increasing number of Department of Defense agencies identify the insider threat as an audacious breach and significant issue that is a
danger to United States national security; however, some
argue that certain leaks are good. But is it possible

that any leak of classified government information is good despite what American public
opinion states? The Defense Security Service states, arguably, insiders have caused more damage than
trained, foreign professional intelligence officers working on behalf of their respective
governments (2013). This in part is due to the fact that the insider has access to information without the
need to go through several hurdles. Furthermore, because the theft of information from classified databases occurs
autonomously, it can go unnoticed for months or even years until the insider is caught (FBI 2013). These leaks cost the United
States government hundreds of millions of dollars and where some argue that there is no such thing as a good breach, others beg to differ. Steven
Aftergood, a Federation of American Scientists government security expert, notes there are such things as a good leak. Some classified things should
be public (Leonning 2013). In todays day and age, there is an increasing need within the American populace for government transparency across the
board; however, the
line qualifying a leak as good versus bad becomes increasingly grey. Some
Americans believe the leak caused by Edward Snowden was a good leak whereas numerous agencies within the intelligence community to
include Keith Alexander, director of the NSA, note the
leak caused irreversible and significant damage (Gjelten
2013). Tom Gjelten expands on the impact identifying that as a result of the leak, terrorist groups are changing their communication methods (2013).
if the United States intends on preventing terrorist attacks on

American soil, then some programs need to remain hidden. On the other hand, Judge Dennis Saylor, a
This is of momentous importance because
member of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that oversees the NSA, as well as James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, note that
the leaking of classified NSA documents by a former employee has generated some of the debate that needs to happen in the U.S. over the
surveillance program (Nolan 2013). That being said, who then determines whether or not a leak is good or bad? There is no board or agency whose
job is to determine the status of a leak and, as obvious with Edward Snowden, there will always be a debate on the issue. The issue, then, becomes
that whether the leak of information is good or bad, the motivating factors provoking the individual to leak the information is threatening.
Impacts: Existential Threats

insiders multiply existential threats make future conflicts more
dangerous (ununderlined portion makes the arg we need to focus
more on behavior monitoring CP?)
Dealing with the insider is like dealing with a Trojan horse which is why the insider threat
is so dangerous. With 4,917,751 individuals with a security clearance in the United States, finding an insider threat is like trying to find a
needle in a bag of needles. The insider can be anyone in the work place and [] the unfortunate truth is that there can never be complete safeguards
against surprise attacks because the number of targets and the ways in which they are vulnerable will always exceed the measure that can be taken to
defend them (Gaddis 2002). While
the insider threat is not comparable to the threat of a nuclear

attack or the launch of a weapon of mass destruction, it is of crucial importance.
When the RQ-170 went down over Iran, the Iranian government refused to give it back to
the United States which ended up being a serious matter seeing as the United States wanted to ensure
that aircraft would never get into the hands of enemies. That event if comparable to the impact of an insider
releasing information; if the enemy continues to obtain intelligence on United States tactics, techniques, and
capabilities, then the United States starts to have a disadvantage should conflict occur with
another country. Due to the impact, monetarily, strategically, and tactically, in which an insider can cause damage to the United States,
steps must be taken in order to prevent, mitigate, and attempt to eliminate. With the poor economy
and current government shutdown, this threat only has the potential to grow as American citizens fight
against financial complications and anger towards the government. The issue is that there is no easy
way to prevent the insider, rather mitigate or minimize the impact. There are several programs that could be implemented to not only draw awareness
to the insider threat but call for periodic review boards and background checks. However, the insider is still a trusted shadow of the government and
with the technological advancements in todays society, numerous programs, if poor in nature, could be implemented and the threat would remain alive
and kicking. Identifying that human behavior plays a major role affecting the detection and prevention of the insider can aid in narrowing the focus when
creating programs that could be affective against the insider. That being said, future studies focusing on the insider threat should continue to aim in
identifying good prevention techniques against the insider. These programs can be implemented to raise awareness to making various forms of
technology illegal in the workplace. The insider threat will be around for years to come and seeing as the impact the insider has on national security is
of crucial concern, future studies should continue to expand on identifying motives and acknowledging similarities behind former and future insiders.
Impacts: Grid Attack

the electrical grid is uniquely vulnerable small attacks spill over
%20Edition.pdf)
Protecting the physical security of the national electrical grid poses a serious
challenge. The diffuse nature of the grid makes it exceedingly vulnerable to physical
attacks from many angles. Additionally, the networked nature of the grid and reliance on
critical nodes means that one small attack or incident has the potential to cause a
cascading failure that affects a wide-ranging area. However, the interconnectedness of the grid also
allows for redundancies and resiliency within the system. The energy grid has clear vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by those who wish to attack the grid. Much of the electrical grid suffers from
decaying and outdated infrastructure. Many of the major components, including
transmissions, distributors, generators, and transformers, that make up the grid are over
25 years old, have undergone minor repairs to patch up issues in the past. In order to replace any damaged parts, or update
the out of date components, replacements must be manufactured overseas with a 12-15 month lead-time. 112 This delay in
accessibility to new components further highlights the importance of keeping the components up to date before an emergency
arises. The majority of stations, transmissions, and distribution lines are located in remote
areas above ground, making them easily accessible targets.113 Transmission systems are especially
attractive targets based on their functional importance. Step up transformers increase voltage so the electricity can flow efficiently
over long distances, and step-down transformers reduced voltage for consumption, both of these systems are critical in maintaining
voltage levels in a substation to control the general transmission system.114 Substations, which often house transformers, are
typically only protected by a chain link fence and a few surveillance cameras, both relatively easy to bypass, pinpointing a major lack
of physical protection. In April of 2013, a group of people attacked a PG&E Metcalf substation in San Jose, California. The
substation was near a highway, and the attackers were able to enter through manholes. They used assault rifles and fired over 112
Madeline Vale et al. Briefing Report #1 - The Electrical Grid: Political & Regulatory Dynamics. Securing the Electrical Grid for the
21st Century. The Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress. September20, 2013. 113 Madeline Vale et al. Briefing
Report #5 Physical Threats: Terrorism, Vandalism, & Weather. Securing the Electrical Grid for the 21st Century. The Center for
the Study of the Presidency and Congress. April 1, 2014. Page 2. 114 Knapp, Eric D. , and Raj Samani. "Chapter 2 Smart Grid
Network Architecture." In Applied Cyber Security and the Smart Grid: Implimenting Security Controls into the Modern Power
Infrastructure. : Newnes , 2013. . July 2014 First Edition 51 100 shots, critically damaging over a dozen transformers.115 The
attack was recorded on surveillance cameras, but the footage proved unhelpful in finding the attackers, and the cameras were
clearly unhelpful in deterring the attack. Transmission components within the grid are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, FERC, and the North American Reliability Corporation, NERC. Following the Metcalf incident, in light of reports raising
concerns about the physical security of the grid, NERC discussed new standards for the protection of critical sites and transmission
equipment. A major portion of the debate surrounding these standards discussed balancing the need for security with the cost of
hardening remote sites or providing round-the-clock surveillance and quick response at grid sites. These standards, currently being
prepared for filing with FERC, requires security planning for the bulk power transmission system, and updated preparations for
physical security. Distribution systems are regulated on the state level. These multiple different regulators may not have the same
level of resources for addressing these security issues or communicating concerns to utilities. Additionally, when the issue of cost
recovery for security improvements is discussed, these state regulators will be the ones responsible for adjusting rate structures. It
will also be vital for electrical, natural gas, and water utilities to work together with each other and the federal government to expand
preparation capabilities, bolster information sharing techniques, stockpile spare equipment and engage in mutual assistance
agreements to ensure a crisis could be handled efficiently. Electric grids offer a wide range of targets that
can impart a great deal of damage on an entire system. Small-scale attacks can affect
much greater systems because the entire grid is connected directly or indirectly. Once
one component is compromised, an entire system can be subject to a cascading failure,
impacting far more than the initial target.
Impacts: Kills Millions

a cyberattack affects millions the plan would derail current improvements
in the system
%20Edition.pdf)
Even though SCADA systems are physically installed in secure locations throughout a utilities facility, there are a variety of threats
that can compromise that security. If an insider or an unauthorized individual gained access to the facility, they
could use an infected USB stick, disconnect a cable, or install a key logger to expose the
system. These threats could infect the system immediately or provide attackers with
backdoor entry to the utility, in which a cyberattack could be used to damage the
entire network. Many of the cyber threats include denial of service, data interception,
unauthorized user access, data alteration and/or data-retransmission. Not only could these
threats lead to a major blackout for millions of customers, but it could interrupt the
ability for other sectors of critical infrastructure to function or allow highly sensitive
material could be obtained. Securing against such challenges not only requires the
development of improved security protocols for utility employees, but also improved
behavioral analysis aimed at preventing or detecting unauthorized access or software installationbe it inadvertent or
malicious. Electrical utilities and other critical infrastructure facilities must begin to implement various practices and methodologies
that can secure SCADA systems from these threats. Utilities have begun to integrate Software
Management and Documentation Systems (SMDS) into SCADA, which monitors all of the activities of the control
system. SMDS can assist IT and OT operators with an application restoration following a catastrophic event; control who may use
any SCADA application system; and can control which actions can be performed. Additionally, many utilities have begun
to develop various Network Security Solutions which range from firewalls to Demilitarized Zones to physical
air-gaps, which prevent unwanted access to a network. Through the use of a Virtual Private Network tunnel (VPN) utilities can
ensure the proper authentication and authorization of data transactions between different networks. VPN gives a utility private use of
a public network through the development of an encrypted tunnel between the server and client. Although, when logging onto the
VPN, the secondary device must have the same level of end-point protection; if there is a variation, it can create vulnerabilities to
the VPN. To fully secure the VPN from unauthorized access, a high level of authentication must be implemented in all networked
devices. Due to the high amount of threats to SCADA systems, utilities have also begun to implement detection methodologies to
mitigate the effect of an attack. IT security systems have created Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) which are designed to recognize
intrusions based upon multiple factors including an unusual pattern of activity and communications attempted from an unusual or
unauthorized address. The IDS creates a log of suspicious events, which system operators can inspect manually to determine true
intrusions versus false alarms. Through the implementation of IDS, OT personnel have the ability to use
firewalls to prevent the attack from spreading, thus mitigating the overall damage the
cyber threat could cause. In addition to technological solutions, securing networks will require an increased emphasis on
behavioral analysis, background investigations, psychological profiling, and analysis of individual motives. These factors are key
tools for detecting potential insider threats, while also understanding how potential adversaries may seek to target individuals who
can provide accesspurposefully or inadvertentlyto vital networks.
Impacts: Grid/Cyber Attack

current standards key to avoid catastrophe
%20Edition.pdf)
While grid security often focuses on external threats to the grid, expecting cyber and
physical attacks to come from the outside, internal threats are just as dangerous. This
insider threat can potentially be mitigated by adjusting the architecture of the system itself
and maintaining high standards for personnel screening. Both actions must come from industry
because there is such variation in system architecture and personnel across utilities. Theoretically, each utility will have a better
understanding of its own unique insider threats, leading to better preparation and crisis management. The way a utility system is
structured affects how it responds to threats. While each utility is (and probably should be, based on the different types discussed
later) structured differently, there are some standards in the electric sector that utilities should follow. One such example is the ESC2M2 (Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model), a White House initiative that the electric power industry
collaborated on with DOE and DHS. ES-C2M2 provides a model of industry-vetted cybersecurity practices, as well as an
evaluation tool that allows utilities to compare themselves to the model. Using these protocols can improve
utilities systems internally in order to protect against external threats. This architectural structure
can open doors for a potentially more dangerous hazard: the insider threat that comes from personnel . Often disgruntled
employees, these risky July 2014 First Edition 134 personnel have greater access to the system
and therefore greater power over it. This power can come in the form of cyber, such as an
infected USB, or physical, such as destroying a critical piece of machinery. Such attacks can often be
untraceable because there is no evidence of breaking into the system . There are many
examples of this threat, and even more that for obvious reasons have never been
released to the press. Many instances are simply unhappy employees lashing out, purposely attack the grid system.
Others, though, are inadvertent, as employees are sent infected emails or given infected thumb drives by attackers, leaving the
employee(s) to unwittingly harm the system. Intentional attacks are an issue, too, as DHS warns utilities that terrorists can
easily gain insider access to the grid and conduct a cyber or physical attack from the
inside. While the insider threat will never be eliminated, it can be mitigated by instituting
regular personnel screening protocols. Utilities have already instituted some measure of personnel
screening, but strengthening and improving this screening is necessary to risk
mitigation. Increased screening may erode trust between employers and employees, as if employees were being accused of
crimes they had not committed, but that is a necessary risk. Even the best, most loyal employees can be unintentionally carry
viruses that can harm the grid. It is also necessary for personnel screening and changes to the systems architecture to be primarily
an industry-led initiative. The executive branch can issue some kind of executive order or policy directive that instructs industries to
incorporate this screening somehow, but the actual implementation falls to utilities. The variation in utilities structures and needs
affects how they can and should implement such a system.
Impacts: Nuclear Secrets

insiders can release nuke secrets managers downplay the risk
Bunn and Sagan 2014 [Professor of Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School ; Caroline S.G.
Munro Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security
and Cooperation at Stanford University]
(Matthew and Scott, American Academy of Arts and Sciences "A Worst Practices Guide to
Insider Threats: Lessons from Past, p 3-4,
Mistakes"https://www.amacad.org/multimedia/pdfs/publications/researchpapersmonographs/insi
derThreats.pdf)
Insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenges that nuclear security
systems face.1 All of the cases of theft of nuclear materials where the circumstances of
the theft are known were perpetrated either by insiders or with the help of insiders; given that the
other cases involve bulk material stolen covertly without anyone being aware the material was missing,
there is every reason to believe that they were perpetrated by insiders as well. Similarly,
disgruntled workers from inside nuclear facilities have perpetrated many of the known
incidents of nuclear sabotage. The most recent example of which we are aware is the apparent insider sabotage
of a diesel generator at the San Onofre nuclear plant in the United States in 2012; the most spectacular was an incident three
decades ago in which an insider placed explosives directly on the steel pressure vessel head of a nuclear reactor and then
detonated them.2 While many such incidents, including the two just mentioned, appear to have been intended to send a
highlight the immense dangers that could arise

from insiders with more malevolent intent. As it turns out, insiders perpetrate a large fraction
of thefts from heavily guarded non-nuclear facilities as well.3 Yet organizations often find it difficult to
message to management, not to spread radioactivity, they
understand and protect against insider threats. Why is this the case? Part of the answer is that there are deep organizational and
cognitive biases that lead managers to downplay the threats insiders pose to their nuclear
facilities and operations. But another part of the answer is that those managing nuclear security often have limited
information about incidents that have happened in other countries or in other industries, and the lessons that might be learned from
them. In the world of nuclear safety, sharing of incidents and lessons learned is routine, and there are regularized processes for it,
through organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators
(WANO). Nothing comparable exists in nuclear security.4
Parker, 2014, [Social Sciences Writer at Stanford News]

(Clifton B., April 24, "When it comes to security at nuclear facilities, danger likely lurks from
within, Stanford scholar says", Stanford News, news.stanford.edu/news/2014/april/nuclearsecurity-risks-042414.html
Insider threats are the most serious challenge confronting nuclear facilities in
today's world, a Stanford political scientist says. In every case of theft of nuclear
materials where the circumstances of the theft are known, the perpetrators were either
insiders or had help from insiders, according to Scott Sagan and his co-author, Matthew Bunn of Harvard
University, in a research paperpublished this month by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. "Given that the other cases
involve bulk material stolen covertly without anyone being aware the material was missing, there is every reason to believe that they
were perpetrated by insiders as well," they wrote. And theft is not the only danger facing facility operators;
sabotage is a risk as well, said Sagan, who is a senior fellow at Stanford's
Center for International

Security and Cooperation and the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor in Political Science. While there have been sabotage attempts in
the United States and elsewhere against nuclear facilities conducted by insiders, the truth may be hard to decipher in an industry
shrouded in security, he said. "We usually lack good and unclassified information about the details of such nuclear incidents," Sagan
said. The most recent known example occurred in 2012 an apparent insider sabotage of a diesel generator at the San Onofre
nuclear facility in California. Arguably the most spectacular incident happened at South Africa's Koeberg nuclear power plant (then
under construction) in South Africa in 1982 when someone detonated explosives directly on a nuclear reactor. Lessons learned In
their paper, the authors offered some advice and insights based on lessons learned from past insider incidents: Don't assume that
serious insider threats are NIMO (not in my organization). Don't assume that background checks will solve the insider problem.
Don't assume that red flags will be read properly. Don't assume that insider conspiracies are impossible.
Don't assume that organizational culture and employee disgruntlement don't matter. Don't
forget that insiders may

know about security measures and how to work around them. Don't assume that security
rules are followed. Don't assume that only consciously malicious insider actions matter. Don't focus only on prevention and
miss opportunities for mitigation. The information for the research paper emanated from an
American Academy of Arts and Sciences project on nuclear site threats, Sagan said. "It
was unusual in that it brought together specialists on insider threats and risks in many
different areas including intelligence agencies, biosecurity, the U.S. military to
encourage interdisciplinary learning across organizations," he said. Sagan explained that the
experts sought to answer the following questions: "What can we learn about potential risks regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear
power facilities by studying insider threat experiences in other organizations? What kinds of successes and failures did security
specialists find in efforts to prevent insider threats from emerging in other organizations?" 'Not perfect' He noted that only a few
serious insider cases in the U.S. nuclear industry have arisen, thanks to rigorous "personal reliability" programs conducted by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. military for people with access to sensitive nuclear materials. But there is room for
improvement, Sagan said. "These programs are effective," he said, "but they are not perfect. And relative success can
breed overconfidence, even complacency, which can be a major cause of security

breaches in the future." For example, the nuclear industry needs to do more research about how terrorist organizations
recruit individuals to join or at least help their cause. It also needs to do a better job on distributing "creative ideas and best
practices" against insider threats to nuclear partners worldwide. Sagan said the U.S. government is not complacent about the
danger of insider threats to nuclear security, but the problem is complex and the dangers hard to measure. "Sometimes
governments assume, incorrectly, that they do not face serious risks," he said. One worrisome
example is Japan, he said. "Despite the creation of a stronger and more independent nuclear regulator to improve safety after the
Fukushima accident in Japan, little has been done to improve nuclear security there," said Sagan. He added, "There is no personal
reliability program requiring background checks for workers in sensitive positions in Japanese nuclear reactor facilities or the
plutonium reprocessing facility in Japan." Sagan explained that some Japanese government and nuclear industry officials believe
that Japanese are loyal and trustworthy by nature, and that domestic terrorism in their country is "unthinkable" thus, such
programs are not necessary. "This strikes me as wishful thinking," Sagan said, "especially in light of the experience of the Aum
Shinrikyo terrorist group, which launched the 1995 sarin gas [chemical weapon] attack in the Tokyo subway."
Impacts: Insider Threats O/W

insider threats are the biggest danger - work around security and know
gov weaknesses
Bunn and Sagan 2014 [Professor of Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School ; Caroline S.G.
Munro Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security
and Cooperation at Stanford University]
(Matthew and Scott, American Academy of Arts and Sciences "A Worst Practices Guide to
Insider Threats: Lessons from Past, p 38-44,
Mistakes"https://www.amacad.org/multimedia/pdfs/publications/researchpapersmonographs/insi
derThreats.pdf)
Many individuals involved in the nuclear security field have backgrounds in engineering
and nuclear safety, where the goal is to protect against natural disasters and accidents,
not against reactive adversaries. This can produce a compliance-oriented approach to
security: a belief that once systems are in place 34 that are assessed to be capable of beating the
adversaries included in the design basis threat (DBT) on the pathways designers identified, the security system
will be effective. But reactive adversaries will observe the security systems and the pathways they
protect against, and they will think of other pathways. Insider threats are a particularly
dangerous form of reactive adversary because insiders are well placed to understand the
organizations security procedures and their weaknesses. The best case to illustrate this
point is that of Robert Hanssen, the senior FBI analyst convicted in 2001 on fifteen counts of
espionage, in what the FBI has called possibly the worst intelligence disaster in U.S. history.38
According to the 2003 Department of Justice report on the case, Hanssens initial decision to engage in espionage arose from a
complex blend of factors, including low self-esteem and a desire to demonstrate intellectual superiority, a lack of conventional moral
restraints, a feeling that he was above the law, a lifelong fascination with espionage and its trappings and a desire to become a
player in that world, the financial rewards he would receive, and the lack of deterrencea conviction that he could get away with
it.39 His espionage activities often raised alarm bells, but his insider advantage let him
avoid detection in three key ways. First, Hanssen was capable of being uniquely reactive to
counterintelligence investigations because of his placement within the FBI counterintelligence
bureaucracy. Second, Hanssen was able to alter his contact procedures with his Russian
associates whenever he felt that he was close to being caught; he was even able to search for his own
name within the FBI internal database to monitor whether he was the subject of any investigation.40 Third, Hanssen knew
how to avoid movement within the FBI bureaucracy that would have subjected him to
polygraph examinations.41 In other contexts, this problemthat insiders can observe and
work around security measurescomes up again and again. In a study of insider crimes that
might be analogous to insider thefts or attacks at nuclear facilities, the authors repeatedly found that the success of insider crimes
depended on the perpetrators observation of security vulnerabilities.42 The study of insider IT sabotage mentioned earlier noted
that the insiders overwhelmingly took advantage of their knowledge of the IT security systems, creating access pathways for them38 selves completely unknown to the organizationin other words, they invented ways to attack that the
security planners had not known were possible.43 There are several lessons here. First, security managers
need to find creative people with a hackers mindset to come up with a wide range of ways that insiders might try to beat the security
systemand then develop security measures that will be effective against a broad range of possibilities. A security system adequate
to defend against the first few pathways thought of by an unimaginative committee is not likely to be good enough against the real
threat. Such uncreative vulnerability assessments were the target for Roger Johnston and his colleagues in the Vulnerability
Assessment Team at Argonne National Laboratory; in their instructive and amusing set of Security Maxims, they offer the Thanks
for Nothin maxim: Any vulnerability assessment which finds no vulnerabilities or only a few is worthless and wrong.44 Second,
those with the most detailed information about how the organization protects itself against insider threats should be subject to
especially strong reviews and monitoring to ensure that the organization is appropriately guarding the guardians.
2NC Impacts: Turns Allied Cred

