MR Garry Mcintosh, Associate To His Honour Mullaly J.: Judgemullaly - Chambers@Countycourt - Vic.Gov - Au

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Mr Garry McIntosh, Associate to His Honour Mullaly J.

judgemullaly.chambers@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Cc:
31-12-2015
Mr Peter Kidd CJ County Court of Victoria, feedback@countycourt.vic.gov.au

Buloke Shire Council buloke@buloke.vic.gov.au
Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria daniel.andrews@parliament.vic.gov.au
Mr Martin Pakula, martin.pakula@parliament.vic.gov.au & attorney-general@justice.vic.gov.au
Elliott Stafford and Associated
lawyers@elliottstafford.com.au
County Court of Victoria crim.reg@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Re: 20151231-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Associate Mr Garry McIntosh to His Honour Mullaly J County Court of Victoria-Re APPEAL15-2502-The court's lack of integrity-etc
Sir,
the meaning of integrity of the court should be known to you, but if you do not
understand/comprehend this then I suggest/recommend you consult a proper dictionary.
His Honour Mullaly Jas I perceived it had a computer screen before him and yet I had no clue
what His Honour Mullaly J was considering that were as details on his screen. In particular
where I view His Honour Mullaly J was bullying me that the law was applying to everyone but
myself, then what details/information did His Honour Mullaly look at on the computer screen
that I was unaware of?
As I did submit to His Honour Smither J when I was representing lawyer Mr Johnson QC that I
didnt know if the solicitor of the opponents was typing on her laptop instructions to His Honour
onto his screen what ruling to make. This as His Honour Phillips J just before retirement from the
Supreme Court of Victoria made known that the government had access to the court computers.
From The Age
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/The-corporatising-of-our-courts/2005/03/23/1111525218521.html
The corporatising of our courts

Retirement speech of John K. Phillips, Supreme Court of Victoria
March 24, 2005
QUOTE
As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our constitutional system,
particularly the independence of this court, which must, from time to time, tell the political arms
what they can and cannot do according to law. As a court we will rarely, if ever, be popular with
politicians, but while I have been sitting here, I have seen what appears to me to be some erosion of
this court's independence.
END QUOTE
Clearly, the wording As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our
constitutional system indicates that this justice held there was a separation of powers within
state level.
From The Age
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/The-corporatising-of-our-courts/2005/03/23/1111525218521.html
QUOTE
The corporatising of our courts
p1
31-12-2015
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD
A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0
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Retirement speech of John K. Phillips, Supreme Court of Victoria
March 24, 2005
In his parting words from the Supreme Court bench, John D. Phillips warns of a dangerous erosion of the
court's independence.
For more than 14 years I have been sitting here, and it has been hard and unremitting, but exciting and
rewarding - emotionally, I hasten to add, before I am misunderstood. But for much of that time I have had
to bite my tongue.
I refer to policy matters rather than the debate within a particular case. For, during my time on the bench,
and especially as I grew more senior, I have watched with some concern a change emerge in the
perception of this court by others and some blurring of essential distinctions. I want to speak briefly of
that now because I have been unable to say much about it until now and when my resignation becomes
effective, I fear that nobody will listen.
As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our constitutional system,
particularly the independence of this court, which must, from time to time, tell the political arms what
they can and cannot do according to law. As a court we will rarely, if ever, be popular with politicians,
but while I have been sitting here, I have seen what appears to me to be some erosion of this court's
independence.
One of the most public examples recently was the refusal of the executive to accept the decision on
remuneration handed down by the tribunal established by the Parliament for the very purpose of freeing
both Parliament and the executive from the invidiousness of the decision-making process over judicial
salaries and so ensuring the independence of which I am speaking.
Less well known was the refusal of earlier governments to allow that the court's own chief executive
officer be appointed by the Governor-in-Council and its insistence that that officer be appointed by and be
ultimately answerable to the Department of Justice, which is what happened.
That appears now, if I may say so, to have been but part of a movement towards this court's becoming
absorbed into that department, and it is that to which I want to draw attention in particular; for such a
movement must be reversed if this court is to have, and to keep, its proper role under the constitution.
This court is not some part of the public service and it must never be seen as such. Established as a court
of plenary jurisdiction and with supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts and tribunals, this court is
the third arm of government, co-equal in concept with Parliament and the executive. Its role, inter alia, is
to control and to limit those other arms according to law and to that end to stand between those other arms
and the citizen. Hence the emphasis on the court's independence, especially from the executive.
Yet within the Department of Justice this court is now identified and dealt with - would you believe
- as "Business Unit 19" within a section labelled "courts and tribunals", a section which
indiscriminately includes all three tiers of the court structure and VCAT.
This court is subject to direction on the raising of taxes in the form of court fees - in that these are
prescribed by departmental regulation, even if a part of those fees is redirected to the court by the
department at its discretion. The other day the department used a regulation to prescribe a procedure in
this court, apparently in disregard, if not in defiance, of the convention that such matters are for rules of
court.
And perhaps most troubling of all: the judges' computers, which were provided by and through the
department, are but part of the departmental network. I do not say that departmental officers ordinarily
avail themselves of the access that that affords; one hopes the department has some controls in place. But
access is possible, and that seems to me altogether inappropriate when the state, in one form or another, is
the major litigant in this court, and sometimes on matters of critical import to the wider community.
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Nobody is suggesting that the executive would ever seek to influence a judge's decision directly,
otherwise than by argument in open court, but what has been happening is more insidious. What is
evolving is a perception of the court as some sort of unit or functionary within the Department of Justice,
a perception which is inconsistent with this court's fundamental role and underlying independence.
Indeed I think it is fair to say that the Supreme Court, despite its dominant role within the court structure
and its constitutional role vis-a-vis the other arms of government, is now seen by some in authority as no
different from a tribunal, nowadays the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in particular. That is
simply not the case; yet the distinction between a court and a tribunal has been steadily undermined over
the years, and it must be restored if the proper constitutional position is not 2to be subverted.
The basic distinction is easy enough. A court exercises judicial power and must be, and be seen to be,
impartial and so must be independent of all else. Accordingly, its judges are appointed once and for all,
and ideally, without hope of additional gain or reward from anyone, including any other arm of
government. Hence Parliament's creation of the specialist remuneration tribunal. In contrast to a court, a
tribunal, properly so called, exercises administrative functions but not judicial power, and many things
flow from that. Such a tribunal may be an arm of the executive; its members may be appointed for fixed
terms, with the possibility of renewal at the discretion of the executive; and the need is not so great, to see
that their remuneration is fixed independently of the executive.
You will see, now, how far the distinction between court and tribunal has become blurred. While the
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal is staffed by a few judges, it consists mainly of members
appointed for fixed terms, capable of renewal at the discretion of the executive - and hence my alarm
when, in addition to its administrative work, that tribunal was given some judicial power to exercise, for
the latter is altogether inconsistent with such a form of tenure.
There is talk now of acting judges for this court, and again, because this is a court which is exercising
judicial power, such would be anathema. It is one thing to tolerate the occasional acting appointment to
this court for a limited time or purpose; it is altogether different to institutionalise such temporary
appointments at the discretion of the executive. Judges of a court properly so called must have security of
tenure or, in a relatively small community like this in Victoria, the whole system is put at risk. Our courts
have been remarkably free from any taint of bias or corruption; let it remain that way. A judge must be,
and be seen to be, impartial and so must eschew all other interests which might one day give rise to
conflict or the appearance of bias.
In my book, the judge must forgo the current cult of the individual: to adapt Edmund Burke, "individuals
pass like shadows, but the (institution) is fixed and stable". The judge is sometimes accused of remoteness
but in one sense that is no more than the reverse side of the commitment, the total commitment, which is
demanded of the appointee.
John D. Phillips is retiring as a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria. This is part of his farewell
address to the court.
END QUOTE
And. Considering that there was no evidence before His Honour Mullaly J on the pre-appeal
hearing then on what legal basis was it that His Honour Mullaly J made his comment?
As I prove/exposed in another case there the lawyers filed their cost charges and by this proved
they had about 9 calls to the judicial officers and on 2 occasions orders were issued as result
without any formal application let alone any hearing to justify such orders being issued. As such,
fraternizing of a judge with a party is not unknown to me.
His Honour Mullaly claimed that the magistrates Court doesnt need any evidence in an ex
parte (criminal) case, whereas the documentation I have indicates the magistrate can only
consider the full brief if it was served upon the defendant at least 14 days prior to a hearing.
Well, I was never properly/lawfully served with any full brief up to the date of this writing, and
as such if His Honour Mullaly J was looking at his computer screen that may have displayed ta
scanned copy or other copy of the full brief then His Honour Mullaly J was considering
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communication from the other party without my knowledge and as such can in my view be
deemed to have been fraternizing with the prosecutor. In my view the integrity of the court is
placed in question when a judicial officer is looking at a computer screren without either/both of
the parties being able to see the same details. It is a matter of NATURAL JUSTICE that a
judicial officer must not consider something that may affect the courts consideration that is
unbeknown to either or both parties.
.
QUOTE 20151130-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Associate Mr Garry McIntosh to His Honour Mullaly J County Court
of Victoria-Re APPEAL-15-2502-LEGAL PROCEDURES-Bigotery
His Honour Mullaly J upon that then considering the ADDRESS TO THE COURT that contained my
written submissions including once again an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION would never even have
been aware that I requested also for a brief, which even despite the orders of His Honour Mullaly J to be
posted via Australia Post by no later than 9 November 2015 still has not been provided at the date of this
writing, but instead a purported concoction of a brief was provided that for example refers to a 18 March
2013 hearing date whereas the alleged offence was claimed to be on 17 November 2014!
END QUOTE 20151130-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Associate Mr Garry McIntosh to His Honour Mullaly J County
Court of Victoria-Re APPEAL-15-2502-LEGAL PROCEDURES-Bigotery
The question then also arises was His Honour Mullaly J looking at his screen that displayed a
copy of the full brief even so it had never been served upon me? And so was His Honour
Mullaly J considering a reference to an 18 March 2013 hearing date that was fictitious?
Did His Honour Mullaly J order for the prosecutor to serve a copy of the full brief (if it was on
court file, that is) as was filed by the prosecutor or was His Honour Mullaly J. simply referring
to some full brief not knowing if it ever existed at all?
Was His Honour Mullaly J in effect ordering a copy of the full brief that His Honour held should
have been on court file, but wasnt? Perhaps never existed then at all? Then again how could His
Honour Mullaly J order something that didnt exist?
Obviously if the full brief was on court file and it was referring to the 18 March 2013 hearing
date then I view the Magistrates Court of Victoria was deceived/misled also, in addition that the
Magistrates Court of Victoria was considering something in violation to the court rules as it (the
full brief) had not been served upon me.
If you consider this is the professionalism of the court then I view you better get re-educated as
to what integrity stands for. Even I with my self-professed crummy English understand that
it doesnt mean the rot I am subjected to.
Generally this kind of rot more reflects the modus operandi how a court/lawyers operates and to
me this is of grave concerns.
The same with the Notice of Appearance, as I understand it from the prosecutor legal
representatives:
QUOTE 20151221-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to ES&a Your ref LA-05-06-Re APPEAL-15-2502 -Re Failure to
comply with court order-etc
We apologise for the delay in providing same but note that a Notice of Appearance had been filed
with the court on 13 October 2015 and we had not been notified that an alternative form was
required by the registry.
No copy of the alleged 13 October 2015 Notice of Appearance was served upon me and as such
the question is was any alleged Notice of Appearance filed at all on 13 October 2015 with the
Court? And if so did the Prosecutor seek leave to serve out of time a copy, where it was not
served at all?
It appears to me the prosecutor seeks to use an excuse as to an incorrect form being used as to
file the Notice of Appearance out of time, without seeking Leave to file and serve out of
time, and the question arises then was this some result of fraternising between the court and the
prosecutor? Who discovered the alleged incorrect form being used, and if this was
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communication between the court and the prosecutor why then wasnt IO provided a copy of the
communication considering that THE QUEEN v STEVEN KING FISHER No 777 of 2008-is
about communication with Associate of Judge?
From: Hannah.Feeney@countycourt.vic.gov.au [mailto:Hannah.Feeney@countycourt.vic.gov.au]
On Behalf Of crim.reg@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Sent: Friday, 27 November 2015 3:44 PM
To: Rebecca Orpwood
Subject: Re: Schorel-Hlavka v Buloke Shire Council - County Court Notice of Appeal - AP-15-2502
Hi Rebecca,
Elliot Stafford Associates are not currently listed as the acting solicitors for this matter
Please complete the attached form and email to crim.reg@countycourty.vic.gov.au and resend
your request for a copy of the Orders. We will then be able to action your request.
Kind regards,
Criminal Registry
END QUOTE 20151221-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to ES&a Your ref LA-05-06-Re APPEAL-15-2502 -Re
Failure to comply with court order-etc
As such on 27 November 2015, some 4 weeks after His Honour Mullaly J was dealing with the
pre-appeal hearing the prosecutor in fact was no prosecutor at all! And where again is the
evidence that the wrong form was filed on 13 October 2015 when the court advises they are not
listed at all as acting solicitors?
I will now quote your email received 21-12-2015:

