Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History

The Closing Triangle: Critical Notes on a Model for Peasant Mobilization in Latin America
Author(s): Peter Singelmann
Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 17, No. 4, Peasants and Political
Mobilization (Oct., 1975), pp. 389-409
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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The ClosingTriangle:CriticalNotes on
a Model for PeasantMobilizationin
LatinAmerica
PETER

SINGELMANN

Universityof Missouri, Kansas City

Students of contemporary campesino movements in Latin America have
their analyses generally focused on two problem-complexes. One of these
entails the macro-structural changes of the larger society within which
campesino movements develop. Such changes are represented by the
gradual imposition of the nation-state over the more remote regions of the
countries, the concomitant decline in the geographic, political, and economic isolation of these remote areas, the emergence of 'multiple-power
domains' within which ascending groups challenge the political brokerage
monopolies of the traditional large landholders over the campesinos
within their domains, and the development of clientelistic political structures within which campesino followings become attractive power resources for politicians at the regional and national level.1 The second, and
more controversial, problem-complex deals with the formation of class
consciousness and solidarity among mobilized campesino groups. In this
line of inquiry the most critical questions concern the degree to which
campesino movements represent the struggles of a 'class for itself' and
emancipate their members from the domination of the upper classes.2
While authors generally agree that campesino movements, as prima facie
evidence of at least a minimal measure of class solidarity, have developed
in the twentieth century largely as a consequence of the indicated macrostructural changes, a number of authors have suggested a very specific
theoretical model for analyzing the interrelations between campesino
solidarity and structural changes. This is the model of the 'closed triangle'
which was first developed by Cotler (1969) and subsequently applied to the
analysis of Peruvian and Bolivian campesinomovements by other authors
(cf. Whyte, 1970; Dandler, 1969, 1971; Bourque, 1971; Alberti, 1970).
I am indebted to Julio Cotler for his very helpful comments on an earlier version of this
paper. For the remaining shortcomings I take the responsibility.
1 On the general development of multiple-power domains in Latin America, cf. Adams
(1967b; 1964: 63-73). On the structure of clientelistic politics, cf. Powell (1970).
2 This concern is
particularly articulated in the debates between Galjart (1964, 1965) and
Huizer (1965), and in Petras and Zemelman (1972).

389

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390

PETER SINGELMANN

According to this model, the development of class solidarity among the

campesinosis a direct function of the encroachments on the part of 'new'
political brokers upon the traditionally monopolistic power domains of
the landed estates. In the following sections some pivotal assumptions of
the 'closed triangle' model will be explicated and subjected to a critical
analysis.
THE MODEL OF THE 'OPEN'

AND 'CLOSED'

TRIANGLE3

The model of the 'closed' triangle, representing relatively modernized

socio-political structures (Tullis, 1970: 46-50), contrasts ideal-typically
with that of the 'open' triangle for the traditional socio-political frame
within which rural-class relations have existed in the past.
Traditional rural-class relations in Latin America have been characterized by patterns of extreme unilateral dependence.4 Founded on a
mixture of coercion and legally sanctioned privileges with regard to
political and property rights, the position of the large landholders has
traditionally enabled them to control and restrict the subsistence means of
most of the rural lower sectors. Given this scarcity, powerlessness and
dependence, campesinoswho interacted with larger landholders as renters,
sharecroppers,serfs, or laborers had little choice but to subject themselves
to the arbitrary and exploitative terms set by their patrones. Their only
means of improving their life chances were deference, obedience, and
loyalty to their landlords as incentives for good treatment and perhaps a
few favors in time of need. The dependence of the campesinos on the
patrones in the micro-social relations was reinforced by macro-structural
patterns which granted the large landholders quasi-monopolies over the
access to, and control over, armed forces and other institutional resources
of the larger society such as political office or influence in the courts.
Campesinos had access to these institutions only via the intermediary
services of a patr6n who had the cultural capacities and political connections to mobilize institutional resources on behalf of his dependents. The
power and brokerage monopoly which the traditional landed gentry
wielded over the dependents in their domain precluded the interference of
rival brokers and made the landlords virtually the sole source of subsistence, protection, and identification for their dependents. Under these conditions, campesinoshad everything to gain from solidarity with the patron
but little from horizontal solidarity with members of their own class.
Relations between landlords and campesinos were particularized; i.e.,
each tenant or laborer had to place himself individually in a favorable
3 The following discussion follows the outlines of the model by Cotler (1969), Alberti (1970),
Whyte (1970), Bourque (1971), Dandler (1969: 4-16; 1971: 64-75), and Tullis (1970: 43-5).
4 In unilateral
dependence one party is relatively more dependent on another than the other
party is dependent on the first; in contrast, bilateral dependence is a relatively mutual interdependence between two or more parties on one another (cf. Blau, 1964: 21-2, 118-25).

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THE CLOSING

TRIANGLE

391

relationship with his patron in competition with his peers.5Not only could
he gain relatively little from the relations with his fellow-campesinos, but
the very imperative to help himself by obeying, and acting in the interest of,
his patr6n placed his immediate self-interest in contradiction with his
objective class interest (cf. Singelmann, 1973). This ideal-typical model of
traditional rural-class relationships is graphically representedby the 'open
triangle' (Figures 1 and 2) in which P designates the patron, C the
p

Fig. 1. The'open'triangle(simplified).
individual campesinos, and R the institutional resources available in the
larger society (government, courts, banks, markets, etc.); the connecting
lines represent channels of communication, influence, exchange, and
brokerage. In this model, links of exchange and communication between
campesinosare minimal; the latter are related to one another indirectly by
the patron who, in turn, controls the links of the campesinos to the institutions and resources of the larger society.
R

Fig. 2. The 'open' triangle.

