Al-Shajarah Journal Article Final Draft

Ab al-usayn al-Bars Use of Reason in Ilm al-Kalm and Ul al-Fiqh
Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa

PhD Candidate
Institute of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies
University of Edinburgh
e-mail: makya@aucegypt.edu
Al-Shajarah Journal of The International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization
Volume 16.1 (2011): 1-46
November 2010
Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 2

This study examines and compares Ab al-usayn al-Bars use of reason in ilm al-kalm and
ul al-fiqh. Very few details are known about the life of Ab al-usayn Muammad b. Al b.
al-ayyib al-Bar (d. 436/1044). This is clear in the extremely brief entries about him in the
medieval biographies of Muslim scholars and intellectuals that include an entry on him: in most
cases his entry does not exceed few lines.1 However, we know that Ab al-usayn is an
influential anaf-Mutazil jurist and theologian.2 He is a member of the Bahshamiyyah sub-
* This paper is a modified version of my masters dissertation submitted to the Institute of Islamic and Middle
Eastern Studies of the University of Edinburgh in July 2009. I would like to thank Dr. Andrew Marsham, Dr.
Christian Lange, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this article.
1
For example, see Ab Abd Allah Muammad b. Amad al-Dhahab (d. 748/1348 or 753/1352-3), Siyar Alm alNubal, ed. Shuayb al-Arnt and Muammad al-Irqiss (Beirut: Muassasat al-Rislah, 1413 A.H.), 17:587, in
CD-ROM al-Jmi al-Kabr li-Kutub al-Turth al-Arab wa-l-Islm, 4th ed. (Amman: Markaz al-Turth li-lBarmajiyyt, 2007-8). Hereafter I refer to this database as CD-ROM al-Jmi al-Kabr; Shams al-Dn Amad b.
Khallikn (d. 681/1282), Wafayt al-Ayn wa-Anb Abn al-Zamn, 7vols., ed. Isn Abbs (Lebanon: Dr alThaqfah, n.d.), in CD-ROM al-Jmi al-Kabr; Shams al-Dn Muammad b. Amad al-Dhahab, Mizn al-Itidl f
Naqd al-Rijl, 8 vols., ed. Al Awa and dil Abd al-Mawjd (Beirut: Dr al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1995), 6:266,
in CD-ROM al-Jmi al-Kabr; Abd al-Qdir b. Ab al-Waf al-Qurash (d. 775/1374), al-Jawhir al-Muiyyah f
abaqt al-anafiyya, 2 vols. (Karachi: Mir Muammad Kutub Khnah, n.d.), 2:93-4, in CD-ROM al-Jmi alKabr; Ab al-Sad al-Musin b. Karmah al-Jusham (d. 484/1101), Shar al-Uyn, in Fud Sayyid, ed. Fal alItizl wa-abaqt al-Mutazilah (Tunis: al-Dr al-Tnisiyyah li-l-Nashr, 1974), 387; Abd al-Jabbr b. Amad (d.
415/1025)/ Amad b. Yay b. al-Murta (d. 840/1437), Firaq wa-abaqt al-Mutazilah , ed. Al Sm alNashshr and Im al-Dn Al (Alexandria: Dr al-Mabt al-Jmiiyyah, 1972), 125-6. This last book is
composed of 12 abaqt of Mutazil scholars. As the editors note in their introduction, Abd al-Jabbr is the author
of the first ten abaqt, whereas the last two abaqah were later added by Ibn al-Murta, Ab al-usayn is
mentioned in the twelfth abaqah added by Ibn al-Murta.
2
Modern scholars disagree whether Ab al-usayn is a anaf or a Shfi. M. Bernand, C. Brockelmann, and F.
Sezgin believe that he is a Shfi. See, Marie Bernand, Laccord Unanime de la Communaut comme Fondement
des Statuts Lgaux de lIslam (Paris: J. Vrin, 1970), 136; Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabishcen Litteratur
Esrter Supplementband (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1937), 1B:669; Fuat Sezgin, Geschichte des Arabischen Schrifttums
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), 1:627. Also see, Muaf b. Abd Allah al-Qusann (ajj Khalfa), Kashf al-unn an
Asm al-Kutub wa-l-Funn (Beirut: Dr al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1992), 2:1732, in CD ROM al-Jmi al-Kabr. On
the other hand, M. Hamidullah, W. Madelung, W. Hallaq, and C. Melchert hold that he is a anaf. See, Muhammad
Hamidullah, introduction to Ab al-usayn Muammad b. Al b. al-ayyib al-Bar, Kitb al-Mutamad f Ul alFiqh, ed. Muhammad Hamidullah and others (Damascus: al-Mahad al-Ilm al-Farans li-l-Dirst al-Arabiyyah,
1965), 24-5; Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2 nd edition, s.v. Ab l-usayn al-Bar Hereafter I refer to the 2nd edition of
the Encyclopaedia of Islam as EI2 and the third edition as EI3; Wael Hallaq, A Tenth-Eleventh Century Treatise on
Juridical Dialectic, Muslim World 77 (1987), 1; Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law
(Leiden: Brill, 1997), 85. Also, see Ibn Ab al-Waf al-Qurash, al-Jawhir al-Muiyyah, 2:93-4. There is
compelling evidence proving that Ab al-usayn is a anaf. For example, Ab al-usayn defends the anaf
definition and use of istisn in reaching fiqh conclusions. This supports the conclusion that he is a anaf
especially that this legal method is usually criticized in Shfi ul al-fiqh literature whereas it is usually defended
in anaf ones. For Ab al-usayns defense of istisn, see his al-Mutamad , 838-41. For Shfi criticisms of
istisn, see for example Ab Isq Ibrhm b. Al b. Ysuf al-Firzabd al-Shrz (d. 476/1083), Shar alLuma, ed. Abd al-Majd Turk (Beirut: Dr al-Gharb al-Islm, 1988),969-74; Ab Muaffar Manr b.
Muammad b. Abd al-Jabbr al-Samn (d. 489/1096), Qawi al-Adillah f Ul al-Fiqh, 5 vols, ed. Muammad
asan Isml al-Shfi (Beirut: Dr Iy al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1997), 4:514-22. For anaf justifications of

school which is part of the Basran branch of the Mutazilah before he forms his own Mutazil
sub-school that is named al-usayniyyah.3 The Mutazil biographer al-kim al-Jusham (d.
484/1101) describes Ab al-usayn as the leading Mutazil of his age.4 Ibn Khallikn (d.
681/1282), Shams al-Dn al-Dhahab (d. 748/1348 or 753/1352-3), and Ibn Khaldn (d.
808/1406) all praise Ab al-usayns works in ul al-fiqh.5 Among the modern scholars, Wael
Hallaq describes Ab al-usayns al-Mutamad f Ul al-Fiqh as a milestone in the
development of legal theory.6 Wilferd Madelung says that al-Mutamad became widely
influential outside the anaf-Mutazil tradition.7 Ab al-usayns theology is not less
significant. Fakhr al-Dn al-Rz (d. 606/1209) notes that in his time all surviving Mutazilah
belonged either to the Bahshamiyyah or al-usayniyyah Mutazil sub-schools.8 In addition,
Madelungs and S. Schmidtkes recent studies show that Ab al-usayns theological thought
has a considerable impact on Imm, Zayd, and Qarr (Karaite) Jewish theology.9
istisn, see Ab Zayd Ubayd Allah b. s al-Dabs (d. 430/138-9), Taqwm al-Adillah f Ul al-Fiqh, ed. Khlid
al-Ms (Beirut: Dr al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 2007), 404-6; Ab Bakr Amad b. Ab Sahl al-Sarakhs (d. 490/1097),
Ul al-Sarakhs, 2 vols. ed. Ab al-Waf al-Afghn (Beirut: Dr al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1414/1993), 2:199-208.
For more arguments establishing Ab al-usayns anaf orientation, see Hamidullahs introduction to Ab alusayns al-Mutamad p. 24-5.
3
Fakhr al-Dn Muammad b. Umar al-Rz (d. 606/1209), Itiqdt Firaq al-Muslimn wa-l-Mushrikn (Cairo:
Maktabat al-Kuliyyt al-Azhariyyah, 1978), 42. For more information on the Basran and the Baghdadi Mutazilah ,
see Rashd al-Khayyn, Mutazilat al-Barah wa-Baghdd (London: Dr al-ikmah, 1997). For more details on the
Bahshamiyyah, see Margaretha T. Heemskerk, Suffering in Mutazilite Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 14-35.
4
Al-Jusham, Shar al-Uyn, 387; Abd al-Jabbr/Ibn al-Murta, Firaq wa-abaqt al-Mutazilah , 125; Ibn
Khalikn, Wafayt al-Ayn, 4:271; Al-Dhahab, Mizn al-Itidl, 6:266.
5
Al-Dhahab, Siyr Alm al-Nubal, 17:588; Ibn Khallikn, Wafayt al-Ayn, 4:271; Abd al-Ramn b.
Muammad b. Khaldn (d. 808/1406), Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldn, 5 th ed. (Beirut: Dr al-Qalam, 1984), 455, in CD
ROM al-Jmi al-Kabr.
6
Hallaq, A Tenth-Eleventh Century Treatise, 197.
7
EI3, s.v. Ab l-usayn al-Bar.
8
Al-Rz, Itiqdt Firaq al-Muslimn, 42.
9
For more information on the influence of Ab al-usayns theology on Imm and Zayd thought, see Wilferd
Madelung, Immism and Mutazilite Theology, in Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam, ed. Wilferd
Madelung (London: Variorum, 1985), VII, 27. For more details on his influence on Qarr Jewish theology, see
Wilferd Madelung and Sabina Schmidtke, Rational Theology in Interfaith Communication (Leiden: Brill, 2006);
idem, Ysuf al-Bars First Refutation (Naqd) of Ab al-usayn al-Bars Theology, in A Common Rationality:
Mutazilism in Islam and Judaism, ed. Camilla Adang, Sabine Schmidtke, and David Sklare (Wrzburg: Ergon
Verlag in Kommission, 2007): 229-96; Sabina Schmidtke, The Karaites Encounter with the Thought of Abu lusayn al-Bar (d. 436/1044): A Survey of the Relevant Materials in the Firkovitch-Collection, St. Petersburg,