QUOTE
RE: Schorel-Hlavka v Buloke Shire Council - County

Court Notice of Appeal - AP-15-2502
From
Alison May
To
crim.reg@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Cc
Rebecca Orpwood
Date
Sun 23:31
, gerrit@inspector-rikati.com
Message 1 of 186 < >
DOC211215-211215092356.pdf
Dear Sirs,
Further to your below email correspondence please find attached scanned copy Notice that Practitioner
Acts.
We apologise for the delay in providing same but note that a Notice of Appearance had been filed with
the court on 13 October 2015 and we had not been notified that an alternative form was required by the
registry.
Would you kindly forward a copy of the 30 October 2015 orders at your earliest convenience.
Yours faithfully
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Alison May| Legal Practitioner

Elliott Stafford & Associates | 316A Queens Parade, Clifton Hill
t: (03) 9486 7555 | f: (03) 9486 6444 | e: alison.may@elliottstafford.com.au
From: Hannah.Feeney@countycourt.vic.gov.au [mailto:Hannah.Feeney@countycourt.vic.gov.au] On
Behalf Of crim.reg@countycourt.vic.gov.au
Sent: Friday, 27 November 2015 3:44 PM
To: Rebecca Orpwood
Subject: Re: Schorel-Hlavka v Buloke Shire Council - County Court Notice of Appeal - AP-15-2502
Hi Rebecca,
To"crim.reg@countycourt.vic.gov.au" <crim.reg@countycourt.vic.gov.au>,
cc
Elliot Stafford Associates are not

currently listed as the acting solicitors
for this matter
SubjectSchorel-Hlavka v Buloke Shire Council - County Court Notice of Appeal AP-15-2502
Please complete the attached form