The twentieth century has witnessed significant changes in the macrostructural parameters of rural-class relations in Latin America. New
'power domains' have encroached upon the traditional domain of the
large hacienda or fazenda, most notably the government (cf. Adams,
1967a: 226-31, 238-47; 1967b). As a result, Adams argues, the individual
campesino has come to occupy a series of roles within a complex of
5 This incompatibility of horizontal and vertical solidarity has been suggested by a number
of authors; e.g., Huizer (1972: 18-19), Hutchinson (1966: 14), Cotler (1970b: 416), and
Singelmann (1973, 1974).

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392

PETER SINGELMANN

'multiple-powerdomains' and thereby 'has a number of alternative

channelsof accessto power.By holdingpositionsin a seriesof domains,
he hasaccessto derivativepowerthatletshimplayone organizationagainst
another,each of which in turn operateswith access to the power of the
government'(Adams, 1967a: 241). It is in this kind of situation that
alternative,'new brokers' (Wagley, 1964: 45-6) have emerged in the
personsof teachers,lawyers,politicians,or union leaderswhose interests
mayconflictwith those of the traditionallandholders.These'newbrokers'
B

C-1

C-2

Fig. 3. The 'closed' triangle(simplified).

are capableof mobilizingpoliticaland economicresourceson behalf of

the campesinos in circumvention of the traditional patrdn. The establishment of vertical solidarity between campesinosand the 'new brokers' thus

no longer entails an inherentlynecessarycontradictionof self-interest

and class-interest for the campesinos,and the development of class solidarity among the campesinos becomes possible. Graphically, this ideal-

typicalsituationis representedby the 'closed'trianglein whichthe traditional patron is substituted by a 'new broker' (B), and lines of exchange
and communication emerge between the campesinos (Figure 3). It should
R-2

R-1

B-2

8-1

C-1

C-2

Fig. 4. Complex of 'closed' triangles.

be noted that in reality series of triangles are likely to develop with several
new brokers offering access to different institutional resources (Figure 4).
The major implications of the closed triangle model for rural-class relations, at the vertical and horizontal levels, can be summarized as follows:

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THE CLOSING

TRIANGLE

393

1. The break-upof the traditionalbrokeragemonopoliesheld by the large landowners

and the emergenceof alternativebrokers reduce the dependenceof the campesinos,
rendertheirexchangeswith patronsmore bilateral,and allow them greaterfreedomfor
'bargaining'with actual or potentialpatrons.
2. Alternativepatrons or brokersshare common economic and political interestswith
the campesinos. Governments whose political strength rests on direct or indirect coali-

tions with campesinossharecommon political interestswith the campesinos.

3. The new patternsof systemlinkage,brokerage,and communicationencourageclass
solidarityamong the campesinos.
4. The new patternsof system linkage, brokerage,and communicationencouragethe
successfularticulationof campesinoclass interestsand serveto emancipatethe campesinos from domination.

The open and closed triangles have been conceived as polar ideal types
which can be used as standardsfor comparing empirical cases. Accordingly,
authors generally recognize that deviant cases and especially 'transitional'
phases are empirically common (cf. Tullis, 1970:49). It should be recognized, however, that the model of the closed triangle constitutes neither the
only logical nor the only empirical alternative development to the open
triangle. Furthermore, while the two models may adequately summarize
the salient parameters of macro-structuralchanges (such as the encroachments of multiple-power domains on the traditional single-power domain
of the haciendas, the emergence of alternative brokers and their alliance
with campesino movements), the issues of campesino class solidarity and
emancipation as a consequence of these larger changes remain unresolved.
Specifically, the four characteristicsof the 'closed triangle' model outlined
above are generally proposed to be historical trends in Latin America by
authors using the triangle model. The model is thus transformed into a
theoretical statement which requires empirical scrutiny. The following
discussion will suggest some critical qualifications of the triangle model as
a heuristic and descriptive tool of analysis.
CRITICAL

ISSUES

1. Reduceddependence,bargaining,and bilateral exchanges. The emergence

of alternative brokers or sympathetic governments per se does not ensure
that the campesinos' dependence will be reduced, that they will be able to
bargain more freely with their patrons, and that their exchanges with new
brokers will be more bilateral than those with the old brokers. They may
simply become dependent on their new brokers and substitute one patron
for another (cf. Adams, 1967a: 186-7). This pattern is graphically represented by Figure 5, which differs from the open triangle only in that the
brokerage monopoly of the traditional patron is substituted by that of a
new broker (B). Such continued dependence on new brokers has indeed
been common in Latin America, although there have been variations in the
patterns and degrees of dependence. One of the most characteristicaspects

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394

PETER SINGELMANN
R

Fig. 5. 'Open' triangle with new broker.