Insiders collapse Allied Cred.
Porter 14
The reason that this is so important is because of the potential damage these types of
insiders can cause. Nidal Hassan, the Fort Hood shooter and an insider threat, entered the Reverse Soldier Readiness
Processing Center at Fort Hood, Texas and killed 13 American service members5 . Bradley Manning, an Army Private
with a Top Secret clearance and an insider threat, published over 700,000 classified
documents to Wikileaks6 . Which as Michelle Van Cleve, former head of U.S. counterintelligence
under President George W. Bush, writes ultimately had repercussions across the world, breaching
confidences, embarrassing friends and allies, undermining US credibility, putting the
lives of American soldiers and Afghan informants in danger and operations at risk7 .
Circumvention Turn/Takeout
1NC
Whistleblower protections are a sham the plan will be circumvented
channels are corrupted
Martin 7
(Brian, Published as a chapter in Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish
(eds.), A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the
Governance of Research (London: Earthscan, 2007), pp. 35-49. Pg online @
http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/07Rappert.html //um-ef)
slow, procedural and reactive processes of official channels put all attention on
the treatment of the whistleblower, neglecting the organizational problems the
whistleblower originally spoke out about. Even when the whistleblower is
successful (e.g. in obtaining a generous compensation payment), the original problems are unaddressed. These
problems with official channels - reprisals under the radar of laws, an imbalance of
power in the whistleblower-organization conflict, slowness, a procedural orientation and
lack of attention to the original organizational problem - explain their appalling record in
helping whistleblowers. The shortcomings are well known to experienced advisers of whistleblowers (Devine, 1997; Martin, 1999a). Jean Lennane, for
Worst of all, the
the only thing you can rely on concerning official

channels is that they will not work. William De Maria, in the most significant study of whistleblowers' experiences with official
many years president of Whistleblowers Australia, says
in The
Whistleblower's Survival Guide, the most comprehensive advice manual for US
whistleblowers, finds serious flaws with even the most effective laws and agencies . The US
bodies, found that they reported being helped in less than one out of ten approaches, and in many cases they were worse off (De Maria, 1999). Tom Devine (1997),
The pattern is that laws are

passed but dodged by employers, un-enforced by agencies
and subverted by courts. The Office of the Special Counsel, set up to receive
has by far the longest experience with whistleblower protection, beginning during the 1970s.
whistleblowing disclosures from federal employees, seldom exercises its power to
demand investigation of charges made by whistleblowers: 'The OSC's annual report for fiscal 1995
reveals that out of 333 whistleblowing disclosures, the office forwarded only two for agency investigation' (Devine, 1997, p. 68). Devine (2004, pp83-84) paints a gloomy picture:
in practice U.S. statutory whistleblower laws have been Trojan horses, creating
more retaliation victims than they helped achieve justice ... the system has been rigged
so that realistically it routinely endorses retaliation. After Congress passed a stronger law in 1989 and bolstered it with
amendments in 1994, the problems continued, according to Devine: ... the pattern of futility persists. Between passage of the 1994
amendments and September 2002, whistleblowers lost 74 of 75 decisions on the merits
at the Federal Court of Appeals, which has a monopoly on judicial review of administrative decisions. (Devine, 2004, p. 85) The law is
filled with loopholes and the court regularly interprets the law to favour the government .
Meanwhile, in the private sector, there is seldom any legal protection to start with. One explanation for governments' enthusiasm
for whistleblower protection is that laws give the appearance of dealing with the
problem without any substantive change in the way organizations deal with dissent (Martin,
On balance,
2003). Several governments have considered or passed whistleblower laws without any consultation with whistleblowers. Most whistleblowers know nothing about the track
record of laws and agencies. With their belief in the system, many of them approach one agency and, after an unsatisfactory response, go on to another, sometimes trying half a
dozen bodies in a futile quest for justice. Some of them eventually get in touch with a whistleblowers' group and find, to their surprise, that others have had identical
experiences. The faith in official channels runs deep. It is to be expected that politicians and agency officials believe in them, but so do quite a few whistleblower activists who
argue for stricter laws, better funded agencies and stronger enforcement.
2NC
Congressional oversight fails- Executive privilege means the FDA will just
circumvent
Senate Judiciary Committee; (Tuesday, February 13, 2007; House Of
Representatives,Subcommittee On Oversight And Investigations,Committee On Energy And
Commerce; Washington, D.C., The Adequacy Of Fda To Assure The Safety Of The Nations
Drug Supply; http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg35502/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg35502.pdf;
07/10/15) JG
My investigations of FDA issues have also revealed a deeply troubling disregard for Congress responsibility to
conduct oversight of the executive branch of Government, getting right to the heart of whether or not the
checks and balances of the 225-year history of our Government are functioning properly, to see that the laws
we passed are faithfully executed and to see that the money that we appropriate is spent in accordance with Congress intent. The FDA and the
Department of Health and Human Services have put VerDate 11-SEP-98 15:43 Jun 06, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt
6633 Q:\DOCS\110-5 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1 16 up so much resistance to my efforts to find out what happened inside the Food and
Drug Administration with a relatively new antibiotic called Ketek, that I can only wonder what there is to cover up.
Every excuse under the sun has been used to create roadblocks, even in the face of
congressional subpoenas requesting information and access to FDA employees. In denying access to documents responsive to
the subpoenas, the Department and the Food and Drug Administration have claimed the official words Prosecutorial
deliberative process, another one confidential communication, another one, agency
prerogative to determine who will be interviewed or testify before jurisdictional
committees. That strikes right at the heart of the work you are doing here, Mr. Chairman, today. Yet, during my years in the Senate, my
investigators have obtained access to every single one of these categories of so-called confidential information, even from HHS, as well as other
executive branch agencies. So why now? Further, I asked the Congressional Research Service to look into the Departments policies regarding this
matter and CRS told me that there is, in their words, no legal basis for the Departments executive branch assertions. Nevertheless, the
Department and FDA
not only withheld documents that do not appear to be privileged, but they
also wont say what has been withheld and why. The subpoenas compel a privilege log,
but the Department and the FDA will not provide one. The Department and the FDA say that they have been responsive to
the Finance Committees Ketek investigation because they made available millions of pages of documents. But what they provided is
quantity, not quality. They delivered hundreds of pages simply marked, for example, 57 pages removed or 43 pages removed, and
that is in attachments 1 through 5 that you will have. Other documents have whole pages, paragraphs and
sentences redacted with no explanation for what has been held or redacted or why. In fact, listen to this, the FDA
redacted some of the same documents differently and they even redacted one of my own
letters to them on a different matter, and that is attachment 6. When I point out the absurdities in the Departments response to my
request for documents and interviews related to Ketek, the Department argues it could not provide access to information and individuals related to
criminal investigations, just like that was what I was trying to do. But I didnt ask for access to open criminal investigations. I dont want to jeopardize
a criminal matter; you folks dont, either. The Department and the FDA know that, yet they keep using that excuse anyway.
Politics
Obama PC
1NC Ptix Link

Eliminating ITP costs massive amounts of capital adjustments are
difficult and time-consuming
Porter 14
Given the many insider threat-related challenges the CI Community faces, the United States
has done a great deal to confront this dangerous enemy. Nonetheless, the CI Community must make
additional changes due to weaknesses in the current legislative processes, organizational interactions, and other issues involved in this effort 99. As addressed in Chapter 3, the
structure of the CI Community has adapted over the years, but the sad reality is that these changes happened largely as a result of failures in the system and kneejerk reactions
designed to address specific instances of failure100. Even then, the changes that do occur often do not come easily and are the result of extensive reform processes throughout
The ever-present threat posed by insiders means that the US CI Community must
routinely evaluate the process it operates under and look to better itself. Our CI specialists must address a
the IC.
. The problem is that substantive

reform is often very difficult to accomplish in the IC, and subsequently the CI Community, for two reasons.
First, intelligence reform is usually more politically motivated than it is focused
on, and motivated by, the need for substantive change101. Second, since the IC is a tool
range of persistent vulnerabilities to help strengthen the American security apparatus
of the policy makers, who ultimately oversee these organizations, this often means that the people making
decisions for the IC have little to no real understanding of the Intelligence process102. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, there were multiple reforms over the past 20 years that have
These changes however, were not the result

of planned reform, they were reactionary movements to larger community failures that
allowed insiders like Ames, Hanssen, and Hassan to exist. Politicians do not like
helped mold the CI Community into an organization that could fight the insider threat.
huge failures for political reasons, so large high-profile events act as motivation for change, and to show their constituents that they are making things
better103. Policymakers drive the intelligence cycle. As the driving force, they should continually evaluate the systems in place, judging their effectiveness and adapting them as
need be104. Unfortunately, this is often not the priority of those in the policy community105. The absolute certainty of the need for reforms in the CI Community begs the
question,
why have major substantive reforms not happened yet? The answer to this question relates
to the challenges that intelligence reform faces: time, concession of power,

and consensus. Time is a valuable commodity and one that has a dramatic impact on the actions of people everywhere. Whether it is rushing to meet a
time is
such a significant challenge to reform has to do with the nature of the IC and CI communities, the policy community, and the dramatically
different understandings they have of time. First, in the IC there has traditionally been less sense of time-urgency,
deadline or hanging on for the long run, time seems to dictate our lives, and this idea could not be truer for both the IC and the policy community. The reason that
because before 9/11 intelligence was seen mostly as a long-run game, an endurance race. The challenges posed by agile extremist organizations have forced the IC to face a
new paradigm in this arena. However, when it comes to collecting, analyzing, and exploiting so much information from the enemy, whether that is an insider threat, a nation-state
As intelligence professionals see it, steady

analysis not rushed by political pressure is the key to success. Conversely, in Congress
and the White House, politicians are rushed to make their mark by showing their
constituents what they have accomplished. In this sense, they often view intelligence as a tool to gain large results in a short period of
he spies for, or an ITO supporting him, the operations tend to last for years.
With the two operating under a different time frame there are bound to be
confrontations107. The second and most important way that time holds back reform is in
time.
the reform process itself. Given that reform will be drafted and incorporated by the policy community, the US Congress cannot simply change. Rather,
there have to be bills written, voted on, debated, passed, and signed into law. This all takes timea
very long time. To make matters worse, it is the legislatures right to conduct an investigation into failures, or reasons for reform108. As Berkowitz states, Commissions take
commissions require, on average, a year or two to

report their resultsand even more time to declassify their reports so they can be
released for public discussion. During this time, any passion officials might have had for
months to convene, staff, and complete their work. Experience shows that
fixing intelligence ebbs and the publics attention wanders to other matters. Just one example of this is
the September 11th Commission, which was formed a year after the attacks, releasing results two years later, and passing changes through Congress 10 months later109. The
problem here is that the IC has its most fervent reform supporters immediately after the failure, as was the case with Ames, Hanssen, and Manning, yet as time drags on, the
The next major barrier to

reform is cession of power, because giving up power is not what any agency, or
leader, wants to do111. This desire to maintain power often results in nothing more than
long debates and very weak results, if any at all. An example of this is clear within the IC. In 2002, with the creation of the position of the
supporters of reform begin to become busy with other things, and the intended reforms do not come to fruition110.
NCIX, the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 tasked the NCIX with developing the annual National CI Strategy. Developing this strategy would be based on the
NTIPA as stated in Chapter 3. The problem is that the NTIPA and the CI Strategy are not based on the Director of National Intelligences National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), nor
does the NIS say anything about CI112. This is because with the creation of the NCIX in 2002, it was given the power of drafting the CI Strategy, while the DNI, created in 2004,
does not have the power to develop any part of the CI strategy. This is one area where a small cession of power and cooperation between organizations could go a long way
to unifying the role that the DNI has within the IC113. This tight hold on the CI Community has had drastic consequences for the office of the DNI, which was originally designed
consensus is a chief barrier to reform for the

IC and policy community because of how the intelligence cycle works. However, consensus
to provide leadership and guidance for all of the IC, but left weak and limited. Like time,
is probably the most important barrier because of the ways in which it can
affect other barriers to reform. One of the key ways in which consensus is a challenge to reform has to do with the fact that
consensus implies that both sides come to an agreement. As Berkowitz discusses, political
compromise allows opponents to sabotage the creation of any new agency from the start
by simply not agreeing to certain aspects of potential future laws114. This truly is a hurdle
for reform because while politicians, and heads of agencies, can come with hands
outstretched under the banner of reform, a nay vote or even language inserted into a
bill that passes through the legislature can destroy consensus and weaken any real
reforms.
2NC Links
Lack of consensus and secrecy means the plan will be unpopular
Porter 14
(Michael Lawrence, Master in Security Studies, Combating Insider Threats: An Analysis Of
Current United States
http://repositories.tdl.org/asu-ir/bitstream/handle/2346.1/30135/PORTER-THESIS-2014.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y //ghs-ef)
Given the many insider threat-related challenges the CI Community faces, the United States has done a great deal to confront this dangerous enemy. Nonetheless, the CI Community must make additional
changes due to weaknesses in the current legislative processes, organizational interactions, and other issues involved in this effort 99. As addressed in Chapter 3, the structure of the CI Community has adapted
over the years, but the sad reality is that these changes happened largely as a result of failures in the system and kneejerk reactions designed to address specific instances of failure100. Even then, the changes
that do occur often do not come easily and are the result of extensive reform processes throughout the IC. The ever-present threat posed by insiders means that the US CI Community must routinely evaluate the
process it operates under and look to better itself. Our CI specialists must address a range of persistent vulnerabilities to help strengthen the American security apparatus. The problem is that substantive reform is
often very difficult to accomplish in the IC, and subsequently the CI Community, for two reasons. First, intelligence reform is usually more politically motivated than it is focused on, and motivated by, the need for
substantive change101. Second, since the IC is a tool of the policy makers, who ultimately oversee these organizations, this often means that the people making decisions for the IC have little to no real
understanding of the Intelligence process102. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, there were multiple reforms over the past 20 years that have helped mold the CI Community into an organization that could fight the
insider threat. These changes however, were not the result of planned reform, they were reactionary movements to larger community failures that allowed insiders like Ames, Hanssen, and Hassan to exist.
Politicians do not like huge failures for political reasons, so large high-profile events act as motivation for change, and to show their constituents that they are making things better103. Policymakers drive the
intelligence cycle. As the driving force, they should continually evaluate the systems in place, judging their effectiveness and adapting them as need be104. Unfortunately, this is often not the priority of those in the
policy community105. The absolute certainty of the need for reforms in the CI Community begs the question, why have major substantive reforms not happened yet? The answer to this question relates to the
challenges that intelligence reform faces: time, concession of power, and consensus. Time is a valuable commodity and one that has a dramatic impact on the actions of people everywhere. Whether it is rushing
to meet a deadline or hanging on for the long run, time seems to dictate our lives, and this idea could not be truer for both the IC and the policy community. The reason that time is such a significant challenge to
reform has to do with the nature of the IC and CI communities, the policy community, and the dramatically different understandings they have of time. First, in the IC there has traditionally been less sense of timeurgency, because before 9/11 intelligence was seen mostly as a long-run game, an endurance race. The challenges posed by agile extremist organizations have forced the IC to face a new paradigm in this
arena. However, when it comes to collecting, analyzing, and exploiting so much information from the enemy, whether that is an insider threat, a nation-state he spies for, or an ITO supporting him, the operations
tend to last for years. As intelligence professionals see it, steady analysis not rushed by political pressure is the key to success. Conversely, in Congress and the White House, politicians are rushed to make their
mark by showing their constituents what they have accomplished. In this sense, they often view intelligence as a tool to gain large results in a short period of time. With the two operating under a different time
frame there are bound to be confrontations107. The second and most important way that time holds back reform is in the reform process itself. Given that reform will be drafted and incorporated by the policy
community, the US Congress cannot simply change. Rather, there have to be bills written, voted on, debated, passed, and signed into law. This all takes timea very long time. To make matters worse, it is the
shows
legislatures right to conduct an investigation into failures, or reasons for reform108. As Berkowitz states, Commissions take months to convene, staff, and complete their work. Experience
that
commissions require, on average, a year or two to report their resultsand even more time to declassify their reports so they can be released for public discussion. During this time, any passion officials might
have had for fixing intelligence ebbs and the publics attention wanders to other matters. Just one example of this is the September 11th Commission, which was formed a year after the attacks, releasing results
two years later, and passing changes through Congress 10 months later109. The problem here is that the IC has its most fervent reform supporters immediately after the failure, as was the case with Ames,
Hanssen, and Manning, yet as time drags on, the supporters of reform begin to become busy with other things, and the intended reforms do not come to fruition110. The next major barrier to reform is cession of
power, because giving up power is not what any agency, or leader, wants to do111. This desire to maintain power often results in nothing more than long debates and very weak results, if any at all. An example of
this is clear within the IC. In 2002, with the creation of the position of the NCIX, the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 tasked the NCIX with developing the annual National CI Strategy. Developing this
strategy would be based on the NTIPA as stated in Chapter 3. The problem is that the NTIPA and the CI Strategy are not based on the Director of National Intelligences National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), nor
does the NIS say anything about CI112. This is because with the creation of the NCIX in 2002, it was given the power of drafting the CI Strategy, while the DNI, created in 2004, does not have the power to
develop any part of the CI strategy. This is one area where a small cession of power and cooperation between organizations could go a long way to unifying the role that the DNI has within the IC113. This tight
hold on the CI Community has had drastic consequences for the office of the DNI, which was originally designed to provide leadership and guidance for all of the IC, but left weak and limited. Like time, consensus
is a chief barrier to reform for the IC and policy community because of how the intelligence cycle works. However, consensus is probably the most important barrier because of the ways in which it can affect other
consensus is a challenge to reform has to do with the fact that consensus implies that both sides come to an
agreement. As Berkowitz discusses, political compromise allows opponents to sabotage the creation of any
new agency from the start by simply not agreeing to certain aspects of potential future
laws114. This truly is a hurdle for reform because while politicians, and heads of agencies, can come with hands outstretched under the banner of reform, a nay vote or even language inserted into a bill
that passes through the legislature can destroy consensus and weaken any real reforms. Another major barrier to consensus is the secret
nature of the IC. The reality is that the majority of the work that the IC does is classified, which can
be a problem for the policy community. The reason this level of secrecy is such a major issue is that members of the policy
community do not normally have the clearance to see all the information necessary to
make proper decisions about CI or any other reforms. This lack of information basically leaves
the IC asking Congress to go along with their plans with a minimum amount of
information and understanding of what the plans actually are115. In this way a call to
reform without all the necessary components is not asking for consensus, but rather
asking for acceptance by the few who have access to the intelligence, which in the case of the Senate is a Select Committee of 15 individuals and in the House, 21 individuals.
Finally, for the proper cession of power there must be consensus on the level of gains or
losses, which can end up being a problem, especially for agencies or individuals not
barriers to reform. One of the key ways in which
wishing to lose power.
For example, when the office of the Director of National Intelligence was created, the policy makers and the Department of Defense never could
time, power struggles, and

