Saudi Arabian Shia Opposition

Open Source Analysis Project

Prepared by: Mansour Al-Hadj
English for Heritage Language Speakers
Georgetown University
June 18, 2012

Contents
I.
II.

Introduction
Findings

Shia opposition groups: domestic/external

Shia leaders: clerics/non-clerics affiliated non-affiliated
goals
Demographics
Strategies and tactics

III.

Evidence

IV.

Analysis and future trends

Works Cited

Abstract
This report identifies four prominent Saudi Shia opposition groups, two domestic and two
external, and eighteen leaders the majority of whom are not affiliated with these groups;
it also highlights the goals, demographics, strategies, and tactics. The domestic groups are
the Freedom and Justice Coalition and the Islamic Solidarity Group; the two externals are
the Khalas Movement and the Committee the Defense for Human Rights in the Arabian
Peninsula. Their prominence was determined by the activity of the group and/or the high
profile of their leaders.
Shia opposition leaders are also classified as domestic, who are clerics or non-clerics, and
external, most of whom are affiliated with opposition groups. Demographically, they are
of different generation and backgrounds and their influence varies among various age
groups and social classes.
In terms of goals, all groups call for ending all forms of discrimination, injustice, and
oppression, and advocate for freedom, equality and human rights. While some groups
advocate for specific goals such calling for the release of the forgotten prisoners,
others focus on general ones. To achieve these goals, these groups use various strategies
and tactics; however, after the events of the Arab Spring, there have been changes in their
demands shifting from sectarian rights to national ones.

Nine detainees suspected of involvement in attacks against a US military installation in Khobar in 1996, which
killed 19 US soldiers and injured more than 300.

I.

Introduction

Inspired by the events of the Arab Spring, Shia protesters have organized demonstrations in a
number of Shia-dominated cities and villages in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia demanding
the release of Shia prisoners, ending all forms of discrimination, the withdrawal of Saudi troops
form Bahrain. The governments response was swift. Heavy security forces with shields and
tanks were deployed to the region, check points were emplaced at the entrance of Qatif and
Awamiyah where most of the protests take place, and tens of individuals have been arrested
including prominent activists and influential clerics who expressed their support for the
demonstrations.
Incensed by the death of eight protesters and buoyed by the support of their leaders, local leaders
founded opposition groups in Qatif, Awamiyah, Sehat, Tarout, and Safwa. They started
organizing larger protests demanding rights that are not limited to the Shia community.
Activists from the Sunni community reacted positively despite the government efforts to isolate
and limit the protests. Late last year, dozens of human rights activists and journalists, both
Sunnis and Shias, issued a petition criticizing the government use of force against civilians.
Early this year, the five groups decided to come together and form the Freedom and Justice
Coalition to be the official entity that represents them. Since its creation, FJC has organized a
number of medium to large protests in and around Qatif. In all its events, this group has been
calling for national demands rather than sectarian ones, a new strategy that has been adopted by
Shia opposition groups after the events of the Arab Spring. In fact, it represents itself as a
national opposition whose aim is to establish a country which respects human rights.
Other groups have also made some adjustments. For example, the Islamic Solidarity Group,
initially focused on calling for the release of Shia prisoners, has included Sunni prisoners in its
campaigns on social media. The leaders of Khalas Movement and the Committee for the Defense
of Human Rights in the Arabian Peninsula have clearly called for the protesters to focus on
national demands such as political and civil rights.
Moving ahead, with a looming succession conflict, its likely that Sunnis and Shias will come
together to form a national opposition that leads the civil rights movement in the kingdom. Sunni
groups are showing similar interests. Sumoud social gathering, organized by Sunni human rights
activist Waleed Abu Al-Khair, has brought Sunnis and Shias, liberal and conservatives together
to discuss political issues. The petition initiated by the Association for Civil and Political Right
in Saudi Arabia, a Sunni group, has clearly questioned the legitimacy of crown Prince Nayef as
heir to the throne. Almost 500 people from different cities and backgrounds have signed this

unprecedented petition. On June 6, 2012, tens of protesters from the Sahwa movement, the
largest Sunni/Salafi group whose leaders are widely influential, took to the streets in Riyadh
calling for the release of their prisoners. This is the first time since the Arab Spring that Salafis
organized a protest in the Kingdom.
Research was conducted using open source materials from online sources, books, and interviews
in Arabic and English.

