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G.R. No.

L-64313
January 17, 1985 NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION vs. BENJAMIN
JUCO AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government
owned and controlled corporation.The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows
a deliberate effort at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full
consequences of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered.
This constitutional provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that
personnel of GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements ."Every" means
each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not cover cases involving
private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings.
For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled corps.
whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the
Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special
charter does not mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service.
G.R. No. L-69870
November 29, 1988
NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) AND ARTURO L. PEREZ, vs. THE HONORABLE
THIRD DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, MANILA AND EUGENIA C. CREDO.
The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose
before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other
employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Constibut prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this
court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms andconditions
of employment in GOCC's, among them NASECO.In the matter of coverage by the civil service of
GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC v Juco wasbased. It provides
that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government,including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by
clear implication, the civil service doesnot include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC
under the general corporation law.
G.R. No. 87676
December 20, 1989 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
the NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE
NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENT SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION & THEIR MEMBERS
NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rules and regulations
(Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil service employees (Sec. 14, Executive
Order No. 180).
In case of a labor dispute between the employees and the government, Section 15 of
Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor- Management
Council, not the Department of Labor and Employment, shall hear the dispute. Clearly, the Court of
Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor dispute between the NPDC and the
members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and Employment.
G.R. No. 120319
October 6, 1995 LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, vs. ASSOCIATION OF
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Under
these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law
the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions
are not appealable to the latter.
(B)
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders
or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989 SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA),
DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE
ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98,
QUEZON CITY
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that
the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law"
[Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180
where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the
SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under
R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295,
November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989 ASSOCIATION
OF
SMALL
LANDOWNERS
IN
THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR.,
BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO,
FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO
B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO,

CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S.


FERRER vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional
distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under
police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such
property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent Domain or the
power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the property
expropriated.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO
FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and
PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental vs. JOKER
ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL
the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian
reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they
envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation
would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There
can be doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions
that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be
distributed among the farmers. we may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such
manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance,
or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO vs. HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and
ROBERTO TAAY
The power of President Aquino to promulgate E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, was authorized under
Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The incumbent president shall continue
to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989 NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., vs. HON.
PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the
agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class
G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989 GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR.,
PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives
a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant
what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens
to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself.
They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State
which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of
this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)
In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders'
rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of
Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides:
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including
lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D.
27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,
Section 6. Retention Limits. ...
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead
G.R. No. 36213 June 29, 1989
FELIX GONZALES & CARMEN GONZALES vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, DECEASED SPOUSES ANDRES AGCAOILE & LEONORA AGCAOILE, substituted
by LUCIA A. SISON
There is no merit in the petitioners' argument that inasmuch as residential and commercial lots
may be considered "agricultural" (Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461) an agricultural tenancy
can be established on land in a residential subdivision. The Krivenko decision interpreting the
constitutional prohibition against transferring private agricultural land to individuals, corporations, or
associations not qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain, save in the case of hereditary
succession (Art. XIII Sec. 5, 1935 Constitution; later Art. XIV, Sec. 14, 1973 Constitution; Art. XII, Sec. 7,
1987 Constitution) has nothing to do with agricultural tenancy. An agricultural leasehold cannot be
established on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion
into a residential subdivision.
G.R. No. 86889 : December 4, 1990. LUZ FARMS vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
The transcripts of deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of
the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution

to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian
reform program of the government. The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as
defined under Section 166 of RA 3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop
lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
People v Panis 142 SCRA 664 1986
Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment
and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement."
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to
provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the
individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or
more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the
course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of)
workers."
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against
illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a
foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only
to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen
GR No 113161 August 29, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOMA
GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused. NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accusedappellant.
Appellant is accused of violating Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. Article 38 of the Labor
Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018, provides that any recruitment activity, including
the prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of said Code, undertaken by non-licensees or nonholders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 thereof. The same article
further provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if
any of these qualifying circumstances exist, namely,
(a) when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate,i.e., if it is carried out by a group of
three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another; or
(b) when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three or
more persons individually or as a group.
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided, that any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the other hand, referral is the act of passing along
or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for
employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a
worker abroad." It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had
the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give her the
money she demanded in order to be so employed
Darvin vs. CA and People of the Philippines
There is lack of evidence that accused offered Toledo a job. Procuring of an airfare ticket and a
US visa does not qualify illegal recruitment.
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 EASTERN
SHIPPING
LINES,
INC
vs.
PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an
overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is
defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels
plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. A contract worker is described as "any person
working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen" or
"any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local employer,
foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen."
These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a
contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern
Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country.
G.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001 PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES
CORPORATION vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA,
RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON
We affirm the ruling of the POEA and the Secretary of Labor and Employment that petitioner
should be held administratively liable for two (2) counts of contract substitution and one (1) count of
withholding or unlawful deduction of salary.
Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by the POEA, the penalty for each count of
contract substitution is suspension of license for two (2) months or a fine of P10,000.00 while the
penalty for withholding or unlawful deduction of salaries is suspension of license for two (2) months or
fine equal to the salary withheld but not less than P10,000.00 plus restitution of the amount in both
instances.36 Applying the said schedule on the instant case, the license of petitioner should be
suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it should be ordered to pay fine in the amount of
P30,000.00. Petitioner should likewise pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A.
de Mesa as restitution for the amount withheld from his salary.

