59.

NUGUID vs CA
It is not disputed that the construction of the 4-door 2-storey apartment, subject of this dispute, was
undertaken at the time when Pecson was still the owner of the lot. When the Nuguids became the
uncontested owner of the lot, by virtue of entry of judgment of the Courts decision, the apartment building
was already in existence and occupied by tenants.
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the improvement as his own
upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in good faith.
Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the
necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is
made. As we earlier held, since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves as early
as June 1993, when they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not
include the apartment building, they could not benefit from the lots improvement, until they reimbursed
the improver in full, based on the current market value of the property.
Despite the Courts recognition of Pecsons right of ownership over the apartment building, the petitioners
still insisted on dispossessing Pecson by filing for a Writ of Possession to cover both the lot and the
building. Clearly, this resulted in a violation of respondents right of retention. Worse, petitioners took
advantage of the situation to benefit from the highly valued, income-yielding, four-unit apartment building
by collecting rentals thereon, before they paid for the cost of the apartment building. It was only 4 years
later that they finally paid its full value to the respondent.
Given the circumstances of the instant case where the builder in good faith has been clearly denied his
right of retention for almost half a decade, we find that the increased award of rentals by the RTC was
reasonable and equitable. The petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement introduced by
the respondent during said period, without paying any amount to the latter as reimbursement for his
construction costs and expenses. They should account and pay for such benefits.
The Court need not belabor now the appellate courts recognition of herein respondents entitlement to
rentals from the date of the determination of the current market value until its full payment. Respondent is
clearly entitled to payment by virtue of his right of retention over the said improvement.

60. ROSALES et al vs CASTELLFORT

Both parties having acted in good faith at least until August 21, 1995, Art. 448 should apply. Respondents
good faith ceased when petitioner personally appraised him of the title over the questioned lot. Should
petitioner opt to appropriate the house they should only be made to pay for the part of the improvement
built by respondent until Aug. 21. Said part should be pegged at its current fair market value. The
commencement of respondents payment of reasonable rent should start on Aug. 21, 1995 as well to be
paid until such time that the possession of the property is delivered to the petitioners subject to
reimbursement of expenses. Generally, payment of reasonable rent should be made only up to the date
appellees serve notice of their option to appropriate. In such event, appellants would have the right to
retain the land on which they have been built in good faith until they are reimbursed the expenses
incurred by them. The right to retain improvements while the indemnity is not paid implies tenancy or
possession in fact of the land on which it was built. (Possession of building with the BPS) However,
appellants ceased as builders in good faith at the time appellant was notified of the appellees lawful title
over the property. The payment of the reasonable rent should accordingly commence at that time (notice
was given) since he can no longer avail of the rights for builders in good faith. If the option chosen by the
land owner is compulsory sale, the payment of rent should continue up to the actual transfer of
ownership.

61. IGNACIO vs HILARIO

The owner in good faith has to make a choice. He cannot dispense the options under the law and then
eject the builder in good faith. This is because both are in good faith.
But when can the owner in good faith compel the builder in good faith to remove the building he erected?
This is only available if after the owner in good faith chose to sell his land to the builder in good faith and
the latter fails to pay the value of the land within the agree period. Only then can the owner in good faith
compel the builder in good faith to remove the building he erected.

62. FILIPINAS COLLEGES, INC vs TIMBANG

Under the terms of these article, it is true that the owner of the land has the right to choose between appropriating the building by
reimbursing the builder of the value thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land. Even this second right cannot
be exercised if the value of the land is considerably more than that of the building. In addition to the right of the builder to be paid the
value of his improvement, Article 546 gives him the corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by the owner of
the land. There is nothing in the language of these two article, 448 and546, which would justify the conclusion of appellants that,
upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter becomes
automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445.

63. QUEMUEL vs OLAES

The plaintiffs claim that their second cause of action is based on Article 448 in connection with Art. 546, of
the new Civil Code. A cursory reading of these provisions, however, will show that they are not applicable
to plaintiffs' case. Under Article 448, the right to appropriate the works or improvements or "to oblige the
one who built or planted to pay the price of the land belongs to the owner of the land. The only right given
to the builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for the improvements; the builder, cannot compel
the owner of the land to sell such land to the former. This is assuming that the plaintiffs are builders in
good faith. But the plaintiffs are not builders in good faith. From the pleadings and the documentary
evidence submitted, it is indisputable that the land in question originally belonged to the government as
part of the Friar Lands Estate and the title thereto was in the name of the government, until it was
purchased by Agapita Solis who applied, thru the Bureau of Lands, to purchase the land by installments.
It can clearly be inferred that plaintiffs cannot compel the defendants to pay for the improvements the
former made on the property or to sell the latter's land. Plaintiffs' only right, is to remove improvements, if
it is possible to do so, without damage to the land.
It should be noted that article 448 of the new Civil Code, (equivalent to Art. 361 of the old Civil Code),
relied upon by plaintiffs, is intended to apply only to a case where one builds, or sows, or plants on land in
which believes himself to have a claim of title and not to land wherein one's interest is that of tenant,
under a rental co tract, which is the present case. The tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith
as he has no pretension to be owner