II.

Findings
Opposition Groups
There are four prominent Shia opposition groups: half of them operate inside the kingdom
(domestic) and the other half are in exile (external) in the UK and Iran. The prominence of these
groups is based on their activities and/or the high profile of their leaders. These groups are:
Domestic:
1- The Freedom and Justice Coalition (FJC)
2- Islamic Solidarity Group (ISG)
External:
3- Khalas Movement (KM)
4- The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in the Arabian Peninsula (CDHRAP)
Leadership
Shia opposition leaders can be classified into two main groups: external and domestic. Three out
of five external leaders are affiliated with opposition groups, while most of the domestic are
independent. Because of the secretive nature of the domestic groups, local leaders prefer to
remain anonymous. Among the independents are clerics, activists, intellectuals, authors, and
politicians. The prominence of these leaders is based on their influence, high profile, and
activities.
External Leaders

Domestic Leaders (Clerics)

Domestic leaders (Non-clerics)

Dr. Hamza Al-Hassan (Khalas

Movement)
Dr. Fuad Ibrahim (Khalas Movement)

Sheikh Hassan Al-Saffar

Dr. Tawfiq Alsaif author

Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr

Jafar Al-Shayeb author and public figure

Ali Al-Ahmed

Sheikh Abdallah Al-Nimr

Wajeha Al-Huwaider activist

Ahmed Al-Rebh

Sheikh Mohammad Hassan AlHabeeb

Adel Al-Labad author

Its important to mention that this classification is based on the religious sect to which these leaders belong. This
classification does not, by any mean, suggest that these leaders share the same views on religion or politics, nor
does it indicate their personal ideologies, beliefs, or convictions. Many of leaders listed do not identify themselves
as Shia.

Sheikh Mohammad Al-Hussain

(CDHRAP)

Sheikh Tawfiq Al-Amer

Sheikh Abd Al-Karim Al-Hubayl
Sheikh Muneer Al-Khabaz
Sheikh Abbas Alsaeed
Sheikh Majid Assadah

Demographic
Shia opposition leaders consist of clerics and non-clerics of different generation and backgrounds
and their influence varies among different social classes and age groups.
Goals
Generally, all groups call for ending all forms of discrimination, injustice, and oppression
enforced against the Shia minority, and advocate for freedom, equality and human rights. While
some groups advocate for specific goals such as freeing the forgotten prisoners, others focus
on general ones. Defending public freedom, advocating for genuine and comprehensive reform,
and highlighting the Saudi government violations of human rights are examples of broad goals.
Even though none of the four groups has included secession and self-determination as goals, they
are considered legitimate rights.
Strategies and Tactics
To achieve their goals, Shia opposition groups use various strategies and tactics; however, after
the Arab Spring, they have changed their discourse from a sectarian-focused movement to a
national civil rights movement.
III.

Evidence for findings

Domestic and external opposition groups:
There are four prominent Shia opposition groups: half of them operate inside the kingdom
(domestic) and the other half are in exile (external) in the UK and Iran. The prominence of these
groups is bases on the high profile of their leaderships and/or their activities.
A- Domestic groups
1- The Freedom and Justice Coalition
2- Islamic Solidarity Group (ISG)
The Freedom and Justice Coalition (FJC)

