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The Nature and Dynamics of Relevance and Valence Appraisals: Theoretical Advances and Recent
Evidence
Klaus R. Scherer
Emotion Review 2013 5: 150
DOI: 10.1177/1754073912468166
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468166
2013
Emotion Review
Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 2013) 150162
The Author(s) 2013
ISSN 1754-0739
DOI: 10.1177/1754073912468166
er.sagepub.com
Klaus R. Scherer
Abstract
Appraisal theories of emotion have had a strong impact on the development of theory and experimental research in the domain
of the affective sciences. While there is generally a high degree of convergence between theorists in this tradition, some central
issues are open to debate. In this contribution three issues have been chosen for discussion: (a) varieties of relevance detection,
(b) varieties of valence appraisal, and (c) sequential-cumulative effects of appraisal results. In addressing these issues, new
theoretical ideas are suggested and an update of recent research on the sequence of appraisal processes is provided. Special
emphasis is placed on nonverbal signatures of appraisal processes.
Keywords
appraisal sequence, appraisal signatures, goal conduciveness, relevance detection, valence
Terminological Considerations
Author note: This research was supported by an Advanced Grant of the European Research Council (ERC 230331 PROPERMO) to Klaus Scherer and the Swiss Center for Affective
Sciences. The author acknowledges pertinent comments by Marc Mehu, Marcello Mortillaro, Vera Sacharin, Katja Schlegel, and Jacobien van Peer.
Corresponding author: Klaus R. Scherer, Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Rue des Battoirs 7, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland.
Email: Klaus.Scherer@unige.ch
Table 1. Stimulus evaluation checks, organized in four groups, illustrated with typical features describing the event or the effects on the person
Stimulus evaluation checks
Event or behavior/person
Relevance
Novelty
Intrinsic pleasantness
Goal/need pertinence
Implications/consequences
Causal attribution
Outcome probability
Discrepancy from expectation
Goal/need conduciveness
Urgency
Coping potential
Control
Power
Adjustment
Norm compatibility
Internal standards
External standards
Event was caused by the persons own/somebody elses behavior/chance; caused un/intentionally
Consequences of the event are predictable
Event confirmed/is inconsistent with expectations
Consequences of the event are positive/negative for person
Event required an immediate response
thematic groups. The CPM assumes that these SECs exert their
effects on other emotion components in a sequential and cumulative fashion (see The Dynamics of Appraisal: Sequential Checking
section). Leventhal and Scherer (1987) proposed that each check
can be processed on different levels of information processing
(sensorimotor/schematic/conceptual) but that earlier checks,
mostly driven by intrinsic stimulus characteristics, tend to be
processed more easily and more rapidly at lower levels, whereas
checks involving external inference require processing at higher
levels. I have further developed the notion of levels of processing
and now postulate four such levels (entailing different neural structures and circuits): (a) a low sensorimotor level with a patternmatching mechanism that is largely genetically determined, using
criteria consisting of appropriate templates; (b) a schematic level,
based on memory traces from social learning processes and
occurring in a fairly automatic, unconscious fashion; (c) an association level, involving various cortical association areas, which
may occur automatically and unconsciously or in a deliberate,
conscious fashion; and (d) a conceptual level, involving propositional knowledge and underlying cultural meaning systems,
requiring consciousness and effortful calculations in prefrontal
cortical areas (see Scherer, 2009a, p. 1314).
The synchronization of the multicomponential response patterning driven by the appraisal results is seen as constitutive for
the emergence of a felt emotional experience that can, under
certain circumstances, be categorized and labeled by an established emotion term in the language spoken in the respective
culture (see Scherer, 2001, 2009a, for further detail).
non for emotion elicitation. The current version of the CPM proposes that novelty, intrinsic pleasantness, and pertinence for
goals or needs are the most important criteria for relevance
appraisal (Scherer, 2001), selecting stimuli that require further,
in-depth treatment. A series of studies in our laboratory (Aue &
Scherer, 2008, 2011; Gentsch, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2012; van
Peer, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2012; van Reekum etal., 2004) suggests that conceptual refinement is necessary in order to derive
specific hypotheses and, in particular, to model potential interaction effects between different sources of relevance appraisal.
