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Sebastian Navarro
Philosophy 100
First Paper Assignment
5 November 2015
Criticisms of Meno 77b
This essay will consider the Meno, a Platonic dialogue in which Socrates debates what
virtue is with his interlocutors. Socrates analyzes and refutes several definitions and conceptions
of virtue, ultimately leading to aporia. In particular, this essay will analyze Socrates' argument
against Meno's definition of virtue at 77b, which states that virtue is desiring good things; what
qualifies one to be virtuous is simply to desire good things.
This essay will outline each premise as well as analyze the plausibility of each premise of
the argument against Meno's definition of virtue at 77b. There are 13 premises total, whereby
premises 1 through 4 are assertions of Meno's and Socrates' clarifications of Meno's assertions in
support of the definition of virtue as desiring good things; premises 1 through 4 thus serve as
relevant background information for Socrates' own assertions in support of his own argument
against virtue as desiring good things made in premises 5 through 13. In the course of analyzing
each premise, it will manifest that premise 8 is the most controversial premise and is made on the
basis of how Socrates believes a rational person should think rather than on an empirical basis.
Ultimately, despite the implausibility of many of the premises, Socrates is right in arguing
against virtue as desiring good things as such a definition is not an accurate metric in
determining virtuosity.
The Premises Deriving From Meno's Assertions and Socrates' Clarifications

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Premise 1: If virtue is to desire good things, then some desire good things and others
desire bad things because some people are virtuous and some are not virtuous (77c). Premise 2:
There are people who know that particular things are bad, yet proceed to desire these bad things
(77c). Premise 3: To desire is to secure for oneself (77c). Premise 4: There are some people who
believe that bad things are beneficial to them and some people who believe that bad things harm
them (77d).
The Premises Deriving From Socrates' Argument
Premise 5: Those who believe that bad things are good may not know that such things are
bad (77d). Premise 6: Those who desire things which are bad do not know that such things are
truly bad (77d). Premise 7: Those who desire bad things believe that such bad things are good;
they merely desire things which they believe to be good, despite that these things are truly bad
(77e). Premise 8: Those who desire bad things but know these things are bad (and thus know that
they will be harmed by these things) are miserable because they are harmed by the things they
desire (78a). Premise 9: Those who are miserable are unhappy (78a). Premise 10: No one wants
to be miserable and unhappy (78a). Premise 11: Therefore, no one desires bad things (78a).
Premise 12: Therefore, everyone only desires good things (78a). Premise 13: If everyone only
desires good things, then the conjunction of premise 12 and premise 1 is a contradiction since it
is not the case that there are people who desire bad things; therefore, virtue cannot be defined as
desiring good things since that would qualify everyone to be virtuous (78b).
Definitions of the 'Bad' and the 'Good'
It is necessary to note that in the context of this dialogue, a 'bad' thing interprets as
something that harms oneself, whereas a 'good' thing interprets as something that is beneficial to

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oneself. Noting such a difference in the conceptions between 'good' and 'bad' is crucial for the
rest of this discussion. When considering the context of the dialogue, Socrates' conception of
'bad' as something that harms oneself is what is observably harmful for a person, as opposed to
what is psychologically or perceivably harmful for a person. For example, a masochist cutting
their self would be 'bad' according to Socrates as it is observably harmful, but not
psychologically or perceivably harmful to the the masochist as they would enjoy such an action.
Furthermore, the context of the dialogue suggests that Socrates believes that the 'good'
would be uniform across all people; what is 'good' for one person will necessarily be 'good' for
all people; alternatively, what is beneficial for one person will necessarily be beneficial for all
people. This is wrong because what is beneficial differs among people because what is beneficial
is in accordance to each person's conception of what is beneficial. In the previously mentioned
masochist example, what may be harmful to one person is beneficial to the masochist. This
problem will reappear and be further illuminated later in this essay and will also serve as the
basis of the implausibility of many of Socrates' premises in his argument against virtue as
desiring the good.
The Plausibility of The Premises Deriving From Meno's Assertions and Socrates'
Clarifications
This section will evaluate the plausibility of the premises which derive from Meno's
assertions and Socrates' clarifications of them. Premise 1 is plausible because if what qualifies
one to be virtuous is simply to desire good things, then it necessarily follows that some people
desire good things and some people desire bad things because some people (by observation) are
virtuous and some people are not virtuous. Premise 2 is also plausible. People may acknowledge