Since its creation on March, 2012 to be the official entity of the Uprising,1 this group has been
actively organizing, mobilizing, and leading the protests in and around the city of Qatif.
According to the admin of the Facebook account The Eastern Regions Revolution,2 a member
of the coalition and the unofficial media wing of FJC, this coalition consists of five groups from
Qatif, Tarout, Safwa, Awamiya, and Sehat.3 It has organized a number of events recently each of
which was dedicated for a specific issue. For example, the Martyrs Wounds4 rally was
planned to commemorate those who were killed since the beginning of the uprising, the
Women5 week, took place on Awamiya and Qatif, was to emphasize governments violations
of women rights, and The Prisoner of Conscious Friday,6 was dedicated to all the prisoners of
conscious. In addition, The Rage Demonstration7 was organized to condemn the beating of
two females by security forces. Moreover, on May 10, 2012, FJC organized its first festival titled
The Stage of Free Men8 in which powerful speeches were delivered by various members of the
community criticizing the ruling family and demanding political and civil rights.
Islamic Solidarity Group (ISG)
This group, dedicated primarily to the plight of the Forgotten Prisoners, has a notable presence
on the ground and in social media. Its activities include calling for and organizing events to
educate and mobilize members of the community. ISGs official Facbook page, in which all
announcements of events, demonstrations, or campaigns are posted, has been liked by more than
3500 fans.9 In the last two months, it organized a number of events in Qatif and Awamiya. For
example, Teach Them10 campaign, launched on April 15, was dedicated to educate children
and encourage them to make drawings that reflect the sufferings of the prisoners and their
families. In addition, participants in Our Breath Will not Stop11 rally, which took place in
Awamiya on May 3, 2012, vowed to continue fighting until all prisoners are freed.
B- External groups
1- Khalas Movement (KM)
2- The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in the Arabian Peninsula (CDHRAP)
Khalas Movement (KM)
Created in 2009 after violent clashes12 between Sunnis and Shia pilgrims in Medina, KM is the
major external Shia opposition group. Its founders, veteran political dissidents and authors Dr.
Hamza Al-Hassn and Dr. Fuad Ibrahim based in London, are the backbone of this group. Their
activities include writing analytical articles on various issues and appearing regularly on TV
channels to comment on developments concerning the Shia minority and the political situation in
the kingdom. KMs unofficial news website, moltaqaa.com, is filled with news stories, articles,
reports, and videos that focus on political, social, and economic issues in Saudi Arabia. Since the
Arab spring, KM has created a remarkable presence on social media websites. For example, its
accounts on Facebook,13 Twitter,14 and Youtube15 are updated frequently with news, images, and
videos mainly about activities relating to the demonstrations in Qatif. Dr. Al- Hassan and Dr.

Ibrahim also have a notable presence on Twitter interacting with followers and expressing their
views regarding the royal family, the religious establishment, and the lack of political and civil
rights, and the Shia uprising.
The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in the Arabian Peninsula (CDHRAP)
According to CDHRAPs website,16 this committee was founded in 1992 based on its belief in
the fundamental principles of human rights guaranteed by the international treaties and
conventions as long as they do not contradict with Islamic Laws.17 One of the main goals of
CDHRAP is monitoring the inhumane practices, such as arrests and detentions on the ground of
conscience, religion, or belief, perpetrated by the Saudi regime against the Shias.18 In its
website, which offers Arabic, Farsi, and English versions, most of the published news stories are
focused on the Saudi governments violations of human rights. In fact, CDHRAP issues reports
annually documenting human rights violation in Saudi Arabia. Its most recent one,19 more than
80 pages, included detailed information about arbitrary detentions, excessive use of force that
resulted in death of civilians, violation of freedom of speech, and discrimination against women.
Leadership: Clerics, non-Clerics, affiliated, and independent
Shia opposition leaders can be classified into two main groups: external and domestic. Three out
of five external leaders are affiliated with opposition groups, while most of the domestic are
independent. Because of the secretive nature of domestic groups, local leaders prefer to remain
anonymous. Among the independents are clerics, activists, intellectuals, authors, and public
figures.
External leaders
1- Dr. Hamza Al-Hassan is a veteran political dissident, author, and a leading opposition
figure for more than three decades. He is well-known within the Shia community. As
one of the most active opposition leaders, Dr. Al-Hassan, the founder of Khalas
Movement, frequently writes about the situation of Saudi Shias and criticizes the
ruling family and the religious establishment. In fact, his book, The Shia in Saudi
Arabia,20 is considered a primary source about the history of Saudi Shia. He also
appears regularly on Satellite TV channels to comment on various domestic, regional,
and international issues. After the Arab Spring, he addressed the Shia community via
Youtube encouraging them to continue their protests21 and to boycott the
government.22
2- Dr. Fuad Ibrahim is a veteran political dissident, an author, and a founding member of
Khalas Movement. He is also the director of Gulf Issues Center for Strategic Studies,
based in London. As a researcher, Dr. Ibrahim has published a number of studies and
books addressing political, social, and religious issues in the kingdom. He appears
regularly on Satellite TV channels to comment, both in English and Arabic, on