of this new dependence has been the general link between the fortunes of
campesinoorganizations and the policies or fates of their political sponsors
inside and outside the government. First of all, there is often a rather close
correlation between the increases or decreases in the number of campesino
movements or leagues on the one hand, and the ascendence or deposition
of 'sympathetic' governments on the other. In Brazil this has been the case
especially during the rise and fall of the Goulart regime (cf. Price, 1964;
Hewitt, 1969), and detailed documentations indicate the same patterns in
Guatemala under the Ar6valo and Arbenz regimes (Murphy, 1970;
Pearson, 1969), in Venezuela between 1945 and 1968 (Powell, 1971) and in
Peru (cf. Matos Mar, 1967). In Chile, a gradual liberalization of the
agrarian laws before and during the Frei government allowed peasant
organizations to gain an increasing momentum (cf. Menges, 1968) which
culminated in the radical movements under the tenure of President Allende
(Petras and Zemelman, 1972: xii; New Chile, 1973: 66-79) and then was
set back by the coup of September 1973. In these and other cases the
development of campesino movements was directly associated with the
ending of repressive regimes and the emergence of regimes relatively more
favorable to the campesinos. Conversely, the fall of 'sympathetic' regimes
has generally struck a severe and often fatal blow to the peasant organizations.
Second, the dependence of campesinomovements on allied governments
is indicated by their subjection to changing policies. In Mexico, for example, the revolutionary governments have fluctuated in their support for
the agrarianists, often persecuted them, and since the end of the Cardenas
presidency (1934-40) steadily shifted away from the radical stance of the
agrarianists (Huizer, 1970b). Similar trends have been observed in Venezuela by Powell (1971:105), where the increasingly moderate policies of the
Accion Democrdticaresulted in a de-radicalization and splits in the peasant
movement.
Third, the dependence of campesino movements on friendly governments and politicians is manifested in the paternalism which often characterizes their relationship with one another. In Guatemala, peasant syndicates and federations were virtually imposed on the rural lower classes by

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THE CLOSING

TRIANGLE

395

the revolutionary Ar6valo and Arbenz governments (cf. Adams, 1960;

Murphy, 1970; Pearson, 1969). In Goulart's Brazil, Galjart (1964, 1965)
has argued, the peasant leagues and syndicates constituted the 'followings'
of political leaders with access to government favors; many peasant strikes
were selectively approved by the government when they were directed at its
political opponents, and spoils were handed down to those organizations
which proved themselves loyal followers or allies of politicians in the
government (cf. also Leeds, 1964; Hewitt, 1969: 395; for a different view,
cf. Huizer, 1965). In Mexico, the provisions of the agrarian reform laws
also have tended to be selectively enforced in a manner which rewarded
political acquiescence to the PRI leadership (Huizer, 1970b). These
structuralaspects of paternalism are generally matched by the corresponding attitudes on the part of politicians and their followings. Petras and
Zemelman, for example, found that leaders of the successful peasant
organizations on the fundo Culipran recognized that without the support
of politicians they would not have had the courage to occupy the estate:
'They were the ones who came to give us encouragement and make all the
plans' (1972:118); help from Congress had always to be asked for,
'because if the congressmen aren't on your side, you're lost. We, for example, obeyed Senator Altamirano' (1972:136). Similar examples from other
countries are numerous. Francisco Juliao in Brazil, for instance, was not
only respected by his followers as the 'chief' and 'doctor' (Moraes, 1970:
470-1), but also revered as 'the Prince of Life, who is going to give us
the resources to live' (Forman, 1971:13). In Bolivia campesinosconsidered
President Villaroel as the 'father and protector' (Dandler, 1971:113), just
as they expressed their personal devotion and gratitude to Victor Paz
Estenssoro for 'giving' them the land after the revolution of 1952 (Heath,
1969:189).
Besides government officials and politicians, other brokers have assumed
the roles of the traditional patrones, with the paternalism and dependence
of the traditional landlord-peasant relations persisting. In Bolivia after
1952, campesinos continued to be dependent on town-dwelling mestizo
middlemen (comerciantes, rescatistas, who were often former landlords)
for marketing their products, becoming godparents to their children, and
for general favors (Heath, 1969:205); in other cases, the secretary-general
of the local campesino syndicate assumed the 'dominant paternalistic
status formerly held by the landlord' (Heath, 1969:207) so that 'aspects of
the patron-peon relationship persist virtually unchanged' (1969:206). In
other cases peasants have been dependent on the services of teachers such
as Juan Guerra in Ucurenia,Bolivia (cf. Dandler, 1971) and others in the
Mantaro Valley of Peru (cf. Tullis, 1970:Ch. 6). Clergymen have often
assumed dominant positions in peasant movements; the occasional complete dependence of the peasants on the political connections of these

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396

PETER SINGELMANN

clergymenhas been illustratedin case studiesfrom Brazil(Foland, 1967)

and Chile(Landsberger,1969).
It may be suggested,then, that campesinomovementsin LatinAmerica
have not only requiredcoalitionswith other political forces in orderto
obtaina measureof success,but that theseallianceswereoftenhighlylopsidedand institutionalized
newpatternsof dependencefor the campesinos.
2. Common interests of campesinos, new brokers, and governments.