consensus will remain barriers to reform and until those barriers are overcome, the IC,
the CI Community, and the policy community will continue to experience problems like those
gain consensus as to the level of power the DNI would have, and the result of this was a DNI with very little power116. Ultimately,
already seen. This continuing failure will waste time and efforttime that is already in short supply and could be used to stop insiders instead of allowing them to continue damaging the United States
And, even if they win the plan SHOULD be bipartisan, 2014 hearings prove
the fiat of the plan guts the democrats opportunity to create a
spectacle and take credit ensures partisan fighting and backlash
Anderson and Kleinman 14
(Christine Anderson, Public Policy Fellow, POGO, and Avery Kleinman was
the Beth Daley Impact Fellow for the Project On Government Oversight,
FDA Surveillance Threatened Whistleblowers, pg online @
http://www.pogo.org/blog/2014/02/fda-surveillance-threatenedwhistleblowers.html //um-ef)
The hearing revisited the media-dubbed case of the FDA 9, a group of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) physicians and
scientists who wrote to Congress and the President in 2008 and 2009 warning that
ineffective and unsafe devices were being approved by the FDA. The FDA whistleblowers described serious
wrongdoing by mid-level and senior FDA officials who cut corners and overruled scientists. The FDA then began to spy on the whistleblowerssweeping up whistleblowing
disclosures to Congress, the Office of Special Counsel, and POGO. The hearing was timed with the release of a joint staff report by House Oversight and Government Reform
Chairman Darrell Issa (R-Calif.) and Senate Judiciary Ranking Member Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), titled Limitless Surveillance at the FDA: Protecting the Rights of Federal
The report concluded that the FDA lacked sufficient authorization to monitor the
whistleblowers, unlawfully captured protected communications of the whistleblowers, failed to explain how ongoing monitoring was necessary to the
investigation of a past leak, and did not adequately bolster whistleblower protections in new policies. Ranking Member Elijah Cummings (D-Md.)
introductory remarks voiced his discontent at being shut out of the drafting of the report .
We must protect our whistleblowers. I am committed to that, and we are all committed to that.
Whistleblowers.
Unfortunately, the majority has taken a traditionally bipartisan issue,

something that all committee members should be investigating together,
and turned it into another partisan spectacle for which our committee has
become well-known. Chairman Issa responded, Whistleblowers made Senator Grassley and
his staff aware of a problem, but independent investigation by the IG and by this
committeebipartisan investigationhave led us to the conclusions we will hear today.
K Stuff
K Links
--foucault links
Their efforts to increase pharmacovigilance by using insiders furthers
Foucaults notion of the laissez faire biopolitical security apparatus,
ultimately giving the state more control in their totalitarian utopia
Langlitz 09 (Nicolas, an anthropologist and historian of science studying epistemic cultures of
mind and life sciences. He is the author of Neuropsychedelia: The Revival of Hallucinogen
Research since the Decade of the Brain (2012) and Die Zeit der Psychoanalyse: Lacan und das
Problem der Sitzungsdauer (2005) Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology at
the New School for Social Research in New York Pharmacovigilance and Post-Black Market
Surveillance Social Studies of Science 39/3 (June 2009) page 396-397 SSS and SAGE
Publications sss.sagepub.com/content/39/3/395.full.pdf , cayla_)
I will briefly outline how pharmacovigilance has emerged in national and international regulatory
systems to deal with unexpected side effects of officially licensed substances before shifting attention to how this problem is addressed in the
designer-drug underground. Here, novel synthetic compounds and unknown psychoactive plant extracts are constantly being introduced to the grey
The black market is subject to police interventions, but is

excluded from the states regulatory structures promoting drug safety. However, the experimental
and black markets without having undergone rigorous preclinical testing.
drug scene developing and researching novel mind-altering agents has established its own way of dealing with unexpected side effects and untoward
incidents. Like the American Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) and WHO, the independently
managed, not-for-profit website Erowid () collects and processes data on adverse drug reactions of mostly unlicensed psychoactive compounds. This
requires a corresponding ethos of vigilance among the self-experimenting drug users frequenting and contributing to this website. Though Erowid fulfils
a broad range of different functions, I will focus on its collection and analysis of experience reports providing information on drug effects and risks to
an analogy between postmarket surveillance of licensed drugs

and what I will refer to as post-black market surveillance of unauthorized and illicit pharmacological
agents.2 This analogy serves to render visible how the genealogically distinct top-down implementation of
potential consumers. In so doing, I draw
pharmacovigilance and the bottom-up emergence of post-black market surveillance

driven by politically antagonistic forces generate functionally equivalent responses to the
problem of drug safety in the shared matrix of advanced liberalism. Advanced
state has come to delegate the management of
it governs at a distance by redirecting its
citizens activities toward its own objectives (Rose, 1999: 4950). One of the key elements of the political rationality of
liberalism is characterized by the dissemination of responsibility. The
many risks to individuals and collectives. It has not withdrawn from politics, but
advanced liberalism is what Michel Foucault called security. In his 1977/78 lecture series Security, Territory, and Population, Foucault outlined the
concept of security in opposition to discipline and law. The law constitutes a purely negative form of normativity, which prohibits certain acts on a
certain territory, for example, the manufacture and sale of particular drugs in the US. Discipline ideally aims at a continuous panoptic observation of
individuals responding even to minute deviations from a norm by disciplinary measures. Close monitoring of all people having to do with illicit
substances can serve as an example. Drug scenes are infiltrated by undercover narcotics officers; dealers are prosecuted; potential consumers are
tested for drug use; pharmaceutical companies and scientists are granted revocable licences for handling, producing, and/or marketing certain
substances while being subject to regular supervision. Often, such disciplinary observation and legal sanctions work hand in hand. However, despite
the establishment of a massive juridico-disciplinary apparatus, the War on Drugs has failed to effectively repress drug trafficking and consumption of
state regulation of the drug market could not foreclose

occasional drug disasters. Total control of society has remained a totalitarian
illegal substances in the US. In the licit sphere,
utopia. As neither proscriptions nor continuous monitoring of individuals, companies and drugs could guarantee the desired outcomes, a third
strategy was developed: security. The emergence
of security as a form of government can be interpreted

as a response to the limits of legal and disciplinary instruments. Here, the aim of total control is replaced by the modulation of a pre-existing
milieu in order to regulate a population at large. While discipline is based on sustained interventions, security adopts
at least to a certain extent a laissez faire attitude, only intervening as a last resort and after observation and evaluation of the specific tendencies of a
given situation (Foucault, 2007: 186). As a key element of biopolitical government (which aims at the promotion rather than the repression of life),
Foucaults notion of security differs from the traditional sense of the term. It is not based on the restriction of civil liberties for the sake of protecting the
biopoliticized security apparatus of the advanced

liberal state monitors the circulation of people, goods, information , and so on, to regulate the
chances and risks integral to these flows (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). The present paper analyses the functioning of this kind of security
population through preventive exclusion of malign agents. The
in pharmaceutical economies dealing with substances that simultaneously

foster and threaten the welfare of the population. Aiming at modulation rather than tight control of drug
markets, both pharmacovigilance and post-black market surveillance conform to Foucaults
notion of security.
The control of medications gives the FDA biopolitical control over

populations and epidemicsthe AIDS movement proves
Until the beginning of the 20th century, states showed little interest in what their citizens ingested. Since then, however, they have begun
to regulate the hitherto uncontrolled commerce in foods and drugs. In the US, for example, the Food and
Drug Administration has come to serve as gatekeeper to the market (Marks, 1997; Hilts, 2003;
Daemmrich, 2004). But at least initially the FDA lacked mechanisms for paying systematic attention to side effects of the drugs it had already
approved. American doctors usually did not report back to the FDA. It dealt with the problem of side effects by demanding extensive and timeconsuming premarket tests from pharmaceutical companies. In the case of the beta-blocker propanolol, for example, it took its manufacturer Ayerst
The FDA gained its power and legitimacy through a

number of drug scandals, in which patients had been severely harmed by adverse drug reactions. As a result, it came to
almost 10 years to get approval (Daemmrich, 2004: 74).
see patients as vulnerable subjects in need of protection against industry.

This protection was granted by setting up high hurdles to the market. Of course, these measures were
criticized from the beginning. The FDA was accused of hampering business interests, slowing down the development of new drugs, and keeping
already developed drugs from patients for too long (Daemmrich, 2004: 29). In the 1980s, these attacks gained momentum. At the time, patient
patients whom the FDA

was meant to protect accused it of withholding life-saving medications from
them. Instead of being protected and patronized, they wanted to be given the chance to try still
experimental drugs in an otherwise hopeless situation. Unwilling to bear with the delays caused by the FDAs due
organizations based on diseases especially the AIDS movement became increasingly active in the US. Now
process, AIDS activists and allied scientists began to organize community-based therapeutic trials and underground tests of new unlicensed drugs in
so-called guerrilla clinics (Epstein, 1996: 21619; Marks, 1997: 22948; Daemmrich, 2004: 96103). However, when the FDA eventually gave in and
accelerated the approval process this was not only due to the AIDS activists media campaign (Abraham, 2007: 53). In fact, the vast majority of novel
medicines that could now enter the marketplace faster did not serve to treat lifethreatening diseases, such as HIV infections.
Drug epidemics are examples of the state controlling the populations

behaviors while excluding itself from the regulatory regime it sets
up for others
The gradual criminalization of most drugs without acknowledged medical applications during the 20th century (alcohol, tobacco and coffee being the
FDA evolved as an efficient instrument to

standardize manufacture and sale of food and drugs in the corporate world, by issuing licenses, seals of quality, and so on, the
tightening of regulations also gave birth to a seemingly wild and unregulated zone of collective
experimentation.12 Since the 1980s, surveillance mechanisms such as the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) system, the Arrestee Drug Abuse
most prominent exceptions) recreated an uncontrolled drug market. While the
Monitoring (ADAM) programme, or the Researched Abuse, Diversion, and Addiction-related Surveillance (RADARS) system, which monitors
data files are kept in restricted

archives, and their research findings are primarily meant to help policy-makers, regulatory agencies and
prescription drug abuse, have kept watch on the epidemiology of widely abused substances. Their
pharmaceutical manufacturers to make decisions concerning problems of drug abuse (some of the results are also communicated to the scientific
community through journal papers). These initiatives concentrate on epidemiological patterns of use of rather common and well-known illegal
substances, such as cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine and opiates. However, the sector of clandestine pharmaceuticals, like its law-abiding
counterpart although at a much slower rate, continuously introduces new (or reintroduces old) drugs to the market. Even though human beings have
tried out unknown drugs since prehistoric times, we have recently witnessed an accelerated rate at which novel substances enter the market. As Philip
Jenkins points out, since the 1970s a new emerging drug epidemic is diagnosed every 3 to 4 years by the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), while the media call for action (Jenkins, 1999: 2). By the mid 1980s, a number of synthetic drugs had already
experimental fringes of the grey

and black markets, the number of hallucinogens grew exponentially throughout the 20th century: Whereas in the 19th century the Western
entered the marketplace in waves (methamphetamine, PCP, fentanyls, MDMA). At the more
world knew only two psychedelic drugs, marijuana and peyote, by the 1950s it knew dozens, and today more than 200. Manufacturers circumvented
prohibitive laws by modifying the molecular make-up of their drugs, producing substances with effects similar to those of their predecessors, but not
covered by drug legislation: the law has always lagged behind. In 1986, the Reagan administration responded to the challenge of such designer drugs
(a term coined around 1980 to designate new synthetic substances serving as drugs of abuse [Jenkins, 1999: 7]) by establishing a more supple, but
highly restrictive legal framework: the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act. Instead of explicitly listing all substances declared illegal, the
so-called Analogs Act anticipated the development of new drugs replacing prohibited substances. Administrators pre-emptively illegalized all
substances that were substantially similar in structure or action to a controlled substance, presumably because they were unable to keep up with the
Erowid can be interpreted as an assemblage exercising

pharmacovigilance on the grey and black markets excluded from the regulatory regime
established by the state. Analogous to WHOs Uppsala Monitoring Centre or the FDAs MedWatch, Erowid
among other things collects and processes data on adverse drug reactions caused by newly
introduced designer drugs or psychoactive plants. This kind of consumer intelligence is based on experience
reports sent in by the drug users themselves, instead of being mediated by physicians a strategy also practiced by
flow of new inventions (Eisner, 1989: 128).
regulatory agencies since the mid 1980s (Daemmrich, 2004: 137).13 Erowid has extended the scope of pharmacovigilance beyond the strict
by
facilitating a regime of postmarket or post-black market surveillance within the virtual
community of experimental drug users.
confines of detecting new signals of safety concerns on the legal drug market (as suggested by the World Health Organization [2002: 7])
The FDA has empirically used the failures of its surveillance regime as a
justification for further interventions and centralization of
pharmacovigilancebringing attention to FDAs mistakes can never
solve
In the case of patients suffering from terminal diseases such as AIDS (at least in the early days of the epidemic) or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis,
however, opting for more security by requiring more preclinical research before marketing, means risking the lives and well-being of patients possibly
profiting from newly developed medications. Here, the opposition between risk and security can only serve a polemical purpose.20 In the 1980s, AIDS
activists and the pharmaceutical industry pressed for an acceleration of the approval process. They asked the government to become more
venturesome in light of unavoidable ignorance with respect to the future, risking unexpected side effects for the sake of the new drugs potential
benefits. In the course of the subsequent deregulation in the 1990s, the FDA managed to halve its average review time. But the system of
postmarket surveillance that was supposed to make up for the resulting reduction of
premarketing safety testing could not prevent a series of drug disasters, ranging from more than 50 deaths attributed to the anticholesterol medicament Lipobay, to a significant increase of suicidal behaviour associated with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI)
antidepressants, and to what at least one FDA official later suggested were thousands of heart attacks and strokes caused by the anti-inflammatory
drug Vioxx (Graham, 2004; House of Commons Health Committee, 2005: 8588). Even though the accumulation of serious incidents related to these
substances was detected through pharmacovigilance, these events have been interpreted as failures of a postmarket surveillance regime, which is
accused of having responded too late. Of course, although it serves as a means of coping with our structural ignorance of the future,
pharmacovigilance is bound to initiate interventions in a post hoc manner. In

the case of Vioxx, for example, which had received expedited review and approval, there had been early indications that patients taking the drug were
suffering disproportionately from cardiovascular problems. Nevertheless, neither the manufacturer, Merck, nor the FDA took action to examine these
problems systematically. Investigations even suggested that
Merck made an effort to actively conceal data
demonstrating the cardiovascular toxicity of its product. While the FDA waited passively for data to accrue, it took more than
5 years to instigate what would become the largest prescription drug withdrawal in history in 2004 (Fontanarosa et al., 2004; Angell, 2006; cf. Harris,
2004, 2006; Topol, 2004). Considering that the FDA would have had the authority to mandate a trial, this failure of pharmacovigilance cannot be
justified by structural ignorance alone. At least in part, it must also be attributed to strategic ignorance in McGoeys (2007) sense.21 In the aftermath of
the drug debacles of the early 2000s, the FDA and other regulatory agencies were accused of having failed to meet their responsibility to protect the
population against drug dangers. American regulators responded to this criticism with two almost contradictory strategies, mirroring the
FDA tried to restore its authority by

tightening its regulations. Since then, the requirements for both pre- and postmarket testing have been raised significantly.
incommensurable demands they faced. On the one hand, the
The average time from application to approval was almost doubled after the withdrawal of Vioxx, and today the FDA tells pharmaceutical companies
more often to conduct systematic studies of the safety of their medicines after they have already been licensed (Harris, 2005). Furthermore, it has been
discussed whether drug makers will have to pay for independent continuing post-approval surveillance of their products (Harris, 2004). Here,
stricter regulations and an increase of centralized pharmacovigilance have

been used in order to rebuild trust in drugs and in the FDA. On the other hand, to cover
itself the FDA has adopted a second strategy undermining this restoration of trust. To avoid being
blamed for unexpected adverse drug reactions, it has begun to issue warnings even if there is no clear evidence. Its new commissioner Lester
Crawford said that the agency could no longer wait until possible risk is verified, but must communicate its uncertainty to the public. Often it does so by
advising patients to speak to their doctors about questionable medications. But, as one medical practitioner said to the press, the physicians dont
know what to tell the patients, either. And a colleague of his added:
Theyre just passing the blame onto the
physician. Theyre just trying to say that they warned us (Harris, 2005).
--cap links (bic)

The biomedical industrial complex works in tandem with the industries,
military, and political system to normalize mental health practices at
the expense of those considered disabled abnormal or
diseased
Gomory et. al 10 (Tomi, Stephen E. Wong, Cohen Jeffrey R. Lacasse Associate professor
at Florida State University, specializing in Homelessness, International Social Work, Mental
Health, Mental Health & Substance Abuse, Philosophy of Science, Research Methods, Social
Policy, Social Work Practice Clinical Social Work and the Biomedical Industrial Complex
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, December 2010, page 2
diginole.lib.fsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=csw_faculty_publications , cayla_)
When Relman (1980) introduced the phrase biomedical industrial complex to echo President Dwight Eisenhowers famous
1960 warning about the influence of the military industrial complex, he wished to emphasize the influence of large corporations on the medical system.
Later writers, focusing on its psychiatric portion or counterpart and emphasizing its ideological elements such as medicalization, described a mental
healthindustrial complex (Duhl, Cummings, & Hynes, 1987), a psychiatricindustrial complex (Carpenter, 2001), or a psychopharmaceuticalindustrial
mean the reinforcing and interlocking

connections between the pharmaceutical, biotechnological, and medical industries that
complex (Breggin, 1997; Murray, 2009). In accord with these authors, we
together with academic experts in the helping professions, governmental funding and regulatory bureaucracies such as the National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and professional and family lobbies promote
and support a
biomedical model of psychosocial distress and disability. Spending in the U.S. on mental health and substance
abuse has been forecast to reach $239 billion by 2014, of which $72 billion is expected to be for psychotropic drugs (Levit et al., 2008). Critics of the
biomedical complex observe that over the past fifty years it has monopolized mental health practices to
the detriment of its ostensible beneficiaries. Its primary purpose seems to be biomedical dominance (Carpenter, 2001, p. 70), the
successful inculcation of the view that a medicalized approach (conceptual, scientific, clinical, institutional) to psychosocial distress, disability, and
disapproved behavior is valid and is the best approach for everyone. Critics document that the approach obscures the differential benefits accruing
especially to the leading players, theorized in most discussions to be large private corporations (especially but not exclusively pharmaceutical) and their
allies in politics, the professions, and academia. These benefits translate into money, and therefore influence to recast all the issues involved, to the
heads of
corporations benefit lavishly but illicitly from the biomedical industrial
complex (e.g., Cassels, 2009), and at least one clinician (Murray, 2009), has argued that the psychopharmaceutical
extent of altering public perceptions as to what is occurring and why (Turnock, 2009, p. 136). Some policy analysts have noted how
industrial complex leads many clients to adopt and internalize diseasemodel messages
in ways similar to cult indoctrination (p. 283), that is, impervious to evidence and experience. These observations
illustrate the complexity of the system, they are not meant to promote a conspiracy theory type of explanation. Our use of psychiatric industrial
complex and associated terms is meant to refocus attention of social workers on the explicit and implicit functions and on the dynamic nature of a very
also meant to highlight interconnections between the

constituent ideologies, professions, client populations, treatments, and institutions of
the system, as well as connections between it and other large systems, such as criminal
justice, welfare, education, and the military.
large social system, and of their roles in it. It is
Case Neg
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Harris-FDA-Statement-FDA-2-26COMPLETE.pdf
FDA Advantage
FDA Fine Now