In describing the central issue of personal relevance and goal
pertinence, appraisal theorists have mentioned different classes
of motivational variables such as tastes, needs, goals, values,
norms, self-esteem, and expectations. There has been little effort
to differentially define these partially overlapping concepts.
Such definitions are particularly important for an interdisciplinary area such as the affective sciences, given that differences in
the use of the same concept by scholars in different disciplines
(e.g., philosophers, psychologists, economists, and social scientists) tend to be the rule rather than the exception. Thus, one of
the major aims for appraisal theory is to further elucidate the
different relevance criteria, for example, determined by individual needs, values, and aspirations on the one hand and by social
expectations, norms, and conventions on the other.
As a first step toward further theoretical development, I suggest exploring the varieties of relevance detection in greater
detail and discussing potential research approaches. Traditionally,
relevance detection has been defined in the CPM as an evaluation of whether a stimulus deserves further processing because
of its bearing on our well-beingas determined by the results of
the checks for novelty, intrinsic pleasantness, and goal relevance
(see Table 1). These three subchecks are predicted to occur in
this order because of (a) the relative efficiency as a filter for
attention, and (b) the respective ease and rapidity of the execution of the checks. The first two checks are amenable to very
rapid low-level processing, whereas the third one may require
somewhat higher levels of processing and thus more time.
To highlight the fact that the novelty check focuses on the
occurrence of an event (such as the appearance of an object,
manifestation of a behavior, or other events) rather than on its
quality (which is appraised by later checks), I suggest relabeling
it novelty occurrence check. Three subchecks have been postulated for the novelty checksuddenness, familiarity, and predictability. I surmise that the outcomes of the individual checks
integrate into a novelty continuum ranging from very high (sudden, unfamiliar, unpredictable) to very low (slow onset, familiar, highly predictable). I further suggest that the results of the
subchecks are stored in a constantly updated appraisal register
(see The Dynamics of Appraisal: Sequential Checking section
of this article and Scherer, 2009a). The degree of novelty is
likely to immediately determine the amount of attention devoted
to an event and the depth of further processing during the
subsequent checks.
The existence of a separate intrinsic un/pleasantness check
has been frequently debated in the literature, one critique being
that its outcome cannot be distinguished from the outcome of
the goal conduciveness/obstructiveness check. This argument
can be rejected based on both theoretical and empirical reasons.
Theoretically the central argument is that the un/pleasantness of
some stimuli is intrinsic to the stimulus, that is, that it does not
depend on the motivational state of the appraiser. Empirically,
the evidence reviewed in what follows shows (with replication
in several studies) that the two checks concerned can be manipulated independently, in an orthogonal design, and that significant differences in the ensuing response patterns are found. The
central argument in making the distinction is the focus on
the intrinsic quality of the stimulus, largely independent of the
motivational state of the appraiser or contextual factor. While I
have focused only on intrinsic un/pleasantness in the past,
I think that there are several classes of intrinsically relevant
stimuli, such as evolutionarily prepared threat-related (snakes,
spiders, anger expressions), reproduction-related (sex), tasterelated (sweetness), or nurturance-related (baby faces; Brosch,
Sander, & Scherer, 2007) stimuli, as well as strongly conditioned or highly overlearned stimulus classes from personal
learning history. I therefore propose changing the label of this
check to intrinsic relevance check, highlighting the central feature of the appraisal process: the readiness to respond, relatively
independently of motivational state or contextual factors, to particular classes of stimuli with given characteristics. This conceptualization provides a direct link to the large literature on
fear stimuli in which the notion of biological preparedness has
loomed large (see hman & Mineka, 2001). Clayton and Myers
(2009) have suggested the interesting concepts of biophilia and
biophobia, postulating the human need to adapt to the environment by approaching positive and avoiding negative aspects,
which is likely to have created an intrinsic, genetically-based
predisposition to associate with and depend on the natural environment. The renaming of this check to intrinsic relevance does
not imply any change in my earlier conceptualization of intrinsic un/pleasantness. It mainly extends the class of stimulus characteristics for which the appraisal is mostly driven by their
intrinsic quality rather than motivational or contextual factors. It
also does not mean that these stimuli are assumed to be exclusively treated on the lowest level of processing; rather, they may
also be processed on higher levels. For example, the appraisal of
the solution for a mathematical problem obviously requires conceptual processing, but the result can be determined by intrinsic
epistemic beauty and elegance.
