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With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the
best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best
evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly
pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country,
or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as
processual presumption.
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws [Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje
(pilotage law of Venezuela) and the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules
governing the navigation of the Orinoco River)] were not proven in the manner provided by
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial Of the
Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an
official publication of the Republic of Venezuela. The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1
del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela.
Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for
they are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is
also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain
Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and
authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such
certificate could be found in the records of the case.
The Court pointed out that Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower court. A foreign law
is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of the
foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue.
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the
grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
Petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
FACTS OF THE CASE: Appeal taken by the Government from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga granting the petition of Marvin G. Ellis and Gloria C. Ellis for the
adoption of a Filipino baby girl named Rose.
Petitioners, both are citizens of the United States, husband and wife, had been in the Philippines
for three (3) years at the time of the hearing of the petition for adoption, the husband being
assigned as staff sergeant in the U.S. Air Force Base in Angeles, Pampanga.
Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital and her mother
left her with the Heart of Mary Villa stating that she could not take care of Rose without bringing
disgrace upon her family.
ISSUE: Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to
adopt Baby Rose.
HELD AND RATIO: NO. Not being permanent residents, petitioners cannot adopt in the
Philippines, pursuant to Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that
non-residents cannot adopt.
Adoption proceedings being in rem, no court may entertain them unless it has jurisdiction, not
only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also, over the res, which is the
personal status not only of the person to be adopted, but also of the adopting parents. The Civil
Code of the Philippines (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a
natural person is determined by his nationality. Pursuant thereto, the Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction over the status of an alien petitioner in adoption proceedings. The political law of
system, which adopts the view that personal status, in general is determine by and/or subject to
the jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of laws, p. 86; The
Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II pp. 713-714). Hence, under either the
nationality theory or the domiciliary theory, the Philippine courts cannot assume an exercise
jurisdiction over the status of petitioners, who are not domiciled in the Philippines, and, hence,
non-resident aliens.
Decision appealed is REVERSED, and another one shall be entered denying the petition in this
case.