Claims that the FDA is in bed with big Pharma are alarmist and just flat
wrong
LaMattina 13 (LaMattina, John- the president of Pfizer Research and Development and
Forbes Contributor, covers news concerned with the Pharmaceutical Industry; 8/07/2013; Is The
FDA Being Compromised By Pharma Payments?;
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2013/08/07/is-the-fda-being-compromised-bypharma-payments/; Forbes.com; 08/07/15) JG
Is The FDA Being Compromised By Pharma Payments? Comment Now Follow Comments In touting an upcoming special issue
of the Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics (JLME), Donald W. Light of the School of Public Health,
University of Medicine & Dentistry of NJ, wrote an article entitled Risky Drugs: Why The
FDA Cannot Be Trusted. Last week I discussed one aspect of this article, Lights challenge that
90% of FDA approved drugs of the last 30 years are no more effective than existing
drugs. However, the bulk of his essay focuses not on his views about pharmas competence but rather on his issues with the
FDA. While I found a number of his comments troubling, the following stood out. The forthcoming article in JLME also presents
systematic, quantitative evidence that since the industry started making large contributions to the FDA for reviewing its drugs, as it
makes large contributions to Congressmen who have promoted this substitution for publicly funded regulations, the FDA has sped
up the review process with the result that drugs approved are significantly more likely to cause serious harm, hospitalizations, and
deaths. This is a pretty damning comment. Basically, Light is saying that pharma paid congressmen to
sponsor legislation that results in the FDA being beholden to pharma for funding for its
work. Implicit in this is that, as a result of these large contributions, the grateful FDA is rapidly approving medicines that are
harmful. A bit of history would be helpful to show the actual reasons why the pharma
industry makes contributions to the FDA. Few remember that back in the late 1980s there was a
drug lag in the U.S. versus other parts of the world. Because of a lack of resources at the FDA, drugs
were being approved at a much slower rate in the U.S. than in Europe. More than half of all drugs
approved in the U.S. had been approved in Europe more than a year earlier. As a result, patients, physicians,
advocacy groups, and pharmaceutical companies were all concerned that access to important new
medicines was being denied to Americans. To solve this problem, Congress enacted the Prescription
Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) of 1992. PDUFA provided a mechanism whereby charges were levied on pharmaceutical
companies for each new drug application (NDA) filed. The revenues from these user fees were used to hire 600 new drug
reviewers and support staff. These new medical officers, chemists, pharmacologists, and other experts were tasked with clearing the
backlog of NDAs awaiting approval. Consequently, the FDA was able to reduce review times of NDAs to 12 months for standard
NDAs and to 6 months for priority applications that involved significant advances over existing treatment. As a result of
PDUFA, the timing of U.S. drug approvals began to mirror that of the rest of the world.
Congress clearly likes PDUFA as the act has been renewed five times since 1992. PDUFA-V
was approved in 2012. Undoubtedly, this legislation helps to support the FDA and fuel needed
growth. In 1995, The actual user fee charged to each company filing an NDA in 1995 was
$208,000. In 2014, the user fee will be $2,169,100. If you assume that as many as 50 NDAs are filed in a year,
Congress is passing on $100 million of FDA funding costs to the industry. Despite Lights
assertion, I can attest that pharma companies dont relish making these payments. The FDA is a
government agency and should be funded entirely by the federal government. But pharma companies dont have a choice. If a
company wants to bring a new medicine to patients, it has to pay the user fee just to get
the drug reviewed. Furthermore, anyone who pays attention to FDA behaviors knows that the agency doesnt
automatically approve NDAs. Just in the last few months, the FDA has rejected, in the form of
complete response letters, an insomnia drug from Merck, a migraine drug from Allergan, and a
kidney cancer drug from Aveo. In fact, any suggestion of the FDA being beholden to the
pharmaceutical industry due to the PDUFA user fees is comical to those familiar with the drug review process. So,
why should anyone care about Lights views? Unfortunately, as an academic whose work is supported by the Safra Center for
Ethics, his word carries a disproportionate amount of influence. These comments perpetrate the view that
there is an unholy alliance between the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry, an alliance that
threatens the health of patients. This might make for a Hollywood movie plot. Truth be told, such a
conspiracy doesnt exist.
FDA Credible Now

The FDA is credible: controversy is just media and alarmist hyperbole
Butterworth 11 (Butterworth, Trevor- Director of Sense About Science, USA ; Why You
Should Trust The FDA; Forbes Magazine; 9/19/2011; 08/07/15;
http://www.forbes.com/sites/trevorbutterworth/2011/09/19/why-you-should-trust-the-fda-and-notdr-oz/) JG
If the reaction in the news media to Dr. Ozs absurd claims about the dangers of arsenic
in apple juice has been enormously heartening (essentially the medias collective Dr. Oz says this, but the FDA says
that narrative leaves the celebrity cardiothoracic surgeon looking like an unscrupulous and unethical quack), the disheartening part is
that too many people will still choose to believe a television doctor who doesnt know his
ass from his elbow in terms of chemistry, over the massed ranks of PhDs and
toxicologists at the Food and Drug Administration. This abysmal state of affairs was summed up by some fool on
The View mouthing off about how we all should be grateful that Dr. Oz is looking out for our kids as if the hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars
spent on a vast array of regulatory agencies simply didnt occur. This trust a TV-doc lunacy is especially frustrating for me as I had the privilege to
speak this summer at the FDAs 12th annual symposium on food safety and applied nutrition, which is jointly organized with Britains Food and
Environment Research Agency (Fera), and the Joint Institute for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (JIFSAN) at the University of Maryland, College
Park. The theme this year was Dealing with Uncertainty in Risk-Based Decision Making and Response. As I listened to presentation after
the
real story about what the FDA does is almost impossible to convey to the public.
Certainly, in all the years Ive been reporting on risk, I have never seen any story in the mainstream media
that articulates the complexity of the science. And if you dont grasp that complexity, you
just cannot understand how serious and scrupulous these scientists are when it comes
to trying to protect the public. This is why Dr. Oz, in refusing to acknowledge the simple, objective errors the FDA pointed out in
presentation from scientists who spend their working days trying to protect the public from contamination in food, I was struck by the fact that
the way his show measured arsenic, betrayed science. And when you betray science, it doesnt matter how much you protest that you are only looking
to protect Americas children. No one is protected by getting the science wrong. But
how do you communicate that betrayal

to a public which simply doesnt understand chemistry (and probably shudders at the mere mention of the subject
thanks to high school), doesnt think scientifically (i.e., mentally tests propositions for the ways in which they might be falsifiable),
but reacts on a deep emotional level to the idea that the kids are in mortal danger? What was
notable and praiseworthy about the FDAs response was that it added a much more personalized message to its straightforward scientific criticism
of Dr. Ozs claims. Donald Zink, Ph.D, senior science advisor at FDAs Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), said what often goes
unsaid in these media controversies. As a parent and grandparent myself, I understand the concern over recent reports that arsenic has been found in
apple juice, he said, before adding that years of testing at the FDA and, more importantly, the way the FDA did its tests, left him without any cause
for concern. Now think about it: Dr. Zink is a microbiologist and biochemist specializing in food; how much microbiology and biochemistry do you really
think Dr. Oz, a heart surgeon, knows? More to the point, do
you really think that the hundreds of parents at the

FDA with academic qualifications every bit as impressive as Dr. Ozs are somehow less reliable and
less concerned about food safety than someone who has chosen to practice medicine on a daily television show? And
finally, what is the likelihood that, in our age of massive food regulation, it just didnt
cross anyones mind to examine and keep examining apple juice? The philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer
warned that drama was as fundamental to journalism as it was to theater and that journalists
were like lap dogs, barking hysterically at everything that moved . Its time to see Dr. Oz as having crossed
the canine rubicon and having abandoned science for a barking role in the theater of the absurd.
FDA Cred Alt Causes

FDA cred shot
Dickson 13 Virgil Dickson November 5, 2013 Regulatory and Policy Reporter at Modern
Healthcare FDA credibility hurting due to budget issues, commissioner says http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20131105/NEWS/311059963
Federal budget cuts and budget uncertainty are hurting the credibility of the Food
and Drug Administration, agency Commissioner Dr. Margaret Hamburg said Tuesday. At a
conference hosted by Bloomberg Government, Hamburg said the stakeholders regulated by
the FDA expect predictability and transparency in how the agency conducts its oversight.
And that's been hard to deliver given the continuing federal budget wars. One problem has
been the freeze on user fees paid by manufacturers who want their products approved for safety and efficacy.
Because of the budget sequestration cuts, the FDA is set to lose $85 million in user fees in fiscal
2013, even though that money comes from regulated businesses, not from taxpayers. You can't run agency as important as the FDA if you don't have
predictability, if you don't know what budget you'll be given during the year, or if you don't know whether you can draw from certain resources or not,
Increased responsibilities, such as regulating medical mobile apps, also have

made the agency's work more challenging. She said the FDA has been stretched thin
for decades. Hamburg said as early next week Congress will vote a bill that would increase her agency's
authority to regulate compounding pharmacies, following the more than 60 fungal infection-related deaths that
occurred as the result of contaminated drugs made at the New England Compounding Center in Framingham, Mass. While more
responsibility has been given to us, our budget has only expanded a little bit, she said.
she said.
Blood pressure safety data alt causes
Blankfield, 13 -- Robert, Case Western School of Medicine, European Journal of Preventive

Cardiology, file:///C:/Users/Debate/Downloads/Credibility%20of%20the%20FDA.pdf
Why doesnt the FDA require the collection of cardiovascular safety data for medications
that raise blood pressure? For new drug approvals, the FDA can require manufacturers
to conduct safety trials after a drug is approved.5 Many of the drugs listed in Table 1 were
approved so long ago that they are available generically. Even if the FDA desired the collection
of safety data for these drugs, it is complicated to require manufacturers to obtain data for drugs
that are available generically The FDA lacks a legislative mandate to conduct research.
Consequently, the FDA lacks the financial resources to support prospective drug trials. For
the drugs listed in Table 1 for which safety data are inadequate, the FDA might be able to
support retrospective studies. There is precedent for this approach. In collaboration
with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, the FDA supported two recently
published retrospective studies regarding the cardiovascular safety of attention deficit
disorder medications.6,7 The credibility of the FDA has been damaged by multiple
drug approvals that occurred despite inadequate safety data. Restoring the FDAs
credibility depends, in part, upon the FDA requiring adequate morbid/mortal safety
data for new drug approvals when drugs raise BP, even though such requirements might
increase the cost of drug development and/or slow down the development of new drugs.
Restoring the FDAs credibility also depends upon the FDA supporting the
collection of morbid/mortal safety data for drugs that have already been approved but that
raise BP. Collecting safety data for drugs that have already been approved would be
complicated. Nonetheless, doing nothing and thereby accepting the status quo means
tolerating drugs on the market that predictably increase the risk of serious adverse
cardiovascular events. The longer the status quo persists, the more the
credibility of the FDA diminishes.
alt causes to FDA legitimacy data bending

McGarity and Vagner, 12 [JDs, UT law professors specializing in enviro law and tort]
(Thomas and Wendy, Bending Science: How Special Interests Corrupt Public Health Research, p. 22-34
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ah6__otORAC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=fda+AND+corrupt&ots=ToasirU8sq&sig=Xq04VSm0SyimbbjmKkvZpN9l
PLU#v=onepage&q=fda%20corrupt&f=false)
Since data collection is merely the process of reporting observations to facilitate subsequent
analysis, any shaping that occurs at that early stage typically equates to outright fraud. In
the mid-1970s, the FDA appointed a special task force to investigate the integrity of the
data the Searle Corporation had submitted to support new drug applications for two
heavily used drugs. After studying the data extensively and performing site visits of the
companys laboratories, the task force concluded that the company had made a number
of deliberate decisions which seemingly were calculated to minimize the chances of
discovering toxicity and/or to allay FDA concern.55 In another 1970s investigation, the
FDA fortuitously learned from a former employee of the manufacturer of the drug MER-29
that upper-level company officials had ordered the employee to change data in animal
studies that were submitted to the FDA in support of the new drug application.56 Three of the
companys employees pleaded nolo cotendere to charges that they had forged and manipulated
the animal studies to minimize the apparent risks posed by MER-29.57 As we learned in
Chapter 3, the EPA during the same time period discovered that a testing contractor, Industrial
Bio-Test Laboratories, had perpetrated systematic fraud in its routine pesticide testing
operations.58
alt causes to legitimacy manufacturers skirt regs and the public loses
interest
McGarity and Vagner, 08 [JDs, UT law professors specializing in enviro law and tort]
(Thomas and Wendy, Bending Science: How Special Interests Corrupt Public Health Research, p. 22-34
Harvard University Press https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ah6__otORAC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=fda+AND+corrupt&ots=ToasirU8sq&sig=Xq04VSm0SyimbbjmKkvZpN9l
PLU#v=onepage&q=fda%20corrupt&f=false)
-means even if whistleblower laws are lessened, public pressure lessens and huge drug companies
dominate w/o enforced regs
Where Possible, Choose Ignorance One way for companies to avoid the dilemma of deciding
whether to suppress damaging research findings is to avoid testing altogether.23 As the
handwritten notes on the agenda for a pharmaceutical company staff meeting revealingly noted:
If FDA asks for bad news, we have to give it, but if we dont have it we cant give it to them.24
The same is true for the information needed to resolve common law tort litigation. Huge gaps in
scientific research relating to the impact of products and industrial activities on health
and the environment serve as a testament to this tendency of many companies,
consistent with rational choice theory, to choose ignorance.25 Even as late as 1984, an NAS
panel found that no toxicity testing existed for more than 80 percent of all toxic
substances used in commerce and by 1998, at least one-third of the toxic chemicals
produced in the highest volumes still failed to satisfy minimal testing standards
recommended by an international expert commission.27 Anticipating the natural preference of
some companies to resist safety research, Congress has enacted several product licensing
statutes that require premarket health and safety testing as a condition to regulatory agency
approval.28 These statutes, however, apply only to pesticides, drugs, certain medical
devices, and a small set of other suspect products.29 For most other products and
pollutants, affirmative testing requirements are effectively nonexistent.30 Even
when the authority docs exist to require testing, the agencies generally need some limited
evidence of harm before they can take meaningful postapproval regulatory actiona Catch-22
that reduces their ability to order more testing.31 The FDA, for example, has authority to
require premarket resting of drugs and devices, but its postmarket testing authority has
been quite limited until recently. A 2006 report of the NASs Institute of Medicine noted that
once a drug is on the market, it can be difficult to compel sponsors or others to
undertake appropriate comparative trials."32 Even when manufacturers have agreed to
undertake postmarket clinical trials, they have not always completed them. The FDA
reported in March 2006 that 65 percent of the twelve hundred studies sponsors had
agreed to undertake during several previous years had not even been initiated.33 The
result is that dangerous drugs might have remained on the market while their
manufacturers chose ignorance. Examples include: ProzacAfter a 1990 epidemiological
study raised serious questions about Prozacs potential to cause some patients to commit
suicide, an FDA advisory committee strongly recommended that the manufacturer conduct a
large clinical study to probe the suicide question. The company hired a prominent scientist who
met with the author of the earlier study, drew up protocols for the recommended study, and
approached investigators about participating in the study. By then public pressure had
subsided, and the company never conducted the more ambitious follow-up study.
Without the study, the FDA was reluctant to take action to protect potential victims, and it
did not require warnings on the high suicide risks that Prozac and similar drugs may have posed
to children and adolescents until New York s attorney general brought a highly publicized lawsuit
in 2004.34
Plan doesnt go near far enough- alt causes to FDA inefficiency

Bloomberg 15- Bloomberg News is an international news agency headquartered in New
York, United States and a division of Bloomberg L.P (The Editors- Bloomberg View; MAY 22,
2015; How to Fix the FDA: Carefully; 07/09/15;
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-05-22/how-to-fix-the-fda-carefully) JG
The process for approving new drugs in the U.S. takes a long time and costs a lot of
money. But in trying to speed things up too much, Congress runs the risk of allowing drugs to reach
the market that aren't necessarily safe. Some lawmakers -- led by Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred
Upton, a Republican from Michigan, and Diana DeGette, a Colorado Democrat -- assert that drugs are slow in coming because the
Food and Drug Administration has been failing to innovate quickly enough. But last year the agency approved more new drugs than
in any other year in almost two decades. In 2013, the median approval time for a new drug was about a year, an improvement over
prior years and faster than that of the FDA's counterparts in Europe or Japan. Most new drugs in the U.S. now qualify for some form
of expedited review. And two-thirds of drugs approved worldwide last year were first approved in the U.S. That doesn't mean the
FDA can't be improved. The agency says it could do its job better if it had greater authority to
hire staff directly. It also wants greater freedom from congressional rules that cap executive
salaries at about a third of what drug companies pay. A bill that may soon come up for a vote in the House
would give the FDA both, as well as push to create still more avenues for expedited drug reviews. But changing how the
FDA operates can do nothing to shorten the long time -- almost 13 years -- that it takes a new drug to arrive at the FDA's doorstep.
The discovery and development phase lasts an average of six and a half years, and
clinical trials take six more. Speeding up the first of these pre-FDA phases takes an
investment in research. To encourage faster drug discovery, the House proposal would
fund more research, granting the National Institutes of Health an extra $10 billion over five
years -- a timely injection of new money for an agency whose budget has been flat for a decade. But how can clinical trials be made
to move faster without increasing the risk that unsafe drugs might be approved? Congress wants to make it easier for drug
companies to use changes in so-called biomarkers, such as cholesterol levels or plaque concentrations in the brain, as proxies for
more traditional health outcomes that take longer to measure. It also wants the FDA to be more willing to accept
clinical trials with fewer participants, and put more weight on evidence from outside the
trials and testimony from patient groups. Some of these ideas have promise. But the balance between political
pressure and scientific caution is easily upset. Lawmakers need to give the FDA more flexibility without
pushing it to weaken specific aspects of the approval process, especially clinical trials,
in ways that the agency considers unsafe. The legislation needs to be written to reflect this principle, and
Congress will have to acknowledge that the gains from reform could well be modest and incremental. Modest change is
the only safe kind. To contact the senior editor responsible for Bloomberg Views editorials: David Shipley at
davidshipley@bloomberg.net.
FDA Collapse Inev

backlash against the FDA is inevitable and the FDA fails anyway
Lamattina 14
(John, Forbes Contributor "Yalw Study on FDA Approvals -- Informative or
Irresponsible?" Forbes. 2/11/14.
www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2014/02/11/yale-study-on-fdaapprovals-informative-or-irresponsible/)
The FDA is Americas gatekeeper for access to new drugs. As such, it gets a lot of scrutiny from the press,
Congress, and generally anyone with a major stake in the decisions it
makes. There are those who claim that the FDA is too lenient in its decision making
process and that it unleashes unproven new drugs on an unsuspecting public that presumes
any medicine approved is safe and efficacious. Others will assail the FDA as being far too conservative and say that
the agency is unnecessarily delaying access to new life-saving drugs because of its bureaucracy. Researchers at Yale recently tried to
bring more transparency to the FDAs decision making process by publishing a study entitled: Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of
Novel Therapeutic Agents, 2005 2012. Heres the stated purpose of their study. Many patients and physicians assume that the safety and
effectiveness of newly approved therapeutic agents is well understood; however, the strength of the clinical trial evidence supporting approval decisions
by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has not been evaluated. Using the FDAs publicly available website, the Yale authors analyzed data
for 188 novel therapeutic agents approved by the FDA over this period. Their results were highlighted in a Yale press release that trumpeted: All FDA
drug approvals not created equal. Lead author, Dr. Joseph Ross, summarized the results. We found
that during the study period, more
than one-third of the drugs were approved on the basis of a single trial, without
replication, and many other trials were small, short, and focused on lab values, or some other surrogate metric
of effect, rather than clinical endpoints like death There was a lack of uniformity in the level of evidence
the FDA used.. Based on our study of the data, we cannot be certain that this expectation (FDA approval certifies safety and efficacy) is
necessarily justified, given the quantity and quality of variability we saw in the drug approval process. Needless to say,
these
comments triggered numerous criticisms of the FDA. All FDA drug approvals not created equal
was the lead for many stories covering this article. Others were more damning such as Yale researchers chide the FDA for failing to enforce high R&D
Twitter also generated much comment and pharma critic Ben Goldacres remark was
typical: FDA approving new drugs on staggeringly weak evidence as new JAMA paper shows.
standards.
new congressional oversight report blasts the FDA