and email to
crim.reg@countycourty.vic.gov.au and
resend your request for a copy of the
Orders. We will then be able to action
your request.
Kind regards,
Criminal Registry
County Court of Victoria
250 William Street Melbourne 3000
DX 290078 Melbourne
+61 (03) 8636 6570
crim.reg@countycourt.vic.gov.au
www.countycourt.vic.gov.au
Rebecca Orpwood
<rebecca@elliottstafford.com.au>
27/11/2015 11:00 AM
Dear Sir/Madam
We act for the Respondent, Buloke Shire Council, in this matter.
We would be grateful for a copy of the orders made on 30 October 2015.
We note that this matter is next listed on 22 February 2016.
Kind regards
Rebecca Orpwood | Legal Assistant
Elliott Stafford & Associates | 316A Queens Parade, Clifton Hill
t: (03) 9486 7555 | f: (03) 9486 6444 | e: rebecca@elliottstafford.com.au
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END QUOTE
END QUOTE 20151221-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to ES&a Your ref LA-05-06-Re APPEAL-15-2502 -Re Failure to
It appears to me that what His Honour Mullaly J needs is some kind of a shopping list. Meaning
he needs to have in front of him a WHAT TO DO list so His Honour can competently deal
with matters. After all should a presiding officer not first check if the parties claiming to appear
before him have a legal standing. Is next Santa Claus so going to appeal and His Honour Mullaly
J will assume he has a legal standing because after all he (I assume) believed in Santa Claus as a
child, and perhaps still does?
Does the court have a CHECK LIST that requires court staff/a judicial officer to mark each
item as to have been complied with including if a Notice of Appearance was filed?
I used to be in management and for my workers I did provide a CHECK LIST so they could
follow this as to the specific issues to be attended to, and surely one could expect a judicial
officer to be at least as competent as ordinary employees to manage to perform such a task?
Well, it appears to me the County Court of Victoria integrity is in tatters at the very least
because obviously what ordinary employees may be able to competently do some judicial officer
seems to me to lack this ability.
Once a 16 year boy asked for a job and his experiences was sheep herding in New Zealand. I
asked him to show me what was 1 inch. He showed me and I indicated that everything else I
would teach him. Within 6 months he was if not equally then better than the machine setters
whop were doing it for more than 35 years. I wonder then if a 16 year old sheepherder can learn
so far that within 6 months is the best setter in the company of expensive machinery then surely
one could expect a judicial officer doing no more but what he is supposed to be experienced in to
do better?
If His Honour Mullaly J cannot even manage basic legal issue then I view he better gets himself
a job that is within his mental abilities. As a party appearing before the court I am entitled to
have a fair minded judicial officer who is competent in the job., and not so to say some amateur
who lacks proper understanding of legal procedures. After all, despite my written submissions in
the ADDRESS TO THE COURT such as to OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION His Honour
Mullaly J didnt seem to understand/comprehend that he had no judicial powers to order any
hearing De Novo but could only order a JURISDICTIONAL HEARING, but as there was no
Notice of Appearance then who was the Prosecutor? Did His Honour Mullaly J appoint himself
to be the prosecutor and hence his what I deem vile and bullying attack upon me as I understood
it that the law applies to everyone else but to me?
As His Honour Mullaly J failed to order a JURISDICTIONAL HEARING the De Novo
hearing has no legal validity, this is because the cpoiurt cannot circumvent the OB JECTION TO
JURISDICTION. And if His Honour Mullaly J lacks competence in being able to read
/understand/comprehend what the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION stands for then I view he
better goes so to say back to the kindergarten and start all over.
It appears from the courts email that no incorrect form was filed as claimed by ES&a lawyers
and as such this would be another deception as to seek to deceive me as to file and serve out of
time without bothering to seek Leave to file and serve out of time.
And this clearly underlines how the courts allow itself to be misused and abused and so to say are
the playground of lawyers.
Despite that on 2-12-2015 I did provide a copy of the 30 October 2015 orders nevertheless weeks
later on Sunday 20 December 2o015 ES&a lawyers requested a COPY. This means they never
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read my correspondence and yet did charge for it before the magistrates Court of Victoria in an
earlier hearing, and despite being then provided on 21 December 2015 with another copy they
still didnt apply for leave to serve out of time the full brief, this even so they failed to
comply with the 30 October 2015 orders of His Honour Mullaly J. As such again it appears to me
that so to say His Honour Mullaly (and so those assisting him) are acting as a puppet-on-a-string
for ES&a lawyers to do whatever suits the prosecutor rather than to conduct matters in a proper
legal manner.
As I indicated in my 20151227-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Associate Mr Garry McIntosh to
His Honour Mullaly J County Court of Victoria-Re APPEAL-15-2502-How the courts are
misused-etc regarding Mr John Murray Abbott then the court was grossly deceived with a
fictitious debt. For sure the court had court rules and in that manner cannot be blamed being
grossly deceived by lawyers who are OFFICERS OF THE COURT having been deceptive, but
the lack of integrity is there where when then I notified an OFFICER OF THE COURT
about this with evidence to prove this gross deception the court fails to act immediately upon
this.
QUOTE 29-12-2015 EMAIL
RE: JOHN ABBOTT Re 7 August 2015 AGC correspondence

People
John Abbott <johnabbott9@bigpond.com>
'Mr Gerrit H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.'
Dec 29 at 4:08 AM
To
Hide
Message body
Thank you Gerrit, I have read the nine pages and appreciate the interest and effort you are taking and
making on my behalf as well as seeking justice.
I am considering taking action against Gadens and joining GE given GEs misconduct in the matter.
The question is:
1.
Do I approach the County Court to review the case based on new evidence (letter from
GE);
2.
Do I appeal the matter by first seeking to file out of time based on the said new evidence
and the fact that the matter may include fraud and thus the time element does not apply;?
It seems to me that the first approach should be to the County Court to review your thoughts please.
Yours
John
END QUOTE 29-12-2015 EMAIL
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Well, reality is that the moment I notified an OFFICER OF THE COURT, being in this case
the Associate to His Honour Mullaly J then it is now in the hands of the court to prove its
integrity that it will immediately, without undue delay, deal with this matter. If the associate
fails to notify the court then he can be deemed to condone the alleged deception and so become
part of it as if he participated in it. Likewise any other OFFICER OF THE COURT.
We do however have another major issue at hand.

For example when a Bill passed through both Houses of Parliament is granted Royal Ascent then
ordinary it is an Act of Parliament. Really? Not if it turns out that the passing of the bill was in
violation of the constitution! Indeed, the Cross Vesting Act in HCA 27 of 1999 was held by the
High Court of Australia to violate the constitution and as such was ULTRA VIRES.
ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2
County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
QUOTE
VICTORIA v. THE COMMONWEALTH AND CONNOR; NEW SOUTH WALES v. THE

COMMONWEALTH; QUEENSLAND v. THE COMMONWEALTH; WESTERN
AUSTRALIA v. THE COMMONWEALTH (1975) 134 CLR 81
Following the averment
the proclamation continues: "Now therefore, I (The Governor-General in office)
does by this my Proclamation dissolve the House of Representatives? (At p129)
If the Senate were in fact dissolved, and if thereafter
writs for an election were issued, the election was held and a new Parliament
was summoned to meet, I can see no difficulty in holding that the new
Parliament would have validly assembled. This of course is not to suggest
that this Court could not intervene to uphold the Constitution and prevent an
invalid proclamation for the dissolution of the Senate from being given
effect. However, these questions need not be further discussed.
END QUOTE
When Senator Woods was declared to be the successful candidate in a political election and the
governor-General had him sworn in as a Senator nevertheless the High Court of Australia
(rightly or wrongly) held that he was not eligible to be a Member of parliament and voided his
election, and so the declaration by the Electoral Commission and the Governor-General
accepting him as a Senator was all invalid.
And bye o bye didnt I warn Buloke Shire Council long before it instituted litigation against me
that I was about citizenship? Well ES&a lawyers representing or allegedly representing Buloke
Shire Council claimed about $1,700 cost regarding my writings, which I view was a fraudulent
charge and so perverted the course of justice. You see, ES&a Lawyers didnt realise that with my
writings if they claim cost for it then they indicate to have read and consider its content, not
merely counting pages to charge. As such it had a legal obligation to set out the relevant issues to
the court on 20 August 2015 and 17 September 2015 as well as before His Honour Mullaly J on
30 October 2015.
In particular where on each occasions I provided my written submission in an ADDRESS TO
THE COURT regarding the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION they were obligated to present
relevant details to the court on each occasion. This they failed in my view to do!
.
Foster (1950) S.R. (N.S.W.) 149, at p151 (Lord Denning, speaking on the role of an advocate)
QUOTE
As an advocate he is a minister of Justice equally with a judge, A Barrister cannot pick or choose his
clients...He must accept the brief and do all he honourably can on behalf of his client. I say 'All he
honourably can' because his duty is not only to his client. He has a duty to the court which is
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paramount. It is a mistake to suppose that he is a mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants: or
his tool to do what he directs. He is none of those things. He owes his allegiance to a higher cause. It is
the cause of truth and Justice. He must not consciously misstate the facts. He must not knowingly
conceal the truth. He must not unjustly make a charge of fraud, that is, without evidence to support
it. He must produce all relevant authorities, even those that are against him. He must see that his client
discloses, if ordered, all relevant documents, even those that are fatal to his case. He must disregard the
specific instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the court.
END QUOTE
As I did set out the issue of CITIZENSHIP then this is very relevant because as indicated above
laws such as the purported Cross Vesting Act and the purported appointment of Senator Woods
turned out to be in violation of the constitution. Then was the appointment of
judges/magistrates/judicial registrars constitutionally permissible one has to ask?
Again, every facet of legality is in question once I made my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
and yet I am not aware that Buloke Shire Council and/or its purported legal representatives
provided any shred of evidence to prove that for example such appointments are legally valid.
There ought to be no doubt that in ACE v Schorel-Hlavka there was an s78B NOTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS and the County Court of Victoria upheld both appeals.
Hence it is beyond the ability of the State of Victoria (so Buloke Shire Council on its behalf) to
seek to re-litigate the same issues. I comprehensively defeated them all on the issue of
CITIZENSHIP!
I submitted that the State of Victoria has no CITIZENSHIP laws and as such I cannot accept any
judicial officer is validly appointed as a judge/magistrate/judicial registrar.
QUOTE
Hansard 6-3-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr. THYNNE:
The union of these colonies must take place in either one or two ways, namely, either by a
unification under one all-powerful parliament, or by a federation which gives to the central
federal parliament certain limited powers and reserves to the other parliaments all other
powers. As I think we may be in danger of overlooking some of the first principles
connected with federation, I may be pardoned if I briefly define some of the characteristics
of a federation. I shall quote from Mr. Dicey's recent work, which is very clear in its
language. He says:
One of the characteristics of a federation is that the law of the constitution must be
either legally immutable or else capable of being changed only by some authority
above and beyond the ordinary legislative bodies, whether federal or state
legislatures, existing under the constitution.
Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and 278
The oath of a justice of this court is ' to do right to all manner of people according to law'
Our sworn duty is to the law itself and to the organic nature of the constitution first of all.
If, then, we find the law to be plainly in conflict with what we or any of our
predecessors errornously thought it to be, we have, as I conceive no right to choose
between giving effect to the law, and maintaining an incorrect interpretation, It is not,
in my opinion, better that the court should be persistently wrong than that it should
be ultimately right..
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Whatever else may be said with respect to previous decisions - and it is necessary here to
consider the principals upon which a court should act in particular cases - so much at least
emerges as is undoubtedly beyond challenge, that where a former decision is clearly wrong,
and there are no circumstances countervailing the primary duty of giving effect to the law
as the court finds it, the real opinion of the court should be expressed.
It is a matter of fact that I was issued with a Certificate of Australian Citizenship No.
ME9401317C on the 28th day of March 1994. I do not believe that the Commonwealth Director
of Public Prosecutions contest the issue of this certificate.
The certificate states;
QUOTE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Australian citizenship Act 1948
Certificate of Australian Citizenship
GERRIT HENDRIK SCHOREL
Born on 7 th June 1947
having applied for a Certificate of Australian Citizenship, having satisfied the conditions
prescribed by the Australian Citizenship Act 19448 for the grant of such Certificate
and having undertaken to fulfil the responsibilities of a citizen.
I the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,
Grant this Certificate of Australian citizenship to the abovenamed applicant who is
an Australian citizen on and after 28 th March 1994.
Issued by the authority
Of the Minister
For Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs.
END QUOTE
By marriage, on 28 March 2001, I became Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-Hlavka

Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133 (1795)
Yet, it is to be remembered, and that whether in its real origin, or in its artificial state,
allegiance, as well as fealty, rests upon lands, and it is due to persons. Not so, with
respect to Citizenship, which has arisen from the dissolution of the feudal system and is
a substitute for allegiance, corresponding with the new order of things. Allegiance and
citizenship, differ, indeed, in almost every characteristic. Citizenship is the effect of
compact; allegiance is the offspring of power and necessity. Citizenship is a political tie;
allegiance is a territorial tenure. Citizenship is the charter of equality; allegiance is a
badge of inferiority. Citizenship is constitutional; allegiance is personal. Citizenship is
freedom; allegiance is servitude. Citizenship is communicable; allegiance is repulsive.
Citizenship may be relinquished; allegiance is perpetual. With such essential
differences, the doctrine of allegiance is inapplicable to a system of citizenship; which it
can neither serve to controul, nor to elucidate. And yet, even among the nations, in
which the law of allegiance is the most firmly established, the law most pertinaciously
enforced, there are striking deviations that demonstrate the invincible power of truth,
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and the homage, which, under every modification of government, must be paid to the
inherent rights of man.
And
These are tacit acknowledgments of the right of expatriation, vested in the individuals; for,
though they are instances of adopting, not of discharging, subjects; yet, if Great Britain
would (ex gratia) protect a Russian naturalized by service, in her fleet, it is obvious that
she cannot do so without recognizing his right of expatriation to be superior to the
Empress's right of allegiance. But it is not only in a negative way, that these deviations in
support of the general right appear. The doctrine is, that allegiance cannot be due to two
sovereigns; and taking an oath of allegiance to a new, is the strongest evidence of
withdrawing allegiance from a previous, sovereign.
And
The power of naturalizing has been vested in several of the state governments, and it
now exists in the general government; but the power to restrain or regulate the right
of emigration, is no where surrendered by the people; and it must be repeated, that,
what has not been given, ought not to be assumed. It may be said, however, that such
a power is necessary to the government, and that it is implied in the authority to
regulate the business of naturalization. In considering these positions, it must be
admitted, that although an individual has a right to expatriate himself, he has not a
right to seduce others from their country. Hence, those who forcibly, or seductively,
take away a citizen, commit an act, which [p*143] forms a fair object of municipal
police; and a conspiracy or combination, to leave a country, might, likewise be
properly guarded against. Such laws would not be an infraction of the natural right of
individuals; for, the natural rights of man are personal; he has no right to will for
others, and he does so, in effect, whenever he moves the mind of another to his
purpose, by fear, by fraud, or by persuasion.
And
But naturalization and expatriation are matters of internal police; and must depend
upon the municipal law, though they may be illustrated and explained by the
principles of general jurisprudence. It is true, that the judicial power extends to a
variety of objects; but the Supreme Court is only a branch of that power; and
depends on Congress for what portion it shall have, except in the cases of
ambassadors, &c. particularly designated in the constitution. The power of declaring
whether a citizen shall be entitled in any form to expatriate himself, or, if entitled, to
prescribe the form, is not given to the Supreme Court; and, yet, that power will be
exercised by the court, if they shall decide against the expatriation of Captain Talbot.
Let it not, after all, be understood, that the natural, loco-motive, right of a free citizen,
is independent of every social obligation. In time of war, it would be treason to
migrate to any enemy's country and join his forces, under the pretext of expatriation.
1 Dall. Rep. 53, and, even in time of peace, it would be, reprehensible (say the writers
on the law of nature and nations) to desert a country labouring under great
calamities. So, if a man acting under the obligations of an oath of office, withdraws to
elude his responsibility, he changes his habitation, but not his citizenship. It is not,
however, private relations, but public relations; private responsibility, but public
responsibility; that can affect the right: for, where the reason of the law ceases, the
law itself must, also, cease. There is not a private relation, for which a man is not as
liable by local, as by natural, allegiance;--after, as well as before, his expatriation: He
must take care of his family, he must pay his debts, wherever he resides; and there is
no security in restraining emigration, as to those objects, since, with respect to them,
withdrawing is as effectual, as expatriating. Nor is it enough to impair the right of
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expatriation, that other nations are at war; it must be the country of the emigrant. No nation
has a right to interfere in the interior police of another: the rights and duties of citizenship,
to be conferred, or released, are matter of interior police; and yet, if a foreign war could
affect [p*145] the question, every time that a fresh power entered into a war, a new
restraint would be imposed upon the natural rights of the citizens of a neutral country;
which, considering the constant warfare that afflicts the world, would amount to a
perpetual controul. But the true distinction appears to be this:--The citizens of the neutral
country may still exercise the right of expatriation, but the belligerent power is entitled to
say, "the act of joining our enemies, flagrante bello, shall not be a valid act of
expatriation." By this construction, the duty a nation owes to itself, the sacred rights of the
citizen, the law of nations, and the faith of treaties, will harmonize, though moving in
distinct and separate courses. To pursue the subject one step further: A man cannot owe
allegiance to two sovereigns. 1Bl. Com. He cannot be citizen of two republics. If a man
has a right to expatriate, and another nation has a right and disposition to adopt him,
it is a compact between the two parties, consummated by the oath of allegiance. A
man's last will, as to his citizenship, may be likened to his last will, as to his estate; it
supersedes every former disposition; and when either takes effect, the party, in one
case, is naturally dead, in the other, he is civilly dead;--but in both cases, as good
Christians and good republicans, it must be presumed that he rises to another, if not
to a better, life and country. An act of expatriation, likewise, is susceptible of various
kinds of proof. The Virginia law has selected one, when the state permits her citizens
to depart; but it is not, perhaps, either the most authentic, or the most conclusive that
the case admits. It may be done obscurely in a distant county court; and even after
the emigrant is released from Virginia, to what nation does he belong? He may have
entered no other country, nor incurred any obligation to any other sovereign. Not
being a citizen of Virginia, he cannot be deemed a citizen of the United States. Shall he
be called a citizen of the world; a human balloon, detached and buoyant in the
political atmosphere, gazed at wherever he passes, and settled wherever he touches?
But, on the other hand, the act of swearing allegiance to another sovereign, is
unequivocal and conclusive; extinguishing, at once, the claims of the deserted, and
creating the right of the adopted, country. Sir William Blackstone, therefore, considers it
as the strongest, though an ineffectual, effort to emancipate a British subject from his
natural allegiance; and the existing constitution of France declares it expressly to be a
criterion of expatriation. The same principle operates, when the naturalization law of the
United States provides, that the whole ceremony of initiation shall be performed in the
American courts; and if it is here considered as the proof of adoption, shall it not be
considered, also, as the test of expatriation? If America [p*146] makes citizens in that way,
shall we not allow to other nations, the privilege of the same process? In short, to admit
that Frenchmen may be made citizens by an oath of allegiance to America, is, virtually, to
admit, that Americans may be expatriated by an oath of allegiance to France. After this
discussion of principles, forming a necessary basis for the facts in this case, it is insisted,
1st, That Talbot was a naturalized citizen of the French Republic at the time of receiving a
commission to command the privateer, and of capturing the Magdalena. He left this
country with the design to emigrate; and the act of expatriation must be presumed to be
regular, according to the laws of France, since it is certified by the municipality of Point a
Pitre, by the French Consul, and by the Governor of Guadaloupe. 2d, That Redick was
also, a naturalized citizen of the French Republic, when he purchased the vessel, and
received a commission to employ her as a privateer.
And
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Ballard was a citizen of Virginia, and also of the United States.
Within the united States of America a person granted naturalization is also granted citizenship,
where as the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) does not provide for this.
Section 51(xix) provides for naturalization.
As already extensively placed before the magistrates in previous proceedings (upon which I rely
before this Court also) some of the Colonies (now States) naturalized aliens and others didnt
however each and every Colony did have legislation in regard of citizenship and the rights to
franchise.
The Hansard records of the 2 March and 3 March 1898 Constitutional Convention Debates
made clear that naturalization powers would be transferred from the Colonies to the newly to
be formed Commonwealth of Australia, as it would be approved by the British Parliament but
CITIZENSHIP legislative powers would be retained by the States in the newly formed
Commonwealth of Australia.
Mr Quick proposed to give the Commonwealth of Australia constitutional powers to
define/declare CITIZENSHIP but this was defeated/refused by the Delegates!
I took occasion to indicate that in creating a federal citizenship, and in defining the
qualifications of that federal citizenship, we were not in any way interfering with our
position as subjects of the British Empire. It would be beyond the scope of the
Constitution to do that.
Therefore, even if the amendment of Mr Quick had succeeded it still was not intended to give
any legislative powers to the commonwealth of australia to interfere with the rights of any person
as a British subject.
Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates;
Mr. BARTON.-I did not say that. I say that our real status is as subjects, and that we
are all alike subjects of the British Crown.
Dr. QUICK.-If we are to have a citizenship of the Commonwealth higher, more
comprehensive, and nobler than that of the states, I would ask why is it not implanted in the
Constitution? Mr. Barton was not present when I made my remarks in proposing the
clause. I then-anticipated the point he has raised as to the position we occupy as subjects of
the British Empire. I took occasion to indicate that in creating a federal citizenship,
and in defining the qualifications of that federal citizenship, we were not in any way
interfering with our position as subjects of the British Empire. It would be beyond the
scope of the Constitution to do that. We might be citizens of a city, citizens of a
colony, or citizens of a Commonwealth, but we would still be, subjects of the Queen. I
see therefore nothing unconstitutional, nothing contrary to our instincts as British
subjects, in proposing to place power in this Constitution to enable the Federal Parliament
to deal with the question of federal citizenship. An objection has been raised in various
quarters-as by the honorable and learned members (Mr. O'Connor and Mr. Wise)-to the
effect that we ought to define federal citizenship in the Constitution itself. I have
considered this matter very carefully, and it has seemed to me that it would be most
difficult and invidious, if not almost impossible, to frame a satisfactory definition. There is
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in the Constitution of the United States of America a cast-iron definition of
citizenship, which has been found to be absolutely unworkable, because, among other
things, it says that a citizen of the United States shall be a natural-born or naturalized
citizen within the jurisdiction of the United States, and it has been found that that
excludes the children of citizens born outside the limits of this jurisdiction. That
shows the danger of attempting definitions, and although I have placed a proposed
clause defining federal citizenship upon the notice-paper, the subject, seems to me
surrounded with the greatest difficulty, and no doubt the honorable and learned
members (Mr. Wise, Mr. O'Connor, and Mr. Symon) would be the first to attack any
definition, and would be able to perforate it. In my opinion, it would be undesirable to
implant a cast-iron definition of citizenship in the Constitution, because it would be
better to leave the question more elastic, more open to consideration, and more
yielding to the advancing changes and requirements of the times.
Mr. SYMON.-I agree with the honorable member, and I also think it is unlikely that the
Commonwealth will seek to derogate from it, but I will not place a power in the hands of
the Commonwealth which will enable them to derogate from it, and if that is not done it
will be merely a dead letter. Is there any citizen of the Commonwealth who is not already a
citizen of the state? State citizenship is his birthright, and by virtue of it he is entitled to the
citizenship of the Commonwealth. When you have immigration, and allow different
people to come in who belong to nations not of the same blood as we are, they become
naturalized, and thereby are entitled to the rights of citizenship.
Sir EDWARD BRADDON.-They are citizens if they are British subjects before they
come here.
Mr. SYMON.-That is a point I do not wish to deal with. But they become citizens of
the states, and it is by virtue of their citizenship of the states that they become citizens
of the Commonwealth. Are you going to have citizens of the state who are not citizens
of the Commonwealth?
Mr. KINGSTON.-In some states they naturalize; but they do not in others.
Mr. WALKER.-Is not a citizen of the state, ipso facto, a citizen of the
Commonwealth?
END QUOTE