Despite the importance of Ab al-usayns legal and theological heritage, his thought
received little attention from modern scholars. Among the few who studied his legal heritage is
Marie Bernand who examined his concept of consensus (ijm) and C. S. el-Tobgui who studied
aspects of his concept of legal reasoning (qiys).10 W. Hallaq translated Ab al-usayns Kitb
al-Qiys al-Shar.11 However, his translation does not include an analysis of Ab al-usayns
perception of legal reasoning.12 Ab al-usayns theology received relatively more attention
than his legal heritage. W. Madelung, E. Giannakis, M. McDermott, and S. Schmidtke are the
only scholars, I am aware of, who wrote articles focusing on aspects of his theology and/or
philosophy.13 None of the previous studies attempted to particularly study the relation between
Arabica 53 (2006):108-42. Some parts of this article are translated in Arabic and were published earlier in Sabina
Shmidtke, Mwjaht al-Qarrn maa Fikr Ab al-usayn al-Bar, al-Tasmu (2005): 224-36.
10
M. Bernand translated Ab al-usayns chapter on consensus from his al-Mutamad (p. 459-540). She concludes
her translation with a chapter analyzing Ab al-usayns perception of consensus and comes to the result that his
concept of consensus is similar to the Sunni one. See, Marie Bernand, Laccord Unanime. Bernand also wrote two
articles on the concept of consensus of the Mutazil scholar Abd al-Jabbr al-Hamadhn (d. 415/1024) who is Ab
al-usayns most famous teacher. In her studies she includes detailed information on Ab al-usayns consensus.
See, Marie Bernand, LIm chez Abd al-abbr et lobjection d An-Nam, Studia Islamica 30 (1969): 2738; idem, Nouvelles Remarques ser lIm ches le Q Abd al-abbr, Arabica 19 (1972): 78-85. C. ElTobgui compares Ab al-usayns acceptance of the probative value of qiys to the rejection of Ibn azm al-hir
(d. 456/1064) of this legal tool. He concludes that their disagreements over the authority of qiys are a result of their
epistemological and theological disagreements. See, Carl Sharif El-Tobgui, The Epistemology of Qiys and Tall
between the Mutazilite Abu l-usayn al-Bar and Ibn azm al-hir, UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near
Eastern Law 2, no. 2 (2003): 281-354.
11
Hallaq, A Tenth-Eleventh Century, 197-228. Kitb al-Qiys al-Shar is a short treatise on legal reasoning
published with Ab al-usayns al-Mutamad , see Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad , 1029-50.
12
Translating qiys as legal analogy is more common. However this translation is problematic due to the fact that
as noted by W. Hallaq- there are other non-analogical arguments that are subsumed under qiys e.g. syllogistic,
inductive, deductive, and linguistic arguments. Therefore, I prefer legal reasoning as a translation for qiys. For
more details see, Wael Hallaq, Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiys, Arabica 36.3 (1989): 286306.
13
Wilferd Madelung. Ab al-usayn Al-Bars Proof for the Existence of God, in Arabic Theology, Arabic
Philosophy from the Many to the One, ed. James Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2006): 273-8; E.
Giannikis, The Structure of Abu l-usayn al-Bars Copy of Aristotles Physics, ZGAIW 8 (1993): 2528; Martin
J. McDermott, Ab al-usayn al-Bar on Gods Volition, in Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam: Essays in
Honor of Wilferd Madelung (London: Taurisian Association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2003): 86-93;
Sabine Schmidtke, Ab al-usayn al-Bar and his transmission of biblical materials from Kitb al-Dn wa-l-dawla
by Ibn Rabbn al-abar: The evidence from Fakhr al-Dn al-Rzs Maft al-ghayb, Islam and Christian-Muslim
Relations 20 ii (2009): 105-118; idem, Ab al-usayn al-Bar on the Torah and its Abrogation, Mlanges de
lUniversit Saint Joseph 61 (2008): 559-80. For more information on Schmidtkes research on Ab al-usayn, see
footnote number 8.

reason and revelation in Ab al-usayns thought.14 Moreover, none attempted to particularly
investigate and compare Ab al-usayns use of rational methods in ul al-fiqh to his use of
rational methods in kalm. In this study I conduct this comparison and underline the differences
and similarities in the role he awards to reason in ul al-fiqh and kalm. One must note that
analyzing the relation between reason and revelation in Islam is far beyond the scope of this
research. This research rather particularly focuses on Ab al-usayns contributions to this
question. However, this research will use Ab al-usayns conclusions as a case study to
challenge a dominant trend among modern historians that usually divide Muslim scholars and
schools of law and theology into scripturalist and rationalist schools, more on this below.
To analyze the role of reason in Ab al-usayns thought I ask the following questions:
how far does Ab al-usayn use reason to reach his fiqh and kalm conclusions? How different
is the role of reason in each discipline? What are the factors that determine the role reason plays
in kalm and ul al-fiqh? Is it possible to categorize him as either a rationalist or a scripturalist?
To answer these questions, I divide my study into two sections. The first section examines Ab
al-usayns methods in using rational arguments to form his kalm positions. I do so by
analyzing how he supports his kalm conclusions and explain what type of evidence he accepts
as eligible in kalm. In this section I argue that Ab al-usayn holds that reason, rather than
revelation, is the only eligible source of knowledge for the kalm issues that are relevant to
proving the veracity of revelation. This approach appears to undermine the role of revelation in
certain kalm topics. Nonetheless, I note that Ab al-usayns dependence on reason as a source
of information on the kalm issues that are relevant for establishing the authority of revelation is
motivated by dialectical reasons and not a result of an inherent position that elevates reason over
14
C. S. el-Tobgui in his The Epistemology of Qiys touched upon this question but did not analyze it on the same
scale I plan to do here.

revelation. Moreover, he does not consider revelation the anti-thesis of reason. For him, both
mediate the same truth and there is no inherent contradiction between them.
The second section investigates Ab al-usayns use of reason and rational methods in
ul al-fiqh as a means to reach fiqh conclusions. This section evaluates how far he depends on
rational methods in comparison to scriptural ones in ul al-fiqh. My analysis reveals that he
awards revelation relatively more authority in ul al-fiqh than in kalm. However, Ab alusayns dependence on revelation in ul al-fiqh does not mean, as will be shown, a rejection
of reason. He depends more on revelation in the ul al-fiqh matters that reason is incapable of
addressing. Also the dialectical considerations that necessitate his dependence on reason in some
aspects of kalm are not as present in ul al-fiqh. This allows him to relatively award revelation
more authority in ul al-fiqh. In addition, the rational investigation of the Divine attributes, as
will be mentioned in section one, already established the veracity of revelation, therefore humans
should trust revelation as a source of guidance.
In my conclusion I show that attempting to categorize Ab al-usayn as a rationalist or a
scripturalist is misleading, rather he is both. He acknowledges the role of reason and revelation,
but each has a different role to play that is dictated by dialectical considerations. I show that
revelation and reason fulfill different tasks in his kalm and ul al-fiqh and that he does not
attempt to favor one over the other. An attempt to categorize Ab al-usayn, and probably most
medieval Muslim jurists and theologians, as a rationalist or a scripturalist is misleading. Such an
analysis is shallow and fails to understand the complexities of Muslim theology and law.
I have mentioned that in this article I intend to use Ab al-usayns ideas on reason and
revelation to challenge a broader tendency among modern historians of Islam. In my comparison

of Ab al-usayns use of reason in kalm and ul al-fiqh I try to avoid the rationalist vs.
scripturalist dichotomy that for long dominated the modern study of Islamic thought. Modern
Islamicists frequently tend to categorize Muslim scholars and schools of law and theology as
either rationalists or scripturalists. They often imagine an ongoing battle between a scripturalist
Islam and a rationalist one. For example, A. Wensinck spoke of a war between rationalism and
orthodoxy in which the spricturalist orthodox branch came out victorious.15 G. Makdisi
speaks about a Sunn traditionalist revival in the fifth/eleventh century in which the forces of
Traditionalism fought against the forces of Rationalism of all shades.16 More recently, C.
Melchert states that from the later eighth century to the beginning of the tenth, there raged
fierce controversy between those who would found their jurisprudence exclusively on the hadith,
ab al-adth traditionialists, and those who reserved a leading place for common sense, ab
al-ray.17
This polarizing dichotomy is also present, although with less effect, among some Middle
Eastern scholars of Islam. In his famous book Fajr al-Islm, Amad Amn speaks about a
vehement dispute in early Islamic law between those who depend more on reason (ahl al-ray)
and those who depend more on Prophetic traditions (ahl al-adth) in reaching their legal
conclusions (kn al-niz bayn al-madrasatayn shaddan).18 Nar mid Ab Zayd uses violent
terminology such as battle (maraka) and conflict (ir) to describe the relationship between ahl
15
Arent Jan Wensinck, The Muslim Creed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 83. Using terms like
orthodox in an Islamic context is problematic, however I am here using Wensicks terminology.
16
George Makdisi, The Sunn Revival, in Islamic Civilization 950-1150, ed. D. H. Richards (Oxford: Bruni
Cassirer, 1973), 157. This idea often appears in G. Makdisis writings, for example see his Law and Traditionalism
in the Institutions of Learning of Medieval Islam, in Theology and Law in Islam, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum 2nd
Giorgio Levi Della Vida Biennial Conference 9-10 May 1969 UCLA (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971), 75, 86;
idem, Asharism and the Asharites in Islamic Religious History I Studia Islamica 17 (1962), 37-80; idem, The
Juridical Theology of Shfi: Origins and Significance of Ul al-Fiqh, Studia Islamica 59 (1984): 5-47.
17
Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools, 1.
18
Amad Amn, Fajr al-Islm, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dr al-Kitb al-Arab, 1969), 244. For the whole section on both
tendencies, see p. 234-45.

al-ray and ahl al-adth. He pictures their battle as one between rationalism and
scripturalism.19 The above, and many other, modern scholars of Islam often analyze the history
of Islamic law and theology through this dichotomy enforcing upon themselves a misleading
typology that would deem a scholar, a school of law, or theology as either rationalist or
scripturalist.
Unlike the previous scholars, more recent ones have noticed the deceitfulness of this
nave dichotomy. For example A. K. Reinhart, in his Before Revelation, studied how Muslim
jurists assess human actions before the advent of revelation, whether actions are proscribed,
prescribed, or neutral. He argues that this debate is not between rationalists and traditionalists.
Reinhart, convincingly, argues that it is rather between an optimistic view of Providence and
pessimistic one, and between an archaic position and an innovative one.20 Moreover, Anver
Emon recently wrote Islamic Natural Law Theories in which he examines the role of reason in
pre-modern Muslim law.21 In this book he argues against scholars such as G. Makdisi and P.
Crone who hold that Islamic law is only based on Divine discretion and does not have a concept
of natural law and reason. Emon suggests that the majority of pre-modern Muslim scholars,
regardless of their theological and legal disagreements, acknowledge the role reason plays in the
law making process.
Reinharts and Emons studies show that it is misleading to imagine that Muslim jurists
and theologians are trenched in two warring ditches, one rationalist and the other scripturalist.
19
Nar mid Ab Zayd, al-Imm al-Shfi wa-Tass al-Idljiyyah al-Wasaiyyah, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Maktabat
Madbl, 1996), passim.
20
A. Kevin Reinhart, Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought (Albany: Sate University of
New York Press, 1995), 39.
21
Anver Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). His earlier article Natural
Law and Natural Rights in Islamic Law, Journal of Law and Religion 20 (2004 -2005): 351-395 includes a brief
account of some of the major arguments of his book.

The current study builds on their arguments and suggests that modern scholars of Islam should
escape the trap of this dichotomy that dictates general and simplistic conclusions. Ab al-usayn
presents a perfect case study to question the dominance of this dichotomy. He is both a Mutazil
and a anaf. The anafiyyah are usually imaged as the rationalist school within the Sunn legal
system, whereas the Mutazilah are imaged as the proponents of rationalist theology. Here I
argue that Ab al-usayn, probably like most medieval Muslim jurists and theologians, accepts
the authority of both reason and revelation, but he awards each a different role to play depending
on the dialectical context of his ul al-fiqh or kalm argument. For him, neither reason nor
revelation has unconditional authority and neither is neglected for the sake of the other, both are
complementary and authoritative. Once again, this research does not attempt to tackle the issue
of reason and revelation in Islam in general. However, this research mainly sheds light on Ab
al-usayns contribution to this debate and tests modern perceptions of this debate against his
conclusions.
In my examination of Ab al-usayns methods in ul al-fiqh I mainly draw upon his
magnum opus al-Mutamad f Ul al-Fiqh which was written during the lifetime of his teacher
Abd al-Jabbr b. Amad al-Hamadhn (320-5/932-7 - 415/1025).22 In the same publication the
editors also published two treatises in ul al-fiqh written by Ab al-usayn namely Kitb
Ziydt al-Mutamad and Kitb al-Qiys al-Shar all published in a two volumes book under
the title of Kitb al-Mutamad f Ul al-Fiqh.23 To study Ab al-usayns use of reason in
kalm I also referred to his al-Mutamad. Although it is not a book on kalm, Ab al-usayn
briefly and sporadically mentions in it his positions on the evidence eligible for deducing kalm
22
See footnote number 4 in Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 23. It was Heemskerk who drew my attention to this note,
see Heemskerk, Suffering in Mutazilite Theology, 44.
23
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 991-1028, 1029-50. Kitb Ziydt al-Mutamad and Kitb al-Qiys al-Shar
respectively.