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what they desire is not good for them in the sense that it may harm them, yet desire them
anyway. This statement will be further explained and supported later in the paper. Premise 3 is
vague, but plausible if slightly altered. "To secure for oneself" interprets more that one has
acquired what they were previously desiring. Perhaps this is a translational problem, but if the
premise is paraphrased to interpret that desire is defined as the desire to secure something for
oneself, it is more cogent for Socrates' argument and thus renders premise 3 to be fully plausible.
One seeks to secure objects of desire for their self. Premise 4 is plausible as well. Here, I will
introduce the example of an addicted heroin user that will be utilized throughout the course of
this essay. When considering premise 4, it is hypothetically possible that there exist heroin users
who believe that heroin benefits them (and is thus good) and that there exist heroin users who
believe that heroin harms them (and is thus bad).
The Plausibility of The Premises Deriving From Socrates' Argument
This section will analyze the plausibility of each of Socrates' premises against Meno's
assertion that virtue is desiring good things. In doing so, this section will analyze and critique the
relevant premises in greater length than the premises in the last section, for this section contains
the main components of Socrates' argument.
I believe that premise 5 is plausible in many, but not all instances. When people desire
things that are bad for them, defined as things which harm them, they typically desire an
outcome elicited by the thing other than what harms them. For example, if an addicted heroin
user desires to use heroin (which can be deemed to harm users according to medical sources),
they do not necessarily desire to be physically addicted and to deteriorate their body.
Nonetheless, this only stands for heroin users who are completely ignorant of the negative effects

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of the drug (which likely would not last long considering the quick bodily deterioration that
heroin causes). It is likely the case for many narcotic users, especially long-term heroin users,
that they are aware that heroin elicits harmful effects on the human body. However, addicted
heroin users can proceed to desire the narcotic. It is therefore possible that one can desire
something which harms them (and severely so) and know that it harms them, thus disproving
premise 5.
Premise 6 is not plausible. Of all those who desire bad things, if premise 6 were true, it
would necessarily follow that not a single person knows that bad things actually harm them.
However, it is possible that one could desire a thing and know that it is harmful. A heroin user
may desire heroin and also recognize that it is harmful to their body. The bad effects of heroin
are inextricable from the continued use of the narcotic and are in fact exacerbated by continued
use.
Premise 7 is not plausible, for it would require all people who desire things which harm
them to believe that such things are actually beneficial to them. Premise 7 is slightly different
than premise 6 in an important way; the latter necessitates that one does not know that harmful
things are harmful; the former necessitates that one believes that harmful things are beneficial to
their self in the sense that it does not harm their self. It is likely the case that some heroin users
can recognize and subsequently believe that heroin induces harmful effects on their body and not
believe that heroin is beneficial. In fact, this is likely the case for long-term, addicted heroin
users who often use the drug merely because they have a physical dependency on it. These longterm users often wish to cease their use but only continue to use it because of their physical
dependency, suggesting that they do not believe that heroin is beneficial.

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Moreover, premise 8 is not plausible. This essay will analyze premise 8 more than the
other premises because it is the most important and controversial premise. It does not necessarily
follow that those who knowingly desire harmful, bad things are miserable. Here, Socrates
employs a statement which is opinion, since the extent to which one is 'miserable' cannot be
accurately measured or uniformly attributed. Thus, whether or not one is miserable is determined
on an arbitrary basis. What can obviously be assumed about Socrates' usage of 'miserable' is that
it is meant to bear a highly negative connotation. If one desires a harmful thing despite
recognizing that such a thing is harmful, then they are in a highly negative situation and are
severely unhappy with their situation, according to Socrates. Nonetheless, perhaps the addicted
heroin user highly enjoys their continued use of heroin despite knowing that their usage harms
their body. The harmful effects of heroin are unfortunate and even undesired consequences for
this particular heroin user, but they can still proceed to enjoy their overall situation and usage of
heroin as they believe their usage is beneficial to them. Such an individual does not seem
miserable according the to conventional usage of the term, but they qualify as miserable by
Socrates' account. Therefore, premise 8 is not plausible.
Premise 8 is the most important and controversial premise because it serves as the crux of
Socrates' argument against virtue as desiring good things. Premise 8 suggests that miserable,
according to Socrates, is conceived and attributed interpersonally. The heroin addict may be
content by harming their body and knowingly doing so, yet they are to be considered miserable
by Socrates since their acts are empirically harming their self. The determination of whether one
is miserable is external and does not regard whether one actually views their self to be miserable.
Therefore, premise 8 is controversial because its usage of 'miserable' is contrary to its