Accordingto the model of the closed triangle,alliancesbetweencampesinos and new politicalpatronsare foundedon theircommoninterestin
containingthe economicand politicalpowersof the traditionallandlords.
While this propositionhas indeed some merit(cf. Singelmann,1973),it
needsto be examinedin the contextof the clientelisticpoliticalstructures
withinwhich campesinoorganizationsoperate.Such clientelisticpolitical
frameworksare characterizedby intermediateexchangesbetweenhighlevel politiciansand their campesinofollowings.In these exchanges,the
campesinostypicallyexert pressures,provide votes or arms, or supply
organizationalsupport for governmentsand other politicianswho, in
turn,usethe campesino
supportas a politicalresourcein thecompetitionfor
and
patronage
spoils.6In returnfor their support,campesinostypically
receivepolitical protection,governmentaltoleranceof pressuretactics,
such as land invasionsor strikes,and favorablelegislationand policies.
campesinoclientelesarelinkedto theirpoliticalsponsors
Characteristically,
intermediaries
through
(political brokers)who occupy a dual role as
patrons to the campesinos and clients to higher-level politicians. Their

success hinges on their ability to deliver governmentalbenefitsto the

campesinosand, in turn,to musterthe collectivesupportfrom theirclientele on behalf of the political sponsors.In such political structuresthe
balanceof powervaries;all partiesareinterdependent
on one another,but
in some instancesthe campesinosexert strong independentpressureon
their patrons,while on other occasionsthey are primarilymanipulated.
Thus, clientelisticpolitics may have the potential for a revolutionary
alliancebetweenpeasantsand other political groups,but the emergence
of such an alliancecannotbe postulateda priorifrom a heuristicmodel;
ratherit dependson the particularhistoricalcontingenciesat hand.Many
of these contingencieshave typicallyencouragedmoderateimprovements
in the status of many campesinos without, however, basically altering

structuresof dependenceand withoutrenderingthe class interestsof the

campesinosequalto those of theirnew patrons.
First, the primarygoal of governmentsand otherpoliticians,in Latin
America, in spite of ideological pronouncements,has typically been
pragmatic:to obtain and maintainpolitical officesand the concomitant
6 On the
general nature of clientelistic peasant politics, cf. Powell (1970); on the general
background of patron-client relationships, cf. Foster (1963) and Wolf (1966).

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THE CLOSING

TRIANGLE

397

controls over spoils and patronageon behalf of their supporters(cf.

Landsbergerand Hewitt, 1970: 562-3). For these ends the support of
campesinoclientelesin the form of demonstrations,votes, or arms is
convenientfor manypoliticians,but not necessarilyintrinsicallydesirable.
In Peru, the APRA party for a long time refrainedfrom organizing
peasants because they could not vote, while the Accion Popularwas
worriedabout armyintervention(Cotler,1970b:430-1). Priorto the Frei
administrationin Chile, radical parties had often mobilized and demobilized the peasantryaccordingto criteria of political expediency
(PetrasandZemelman,1972:14-22).In Boliviathe PazEstenssorogovernment of 1952spearheadedthe agrarianrevolutiononly afterstrongpressures and a futile attemptto impose its own leadershipon the peasant
movement(Dandler,1971:215-22). Wherea pragmaticconcernfor conqueringpolitical officesis the primaryfoundationof alliancesbetween
campesinomovementsand political parties,the partiestend to compete
with one another and with other political brokersfor control of the
campesinoclientele(cf. Landsbergerand Hewitt, 1970:561-4).Whilesuch
competitionmayenablethe campesinoto play somebrokersagainstothers
and thus bargainfor maximalbenefits,it usuallyplays into the handsof
the commonclassenemy(cf. Huizer,1970b:449).Especiallythe participation of governmentsin this competitiontends to result in the favorable
treatmentof thosecampesinoorganizationswhosepoliticalpatronscontrol
political offices, while rival organizationsare neglected,harassed,and
repressed.Theseconditionsprevailedin Venezuelabetween1945and 1948
(Powell,1971:73-86),in Mexicoafterthe Cardenasregime(Huizer,1970b),
and to an extentin BrazilunderGoulart(Hewitt,1969).In thesecasesthe
interestsof the governmentsthus were at best in congruencewith the
interestsof somecampesinos-namely theirparticularfollowings-but not
with the interestsof the campesinatoas a whole.
Second,governmentswhich representthe interestsof campesinoclientelesin LatinAmericahavealwaysalsoneededpoliticalsupportfromother
sectorssuchas urbanlaborunions,intellectualsand othersegmentsof the
urbanmiddleclasses,or the armedforces.Thisdiversifiedbasisof support
requiredthe establishmentof somebalancebetweenthe interestsof groups
who sharedsomecommonconcernsbut weredividedon otherissues.One
of the most common coalitions involved campesinos,industrial and
miningworkers,and membersof the 'progressive'bourgeoisie.Thiswas
the casein countriessuchas Mexico,Guatemala,Chile,Peru,Bolivia,and
Venezuela.7But LatinAmericancountries,in contrastto West European
countriesduringtheirindustrialrevolution,generallydo not have a 'pro7 These peasant coalitions are discussed in most of the literature. E.g., Huizer (1970a,
1970b), Pearson (1969), Menges (1968), Cotler and Portocarrero (1969), Dandler (1971),
Powell (1971), and Bourque (1971).