ANH 14
("Congress Chastises FDA: 'You're Not Listening!'" Alliance for Natural Health. 5/27/14.
www.anh-usa.org/congress-chastises-fda/)
We found that FDA focused on perfecting their legal reasons for inaction, a Senate
committee wrote, instead of protecting families. Action Alert! Last Friday, the Senate
Appropriations Committee criticized the FDA for ignoring doctors, patients, and compounding
pharmacists by issuing proposed new regulations on compounding pharmacies without sufficiently consulting these
stakeholders. The languagewhich is worded stronger than any report language the ANH staff has previously seenalso directs
the FDA to consult with interested parties before moving forward: The Committee notes that the Food and Drug Administration has
begun implementing the Compounding Quality Act by releasing guidances and working to appoint members to the Pharmacy
Committee is concerned that the Food and Drug

Administration is not meeting with any stakeholders before publicly releasing
further guidance for public comment. The Committee directs the Food and Drug Administration to meet with
Compounding Advisory Committee. The
stakeholders to help inform the implementation of the Compounding Quality Act to ensure continued access to safe compounded
drugs for which there is a clinical need. The language scolding the FDA was inserted into a committee report at the request of Sen.
Lamar Alexander (R-TN), who has committed himself to making sure stakeholders are heard: If FDA isnt sitting down
with doctors, patients, and pharmacists and communicating how it is implementing the
law, then I will stay on FDA until it does.
Mercola Indict
Mercolas a charlatan- his claims are unsubstantiated and hyperbolic
Barrett 14- retired psychiatrist, author, co-founder of the National Council Against Health Fraud,
and the webmaster of Quackwatch (Barrett, Stephen; FDA Orders Dr. Joseph Mercola
to Stop Illegal Claims; Quackwatch; http://www.quackwatch.com/11Ind/mercola.html; September
2, 2014.; 08/07/15) JG
Joseph Mercola, D.O., who practices in Schaumburg, Illinois, also operates one of the Internet's largest and
most trafficked health information sites. In 2012, Mercola stated that his site had over 300,000 pages and is
visited by "millions of people each day" and that his electronic newsletter has close 1,500,000 subscribers [1]. The site
vigorously promotes and sells dietary supplements, many of which bear his name. In 2004, Medical Economics reported that Mercola's practice
employed 50 people and that he employed 15 people to run his newsletter, including three editors [2]. Much of his support has comefrom chiropractors
Two of his books hit the #2 sales rank on Amazon Books

shortly after his newsletter plugged them for the first time. For many years, Dr. Mercola and other staff
who promote his newsletter from their Web sites.
members saw patients at his clinic, which was called the Optimal Wellness Center. However, in 2006, an article in Chicago Magazine reported that
Mercola had stopped practicing medicine to focus on his Web site [3]. I did not see any mention of this on his Web site, and the site invited patients to
come to his clinicwhich was renamed Dr. Mercola's Natural Health Centerfor detoxification, chiropractic, Dispensary, Emotional Freedom
Technique (EFT), Functional Medicine Program, homeopathy, Neuro-Structural Integration Technique (NST), nutritional consultation, Nutritional Typing
Test, thermography, Total Body Modification (TBM), and Active Isolated Stretching. In September 2014, the site announced that he had closed the clinic
"in order to devote his full time and attention to research, education and increasing public awareness." [4] Many
of Mercola's articles
make unsubstantiated claims and clash with those of leading medical and public health
organizations. For example, he opposes immunization [5] fluoridation [6], mammography
[7], and the routine administration of vitamin K shots to the newborn [8,9]; claims that amalgam fillings
are toxic [10]; and makes many unsubstantiated recommendations for dietary supplements.
Mercola's reach has been greatly boosted by repeated promotion on the "Dr. Oz Show."
Mercola's Profits Mercola is very critical of drug company profits and proudly states : Mercola.com
does NOT accept any third-party advertising or sponsorship, and I am in no way tied into any pharmaceutical company or any other corporate "interest"
whatsoever. So you get the real inside scoop on health issues, with practical advice that matters to you untainted by outside influence! [1] He also
states: Mercola.com is not . . . a tool to get me a bigger house and car, or to run for Senate. I fund this site, and therefore, am not handcuffed to any
advertisers, silent partners or corporate parents. . . . Profit generated from the sale of the products I recommend goes right back into maintaining and
building a better site. A site that, startling as it may be with all the greed-motivated hype out there in health care land, is truly for you [11]. I don't doubt
The word
"Mercola" on the labels of his "Dr. Mercola Premium Supplements" is service-marked.
Records at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office say that he began using the mark in
commerce in 2000, applied to register it in 2009, and was granted registration in 2010.
The registration address is for his home in South Barrington, Illinois, which the BlockShopper Chicago Web site states has
5,083 square feet and was purchased by Mercola in 2006 for $2 million. The Bing Maps aerial view indicates that it is
quite luxurious. In 2011, Mercola announced the formation of Health Liberty, a nonprofit coalition whose goals include promoting organic
Mercola's sincerityand I know nothing about how he allocates his income. But I recently made some interesting observations.
foods and targeting fluoridation, vaccination, genetically modified foods, and the use of amalgam fillings [12]. In a video accompanying the
announcement, Mercola stated that he planned to donate $1 million to catalyze the project. In addition to Mercola.com, The coalition members are:
National Vaccine Information Center (NVIC), which understates the benefits and exaggerates the risks of vaccination Fluoride Action Network (FAN),
the leading promoter of misinformation about fluoridation Institute for Responsible Technology, which understates the benefits and exaggerates the
risks of genetically modification of foods Consumers for Dental Choice, which vigorously attacks amalgam use with misinformation, propaganda,
lobbying, and lawsuits Organic Consumers Association, which irresponsibly promotes unpasteurized milk and spreads false alarms about food
irradiation, agricultural biotechnology, and vaccines. The "health freedom" argument involves deception by misdirection. It focuses on individual
freedom but does not consider how people who fail to protect their health put the rest of society at physical and/or financial risk. Failing to vaccinate, for
In 2012, Mercola becan calling his newsletter "Health Liberty

Mercola had donated a total of $26,975 in cash and in-
example, decreases herd immunity so that contagious diseases spread more widely.
Newsletter." In 2013, Williamette Week reported that
kind contributions that included polling and a YouTube video to support the efforts of the antifluoridation group that is opposing a
fluoridation referendum in Portland, Oregon. The report also stated that "Mercola has questioned whether HIV causes
AIDS, suggests that many cancers can be cured by baking soda, and warns parents not
to vaccinate their children. He also says that animals are psychic." [13] Better Business Bureau Report
Mercola markets his supplements through Mercola Health Resources, LLC. In 2011, after a customer complained that she thought a product she
purchased was overpriced, I began checking whether the Better Business Bureau had received any complaints. I found that the company was rated Con a scale of A+ through F. On February 1, 2012, the BBB reported that during the previous 36 months, there were 26 complaintswhich is not an
unusually high number for a high-volume businessbut the report contained the following comments: A recent review of consumer complaints filed
with the BBB of Chicago & Northern Illinois against your Mercola Health Resources, LLC delineates a pattern of consumer allegations. Consumers are
alleging that Mercola Health Resources does not honor the 100% money-back guarantee listed on your website. Customers have reported that refunds
have not been provided for returns that were specifically covered under this guarantee. Consumers have also reported that they have experienced
delivery issues. While www.mercola.com states that orders ship within 10 business days, consumers say they have waited much longer for their
products. Customers allege that the company's service staff has been unable to provide explanations regarding this delay. Some consumers have also
reported that Mercola provided them with shipment tracking numbers that were not valid with their respective carriers [14]. On November 26, 2013, I
checked again and found that during the previous 36 months there had been 34 complaints, complaints but the Mercola Health Resouces was rated
A+. FDA Warnings In
2005, the FDA ordered Mercola and his Optimal Wellness Center to stop
making illegal claims for products sold through his Web site [15]. The claims to which the
FDA objected involved three products: Living Fuel Rx, claimed to offer an "exceptional countermeasure" against cancer,
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, autoimmune diseases, etc. Tropical Traditions Virgin Coconut Oil, claimed to reduce the risk of heart disease and
has beneficial effects against Crohn's disease, irritable bowel syndrome, and many infectious agents Chlorella, claimed to fight cancer and normalize
blood pressure. In
2006, the FDA sent Mercola and his center a second warning that was based
on product labels collected during an inspection at his facility and on claims made on the
Optimum Wellness Center Web site [16]. This time the claims to which the FDA objected
involve four products: Vibrant Health Research Chlorella XP, claimed to "help to virtually eliminate your risk of developing cancer in
the future." Fresh Shores Extra Virgin Coconut Oil, claimed to reduce the risk of heart disease, cancer, and degenerative diseases. Momentum
Health Products Vitamin K2, possibly useful in treating certain kinds of cancer and Alzheimer's disease. Momentum Health Products Cardio Essentials
Nattokinase NSK-SD, claimed to be "a much safer and effective option than aspirin and other pharmaceutical agents to treating heart disease." The
warning letters explained that the use of such claims in the marketing of these products
violates the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, which bans unapproved claims for
products that are intended for curing, mitigating, treating, or preventing of diseases .
(Intended use can be established through product labels, catalogs, brochures, tapes, Web sites, or other circumstances surrounding the distribution of
the product.)
In 2011, the FDA ordered Mercola to stop making claims for thermography that
go beyond what the equipment he uses (Medtherm2000 infrared camera) was cleared for. The warning letter said
that statements on Mercola's site improperly imply that the Meditherm camera can be used alone to diagnose or screen for various diseases or
conditions associated with the breast, they also represent that the sensitivity of the Meditherm Med2000 Telethermographic camera is greater than that
of machines used in mammography. The statements to which the FDA objected included: "Revolutionary and Safe Diagnostic Tool Detects Hidden
Inflammation: Thermography" "The Newest Safe Cancer Screening Tool" "[b]ecause measuring inflammation through thermal imaging is a proactive,
preventative method you can use for detecting disease, which significantly improves your chances for longevity and good health." Additionally,
thermograms provide: "Reliable and accurate information for diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis" "Yes, it's true. Thermograms provide you with
early diagnosis and treatment assistance in such problems as cancer, inflammatory processes, neurological and vascular dysfunction, and
musculoskeletal injury." Thermography can benefit patients by detecting conditions including: Arthritis: "[d]ifferentiate between osteoarthritis and more
severe forms like rheumatoid." Immune Dysfunction, Fibromyalgia and Chronic Fatigue, "Digestive Disorders: Irritable bowel syndrome, diverticulitis,
and Crohn's disease" and "Other Conditions: including bursitis, herniated discs, ligament or muscle tear, lupus, nerve problems, whiplash, stroke
screening, cancer and many, many others." [17] In 2011, the Chicago Tribune reported that Mercola had not complied with the FDA's order and
intended to "fight the FDA . . . if they decide to take it further." [18] In 2012, the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation asked
Mercola to attend an informal conference to discuss a complaint that he was "making deceptive claims promoting thermography as a standalone
diagnostic tool for detecting cancer and other diseases and is attacking the use of mammograms." Mercola's Web site still promotes thermography and
trashes mammography, but the site stopped offering thermography appintments later that yearand Mercola's special report, "The Safe Breast Cancer
Screening Test Your Doctor Isn't Telling You About," is no longer apparent.
No Pharma Link
Claims that the FDA is in bed with big Pharma are alarmist and just flat
wrong
LaMattina 13 (LaMattina, John- the president of Pfizer Research and Development and
Forbes Contributor, covers news concerned with the Pharmaceutical Industry; 8/07/2013; Is The
FDA Being Compromised By Pharma Payments?;
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2013/08/07/is-the-fda-being-compromised-bypharma-payments/; Forbes.com; 08/07/15) JG
Is The FDA Being Compromised By Pharma Payments? Comment Now Follow Comments In touting an upcoming special issue
of the Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics (JLME), Donald W. Light of the School of Public Health,
University of Medicine & Dentistry of NJ, wrote an article entitled Risky Drugs: Why The
FDA Cannot Be Trusted. Last week I discussed one aspect of this article, Lights challenge that
90% of FDA approved drugs of the last 30 years are no more effective than existing
drugs. However, the bulk of his essay focuses not on his views about pharmas competence but rather on his issues with the
FDA. While I found a number of his comments troubling, the following stood out. The forthcoming article in JLME also presents
systematic, quantitative evidence that since the industry started making large contributions to the FDA for reviewing its drugs, as it
makes large contributions to Congressmen who have promoted this substitution for publicly funded regulations, the FDA has sped
up the review process with the result that drugs approved are significantly more likely to cause serious harm, hospitalizations, and
deaths. This is a pretty damning comment. Basically, Light is saying that pharma paid congressmen to
sponsor legislation that results in the FDA being beholden to pharma for funding for its
work. Implicit in this is that, as a result of these large contributions, the grateful FDA is rapidly approving medicines that are
harmful. A bit of history would be helpful to show the actual reasons why the pharma
industry makes contributions to the FDA. Few remember that back in the late 1980s there was a
drug lag in the U.S. versus other parts of the world. Because of a lack of resources at the FDA, drugs
were being approved at a much slower rate in the U.S. than in Europe. More than half of all drugs
approved in the U.S. had been approved in Europe more than a year earlier. As a result, patients, physicians,
advocacy groups, and pharmaceutical companies were all concerned that access to important new
medicines was being denied to Americans. To solve this problem, Congress enacted the Prescription
Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) of 1992. PDUFA provided a mechanism whereby charges were levied on pharmaceutical
companies for each new drug application (NDA) filed. The revenues from these user fees were used to hire 600 new drug
reviewers and support staff. These new medical officers, chemists, pharmacologists, and other experts were tasked with clearing the
backlog of NDAs awaiting approval. Consequently, the FDA was able to reduce review times of NDAs to 12 months for standard
NDAs and to 6 months for priority applications that involved significant advances over existing treatment. As a result of
PDUFA, the timing of U.S. drug approvals began to mirror that of the rest of the world.
Congress clearly likes PDUFA as the act has been renewed five times since 1992. PDUFA-V
was approved in 2012. Undoubtedly, this legislation helps to support the FDA and fuel needed
growth. In 1995, The actual user fee charged to each company filing an NDA in 1995 was
$208,000. In 2014, the user fee will be $2,169,100. If you assume that as many as 50 NDAs are filed in a year,
Congress is passing on $100 million of FDA funding costs to the industry. Despite Lights
assertion, I can attest that pharma companies dont relish making these payments. The FDA is a
government agency and should be funded entirely by the federal government. But pharma companies dont have a choice. If a
company wants to bring a new medicine to patients, it has to pay the user fee just to get
the drug reviewed. Furthermore, anyone who pays attention to FDA behaviors knows that the agency doesnt
automatically approve NDAs. Just in the last few months, the FDA has rejected, in the form of
complete response letters, an insomnia drug from Merck, a migraine drug from Allergan, and a
kidney cancer drug from Aveo. In fact, any suggestion of the FDA being beholden to the
pharmaceutical industry due to the PDUFA user fees is comical to those familiar with the drug review process. So,
why should anyone care about Lights views? Unfortunately, as an academic whose work is supported by the Safra Center for
Ethics, his word carries a disproportionate amount of influence. These comments perpetrate the view that
there is an unholy alliance between the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry, an alliance that
threatens the health of patients. This
conspiracy doesnt exist.
might make for a Hollywood movie plot. Truth be told, such a
Status Quo Solves FDA

FDAs interim policy addresses all OIG recommendations (neg card)
OIG 14 (Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, Daniel R.
Levinson, Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services Since 2008;
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General Report, Review of the
Food and Drug Administrations Computer Monitoring of Certain Employees in Its Center for
Devices and Radiological Health; This review was conducted by a 12-member team composed
of individuals from OIGs Immediate Office, Office of Audit Services, Office of Counsel to the
Inspector General, Office of Evaluation and Inspections, Office of Investigations, and Office of
Management and Policy (further methodology is given on page 23 of the pdf of the report);
February 2014, OIG-12-14-01; http://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/portfolio/20140226FDA-Final.pdf)//HB
FDA issued its interim computer-monitoring policy on September 26, 2013. In particular, the
FDAs interim policy:
establishes procedures requiring authorization by senior management and consultation
with legal counsel;
distinguishes between monitoring conducted at the behest of law enforcement and
monitoring conducted for management purposes to minimize interference with law
enforcement investigations;
requires monitoring to be narrowly tailored in time, scope, and degree to accomplish the
monitorings objectives; and
requires that the authorization describe the reason, factual basis, and scope of the
monitoring.
Given this, FDAs interim policy addresses our five recommendations outlined above.21 HHS
should determine whether all other individual OpDiv polices meet our recommendations above.
HHS also should regularly review and, as necessary, update its Department-wide monitoring
policies to ensure they are compatible with new and emerging technologies and methodologies.
Information technology is continually changing, and a static monitoring policy could fail to
address key implementation issues as capabilities evolve.
---Impact D
Econ Impact D
Empirics disprove the impact
Cooley 9
(Thomas-- Ph.D. in Economics, Professor of Economics and Dean of New York University's
Stern School of Business, Financial booms and busts 'are inevitable'; Academic expects the
next economic crisis to follow the same path as the one the world is experiencing now and it will
involve a similar breakdown in confidence", South China Morning Post, November 25th 2009,
December 1st 2009, Lexis Nexis,)
Another financial crisis is inevitable because booms and busts are simply part of the
business cycle, a leading academic told a seminar organised by Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology. Dr Thomas F. Cooley, professor of economics and dean of New York University's Stern School of Business, recently
spoke at a Global Finance Seminar Series event entitled "The Next Financial Crisis" at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
(HKMA) offices. Edmond Lau, executive director of the HKMA's monetary management department and a board member of the
Treasury Markets Association, delivered opening remarks, while Reginald Chua, editor-in-chief of the South China Morning
Post, later moderated a panel discussion between Cooley and K.K. Tse, executive vice-president of State Street Bank and Trust
Company. Cooley would not say when he thought the next financial crisis would occur
but said it definitely would come because booms and busts were part of the
business cycle. He said the next crisis would have the same characteristics and
follow the same path as the present one - flowing from a loss of confidence. "History
is replete with examples of financial crises and bank panics," he said. "Just in
the United States alone, in the 20th century we had the panic of 1907, the stock market
crash of 1929 and banking panics of the 1930s. Then we had a long period of relative
success and calm, and then we had episodes such as the savings and loan crisis, and
the failures of Continental Illinois Bank and Long Term Capital Management. "That's
just in the US. In the past two decades we've had financial crises in Asia, Mexico,
Chile, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Russia, so financial crises occur with some
frequency, but what they don't do is occur with predictability," he said.
No escalation
Jervis 11
(Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International
and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, Force in Our Times, Survival, Vol.
25, No. 4, p. 403-425)
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of
interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring
the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be
one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening
of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism,
undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic
policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could
be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each
other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it
could not be reversed states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen
internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme
versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard
to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass
opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or
even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people
will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note
that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an
optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a
sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the
solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it
will not make war thinkable.
Pharma not k Econ