political issues. Dr. Ibrahim used Youtube last year to encourage Shia protesters to
focus on national demands rather than sectarian ones.23
3- Ali Al-Ahmed is the director of the Institute for Gulf Affairs,24 an organization based
in Washington, DC known for its analytical reports and commentaries on issues
related to discrimination against minorities, violations of human rights, and
intolerance in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. For more than ten years, Mr.
Al-Ahmed has been actively advocating against the Saudi government by briefing
government officials, testifying before Congress25, organizing conferences,26 and
leading27 demonstrations28. He has also given speeches in educational and nongovernment institutions, written in major publications, and appeared in American and
European mainstream media platforms29.
4- Ahmed Al-Rebh is the founder of what used to be called the Society for Development
and Change30, an external Shia opposition group, the closure of which he announced
due to the emergence of FJC. To explain his action, Al-Rebh stated today, after we
are completely assured that our movement is in a safe place, we declare to the
generous public that we will completely stop executing any political activities by the
name of SDC either inside or outside the country.31 Mr. Al-Rebh, currently seeking
political asylum in New Zealand, is the editor-in-chief of altaghyir.com, which is one
of the main sources of news about the uprising in the eastern region. He appears
Arabic TV channels to comment on Shia-related issues, about which he writes as
well.32
5- Sheikh Mohammad Al-Hussain, a cleric, is the head of the Committee for the
Defense of Human Rights in the Arabian Peninsula (CDHRAP). He leads his
opposition from Qum, Iran. Sheikh Al-Hussain doesnt believe that the establishment
of a constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia is applicable because many members of
the Royal family dont believe in reform.33 After the Arab Spring, he addressed the
demonstrators in Qatif urging them to continue protesting and focus on national
demands rather than limited ones.34
Domestic leaders can be classified into two main groups: clerical and non-clerical.
Clerical Leaders:
1- Sheikh Hassan Al-Saffar, based in Qatif, is the most influential Shia cleric
especially among Shia intellectuals and middle class. Since he reconciled with the
government in 1993, Al-Saffar has been one of the leading advocates for peaceful
co-existence between Sunni and Shia, as well as religious freedom and reform in
the kingdom. In his Friday sermons, he addresses local and regional issues.
Recently, he was harshly criticized by the government after comparing the
situation in Qatif with the revolution in Syria;35 however, he received tremendous
support from human rights activists and journalists.36 His website,37 updated

2-

3-

4-

5-

6-

7-

8-

9-

frequently, includes a large number of his activities such as videos and audio
tapes of his sermons, as well as interviews that were conducted with him in the
past. His Facebook page, liked by more than 25000 fans, provides, among other
types of information, summaries of his ideas with links to his website.
Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr is the most outspoken cleric against the Saudi government
in his public appearance and in Friday sermons. Highly respected in Awamiya, he
is regarded as the spiritual leader of the uprising. According to his Facebook38
account, he was arrested and tortured multiple times. In 2009, his unprecedented
comment about seceding from the kingdom sparked tensions that forced him to
live in hiding for months.
Sheikh Abdallah Al-Nimr, from Al-Hassa, speaks out frequently against
discrimination and injustice. He has openly supported the uprising in Qatif. In
his public speeches, he encourages his followers to stand up for their rights and
the future of their children.
Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Al-Habeeb is an outspoken cleric whose Friday
sermon is attended by hundreds of worshipers. As one of the supporters of the
uprising, he speaks regularly at events organized by opposition groups.
Information about Al-Habeebs activities is posted in his website,39 as well as on
his social media40 accounts.41
Sheikh Tawfiq Al-Amer is a highly-respected Shia cleric currently in jail for
calling for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in a Friday sermon. His
arrest last year sparked major protests in Al-Hafouf and other cities calling for his
release. Many activists and groups including Sunnis have called for his release by
launching social media campaigns. Recently, after the news that he is being
tortured and badly treated in jail, activists and groups expressed their concern
about Al-Amers safety.
Sheikh Abd Al-Karim Al-Hubayl is a fierce critic of the governments anti-Shia
policies and one of the leading supporters of the uprising. As the Imam of AlAbbas mosque in Tarout Island, he is a highly respected religious figure.
Sheikh Muneer Al-Khabaz is an influential and a highly-respected cleric who
considers full citizenship for the Shia of Al-Hassa and Qatif the major issue
for Saudi Shias. His sermons are attended by a large number of attendees and all
of his activities are published on his website, almoneer.org and on his social
media accounts.
Sheikh Abbas Alsaeed is a young influential cleric who is connected with FJC.
His Friday sermons, dedicated to issues of injustice and freedom, are attended by
hundreds of Awamiyas residents.
Sheikh Majid Assadah is an influential cleric and writer who is active in social,
religious, and cultural events. In his writings and speeches, he encourages his
audience to stand up for their rights.

