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a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 4 June 2013
Accepted 18 January 2014
Available online 7 February 2014
In this paper, the relationship between stability, safety and operability for small shing vessels is
investigated. To this aim, a relevant set of small shing vessels is selected. These have similar main
dimensions and capsized in stability related accidents between 2004 and 2007. The stability and
operability characteristics of such vessels are confronted with those of the vessels that had been
decommissioned in order to build them, operated by the same crews, in the same areas and using the
same shing gear types. Such vessels are considered as reference safe vessels since their operational
life came to an end without any hazards. With regard to stability, fullment of the intact stability
criteria in force when the vessels were designed and built is veried. Operability criteria are selected
and their fullment is analyzed for a range of sea states, headings and velocities using linear
seakeeping analysis. In light of this analysis, operability is discussed as a valid indicator of ship safety.
This step is considered relevant prior to analyzing these sets of vessels through second generation
stability criteria under development by the International Maritime Organization, a subject of
immediate future research.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Safety
Operability
Fishing vessel
Seakeeping
Intact stability
Ship motions
1. Introduction
Commercial shing is one of the most hazardous occupations
today, with fatality rates being widely documented in the specialized literature. In the US, they are around 130 fatalities per year
for every 100,000 shing sector workers, compared to 4 for the
rest of the sectors (Lincoln and Lucas, 2010); similar alarming
gures are reported in the UK (UK MAIB, 2010).
In Galicia, the region of Spain where the shing sector is most
prevalent, with more than one half of the shing eet and workers
of the whole country, shing accounts for a very high number of
fatal accidents during the working day, second only to the
construction sector which employs a much larger percentage of
the Spanish working force. It can be seen that most of the
casualties happen in vessel-related accidents (or maritime accidents) and among these, losses due to stability problems (capsizing or large heeling) account for half, mainly in vessels of length
below 24 m (Mguez Gonzlez et al., 2012). This analysis is
consistent with Jin et al. (2001) who demonstrated that capsizing
is the type of accident where crewmembers have the highest
probability of dying.
Between November 2004 and September 2007, ve Spanishagged shing vessels capsized due to loss of stability resulting in
a large part of their crew dead. Examining the ve accidents side
by side, it is noticeable that the vessels had similar characteristics,
in particular that their lengths ranged between 15 and 24 m and
that they had all been built between 1999 and 2001 in accordance
with a recent tonnage distribution regulation (Mata-lvarezSantullano and Souto-Iglesias, 2013).
The shipowners, masters and crews of the capsized vessels
were the same that had been operating the vessels decommissioned in order to build the lost ones. The decommissioned vessels
are referred to hereinafter as predecessors. Moreover, it can be
reasonably argued that the uses of the capsized vessels were
analogous to the predecessors' since they operated in the same
area, using the same shing gear and in the same social framework. The predecessors had been in service for many years, while
the ve shing vessels which succeeded them sank, after a short
operational life, in stability related accidents. It may therefore be
interesting to try and study the differences, at various levels, of
these two sets of vessels.
All these lost vessels complied with the IMO (International
Maritime Organization) stability regulations, implemented in 1970
in the Spanish legislation. Despite this fact, the lack of stability
caused all accidents. Given the growing complexity and specialization of vessels and also given that the current stability criteria
could not properly cover part of the dynamic phenomena present
in several stability related accidents, the IMO has recognized that
82
Nomenclature
B
D
DISF
GM
breadth [m]
depth to main deck [m]
displacement [t]
transversal metacentric height [m]
KG
LBP
LOA
T
RT
VA
2. Methodology
2.1. General
Five shing vessels that sank due to stability failure are studied.
The studied shing vessels are similar in size, relatively small (LOA
between 16 and 20 m), built between 1999 and 2001, and were
lost from comparable stability causes between 2004 and 2007.
Building any of these vessels meant that one or more existing
shing vessels had to be decommissioned refraining the tonnage
of the whole shing eet from increasing, according to the
European shing effort regulations in force. In the ve cases
studied more than one vessel had to be decommissioned, The
largest among the decommissioned vessels will be the selected
predecessor of the capsized shing vessel and will be considered
a reference safe vessel for comparisons. Normally, and what was
the case for the considered pairs of vessels, a shing vessel and her
predecessor share many characteristics such as master, crew,
shing zones, gear type, base port, etc., since the shipowner is
usually the same person.