conclusions, including reason. Second, there is Ab al-usayns partially extant book Taaffu
al-Adillah; in this book he mainly criticizes some of the Mutazil kalm arguments that he
rejects and mentions his own positions.24 Unfortunately, both books do not include enough
details on Ab al-usayns kalm. Therefore, I am forced to refer to books by his Mutazil
teacher Abd al-Jabbr al-Hamadhn (known as Q al-Quh Abd al-Jabbr) in an attempt to
uncover some of the contemporary Mutazil kalm positions and ascertain some of the details
relevant to Ab al-usayns theology.
Ab al-usayn and Abd al-Jabbr both belong to the Bahshamiyyah sub-school of the
Mutazilah before Ab al-usayn established his own Mutazil sub-school. I do not assume that
both scholars have the same positions on all kalm topics, because we know that this is not the
case.25 However, I only refer to Abd al-Jabbrs books (mainly his master piece al-Mughn) in
the cases where it is clear from his and Ab al-usayns writings that both scholars expressed
similar if not identical theological opinions.26 This method is mainly adopted in two cases. First,
in case Ab al-usayn very briefly states his theological position without much details. If Abd
al-Jabbr adopts the same position and mentions his own views in more details, I refer to his
books to know the missing details about Ab al-usayns position. A position that he already
mentioned but only briefly- in his works. Second, in most of the theological doctrines I
examine, Ab al-usayn usually expresses his theological position without mentioning his
detailed argument in support of it. In such cases, I refer to Abd al-Jabbrs writings to obtain
24
Ab al-usayn al-Bar, Taaffu al-Adillah, ed. Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke (Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz, 2006).
25
For more information on the differences between both Mutazil scholars, see Madelung, Rational Theology, 1-12;
EI3, s.v. Abd al-Djabbr.
26
Abd al-Jabbr b. Ahmad al-Hamadhn, al-Mughn f Abwb al-Tawd wa-l-Adl, 20 vols. ed. aha usayn and
others (Cairo: Wizrat al-Thaqfah wa-l-Irshd al-Qawm, 1960-). When referring to Abd al-Jabbrs writings a
source of information on some aspects of Ab al-usayns theology, I always present evidence showing that both
scholars hold similar if not identical theological positions. For example, see pages 18-21, 35-6 of this article.

more details on the nature of the arguments that Ab al-usayn might have used to reach and
support his theological positions, positions that Ab al-usayn already expressed in his books
but only briefly. Thus, I do not refer to Abd al-Jabbrs writings to determine Ab al-usayns
theology, but only to ascertain some of the missing details that Ab al-usayn left unmentioned
in his discovered books. Nonetheless, one must admit here that information on Ab al-usayns
theology inferred from Abd al-Jabbrs books will inevitably remain somewhat speculative.27
My use of Abd al-Jabbrs writings as an auxiliary source of information on some
aspects of Ab al-usayns theology might open my choice of Ab al-usayn as the case study
here for question. Is Abd al-Jabbr a more suitable choice for this research rather than Ab alusayn specially that his theology is known in more details than Ab al-usayns? I would
negatively answer this question, for a number of reasons. First, in case I chose Abd al-Jabbr as
my case study I would run into a similar problem. None of Abd al-Jabbrs books on ul alfiqh have been hitherto discovered.28 Volume seventeen of his al-Mughn addresses some aspects
of ul al-fiqh. However, Abd al-Jabbr repeatedly all through this volume explicitly states that
this volume is not intended as a book on ul al-fiqh but only as a brief account of the ul alfiqh issues that are relevant to theology. He also frequently states that in this volume he only
27
There is an ul al-fiqh manuscript that is erroneously attributed to Ab al-usayn. Abd al-amd Ab Zunayd
edited and published MSS vat. ar. 1100 from the Vatican Library and indentified it as Ab al-usayns Shar alUmad which is suppose to be a commentary on Abd al-Jabbrs hitherto undiscovered book al-Umad. Ab
Zunayd admits that identifying the manuscript was not easy especially that the first and last pages are missing
leaving the manuscript anonymous. However, W. Madelung argues that vat. ar. 1100 is not Shar al-Umad but
rather al-Mujz f Ul al-Fiqh authored by the Zayd scholar Ab lib Yay b. al-usayn al-Niq bi-l-aqq (d.
424/1033). What conclusively supports Madelungs opinion is the discovery of further manuscripts of al-Mujz f
Ul al-Fiqh (e.g. MSS. ar. E. 409 preserved in Biblioteca Ambrosiana) that are identical with the manuscript Ab
Zunayd erroneously identified as Ab al-usayns Shar al-Umad. The evidence against Ab Zunayds
identification is compelling therefore I do not use vat. ar. 1100 as a source of information on Ab al-usayns
thought. For Ab Zunayds argument, see Abd al-amd Ab Zunayd, introduction to Ab al-usayn Muammad
b. Al b. ayyib al-Bar (d. 436/1044) [pseudo], Shar al-Umad, 2 vols., ed. Abd al-amd Ab Zunayd
(Medina: Maktabat al-Ulm wa-l-ikam, 1410/[1990]), 22-5. For Wilferd Madelungs argument, see his Der Imam
al-Qasim b. Ibrahim (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965), 178-80. It was Sabine Schmitdke who informed me of the
Biblioteca Ambrosiana manuscript in a personal e-mail correspondence on the 20 th of March 2010.
28
Al-kim al-Jusham mentions three of Abd al-Jabbrs books on ul al-fiqh namely al-Nihya, al-Umad, and
Shar al-Umda. See, al-Jusham, abaqt al-Mutazilah , 368.

mentions his ul al-fiqh positions briefly. He repeatedly refers the reader to his other books on
ul al-fiqh to ascertain more details on his positions.29 This problem is further complicated
when we know that volume seventeen of al-Mughn is only partially extant. The editor
speculates that one third of the manuscript is missing.30 To ascertain some of the missing details
on Abd al-Jabbrs ul al-fiqh I will have to refer to his contemporaries writings on legal
theory such as Ab al-usayns book al-Mutamad. In this case I would be adopting a similar
methodology to the one I already adopted in this research to gather some of the missing details
on Ab al-usayns theology. In case I chose Abd al-Jabbr as my case study I will have
detailed information on his theology but I will face a shortage of information on his ul al-fiqh
and refer to his contemporaries books to treat this lacuna. In case I chose Ab al-usayn I will
have detailed information on his ul al-fiqh but face a shortage of information on his theology
and also refer to his contemporaries writing to fill a similar lacuna. However the next two
reasons make Ab al-usayn rather than Abd al-Jabbr a better choice for this study.
Second, my choice is also motivated by the relative shortage of studies on Ab al-usayn
if compared to the ones on Abd al-Jabbr. There are numerous studies on Abd al-Jabbrs
legacy. The number of studies on Ab al-usayns thought dwarf when compared to the ones
conducted on his teachers legacy. Therefore I chose to rather focus on Ab al-usayn and shed
more light on his thought that still remains relatively in the shade. Third, Abd al-Jabbr is a
Shfi scholar whereas Ab al-usayn adopts the anaf madhhab. As previously mentioned,
the anaf School of law is usually stereotyped as the most rational school among the four Sunn
Schools of law. The Shfi madhhab does not have this reputation. Therefore, I preferred to
29
For example see, Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 17:46, 91-2, 102-3, 116, 152, 245, 279, 295, 325, 327, 328, 338,
352. Also see the editors comments in his introduction to Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 17:4-5.
30
See the editors introduction to Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 17:3-4.

study the role of reason and revelation in the thought of a scholar who belongs to a madhhab
usually credited with relatively more appreciation of reason than other schools of law. Ab alusayns legal orientation will better serve the questions I am posing in this study. It will help
me show that even a scholar who belongs to supposedly rationalist legal and theological schools
accepts the authority of revelation in the same vehement of any other scholar who belongs to the
other schools of law and theology.
One final point in this regard, I have used the books of Abd al-Jabbr as a source of
information on some aspects of Ab al-usayns theology because both are contemporaries and
for some time- both belonged to the same Mutazil sub-school.31 I deliberately avoid using the
few available writings of earlier Mutazil theologians as a source of information on Ab alusayns Mutazil theology. Using the writings of earlier Mutazil scholars to gather
information on a later Mutazil theologian would entail an assumption that the Mutazilah are
one unified group with only one unanimously accepted and unchanging theology. An assumption
that is quite questionable. Medieval heresiogarphies inform us that there are at least seventeen
Mutazil sub-schools.32 We also know that Mutazil theology probably existed even in an
embryonic form- since the second/eighth century. It is inconceivable that despite the presence of
many Mutazil sub-schools and the different historical contexts in which different Mutazil
scholars lived in that they all would adopt only one monolithic theology. Therefore it would be a
31
I only referred once to Rukn al-Dn Mamd b. Muhammad al-Malam (d. 536/1141), Kib al-Mutamad f
Ul al-Dn, ed. Martin McDermott and Wilferd Madelung (London: al-Hoda, 1991) for information on Ab alusayns interpretation of a tradition attributed to the Prophet that have theological references. See p. 26-7 of this
article. Also see footnote 73 of this article for my justifications for referring to Ibn al-Malams book in this context
in particular.
32
For example Fakhr al-Dn al-Raz mentions seventeen Mutazil sub-schools, see al-Rz, Itiqdt, 23-42; Ab
Manr Abd al-Qhir b. hir b. Muammad al-Baghdd (d. 429/1037) mentions eighteen schools, see his al-Farq
bayn al-Firaq, ed. Muammad Uthmn al-Khisht (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Sn, 1989), 104-177; Ab al-Muaffar alIsfarn (d. 471/1078) mentions eighteen sub-schools, see his al-Tabr f al-Dn wa-Tamyz al-Firqah al-Njiyyah
an Firaq al-Hlikn (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Azhariyyah l-l-Turth, 1999), 53-82.

methodological fallacy to refer to earlier Mutazil authors to gain more information on Ab alusayns theology. Moreover, along the same lines, the conclusions of this paper are limited to
Ab al-usayns thought. This research is based on the theological writings of Abd al-Jabbr
and Ab al-usayn, therefore claiming that its conclusions apply to the whole Mutazil School
would be an unwarranted generalization.
Before going any further it might be useful to start with a definition of the terms
revelation and reason. Revelation is the term I use in reference to the Qurn and the Prophetic
Sunnah. I also use revelation as a translation of the terms shar and sam that Ab al-usayn
uses to refer to the Qurn and the Prophetic Sunnah. The use of the word revelation in reference
to Prophetic Sunnah might be problematic. Muslim scholars do not usually consider the
Prophetic Sunnah to be the verbatim word of God, whereas they unanimously accept the Qurn
as such. Thus it is easier to apply the word revelation to the Qurn. Therefore, my reference to
the Prophetic Sunnah as revelation proper is only an approximation.33
The term reason is more complex. I use reason to translate the Arabic word aql. Some
modern anthropologists such as S. Tambiah and P. Winch have already noted that there is no one
definition of rationality and there is no one yard stick by which scholars can judge the rationality
of cultures other than their own.34 Winch describes enforcing one cultural definition of
rationality on another as a category mistake. For him, and many others, different cultures in
33
Reinhart made a similar comment, see his Before Revelation, 185.

Stanely J.Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion and the Scope of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), especially 111-39; Peter Winch, Understanding a Primitive Society, in Rationality, ed. Bryan R.
Wilson (1970; reprint, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974): 78-111; Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its
Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). It is Tambiah who drew my attention to
Winchs discussion of this problem. However, one must say that Tambiah does not agree with Winch on many
points (see his critical remarks in p. 121-30). Moreover, Tambiahs and Winchs comments are expressed in relation
to anthropological studies of primitive tribes who lived during the two previous centuries. The study of medieval
Islam is categorically different. However their comments on the difficulties of defining reason and rationality are
applicable to the study of the role of reason in any culture and society in the past and the present.
34

different periods of time have different understandings of rationality. To apply a modern
understanding of rationality to a medieval one would be a category mistake that will lead to
misunderstanding the role and the meaning of reason in an intellectual context of the past. As it
is well known among modern scholars of Islam, there are different Muslim pre-modern
understandings of rationality and there is an extensive modern literature engaging with it.
Winchs concerns might be taken for granted, however the presence of the rationalist vs.
scripturalist dichotomy among modern scholars of Islam show that his criticisms of other
anthropologists applies to modern scholars of medieval Islam as well. To avoid committing this
category mistake I am here only concerned with the Mutazil definition of rationality and
particularly that of Ab al-usayns.
Unfortunately, Ab al-usayn, in his discovered books, does not leave us a clear
definition of reason. Therefore, in a hesitant attempt to ascertain his definition of reason, I
mainly refer to the Basran Mutazil (especially Abd al-Jabbrs) definition of the term. In
general, it seems that the Basran Mutazilah saw that aql is knowledge. Ab al-usayn notes
that the Mutazilah define aql as the knowledge that God creates in humans.35 Mahra Ab Sada
wrote that earlier Mutazil scholars, such as Ab Al al-Jubb (d. 303/915-6) and his son Ab
Hshim (d. 321/933) accept this understanding of aql.36 On similar terms, A. N. Ndir says that
the Mutazil scholar Ab al-Hudhayl al-Allf (died between 226/840-1 and 235/849-50)
defines reason as the power to acquire knowledge.37 The famous Mutazil scholar Abd alJabbr al-Hamadhn defines reason as an aggregate of knowledge, once it occurs in the one
who is accountable (al-mukallaf, i.e. humans who are expected to follow religious injunctions)
35
Ab al-usayn, Taaffu al-Adillah, 78.