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conventional use. The usage of 'miserable' reappears in proceeding premises, indicating that it is
an important part of Socrates' argument against virtue as desiring good things.
The assertion made in premise 8 is not an empirical claim in the sense that it cannot be
made by observation. As evidenced by the example of the heroin user, which very likely exists in
reality independently from the hypothetical nature of this example, there are people who very
strongly desire things which harm them because such things are perceivably beneficial to them.
Rather, Socrates' assertion that people who desire to harm themselves are 'miserable' is based on
his view of how a rational individual should perceive harmful things. According to Socrates, a
rational person should view those who desire harmful things as 'miserable' because such thinking
would deter rational individuals from desiring things which truly harm them. It is rational for
people to promote their wellbeing by not harming theirselves. Though what is beneficial is
ultimately at the discretion of every individual, it is truly and empirically beneficial to live a life
where one does not engage in actions which are harmful to their self as it would lead for a life
closer to the form of the good. Accordingly, Socrates' likely makes this claim in an effort to
explain how a rational person should think rather than a binding prescription regarding how all
people should think.
Premise 9 is also questionable. As previously demonstrated, though the heroin addict may
be 'miserable' according to Socrates', they can still be happy. 'Miserable' is conventionally (and
practically unanimously) considered as a negatively connoted term. In fact, it can be argued that
'miserable' likely falls at the extreme negative pole of adjectives. Therefore, the usage of
'miserable' should never be interpreted in a positive light. However, due to the potentiality of a
person being simultaneously miserable and happy, miserable must be conceived as possessing a

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positive connotation by Socrates' definition, strikingly opposite to the conventional conception of
'miserable'. This also means that persons may potentially strive to be 'miserable' since they may
still be happy in such a state. Thus, it does not follow that one will certainly be unhappy if they
are miserable, for it is possible to be happy and 'miserable' in the context of Socrates' account of
the term.
By disproving the plausibility of premise 9, premise 10 is also not plausible because it is
a conjunction with a false statement (premise 9). Surely, no one desires to be unhappy, making
one part of the conjunction in premise 10 plausible. Yet if being 'miserable' by Socrates' account
may allow one to still be happy, then one may desire to be miserable.
As a result of the implausibility of the preceding premises, premise 11 is also implausible
since it follows such premises. As illuminated in the example and analysis of the heroin user,
people do in fact desire bad things, or things which harm them.
Unlike many of the previous premises, premise 12 is plausible when considering 'good'
things as things which are beneficial to one. As stated previously, what is beneficial differs
among people for it is dependent among what one perceives to be beneficial. It is not likely that
anyone would desire something that they perceive to not be beneficial in some sense. The heroin
user perceives the immediate effects of heroin to be beneficial. It is not likely that the empirically
harmful effects of heroin are desired; they are rather unfortunate consequences of the desire for
the positive effects of heroin on the user. Even in the case where a heroin user desires the
empirically harmful effects of heroin, such is perceivably beneficial to them. Therefore, it is
plausible to assert that people only desire which they perceive to be beneficial to themselves.

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However, it could also make sense for Socrates' to mean 'good' here to mean that 'good'
things are those which are truly and empirically beneficial, for such an interpretation could also
advance his argument. If this is the case, then premise 12 is not plausible as evidenced by the
possibility of one desiring something which is not truly beneficial to them as detailed earlier in
this essay.
Finally, oddly enough, premise 13 is plausible because desiring good things truly is not a
good metric for virtuosity. Simply desiring good things, whether they be perceived to be good
and are actually bad or are perceived to be good and are actually good, does not amount to
virtuosity. Meno's definition of virtue is therefore not adequate because it would qualify
everyone as virtuous since all everyone ever desires is what they perceive to be beneficial,
regardless of whether such things harm them or are truly beneficial to them.
However, should 'good' be interpreted as things which are truly beneficial to the human
condition as opposed to what one perceives to be beneficial (as Socrates' suggests what a rational
person would consider to be beneficial), then the part of premise 13 that states everyone only
desires good things is not plausible, as evidenced by the previous discussion of the heroin user.
Conclusion
Although Socrates introduces and argues on behalf of numerous implausible claims in
support of his argument against virtue as desiring good things, he takes a plausible stance against
such a conception and subsequently arrives at a plausible conclusion.