QUOTE
The Hansard records of the 2 March and 3 March 1898 Constitutional Convention Debates
made clear that naturalization powers would be transferred from the Colonies to the newly to
be formed Commonwealth of Australia, as it would be approved by the British Parliament but
CITIZENSHIP legislative powers would be retained by the States in the newly formed
Commonwealth of Australia.
Mr Quick proposed to give the Commonwealth of Australia constitutional powers to
define/declare CITIZENSHIP but this was defeated/refused by the Delegates!
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I took occasion to indicate that in creating a federal citizenship, and in defining the
qualifications of that federal citizenship, we were not in any way interfering with our
position as subjects of the British Empire. It would be beyond the scope of the
Constitution to do that.
Therefore, even if the amendment of Mr Quick had succeeded it still was not intended to give
any legislative powers to the commonwealth of australia to interfere with the rights of any person
as a British subject.
END QUOTE
As such it was beyond the judicial powers of the High Court of Australia to determine otherwise
in Sue v Hill! And again none of the Attorney-Generals challenged any of my extensive
submissions! As such they are deemed to have accepted the correctness of my submissions!
QUOTE
For the record, it ought to be understood that my naturalization never involved any State official,
as it was done at 55 Kings Street, Melbourne at the then offices of the Immigration Department,
and as such unlike most other people my naturalization was purely conducted by Commonwealth
of Australia officers, who obviously lacked any constitutional powers to provide me with
franchise as that was a State matter. It can therefore neither be argued that somehow the state
of Victoria did provide me with franchise as it never did. It erroneously relied upon the
ULTRA VIRES Australian Citizenship Act 1948 as to somehow take it that I was granted
franchise where clearly this never could be so.
In the Moller v Board of Examiners for Legal Practitioners case it is clear that some oath of
alliance was required. Now, if there was some change of oath of alliance because of
purportedly the Commonwealth of Australia having become INDEPENDENT then at what time
was the oath of alliance taken by lawyers to practice at the Victorian Bar valid? And, when did
lawyers already have taken this oath of alliance to the British Monarch then make a new oath
of alliance to the purported Queen of Australia? Or is it that we have lawyers (including
judicial officers) where some have sworn an oath of alliance to the LEGAL FICTION of
Queen of Australia while others to the British monarch?
I take the position that it is not relevant what the High Court of Australia may purport to make
out of matters in the Sue v Hill case, as ultimately it is ULTRA VIRES where they are making
decisions that are in conflict to the intentions of the Framers (and so amended by the successful
referendums) as expressed in the Constitution.
I view it is beyond constitutional powers for the High Court of Australia to interfere with
constitutional provisions and as such we are and remain to be British nationals and ultimately it
will be up to the people to decide otherwise.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
The term citizenship was not at all associated with nationality but rather covered any
subject of the Queen residing within the Commonwealth of Australia or for that the continent
Australia.
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The terms Australian citizen, Australian citizens , Australian citizenship,
Commonwealth citizens, federal citizen, citizen of the Commonwealth were used ongoing
by the Framers of the Constitution, as shown below, and as such were terms not as to
nationality but in regard of citizenship as being a resident in the colonies (now States) and the
Commonwealth of Australia. Therefore any constitutionalist, as I am, is or should be aware that
the term Australian citizenship cannot be held to relate to nationality. Neither that there can be
an Australian nationality merely because some judges happen to desire to make such a
declaration as the proper powers to legislate for this is to follow the procedures within Section
128 of the Constitution.
13-02-1890 Re; Australian citizen