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398

PETER SINGELMANN

gressive'bourgeoisiewhoseinterestsare diametricallyopposedto those of

the traditionallandholders(Stavenhagen,1969:110-11;also Baran,1970).
Furthermore,the interestsof urbanworkersare in some respectsincompatiblewiththose of the peasants.For example,the relativeimprovements
in theirlevels of living are generallyobtainedat the expenseof the rural
population,and the initial decreasein food productionresultingfrom
agrarianreform(theinterestof the peasants)is generallyto theirdetriment
(cf. Stavenhagen,1969:116-7).Occasionallygovernmentshave been able
to play the interestsof urban workersagainst those of the peasants.
Mexicanlabor unions organized'red battallions'in 1915 to combatthe
peasant armies of Pancho Villa; in return, the Carranzagovernment
permittedthemto organizeworkersin areasreclaimedfrom the peasants
(Huizer,1970a:386).The evolutionof the PRI in Mexicois anotherclassic
exampleof a movementwith a diversifiedbasis of supportin which the
voice of the peasantsectorgraduallydiminishedin favor of middle-class
interests(Huizer,1970b).
Third,partieswhichcontrolthe nationalgovernmentsof societiesmust
gain a minimumof legitimacyamongthose sectorswho do not constitute
theirclienteles,and theymustalso committhemselvesto whatis generally
perceivedto be a national,in contrastto a particularclientelistic,interest.
The armedforces must at least toleratea regimeand always have the
opportunityto withdrawtheirneutralityor activesupport.In the absence
of a violenttake-overby their own forces,peasant-oriented
governments
cannotbe totallyobliviousto the interestsof othersectors.Whenthe AD
governmentof 1945 in Venezuelatoo narrowlypursuedthe interestsof
its peasantand labor clientele,it met the resistanceof the manufacturing
andpetroleumindustries,thelandedelite,andmembersof themilitarywho
eventuallyoverthrewthe regimein 1948 (Powell, 1971:83-4). Salvador
Allende'sUnidadPopularin Chilewas in a similarbind whereit was not
legitimizedby the middleclassesand unableor unwillingto assertitself
by forcefulmeans.
Claimson the part of a governmentto largerlegitimacyrequirecommitmentsto 'national'(as opposed to partisan)goals. One of the most
salientgoals proclaimedby LatinAmericangovernmentshas beenthat of
economic development.Economic development,however, is generally
predicatedon rapid industrialization,limitations on consumption,restrictedinvestmentsin welfareand othernon-productiveservices,and increasedagriculturalproduction.All of these have historicallyfavoredthe
establishmentof largecommercialagricultural
enterprisesin LatinAmerica
and the attractionof foreigncapital.In orderto increaseproductionand
attractforeigncapital,governmentshavegenerallyconsideredit necessary
to suppressdisruptivelaboragitationand strikes.Mexico'sPRI underthe
presidencyof MiguelAleman(1946-52)is a classicinstanceof a revolu-

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THE CLOSING

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399

tionary party which turned away from the interests of its peasant clientele
in favor of what it defined as the requirements for national development
(Huizer, 1970b: 486-9; also Gonzalez-Casanova, 1969; Chevalier, 1967).
The result of the pragmatic concern with spoils and patronage, the
diversified power bases of peasant-oriented parties, and the overriding
preoccupation with national concerns by these parties have militated
against the representation of campesino interests by their own political
patrons. These patrons have often de-radicalized their followings so that
they could not disturb tenuous political balances between various political
forces at the national level. Leaders of campesino movements have frequently been coopted to represent the interests not of their clientele but of
those upper-echelon politicians whose patronage they needed (e.g., Landsberger and Hewitt, 1970: 571-3; Adie, 1970; Anderson and Cockroft,
1966). Clientelistic politics has encouraged politicians to compete with one
another for the privilege of manipulating campesinoson behalf of their own
political ambitions or ideological convictions. Campesino organizations
have been sponsored by governments to compete with the campesino
organizations of their opponents in Chile (Menges, 1968), Brazil (Hewitt,
1969; Moraes, 1970; Galjart, 1964), Peru (Cotler and Portocarrero, 1969;
Dew, 1969) and Mexico (Huizer, 1970b). Churches have mobilized campesinos so that they would not follow communist organizers in Chile
(Menges, 1968), Peru (Cotler and Portocarrero, 1969), and Brazil (Hewitt,
1969; Moraes, 1970). Finally, many times politicians have used campesino
organizations solely as a vehicle to obtain political power (e.g., the Ciceres
brothers in Juliaca, Peru; cf. Dew, 1969; Landsberger and Hewitt, 1970:
569-70), or to enrich themselves through graft and corruption (cf. Huizer,
1970b). The interests of the campesinos(land redistribution, freedom from
dependence and domination) are thus not necessarily those of their
individual new patrons or sponsoring political groups.
The latter have their own ambitions and generally must balance the
interests of the campesino clientele with those of other clienteles or of
allies with other concerns. The interests of campesinosand their political
sponsors are therefore not identical but at best complementaryfor given
purposes (cf. Singelmann, 1973). Situational expediency thus sets the
parameters of campesino coalitions with other groups, but the coalitions
always remain tenuous. That they may contain a revolutionary potential
need not be denied. But in the long historical view it appears that clientelistic politics, even in its most radical manifestations (e.g., Bolivia after
1952, Venezuela after 1958, Mexico under Cardenas) has always contained
built-in limitations for the development of interest identity on the part of
peasant movements and their political leadership.
3. Class solidarity among campesinos. According to the model of the
closed triangle, the formation of class solidarity among campesinos is

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400

PETER SINGELMANN

predicated upon the emergence of alternative patrons with common

political interests who are freely accessible for relatively bilateral exchanges
with the campesinos. To the extent that, as has been suggested in the
previous sections, campesinos have often remained dependent on new
patrons who shared their political and economic interests only to a limited
extent, the terms of the model themselves would suggest that campesino
solidarity should be at best limited. Indeed, it can be argued that the
clientelistic political systems of Latin America have had an inherently
divisive potential not only in terms of rival political brokers but also with
regard to different segments of the peasantry competing with one another
in the following of their patrons (cf. Landsberger and Hewitt, 1970:
562-4). As a result, there have been splits in many countries between
G

c
cC
cC
C
=
brokers
and
6.
Fig. Competing
competingcampesinos(G Government).