64. GERMINIANO, et al vs CA
T h e p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s c l a i m t h e y a r e builders in good faith, hence, Article 448 of
the Civil Code should apply. They rely on the lack of title of the petitioners' mother at the time of
the execution of t h e c o n t r a c t o f l e a s e , a s w e l l a s t h e a l l e g e d a s s u r a n c e
m a d e b y t h e p e t i t i o n e r s t h a t t h e l o t o n which the house stood would be sold to
them.B u t b e i n g m e r e l e s s e e s , t h e p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s k n e w t h a t t h e i r o c c u p a t i o n o
f t h e p r e m i s e s w o u l d continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be
considered as possessors nor builders in good faith. Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation
to A r t i c l e 5 4 6 o f t h e s a m e C o d e , w h i c h a l l o w s f u l l reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in
good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply
where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would
always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property. And even if the
petitioners indeed promised to sell, it would not make the private respondents p o s s e s s o r s o r
b u i l d e r s i n g o o d f a i t h s o a s t o b e covered by the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil
Code. The latter cannot raise the mere expectancy of ownership of the aforementioned lot
because the a l l e g e d p r o m i s e t o s e l l w a s n o t f u l f i l l e d n o r i t s existence even
proven.

65. TAYAG vs YUSECO

O n c e a c h o i c e i s m a d e b y t h e l a n d o w n e r , i t i s g e n e r a l l y irrevocable. Thus, if the
landowner has opted/elected to appropriate the building but he is unable to pay for the indemnity or
amount, the landowner CANNOT afterwards opt/elect to sell the land. Since Tayags first choice had
already been communicated to the court and she had already been ordered to pay, her duty has been
converted into a monetary obligation which can be enforced b# a writ of execution.
Note: Yuseco is a possessor in good faith as she believed the land given was a donation or was
compensation for the services rendered.
66. DEPRA vs DUMLAO
The judgment of forced lease is improper. A forced lease, just like co-ownership is not favored. It should
be considered that the parties themselves stipulated that Dumlao, the builder, was in good faith and it was
later found that Depra, the owner, was also in good faith. Hence, what applies is the provisions of Article
448 of the Civil Code, which provides in sum that:
a. Builder in good faith entitled to retain the possession of the land on which he built in good faith until
he is paid the value of the building he built in good faith;

b. Owner in good faith has the option to either (i) pay for the building OR (ii) sell his land to the builder in
good faith but builder cannot be forced to buy said land if the same is considerably more than the value of
the building.
Forced rent only comes in if the owner exercises his right to sell the land but the builder rejects it by
reason of the price thereof being considerably more than the value of the building in such case, the
parties shall agree to the terms of the lease, if they cant agree then they may bring the issue to court.
2. The action for quieting of title is not barred by reason of res judicata. The cause of action in the
unlawful detainer case involves possession while the cause of action in the quieting of title case involves
ownership. Furthermore, the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case shall not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land.

67. HEIRS OF E. NAVARRO vs IAC

It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the
Civil Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where
the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced. If theres any land to
be claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The law is clear on this.
Accretion of land along the river bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of land on the
property adjacent to Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land and the applicable law is not
Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This law, while old, holds that accretion along sea
shore cannot be registered as it remains public domain unless abandoned by government for public use
and declared as private property capable of alienation.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part
of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the
Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
increment thereof.
The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set aside. Registration cannot be allowed.

68. AGUSTIN vs IAC

Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the currents of the waters. Accretion benefits a riparian owner provided that
these elements are present: 1) deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) it resulted from the effects of the
current of the water and 3) the land is adjacent to the river bank. When the River moved from 1919 to
1968, there was alluvium deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible.

Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are exposed to floods and other damage due
to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various
kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers should in some way be compensated by the
right of accretion. Also, respondents ownership over said lots was not removed when due to the sudden
and abrupt change in the course of the river; their accretions were transferred to the other side. Art. 459
states when the current of a river x x x segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and
transfers it to another estate, the owner of segregated portion retains ownership provided he removes the
same w/in 2 years. And Art. 463 states that whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches,
leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains ownership. He also retains it
if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.