13-03-1891 Re; Australian citizens
Re; dual citizenship
26-03-1897 Re; citizen of the Commonwealth
29-03-1897 Re; Dual citizenship
30-03-1897 Re; federal citizen
Re; citizen of the Commonwealth
15-04-1897 Re; Dual citizenship
Re; Commonwealth citizenship
28-01-1898 Re; Australian citizenship
Re; Commonwealth citizens
Re; federal citizenship
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END QUOTE
Hansard 28-1-1898 Constitution convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. KINGSTON.-By its lessees or any one else. Pushed to a legitimate conclusion his argument would
amount to this: That the state might dictate as to the right with which each person could step ashore on to that
soil. I do not think the matter should be viewed solely with regard to our dealing with alien races, who will
chiefly come within the scope and purview of this sub-section. We ought to deal with the matter not on local
or provincial, but on broad Australian lines. I know that in this respect I differ a good deal from many with
whom I generally work in sympathy, but the view which I venture to propound is this-that if you do not
like these people you should keep them out, but if you do admit them you should treat them fairlyadmit them as citizens entitled to all the rights and privileges of Australian citizenship.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Mr. BARTON.Providing, as this Constitution does, for a free people to elect a free Parliament-giving that people
through their Parliament the power of the purse-laying at their mercy from day to day the existence of
any Ministry which dares by corruption, or drifts through ignorance into, the commission of any act
which is unfavorable to the people having this security, it must in its very essence be a free
Constitution. Whatever any one may say to the contrary that is secured in the very way in which the
freedom of the British Constitution is secured. It is secured by vesting in the people, through their
representatives, the power of the purse, and I venture [start page 2477] to say there is no other way of
securing absolute freedom to a people than that, unless you make a different kind of Executive than
that which we contemplate, and then overload your Constitution with legislative provisions to protect
the citizen from interference. Under this Constitution he is saved from every kind of interference.
Under this Constitution he has his voice not only in the, daily government of the country, but in the
daily determination of the question of whom is the Government to consist. There is the guarantee of
freedom in this Constitution. There is the guarantee which none of us have sought to remove, but every
one has sought to strengthen. How we or our work can be accused of not providing for the popular
liberty is something which I hope the critics will now venture to explain, and I think I have made their
work difficult for them. Having provided in that way for a free Constitution, we have provided for an
Executive which is charged with the duty of maintaining the provisions of that Constitution; and,
therefore, it can only act as the agents of the people. We have provided for a Judiciary, which will
determine questions arising under this Constitution, and with all other questions which should be dealt
with by a Federal Judiciary and it will also be a High Court of Appeal for all courts in the states that
choose to resort to it. In doing these things, have we not provided, first, that our Constitution shall be free:
next, that its government shall be by the will of the people, which is the just result of their freedom: thirdly,
that the Constitution shall not, nor shall any of its provisions, be twisted or perverted, inasmuch as a
court appointed by their own Executive, but acting independently, is to decide what is a perversion of its
provisions? We can have every faith in the constitution of that tribunal. It is appointed as the arbiter of the
Constitution. It is appointed not to be above the Constitution, for no citizen is above it, but under it; but
it is appointed for the purpose of saying that those who are the instruments of the Constitution-the
Government and the Parliament of the day-shall not become the masters of those whom, as to the
Constitution, they are bound to serve. What I mean is this: That if you, after making a Constitution of
this kind, enable any Government or any Parliament to twist or infringe its provisions, then by slow
degrees you may have that Constitution-if not altered in terms-so whittled away in operation that the
guarantees of freedom which it gives your people will not be maintained; and so, in the highest sense,
the court you are creating here, which is to be the final interpreter of that Constitution, will be such a
tribunal as will preserve the popular liberty in all these regards, and will prevent, under any pretext of
constitutional action, the Commonwealth from dominating the states, or the states from usurping the
sphere of the Commonwealth. Having provided for all these things, I think this Convention has done
well.
END QUOTE
.
Therefore Australian citizenship must be understood and applied as to its true constitutional
meaning and not otherwise. Hence, it has nothing to do with nationality!
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QUOTE
Mr. WISE.-It would give full power to impose a tax on absentees outside the
Commonwealth, but not within it. There [start page 675] should be no absentees within the
Commonwealth after federation. I do not see, how, after federation, a man can be regarded
as an absentee at Sydney when he lives in Melbourne. If we are to have federation, the idea
that when a man moves from one part of the Commonwealth into another he becomes an
absentee, or ceases to be an Australian, is one that must vanish, and we ought, as far as our
Constitution will permit us, to do everything to make it vanish quickly. It is a survival of
the old idea that there is a distinctive citizenship in a Victorian, and a distinctive
citizenship in a New South Wales man. That is the idea which I am endeavouring to
destroy by supporting the amendment of Tasmania, that Australian citizenship, and that
alone, shall be recognised in every part of the Federation. The way to secure that is to
provide in the clearest terms, as Tasmania suggests, that no local Parliament can have any
authority to, in any way, abridge the citizenship of an Australian.
Mr. REID (New South Wales).-I really think that the constant attempts which are being
made to interfere with the rights of the states, in matters which are left to them expressly, is
becoming quite alarming. There are a number of general words already in this Constitution
which, I fear, may be used so as to almost destroy the independent powers of legislation of
the states, with reference to every conceivable subject that they have left to them.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Dual citizenship is not a dual nationality this as the Framers of the Constitution made clear;
Mr. SYMON.Dual citizenship exists, but it is not dual citizenship of persons, it is dual citizenship in
each person. There may be two men-Jones and Smith-in one state, both of whom are
citizens of the state, but one only is a citizen of the Commonwealth. That would not be
the dual citizenship meant. What is meant is a dual citizenship in Mr. Trenwith and
myself. That is to say, I am a citizen of the state and I am also a citizen of the
Commonwealth; that is the dual citizenship.
Supreme Court of Victoria - Court of Appeal
Moller v Board of Examiners for Legal Practitioners [1999] VSCA 116 (30 July 1999)
24. Mr Bevan-John's next submissions related to the appellant's personal position. He put it
that the appellant has already publicly and deliberately declared his allegiance to
Australia and that the purpose of his taking the oath has been fulfilled by his pledge upon
taking citizenship. He submitted that it was unfair to use the exemptive power under
HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/lpa1996120/" the
Act to excuse those who do not want to make any commitment of allegiance to
Australia at all and to deny it in respect of one who has already made the solemn pledge
of that allegiance when he formally undertook Australian citizenship.
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And
32. The requirement which the Court imposes on those seeking admission to practise as
barristers and solicitors in this State to take an oath or make an affirmation of allegiance
retains a significance which goes beyond the mere academic and the pompous. Young,
C.J. explained its importance in Re Miller [1979] V.R. 381 at 383 in terms of the statutory
recognition given by the Parliament to the oath of allegiance and its administration to
persons carrying out significant functions in this State.
33. To my mind his Honour's comments remain valid, notwithstanding the differences to be
found between the terms of HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/lpa1996120/s6.html" s.6 of the
HYPERLINK "http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/lpa1996120/" Legal
Practice Act 1996 and those which existed in s.5 of the Legal Profession Practice Act
1958. As Street, C.J. said in Re Howard [1976] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 641 at 643, the significance
of the oath being administered to those wishing to practise as barristers and solicitors is
its reminder to them that their role will be to serve law and justice in the State, of which
the Sovereign is the fountainhead.
34. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Court, in exercising its role as the ultimate
controller of the profession, imposes as one of the prerequisites for admission to practise
a promise of allegiance and does not lightly entertain applications to exempt persons from
that obligation. Where, as here, exemption was sought on the grounds of a strongly held
commitment to a republican model of government and a fear of compromising conscience
and principles if required to take an oath of allegiance, it is equally, in my view, not
surprising that His Honour exercised his discretion against exemption.
Again;
He submitted that it was unfair to use the exemptive power under HYPERLINK
"http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/lpa1996120/" the Act to excuse
those who do not want to make any commitment of allegiance to Australia at all and to
deny it in respect of one who has already made the solemn pledge of that allegiance when
he formally undertook Australian citizenship.
What was misconceived was that the oath of alliance is not as to citizenship but to
naturalization in regard of Subsection 51(xix) op the Constitution The oath of alliance to be
admitted to the Bar to practice in the State of Victoria is a different kind of alliance as it related
to uphold the specific laws of the State of Victoria. The oath of alliance in the State of NSW, for
example, is to uphold the laws of that State when seeking admission to the Bar there.
There can be no oath of alliance in regard of Australian citizenship as referred to by the
Framers of the Constitution as it is obtained AUTOMATICALLY when obtaining state
citizenship.
As I perceived it at the time of what I considered to be naturalization I made an oath of alliance
to become a subject of the British Monarch and indeed the Dutch Government advised me that
by taking up this naturalization I no longer have the Dutch nationality. This being so then clearly
the oath of alliance was in regard of the naturalization powers provided for within Subsection
51(xix) to naturalize aliens to become British nationals, and as such nothing to do with
citizenship as to being to include franchise.
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It is not relevant if the intentions of the Commonwealth of Australia is to include franchise as
it simply is unconstitutional and so ULTRA VIRES.
Many aliens who arrived as children in the Commonwealth of Australia with their parents,
who subsequently naturalized, found that years later they never were actually naturalized even so
they were voting in elections. Indeed, the Australian Electoral Commission is on record that
people were found not to be naturalized and so not entitled to vote even so they had filled out a
card to be an Australian citizen and so entitled to vote.
What has occurred that often children understood, as their parents did, that they were
naturalized at the time their parents were but this was somehow omitted from the documentation
to show so. My own 45 year old stepdaughter discovered this only a few years ago! By this,
while she considers herself to be an State citizen, and so an Australian citizen and also having
been naturalized, the Commonwealth of Australia however never accept any of this. The Pochi
case is another clear example, where Mr. Pochi was deported where the High Court of Australia
in 1982 held he was not an Australian citizens despite that he had lived for most of this life and
had children here. The High Court of Australia confusing Australian citizenship with
nationality.
To many Australian citizenship remains to be relating to having political rights and nothing to
do with nationality, and yet the Commonwealth of Australia keep advertising about Australian
citizenship but in real terms may and does in fact refer to some concocted Australian
nationality even so no constitutional powers exist in that regard.
Therefore, the fact that I had filled in enrolments cards to vote in Federal elections is of no
meaning where this was done upon misconceptions created by the Commonwealth of Australia
itself to refer to Australian citizenship but which in fact was not at all referring to franchise
of citizenship as such but to some purported Australian nationality.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
As was also placed before the Magistrates Court of Victoria the evidence in the ADDRESS TO
THE COURT that the Attorney-General in November 2002 advised me that the State of
Victoria has no legislation to provide State citizenship!
Mr. SYMON.As a citizen of a state I claim the right to be a citizen of the Commonwealth. I do not
want to place in the hands of the Commonwealth Parliament, however much I may be
prepared to trust it, the right of depriving me of citizenship.
And
Mr. SYMON.-I would not put such a power in the hands of any Parliament. We must
rest this Constitution on a foundation that we understand, and we mean that every
citizen of a state shall be a citizen of the Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth
shall have no right to withdraw, qualify, or restrict those rights of citizenship, except
with regard to one particular set of people who are subject to disabilities, as aliens,
and so on.
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Therefore, regardless if the Commonwealth of Australia purports to call nationality citizenship
it still does not encompass a right to declare/define CITIZENSHIP that includes state
citizenship and State franchise.
Section 41 of the Constitution is very clear that the right to vote, and it is a right not an
obligation, is based upon being a State lector. If therefore, the state or States do not have any
State citizenship, then there neither can be a State franchise right, and so section 41 of the
Constitution does not come in play either.
It might be clear that the magistrate on 4-12-2002 upon submission of the Commonwealth
Director of Public Prosecutions held it better that these matters be determined by the High Court
of Australia before any further proceedings were to be dealt with, if at all.
As the onus of proving jurisdiction was upon the Commonwealth director of Public Prosecution
then it had the obligation to have a ruling by the High Court of Australia upon these matters.
The fact that it failed to pursue the matters before the High Court of Australia in my view
was tantamount to abandoning its prosecution against me.
Any notion that somehow I had to pursue the matters before the High Court of Australia is
absurd, as I am not the one who instituted proceedings in the Magistrates Court of Victoria!
END QUOTE