peasants following different leaders, a condition which constitutes yet

another alternative to the one modeled by the closed triangle (Figure 6).
Such intra-class competition among campesinos has been common in
Mexico (Huizer, 1970b), Brazil (Hewitt, 1969; Moraes, 1970), Venezuela
(Powell, 1971), Bolivia (Malloy, 1970: 211-3), Peru (Cotler and Portocarrero, 1969; Dew, 1969), and Chile (Menges, 1968).
One source of conflict among mobilized peasants is their continued
competition for scarce goods even when old patterns of subjugation have
broken down. Many Peruvian rural communities, manipulated by cynical
lawyers, have been engaged in endless litigations against one another over
land claims (Tullis, 1970: Ch. 6; Whyte and Williams, 1968: 8-12). Many
such litigations involved violence. Characteristic lines of cleavage have
developed between different types of peasants. In Peru indigenous communities have frequently fought with the former peones over the legal
rights to the lands of an expropriated hacienda (Tullis, 1970: Ch. 6). In
the valley of La Convenci6n (Peru), the initial success of the peasant movement opened the way for rivalries between the older tenant-laborers
(arrendires) and the more newly arrived sub-tenants (allegados) (Craig,
1969: 290-1). On a Chileanfundo, the peasantry was divided between the
regular inquilinosand the empleados who had received preferential treat-

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THE CLOSING

TRIANGLE

401

ment by the patron(Petrasand Zemelman,1972). In post-revolutionary

Mexico certainpeasantgroupswere systematicallyexcludedfrom membershipin the officialorganization.Many of them (such as the resident
haciendaworkers)followed their priests and landlords in the armed
Cristerobands againstthe governmentand the agrarianforces (Huizer,
andrentersworkingsmall
1970b:462),whileothers(suchas sharecroppers
properties)followed the fascist sinarquistasand other reactionarymovements(Huizer,1970b:479).In Bolivia,the peasantsof Clizaand Ucureiia
have been engagedin notoriousbattlesover the dominationof the region
(Antezana, 1960).8It appears, thus, that peasant solidarity in Latin
Americahas developedprimarilyat the subgrouplevelbut not in a manner
that unitedthe peasantsas a class. One reasonfor this 'limitedconcern'
and Hewitt, 1970:574)of peasantmovementsis doubtlessly
(Landsberger
the diversityof the peasantryas a whole whose differentsubtypes9have
differentclassinterests.Butthe evidencesuggeststhatevenwithinthe same
subtypeof peasantrysolidarityhas seldomtranscendeda narrowconcern
To the extentthat suchimprovewith personaland local improvements.10
mentshad to be obtainedin competitionwith othermembersof the same
class,class solidarityamongmobilizedcampesinoshas containedthe same
inherentcontradictionsas underthe traditionalpatron.
4. Articulationof class interestsand emancipation.The analysis of campe-

sino class interestand emancipationrequiresa criticalexaminationof the

underlyingconcepts,as both the terms'interest'and 'emancipation'contain a varietyof descriptiveand normativeconnotations.One difficultyin
defininggroup interestsin generalis the discrepancybetweeninterests
whicharesubjectivelyperceivedat a giventimeby the membersandwhich
motivatetheirconducton the one hand,andthe normativeimplicationsof
a relativelymore objectivestructuralanalysison the other.ll A dilemma
whichparticularlyappliesto manypeasantsis thatby virtueof theirdesire
for landedpropertythey identifythemselveswith the very valuesagainst
whichtheyrebel;oncepeasantshaveobtainedthe landtheyfightfor, class
differentiationis likely to emerge among them. Another problem in
conceptualizingpeasant interestsrests in the differentialsignificanceof
statusimprovementswithinthe existingeconomicand politicalstructure
on the one hand,and the radicaltransformationof this sameorderon the
other. Clearly,a point of view can be developedwhich can legitimately
claim that Latin Americacampesinomovementshave been engagedin
8 Cf. the general discussion of the causes of weakness and cleavage in Latin American
peasant organizations by Landsbergerand Hewitt (1970).
9 On the diversity of peasant types in Latin America, cf. Adams (1967a: 91-3), Wolf (1955),
and Wagley (1964).
10For examples of peasant concerns, cf. Tullis (1970: Ch. 6), Petras and Zemelman (1972),
and Powell (1971: 137, 138).
11Cf. Lukdcs' (1970) thesis that 'class consciousness' is not identical with immediate subjective perceptions of one's position.
B

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402

PETER SINGELMANN

'class struggles,' furtheredthe 'interests' of their members, and contributed

to their 'emancipation'. Some authors have even gone as far as to suggest
that peasants have become a 'class for itself', as Marx conceived the term,
in countries such as Brazil (Huizer, 1965) and Venezuela (Powell, 1971:
58-9). In the following, a few general characteristics of an emancipated
peasant 'class for itself' will be sketched.12The progress of campesino
movements will then be assessed in terms of these criteria: they are:
1. Campesinosare autonomouspolitical actors determiningand negotiatingtheir own
destinies.
2. The concern of campesinomovementsis for the class as a whole, not for individual
membersor subgroups.
3. 'Class consciousness'entails a broad vision of macro-societalstructuresof domination and alienation,ratherthan a limitedperceptionof absolute or relativedeprivation
within the peasantryor some of its subgroups.
4. The goals of campesinomovementsare directedat a radical transformationof the
macro-societalstructureswithin which campesinosare subjugated,rather than at the
mere redressof group-specificgrievanceswithinthe existing structures.
5. Landlordsare collectivelyperceivedas membersof an opposing class, rather than
being individuallydefinedas particular'good' or 'bad'patrones.