Whereas novelty relevance is detected by expected occurrence and intrinsic relevance by specific types of stimuli, relevance criteria are much more complex for the third type of
relevance check, which concerns what one might call motivational relevance classes. These do not consist of specific classes
of stimulus types. Rather, the defining criterion is that the respective need, goal, or value of the appraiser on which the stimulus
has a direct bearing must be salient or of high priority at the
occurrence of the event. For example, food cues have been
shown to be less relevant and attention-grabbing in a state of
satiety (see Sacharin etal., 2012, for a review). Thus, for basic
needs (food, sex, social contact), relevance appraisal may depend
on the current motivational state. For goals in a meansend
action plan, for example, executing a complex task, motivational
relevance may depend on context, distance from goal attainment,
or probability of success as evaluated in the appraisal of implications. In the past, I have generally used the term goal relevance
to cover this large array of motivational states. However, apart
from the fact that the notion of a goal has a restrictive meaning
for many people (laymen and scientists alike), it has a somewhat
static connotation. Frijda (1986) has pointed out that relevance
needs to be assessed with respect to current concerns, that is,
needs, goals, values, norms, self-esteem, expectations, and so
forth, that are particularly pertinent at the time. This provides a
much more dynamic view of the underlying process, and it
underlines that a very high level of relevance is required. In consequence, I suggest changing the label of this relevance check
from goal relevance to concern pertinence. In a further step, one
might want to further develop the distinctions between these
motivational classes, with continuously operative needs being
mostly biologically based and thus universal, values being a
high-level construct of desirable qualities and achievements and
thus in large part shared by groups and cultures, goals (with a
definite end state) being more concrete objectives toward which
action is directed and thus likely to show a large variability over
individuals and time, and norms being strictly constrained sociocultural codices for required behavior.
I now turn to promising research approaches in the domain
of relevance appraisal, concentrating in large part on the work
conducted in our group. Differences in relevance detection for
the three checks described before can be examined experimentally, both individually and in combination. The experimental
manipulations would be determined by the relevance class:
types of stimuli for novelty and intrinsic relevance, manipulation of motivational need state and task goals for concern pertinence, and systematic participant selection for values and social
Type of valence
Novelty
Intrinsic pleasantness/beauty
Goal/need conduciveness
Coping potential
Compatibility self-standards
Compatibility norms/values
Unknownfamiliar
Pleasantunpleasant
Satisfieddisappointed
Strongweak
Achievedfailed
Virtuouswicked
Familiarity
Pleasure
Contentment
Power
Self-worthiness
Moral worthiness
Table 3. Factor loadings of the appraisal features in the data set of the intercultural GRID study
Valence appraisal
Novelty appraisal
0.97
0.96
0.93
0.88
0.88
0.84
0.81
0.79
0.73
0.70
0.53
0.47
0.55
0.72
0.76
0.81
0.83
0.86
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.04
0.15
0.42
0.07
0.44
0.09
0.19
0.35
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.07
0.09
0.11
0.07
0.26
0.11
0.12
0.28
0.48
0.36
0.48
0.09
0.12
0.26
0.01
0.05
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.84
0.76
0.64
0.56
0.49
0.34
0.23
0.37
0.41
Note: Based on a two-factorial varimax rotated structure; reproduced from Scherer and Fontaine (in press a).