For each lost shing vessel and her respective predecessor, a
characteristic loading condition is established. Each vessel has
been studied in one loading condition only, chosen from the
available information, normally being the full load condition. In
the case of vessels for which no stability booklets were available
(most predecessors) using the best available information a loading
condition close to the full load is estimated. Then, stability and
operability calculations for both vessels are performed.
2.2. Regulatory stability
2.2.1. General
The vessels stability is checked against the IMO stability criteria
for shing vessels proposed in the Code on intact stability for all
types of ships covered by IMO instruments, approved by the IMO
Assembly Resolution A.749(18).
Spain adopted these stability criteria in 1970 which were
therefore mandatory when the ve vessels studied were designed
and built. Since it was not mandatory when the ve predecessors
were built, the IMO Severe Wind and Rolling Criterion (weather
criterion) has not been considered in the present study. Regarding
the ve lost vessels, according to the Spanish stability regulations,
compliance with the weather criterion has to be checked only if
the area under the stability curve up to 301 is below 0.065 m rad in
the most unfavorable loading condition. All ve vessels concerned
had larger area stability curves and therefore the previously
mentioned weather criterion did not apply in any case.
Intact stability calculations have been performed with state of
the art naval architecture software, considering free trim. No free
surfaces in tanks have been considered. The center of gravity has
been considered to be at midship. For the cases where the stability
C1
C2
C3
C4
61 (rms)
31 (rms)
0.1 g (rms)
0.2 g (rms)
Roll
Pitch
Lateral acceleration (at the previous three points)
Vertical acceleration (at bridge, working deck fore
and working deck aft)
C5 Propeller emergence
C6 Green water on deck (at working deck fore and
working deck aft)
(1989), on the basis of the relative motions between the vessel and
the sea surface given by the seakeeping code.
For the green water on deck criterion, the probability has been
calculated at two points for each vessel (deck level fore and aft)
and the largest value has been chosen. Vertical and lateral
accelerations have been computed at three points for each vessel
(working deck fore and aft, and the bridge). The largest value
amongst the three is chosen to check the criterion fulllment.
Calculations have been performed for headings from 01 to 1801
(head seas) in steps of 301 and vessel speeds from 0 to 10 knots in
steps of 2 knots.
Although, strictly speaking, the proposed criteria limit operability and not safety it is assumed that, for comparative purposes,
these operability values may be valid indicators of the vessels
safety. It will later be seen, by comparing capsized vessels with
their predecessors, that this could in general not be the case.
However, it is necessary to be aware of the several limitations of
the method used, since a linear seakeeping approach cannot
capture some dynamic phenomena in waves e.g., broaching-to
or parametric rolling, and the amplitude of the ship motions in
large amplitude waves can be questioned. These limitations must
be taken into account when considering the relationship between
the calculated operability and ship safety.
2.3.2. Sea state
The operability study has been performed in two sea states
dened by the signicant wave height and modal wave period
according to the standardized scale adopted by NATO (Military
Agency for Standarization, NATO, 1983). For all vessels, SSN4 and
SSN5 have been studied, corresponding to signicant wave heights
of 1.88 m and 3.25 m with modal periods of 8.8 s and 9.7 s
respectively.
A Bretschneider sea spectrum has been used. Three of the ve
studied vessels were lost in the Atlantic Ocean, close to the
Spanish north coast; one sank in the Gulf of Cadiz, close to the
Gibraltar strait, while the fth was lost in the Mediterranean Sea.
Those sea states chosen have been found to represent the conditions of those areas, where the eet of small coastal shing vessels
operates most of the time. With the RAOs obtained with PRECAL
and the previously mentioned spectra, the motion spectra have
been computed and used to obtain the rms values necessary to
assess the fulllment of the operability criteria presented in
Table 1.
2.3.3. Operability index
For comparative purposes, an operability index (OI) has been
dened and is calculated as the percentage of combinations
speedheading at which the operating vessel complies with all
operability criteria. The OI can be rigorously established using an
auxiliary function Z which depends on speed and heading and is
dened as a Boolean function, taking value 1 when at least one
criterion is not met and 0 for the safe zone:
Z Z 10
OI 1
z; vdv d=10
1
0
Criterion
15% (probability)
5% (probability)
83
84
and hence meaningful OIs. The loading conditions studied are the
same as in the stability study.
4. Results
4.1. Regulatory stability
The stability curves of the vessels studied are presented in
Fig. 1. Comparison of stability curves of vessels (F1F5) and their
predecessors (P1P5) have been plotted jointly.
Regarding the stability curves calculated for each vessel, all
predecessors had, in general, a larger GZ and, thus, better dynamic
stability than the lost vessels. The capsized shing vessels had also
a lower GM than their respective predecessors.