Mahra Ab Sada, al-Ittijh al-Aql f Mushkilat al-Marifa ind al-Mutazilah (Cairo: Dr al-Fikr al-Arab,
1993), 80.
37
Albr Nar Ndir, Falsafat al-Mutazilah : Falsifat al-Islm al-Asbaqn, 2 vols. (n.p.: Mabaat al-Rbiah,
1951), 2:34.
36

his rational speculation and inferences become sound and he becomes capable of performing his
religious duties.38 Abd al-Jabbr sees that this knowledge is mainly innate created by God in
humans.39 He argues that the knowledge(s) that comprise reason is the one(s) necessary for
performing religious duties and without which the acquisition of further knowledge is
impossible.40 It is also the knowledge indispensable for a basic understanding of the ontological
realities of the world. Furthermore, it is the necessary knowledge (al-ulm al-arriyyah)41
required for a basic understanding of ethical and deontological norms such as knowing that
injustice is evil, justice is good, and that thanking the benefactor is a duty.42 In sum, reason or
aql are the innate knowledge that differentiate between a sane and an insane person. Reason is
the knowledge that makes humans aware of their ethical and deontological obligations and thus
allows them to conform to the social values of their social contexts. Reason is also the
foundational knowledge that is necessary for gaining further knowledge.43
One must note that we have been mainly considering the Basran Mutazil definition of
reason. Unfortunately, for the moment, we can not be sure whether or not Ab al-usayn agrees
with this definition. His hitherto discovered works do not offer a concrete definition for reason.
As mentioned above Ab al-usayn says that the Mutazilah define reason as knowledge created
by God in humans. He attributes this definition to the Mutazilah without categorically rejecting
it. He only objects saying that the knowledge that composes reason is not always innate but is
partially innate and partially acquired.44 If he rejects the idea that reason is an aggregate of
38
Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 11:375.

" "
39
Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 11:371-2.
40
41
42
43
44

knowledge he would have mentioned this objection as well. Given this, it might be safe to
assume that, as a Basran Mutazil, Ab al-usayn adopts the Basran Mutazil definition of
reason mentioned above.45 The use of this reason unaided by revelation to acquire fiqh and
kalm knowledge is the subject of this research. In the next section I particularly focus on Ab
al-usayns use of reason to reach and support kalm conclusions.
AB AL-USAYNS USE OF REASON IN KALM : THE LIMITS ON REVELATION

Ilm al-kalm is a discipline that investigates theological issues related to the nature of God, His
relation with humans, and political authority (immah). It is also a discipline concerned with
metaphysical, ontological, and cosmological questions. A specialist in ilm al-kalm (sg.
mutakallim/ pl. mutakallimn) usually expresses him/her self in the language and terminology
common among the ancient Hellenistic philosophers. Ilm al-kalm also has a polemical and an
apologetic function, a mutakallim is often engaged in polemical debates against non-Muslims
and Muslims belonging to other sects in defense of his/her understanding of Islam. It is difficult
to find an accurate translation for ilm al-kalm, however a common one is theology. This
translation is only an approximation and I plan to use the Arabic term and its approximate
English translation interchangeably.46
45
In the second section, I explain another definition of reason that Ab al-usayn and other Mutazilah hold. As
will be mentioned in more details, Ab al-usayn believes that any proper rational investigation must inevitably
lead to the Mutazil understanding of Divine unity and justice, and in this sense reason becomes the same as those
two theological concepts. Any contradiction with both principles is not only a contradiction with the Mutazil creed,
but is also a contradiction with correct reason. In this sense, Divine unity and justice becomes part of the
knowledges that comprise reason, see p. 23-4 of this study.
46
For more details on the definition of ilm al-kalm, see Ab Nar Muammad al-Farb (d. 339/950), I alUlm, 2nd ed., ed. Uthmn Amn (Egypt: Mabaat al-Itimd, 1949), 107-8; Sad al-Dn Masd b. Umar alTaftazn (d. 793/1390), Shar al-Maqid min Ilm al-Kalm, 2 vols. (Pakistan: Dr al-Marif al-Numniyyah,
1401/1981), 1:18; Ibn Khaldn, Muqaddimat ibn Khaldn, 458-60; Amad Mamd ub, F Ilm al-Kalm: al-

The attributes of God (al-ift) are an integral part of ilm al-kalm. Both Ab al-usayn
and Abd al-Jabbr argue that reason should play the primary role in investigating this aspect of
ilm al-kalm. Abd al-Jabbr often argues that humans cannot prove and appreciate the authority
and veracity of revelation until they first know the attributes of the God who sent this revelation.
Therefore he concludes that the Divine attributes are among the primary evidence necessary to
establish the authority of revelation.47 Ab al-usayns position is very similar: he says that
humans will not be certain that revelation is trustworthy and infallible until they first know that
God Himself is infallible, just, and does not need to commit evil. Thus before knowing those
Divine attributes (and related kalm issues) revelation has no authority. Therefore, Ab alusayn argues that humans are left only with unaided reason to investigate the nature of God and
His attributes.48 He adds that since the Divine attributes are important evidence to establish the
authority of revelation, referring to revelation to ascertain the attributes of God would rest the
authority of revelation on a petitio principii. For that reason, from a dialectical perspective, it
does not make sense to refer to revelation to discover the Divine attributes and then later use the
Divine attributes to establish the authority of revelation. Furthermore, it does not make sense to
refer to Gods Words to prove His good and just attributes. Ab al-usayn suggests that in order
to avoid this logical fallacy, reason, instead of revelation, should be used to investigate any
kalm issue that is necessary to establish the authority and veracity of revelation.49 His position
Mutazilah (Beirut: Dr al-Naha al-Arabiyyah, 1405/1985), 15-8; H. A. Wofson, The Philosophy of the Kalam
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 1-42; EI2, s.v. Ilm al-Kalm.
47
Abd al-Jabbr b. Amad al-Hamadhn, Mutashbih al-Qurn, ed. Adnn Zarzr (Cairo: Dr al-Turth, 1969),
36; Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 12:166, 16:395, 17: 93, 315, 393.
48
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 886-7, 910.
49
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 887.

on this point is common among other Muslim theologians including Abd al-Jabbr who
expresses identical views on this issue.50
Among the Divine attributes that Ab al-usayn and Abd al-Jabbr believe to be crucial
for establishing the authority of revelation are Divine unity and justice (al-tawd wa-l-adl).
Both scholars argue that Divine unity and justice are necessary to prove that Gods revelation
includes neither evil nor injustice. They argue that without precluding evil and injustice from
revelation it is impossible to establish its usefulness and probative value. In the following pages,
I explain their arguments linking Divine unity and justice to proving the probative value of
revelation.
For the Mutazilah, Divine unity is more than an assertion of monotheism.51 Their
understanding of Divine unity leads to other theological consequences such as the rejection of
corporeality (tajsm) and an assertion of the createdness of the Qurn.52 Their rejection of
corporeality (i.e. God does not have a material body) led them to reject any anthropomorphic
description of God because they consider anthropomorphism as tantamount to corporeality.53
50
Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 14:151-2, 17:93; Richard Frank, Knowledge and Taqld: The Foundations of
Religious Belief in Classical Asharism, Journal of the American Oriental Society 109 (1989): 37-62.
51
W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003),
48.
52
For a detailed explanation of the Mutazil concept of Divine unity and its theological consequences, see Abd alJabbr b. Amad al-Hamadhn [Mnkdm Shashdw d. 425/1034], Shar al-Ul al-Khamsah, ed. Abd al-Karm
Uthmn (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1988), 149-298; Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 57-64. In relation to Shar al-Ul al-Khamsah, it is now widely accepted
that A. Uthmn wrongly identified the edited manuscript as Abd al-Jabbrs Shar al-Ul al-Khamsah. D.
Gimaret wrote an article arguing that the edited manuscript is rather Mnkdms commentary on and paraphrastic
reproduction of Abd al-Jabbrs original book Shar al-Ul al-Khamsah. After reading the book it became clear to
me that the manuscript Uthmn edited includes the words of two authors and not only one, which makes Gimarets
identification more plausible. In all cases, I only refer to Shar al-Ul al-Khamsah to understand the contemporary
Mutazil positions from certain theological questions and not to investigate Abd al-Jabbrs thought in particular.
For more on Uthmns argument that the manuscript is Abd al-Jabbrs, see Abd al-Karm Uthmn, introduction
to Abd al-Jabbr, Shar, 25-8. For Gimarets argument, see D. Gimaret, Les Ul al-Hamsa du Q Abd alJabbr et leurs Commentaires, Annales Islamologiques 15 (1979): 47-96.
53
For example, see Abd al-Jabbr b. Amad al-Hamadhn, al-Mukhtaar f Ul al-Dn, in Muammad Amrah,
ed. Rasil al-Adl wa-l-Tawd (Cairo: Dr al-Hill, 1971), 184-90.

Abd al-Jabbr sees that disproving corporeality is vital for establishing the authority of
revelation. He argues that the main evidence proving that God does not commit evil is that He is
totally self sufficient (ghan) and is never in need (jah) and thus He has no need or motivation
to commit evil. He then links self sufficiency with non-corporeality and makes the authority of
revelation contingent on both concepts. Abd al-Jabbr states that revelations from a corporeal
being can not be taken for granted as good and just. He argues that any corporeal body is
insufficient (mutj) and thus might commit evil to satisfy its needs. Abd al-Jabbr adds that an
insufficient being might then commit evil and injustice to satisfy the needs of its corporeal body
and maintain its existence. A revelation from such a being cannot then by default be trusted
because there is a possibility that this corporeal being might commit injustice or evil in its
revelations. Therefore, evil and injustice can not be categorically precluded from the revelations
of such a being. Revelations from such a being do not warrant the complete trust of the human
mind. Abd al-Jabbr concludes that revelations only from a totally self-sufficient being who will
never need to commit evil to survive can be taken for granted as trustworthy and free from evil.54
Through this argument Abd al-Jabbr makes the authority and veracity of revelation contingent
on upholding the non-corporeality of God.
In none of his discovered works does Ab al-usayn explicitly connect non-corporeality
with self-sufficiency. However, it can be inferred from his writings that he would agree with
Abd al-Jabbrs statements mentioned in the previous paragraph. In al-Mutamad, Ab alusayn says that among the conditions to accept the performance of the religious duties (taklf)
mediated by revelation is to know that this revelation originates from a self-sufficient Being who
54
Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 4:19-33, 6:177-80.