Table 4. Factor loadings of the theoretically predicted appraisal features after partialling out the superfactor outcome valence (g) in the data set of
the intercultural GRID study
Suddenly
Unpredictable
Caused by chance
Inconsistent with expectations
Required an immediate response
Enough resources to avoid or modify consequences
Consequences avoidable or modifiable
Consequences able to live with
Caused intentionally
Confirmed expectations
Familiar
Consequences predictable
Important and relevant for persons goals
Important and relevant for goals of somebody else
Violated laws or socially accepted norms
Incongruent with own standards and ideals
Caused by somebody elses behavior
Caused by the persons own behavior
Novelty/
chance cause
Coping
ability
Expected/
familiar
Goal
relevance
Norm
violation
Self vs.
other cause
0.87
0.85
0.75
0.64
0.63
0.05
0.05
0.01
0.05
0.28
0.17
0.23
0.15
0.04
0.09
0.07
0.33
0.02
0.10
0.17
0.08
0.07
0.19
0.85
0.79
0.71
0.14
0.00
0.15
0.38
0.00
0.07
0.01
0.17
0.02
0.26
0.02
0.12
0.05
0.11
0.25
0.12
0.17
0.14
0.73
0.67
0.63
0.62
0.06
0.09
0.01
0.06
0.33
0.39
0.01
0.01
0.15
0.10
0.16
0.12
0.02
0.31
0.19
0.38
0.16
0.11
0.83
0.81
0.10
0.05
0.15
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.08
0.11
0.09
0.06
0.25
0.09
0.22
0.05
0.26
0.09
0.04
0.01
0.85
0.81
0.05
0.09
0.02
0.13
0.03
0.32
0.11
0.16
0.16
0.20
0.13
0.15
0.04
0.20
0.14
0.25
0.24
0.24
0.69
0.67
Note: Based on a six-factorial varimax rotated structure; reproduced from Scherer and Fontaine (in press a).
As this feature of the CPM is often misinterpreted, I will provide a somewhat more extensive description here, followed by
the empirical evidence to date.
From the very inception of the CPM (Scherer, 1982, 1984), I
have postulated that the SECs exert their effectsfor both logical and economical reasonsin a sequential fashion. It seems
plausible to assume that if the results of an SEC provide essential
information to judge a criterion in another SEC, the former must
yield a result before the latter can be processed. Logically, I can
determine my potential to cope with the consequences of an
event only if I know what they are. And it would be extremely
uneconomical to invest precious resources before I am reasonably certain about the outcome of any actions I may want to prepare for. Apart from adducing logical and economical reasons, it
can be argued that the microgenetic unfolding of the emotionantecedent appraisal processes parallels both phylogenetic and
ontogenetic development in the differentiation of emotional
states. The earlier SECs, particularly the novelty and the intrinsic
pleasantness check, seem to be present in most animals as well
as in newborn humans. Thus it seems plausible that these lowlevel processing mechanisms are hard-wired detection capacities
and occur very rapidly after the occurrence of a new stimulus.
More complex evaluation mechanisms are successively developed at more advanced levels of phylogenetic and ontogenetic
development, with natural selection operating in the direction
of more sophisticated information-processing ability in phylogenesis, and with maturation and learning increasing the individuals cognitive capacity in ontogenesis (see Scherer, 1984,
pp. 313314; Scherer, Zentner, & Stern, 2004).
As shown in Figure 1, all SECs are expected to be processed
simultaneously, starting with relevance detection. However, the
essential criterion for the sequence assumption is the point in time
at which a particular check achieves preliminary closure, that is,
yields a reasonably definitive result, one that warrants efferent
Figure 1. Sequential-cumulative efferent effects of appraisal results on different components of emotion (slightly modified after Table 5.2 in Scherer,
2001).
2001, for more detail). The relatively homogeneous synchronization pattern that characterizes a specific type of emotion
episode can be described as an attractor basin in the language
of nonlinear systems theory (see Scherer, 2000, 2009b). As
described in greater detail elsewhere (Scherer, 2001, 2009a),
the appraisal-driven synchronization of the components may
lead to emergent consciousness on the level of the feeling
component. These feelings represent all of the accumulated
changes in the components (and the consolidated results of the
appraisal process) and thus have very specific qualia. In some
cases, for example, when a person wants to engage in social
sharing of an emotion episode, the feeling qualia are categorized and labeled with a word or an expression (sometimes a
metaphor). The emotion episode will continue until massive
changes in the appraisal (e.g., a problem is resolved or a new
event intervenes) lead to a desynchronization or new synchronization pattern.