Non-clerical Leaders
1- Dr. Tawfiq Alsaif is a veteran human rights activists, author, and thinker whose
writings are focused on democracy, reform, and human rights. Most of his
writings are dedicated to reform in the kingdom. He has signed many petitions
demanding civil and political rights. Dr. Al-Saif considers the Shia question part
of a major issue which is the lack of basic rights. In fact, he compared the Shia
movement with the Civil Rights Movement started by the African Americans in
the 1960s.42
2- Jafar Al-Shayeb, a writer, political activist, and an elected Chairman of Qatif
Municipal Council in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia,43 has been actively
involved in activities related to reform in the kingdom. In his writing and public
speeches he emphasizes the need for political and civil rights in the kingdom.
3- Wajeha Al-Huwaider is an internationally-known women rights activist who has
been arrested several times for protesting against violations of women rights.
Because of her leading role in defending womens rights, Ms. Al-Huwaider has
been recognized by a large number of international institutions. For example, she
was listed by Georgetown University among 500 most influential Muslims,
named by the Arabian Business Magazine one of the 100th most powerful Arab
women, and included in Newsweek's 150 "Women Who Shake the World.44
4- Adel Al-Labad is an influential poet and author whose writings are considered a
source of inspiration. His poems in support of peaceful resistance against
injustice, oppression, and discrimination are well received by the public. As one
of the supporters of the uprising, Mr. Al-Labad has participated in a number of
events organized by opposition groups.
Demographic: diverse background and community-related influence
Shia opposition leaders consist of clerics and non-clerics of different generation and backgrounds
and their influence varies among different age groups and social classes. Local leader who are
affiliated with opposition groups dont identify themselves, but the government list of 23 wanted
accused of being involved in the demonstrations suggest a possible age and domestic
demographic. For example, Sheikh Hassan Al-Saffar follows Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in Iraq,45
whereas Al-Hubayl is a follower of Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran.46 In terms of influence, Sheik
Nimr Al-Nimr is famous among young lower-class residents of Awamiya, Sheikh Muneer AlKhabazs followers are mainly middle-class of Qatif. Non-cleric leaders are also diverse. Jafar
Al-Shayeb is a political figure; Tawifiq Al-Saif and Adel Al-Labad are authors, and Wajeha AlHuwaider is a female activist. Even though information about leaders who are affiliated with
local opposition groups are limited, one could infer from the details provided about 23 wanted
individuals that they are from different age groups47 and the vast majority of them are from
Awamiyah.48 In Fact, Mohammad Al-Shakhouri49 and Mohammad Issa Al-Labad,50 whose
names were mentioned in the list, have appeared unmasked in events organized by FJC.