69. GOVT vs COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE

Article 337 provides that The owners of estates bordering on ponds or lagoons, do not acquire the land
left dry by the natural decrease of the waters, nor lose those inundated by them in extraordinary floods.
The provision refers to ponds and lagoons, and has therefore no application to the case at bar, which
refers to a lake, a lagoon being legally distinct in character from a lake.
Having pointed out that the inundations of the two parcels of land in question during the months of
September, October and November, is extraordinary, the legal provision applicable to the case is that
contained in article 77 of the aforesaid Law of Waters, which reads: ART. 77. Lands accidentally
inundated by the waters of lakes, or by creeks, rivers, and other streams, shall continue to be the property
of their respective owners.
Therefore, they must belong to Colegio de San Jose as part of Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, which
was originally owned by it.

70. VIAJAR vs CA
It was established in the trial that for a period of 40 years the Suague river overflowed its banks yearly
and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the
river.

It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an
adjoining stream or river. Accretions which the banks of the river may gradually receive from the effect of
the current become the property of the owners of the banks.

71. REYNANTE vs CA
While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner of the lot adjoining such accretion, it does
not automatically bestow an imprescriptibility. If the owners of said land have not registered this with the
proper entity, said land will be subject to acquisition by prescription, which was what occurred in this case.
Since the affidavits prove that Reynante has been in possession of these lands for more than 50 years,
the SC rightly held that the land belongs to him.

72. REPUBLIC vs CA
Private oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged reclamation, therefore, their
claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall. In the second place, their alleged possession can never ripen
into ownership. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as the root of a
title acquired by prescription. As correctly found by the appellate court, the private oppositors-petitioners
entered into possession of the land with the permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio. The
fact that some of them at one time or another did not pay rent cannot be considered in their favor. Their
use of the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and these
could not have affected the character of the latter's possession which has already ripened into ownership
at the time of the filing of this application for registration.
The applicant private-respondent having satisfactorily established his registerable title over the parcel of
land described in his application, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.

73. VDA. DE NAZARENO vs CA

Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property,
applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:
"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters."
In the case of Meneses v. CA,[2] this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under
Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or
sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea
coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands

adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of
waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the abovementioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping
of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River
bounding their land.[3] It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and
other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current
of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila,[4] this Court held that the word
"current" indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low
tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules on alluvion,
they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.

74. PAYATAS-ESTATE IMPROVEMENT vs TUASON

Article 366 of the [Old] Civil Code provides: any accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually
receive from the effect of the current belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon. This
provision applies even to Torrens titled lands.
Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and are not
affected by the registration laws. It follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner (Payatas
Estate) against diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining
stream.
Avulsion cannot be raised as well as a ground to lay claim over the 22 hectares land now forming part of
the Mariquina estate. There was no evidence presented to show that the increase was due to avulsion.
The presumption is that the change was gradual and cause by erosion of the Payatas bank of the river
and consequent accretion to the Mariquina estate. It follows that the land in question is now a part of that
estate and no longer pertains to the Payatas estate.

75. C.N. HODGES vs GARCIA

In the cadastral proceedings wherein the land object of this action was sought to be registered by herein
defendant Amador D. Garcia, plaintiff C.N. Hodges did not file any opposition despite due publication of
the notice of the application and hearing. The record also shows that the land now being claimed by
plaintiff had been litigated in three civil cases. In those cases, herein defendant was recognized as the
owner of the land and held legally entitled to its possession. In fact, the land in question had been
adjudged to be owned by him as an accretion to his lot No. 2290.
It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's estate as a result of
accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to his land used to
pertain to plaintiff's estate, which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude him

(defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.
Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the
property of the owners of the banks. (Art. 366 of the old Civil Code; art. 457 of the new.) Such accretions
are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that
respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act.

76. SPS. GULLA vs HEIRS OF LABRADOR

Petitioners should be ejected even if the portion occupied by them is in the salvage zone. The ownership
of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated
or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially (Article 440, Civil Code). Accession is the right of an
owner of a thing to the products of said thing as well as to whatever is inseparably attached thereto as an
accessory.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the area of 562 square meters is outside the titled property of the
respondents and is within the salvage zone adjacent to respondents' property. However, while it is true
that the salvage zone cannot be the subject of commerce, the adjoining owner thereof, the respondents in
this case, has the priority to use it. Otherwise stated, herein respondents [do] not own the salvage zone
but as an adjacent owner, he has the right to use it more than the petitioners applying the basic rule as
stated above.
Moreover, the law provides the different modes of acquiring ownership, namely: (a) occupation; (b)
intellectual creation; (c) law; (d) donation; (e) succession; (f) tradition, as a consequence of certain
contracts; and (g) prescription. It will be noted that accession is not one of those listed therein. It is
therefore safe to conclude that accession is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The reason is simple:
accession presupposes a previously existing ownership by the owner over the principal. This is not
necessarily so in the other modes of acquiring ownership. Therefore, fundamentally and in the last
analysis, accession is a right implicitly included in ownership, without which it will have no basis or
existence.