QUOTE
QUOTE 19-11-2002 correspondence to Victorian Attorney-General

WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Attorney General
19-11-2002
Victoria
Fax 9651 0577
AND TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
URGENT
Sir/Madam
Since 27-9-2002 I sought clarification about what, if any State citizenship I have
as to be able to obtain Australian citizenship, yet, in the recent 18 November 2002 response it
was stated;
As explained in my previous letter, citizenship is a matter for the Commonwealth,
not the States. You indicated that you were naturalized in 1994. As result of that, you
are an Australian citizen.
This utter ridiculous response was provided by RUVANI WICKS, Assistant Director, Civil
Branch of the Department of Justice.
Edmund Barton (later becoming the first Prime Minister of Australia and thereafter a judge of the
High Court of Australia) made very clear during the convention, that if it isnt in the
Constitution, then the Commonwealth had no legislative powers.
RUVANI WICKS refers me to the Commonwealth Government to sort out matters, however this
is clearly unacceptable, this, as the State of Victoria and not the Commonwealth deals or must
deal with State Citizenship!
Unless you can point out when there was a reference of legislative powers from the State of
Victoria to the Commonwealth approved within Section 128 of the Commonwealth constitution,
I view, there never was and still is no constitutional legislative powers by the Commonwealth to
determine State or any other citizenship!
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At most, the Commonwealth, could determine citizenship as the local law for the Act and
Northern Territory through the parliaments governing those Territories (being Quasi States) as
they are not limited to constitutional provisions, however there never was any Constitutional
powers for the Commonwealth to grant citizenship to any resident of a State, neither determine
citizenship of a citizen of a State!
If your Department nevertheless maintains that the Commonwealth has the legislative powers to
determine citizenship of residents of the State of Victoria then please do set out in which
Constitutional manner the Commonwealth had this power from on set, if any, and/or how it
obtained this legislative power since the formation of the Commonwealth!
If anything, the Department of justice ought to be well aware that unless it is done lawfully it is
ULTRA VIRES!
END QUOTE 19-11-2002 correspondence to Victorian Attorney-General
No further reply was received by me upon this.
What was shown was that the Victorian government also had seemingly gone along to confuse
Australian citizenship with state citizenship! And that is the real problem. Somehow everyone,
other then me, seems to have lost reality as to what is applicable.
Likewise, other States seemed to have gone along, despite constitutionally the purported
Australian citizenship could never substitute the constitutional powers of the states to
legislate for State citizenship. No State citizenship then no Commonwealth citizenship and so no
electoral rights either! Yet, even this basic issue still seems to remain unresolved! Still, Section
245 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 cannot be enforced unless the CDPP can show to
the Court that somehow I did obtain State citizenship (political rights) and so invoked Section
41 of the Constitution to obtain electoral rights in Commonwealth citizenship.
END QUOTE
If therefore the State of Victoria has no Citizenship act to define/declare who is a citizen then
regardless if judges/l/judicial officers are appointed by of certain legislative provisions it is as
much NULL AND VOID as that of Senator Woods appointment. While I understood that the
High court of Australia made a ruling that lawyers can practice in another state, I nevertheless
hold that any appointment must be subject to the person being a citizens of a State. And if
there is no state citizenship then there can neither be any Commonwealth citizenship.
Little wonder why the Commonwealth and other Attorney-Generals didnt defeat me on 19 July
2006!
A person is entitled to be judges by his/her peers and clearly if a citizen of the State of Victoria is
judged by non-peers then this violated the embedded legal principles in the constitution.
As now the Commonwealth of Australia naturalize a person and somehow provides citizenship
to a person regardless the person may never have resided in the Commonwealth of Australia then
clearly such a person cannot be deemed a peer and neither the purported citizenship be
deemed valid in law. Nor are aliens residing in the state deemed to be in a legal standing to be
deemed to be a peer as to be part of a jury!
HANSARD 12-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE Mr. BARTON:
And then there is this proviso:

Provided that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in the High
Court than according to the rules of the common law.
END QUOTE
p23
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As such the High court of Australia cannot deal with facts seeking to rely upon external jurdial decision of other ccountries as they
will have different common law provisions.
The common law of each state varies and hence a judicial officer must be a peer with full
knowledge of the common law of the state in which he/she adjudicates. If the judicial officer
is not a citizens of the State then he/she cannot be deemed a peer for common law purposes.
The citizenship of a state can only be obtained where this is provided for by State legislation, if
the state has no such legislation in place then no State citizenship can be declared/defined nor can
be assumed and hence no appointment can be accepted to be deemed valid where the person fails
to obtain the required State Citizenship
HANSARD 12-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE Mr. BARTON:
Then it is provided that trial by jury shall be held in the State where the offence has been committed.
Thai is to prevent a person being taken away from the State where the alleged offence was committed
into another, and there tried by another jury 1,000 or 1,500 miles distant, perhaps. In other words, the
power to change the venue of the trial is restricted to the limitations of the State in which the offence
has occurred; so that, if it has occurred in New South Wales, South Australia, or Tasmania, a person
could not be taken away to be tried by the jury of another colony, but only by his peers in his own
State.
END QUOTE
As I indicated I challenged the validity of the purported Australian Citizenship Act 1948 and
this was not challenged either by the Commonwealth of Australia or the State/Territory
Attorney-Generals and as both appeals were upheld than I am entitled to rely upon that my
submissions were without reservation upheld.
As far as I am aware of no State Citizenship Act has been enacted and as such the very basic
legal requirement to be judges by once peers (including a judge) fails to exist.
Hence, it was for the Prosecutor to prove on each occasion that the presiding judicial officer was
validly appointed to adjudicate. This never eventuated.
While this means that technically every judgment with or without conviction at least in the State
of Victoria might be ULTRA VIRES and so basic ally all prisoners are unconstitutionally held
in detention, that is the end result of the conduct of the State of Victoria failing to legislate as to
whom is entitled to be a citizens.
It is totally irrelevant if the RUVANI WICKS, Assistant Director, Civil Branch of the
Department of Justice in his 18 November 2002 correspondence response stated;
As explained in my previous letter, citizenship is a matter for the Commonwealth,
not the States. You indicated that you were naturalized in 1994. As result of that, you
are an Australian citizen.
That somehow then this is to override the constitution and its embedded legal principles! To my
knowledge no referendum was ever held let alone approved to amend the constitution and as
such the Commonwealth of Australia has no constitutional legislative powers to define/declare
citizenship.
.

QUOTE Mr. BARTON.
If we are going to give the Federal Parliament power to legislate as it pleases with
regard to Commonwealth citizenship, not having defined it, we may be enabling the
Parliament to pass legislation that would really defeat all the principles inserted
elsewhere in the Constitution, and, in fact, to play ducks and drakes with it. That is
not what is meant by the term "Trust the Federal Parliament."
END QUOTE
.
p24
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It should be very obvious that if the Commonwealth could define/declare citizenship then it
could simply abolish citizenship if the States and so abolish by this the rights of State citizens to
vote and elect Members of State Parliament, etc.
As with the Cross Vesting Act the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 is unconstitutional, and
as such if no citizenship exist none can be assumed.
If therefore His Honour Mullaly, so the Judicial Registrar of the Magistrates Court of Victoria
(at St Arnaud) lacked State citizenship then little wonder they are seeking to avoid having to
deal with my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION but in the end they never invoked jurisdiction
by doing so.
While an Associate may be appointed to a judge it doesnt give the associate legal powers where
the judge himself/herself has none. Bering an OFFICER OF THE COURT in itself doesnt
provide any judicial powers! One merely is a member of the Bar.
As indicated above way back in 2002 I referred to this issue, and as such it is an issue that was
raised by me more than 13 years ago. Ample of time to have provided appropriate legislation to
address the issue.
As to As explained in my previous letter, citizenship is a matter for the Commonwealth,

not the States. It is clear that the lawyers the Attorney-Generals Department fail to
understand/comprehend what citizenship is about.
.
I did publish the following book about citizenship also:

INSPECTOR-RIKATI on CITIZENSHIP
A book on CD about Australians unduly harmed.
(ISBN 0-9580569-6-X prior to 1-1-2007) ISBN 978-0-9580569-6-0

As the Magistrates Court of Victoria never dismissed my OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
then its orders cannot be reviewed De Novo as they are no orders at all.
In Re O (infants) (1971) Ch 748,754 and 755
QUOTE
In my considered opinion the law now is that if an appellate court is satisfied that the decision of the lower
court is wrong, it is it's duty to say so and act accordingly.
END QUOTE
Another serious issue is if the State of Victoria did or didnt gazette that a payment in regard of a
fine imposed by a court can be made payable not to the state consolidated revenue funds but to a
party who merely litigates for the State but is not in any way entitled to receive a fine payment?
The same might be considered about the Infringement court and its alleged location when was it
gazetted and when are its hours of an open court?
So much more and I view that the integrity of the court by the above alone is in serious
question. Hence, without the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION having been disposed of the
issues raised by me in addition to the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION remains to be an
obstacle to the court to exercise JURISDICTION.
Just to clarify:
.
Ambard v Att Gen for Trinidad and Tabaco (1939) AC 322 at 335
QUOTE
The basic of the right to fair comment is the Right of Freedom of speech and the inalienable right of
everyone to comment fairly upon matters of public importance.
END QUOTE
No wrong committed in criticism of administration of justice:

LORD ATKIN in AMBARD v ATTORNEY-GENERAL for TRINIDAD and TABAGO (1936) A.C. 332, at 335
p25
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Page 26
QUOTE
But whether the authority and position or an individual judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned,
no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising, in good
faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way, the
wrong headed are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper
motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism,
and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a
cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of
ordinary man
END QUOTE
.
The right for the public to be informed about the judicial process being properly applied or acts:
THE COMMENTS OF SIR JAMES MARTIN C.J., IN THE MATTER THE EVENING
NEWS (1880) N.S.W. LR 211 AT 239.:
QUOTE
The right of the public to canvass fairly and honestly what takes place here cannot be disputed. Our practice of
sitting here with open doors and transacting our judicial functions as we do, always in the broad light of day,
would be shown of some of its value if the public opinion respecting our proceedings were at all times to be
rigidly suppressed. We claim no immunity from fair, even though it be mistaken criticism.
END QUOTE
.
As to value of criticism, keeping judge subject to rules and principles of honour and justice;
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
R v FOSTER (1937) St. E Qd 368

Re WASEMAN (1969) N.Z.L.R. 55, 58-59
Re BOROVSKI (1971) 19 D.L.R. (34) 537
SOLICITOR-GENERAL v RADIO AVON LTD (1978) 1 N.Z.L.R. 225, at 230-31
In my view the 22 February 2016 hearing must be aborted and only a judicial hearing at
Melbourne can be heard. After all as the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION was submitted in
Melbourne the Court failing to deal with it lacked any jurisdiction to transfer the matter to
Ballarat.
It must be made clear that the issue of CITIZENSHIP is not negotiable nor can be re-litigated
and the above is merely to clarify to some extent what eventuated then, as it was part of the
successful appeals as constitutional issues on 19 July 2006 and it cannot be re-litigated by
Buloke Shire Council acting for the State of Victoria.
Perhaps I ought to be a lecturer at the universities about constitutional matters so even those
students in legal issues will get a basic education as to the true meaning and application of the
constitution and judicial officers be retrained also for this. After all it is of concern that not just
ordinary lawyers but even judicial officers seems to me to lack some basic education as to the
true meaning and application of the constitution! At least the State government would in my
view do better to consult me as to the issue of CITIZENSHIP as obviously after all this time it
still fails to grasp the legal consequences of not having a proper legislation in place.
This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to state all issues/details.
Awaiting your response,
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

(Our name is our motto!)
p26
31-12-2015

MR Garry Mcintosh, Associate To His Honour Mullaly J.: Judgemullaly - Chambers@Countycourt - Vic.Gov - Au

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Mr Garry McIntosh, Associate to His Honour Mullaly J.

Mr Peter Kidd CJ County Court of Victoria, feedback@countycourt.vic.gov.au

The corporatising of our courts

I will now quote your email received 21-12-2015:

RE: Schorel-Hlavka v Buloke Shire Council - County

Alison May| Legal Practitioner

Elliot Stafford Associates are not

SubjectSchorel-Hlavka v Buloke Shire Council - County Court Notice of Appeal AP-15-2502

Please complete the attached form

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

RE: JOHN ABBOTT Re 7 August 2015 AGC correspondence

John Abbott <johnabbott9@bigpond.com>

'Mr Gerrit H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.'

We do however have another major issue at hand.

VICTORIA v. THE COMMONWEALTH AND CONNOR; NEW SOUTH WALES v. THE

Hansard 6-3-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

By marriage, on 28 March 2001, I became Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-Hlavka

ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

13-02-1890 Re; Australian citizen

ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

QUOTE 19-11-2002 correspondence to Victorian Attorney-General

And then there is this proviso:

Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

As to As explained in my previous letter, citizenship is a matter for the Commonwealth,

I did publish the following book about citizenship also:

(ISBN 0-9580569-6-X prior to 1-1-2007) ISBN 978-0-9580569-6-0

No wrong committed in criticism of administration of justice:

R v FOSTER (1937) St. E Qd 368

Awaiting your response,

G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

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