While these idealized conditions are approached at varying degrees by

historical realities, they are useful standards for comparison. In view of
the previous analysis we must conclude that Latin American campesino
movements, by and large, have not come very close to the ideal of an
emancipated 'class for itself'. Far from being autonomous political actors,
most campesinosstill depend on one kind of patron or another who often
manipulates and paternalisticallyco-opts them and who deflects campesino
organizations from their original goals. The movements themselves are
usually directed toward rather limited objectives such as getting rid of a
particularlandlord or implementing agrarianreforms; they benefit limited
clienteles competing with one another in particular communities, regions,
or socio-economic categories. Finally, landlords are often not opposed as
members of a dominant class but as 'bad' particularpatrones, while 'good'
patrones are still preferred. Indeed, campesinomovements have generally
been triggeredwhen landlords encroached upon their subordinates to such
a degree that they were defined as 'bad', while the overall legitimacy of
class domination remained unchallenged. It should be noted that sustained
participation in campesinomovements has often contributed to a politicization and radicalization of the members, especially in the wake of successful land invasions or strikes. But even the relatively more politicized
participants of successful campesino movements may admit that at the
bottom they would have preferred to stay with a patron provided he had
been 'good' and taken care of his laborers (cf. Petras and Zemelman,
12This outlinewill follow the generalconceptualization
of Lukcs (1970)and the criteria
of'political consciousness'suggestedby Petrasand Zemelman(1972:64-5).

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THE CLOSING

TRIANGLE

403

1972:129, 135);or theymayrefuseto expandtheiractivitiesto a neighboring estate which has a 'good patron'(Petrasand Zemelman,1972: 116,
129).As hasbeenshownabove,suchpaternalisticattitudeshaveoftenbeen
transferredto the 'newpatrones'who lead or protectthe campesinoorganizations.In bothtraditionaland'modern'formsof paternalism,campesinos
are subjectedto the arbitrarywhimsof theirprotectorswho have the discretion to turn 'good' or 'bad' as they deem feasible (cf. Feder, 1969:
401); in both cases campesinosreceivecertainbenefitsnot as enforceable
rightsbut as unenforceableprivilegesandfavors (Adams, 1964; 69-71).
Militantdemandsandviolentactivitieson the partof campesinos
maythus
be imbeddedin traditionalforms of power relations; by themselves,
therefore,they do not markthe emergenceof an emancipatedpeasantry.
A majordifficultyin unitingcampesinosunderone movementrests in
the fact that their class interestsare diversifiedand often contradictory
withinsubtypes.As was pointedout above,somecategoriesof campesinos
are often excludedfrom membershipin unions or leagueswhich makes
them vulnerable to recruitmentinto conservativemovements.Also,
andwagelabdifferentsubtypessuchas comuneros,
peones,sharecroppers,
orers tend to have differentgoals which may be mutuallyincompatible
(cf. Landsbergerand Hewitt,1970:574-5). But evenwithinthe samecategorytheremaybe inherentlycontradictorygoals.Thisis thecasewhenrival
patronsmobilizetheirclientelein rivalingorganizations,so that for the
individualcampesinofollowersit is most rationalto ally themselveswith
theirupper-classpatrons,ratherthanwith theirpeersfroma rivalorganization.A relatedproblemis the petty-bourgeoisstrivingfor a privatepiece
of landedpropertyby many sharecroppers,renters,and colonos.Where
landshavebeenparceledout to individualcampesinos,
however,class solidarity has been underminedby internal differentiationbetweenthose
peasantswith morelandand thosewithlittle or no lands.Theseproblems
wereobservedon a Chileanexpropriated
fundo by Petrasand Zemelman
(1972: xii, 95-7) and in the valley of La Convenci6n(Peru)where the
formertenantlaborersbecamelandlordsandemployersthemselves(Craig,
1969:290-1); similardevelopmentsoccurredeven in the Mexicanejidos
(cf. Chevalier,1967: 178, 180-4). Trends toward an embourgeoisement
of campesinosafterthey have acquiredtheir own land, by virtueof their
effecton renewedclass differentiation,plant the seeds of conflictinto the
very structureof campesinosolidarity.
Finally, it should be noted that the structuraltransformationsLatin
Americansocietieshaveundergonein the twentiethcenturyhaveweakened
but by no means always destroyedthe powers of the traditionallandholders. In most countriesthey still mount formidablepressuregroups
which compete with campesinoorganizationsfor the formulationof
favorablegovernmentpoliciesandlegislation(Figure7); or the traditional

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404

PETER SINGELMANN
G

C
P
Fig. 7. Landowners (P) and campesinos
(C) competing for governmental policies
and legislation (G).