Table 2
Fishing vessels lost.
Label Boat code in European Gear type
eet
Length overall
(m)
Tonnage
(GT)
Year of
build
Year of
loss
F1
F2
F3
F4
ESP25057
ESP24593
ESP24391
ESP24358
Seines
Hook and linesa
Seines
Gillnets and
entangling nets
17.00
16.02
18.00
20.00
34.18
29.97
44.83
87.03
2001
2000
1999
1999
2004
2004
2004
2006
F5
ESP24199
Seines
19.40
59.01
1999
2007
Table 3
Fishing vessels predecessors to the lost ones.
Label
Gear type
Tonnage (GT)
Year of build
Year of retirement
Notes
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
ESP16060
ESP11830
ESP05969
ESP00251
ESP05154
Seines
Hook and lines
Seines
Gillnets and entangling nets
Seines
15
11.3
14.1
16
15.75
17.11
5.86
28.7
47
29
1989
1963
1978
1983
1959
2001
2000
1999
1999
1999
Predecessor
Predecessor
Predecessor
Predecessor
Predecessor
to
to
to
to
to
ESP25057
ESP24593
ESP24391
ESP24358
ESP24199
Table 4
Case studies and predecessors' body plans.
Fishing vessels (F1F5)
Predecessors (P1P5)
F1P1
85
F2P2
F3P3
F4P4
F5P5
Table 5
Main dimensions of the lost vessels (F1F5) and their predecessors (P1P5).
F1
P1
F2
P2
F3
P3
F4
P4
F5
P5
Lbp (m)
B (m)
D (m)
T (m)
DISF (t)
Freeboard (m)
KG (m)
RT
GM (m)
13.5
12.6
13.8
9.5
13.5
12.5
16.2
14.46
15.5
14
5
4.08
4.57
4.38
5.2
5.12
5.3
4.7
5.75
5
2.35
1.54
2.15
1.57
2.35
1.7
2.3
1.902
2.5
2.068
2.127
1.05
1.8
1.17
1.775
1.264
2
1.302
1.73
1.616
71.21
25
53.23
21.65
80.67
43.6
97.82
49.2
90.8
68.14
0.223
0.49
0.658
0.4
0.336
0.436
0.3
0.6
0.759
0.455
2.191
1.185
1.8
1.334
2.21
1.56
2.238
1.98
2.17
1.104
30.15
13.37
26.03
10.1
23.69
26.4
34.46
20
32.45
32.45
5.2
3.3
4.4
3.5
4.8
3.3
4.3
3.3
4.8
3.4
0.579
0.842
0.68
0.93
0.76
1.38
0.62
1.1
0.96
1.2
86
Table 6
Stability index (SI) of the lost vessels (F1F5) and their predecessors (P1P5).
Vessels
F1-P1
Lost vessel
SIF (%)
Predecessor
SIP (%)
Ratio SIP/SIF
F1
F2
F3
F4
F5
2.7
9.9
6.7
10.1
2.0
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
11.0
19.7
51.0
8.0
37.0
4.6
2.0
7.6
0.8
18.5
Vessels
F2-P2
Vessels
F3-P3
Vessels
F4-P4
(1) The lost vessels have, in general, larger operability but less
stability than their predecessors.
(2) When comparing stability and operability between a lost
vessel and her predecessor, large differences in operability
do not always imply large differences in stability. For instance,
F4 and P4 have stability indexes quite similar (see Table 6) but
the operability differences between F4 and P4 are quite
signicant (see Figs. 5, 7 and 8). This suggests that there is
no direct and obvious correlation between stability and
operability.
Summarizing the previous results, it can be stated that operability studies based on linear seakeeping calculations may not be
enough to assess ship safety. A consistent relation between ship
stability and ship operability, calculated from linear seakeeping
methods, has not been found. Due to the particular nature of the
case studies (all vessels capsized in stability related accidents) the
conclusion can be drawn that a direct link between operability and
safety in the ve case studies and by extension for these types of
vessels cannot be established.
4.3. Additional remarks
Vessels
F5-P5
SSN4
SSN5
F1
P1
Fig. 2. Operability of vessels F1 and P1, in SSN4 and SSN5 (see Table 1 for criteria denition).
SSN4
SSN5
F2
P2
Fig. 3. Operability of vessels F2 and P2, in SSN4 and SSN5 (see Table 1 for criteria denition).
87
88
SSN4
SSN5
P3
Fig. 4. Operability of vessels F3 and P3, in SSN4 and SSN5 (see Table 1 for criteria denition).