has no need to commit evil.55 He also says that proving the authority of revelation depends on
first establishing the self-sufficiency of God.56 Ab al-usayn adds that self-sufficiency ensures
the usefulness of revelation. He believes that self-sufficiency guarantees that nothing can either
benefit or cause harm to God, therefore Gods orders and prohibitions mentioned in His
revelation are not for His own benefit but for the benefit of His creatures including humans,57
and therefore are worthy of being followed. Also, in his Taaffu al-Adillah, Ab al-usayn
states that self-sufficiency is among the crucial conditions to know that God will not commit
evil.58 Ab al-usayn makes these statements while attempting to prove the probative value and
usefulness of revelation. It is clear here that for Ab al-usayn the authority of revelation is
contingent on first establishing that it comes from a self-sufficient Being. It is obvious that Ab
al-usayns statements here are very similar to Abd al-Jabbrs statements in which he makes
the rejection of corporeality vital to establish the trustworthiness of revelation. Therefore, it
seems that both scholars believe that Divine unity (specially the rejection of corporeality) is
necessary to prove the veracity of revelation, and thus, in order to avoid a circular argument,
revelation should not be used to investigate Divine unity, because Divine unity will be later used
as evidence for the authority of revelation. Therefore, given this dialectical context, reason is the
only tool that is logically capable of addressing issues related to Divine unity.
A similar argument is made to show that Divine justice is crucial for establishing the
authority of revelation. Again the Mutazil perception of Divine justice is not just a simple
assertion of Gods adherence to objective criteria of justice. It necessitates other theological
55

"
"
56
57
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 80-2.
58

consequences such as free will (qadar), the concept of Gods adherence to the optimum benefit
of humans (al-al wa-l-ala),59 Divine benevolence (luf), Divine wisdom (ikmah).60 Abd
al-Jabbr states that Divine justice (and its theological consequences) is indispensable to
preclude the possibility that revelation will contain evil or injustice.61 Ab al-usayn holds the
same position. He says that Divine wisdom (one of the theological consequences of Divine
justice) is important to prove the usefulness of revelation.62 Gods wisdom is necessary to rule
out the possibility that He will do futile or evil acts. Therefore, the belief that Gods revelation is
free from futile orders and pointless prohibitions is contingent on first establishing that God is
wise and just.63 Divine justice is thus necessary to establish the authority and usefulness of
revelation. For that reason, depending on revelation to prove Divine justice and its theological
consequences would rest the authority of revelation on a circular argument. To avoid such a
dialectic fall, Ab al-usayn argues that reason rather than revelation is the only suitable tool to
investigate issues related to Divine justice and wisdom. Referring to revelation to establish those
theological tenants would be referring to Gods words to establish His wisdom and justice. Such
an argument would not stand any logical scrutiny.
Unfortunately, in his published books, Ab al-usayn does not mention the rational
arguments by which he reached his belief in Divine unity and justice. However, as can be
inferred from his al-Mutamad and Taaffu al-Adillah, Ab al-usayn is very explicit in his
59
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 80-2. According to this Mutazil concept, God will always create and put humans
in the best situation (al-ala) and will always guide them, through revelation, to their best interest (al). For
more details, see Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 14:7-180; idem, Shar, 518-28.
60
For a detailed explanation of the Mutazil concept of Divine justice and its theological consequences, see Abd
al-Jabbr, Shar, 299-528. For a detailed description of the Mutazil understanding of Divine benevolence see
volume thirteen of Abd al-Jabbrs al-Mughn.
61
Abd al-Jabbr, Mutashbih, 9, 33.
62
63
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 180-1, 371, 405, 551.

belief in Divine unity and justice and their theological consequences. Since he believes that only
reason can prove Divine unity and justice and their theological consequences, and since he
believes in those two theological principles, then it follows that he believes that the Mutazil
perception of Divine unity and justice is compatible with objective reason. This brings up
another Mutazil definition of reason. For Ab al-usayn, and many other Mutazilah, any
correct rational investigation of the nature of God will only lead to the Mutazil understanding
of Divine unity and justice. Any rational effort leading to different theological conclusions would
be corrupt. In their works when Ab al-usayn and Abd al-Jabbr speak about compatibility
with reason (aql), they are in fact referring to compatibility with their perceptions of Divine
unity and justice and their theological consequences, and not to compatibility with an objective
rational criteria that is free from doctrinal presumptions. Therefore, for them (and probably other
Mutazilah as well), predestination and anthropomorphism are not only incompatible with the
Mutazil creed, but are a challenge to the veracity of revelation and in discrepancy with correct
reason. This shows that among the knowledges that comprise reason Ab al-usayn and
Abd al-Jabbr would include knowledge and belief in the Mutazil perceptions of Divine unity
and justice.
Ab al-usayn, and the Mutazilah in general, consider Divine unity and justice (and
their theological consequences) fundamental to establishing the veracity of revelation, therefore
for dialectical reasons revelation is not a valid source of information on them. Ab al-usayn
does not reject revelation because it is inherently incapable of establishing these theological
positions. He refers to revelation to establish any other kalm position that he considers not to be
relevant to proving the authority of revelation.64 His dependence on reason in such theological
64
For example, see Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 888; idem, Taaffu Al-Adillah, 77.

topics is motivated by his desire to avoid any logical fallacies and maintain the soundness of a
rational argumentation for the authority of revelation.
HARMONIZING REVELATION WITH REASON

Ab al-usayns dependence on reason does not mean that he totally neglects revelation. He has
to come up with theories to show that his rationally acquired Mutazil creed is in harmony with
revelation. This problem is particularly pressing because there are some aspects of revelation that
appear to be in contradiction with the Mutazil perception of Divine unity and justice, such as
the Qurnic verses and traditions attributed to the Prophet that describe God in anthropomorphic
terms or the ones that seem to uphold predestination.65 Ab al-usayn has to explain the
existence of such texts without compromising his Mutazil creed. Before going into his
justifications, it is useful to give some brief definitions of the terms important for understanding
his arguments. In terms of authenticity there are two types of textual evidence. First the
conclusively authentic texts (qa al-thubt), those are the textual evidence that Muslim scholars
believe to be beyond any doubt authentic. The only two types of conclusively authentic textual
evidence are the Qurn and the mutawtir Prophetic traditions. The mutawtir Prophetic
traditions are ones narrated by a large number of unrelated people whose unrelatedness would
65
For the Qurnic verses that might be used to support anthropomorphism, see for example 2:115, 20:39, 38:75.
For traditions attributed to the Prophet that might be used to support anthropomorphism, see for instance
Muammad b. s al-Tirmidh (d. 279/892), Sunan al-Tirmidh, ed. Amad Shkir and others (Beirut: Dr Iy alTurth al-Arab, n.d.), 5:366, in CD-ROM al-Jmi al-Kabr. For the Qurnic verses that might be used to support
predestination, see for example 9:51, 13:22, 57:22. For traditions that might be used to support predestination, see
for example Muslim b. al-ajjj (d.261/875), a Muslim, ed. Muammad Abd al-Bq (Beirut: Dr Iy alTurth al- Arab, n.d.), 2037-42. CD-ROM al-Jmi al-Kabr.

make it impossible for them to collude to forge a tradition.66 Second, there is the inconclusively
authentic textual evidence (ann al-thubt); most traditions attributed to the Prophet are of this
type, they are usually called d traditions.67 Specialists in the discipline of adth have
established criteria to evaluate the authenticity of the d traditions. The ones that do not fulfill
these authentication criteria are discarded as fake (maw), d traditions that fulfill the
authentication criteria are considered to be only most probably and not conclusively authentic.68
Ab al-usayn is aware that there are a number of inconclusively authentic textual
evidence (mainly d traditions attributed to the Prophet) that are in contradiction with the
Mutazil perceptions of Divine unity and justice. However, he explicitly states that any d
tradition attributed to the Prophet that supports anthropomorphism or predestination must
definitely either be a result of a later fabrication or an error in transmission.69 In several
occasions in al-Mutamad, Ab al-usayn also says that any d tradition attributed to the
Prophet that is in contradiction with reason must be inauthentic, because the Prophet would
never utter words that are in contradiction with reason.70 As mentioned above, it can be easily
inferred that what Ab al-usayn means by reason is not objective reason that is free from any
theological presumptions. For him, reason includes a belief in the rationally acquired Mutazil
principles of Divine unity and justice and their theological consequences.
66
For more details on mutawtir traditions, see Amad b. Al b. ajar al-Asqaln (d. 852/1449), Nuzhat al-Naar
f Shar Nukhbat al-Fikr f Muala Ahl al-Athar, ed. amd al-Dimirdsh (Mecca: Maktabat Nir Muaf alBz, 2000), 25-30; Abu al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 547-8, 552-3, 558, 561, 565-6; EI2, s.v. Tawtur.
67
Ab Amr b. al-ala (d. 643/1245), Muqaddimat ibn al-ala wa-Masin al-Iil, ed. ishah Abd alRaman (Cairo: Dr al-Marif, 1990), 454.
68
For more details, see Ibn ajar al-Asqaln, Nuzhat al-Naar, 39; EI2, s.v. Khabar al-wid. d traditions
are also further divided into a, asan, and af traditions according to the reliability of their narrations. On
those last categories and further classifications, see ub al-li, Ulm al-adth wa-Mualauh (Damascus:
Mabaat Jmiat Dimashq, 1959), 141-67.
69
This approach is best demonstrated in Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 549-50.
70
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 549-50, 570-3, 641-2, 1028.

However, Ab al-usayn does not always rush to declare an alleged Prophetic tradition
as inauthentic, he says that before the tradition is disallowed, a scholar should try to see if the
tradition in question could be allegorically interpreted (tuawwal) in a way that would make it
compatible with reason. Only after this process of tawl fails to harmonize the alleged
tradition with reason, should the tradition in question be declared inauthentic.71 It is worth
noting that in this context the Arabic term that Ab al-usayn uses for the word interpretation is
tawl and not the more commonly used term tafsr. Tawl is used by some medieval scholars to
refer to allegorical interpretations that do not remain faithful to the exoteric meanings of the
verse, whereas tafsr is usually limited to an exoteric interpretation of a Qurnic verse.72
I found only one example in which Ab al-usayn is reported to have performed tawl
of an d tradition attributed to the Prophet. Rukn al-Dn b. al-Malam (d. 536/1141) records
Ab al-usayns tawl of an alleged Prophetic tradition that is used to support the beatific vision
of God on Judgment Day.73 In this tradition it is reported that the Ab Dharr al-Ghifr (d.
32/652-3) asked the Prophet if he saw God. There are two versions of the Prophets reply, the
first is, Light, I saw [it], whereas the second is, Light! How can I see it? According to Ibn alMalam, Ab al-usayn prefers the second version, because it is in harmony with the Mutazil
71
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 549-50, 570-3, 641-2, 1028. Interestingly, Abd al-Jabbrs Mutazil student
Mnakdm Shashdw mentions an identical method to deal with such d traditions, see Abd al-Jabbr, Shar,
770.
72
For more details on the different definitions of the terms tawl and tafsr, see Jall al-Dn al-Suyt (d. 911/1505),
Al-Itqn f Ulm al-Qurn, 4 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat al-af, 2006), 4:138-40.
73
In his al-Mutamad f Ul al-Dn, Ibn al-Malam says that the first part of his book is an abridgement of Ab alusayns Taaffu al-Adillah. Ibn al-Malam adds that he rarely disagreed with Ab al-usayns theological
teachings, and when he did he made it clear to the reader (p. 5). In their introduction to al-Mutamad f Ul al-Dn,
the editors state that Ibn al-Malam is the 6th/12th century main representative of Ab al-usayns Mutazil subschool (p. vi). Therefore, Ibn al-Malams al-Mutamad f Ul al-Dn seems to be a relatively reliable source of
information on Ab al-usayn in this specific context. See, Ibn al-Malam, Kitb al-Mutamad f Ul al-Dn.

rejection of the beatific vision.74 However, Ibn al-Malam says that Ab al-usayn does not
reject the authenticity of the first version, instead Ab al-usayn is reported to have stated that if
the Prophet actually uttered the first reply, then this must be a reference to seeing the Angel
Gabriel or that the Prophet saw light but did not see God Himself.75 In this example, Ab alusayn does not rush to declare the first reply as fake. He rather prefers to abandon its literal
meaning and came up with another interpretation that makes the alleged tradition compatible
with the Mutazil perception of Divine unity.
It is relatively easy to declare an inconclusively authentic tradition fake, however this
method is not possible when dealing with conclusively authentic textual evidence that are in
contradiction with Divine unity and justice. Unfortunately, neither in al-Mutamad nor in
Taaffu al-Adillah does Ab al-usayn inform his readers how he explains the existence of
Qurnic verses that appear to be in contradiction with the Mutazil understanding of Divine
unity and justice. As mentioned above Ab al-usayn believes that the Prophet would never
utter words that are in contradiction with Divine unity and justice. It is then reasonable to assume
that Ab al-usayn also believes that the Qurrn would never bring information that are in
contradiction with Divine unity and justice as well. However, as mentioned earlier, there are
several Qurnic verses that seem in contradiction with both Mutazil principles. Ab al-usayn
does not mention how he intends to resolve this dilemma. However, Abd al-Jabbrs words
might offer some insights on the methods Ab al-usayn might have adopted to deal with such
verses.
74
A number of Mutazil scholars argue that accepting the beatific vision will lead to accepting that God has a
corporeal body, therefore they reject it. See, for example Abd al-Jabbrs argument in his al-Mughn, 4:140.
75
Ibn al-Malam, al-Mutamad f Ul al-Dn, 486-7.