G.R. No. 76595 May 6, 1988 PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TEODORO RANCES
The court conclude that the POEA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its
Decision dated 14 April 1986 and its Order dated 20 May 1986, and that public respondent NLRC
similarly acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Orders dated 14 August 1986 and 19
November 1986 denying petitioner's appeal and Motion for Reconsideration. This, however, is without
prejudice to the right of respondent Rances to initiate another proceeding before the POEA against
petitioner Pascor, this time on the basis alone of the contract of employment which existed between
said respondent and petitioner or petitioner's foreign principal; there, respondent Rances may seek to
show that he is still entitled to the allotments which he claims were not remitted by his employer to his
wife.
[G.R. No. 110524. July 29, 2002] DOUGLAS MILLARES and ROGELIO LAGDA, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY, INC. and ESSO
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CO., LTD.
The court ruled that Seafarers are considered contractual employees. They can not be
considered as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Their employment is governed
by the contracts they sign everytime they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the
contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under
the exception of Article 280 whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee
or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.
April 2, 1996 GR No. 101825, 256 SCRA 36 Tierra International Construction Corporation vs
NLRC, POEA, Manuel S. Cruz, Raymundo G. Nepa and Rolando F. Carino
The private respondents are fully justified in refusing to do assignments not connected with the
nature of their engagements. The NLRC had jurisdiction, therefore the basis for the finding of the NLRC
that private respondents had been required to dig canals, make excavations, and haul construction
materials. It is not disputed that to make them do this would require them to do work not connected to
their employment as transit mixer, truck driver and batch operator. They were therefore fully justified
in refusing to do the assignment.
G.R. No. 79560 : December 3, 1990. 191 SCRA 823 ANDRES E. DITAN vs. PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ASIAWORLD RECRUITMENT, INC., AND/OR INTRACO SALES CORPORATION
The paramount duty of this Court is to render justice through law. The law in this case allows
two opposite interpretations, one strictly in favor of the employers and the other liberally in favor of
the worker. The choice is obvious. We find, considering the totality of the circumstances attending this
case, that the petitioner is entitled to relief. The petitioner went to Angola prepared to work as he had
promised in accordance with the employment contract he had entered into in good faith with the
private respondents. Over his objection, he was sent to a dangerous assignment and as he feared was
taken hostage in a rebel attack that prevented him from fulfilling his contract while in captivity. Upon
his release, he was immediately sent home and was not paid the salary corresponding to the
unexpired portion of his contract. He was immediately repatriated with the promise that he would be
given priority in re-employment, which never came. To rub salt on the wound, many of his co-hostages
were re-employed as promised. The petitioner was left only with a bleak experience and nothing to
show for it except dashed hopes and a sense of rejection. Under the policy of social justice, the law
bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification
that those with less privilege in life should have more privileges in law
G.R. No. 113911. January 23, 1998 VINTA MARITIME CO., INC. and ELKANO SHIP
MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LEONIDES C.
BASCONCILLO
The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is apparent. For an employees
dismissal to be valid, (1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (2) the employee must be
afforded due process. Petitioners allege that private respondent was dismissed because of his
incompetence, enumerating incidents in proof thereof. However, this is contradicted by private
respondents seamans book which states that his discharge was due to an emergency leave.
Moreover, his alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made by petitioners in the same book
that private respondents services were highly recommended and that his conduct and ability were
rated very good . Petitioners allegation that such remark and ratings were given to private
respondent as an accommodation for future employment fails to persuade. The Court cannot consent
to such an accommodation, even if the allegation were true, as it is a blatant misrepresentation. It
cannot exculpate petitioners based on such misrepresentation. When petitioners issued the
accommodation, they must have known its possible repercussions.
Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and hearing. Before the
employee can be dismissed under Art. 282, the Code requires the service of a written notice containing
a statement of the cause/s of termination and giving said employee ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself. A notice of termination in writing is further required if the employees dismissal is
decided upon. The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of
employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the employee of
the employers decision to dismiss. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the
essential elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running
afoul of the constitutional guaranty.
Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of their employment where the employment is for a definite period. Conformably,
the administrator and the NLRC properly awarded private respondent salaries for the period of the
effectivity of his contract. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The challenged decision and
resolution are affirmed.

[G.R. No. 127195. August 25, 1999] MARSAMAN MANNING AGENCY, INC. and DIAMANTIDES
MARITIME, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and WILFREDO T. CAJERA
The rule has always been that an illegally dismissed worker whose employment is for a fixed
period is entitled to payment of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment.
On 15 July 1995, RA 8042 otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995" took effect, Sec. 10 of which provides:
Sec. 10. In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause
as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement
fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term whichever is less.
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally
dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or three (3) months' salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1)
year or more.
To follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary
only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used
in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal
hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word thereof be
given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in
the statue and to have used them advisedly.