The Heirs of the late Ruben Reinoso, Sr. vs.

Court of Appeal, Ponciano

Tapales et al.
Gr no. 116121 July 18, 2011
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a
passenger jeepney and a truck at around 7:00 oclock in the evening of
June 14, 1979 along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. As a result, a
passenger of the jeepney, Ruben Reinoso, Sr. (Reinoso), was killed. The
passenger jeepney was owned by Ponciano Tapales (Tapales) and
driven by Alejandro Santos (Santos), while the truck was owned by Jose
Guballa (Guballa) and driven by Mariano Geronimo (Geronimo).
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and
against Guballa ordering him to pay the Heirs of Reinoso the amount
og 250,000.00, in favor of defendant Jose Guballa under Policy No OV09527 the amount of 60,000.00 with the legal interest of 6% per
annum from date of complaint until fully paid.
The CA set aside the decision of the RTC and reverse the decision
of RTC and dismissed the complain on the ground of non-payment of
docket fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondent is negligent.
Held:
Reinoso, the jeepney passenger, died as a result of the collision
of a jeepney and a truck on June 14, 1979 at around 7:00 oclock in the
evening along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. It was established
that the primary cause of the injury or damage was the negligence of
the truck driver who was driving it at a very fast pace. The Court
likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the truck owner, Guballa,
failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the hiring and
supervision of his employee. Whenever an employees negligence
causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of his
employee.
Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualification, experience and

service record.
With respect to the supervision of employees,
employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor
their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches
thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
Philippine American General Insurance Company vs. PKS Shipping
Company
GR. No. 149038 April 9, 2003
Vitug, J
Facts:
Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the
services of respondent PKS Shipping Company (PKS Shipping) for the
shipment to Tacloban City of seventy-five thousand (75,000) bags of
cement worth Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P3,375,000.00). DUMC insured the goods for its full value with
petitioner
Philippine
American
General
Insurance
Company
(Philamgen). During the transport, the barge where the bags of cement
were loaded, sank. Upon demand of payment by DUMC, Philamgen
immediately paid them. Hence, it sought reimbursement from PKS
Shipping but the latter refused.
Issue:
1. Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private
carrier; and
2. WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the
goods they carry. Or, WON PKS Shipping is liable.
Held:
PKS Shipping is a common carrier. PKS Shipping has engaged
itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a limited
clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of
its activities in this area indicates more than just a casual activity on its
part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier change merely
because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons
of the carrier.
PKS Shipping is not liable. The vessel was suddenly tossed by
waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet and buffeted
by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the
barges hatches. The official Certificate of Inspection of the barge

issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise Load Line

Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under
Art. 1733, NCC, common carriers are exempt from liability for loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to any of the following
causes, among others:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity x x x

City of Manila and Anthony Acevedo vs. Hon. Angel Valera Colet and
Malaysian Airline System
GR No. 120051 December 10, 2014
Leonardo-De Castro J
Facts:
The case involves 10 consolidated petitions involving several
corporations operating as transportation contractors, persons who
transport passenger or freight for hire, and common carriers by land,
air or water with principal offices in Metro Manila, and City of Manilas
Ordinance No. 7807 which amended Sec. 21 (B) of the Manila Revenue
Code. Sec.21 (B) imposed business tax on transportation contractors,
persons who transport passenger or freight for hire, and common
carriers by land, air or water; while the subject ordinance amended
such by lowering the tax rate from 3% per annum to .5% per annum.
The City of Manila, through its City Treasurer, began imposing and
collecting the business tax under Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue
Code, as amended, beginning January 1994.
Because they were assessed and/or compelled to pay business taxes
pursuant to Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code before they
were issued their business permits for 1994, several corporations
questioned the constitutionality of Sec. 21 (B) for being contrary to the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, and asked for the refund
of what they had paid as business tax.
The City of Manila, argued that it was constitutional and valid;
and such position was adopted by the RTC and the CA when the case
reached the respective fora. The City argued that the enactment of
Sec. 21 (B) is based on the exempting clause found at the beginning of
Sec. 133, in conjunction with Section 143(h), of the LGC.

Issue:
Whether or not the transportation contractors and common
carriers are subject to local business tax.
Held:
In the case at bar, the sanggunian of the municipality or city
cannot enact an ordinance imposing business tax on the gross receipts
of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or
water, when said sanggunian was already specifically prohibited from
doing so.
Such construction gives effect to both Sections 133(j) and 143(h)
of the LGC. Also, Sec. 5(b) of the LGC itself, on Rules of Interpretation,
provides that in case of doubt, any tax ordinance shall be construed
strictly against the LGU enacting it, and liberally in favor of the
taxpayer. Furthermore, such a construction is pursuant to the
legislative intent to exclude from the taxing power of the LGU the
imposition of business tax against common carriers to prevent a
duplication of the so-called common carriers tax.
KIMBERLY P. RAFAEL