Abd al-Jabbr explicitly states that some Qurnic verses might appear to be in
contradiction with the rationally acquired Mutazil main theological principles, such verses he
considers to be mutashbih, whereas he considers the verses that are explicitly in harmony with
the Mutazil five principles to be mukam,76 and concludes that all mutashbih verses must be
interpreted in harmony with the mukam ones regardless of the literal meaning of the mutashbih
verses.77 This means that even the Qurnic verses that their literal meaning would appear to be
in contradiction with Mutazil theology will be allegorically interpreted to harmonize them with
the Mutazil creed. By this exegetical method, all Qurnic verses would be interpreted in
harmony with Divine unity and justice, including those with an apparent literal meaning in
contradiction with both principles. Given Ab al-usayns advise to allegorically interpret d
traditions that seem in contradiction with Mutazil reason before declaring them fake, it seems
safe to assume that Ab al-usayn would have accepted Abd al-Jabbrs method in dealing with
the Qurnic verses that seem in contradiction with Divine unity and justice.
Unfortunately, Ab al-usayns writings do not explicitly reveal why revelation should
be interpreted according to the dictates of correct reason and not vice versa. It is also not
explicitly stated why reason is entitled to determine the authentic parts of revelation, and not
revelation that would distinguish between correct and corrupt rational endeavors. At the same
time, Ab al-usayn makes it very clear that humans trust in revelation is based on the
76
There are a number of Qurnic verses that might be interpreted in a manner that supports freewill, for example
2:286, 18:29, 74:382. And other Qurnic verses that might be interpreted in a manner that rejects
anthropomorphism, for example 42:11, 112:4. The five theological principles are the theological beliefs that the
Mutazilah unanimously accept, among them is Divine unity and justice. The remaining three are the promise and
the threat, the intermediate position, and commanding the good and forbidding the evil. However, the Mutazilah
differ on the details pertaining to these broad theological doctrines.
77
Abd al-Jabbr, Mutashbih, 7. Mukam and Mutashbih are two exegetical terms. The first is usually used to
refer to unequivocal Qurnic verses, whereas the other is usually used to refer to equivocal Qurnic verses or ones
that their connotations are unclear. This is an oversimplified explanation, for more details, see ub al-li,
Mabith f Ulm al-Qurn, 5 th ed. (Beirut: Dr al-Ilm li-l-Malayn, 1968), 281-6.

rationally acquired Mutazil understanding of Divine unity and justice. Humans trust revelation
because God is wise, just, and self sufficient. These Divine attributes (that are established by
rational arguments) ensure that God will not commit evil, injustice, and futile acts. This
guarantees that His revelation is free from evil and error. Moreover, this assures that Gods
proscriptions and prescriptions are not futile or harmful rather they are beneficial and aim at
avoiding harm.78 If those principles are undermined then the authority of revelation will be
undermined as well. Thus, it makes sense to find Ab al-usayn always keen to interpret
revelation in harmony with Divine unity and justice. From his point of view, it would not make
sense to find revelation bringing information that would undermine its own authority and
veracity.
Abd al-Jabbrs statements are even more explicit. He states that the authority of
revelation is based on the rational arguments that support the Mutazil understanding of the
Divine attributes (i.e. Divine unity and justice). Therefore he argues that it is inconceivable that
revelation would contradict those rationally acquired principles because they are the main
evidence proving the veracity of revelation. If revelation contradicts those rationally acquired
principles it would undermine the evidence that supports its own authority. Therefore, the Qurn
and the Prophetic Sunnah must always be in harmony with Mutazil reason. It would not make
sense to interpret the Qurn and the Prophetic Sunnah in contradiction with reason because
contradiction with reason would undermine their own authority. Furthermore, it is impossible
that the Qurn and the Prophetic Sunnah would include information that undermines their own
authority. Since Divine unity and justice is the main evidence establishing the authority of
78
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 179-81, 284, 371, 405, 419, 551, 886-8, 908, 931.

revelation,79 therefore revelation cannot be used as evidence to disprove the same evidence (i.e.
Divine unity and justice) that proved its own veracity.80 Therefore the correct interpretation of
revelation is always the one that will keep revelation in harmony with reason. Thus, on kalm
issues that are relevant to Divine unity and justice, reason determines the authentic parts of
revelation and determines the correct interpretation of revelation as well. On this point, Abd alJabbr and Ab al-usayn (and probably other Mutazilah) are in agreement.
This theory places reason on top of Ab al-usayns epistemic hierarchy of evidence in
kalm. Reason becomes the decisive factor in identifying the authentic Prophetic traditions and
determining the correct interpretation of revelation. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Ab
al-usayn does not believe that reason is superior to revelation. He rather adopts this epistemic
hierarchy of evidence in kalm for dialectical reasons. To maintain a sound rational argument for
the authority of revelation, Ab al-usayn has to avoid depending on revelation to establish the
Divine attributes. The Divine attributes themselves will be later used to establish the authority of
revelation. This epistemic hierarchy of evidence is adopted to avoid grounding the authority of
revelation on a circular argument and not because he holds that reason is superior to revelation.
In ul al-fiqh Ab al-usayn adopts a slightly different epistemic hierarchy of evidence. The
next section examines Ab al-usayns epistemic hierarchy of evidence in ul al-fiqh and
compares it to his hierarchy of evidence in kalm.
AB AL-USAYNS USE OF REASON IN UL AL-FIQH
79
80
Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 12:166, 16:395, 17:315, 393.


To conduct this comparison, I mainly investigate Ab al-usayns use of reason in relation to
revelation in reaching fiqh conclusions. I conduct this investigation by analyzing a number of
ul al-fiqh questions. In this section, I argue that revelation has more authority in his ul alfiqh than in his kalm. However, his dependence on revelation in ul al-fiqh does not mean, as
will be shown, a rejection of reason. He depends more on revelation in the ul al-fiqh matters
that reason is incapable of addressing. Also the dialectical reasons that necessitate his
dependence on reason in some aspects of kalm, especially the Divine attributes, are not present
in ul al-fiqh and this allowed him to award revelation more powers in it. However, I argue that
attempting to categorize Ab al-usayns ul al-fiqh as rationalist or scripturalist is misleading.
Rather, his ul al-fiqh appreciates reason and revelation, but each has a different role to play,
and for him both are indispensable.
On the macro level ul al-fiqh (usually translated as legal theory and I plan to use the
Arabic term and its English translation interchangeably) are the theoretical and philosophical
foundation[s] of Islamic law.81 On the mircro level, ul al-fiqh are the methods jurists use to
read and interpret the Qurn and the Prophetic Sunnah to reach and support their fiqh
conclusions. Ul al-fiqh are the tools through which fiqh is formed and through which the
Qurn and Prophetic Sunnah produce positive laws that Muslims can apply in their daily lives.
In addition to the Qurn and the Prophetic Sunnah, consensus and legal reasoning also serve as
ul al-fiqh methods to form fiqh regulations.82 Fiqh is the positive laws that ul al-fiqh
81
Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), vii.
For more details on the definition of ul al-fiqh, see Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad , 10-1; al-Shrz, Shar alLuma, 157-63; Ab al-Mal al-Juwayn (d. 478/1085), al-Burhn f Ul al-Fiqh, 2 vols. ed. Abd al-Am alDb (Mansoura: al-Waf, 1418 H), 78-9; Ab mid Muammad b. Muammad al-Ghazl (d. 505/1111), alMustaf min Ilm al-Ul, ed. amza b. Zuhayr fi (Medina, 1413/1992), 1:5; Muammad al-Khuar, Ul alFiqh, 6 th ed. (Cairo: al-Maktabah, al-Tijriyyah, al-Kubr, 1389/1969), 14-20; Abd al-Wahhb Khallf, Ilm Ul
al-Fiqh, 8 th ed. (n.p.: Maktabat al-Dawah al-Islmiyyah, n.p.), 12-5. The definition I adopt here indicates that the
function of ul al-fiqh is to both construct new laws and justify current ones. However, some recent historians
82

produce. Ul al-fiqh are abstract regulations whereas fiqh is the body of exact rules and
regulations deduced from revelation (via ul al-fiqh) that Muslims are expected to follow.
To understand the evidence and the process through which Ab al-usayn reaches his
fiqh conclusions I start by examining his moral epistemology.83 His trust in revelation is based
on his rationally established theology. As mentioned in the previous section, the rationally
acquired Mutazil concept of al-ala is based on the idea that Gods wisdom and justice makes
Him act in the best benefit of His creatures. This concept, Ab al-usayn argues, necessitates
that God will always refrain from issuing purposeless, evil, or harmful orders.84 Therefore, Ab
al-usayn concludes that all revelational stipulations, by default and based on his rational
theology, must lead to benefit (malaah)85 and fend off harm (fasd).86 Ab al-usayn, as Carl
El-Tobgui notes, sees that there is a symbiotic relationship between revelation and malaah.87
Ab al-usayn explicitly says that Gods orders are for the wellbeing of humanity.88 Therefore
humans can safely depend on it to mediate moral assessments of human actions, because what
revelation condones is by default good and beneficial and whatever it condemns is always
repugnant and harmful.
argue that legal theory is not a tool that creates new laws but one that only justifies current laws, for example see
Sherman Jacksons argument in his Function and Formalism: Toward a Functional Analysis of Usul al-fiqh, in
Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002): 177-201. For an argument that supports
my definition, see Wael Hallaq, Considerations on the Function and Character of Sunni Legal Theory, Journal of
the American Oriental Society 104.4 (1984): 679-689.
83
Marcus Singer defines moral epistemology as the discipline, at the intersections of ethics and epistemology, that
studies the epistemic status and relations of moral judgments and principles. It has developed out of an interest,
common to both ethics and epistemology, in questions of justification and justifiability in epistemology, of
statements or beliefs, and in ethics of actions as well of judgments of actions and also general principles of
judgments. For more details see his article in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, s.v. Moral Epistemology.
Also, see The Online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. Moral Epistemology.
84
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 78, 80, 180.
85
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 573-4, 713.
86
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 908, 988.
87
El-Tobgui, The Epistemology of Qiys, 318.
88

Ab al-usayns trust in revelation is clear in his argument for the goodness (usn) of
and benefit behind religious rituals (ibdt) ordained by revelation. He states that all religious
rituals are Divinely ordained for the benefit of Humanity.89 In his al-Mutamad, he does not
attempt to rationally prove that the religious rituals ordained by revelation are good and
beneficial. Instead he argues that Gods wisdom necessitates that He will not burden humans
with obligations without a reward, will not issue futile orders, and prevent Him from issuing
harmful orders.90 He adds that Gods wisdom necessitates that all of His prescriptions are for the
benefit of humans including the religious rituals. Therefore, it is taken for granted that the
performance of religious rituals is good and beneficial.91 However, Ab al-usayn states that
unaided reason is incapable of discovering the good nature in and benefit behind rituals such as
the five daily prayers and fasting during Raman, only revelation can do this task.92 For
example, unaided reason cannot inform humans of the reasons why it is obligatory [and thus
beneficial] to fast on the first day of Raman whereas it is not blameworthy [thus not harmful]
not to fast one day before Raman.93 Such ritualistic details, the benefit that they bring, and the
harm caused by omitting them can only be known by revelation and not through any rational
effort. This is also true about other religious proscriptions such as the prohibition of consuming
intoxicants and blood. Ab al-usayn says that pure reason does not prohibit these acts and does
not consider them harmful.94 However, since revelation proscribes them, they must be harmful.
89
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 403-5, 574, 710, 888-9.

Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 80-1, 178-80.
91
92
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 888-9. Elsewhere Ab al-usayn explicitly says that unaided reason would have
considered the five daily prayers as futile, see his al-Mutamad, 682. Only revelation is capable of discovering the
benefits behind such a ritual.
93
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 888. He also adds that reason can not ascertain the details necessary for performing
the five daily prayers such as the number of prostrations required for each prayer, see his al-Mutamad, 724.
94
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 301, 725-6, 813.
90

This symbiotic relationship between revelation, on the one hand, and benefit and
goodness on the other should not mislead us to conclude that Ab al-usayn believes that
actions become good or repugnant just because of a revelatory stipulation. This problem is
complicated by Ab al-usayns use of the terms illah and wajh (defined below). In his
discussion of tall (i.e. knowing the illah behind a fiqh judgment (ukm) in order to perform
qiys),95 he argues that an illah shariyyah (i.e. illah known or inferred from revelation) might
be the wajh96 of benefit (malaah) behind performing certain acts, and therefore there is no
malaah in this act before the advent of revelation.97 This might suggest that for Ab al-usayn
certain acts are not essentially beneficial or good and they only acquire their aspect (wajh) of
goodness or repugnancy after the advent of revelation.
The word wajh is of importance here and deserves some attention. Reinhart notes that the
Basran Mutazilah believe that the wajh of an act is part of the ontological composite that
constituted the nature of a thing or act; yet the wajh was only tenuously a part of the acts
existence. Reinhart adds that the Basran Mutazilah came up with this idea to correct the rigid
moral theory of the Baghdadi Mutazilah who wish
95
Illah is the reason behind the fiqh judgment as mentioned or inferred from a text (na). The illah is used to
extend the same judgment mentioned in the text to another similar case not covered by the text, this process is called
qiys. The case covered by the text is called al while the case to which the judgment is transferred is called far.
For more details on these terms and their use in qiys, see Hallaq, A Tenth-Eleventh Century Treatise, 197-206.
For Ab al-usayns definitions of illah, see Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 704-5. For his definition of al, see
96
R. Frank translates the term wajh as the manner of the acts occurrence. See, Richard Frank, Beings and their
Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Mutazila in the Classical Period (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1978), 126, 131-5; idem, Reason and Revealed Law: A Sample of Parallels and Divergences in
Kalm and Falsafa, in Philosophy, Theology, and Mysticism in Medieval Islam, ed. Dimitri Gutas (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2005), VII 125. George Hourani translates this term as ground or aspect, for his discussion of the term,
see his Islamic Rationalism The Ethics of Abd al-Jabbr (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 62-89, 104-8, 121-2. A.
Reinhart translates wajh as aspect, see his Before Revelation, esp. 146. Here, I adopt the term aspect as a
translation of the technical term wajh.
97

to lodge[the acts] moral quality within its very being, to make the moral quality part of what made
it what it was. For the Basrans, such a theory entailed too rigid a view of the acts moral qualities
since, consequently, similar acts could not differ in value though they differed in context. Yet the
Basrans were unwilling to divorce the acts being entirely, for this might entail the inability of the
mind to perceive its qualities. 98
Instead the Basrans come up with the concept of wajh to mitigate the Baghdadi position and be
able to contextualize each act. Here Reinhart bases his discussion of the term wajh mainly on
Richard Franks discussion of it,99 and both heavily depend on books authored by Abd alJabbr, mainly al-Mughn. Ab al-usayn does not discuss the term wajh in any of his published
books. Nonetheless, his definition and discussion of goodness (usn) and repugnance (qub) in
al-Mutamad and Taaffu al-Adillah makes it clear that he thought that the wajh of an act is the
factor that causes an act to be either good or repugnant.100 What is not clear from Ab alusayns definitions is whether revelation awards this wajh to the act or it only discovers it in
the act. If it awards it to the act then revelation is the only source of goodness or repugnancy of
an act not the acts essential being. If revelation only discovers it, then revelation only discovers
an aspect (wajh) already in the act that unaided reason was only incapable of noticing.
Ab al-usayns teacher Abd al-Jabbr is more explicit on this point. He holds that
revelation only discovers the wajh of goodness or repugnancy of an act and does not award it to
the act.101 There are three passages indicating that Ab al-usayn agrees with his teacher. Ab
al-usayn says that for an order (amr, i.e. a religious prescription) to be good, it must add
another good character (ifah) to a [already] good action.102 Here Ab al-usayn is saying that
revelation will add another good character to what is already a good action. This suggests that he
98
Reinhart, Before Revelation, 146.

Frank, Beings and their Attributes, 126, 131-5; idem, Reason and Revealed Law, VII 125.
100
For example, see Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 1003; idem, Taaffu al-Adillah, 89-92.
101
Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 14:22-3. Also see Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 33-4.
102
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad , 177.
99

does not believe that revelation randomly awards the wajh of goodness or repugnancy to an act.
Revelation rather confirms the goodness of and adds another good aspect to an already good act.
Second, he says that for a prohibition to be good, the prohibited act must be evil.103 Again, this
indicates that he believes that any Divine proscription prohibits an act that is already evil and the
act does not become evil simply because of the Divine proscription. Finally, Ab al-usayn says
that the Wise (i.e. God) will not issue an order unless there is a benefit that will be accumulated
from this order.104 He also adds that Sharah is prescribed either to ensure a benefit or fend off a
harm.105 Both statements indicate that he believes that God issues an order or a prohibition to
maintain a certain benefit or avoid a harm and not because of a random fiat. These statements
indicate that Ab al-usayn, probably like most Mutazilah, does not believe that acts become
good and evil just because a Divine decree. God issues orders and prohibitions in response to the
good (and useful) or evil (and harmful) nature of these acts.
Nonetheless, it is not accurate to describe Ab al-usayns moral assessment scheme as
either rationalist or scripturalist. Unlike the stereotypical view of the Mutazilah, Ab al-usayn
adopted an intermediate position between the rational and revelational moral assessments of
human acts. Revelation will condone what is condoned by reason and will condemn what is
condemned by it. Nonetheless, unaided human reason is, in some cases, incapable of discovering
the good and repugnant nature of certain actions, in such cases revelation is the ultimate guide.
As mentioned in the previous section, Humans trust in revelation is supported by rational
theological arguments, thus the authority of revelation is based on reason. Since Muslims trust
revelation, and know that revelation is always in harmony with reason, therefore they should
103

105
104

follow it knowing that it will lead to good and beneficial acts. Ab al-usayns moral
epistemology uncovers the interdependence of reason and revelation in his ul al-fiqh. In fiqh
and ul al-fiqh, revelation needs reason as evidence for its authority, and reason needs
revelation to ascertain the ethical and deontological value of actions that reason is incapable of
ascertaining.
REASON AND REVELATION IN INTERACTION

The role Ab al-usayn awards to reason and revelation in ul al-fiqh reveals the
interdependent relationship between them in his thought. This interdependence will be further
demonstrated by discussing four ul al-fiqh issues. First, the Shar judgment (ukm Shar) of
actions before the advent of revelation, are they permitted, proscribed, or neutral?106 Ab alusayn sees that, in the absence (or silence) of revelation, reason has the ability to distinguish
between the useful, thus permitted, and the harmful, thus proscribed, acts.107 His position is again
based on the rationally acquired theological concept of al-ala according to which God will
always act in the best interest of humans. Therefore, Ab al-usayn argues that God will
constantly provide humans either with rational or revelatory evidence to warn them against
harmful acts.108 Therefore, if revelation is silent on an issue, he assumes that reason has the
ability to reach the right judgment on this issue. Otherwise, God would have left humans
unguided, and for Ab al-usayn the concept of al-ala necessitates that God will never leave
humans unguided.
106
For more on this question, see A. K. Reinharts Before Revelation.

108
107

Ab al-usayn goes one step further, he declares that, in the absence of revelation, any
rational judgment (ukm aql) is just as valid as a revelatory one (ukm Shar).109 Revelation is
silent on many issues and numerous novel cases always appear that are not addressed by
revelation. On these issues Ab al-usayn awards reason a free hand. However, he makes it
clear that rational judgments are valid until altered by revelation.110 In other words, reason can
offer fiqh assessments in the silence of revelation and not in contradiction to it, and in case of
contradiction revelation will alter the rational judgment.111 For example, Ab al-usayn says that
there is no rational proof for the infallibility of the consensus (ijm) of the Muslim ummah.
Reason does not distinguish its consensus from that of other nations. Nonetheless, revelation
informs Muslims, according to Ab al-usayn, that their consensus is unique and infallible.112
He also adds that there is no rational basis for the prohibition of consuming intoxicants113 and
blood,114 nonetheless revelation proscribed both. Therefore, they must be harmful. At the same
time, he does not believe that revelation arbitrarily imposes obligations on humans. As
previously mentioned, reason has established Divine wisdom and justice. Therefore, as Ab alusayn argues, all Divine orders are good, beneficial, and not arbitrary. Moreover, reason has
established the veracity of revelation, therefore humans already know that revelation is
trustworthy. Thus he allows revelation to alter reason without stripping reason of its authority in
fiqh. His presumptive position is that reason could issue valid judgments, unless revelation
interferes. Revelation has enough authority to alter reason not because it can arbitrarily do so, but
109
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 579, 583 "" , 875 "" .

Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 715 "" . Similar statements are produced on p.
11, 908-9, 1015.
111
112
113
114
110

because rational theological arguments have already established the veracity and goodness of
revelation.
The only case in which reason is allowed to alter a fiqh stipulation dictated by revelation
is when this stipulation contradicts Divine justice which for Ab al-usayn is among the rational
basis on which the authority of revelation rests. This is done by allowing reason to particularize
(takh) revelation.115 Because Divine wisdom and justice are among the indispensable evidence
that proves the authority of revelation, any literal interpretation of revelation that would
undermine Divine wisdom must be erroneous. This is also valid in fiqh. Ab al-usayn states
that we already know that God is wise. Therefore, any fiqh obligation ordained by revelation
that will undermine Gods wisdom must be particularized, because we know that a wise God will
never issue unwise obligations.116 He mentions the example of intolerable religious obligations
(taklf m l yuq). Since imposing intolerable obligations is unwise, therefore God will never
issue such obligations. Revelation places general obligations on all Muslims. However, children
and the insane should be excluded (through particularization) from these general obligations.
Young children and the insane cannot understand revelation, therefore they are relived from
religious duties until they gain the mental abilities necessary to understand revelation. Requiring
children and the insane to follow revelation is unwise,117 and God will never issue unwise and
harmful obligations.118 Ab al-usayn considers their exclusion to be necessary to maintain the
veracity and authority of revelation. If God were to be proven unwise, then His revelation will be
deprived of its authority. For dialectical reasons, reason is allowed to particularize general
115
W. Hallaq defines takh as the exclusion from the general of a part that was subsumed under that general.
See Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 45-6.
116
117
118

revelatory obligations that will undermine the authority of revelation. Reason is again utilized to
maintain the authority and veracity of revelation. This is the only case in ul al-fiqh in which
reason has more authority than revelation.
The second ul al-fiqh issue I study is the concept of preponderance (tarj).119 Ab
al-usayn defines tarj as declaring one inconclusive (and/or equivocal) evidence (amrah)
as stronger than another.120 Tarj is used by jurists to resolve the problem of the existence of
conflicting textual evidence by adopting one and forsaking the other. Here I examine Ab alusayns methods of tarj between conflicting traditions attributed to the Prophet. He says
that where a jurist faces two contradicting traditions ascribed to the Prophet the jurist is
required to give preponderance to one over the other as authentic or more relevant to the case
in question. He also says that in such a case, a scholar should prefer the tradition with the
more reliable chain of narration (isnd). If both have equally reliable chains of narration, a
scholar should prefer the particular (kh) to the general (mm) tradition. If this fails then
the jurist should investigate whether one tradition has abrogated (nasakh) the other. Finally,
if this does not help, the scholar should see if both traditions mention optional regulations.121
When all those attempts fail to identify the epistemically stronger tradition, Ab al-usayn
suggests following the tradition that is in contradiction to the judgment of reason. He advises
the reader not to assume that the tradition in harmony with reason is more worthy of being
followed, because, in his opinion, it makes more sense that the Prophet would only teach
humans what they cannot know by their independent reason.122 Only when this final attempt
119
Here I borrow Hallaqs translation of the term tarj that he used in his A History of Islamic Legal Theories.
121
122
120