Goals: Ending discrimination and call for equality

Generally, all groups call for ending all forms of discrimination, injustice, and oppression
enforced against the Shia minority, and advocate for freedom, equality and human rights. While
some groups advocate for specific goals such as the freeing the forgotten prisoners, others
focus on general ones. Defending public freedom, advocating for genuine and comprehensive
reform, and highlighting the Saudi government violations of human rights are examples of broad
goals. Even though none of the four groups has included secession and self-determination as
goals, they are considered legitimate rights for all oppressed groups.
The Freedom and Justice Coalition (FJC)
- Support and empower the peoples movement.
- Defending our (Shia) rights, freedom, dignity, and sacred places.51
Islamic Solidarity Group (ISG)
- Freeing the Forgotten Prisoners.52
Khalas Movement (KM)
- Advancing the current political reality.
- Pushing for radical and comprehensive change.
- Addressing the unfair policies imposed by the government against Saudi Shia.
- Forcing the regime to apply a comprehensive change that would achieve the aspirations
of all social groups and end all forms of discrimination.53
The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in the Arabian Peninsula (CDHRAP)
- Creating a state based on truth that respects human dignity
- Defending the disadvantaged and the detainees who are languishing in prisons
- Promoting respect for human rights
- Removing discriminatory policies that are based on religion
- Granting people the right to exercise the freedoms approved by Islam such as religious
freedom and freedom of expression.54
Strategies and Tactics: From sectarian to national
To achieve their goals, Shia opposition groups use various strategies and tactics; however, after
their focus has shifted from local to national and from demanding rights for Shia to calling for
civil and political rights. Apparently, organizing demonstrations is one tactic FJC has been using.
In the last two months, it organized at least five large demonstrations and one festival in all of
which the call the call for national rights was clearly emphasized. For example, in April 2012,
the group organized Breaking the Yokes,55 The Prisoner of Conscious Friday,56 and
Martyrs Wounds57 rallies. It major festival titled Free mens Stage58 that took place on May
10, 2012, was attended by hundreds of activists and many members of the community gave

powerful revolutionary speeches. In fact, two females from Jeddah and Riyadh59 and Jeddah60
were among the speakers.
The ISG mentioned broadly that it would use all legitimate means to free the forgotten
prisoners. Apparently, demonstrations, online campaigns, and organizing local events are part
of the tactics ISG has been using. It holds monthly demonstrations in Awamiyah, produces
YouTube videos, and launches Twitter campaigns entirely focused on the prisoners. For
example, last April, the group organized Teach Them61 campaign for two weeks to educate
children about the plight of the prisoners. One of the major demonstrations organized by ISG
was the Our Breath Will Not Stop rally that took place in Qatif on May 3, 2012. After the Arab
Spring, ISG has called for the release of Sunni prisoners. For example, it organized a campaign
advocating for the release of Khaled Al-Jihani, a Saunni activist who was arrested in March
2011.
In addition, KM states that it would use all legitimate tools to counter the unfair policies
imposed by the government against Saudi Shia. The leaders of this group, Dr. Hamza AlHassan and Dr. Fuad Ibrahim, use both traditional and social media to spread their message.
They appear regularly on satellite channels commenting on developments in the country. Their
writings are published on moltaqaa.com, a website that filled with news stories, articles, reports,
and videos all of which are focused on political, social, and economic issues in Saudi Arabia.
After the Arab Spring, this movement has intensified its media presence using Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube as platforms to report mainly about developments of the uprising in
Qatif. In fact, last year, its founders used YouTube to urge the demonstrators to continue
protesting, ignore those who asked them to stop, and widen the scoop of their demands.62
CDHRAP, besides its annual reports and monthly newsletters, cooperates with international
organizations that promote and defend human rights. This group has an official Facebook page
and a Twitter account. Its leader, Sheikh Mohammad Al-Hussain appears frequently on TV
channels. After the Arab Spring, Sheikh Al-Hussain addressed the Shia community in the
kingdom at least twice encouraging them to continue protesting and focus more on national
demands not sectarian ones.63

IV.