Pharma not key to growth its a profit motivated deception
Light and Lexchin 12

(Donald W Light professor, Joel R Lexchin professor 1Department of Psychiatry, University of
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 2250 Chapel Avenue, Cherry Hill, NJ 08002, USA; 2York
University, School of Health Policy and Management, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 8/11,
http://www.pharmamyths.net/files/BMJ-Innova_ARTICLE_8-11-12.pdf)
Data indicate that the widely touted

innovation crisis in pharmaceuticals is a myth. The real innovation crisis, say Donald Light and
Joel Lexchin, stems from current incentives that reward companies for developing large
numbers of new drugs with few clinical advantages over existing ones. Since the early 2000s,
Pharmaceutical research and development: what do we get for all that money?
industry leaders, observers, and policy makers have been declaring that there is an innovation crisis in pharmaceutical research. A 2002 front page
investigation by the Wall Street Journal reported, In laboratories around the world, scientists on the hunt for new drugs are coming up dry . . . The
$400 billion a year drug industry is suddenly in serious trouble.1 Four years later, a US Government Accounting Office assessment of new drug
development reported that over the past several years it has become widely recognized throughout the industry that the productivity of its research
and development expenditures has been declining.2 In 2010, Morgan Stanley reported that top executives felt they could not beat the innovation
crisis and proposed that the best way to deal with a decade of dismal R&D returns was for the major companies to stop trying to discover new drugs
and buy into discoveries by others.3 Such reports continue and raise the spectre that the pipeline for new drugs will soon run dry and we will be left to
the mercies of whatever ills befall us.4 The
innovation crisis myth The constant production of reports

and articles about the so called innovation crisis rests on the decline in new molecular
entities (defined as an active ingredient that has never been marketed . . . in any form5 ) since a spike in 1996 that
resulted from the clearance of a backlog of applications after large user fees from companies were introduced
(fig 1). This decline ended in 2006, when approvals of new molecular entities
returned to their long term mean of between 15 and 25 a year (fig 2).6 Even in 2005, an analysis of the
data by a team at Pfizer concluded that the innovation crisis was a myth which bears no
relationship to the true innovation rates of the pharmaceutical industry.7 So
why did the claims and stories not abate? A subsequent analysis also concluded that the
innovation crisis was a myth and added several insights.8 Based on US Food and Drug
Administration records, Munos found that drug companies have delivered
innovation at a constant rate for almost 60 years. The new biologicals have
been following the same pattern in which approvals fluctuate around a constant, low
level.8 These data do not support frequently heard complaints about how hard it
is to get any new drug approved. They also mean that neither policies considered to be
obstacles to innovation (like the requirement for more extensive clinical testing) nor those regarded as
promoting innovation (like faster reviews) have made much difference. Even the biotechnology
revolution did not change the rate of approval of new molecular entities, though it changed strategies
for drug development.9 Meanwhile, telling innovation crisis stories to politicians and the press
serves as a ploy, a strategy to attract a range of government protections from free
market, generic competition.10
Disease Impact D
No extinction
York 14
(Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and
Pathogenesis Branch of the Influenza Division at the CDC, PhD in Molecular Virology and
Immunology from McMaster University, M.Sc. in Veterinary Microbiology and Immunology from
the University of Guelph, former Assistant Prof of Microbiology & Molecular Genetics at Michigan
State, Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species? 6/4/2014, http://www.quora.com/Whydont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species)
diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one, the
most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the
disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that
individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to
burn themselves out that way. Probably the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants.
Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone
or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive . We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who
But mostly
are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't
many instances of pathogen resistance

genes that have spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that
conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious
progress to disease. We can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain
threats to the species.
Whistleblowers Advantage
Solvency Answers
Alt Causes
Whistleblowers fail because of the lack of transparency in the SEC, not the
lack of incentives
Cohan 14 (William D., American business writer. He has written books about the Wall Street
industry and is a contributor to Vanity Fair, The Financial Times, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, The
Atlantic, ArtNews, The Irish Times, The Washington Post, The New York Times, and Fortune
Magazine, and author of The Price of Silence: The Duke Lacrosse Scandal, the Power of the
Elite, and the Corruption of Our Great Universities William D Cohan on Wall Street
whistleblowers May 30, 2014 www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ce216134-e6c7-11e3-9a2000144feabdc0.html , cayla_)
As a further harbinger of danger, Edwards points to the secret $14m award the SEC made recently to an anonymous whistleblower at an unnamed financial institution. The
SEC didnt even reveal the nature of the wrongdoing the whistleblower uncovered, so both
the companys shareholders and the public remain in the dark about what was specifically uncovered
and where. All that is known is that the SEC did bring a major enforcement action against a financial institution that resulted in a large penalty and the corresponding
$14m award to the whistleblower. If you allow this that the award can be made without naming the company or the type of fraud its really nothing more than hush money,
she says. How is it different? The SEC of course defends itself by saying, Were not revealing the name of the company or the nature of the fraud because were protecting the
identity of the whistleblower. But the SEC is a disclosure agency, so they should have to establish that [not revealing the information] is really required in order to protect the
whistleblower, if theyre going to in a sense subvert their mission...They really are not able to justify why they are silent about the name of the company or the nature of the
SECs failure to release publicly the details of the $14m reward sends precisely the
wrong message. The one effect obviously it has is that it protects the reputation of the fraudulent
corporation, she adds. [Reputational damage] is probably the main deterrent in cases like this, since
fraud. She believes the
there have been really no prosecutions of senior managers for fraud over a period of time on Wall Street. If even the name of the company is withheld by the SEC when it
makes a bounty award, theres no reputational risk, either. Whats the downside of trying to get away with it? Dennis Kelleher, a former attorney at Skadden, Arps and now the
CEO of Better Markets, Inc, a Washington-based non-profit organisation that is a leading advocate for tough banking regulations, says that the architects of the Dodd-Frank law
of whom he was one were trying to balance the need for disclosure about financial wrongdoing with provisions to protect the whistleblower from public humiliation and
all the incentives previously were dramatically stacked

against whistleblowers, and its still an incredibly high-risk action, he says. Although critics remain, he thinks the new whistleblower provisions in Doddretaliation. The most important thing is to incentivise whistleblowers to come forward, and
Frank strike the right balance. I would be significantly more likely to encourage a whistleblower post-Dodd-Frank than pre-Dodd-Frank, he says. Jordan Thomas, a former
senior enforcement official at the SEC and now a partner at the law firm Labaton Sucharow, where he leads the firms whistleblower practice and represents Eric Ben-Artzi,
agrees with Kelleher. He believes the fact that Dodd-Frank allows anonymity for whistleblowers facilitates the reporting of wrongdoing while offering them protection from
retaliation, which is the point after all. Essentially most whistleblower horror stories start with retaliation, he says. And to be retaliated against, you have to be known. The
genius of Dodd-Frank was it created a way for people with knowledge to report without disclosing their identity to their employers or the general public. That has been a game
changer because now people with knowledge are coming forward with a lot to lose, but they have a mechanism where they can report this misconduct without fear of retaliation
or blacklisting. He says the fact that the SEC could award $14m to a single whistleblower whose identity has remained unknown, despite efforts by the media to uncover it,
sends a powerful message that whistleblower identities will be protected. Maybe so. But then there is the message being sent by prosecutors who allow the big Wall Street
the governments apparent policy of permitting Wall

Street banks to purge their liability using their shareholders money will not deter bad behaviour. The fines she
banks to pay large fines to make their troubles disappear. Bea Edwards, for one, thinks that
specifically cites JPMorgan Chases $13bn settlement last year with the government over its role in manufacturing and selling faulty mortgage-backed securities in the years
leading up to the 2008 financial crisis are merely seen as a cost of doing business, and are a major source of revenue for the US Treasury and a way for the SEC and the
The calculation
for the bank is going to be, OK, how much money can we make by doing this [bad behaviour] before we
get caught? Are we going to be able to cover the fine, at the very least, and then make a fairly substantial profit and just pay the fine? And that would explain why
Justice Department, among others, to argue for a larger budget allocation from Congress. Its win-win for everybody [involved], she fears.
there arent any prosecutions, because if the DOJ starts prosecuting, then the gravy train kind of shuts down . . . Calculate how much money you can make doing x or selling y
before getting caught at it, and what you think essentially you could settle for, and if what you can make is substantially more than what you can settle for, then you go forward. If
getting caught means [there is] a whistleblower, then you just grind up that employee in the cost of doing business. If the employee whistleblower is lucky, he or she comes out
of it with a successful anti-retaliation claim, three or four years after the blood was shed. Or the whistleblower, if successful, gets an amount of money that may make it possible
to go on living but it is certainly not an amount of money that caused real pain to a major financial institution on Wall Street.
Alt cause to chilling of whistleblowers- no real legal protection

DW 15
(DW, US whistleblower laws offer no protection, http://www.dw.com/en/us-whistleblower-lawsoffer-no-protection/a-17391500) JB
For years, would-be whistleblowers in the US intelligence community had no legal protections to
shield them from retaliatory measures by their superiors. The Whistleblower Protection
Act of 1989 covered most of the federal government with the glaring exception of the
intelligence agencies. In an effort to close this legal gap, Congress passed the
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) a decade later. The law covers employees
and contractors at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) as well as the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). But according to
Thomas Drake, the
act failed to adequately protect whistleblowers from retaliation. A former

senior executive at the NSA, Drake blew the whistle on a failed surveillance program
called Trailblazer. He used what the government calls "proper channels" to express his concerns
about the program's exorbitant cost and its lack of privacy protections, reaching out to his immediate supervisor, the office of the
inspector general, and the congressional intelligence committees. "I was reprised against severely within the
proper channels," Drake told DW. "I was identified as a troublemaker." Drake called the NSA's response to
his whistleblowing activities "death by a thousand cuts administratively and
bureaucratically," saying that the agency found ways to change his job and cut his
responsibilities. Ultimately, the NSA re-organized the section he worked in, leaving him
with nothing but a "paper title." Drake resigned from the agency in 2008.
Alt causes to FDA whistleblower intimidation- plan cant solve

Mercola 15- world-renowned physician and multiple New York Times bestselling author
(Mercola, Dr. Joseph; 07/08/15; Shocking Story Reveals How the FDA Is Recklessly
Abandoning Drug Safety - See more at: http://healthimpactnews.com/2012/shocking-storyreveals-how-the-fda-is-recklessly-abandoning-drug-safety/#sthash.rJnRhWxM.dpuf; Health
Impact News; http://healthimpactnews.com/2012/shocking-story-reveals-how-the-fda-isrecklessly-abandoning-drug-safety/) JG
Kavanagh was not surprised to learn about the agencys retaliation against the five whistleblowers ,
giving several examples of how they were personally intimidated, to the point of fearing for their
lives, and the safety of their children! After FDA management learned I had gone to
Congress about certain issues, I found my office had been entered and my computer
physically tampered with, Kavanagh tells Rosenberg. After I gave Representative Waxmans (D-CA) office a
USB drive with evidence, FDA staff was admonished that it was prohibited to download information to USB drives. Then, after I
openly reported irregularities in an antipsychotic drug review and FDA financial collusion with outsiders to Senator Grassleys office
and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, I was threatened with prison if I should
release trade secret information to Congress [T]he Food Drug and Cosmetics Act
explicitly allows communication of trade secrets by FDA employees to Congress, but
since most people are unaware of this, FDA management can use the threat of jail for
violation of the Trade Secrets Act, not only to discourage reviewers, but in my case they got Senator Grassleys staff to destroy the
evidence I provided them. The threats, however, can be much worse than prison. One manager
threatened my children who had just turned 4 and 7 years old and in one large staff meeting, I
was referred to as a saboteur. Based on other things that happened and were said, I was afraid that I
could be killed for talking to Congress and criminal investigators. We Now Know What Domestic Surveillance of
Whistleblowers Looks Like The following video features attorney, Stephen Kohn, executive director of the National Whistleblowers
Center and attorney for the FDA whistleblowers in the recently revealed FDA spy operation against them2. For the first time, we
now have a glimpse into what domestic surveillance of whistleblowers looks like in this country with the modern technological
developments, Kohn says. The agency [sought] to destroy the reputation of these whistleblowers forever. - See more at:
http://healthimpactnews.com/2012/shocking-story-reveals-how-the-fda-is-recklessly-abandoning-drugsafety/#sthash.rJnRhWxM.dpuf
SQ Solves
Status quo solves- Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012
proves.
Canterbury 12- Director of Public Policy, is an experienced advocate, policy analyst,
and public campaign strategist (Canterbury, Angela; Advocatates Laud President
Obama's Signing of Federal Whistleblower Reforms; 12/03/12; POGO; 06/12/15;
www.pogo.org/about/press-room/releases/2012/20121203-advocates-laud-presidentwhistleblower-reforms.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/) JG
President Obama signed the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA, S. 743) into law
today, marking the finale of a more than decade-long campaign by the Make It Safe Coalition to restore and modernize
federal whistleblower protections. The Presidents unwavering support of the WPEA, paired with Congress sweeping endorsement by
unanimous consent, demonstrates the strong mandate for a new day of accountability in the federal
government. These reforms expand protections for federal employees who disclose
wrongdoing and protect the public trust. Whistleblower advocates from organizations with diverse interests
and ideologies who together waged a historic campaign for this landmark government accountability reform are enthusiastic about this
victory for whistleblowers and taxpayers: Beth Moten, Legislative Director for American Federation of Government Employees, commented: AFGE applauds the
bipartisan, collaborative work of members of Congress, a diverse coalition of worker advocates and good government groups, and the Obama Administration resulting in the
bill signed into law today. The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act provides many of the changes in law necessary to
protect federal workers when they come forward to report fraud, waste, and wrongdoing in
the workplace and to hold managers accountable when they retaliate. AFGE is especially pleased that the law applies to Transportation
Security Officers, the federal workers dedicated to the safety of the flying public, and provides them with the same whistleblower protections as other federal workers. Tom
This reform took 13 years to pass, because it can make so much

difference against fraud, waste and abuse. Over the years, earlier versions of this law had been called the Taxpayer Protection Act.
Devine, Legal Director of Government Accountability Project, commented:
Nothing could set a better context for fiscal cliff negotiations than a unanimous, bipartisan consensus to protect those who risk their careers to protect the taxpayers. The
mandate for this law is that the truth is the public's business. The victory reflects strong bipartisan teamwork, as well as advocacy within the party, as Republicans often had to
work harder at convincing wary colleagues. And it reflects relentless pressure from conservative stakeholders to whistleblowers and their champions throughout the last 13
Most Presidents have

offered lip service for whistleblower rights, but President Obama fought to give them
more teeth. Michael D. Ostrolenk, National Director of Liberty Coalition, commented: "With a lack of cooperation as a starting point in our present day political
years. Unique support came from President Obama, who was committed from day one of his term to signing this bill into law.
system, it's good to see a positive bi-partisan effort come to fruition. One cheer for President Obama, the Republican held House, and Democrat controlled Senate, and two
cheers for the American people." Pete Sepp, Executive Vice President of National Taxpayers Union, commented: "Today an important chapter in the struggle to recognize
whistleblowers for the tremendous service they provide taxpayers has been concluded. This bipartisan effort is proof positive that fiscal responsibility can be restored to
Washington, one step at a time. We look forward to helping write the next chapter in the vital national conversation over how best to make government more efficient and
accountable." Colleen M. Kelley, National President of National Treasury Employees Union, commented: This bi-partisan effort represents a big step forward in restoring and
it creates specific legal protection for scientific

freedom, providing whistleblower protection rights to employees who challenge
censorship, and makes it an abuse of authority to punish disclosures about scientific
censorship. By protecting those who speak out, this law increases accountability and transparency in government. Angela Canterbury, Director of Public Policy for
modernizing whistleblower rights for federal workers. For example,
the Project On Government Oversight (POGO), commented: Today marks a tremendous victory for a historic campaign for more government accountability. The reforms signed
into law today will go a long way to change the fact that for far too long the truth about government wrongdoing could easily be suppressed through intimidation and retaliation
against the truthtellers. Federal workers will now have a fighting chance at justice when they face retaliation for blowing the whistle on waste, fraud, abuse, and other illegalities.
Americans should be encouraged by this laws passageit demonstrates extraordinary support for a better government
that transcends the partisanship that so often characterizes Washington today. Today, the publics trust, health, and safety were put before politics. Keith Wrightson, Worker
Safety and Health Advocate for Public Citizens Congress Watch, commented: President Obama and the 112th Congress have made a significant contribution to how civil
employees will be treated when they identify workplace hazards. Civil employees can now live without fear of retaliation from their supervisors when disclosures are made.
David Williams, President of Taxpayers Protection Alliance, commented: This is a historic day for whistleblowers and taxpayers as the President signs the Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act. Bi-partisan common sense prevailed and the country is one step closer to being a government of the people, by the people, for the people. Celia
Wexler, Senior Washington Representative, Center for Science and Democracy, Union of Concerned Scientists, commented: At a time when science seems to be routinely
Passage of this bill

will help American families, who depend on federal agencies to protect them from unsafe
drugs, defective consumer products, hazardous workplaces, and polluted air and water.
But it also strongly supports the role of independent science as the foundation for federal policymaking. It sends a strong signal that federal scientists deserve respect. The
WPEA includes critically important upgrades to the broken system for federal
whistleblowing to better serve taxpayers. Though it does not include every reform that we have sought and will continue to seek, the
under attack in Congress, this legislative success is a breath of fresh air and a reminder that bipartisan cooperation is still possible.
bill will restore and modernize government whistleblower rights by ensuring that legitimate disclosures of wrongdoing will be protected, increasing government accountability to
will restore free speech

rights closed through arbitrary loopholes and create new protections for federal
scientists and Transportation Security Administration officers. The bill also will strengthen due process rights, such as a
taxpayers, and saving billions of taxpayer dollars by helping expose fraud, waste and abuse. Overall, the WPEAs provisions
two-year experiment in normal access to appeals courts (effectively breaking the Federal Circuits monopoly on appellate review); provide compensatory damages; create
whistleblower ombudsmen at Inspectors General offices; and strengthen authority by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel to help whistleblowers through disciplinary actions
against those who retaliate and to file briefs in court supportive of whistleblower rights. This hard fought victory could not have been achieved without the steadfast support of
whistleblowers, advocates and nongovernmental organizations alike, who demonstrated a marathon commitment to the restoration of federal whistleblower protections
throughout this more than a decade-long campaign. Congressional champions and their staff deserve praise and appreciation, especially retiring Sen. Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii)
and Rep. Todd Platts (R-Pa.), as well as Sens. Susan Collins (R-Maine), Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), Joseph Lieberman (I-Ct.), Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.), Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
and Carl Levin (D-Mi.), and Reps. Darrell Issa (R-Ca.), Todd Platts (R-Pa.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and Elijah Cummings (D-Md.). A full list of Congressional sponsors can be
viewed here: http://bit.ly/TqyJCe. We cannot thank the whistleblower community and these Congressional offices enough for their resolute commitment to the WPEA.
Uniqueness
WB Protections Up
their author concludes neg internal whistleblower protections have
increased hugely under Obama
Rubenfeld, 2013, [Reporter at WSJ.com's Corruption Currents covering news and trends
concerning bribery, money laundering, sanctions breaches, whistleblowers and other issues of
international corruption ]
(Samuel, Jan 7, "Obama Expands Whistelblower Protections Amid Aggressive
Enforcement"blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2013/01/07/obama-expands-whistleblowerprotections-amid-aggressive-enforcement/)
Is President Obama really waging, as critics contend, a war on whistleblowers? Jacquelyn
Martin/Associated Press Former CIA officer John Kiriakou, left, is the first former CIA officer to
be convicted of disclosing classified information to a reporter. The Obama administration has
tried to prosecute more people under the Espionage Act than all previous presidencies
combined, leading critics to proclaim that Obama is waging a war on whistleblowers. The
World War One-era law was originally intended to prevent spies from getting a hold of
national security information that could be used by the countrys enemies. The Obama
administration prosecutions under the law, however, have concerned leaks to the media.
The New York Times ran a profile over the weekend of the first former Central Intelligence
Agency officer to be convicted of disclosing classified information to a reporter. At the same
time, the rights and protections of some informants have expanded significantly
during Obamas first term in office, and the rights cover an increasing number of eligible
people. Hes done more to affirmatively protect whistleblowers than any other
president, said Angela Canterbury, director of public policy at the Project on Government
Oversight, in an interview. She said that Obama wants to encourage internal reporting of
wrongdoing. Obama believes that if there are more protections for internal
whistleblowers, there will be fewer leaks of national security information, Canterbury
said. We share that belief, but that does not de-legitimize the need for external whistleblowers.
Sometimes information needs to be disclosed outside the government for there to be
accountability, she said. In the last few years, people blowing the whistle on securities
violations won new rights, including access to a bounty, under the Dodd-Frank Act, federal
contractors won new protections under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act and
intelligence and national security employees received protections under a presidential policy
directive. The directive on intelligence people is far and away more than anyone else
has ever done, Canterbury said. Thats a remarkable action. And buried in a defense bill
were even more protections. A provision of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013,
signed into law late Wednesday, expanded protections for employees of the Defense
Department and National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It also established a fouryear pilot program to strengthen whistleblower protections for all other federal
executive agency contractors and subcontractors.
Impact D
Food Safety Defense