77. BACHRACH MOTOR CO. vs TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO.

Civil Fruits under Article 355 of the Civil Code

Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings; second, the
proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar
sources of revenue. According to the context of the law, the phrase u otras analogas refers only to rents
or income, for the adjectives otras and analogas agree with the noun rentas, as do also the other

adjectives perpetuas and vitalicias. The civil fruits the Civil Code understands one of three and only
three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain kinds of income.
Bonus not a civil fruit; not an income of the land
The amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of the central granting it, is not based upon the
value, importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the
debt thereby secured, according to the annual balance, which is something quite distinct from and
independent of the property referred to. As the bonus is not obtained from the land, it is not civil fruits of
that land. It is neither rent of buildings, proceeds from lease of lands, or income under Article 355 of the
Civil Code.

78. PACIFIC FARMS vs ESGUERRA

Applying article 447 by analogy, we perforce consider the buildings as the principal and the lumber and
construction materials that went into their construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own
the six buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the values of the said materials; the appellant
which apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were minded to do so, cannot
remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings has the corresponding right to recover the
value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials.
Of course, the character of a buyer in good faith and for value, if really possessed by the appellee, could
possibly exonerate it from making compensation.
But the appellee's stance that it is an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith is open to grave
doubt because of certain facts of substantial import (evident from the records) that cannot escape notice.
During the trial of civil case the Insular Farms was represented by Atty. Amado Santiago of the law firm of
J. Araneta. The latter was one of the counsels of the Pacific Farms. They cannot claim ignorance of the
pendency of civil case because the Insular Farms was defended by the same lawyer from the same law
firm that commenced the present action.
.
79. BALUCANAG vs FRANCISCO
The lessee cannot be considered a builder in good faith. The provision under Art. 448 of the New Civil
Code (Philippine) on a builder of good faith applies only to the owner of the land who believes he is the
rightful owner thereof, but not to a lessee who's interest in the land is derived only from a rental contract.
Neither can Stohner be considered a 'possessor in good faith'. A possessor in good faith is a party who
possesses property believing that he is its rightful owner but discovers later on a flaw in his title that could
indicate that he might not be its legal owner. It cannot apply to a lessee because he knows right from the
start that he is merely a lessee and not the owner of the premises.
As a mere lessee, he introduces improvements to the property at his own risk such that he cannot recover
from the owner the reimbursements nor he has any right to retain the premises until reimbursements.

What applies in this case is Art. 1678 (NCC) which provides that, " if the lessee, makes, in good faith,
useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the
form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee
1/2 of the value of the improvements at the time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the
lessee may remove the improvements even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He
shall not. however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary."

80. REALTY SALES ENTERPRISES, IN. vs IAC

The action filed by Carpo against Realty is in the nature of an action to remove clouds from title to real
property. By asserting its own title to the property in question and asking that Carpo's title be declared null
and void instead, and by filing the third-party complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking the
court to remove clouds from its own title. Actions of such nature are governed by Articles 476 to 481,
Quieting of Title, Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386), and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and Similar
Remedies, Rules of Court.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being
against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. The
judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

81. LUCASAN vs PDIC

To avail of the remedy of QUIETING OF TITLE, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
1.

The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of action; and
2. The deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown in fact invalid or inoperative despite it prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Stated simply, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal title or at least an equitable title over the real
property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case. Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem
the property during the redemption period, on account of his ten limited financial situation. It was only 15
years later that he manifested his desire to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus, he had lost whatever
right ha had over the lots.
The payment of loans made by Lucasan cannot in any way operate to restore whatever right he had over
the subject properties. Such payment only extinguished his loan obligations to the mortgagee banks and
the liens which Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the time of the registration of the notice of embargo
and certification of sale.
Neither can Lucasan capitalize on PBC's failure to file a petition for consolidation of ownership after the
expiration of the redemption period. with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period
forecloses the obligor's right to redeem ans that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance
thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is
already vested in the purchaser.

Certainly, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title to or interest over the subject parcels of
land; hence, he cannot validly maintain an action for quieting of title.