In response to critics of the sequence assumption I have
insisted that it is entirely consistent with the notion of parallel
processing (see Scherer, 2001, for a detailed argument). The
reason is that I assume a type of appraisal register (rapidly
accessible storage space for elementary information such as
intermediate calculation results), the contents of which are continuously updated in each recursive loop (see Figure 2). In parallel processing, all checks are always performed and separate
registers for each SEC hold temporary values that consist of the
best available estimates of the respective criterion. An efferent
Figure 2. Sketch of the potential architecture of the appraisal process as part of a general information-processing system, separately driving peripheral
support systems and alternative action tendencies (slightly modified after Figure 5.3 in Scherer, 2001).
Note: NES: neuro-endocrine system; ANS: autonomic nervous system; SNS: somatic nervous system; Nov: novelty; Plea: pleasantness; Rel: relevance; Con: conduciveness;
Urg: urgency; Ctr: control; Adj: adjustment; InSt: internal standards; ExSt: external standards.
Reaction Time
Flykt, Dan, and Scherer (2009) reported an attempt to estimate
the time window of the intrinsic pleasantness check using a dualtask probe paradigm. In three experiments, participants viewed
negative and positive pictures. Their other task was speeded
response on a probe superimposed on the pictures with different
stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs). Longer probe-reaction
times were observed for negative than for positive pictures. This
effect appeared at SOA 300 ms or 350 ms, suggesting that the
intrinsic pleasantness appraisal check yields a differential behavioral outcome around 300 ms after stimulus onset, and seems to
continue unless attention to picture content is inhibited.
Physiological Indicators
Aue etal. (2007) tested the sequence assumption with a memory
task in which participants were presented with pictures displaying biological and cultural threat stimuli or neutral stimuli (stimulus relevance manipulation) with superimposed symbols
signaling monetary gains or losses (goal conduciveness manipulation). Results for heart rate and facial EMG showed differential
efferent effects of the respective appraisal outcomes and provided direct evidence for sequential processing. As predicted,
muscle activity over the brow and cheek regions marking the
process of relevance appraisal occurred significantly earlier than
that of goal conduciveness appraisal. Heart rate, in contrast, was
influenced by the stimulus-relevance manipulation only.
Delplanque etal. (2008) tested whether an odor is detected as
novel or familiar before it is evaluated as pleasant or unpleasant.
Participants performed a recognition task in which they were
presented with pairs of unpleasant or pleasant odors (sample and
target odors). Within a pair, the sample and target were either
identical or different in order to assess participants novelty
detection; unpleasant and pleasant target odors were contrasted
to examine participants appraisal of intrinsic pleasantness.
Dependent measures included facial expressions (using EMG)
and physiological reactions (using electrocardiogram and electrodermal activity). The earliest effects on facial muscles and
heart rate occurred in response to novelty detection. Later effects
on facial muscles and heart rate were related to pleasantness
evaluation, confirming the existence of sequential effects of
appraisal checks on odor-elicited emotional reactions.
Brain Activity
Grandjean and Scherer (2008) systematically manipulated novelty, goal relevance, intrinsic pleasantness, and goal conduciveness SECs in visual stimuli to test the sequence hypothesis in
two experiments with EEG recordings. Topographical analyses
of the ERPs revealed a specific electrical map related to novelty
(90 ms after the onset of the stimulus) preceding another topographical map related to task goal relevance, indicating that the
occurrence of the novel map precedes the task goal relevance
map by about 50 ms. To investigate the effects of manipulated
appraisals not revealed by the topographical analyses, Grandjean
Note
1
Of course, this result depends on the order in which the different components are entered into the discriminant analysis because in the case of a
high level of common variance, as is the case here, the first component
entered will automatically explain a very high amount of the variance.
However, as in regression analysis, the strongest component is always
entered first, and this is indeed appraisal in our case, with over 70% of
the variance explained on the basis of the component features alone (in
comparison, action tendencies explain 67.7%, bodily reactions 62.4%,
facial expression 62.7%, vocal expression 53.2%, and feeling 52.5%).
Quite independently of the statistics, it seems difficult to imagine
another sequence, given that it is hard to imagine other major sources of
differentiation in the response components than appraisal.
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