FSMA solves for food security- whistleblowers arent key
Taylor 15- contributing writer
(Michael, The Future is Now for the Food Safety Modernization Act, Food Safety News,
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/03/the-future-is-now-for-the-food-safety-modernizationact/#.VaQmdJ3F98F) JB
We all knew FSMA was a big deal when Congress passed it a little over four years ago. After a decade
of illness outbreaks, import safety problems, and market disruptions that shook
consumer confidence and imposed billions of dollars in costs on the food system,
Congress mandated a paradigm shift to prevention to establishing a modern system of food safety
protection based not on reacting to problems but on preventing them from happening in the first place. Thats how well
achieve the food safety goals we all share fewer illnesses, stronger consumer confidence in the system of
protection, and a level playing field for American farmers and food companies. In addition to embracing these goals, Congress
adopted a strong vision of how to achieve them. With broad input and support from industry and consumers alike, Congress
said that a food safety system fit for the 21st century must be built on what the food
industry itself has learned about how to make food safe and how to manage global
supply chains, and it must harness the efforts of all food system participants public and
private, domestic and foreign in a collaborative effort to see that those practical, effective, preventive measures are consistently
followed. As big as that sounds and its by far the biggest overhaul of the food safety system since the
first national law was passed over a century ago I dont think any of us fully envisioned how much would have to be
done and how much would have to change to make FSMA a success. The law itself spelled out the large number of regulations FDA
must issue to establish the prevention framework. Indeed, FSMA made FDA responsible for some 50 specific deliverables in the
form of rules, guidance for industry, new programs, and reports to Congress. FDA has been hard at work on these, with the major
rules set to be final this year under court-ordered deadlines. You can see an inventory of what weve done since enactment of FSMA
here on our FSMA web page. But weve learned that FSMA is about far more than new rules. Its about
how FDA changes fundamentally its approach to implementing food safety rules, including
Thats why FDA has

devoted such huge effort over the past two years to rethinking every
aspect of what will go into achieving high rates of compliance with the
FSMA rules for both home-grown and imported food compliance that is essential to food safety and to
how FDA works with other governments and the food industry to achieve food safety success.
achieving the level playing field on food safety that American consumers and industry both demand.
Food Safety Impact D

Alt causes make food insecurity inevitablewater shortages, land
degradation, deterioration of farming systems, climate change and
competition between industrial and urban land users
The United Nations 11
(U.N, "Land degradation and water shortages threaten global food production
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 40533#.U1FCUm0o5Fc) JB
28 November 2011 Global food production is being undermined by land degradation and
shortages of farmland and water resources, making feeding the worlds rising population
projected to reach nine billion by 2050 a daunting challenge, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) said in a
report unveiled today. The past five decades have witnessed a significant rise in food production,
but in many places the better yields have been associated with agricultural practices that
have degraded the land and water systems, according to FAOs State of the Worlds Land and Water Resources for Food
and Agriculture (SOLAW) report. Farming systems face the risk of progressive breakdown of their
productive capacity under a combination of excessive demographic pressure and
unsustainable agriculture use and practices, says the report. Competition for land and water is
increasing including competition between urban and industrial users as well as
within the agricultural sector between livestock, staple crops, non-food crop, and biofuel
production. Climate change is expected to alter the patterns of temperature,
precipitation and river flows upon which the worlds food production systems depend,
according to the report, which also notes that the problem could be more acute in developing countries,
where quality land, soil nutrients and water are least abundant. The SOLAW report highlights that the
collective impact of these pressures and resulting agricultural transformations have put
some production systems at risk of breakdown of their environmental integrity and
productive capacity, said Jacques Diouf, the FAO Director-General. These systems at risk may simply not
be able to contribute as expected in meeting human demands by 2050. The consequences in terms of
hunger and poverty are unacceptable. Remedial action needs to be taken now, he added. Between 1961 and 2009, the worlds cropland grew by 12
per cent, but agricultural production expanded 150 percent, thanks to a significant increase in yields of major crops, the report says. One of the
warning signs pointed out in the study is that rates of growth in agricultural production have been slowing in many areas and are currently only half of
what they were at the height of the Green Revolution the period between the 1940s and the late 1970s when the worlds agricultural productivity
rose dramatically. Overall, the
report paints a picture of a world experiencing an increasing

imbalance between availability and demand for land and water resources at the local and
national levels. The report for the first time provides a global assessment of the state of the planets land resources. A quarter of the land is
highly degraded, while another eight per cent has moderate degradation, 36 per cent is classed as stable or slightly degraded and 10 per cent ranked
as improving. The rest of Earths land surface is either bare (around 18 per cent) or covered by inland water bodies (around two per cent). Large
parts of all the continents are experiencing land degradation, with particularly high incidence noted along the west coast of the Americas, across the
Mediterranean region of Southern Europe and North Africa, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and throughout Asia. The greatest threat is the loss of
soil quality, followed by biodiversity loss and water resources depletion, the report notes.
Meltdown Impact D
Meltdowns dont cause lasting damage
Bosselman 07- Professor of Law Emeritus, Chicago-Kent College of Law
(Fred, The New Power Generation: Environmental Law and Electricity Innovation: Colloquium
Article: The Ecological Advantages of Nuclear Power, 15 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 1, 2007) JB
In 1986, an explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Ukraine caused the release of large amounts of
radiation into the atmosphere. 247 Initially, the Soviet government released little information about the explosion and tried to play
down its seriousness, but this secrecy caused great nervousness throughout Europe, and fed the public's fears of nuclear power all over the [*46]
world. 248 Now a comprehensive analysis of the event and its aftermath has been made: In 2005, a
consortium of United Nations agencies called the Chernobyl Forum released its analysis of the long-term effects of the Chernobyl explosion. 249 The
U.N. agencies' study found that the
explosion caused fewer deaths than had been expected. 250 Although the
fewer
than seventy deaths so far have been attributed to the explosion, mostly plant employees and firefighters
who suffered acute radiation sickness. 253 The Chernobyl reactor, like many Soviet reactors, was in the open rather
than in an American type of pressurizable containment structure, which would have
prevented the release of radiation to the environment if a similar accident had occurred. 254 [*47] Perhaps the
most surprising finding of the U.N. agencies' study was that "the ecosystems around the
Chernobyl site are now flourishing. The [Chernobyl exclusion zone] has become a wildlife
sanctuary, and it looks like the nature park it has become." 255 Jeffrey McNeely, the chief scientist of the World Conservation Union, has made
Chernobyl reactor was poorly designed and badly operated 251 and lacked the basic safety protections found outside the Soviet Union, 252
similar observations: Chernobyl has now become the world's first radioactive nature reserve... . 200 wolves are now living in the nature reserve, which
has also begun to support populations of reindeer, lynx and European bison, species that previously were not found in the region. While the impact on
humans was strongly negative, the
wildlife is adapting and even thriving on the site of one of the 20th
century's worst environmental disasters. 256 Mary Mycio, the Kiev correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, has written a
fascinating book based on her many visits to the exclusion zone and interviews with people in the area. 257 She notes that the fear that
radiation would produce permanent deformities in animal species has not been borne
out after twenty years; the population and diversity of animals in even some of the most heavily radiated
parts of the exclusion zone is similar to comparable places that are less radioactive . 258
Radiation impacts are exaggerated Chernobyl disproves

Cravens, 07 A published novelist
(Gwyneth, The Power to Save the World, pg. 99-100) JB
UNSCEAR also found that "the accident had a large negative psychological impact on
thousands of people." Fear, born of ignorance of real risk coupled with anxiety about
imagined harm, fostered epidemics of psychosomatic illnesses and elective abortionsperhaps as many as 200,000-because of dread of genetic mutants. Long-standing anxiety about government directives
was exacerbated by the actions of Soviet officials during the first two years after the
incident. Better management of the emergency, including adequate dissemination of
facts, probably could have prevented much of this psychic damage, which also plagues war veterans
and people displaced by natural disasters like major hurricanes and floods. " Most of the world community agreed that
the conclusions were what had been expected," Mettler said. "The Russians were in agreement. But at first, Ukraine
and Belarus went nuts and claimed that all sorts of other things were happening. When we presented the findings in
Vienna in 1992, the Ukrainians said that rates of TB, measles, and other diseases had
gone up. I asked then and there for their data, and added, 'And, oh, by the way, include
your data from the years preceding Chernobyl.' I got some data and had it translated and showed it to the audience.
Certain diseases were down, others were up. So that data didn't support the Ukrainians' blanket
statements. There was a great deal of discussion of thyroid cancer and leukemia. The claim that cancer rates in
general went up didn't cut it for us, for a number of reasons. As I said, those separate
groups, one in Hiroshima and one London, independently analyzed the data and made
the conclusions. The conclusions have been borne out and continue to be borne out.
Theres been no change.
Nuclear Impact D
The NRC is keeping up to date with appropriate safety measures- no risk of
failure
Kilisek and Anderson 15- Kilisek is a Global Energy & Natural Resources Analyst and
Anderson is a writer
(Roman, Jared, US Nuclear Power Safety: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?,
http://breakingenergy.com/2015/04/27/us-nuclear-power-safety-is-the-glass-half-empty-or-halffull/) JB
For its part,
the NRC says they have taken appropriate measures without consideration of
costs to ensure US nuclear power plants operate safely while incorporating safety
enhancement recommendations based on lessons learned from Fukushima. The NRC
concluded, based on the July 2011 report from a task force of senior managers, that U.S. nuclear power plants can
continue to operate safely while the agency appropriately implements recommended
enhancements. The NRCs process set aside cost considerations in announcing firm new requirements for those
enhancements within a year of the Fukushima accident, NRC Public Affairs Officer Scott Burnell told Breaking Energy in an email. The
NRC process has
appropriately incorporated new information since then [2011 Fukushima accident]. U.S. plants have already
made great strides in enhancing their ability to maintain safety functions in the unlikely event they lose all
a/c power, Burnell added.
US nuclear reactors are very safe

NEI 15
(Nuclear Energy Institute, Safety: The Nuclear Energy Industry's Highest Priority,
http://www.nei.org/Master-Document-Folder/Backgrounders/Fact-Sheets/Safety-The-NuclearEnergy-Industry-s-Highest-Prior) JB
Americas 99 nuclear energy facilities are among the safest and most
secure industrial facilities. Multiple automatic safety systems, the industrys commitment to
comprehensive safety procedures and stringent federal regulation keep nuclear energy
facilities and neighboring communities safe. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an independent federal agency,
strictly regulates commercial nuclear energy facilities. The agency evaluates performance in three strategic areas: reactor
safety, radiation safety and security. NRC inspectors stationed at each facility provide oversight of operation, maintenance, equipment replacement and training. If the NRC
industry and the NRC routinely analyze operational events

worldwide to identify possible lessons for U.S. facilities. After the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear energy
facility in Japan, the NRC issued new requirements and requested detailed information in several
areas relevant to the accident in Japan. The industry is taking steps to implement the new requirements and to develop the information
requested by the agency. The industry also has developed a diverse, flexible mitigation approach to
address the major problem encountered at Fukushima: the loss of power to maintain effective cooling.
believes a facility is unsafe, it will order it shut down. The
Building on existing safety systems, the FLEX program involves stationing another layer of backup equipment at facility sites and regional depots. About 1,500 pieces of
equipment have been purchased or ordered. All commercial nuclear energy facilities have emergency response procedures in the event of an accident or security event. These
procedures are evaluated regularly during drills involving facility personnel and local
policy, fire and emergency management organizations. NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency expert teams
The nuclear energy industry is relentless in its pursuit of safety through quality
This approach doesnt just meet the
standards created by the federal governmentit exceeds them.
evaluate some of these drills.
facility construction, continuous preventive maintenance and ongoing reactor operator training.
Environment Impact D
Environment resilient
Kareiva et al 12 Chief Scientist and Vice President, The Nature Conservancy (Peter,
Michelle Marvier --professor and department chair of Environment Studies and Sciences at
Santa Clara University, Robert Lalasz -- director of science communications for The Nature
Conservancy, Winter, Conservation in the Anthropocene,
http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-theanthropocene/)
2. As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's
justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on
biodiversity. Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too
much human use and abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert
landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture, and urban development and when
key species or ecosystems are lost. But ecologists and conservationists have grossly
overstated the fragility of nature, frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever. Some
ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be in danger of
collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth will start to come
apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing
waterways, has been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our planetary
ecosystem. The fragility trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in
Silent Spring of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the intricate balance
of nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth
in the Balance.23 And the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of agriculture and other
forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's poor, ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting
systems in jeopardy of collapse.24 The trouble for conservation is that the data simply do not support the idea
of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance of one species
does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the
same ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be
inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chestnut, once a dominant tree
in eastern North America, has been extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest
ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks
darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless other species from the Steller's sea cow
to the dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects. These stories of
resilience are not isolated examples -- a thorough review of the scientific
literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following major disturbances such
as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and other types of pollution. The abundance of plant
and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function recovered, at least
partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies.25 While global forest cover is continuing to
decline, it is rising in the Northern Hemisphere, where "nature" is returning to former
agricultural lands.26 Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor countries achieve a similar
level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded that rainforests that have grown back over
abandoned agricultural land had 40 to 70 percent of the species of the original forests.27
Even Indonesian orangutans, which were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine forests, have been found in surprising
is so resilient that it can recover rapidly

from even the most powerful human disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear
facility, which melted down in 1986, wildlife is thriving, despite the high levels of radiation.29 In the
Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test that boiled the
numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded lands.28 Nature
water in the area, the
number of coral species has actually increased relative to before the

explosions.30 More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was degraded and
consumed by bacteria at a remarkably fast rate.31 Today, coyotes roam downtown Chicago,
and peregrine falcons astonish San Franciscans as they sweep down skyscraper canyons to
pick off pigeons for their next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create new ones: in the
southwestern United States a rare and federally listed salamander species seems
specialized to live in cattle tanks -- to date, it has been found in no other habitat.32 Books have been
written about the collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl data show the
biomass of cod has recovered to precollapse levels.33 It's doubtful that books will be
written about this cod recovery since it does not play well to an audience somehow
addicted to stories of collapse and environmental apocalypse. Even that classic symbol
of fragility -- the polar bear, seemingly stranded on a melting ice block -- may have a good chance of
surviving global warming if the changing environment continues to increase the
populations and northern ranges of harbor seals and harp seals. Polar bears evolved
from brown bears 200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth's history, developing a
highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing trends -- the decline of
sea ice and the potential increase of energy-rich prey. The
history of life on Earth is of species evolving to

take advantage of new environments only to be at risk when the environment changes
again. The wilderness ideal presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by
humankind, but today it is impossible to find a place on Earth that is unmarked by human
activity. The truth is humans have been impacting their natural environment for
centuries. The wilderness so beloved by conservationists -- places "untrammeled by man"34 -- never existed, at least not in the
last thousand years, and arguably even longer.
Warming Impact D
Tipping points theory is wrong---zero data can reliably identify specific
tipping points
Andrew C. Revkin 9, senior fellow at Pace University's Pace Academy for Applied
Environmental Studies, has taught at Columbia's Graduate School of Journalism and the Bard
College Center for Environmental Policy, March 29, 2009, Among Climate Scientists, a Dispute
Over Tipping Points, The New York Times, online:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/weekinreview/29revkin.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print
But the idea that the planet is nearing tipping points thresholds at which change suddenly becomes
unstoppable has driven a wedge between scientists who otherwise share deep concerns
about the implications of a human-warmed climate. Environmentalists and some climate experts are
increasingly warning of impending tipping points in their efforts to stir public concern. The term confers a
sense of immediacy and menace to potential threats from a warming climate dangers that otherwise might seem too distant for
scientists say there is little hard evidence to back up

specific predictions of catastrophe. They worry that the use of the term tipping point can be
misleading and could backfire, fueling criticism of alarmism and threatening public
support for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. I think a lot of this threshold and tipping point talk
is dangerous, said Kenneth Caldeira, an earth scientist at Stanford University and the Carnegie Institution and an advocate
people to worry about. But other
of swift action to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. If we say we passed thresholds and tipping points today, this will be an excuse
for inaction tomorrow, he said. While studies of climate patterns in the distant past clearly show the
potential for drastic shifts, these scientists say, there is enormous uncertainty in making
specific predictions about the future. In some cases, there are big questions about whether
climate-driven disasters like the loss of the Amazon or a rise in sea levels of several yards in a century are
even plausible. And even in cases where most scientists agree that rising temperatures
could lead to unstoppable change, no one knows where the thresholds lie that would set
off such shifts.
Mitigation and adapaptation solves.

Mendelsohn 09 (Robert O., the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental
Studies, Yale University, June 2009, Climate Change and Economic Growth, online:
http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf)
The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give
the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b;
Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes
(IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will
grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 2030 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be
catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate
hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are
cut dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely
alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, societys
immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic
consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over
the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by
alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the
predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change
over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century
or even a millennium to unfold and many of these potential impacts will never occur
because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies
need to be developed to thwart longrange climate risks. What is needed are longrun balanced responses.
Groupthink Advantage
Groupthink Wrong
And, groupthink doesnt explain their scenario intelligence is developed
by individuals
Jervis 4
(Robert, Poli Sci Prof @ Colombia Univ, Consultant to the CIA, L.A. Times,
7/16, pg lexis//um-ef)
Senate Intelligence Committee concluded last
week that CIA analysts had succumbed to what it called a "groupthink" dynamic. According to
the committee's report, the analysts suffered from a "collective presumption" that Iraq had acquired weapons
of mass destruction and they blithely ignored any evidence to the contrary. But was
LOS ANGELES - In an unusual foray into psychological diagnostics, the
that indeed what happened? "Groupthink" -- identified in the early 1970s by the late Yale psychologist Irving Janis -- refers
to a process by which conformity grows out of deliberations in small groups. It can be quite powerful. The way Janis explained it, groupthink operates
when individuals work closely together over a sustained period. It isn't merely that members of the group come to think alike but that they come to
overvalue the harmonious functioning of the group. In their eagerness to reach consensus, they become inhibited from questioning established
assumptions or from raising questions that might disturb their colleagues and friends. In this way, a group of intelligent individuals can confidently arrive
at conclusions that are wildly removed from reality. Most
social scientists agree that groupthink has

contributed to many disastrous decisions in business, families and foreign policy. President
John F. Kennedy and his top advisers, for instance, fell into a groupthink trap, believing that the landings of the Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs in April
1961 might overthrow Fidel Castro. Intense face-to-face meetings among the president's top foreign policy planners formed strong bonds that no one
wanted to loosen. Richard Nixon's Watergate cover-up was in part maintained by the same dynamic. To many outsiders even at the time, it was
obvious that the only way for Nixon to survive was to air the full truth early on. But the Nixon White House was a small group, closed-mouthed and
But although groupthink has played a part in past foreign policy

decisions, it does not appear to explain the CIA's current intelligence failures. First of all,
intelligence gathering is work done by individuals. Analysts read reports from
the field and ask themselves how those reports fit with other reports and prevailing
views, and then these individuals write their own summaries and
conclusions for fellow analysts and superiors. Group discussions are generally
built around what the individuals have come to believe. Furthermore, from what I have seen of them,
intelligence analysts tend to be highly individualistic, if not intellectually combative . They
predisposed to keeping everything secret.
have selected the career of an analyst rather than a more public and people-oriented career in part because they like to work on their own. There are,
of course, some larger group meetings where members of the broader intelligence community convene. And as in any such group situations, there will
meetings are not

likely to be susceptible to groupthink. Many of them are large, which precludes the
formation of close ties among participants. Indeed, many of the meetings are ad hoc, with different people participating at
be times when individuals shape the views they bring in anticipation of what they think will appeal to the others. But these
, many
intelligence officials these days -- unlike top political leaders -- are on
guard against groupthink. They have read about decision-making pathologies and are wary of overvaluing the good feeling of
different times. Although the members probably know one another, the stability required for groupthink is rarely present. Finally
the group. None of this is to say that the CIA's processes were as good as they should have been or that the desire not to rock the boat was absent.
On the contrary, it appears that another dynamic was at work in this case . Intelligence officials, like the rest of
us, hesitate to tell their bosses what they do not want to hear -- and may even, on occasion, convince themselves that alternative views are
groundless. The Bush administration made it clear early on that it was seeking to prove the existence of WMD in Iraq -- not disprove it. The intelligence
community was under pressure to deliver that evidence. There are lots of ways psychology can help explain what went wrong and how intelligence
could be done better, but groupthink was not the main problem in this case.
Groupthink theory is wrong
Anthony Hempell 4, User Experience Consulting Senior Information Architect, Groupthink:

An introduction to Janis' theory of concurrence-seeking tendencies in group work.,
http://www.anthonyhempell.com/papers/groupthink/, March 3
In the thirty years since Janis first proposed the groupthink model, there is still little
agreement as to the validity of the model in assessing decision-making
behaviour (Park, 2000). Janis' theory is often criticized because it does not present a
framework that is suitable for empirical testing; instead, the evidence for groupthink
comes from largely qualitative, historical or archival methods (Sunstein, 2003). Some critics go
so far as to say that Janis's work relies on "anecdote, casual observation, and
intuitive appeal rather than rigorous research" (Esser, 1998, cited in Sunstein, 2003, p.142). While
some studies have shown support for the groupthink model, the support tends to be mixed or conditional (Esser, 1998); some studies have
revealed that a closed leadership style and external threats (in particular, time pressure) promote groupthink and defective decision making (Neck
& Moorhead, 1995, cited by Choi & Kim, 1999); the effect of group cohesiveness is still inconclusive (Mullen, Anthony, Salas & Driskel, 1994, cited
by Choi & Kim, 1999). Janis's model tends to be supported by studies that employ a qualitative case-study approach as opposed to experimental
research, which tends to either partially support or not support Janis's thesis (Park, 2000). The lack of success in experimental validation of
groupthink may be due to difficulties in operationalizing and conceptualizing it as a testable variable (Hogg & Hains, 1998; Park, 2000). Some
researchers have criticized Janis for categorically denouncing groupthink as a negative phenomenon (Longley & Pruitt, 1980, cited in Choi & Kim,
1999). Sniezek (1992) argues that there are instances where concurrence-seeking may promote group performance. When used to explain
behaviour in a practical setting, groupthink has been frames as a detrimental group process; the result of this has been that many corporate
training programs have created strategies for avoiding groupthink in the workplace (Quinn, Faerman, Thompson & McGrath, 1990, cited in Choi &
Kim, 1999). Another
criticism of groupthink is that Janis overestimates the link between

the decision-making process and the outcome (McCauley, 1989; Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang & Feld, 1992;
cited in Choi & Kim, 1999). Tetlock et al argue that there are many other factors between the
decision process and the outcome. The outcome of any decision-making process,
they argue, will only have a certain probability of success due to various
environmental factors (such as luck). A large-scale study researching decision-making in seven major American
corporations concluded that decision-making worked best when following a sound information processing method; however these groups also
showed signs of groupthink, in that they had strong leadership which attempted to persuade others in the group that they were right (Peterson et
al, 1998, cited in Sunstein, 2003). Esser (1998) found that groupthink characteristics were correlated with failures; however cohesiveness did not
appear to be a factor: groups consisting of strangers, friends, or various levels of previous experience together did not appear to effect decisionmaking ability.
Janis' claims of insulation of groups and groups led by autocratic leaders did
show that these attributes were indicative of groupthink symptoms . Moorhead &
Montanari conducted a study where they concluded that groupthink symptoms
had no significant effect on group performance, and that "the relationship
between groupthink-induced decision defects and outcomes were not as strong as
Janis suggests" (Moorhead & Montanari, 1986, p. 399; cited by Choi & Kim, 1999).
Congress Cant Solve

Congress can't solve groupthink
Posner and Vermeule, 7 *Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago
Law School AND **professor at Harvard Law School (Eric and Adrian, Terror in the Balance:
Security, Liberty, and the Courts p. 46-47)
The idea that Congress will, on net, weed out bad policies rests on an institutional
comparison. The president is elected by a national constituency on a winner-take-all basis (barring the remote chance that the Electoral
College will matter), whereas Congress is a summation of local constituencies and thus affords more voice to political and racial minorities. At the level
of political psychology, decisionmaking
within the executive is prone to group polarization and other forms of

groupthink or irrational panic,51 whereas the internal diversity of legislative deliberation
checks these forces. At the level of political structure, Congress contains internal veto gates and chokepointsconsider the committee
system and the fi libuster rulethat provide minorities an opportunity to block harmful policies, whereas executive decisionmaking is relatively
centralized and unitary. The
contrast is drawn too sharply, because in practice the executive is a
they, not an it. Presidential oversight is incapable of fully unifying executive branch policies, which means that disagreement
flourishes within the executive as well, dampening panic and groupthink
and providing minorities with political redoubts.52 Where a national majority is internally divided, the
structure of presidential politics creates chokepoints that can give racial or ideological
minorities disproportionate influence, just as the legislative process does. Consider the influence of
Arab Americans in Michigan, often a swing state in presidential elections. It is not obvious , then, that statutory
authorization makes any difference at all. One possibility is that a large national majority dominates both Congress
and the presidency and enacts panicky policies, oppresses minorities, or increases security in ways that have ratchet effects that are costly to reverse.
If this is the case, a requirement of statutory authorization does not help. Another possibility is that there are internal institutional checks, within both the
executive branch and Congress, on the adoption of panicky or oppressive policies and that democratic minorities have real infl uence in both arenas. If
this is the case, then a requirement of authorization is not necessary and does no good. Authorization only makes a difference in the unlikely case
where the executive is thoroughly panicky, or oppressively majoritarian, while Congress resists the stampede toward bad policies and safeguards the
interests of oppressed minorities. Even if that condition obtains, however, the argument for authorization goes wrong by failing to consider both sides of
the normative ledger. As for majoritarian oppression, the multiplicity of veto gates within Congress may allow minorities to block harmful discrimination,
if Congress
is more deliberative, one result will be to prevent groupthink and slow down stampedes
toward bad policies, but another result will be to delay necessary emergency measures
and slow down stampedes toward good policies. Proponents of the authorization requirement sometimes
assume that quick action, even panicky action, always produces bad policies. But there is no
necessary connection between these two things; expedited action is sometimes good,
and panicky crowds can stampede either in the wrong direction or in the right direction.
Slowing down the adoption of new policies through congressional oversight retards the
adoption not only of bad policies, but also of good policies that need to be adopted
quickly if they are to be effective.
but it also allows minorities to block policies and laws which, although targeted, are nonetheless good. As for panic and irrationality,
Groupthink Impact D
No realistic scenario
Pillar, 13 -- Brookings Foreign Policy Senior Fellow
(Paul, "The Danger of Groupthink," The National Interest, 2-26-13,
webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:6rnyjYlVKY0J:www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/02/26danger-groupthink-pillar+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)
David Ignatius has an interesting take on national security decision-making in the Obama administration in the wake of the reshuffle of senior positions taking place during these
early weeks of the president's second term. Ignatius perceives certain patterns that he believes reinforce each other in what could be a worrying way. One is that the new team
does not have as much independent power as such first-term figures as Clinton, Gates, Panetta and Petraeus. Another is that the administration has centralized national
Ignatius fears
security policy to an unusual extent in the White House. With a corps of Obama loyalists, the substantive thinking may,
, run too uniformly in the
same direction. He concludes his column by stating that by assembling a team where all the top players are going in the same direction, he [Obama] is perilously close to
groupthink. We are dealing here with tendencies to which the executive branch of the U.S. government is more vulnerable than many other advanced democracies,
where leading political figures with a standing independent of the head of government are more likely to wind up in a cabinet. This is especially true of, but not limited to,
coalition governments. Single-party governments in Britain have varied in the degree to which the prime minister exercises control, but generally room is made in the cabinet for
those the British call big beasts: leading figures in different wings or tendencies in the governing party who are not beholden to the prime minister for the power and standing
Ignatius overstates his case in a couple of respects. Although he acknowledges that Obama is better than most in handling
there have been egregious examples in the past of administrations
enforcing a national security orthodoxy, and that the Obama administration does not even come close to these examples.
they have attained.
open debate, he could have gone farther and noted that
There was Lyndon Johnson in the time of the Vietnam War, when policy was made around the president's Tuesday lunch table and even someone with the stature of the
indefatigable Robert McNamara was ejected when he strayed from orthodoxy. Then there was, as the most extreme case, the George W. Bush administration, in which there
was no policy process and no internal debate at all in deciding to launch a war in Iraq and in which those who strayed from orthodoxy, ranging from Lawrence Lindsey to Eric
Obama's prolongedto the point of inviting charges of ditheringinternal debates on the

Afghanistan War were the polar opposite of this. Ignatius also probably underestimates the
contributions that will be made to internal debate by the two most important cabinet members in national
Shinseki, were treated mercilessly.
security: the secretaries of state and defense. He says John Kerry has the heft of a former presidential candidate, but he has been a loyal and discreet emissary for Obama and
heft matters, and Kerry certainly qualifies as big
is likely to remain so. The

a
beast. Moreover, the discreet way in which a
member of Congress would carry any of the administration's water, as Kerry sometimes did when still a senator, is not necessarily a good indication of the role he will assume in
internal debates as secretary of state. As for Chuck Hagel, Ignatius states he has been damaged by the confirmation process and will need White House cover. But now that
Hagel's very
inclination to flout orthodoxy, to arrive at independent opinions and to voice those
opinions freely that led to the fevered opposition to his nomination.
Hagel's nomination finally has been confirmed, what other cover will he need? It's not as if he ever will face another confirmation vote in the Senate. It was
No Groupthink
No group think data
Fuller et al 98
(Sally Rigs, School of Business Administration, University of Wisconsin and Ramon J. Aldag
School of Business, University of WisconsinMadison, Organizational Tonypandy: Lessons
from a Quarter Century of the Groupthink Phenomenon Organizational Behavior And Human
Decision Processes, Vol. 73, Nos. 2/3, February/March, pp. 163184, 1998,
http://liquidbriefing.com/twiki/pub/Dev/RefFuller1998/Organizational_tonypandy.pdf)
There could, of course, be a very simple explanation for this widespread acceptance: research
relating to the phenomenon might be uniformly supportive. In fact, though, our review of the
groupthink literature (Aldag and Fuller, 1993) indicates that this is not the case. For example,
following that review, we noted that, . . . most support for groupthink has come from
retrospective case studies that have focused on decision fiascoes rather than comparing
the decision-making processes associated with good versus bad decisions.
Experimental studies of groupthink have considered only a small portion of the model,
often without a cohesive group and in situations inconsistent with Janiss (1971, 1972,
1982, 1989) antecedents. Furthermore, they have relied exclusively on student samples
dealing with hypothetical or simulated decisions, with resultant problems for external
validity. Military strategists, managers, politicians, or other real-world decision makers
have never been used. In the laboratory, many real-world group characteristics, including
ongoing power relationships ORGANIZATIONAL TONYPANDY 167 and political maneuverings,
have been necessarily ignored. Although student samples in laboratory settings may be
valuable to address many issues relating to group problem solving, their use to examine
groupthink is problematic. In addition, we have argued that it is inappropriate to attempt to
generalize from the hot decision situations characterizing the fiascoes (primarily major
military policy decisions or groups facing natural disasters) on which early case evidence
for groupthink was based. We have also contended that there is little support for the full
groupthink model; in fact, in no study have all results been consistent with the model. In
addition, Janis made no changes in, or additions to, the groupthink model despite
evidence of the relevance of many additional variables, including group norms, the
nature of the task, the degree of leader power, and stage of group development. Indeed,
our review of the research suggests that the groupthink phenomenon per se lacks empirical
support and rests on generally unsupported assumptions. Failures to support groupthink
predictions have regularly been viewed as evidence of partial support or as signals that the
research methodology was flawed. In our view, groupthink researchers and theorists have
unwittingly acted, in Janiss terms, as virtual mindguards of the groupthink phenomenon.
Groupthink theory is weak

Scheeringa 10
(Daniel, Was the Decision to Invade Iraq and the Failure of Occupation Planning a Case of
Groupthink? Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts In Political
Science. pg. lexis)
In Groupthink and Government, Paul tHart undertakes a thorough examination of the

theory. He examines the theory from social-psychological and political perspectives. He also
applies groupthink theory to the Iran-contra scandal of the late 1980s. In Groupthink, Bay of
Pigs and Watergate Reconsidered Bertram Raven used groupthink theory to examine the
decisions leading to the Watergate scandal. He concluded that while groupthink was a
factor, other factors, such as Nixons influence and political considerations, also weighed on
the group dynamic. Raven uses the Watergate example as evidence that groupthink
does not necessarily lead to failure, which is the converse of the argument that
failure is not necessarily caused by groupthink24. In Revisiting the Bay of Pigs
and Vietnam Decisions 25 Years Later: How Well Has Groupthink Theory Stood the Test of
Time? Kramer contends that new historical information regarding Presidents Kennedys
and Johnsons decision-making processes shows 16
Informal checks on groupthink are sufficient

Kennedy 12
(Brandon Kennedy, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; M.A. Regional Studies: Middle
East 2009, Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences; B.A. Government 2009, Harvard University Gould
School of Law Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal Spring, 2012 Southern California
Interdisciplinary Law Journal 21 S. Cal. Interdis. L.J. The Hijacking Of Foreign Policy Decision Making:
Groupthink And Presidential Power In The Post-9/11 World pg lexis)
Neither the president nor the decision-making group members implement "hybrid"
checks; the checks do, however, originate in the executive branch and directly affect the
president and the group members. Hybrid checks relate to the bureaucratic machine and
typically address the structural faults within the executive branch that can affect the core
decision-making group. Although the president and his or her advisers constitute the insiders
of the decision-making group, they ultimately belong [*676] to a larger organization - the
executive branch - and thereby become part of the bureaucratic machine. 1. Inter-Agency
Process The "inter-agency process" check involves getting approval for, or opinions about,
a proposed decision from other agencies. n252 The inter-agency process is particularly
common for national security and foreign policy decisions. n253 "Occasionally, it will
operate at a higher level in principals' committees involving Cabinet-level or sub-Cabinet people
and their deputies," thus directly checking the decision-making group members. n254 2. IntraAgency Process Another similar check is the "intra-agency process," in which the
circulation of proposed decisions within the agency empowers dissidents and harnesses
a diversity of thinking. n255 If nothing else, the process catches errors, or at least
increases the odds of avoiding them, given the number of people who must review or
approve a document or decision within the agency. n256 3. Agency or Lawyer Culture The
culture of a particular agency - the institutional self-awareness of its professionalism provides another check. n257 "Lawyer culture" - which places high value on competency
and adherence to rules and laws - resides at the core of agency culture; n258 its "naysaying" objectivity "is especially important in the small inner circle of presidential decision
making to counter the tendency towards groupthink and a vulnerability to sycophancy." n259
[*677] 4. Public Humiliation A final check in this category is the "public humiliation" check.
n260 This check only comes into play when the previous three have failed, and involves
the threat to ""go public' by leaking embarrassing information or publicly resigning."
Russia Impact D
Conflicts will never go nuclear prefer Russian generals
Ivashov 7
(Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, 2007.
Defense and Security, Will America Fight Russia? p. Lexis)
Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total
confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are
allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia
will refuse and its objects

(radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided
missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum
will be presented - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia.
Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy
assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two
turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device
that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave,
parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over
Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United
States that continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in
nuclear arsenals. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion.
We would crush them
Sharavin 7
(Alexander Sharavin, Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, 2007. Defense
and Security, Will America Fight Russia? p. Lexis)
The United States may count on a mass air raid and missile strike at objects of the Russian
strategic nuclear forces and, perhaps, some objects of other branches of the Russian military. Plus, of course, at the
military and political planning centers. Whatever targets may escape destruction on the first try
will be bombed out of existence by repeated strikes. And Russia will have nothing to
answer with. Even if some elements of the strategic nuclear forces survive, they will fall
prey to the American national missile defense. The American strategic missile forces in their turn will
escape the war unscathed.
No Russia war---no motive or capability

Betts 13 Richard is the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies @ Columbia.
The Lost Logic of Deterrence, Foreign Affairs, March/April, Vol. 92, Issue 2, Online
These continuities with the Cold War would make sense only between intense adversaries. Washington and Moscow remain in an adversarial
relationship, but not an intense one. If the Cold War is really over, and the West really won, then continuing implicit deterrence does less to protect
it is now
hard to make the case that Russia is more a threat to NATO than the reverse. First, the EastWest balance of military capabilities, which at the height of the Cold War was favorable to the Warsaw Pact or at best even,
has not only shifted to NATO's advantage; it has become utterly lopsided. Russia is
against a negligible threat from Russia than to feed suspicions that aggravate political friction. In contrast to during the Cold War,
now a lonely fraction of what the old Warsaw Pact was. It not only lost its old eastern European allies; those allies
are now arrayed on the other side, as members of NATO. By every significant measure of power -- military
spending, men under arms, population, economic strength, control of territory -- NATO
enjoys massive advantages over Russia. The only capability that keeps Russia militarily potent is its nuclear arsenal.
There is no plausible way, however, that Moscow's nuclear weapons could be used for
aggression, except as a backstop for a conventional offensive -- for which NATO's
capabilities are now far greater. Russia's intentions constitute no more of a threat than
its capabilities. Although Moscow's ruling elites push distasteful policies, there is no
plausible way they could think a military attack on the West would serve their
interests. During the twentieth century, there were intense territorial conflicts between the two sides and a titanic struggle between them over
whose ideology would dominate the world. Vladimir Putin's Russia is authoritarian, but unlike the Soviet Union, it is not the
vanguard of a globe-spanning revolutionary ideal.

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***Insider Threats Neg Wave 1

Reform the FDA CPs

Funding and FDA Reform CP

includes increasing the FDA budget considerably and shielding it

You can't run

certain resources or not, she said. Increased

responsibilities, such as regulating medical mobile apps, also have made

you think user fees give companies too much influence

Ptix Net Benefit

One area where we could see bipartisan

Other Reform CPs

Only CP can solve FDA circumvention- plan doesnt go far enough

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

considered that, yes. But you

. Our CI specialists must address a range of persistent vulnerabilities to help

this work focuses on reform efforts at the

individual agencies look too deeply at specific tactics.

Richard Betts refers to,

The first improvement that is

as outlined in the NCIXs Official Terms & Definitions of Interest List122.

The second improvement needed is that the CI Community should

The minimum standards read more like a list of

, as addressed in Chapter 2, should be a part of the

proper use of these programs is crucial for serving this preventative

. The spy found that help in the solace of a foreign

. Additionally, teaching this

Models to Follow: The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Programs The alignment of

government and whistleblower interests can provide significant

programs. n259 In all likelihood, the government's willingness to create more

Dodd-Frank programs however,

environmental violations to the forefront. n274 Making such awards mandatory

would [*225] incentivize these parties to come forward and encourage

2NC Solvency (Short)

several substantial government settlements in whistleblower cases

To ensure that whistleblowers [*197] continue to be

Whistleblower programs provide assistance to the U.S. government

adequately reflect the cost-benefit analysis that each whistleblower must

Without significant changes to these statutory

. n246 2. Streamlining Whistleblower Protection

General Incentives Solvency

impact of such legislation on the willingness of employees to report fraud

Among the reports

AT: Disads to the CP (short)

D. Perceived Challenges That Must Be Overcome

AT: Lawsuit overload

there may be an influx of whistleblower claims to begin with, the EPA

AT: Agency Capture

AT: Money for Envt Key

whistleblowers-security-sector, Accessed: July 7, 2015, YDEL)

Congress has the power to provide oversight for whistleblowers

whistleblowers-security-sector, Accessed: July 7, 2015, YDEL)

We believe US authorities should exercise discretion when considering prosecuting such

Recommended data points to observe include: Communications between devices: the

Insider threat D.A.

At its broadest use, the service can

B. Insider threat ensures a cyber attack on the nations grid

should be made more of a priority that businesses and utilities

Insider threats oftentimes pose a greater risk than outsider

Sometimes, an attacker will recruit

must remain priority

(Eugue Retired Air Force General, Cyberwarfare and Cyberterrorism, The

effect of this would be to undermine our

Uniq: Insider Threats High

the rise (Barrios 2013, 54).