Analysis
Rationale for new discourse
Inspired by the Arab Spring, Shia opposition groups, leaders, and activists have shifted their
focus from calling for limited rights that are exclusively for the Shia minority to civil and
political rights for all Saudis. Despite the governments efforts to limit, isolate, and silence these
voices from spreading across the country, Sunnis and Shias seem likely to come together to form
a national opposition that will lead a civil rights movement in the kingdom. With a looming
conflict over succession, both Shias and Sunnis are likely to challenge Prince Nayefs
ascendance to power as he seems to be a polarizing figure.
Believing that their struggle is due to the lack of civil and political rights, Shia demonstrators,
prominent Shia clerics, writers and activists have boldly emphasized the need for a genuine and
comprehensive reform. Since February, 2011, large protests took to the streets demanding rights
for all Saudis. Influential Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr has been continuously preaching about freedom,
equality, and justice in his Fridays sermons since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Sheikh
Tawfiq Al-Amer called for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in a Friday sermon
last year, a move for which he was jailed. Activists Nazeer Al-Majed and Fadhel Al-Manasif are
currently in jail for participating in the protests. Dr. Tawfiq Al-Saif compared the current
movement to the Civil Rights Movement in the US.64
The government response to this movement has been swift. It issued a wanted list65 that included
23 names accused of organizing demagogic gathering, eight protesters have been killed,
hundreds were arrested, and government-affiliate newspapers and TV channels have been
campaigning against the protesters accusing them of carrying foreign agendas.66 Social media
accounts related to the uprising are being blocked. The religious establishment has backed the
government by issuing edicts ruling protests un-Islamic.67
Despite government attempts to crackdown, Sunni activists are responding positively to the
Shias new discourse. For example, in December, 2011, tens of Sunnis along with Shia activists
urged the government to investigate the killing of the protesters and hold those who are involved
responsible.68 A few months ago, prominent Sunni activist, Waleed Abu Al-Khair, banned from
travelling outside the country, started the Sumoud campaign (Arabic for resilience), a crosssectarian social gathering whose main goal is to bring activists together in order to discuss
political issues.69 More recently, the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA), a
Sunni group, has drafted a petition questioning the legitimacy of Crown Prince Nayef as the next
heir. It urged members of the Royal Family to join its effort to establish a national alliance to
fight for peoples right to have a constitution and elect their leaders. The statement, posted
online70 on April 23, 2012, has so far been signed by almost 500 individuals of diverse
backgrounds and from different parts of the country. On June 6, 2012, tens of Sunni individuals

from the Sahwa movement, the largest organized Sunni groups, protested in Riyadh demanding
the release for their prisoners.
Sunni and Shia groups share their resentment of Prince Nayef whom they accuse of being the
most corrupt, and anti-reform minded, as well as responsible for the imprisonment of tens of
thousands from both communities. His ascendance to power is likely to spark major protests
across the country. In order to minimize the influence of this movement, the Saudi government is
likely to continue imprisonment of activists, expand its media campaign, increase its reliance on
the religious establishment for more edicts, ban more citizens from traveling, and deploy heavy
security forces to where protests would take place.

( )
()
3
(Anonymous)
4
()
5
( )
6
( )
7
( .. )
8
()
9
(Islamic Solidarity Group Facebook page)
10
()
11
()
12
(Kwarten)
13
(Khalas official Facebook Page)
14
(Khalas Official Twitter Account)
15
(Khalas Official YouTube Channel)
16
(The Official website of CDHRAP )
17
(About CDHRAP)
18
(About CDHRAP)
19
(The Official website of CDHRAP )
20
()
21
( )
22
( )
23
()
24
(Institute for Gulf Affairs )
25
('ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2004')
26
(Climaco)
27
(Ali Al-Ahmed: No Women No Play Concert)
28
(Women protest Saudi driving ban)
29
(Critics worried by Saudi king succession)
30
()
31
()
32
()
33
(Al-Hussain)
34
( )
35
()
36
( )
1
2

37

)(The official website of Sheikh Hassan Al-Saffar

)(Biography
39
)(The official website of Sheikh Mohammed Al-Habeeb
40
)(The official Twitter account of CDHRAP
41
)(The official Facebook page of CDHRAP
42
) (
43
) (Resume:Jafar Mohammad Al-Shayeb
44
)(Hudson New York Salutes: Wajeha Al-Huwaider, Saudi Arabia
45
) (
46
) (
47
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48
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