SSN4
SSN5
F4
P4
Fig. 5. Operability of vessels F4 and P4, in SSN4 and SSN5 (see Table 1 for criteria denition).
SSN4
89
SSN5
F5
P5
Fig. 6. Operability of vessels F5 and P5, in SSN4 and SSN5 (see Table 1 for criteria denition).
F1 - P1
F2 - P2
F3 - P3
F4 - P4
F5 - P5
Vessel
Predec.
Fig. 7. Operability comparison of vessels F1F5 and P1P5, in SSN4, considering roll, pitch, lateral acceleration and vertical acceleration.
90
F1 - P1
F2 - P2
F3 - P3
F4 - P4
F5 - P5
Vessel
Predec.
Fig. 8. Operability comparison of vessels F1F5 and P1P5, in SSN5, considering roll, pitch, lateral acceleration and vertical acceleration.
Table 7
Operability indexes of the lost vessels (F1F5) and their predecessors (P1P5).
F1P1
F2P2
F3P3
F4P4
F5P5
OI SSN4
Lost vessels
Predecessors
Ratio OIP/OIF
0.94
0.47
0.50
0.81
0.00
0.00
0.86
0.90
1.05
0.92
0.52
0.57
0.91
0.83
0.91
OI SSN5
Lost vessels
Predecessors
Ratio OIP/OIF
0.17
0.08
0.47
0.15
0.00
0.00
0.30
0.31
1.03
0.62
0.08
0.13
0.59
0.32
0.54
5. Conclusions
In the present paper, the intact stability and short term
operability of ten small shing vessels have been studied. Five
vessels built in the same time frame, which sank due to stability
related causes in a short period of time, and the ve respective
vessels which were decommissioned to build those (referred to as
predecessors) have been compared. These predecessor vessels,
which ended their service life in a regular way, are considered as a
safety reference. It is relevant to stress that the shipowners,
masters and crews of the capsized vessels were the same ones
that had been operating the predecessors, in the same shing
areas, using the same shing gear type, and in the same social
framework.
The intact stability of each vessel has been characterized by her
stability curve in a characteristic loading condition, and by a
stability index, dened from the limiting KG that allows the ship
to fulll the IMO intact stability criteria. The Weather Criterion has
not been considered since it was not applicable to the selected
vessels when these were designed and built.
The stability of each lost shing vessel has been compared with
the stability of her predecessor. It has been found that the new
vessels had in general larger stability than the predecessors.
Notwithstanding that, the ten vessels fullled the IMO stability
criteria and hence, from the stability point of view, they can be
considered equally safe.
Considering that the capsized vessels and their predecessors
were operated in similar contexts, this stability analysis opens a
question mark on the suitability of intact stability criteria for these
cases and therefore the possibility of analyzing the vessels operability in order to characterize the vessels safety has been
explored. The masters operate the ships responding to the fulllment of operability criteria and interrupt shing operations only
when those are surpassed and operation is no longer possible.
They are hence the rst to assume that a ship with a larger
operability range is a safer ship.
Operability of each vessel is established by calculating her
short-term motions in two typical sea states with linear seakeeping analysis, and checking these motions against a set of operability criteria. A global operability index has been dened
for comparison purpose. The operability of each pair of
vessels (sunken vessel and predecessor) has been compared,
resulting in the capsized vessels having more operability than
the predecessors.
As a main conclusion, the comparison between the stability
characteristics of two sets of vessels and the comparison between
the operability characteristics of the same two sets of vessels
throw opposite results. While the predecessors had in general
more stability, the lost ones had in general larger operability. Thus
the masters of the new shing vessels could have considered them
to be safer as they experienced, in general, lower motions and
accelerations, while in fact the new vessels were less stable than
their predecessors, and might have required a more careful
operation.
Overall, these results indicate that usual operability criteria
may not contribute much to assess ship safety during design
phases. It also suggests that masters should be strongly trained in
stability, making them able to adequately manage their vessel's
stability regardless of the operability behavior.
As a nal remark, taking again into account that the sunken
vessels fullled IMO stability criteria and had larger operability
than the predecessors, we believe that more effort is needed
towards developing and validating new and more complex stability criteria, able to capture the reality of the dynamics of shing
vessels at sea.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to Hugo Gee, Jos L. Cercos-Pita and Clara
Mata for assisting in the preparation of the manuscript. The authors
are also grateful to one anonymous reviewer for her/his detailed
analysis of the manuscript and subsequent recommendations.
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