82. CORONEL vs IAC

The private respondents never sold their 1/3 share over Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate; that what their
co-owners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the same lot; and that Ignacio Manalo sold only
the 2/3 share to third-party defendant Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Rodolfo
Coronel. Consequently, there was a mistake when Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41175 was issued to
Mariano Manalo covering the whole area of Lot No. 1950-A. Unfortunately, Mariano Manalo who was
included as third-party defendant as well as the subject of a cross- claim filed by the other third-party
defendants, and who could have shed light on this controversy was at the time residing abroad and was
not served with the third-party complaint.
Moreover, private respondents Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan were in open, peaceful and adverse
possession of their 1/3 share over the lot even after 1950 when the first sale of the lot took place. The first
time they knew about Coronel's claim over the whole lot was when they were served a copy of his
complaint in 1975.
The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not necessarily make the
possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens
system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens
systems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included.
The court finds no reversible error on the part of the lower courts in recognizing the ownership of the
private respondents over 1/3 of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate. The petitioner is bound to recognize
the lien in favor of the private respondents which was mistakenly excluded and therefore not inscribed in
the torrens title of the land of his predecessors-in-interest.

83. LUZURIAGA vs ADIL

In the forcible entry case, the dispute between petitioner Luzuriaga and respondent Young about the
possession of Agho Island arose out of their conflicting claims of ownership over the said island. The
issue of ownership is indispensably involved. In a long line of cases The Court ruled that a party may
institute only one suit for a single cause of action. If two or more complaints are brought from different
parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others,
and a judgment upon the merits in anyone is available as a bar in the others. The reason for the rule
against the splitting of a cause of action is intended to prevent repeated litigation between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation;
and to avoid the costs incident to numerous suits.
In the case at bar, an action to quiet title was filed on April 21, 1980, whereas the forcible entry case was
instituted before the Municipal Circuit Court of Estancia, Iloilo three (3) days thereafter, or on April 24,
1980. In his complaint for ejectment, petitioner Luzuriaga anchored his claim for rightful possession on his

alleged ownership over the subject property. Thus, it is clear that the issue of possession is connected
with that of ownership and, therefore, respondent CFI Judge Adil rightfully enjoined the Municipal Circuit
Court of Estancia, Iloilo from proceeding with the trial of the ejectment controversy in Civil Case No. 2133C. Besides, the respondent court could also grant the relief sought by petitioner by issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction ousting private respondent from the property and placing him in
possession thereof.

84. BALBECINO vs JUDGE ORTEGA

The court a quo found no other alternative than to grant the petition for preliminary injunction filed by
respondent Acosta, for it really appears that at the time of the filing of the second action he was in actual
possession of the land, and it is but fair that for the time being that possession be respected until the case is
decided on the merits.

It is true that petitioners have filed with the sheriff an opposition protesting against the order placing
Paulino Acosta in possession of the land, but the same came late, and so it was properly disregarded by
the sheriff. This protest is a clear proof that Acosta was really in possession of the land when this case
was started by petitioners. Considering that Justo Balbecino averred in the affidavit he attached to his
motion for reconsideration that he is the absolute owner of the land and that after all his hope to regain it
has vanished petitioners, who are his brothers and sisters, commenced the present action, there is
reason to believe that the same is but an eleventh hour attempt to circumvent the decision rendered in
Civil Case No. 758. This is enough reason that justifies the action taken by the court a quo.

85. SALVADOR vs CA
This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded
as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them. 31 Acts which may be considered
adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent
possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings
and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of
exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of
possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other coowners. 32
Thus, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other
co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the
evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

86. PARDELL vs BARTOLOME

The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the said property was a
mere exercise of their right to use the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on a co-owners right of
use is that he must use it in such a way so as not to injure the interest of the other co-owners. In the case
at bar, the other party failed to provide proof that by the occupation of the spouses Bartolome, they
prevented Vicenta from utilizing the same

87. AVILA et al vs SPS BARABAT

Art. 1623 provides that the right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The
deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The right of redemption of
co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
Petitioners right to redeem would have existed only had there been co-ownership among
petitioners-siblings. But there was none. For this right to be exercised, co-ownership must exist at the
time the conveyance is made by a co-owner and the redemption is demanded by the other co-owner or
co-owner(s). However, by their own admission, petitioners were no longer co-owners when the property
was sold to respondents in 1979. The co-ownership had already been extinguished by partition.
The regime of co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons. By the nature of co-ownership, a co-owner cannot point to any specific portion of the
property owned in common as his own because his share in it remains intangible and ideal.