8B

C
C
Fig. 8. Single-power domain of landowners (P) competing with multiplepower domains of new brokers (B).

single-power domains of many landholders remain intact and confront the

multiple-power domains within which campesino organizations operate
(Figure 8). Particularly violent conflicts of this sort have taken place in
post-revolutionary Mexico (Huizer, 1970b), but the influence of the landed
elite in most other Latin American countries has remained strong enough
that they could turn agrarianreforms into 'counter-reforms'which actually
strengthened the status quo in the rural sectors (cf. Feder, 1969, 1970).
In summary, campesinomovements have without doubt engaged in class
conflicts with the landed elite; they have 'articulated' some campesino
'interests', they have entailed a measure of campesino'solidarity', and they
have improved the status of many of their members. But if we critically
examine the kinds of interests served by the movements and the nature as
well as limitations of their group solidarity, it becomes apparent that
campesinoshave not yet become a 'class for itself'. They are divided along
several lines; many engage in temporaryjoint actions for limited purposes
at a given time, but few have persisted in a sustained effort to renew the
larger social order; and they are often manipulated to serve the ambitions
of cynical politicians. They have not overcome traditional forms of domination by changing the personnel of their patrons. Their 'interest articulation'
thus does not necessarily emancipate them as a class.
IMPLICATIONS

The preceding analysis was not intended as a rejection of the closed triangle
model for the analysis of campesinomovements. Indeed, I have suggested
elsewhere (Singelmann, 1973, 1974) that the model is a useful heuristic
device which comprehends the basic structure of campesino mobilization
in Latin America. In this paper an attempt was made to spell out the
model's implication with regard to campesino solidarity and campesino
emancipation. It was suggested that there are logical as well as empirical
alternatives to the 'closed triangle' and that the empirically observed alternatives cannot be dismissed as 'deviant cases' or 'transitional phases'. It
may well be that they manifest a continuity of domination and repression
built into the very structure of seemingly revolutionary changes. In com-

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THE CLOSING

TRIANGLE

405

paring the experiences of various Latin American countries, it becomes

apparent that general shifts in the larger power and brokerage patterns
have entailed an emancipatorypotential, but the triangle does by no means
close automatically. In some countries the revolutionary potential of
campesino movements has become apparent at various times, e.g. in
Mexico between 1910 and 1915 and from 1934 to 1940, in Bolivia after
1952, in the Cuban revolution, in Chile under the presidency of Salvador
Allende, and in Venezuela during the earlier years of the AD rule. What
distinguishes these cases from the remaining ones is that in all of them the
campesinoshave had political resources which strengthened their bargaining power with their political sponsors. In some cases the survival of the
ruling political groups depended heavily on armed support from the
campesinos (Cuba, Mexico, Bolivia), while in others the campesino vote
was a major pillar of the regime (Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile). Furthermore,
in Bolivia and Mexico the armed peasantry forced agrarian reforms upon
resilient governments. Conversely, when and where the repressive powers
of governments or landholders were relatively larger (as in Peru, Brazil,
Guatemala, Mexico before and after Cdrdenas or Zapata, Chile before
Allende, contemporary and pre-1952 Bolivia), campesinomovements have
been more patronized, manipulated, and co-opted. Furthermore, even the
Mexican, Venezuelan, and Bolivian cases show that trends toward campesino emancipation can be stopped or reversed.
Latin American campesino movements have, thus, vacillated in their
relative political strength, but they all had their limits set by the nature of
the larger political structures in their respective societies. The historical
development of Latin American nations has thus far been toward the
establishment of regimes hostile to the traditional landed oligarchies. But
such a development has not entailed a radical commitment to campesino
emancipation. Latin American societies have, instead, mostly adopted
political models the characteristicdimensions of which included, in various
degrees, populism, corporativism and cautious measures of nationalism.
The premise of these models has been that social and economic development can take a 'third route' between capitalist class domination and
socialist revolution via a vertical alliance between the upper and lower
classes under the banner of nationalism and with a semi-corporate state
operating as the integrating and controlling institution.13 Within this
political structure, mass mobilizations of the lower classes constituted the
political balance to the middle and upper classes; but on the other hand,
these mobilizations, coupled with substantial material improvements for
13 This paper cannot discuss in detail the complexities and varieties of populism, the 'third'
way and its Latin American variants. For a discussion of populism, cf. di Tella (1965); a
general discussion of the 'third way' is found in Mansilla (1974). For pertinent studies on
Peru, Mexico, Bolivia and Argentinia, cf. Cotler (1974), Tripp (1974), Mayorga (1974) and
Skupch (1974) respectively.

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406

PETER SINGELMANN

at least some sectors of the lower classes, have also legitimated the regimes
and made the persistence of certain traditional socio-political structures
more acceptable to the lower classes. Furthermore, the corporatistpopulist regimes have been beset by inherent contradictions and weaknesses.14Nationalistic economic policies were limited by dependence on
foreign investments; policies directed toward the emancipation of workers
and campesinos conflicted with the dependence on both domestic and
foreign private investment; and within the national alliance the political
balance always remained tenuous, as each sector retained its fundamentally
self-centered interests. The regimes thus always needed strong controls to
keep the parties within the boundaries of the political model. They thus
fluctuated between states of more or less friction and states in which different sectors were relatively more or less influential in determining policies.
It is against the background of these contradictions inherent in the
modem political regimes of Latin America that the contemporary campesino mobilizations as well as their ultimate limitations can be understood.
The generic mechanisms of domination prevailing in the past could thus
reappear in a new form, integrating the campesinadointo a society that
was no longer oligarchical but so far has retained its inherently bourgeois
character.
The purpose of the paper, then, was to point out some pitfalls in the
generalizations derived from the closed triangle model and to suggest
some guideposts for assessing the authenticity of the progress campesinos
have made toward emancipation. Above all, observers are invited to take
a critical stance toward that which is billed as 'modernization' or 'progress' and to look for possibly alienating structures under the guise of
'liberation' so that more truly emancipatory actions can be implemented.
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