fails to distinguish the tradition worthy of being followed should the jurist follow the one in
harmony with reason.123
A third way to analyze Ab al-usayns use of reason in ul al-fiqh is by examining
his epistemic hierarchy of evidence through which fiqh conclusions may be reached; i.e.
what types of evidence produce more reliable knowledge. It seems that Ab al-usayn has
two epistemic hierarchies, one for kalm and another for ul al-fiqh. In theology he awards
reason relatively more authority than revelation. This is not exactly the case in ul al-fiqh, in
which he seems to award textual evidence relatively more authority than rational ones. In his
ul al-fiqh reason and rationally oriented evidence (such as qiys) are always ranked below
textual evidence; they are kept at the bottom of his epistemic hierarchy of evidence used to
reach fiqh conclusions.
This hierarchy is obvious in the relation between rational evidence and d
Prophetic traditions. Ab al-usayn, like many other jurists, states that d traditions only
yield suppositional (ann) knowledge,124 and therefore he, like others, puts them in an
inferior position to conclusive (qa) evidence such as the Qurn and mutawtir Prophetic
traditions. In fact, d Prophetic traditions are at the bottom of his epistemic hierarchy; all
other evidence is preferred to them. However, the only kind of evidence that is inferior to
d Prophetic traditions is the rationally acquired evidence. For example, he says that d
Prophetic traditions are not allowed to abrogate any Qurnic verse, because the Qurn is
conclusively authentic, whereas d traditions are inconclusively authentic.125 In addition,
d Prophetic traditions are not allowed to abrogate mutawtir ones for the same reason.
123

125
124

According to Ab al-usayn, the only kind of evidence that d Prophetic traditions can
overrule are rational ones.126 d traditions have only suppositional (ann) epistemic value
and occupy a low status in Ab al-usayns epistemic ladder, and they can neither abrogate
the Qurn nor the mutawtir Prophetic traditions. Nonetheless, they can abrogate rational
evidence. This shows that rational evidence occupy a low status in his hierarchy of evidence,
even lower than d traditions. Therefore rational evidence seems to be at the very bottom
of Ab al-usayns epistemic hierarchy of evidence used in fiqh, in a position below all
textual evidence.
A similar hierarchy is noticed when analyzing Ab al-usayns views on the
relationship between qiys and textual evidence. Although qiys in fiqh has to be based on
textual evidence, it includes a considerable amount of rational speculation. His discussion of
the relation between qiys and d traditions show that he considers qiys to have less
epistemic value than d Prophetic traditions. He explicitly states that in case of a
contradiction between qiys and any textual evidence (khabar) a scholar is advised to follow
the textual evidence.127 Moreover, like many other legal theorists,128 Ab al-usayn
discusses the different types of ilal on which a qiys judgment can be based. His discussion
of the types of ll reveals, again, his preference for textual evidence in ul al-fiqh to
evidence that includes a wider margin of rational effort. Ab al-usayn speaks about two
kinds of ill, first illah manah which is an illah that is explicitly mentioned in the al
and the jurist does not have to use his reason to ascertain it. Secondly, an illah mustanbaah
which is an illah that is not explicitly mentioned in the al, and a jurist has to rationally infer
126
Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 443-4, 446-7.

128
Again, here I borrow the term Hallaq uses in his A History of Islamic Legal Theories to refer to Muslim jurists
specialized in ul al-fiqh.
127

it from the al. Both types of ilal can be used to reach a judgment through qiys, however
Ab al-usayn prefers the illah manah to the mustanbaah, and says that the manah is
more reliable than the mustanbaah.129 This shows his preference to a judgment reached
through a qiys that includes less rational speculation. In sum, it seems that he always prefers
to rely on textual evidence rather than rationally oriented ones to reach fiqh judgments. This,
to me, shows that in his ul al-fiqh rationally oriented evidence has an inferior status to the
textual ones.130
CONCLUSION
The comparison of Ab al-usayns use of reason in kalm and ul al-fiqh shows that he has
two different methods in using reason one for ul al-fiqh and another for kalm. In kalm,
reason enjoys more authority than revelation. However, his dependence on reason is not a
rejection of revelation, nor does he hold the superiority of reason over revelation in kalm. He
sees that many kalm issues, especially the Divine attributes, are necessary to establish the
veracity of revelation. Using revelation to establish the kalm issues that will later be used to
prove the authority of revelation grounds the authority of revelation on a circular argument. To
avoid this logical fallacy and maintain a sound rational argumentation for the authority of
revelation, he has to depend on reason rather than revelation in his investigation of the kalm
issues that are relevant for establishing the authority of revelation. Furthermore, he believes that
both reason and revelation produce the same truth, and that there is no inherent contradiction
129

El-Tobgui also discusses Ab al-usayns epistemic hierarchy of evidence used in fiqh, and concludes that
textual evidence enjoy more authority than rational ones in Abu al-usayns fiqh. See The Epistemology of Qiys,
319.
130

between them. Any apparent contradiction between reason and revelation is a result of
misinterpreting revelation or a text wrongly considered to be part of it. At the same time, he
holds that revelation must be interpreted in harmony with reason and not the opposite. Mainly
because rational evidence is the main proof for the authority of revelation, therefore he argues
that it does not make sense that revelation would contradict the rational evidence that proves its
authority.
Whereas in ul al-fiqh the dialectical motives that encourage Ab al-usayn to depend
more on reason is not as present as they are in theology. Therefore, in his ul al-fiqh revelation
enjoys relatively more authority than reason. This does not mean that Ab al-usayn rejects the
use of rational evidence in to reach fiqh conclusions. After all he assumes that all rational fiqh
judgments are valid as long as they do not contradict revelation. Also, kalm rational arguments
are the main support for the authority of revelation in ul al-fiqh and fiqh, and in this sense
revelation is indebted to reason. Since the authority of revelation has already been rationally
established, then it follows that humans can safely follow revelation even if sometimes they fail
to rationally ascertain the grounds of the revelatory stipulations. For Ab al-usayn, humanitys
trust in revelation is not a fideistic belief in its authority, after all humans did not trust revelation
until reason proved that it deserves their trust.
This trust in the authority of revelation does not mean that revelation can arbitrarily
condone and condemn actions. All proscriptions and prescriptions communicated by revelation
are for the benefit of humanity. However, Ab al-usayn is aware that some of the revelatory
stipulations, such as the religious rituals and dietary regulations, are contrary to what reason will
consider necessary and beneficial. For him, this does not prove that revelation issues irrational
stipulations, rather this shows the incapability of the unaided human mind to understand the

rationale behind those revelatory provisions. Again this symbiotic relationship between goodness
and revelation in fiqh and ul al-fiqh is supported by the Divine attributes of unity and justice,
two concepts reached by rational speculation. Divine unity and justice guarantee that revelation
is good, infallible, and free from evil. Unlike kalm, in fiqh and ul al-fiqh reason is interpreted
in harmony with revelation, and not the opposite. This is because, firstly, in most fiqh and ul
al-fiqh matters there are no dialectical reasons that force certain rational conclusions on
revelation. Secondly, as mentioned above the authority of revelation has already been established
by kalm rational arguments that established the justice and wisdom of God, then there is no
need to put revelation to further rational investigations.
Thus, it is inaccurate to describe Ab al-usayns kalm and ul al-fiqh as either
scripturalist or rationalist. For him, reason and revelation are in need of each other and each play
an indispensable role in his thought. Moreover, he does not have one fixed method in using
reason in both kalm and ul al-fiqh. The role of reason in each discipline is mainly determined
by the dialectical context of the question being addressed. Reason plays a primary role in
investigating the theological issues that are relevant for establishing the authority of revelation.
In other theological issues revelation plays an equally important role. This is also true about ul
al-fiqh matters. In the ul al-fiqh matters that are relevant to establishing the authority of
revelation, reason has the upper hand. In ul al-fiqh matters that are not relevant for such a task,
revelation has the upper hand. Furthermore, the authority of revelation is indebted to the rational
investigation of the Divine attributes. This does not mean that reason is the ultimate guide on all
religious matters. He believes that reason is sometimes incapable of ascertaining the rationale
behind some of the religious stipulations. All religious stipulations that are not relevant to
establishing the authority of revelation are to be decided by revelation. Therefore, Ab al-

usayn is both a scripturalist and a rationalist. He does not have one categorical position from
reason or revelation that is applicable to all ul al-fiqh and kalm topics. His position from the
role of reason is rather determined by the dialectical framework of each argument.
This study focuses primarily on Ab al-usayns contributions to the debate around the
role of reason and revelation in law and theology. It does not attempt to address this debate in the
different Muslim legal and theological systems in general. Such an attempt would require a much
more extensive and broader study. The main aim here is to shed more light on Ab al-usayns
contributions to this debate and test his conclusions against the rationalist vs. scripturalist
paradigm that is dominant within modern scholarship of Islam. Ab al-usayns ideas explained
above show that it is erroneous to use rationalism and scripturalism as absolute typologies to
classify him and analyze his thought; this might be also true about many other medieval Muslim
jurists and theologians. To study Ab al-usayns thought through the prism of this dichotomy
pre-determines an either or conclusion. Such polarizing conclusions are simplistic and fail to
understand the complexities of the legal and theological debates current among medieval Muslim
scholars. The debate is not about the authority of reason or revelation. It is rather about how to
use reason and revelation to reach religious conclusions, how to maintain a rational argument for
the authority of revelation, and a debate around which kalm and ul al-fiqh issues are relevant
for this argument.
Labeling medieval Muslim scholars and schools of thought (both legal and theological)
as rationalist or scripturalist will not help in understanding medieval Muslim theology and law.
Such an approach will rather pre-determine misleading conclusions. The Mutazilah in kalm
and the anafiyyah in fiqh have been always considered the proponents of rationalism, whereas
the Ashariyyah in kalm and the anbilah in fiqh have been considered the representatives of

scripturalism. Modern scholars of Islam should free themselves from this polarizing typology.
Adhering to this nave typology will prevent them from focusing on and appreciating the real
questions and debates that are current among the medieval Muslim jurists and theologians.

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Ab al-usayn al-Bars Use of Reason in Ilm al-Kalm and Ul al-Fiqh

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 2

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 3

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 4

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 5

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 6

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 7

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 8

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 9

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 10

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 11

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 12

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 13

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 14

Reinhart made a similar comment, see his Before Revelation, 185.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 15

Ab al-usayn, Taaffu al-Adillah, 78.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 16

Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 11:375.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 17

AB AL-USAYNS USE OF REASON IN KALM : THE LIMITS ON REVELATION

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 18

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 19

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 20

Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 4:19-33, 6:177-80.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 21

Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 908.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 22

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 23

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 24

HARMONIZING REVELATION WITH REASON

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 25

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 26

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 27

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 28

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 29

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 30

AB AL-USAYNS USE OF REASON IN UL AL-FIQH

Abd al-Jabbr, al-Mughn, 12:166, 16:395, 17:315, 393.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 31

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 32

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 33

Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 403-5, 574, 710, 888-9.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 34

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 35

Reinhart, Before Revelation, 146.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 36

Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 182.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 37

REASON AND REVELATION IN INTERACTION

For more on this question, see A. K. Reinharts Before Revelation.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 38

Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 579, 583 "" , 875 "" .

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 39

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 40

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 41

Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 672.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 42

Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 443-4, 446-7.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 43

Ab al-usayn, al-Mutamad, 847.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 44

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 45