G.R. No.

81015 July 4, 1991

CRESENCIO VIRAY and BENJAMIN D. DE ASIS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and RUSTICO VICTOR, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:p
It is about a written lease agreement that the case at bar turns. The lease concerns residential
premises identified as Apartment A at 1836 Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Said lease was
executed on April 1, 1981 by the owner of the place, Benjamin de Asis, and Rustico Victor, as
lessee. 1 The agreement included stipulations (a) fixing the term of the lease and (b) governing
the lessors right of repossession, viz.:
(a. Term of Lease)
2. The term of this lease shall be for a period of three (3) months and shall be
impliedly renewable from month to month under the same terms and conditions,
unless revised by the parties in writing with previous notice to each other of at least
fifteen (15) days.
(b. Repossession by Lessor)
7. Upon failure of the Lessee to comply with any of the terms and conditions of this
lease, as well as such other terms and conditions which may be imposed by the
Lessor prior to and/or upon renewal of this lease agreement as provided in par. 2
above, then the Lessor shall have the right, upon five (5) days written notice to the
Lessee or in his absence, upon written notice posted at the entrance of the
premises leased, to enter and take possession of the said premises holding in his
trust and custody and such possessions and belongings of the Lessee found
therein after an inventory of the same in the presence of a witness, all these acts
being hereby agreed to by the Lessee as tantamount to his voluntary vacation of
the leased premises without the necessity of suit in court.
A duplicate original of the contract was given to the lessee, Rustico Victor.
Sometime in October, 1983, Victor and his wife left for Ontario, Canada and did not return to the
Philippines until February, 1985. They left the apartment in the care of their son, Ramon.
Believing that the Victor spouses had abandoned the apartment they having been away for
more than a year, and the place being occupied by Ramon Victor, an unauthorized stranger
De Asis brought suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court in December, 1984 to evict the latter. But as
aforestated, the spouses returned in February, 1985, and on their representation that they did not
mean to give up the apartment, the case was dismissed on joint motion of the parties dated March
12, 1985. 2
It seems, however, that Rustico Victor did not re-occupy the apartment but continued to leave it
in the care of his son, Ramon. Later, in the second week of October 1985, Ramon himself left for
Canada. He asked his brother, Roldan, to look after the place. But Roldan Victor did not actually
move into the apartment; all he did was to install a padlock at the main door, visit the place once
a week, and sleep there occasionally. 3
When De Asis learned of this state of affairs sometime in December, 1985, he went to the place
to see for himself if it was true. He saw there was nobody in the apartment, but he could not get
inside because it was locked. De Asis then caused the cutting off of the electrical and water
service connections and, on the following day, posted at the main door of the apartment a notice
of termination of the lease, on the ground of abandonment and failure to pay rentals in accordance
with the contract. He could not serve the notice of termination directly on the lessee since he did
not know where the latter was.
In the first week of January, 1986, De Asis returned to the apartment and noted that the
termination notice he had posted at the door was no longer there. He posted another notice, this
time announcing that he would repossess the place after five (5) days in order to secure it from
fire, repair it to preserve its value, and inventory such of the lessee's things as were inside which
might thereafter be claimed at his residence in Quezon City. 4

De Asis also wrote on January 2, 1986 to the local barangay captain requesting his presence at
the premises on January 5, 1986 at which time he intended to open and repossess the apartment.
On January 5, 1986, as announced, and in the presence of the barangay authorities, De Asis had
the door of the apartment opened by a carpenter, and hauled to his residence the things found
inside after making an inventory of them. Thereafter, he made repairs on the apartment at a cost
of P13,108.00, and then leased it to Cresencio C. Viray. 5
Not long afterwards an action of forcible entry was instituted in the Metropolitan Trial Court against
De Asis and his new lessee, Viray, by Roldan Victor in behalf and in the name of his father,
Rustico. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. 11635-CV and resulted in a judgment
rendered on December 29, 1986 "against the defendants . . De Asis (owner-lessor) and Sgt. C.
Viray (present occupant) ordering the said defendants to restore plaintiff to the possession and
enjoyment of the leased premises at No. 1836-A Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila and to pay the
costs of this suit." 6 The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled that Rustico Victor could not be deemed to
have abandoned the premises, and even if he had, the apartment could not be repossessed
without Judicial action, the stipulation authorizing the lessor to do so being void as "against public
policy and existing precedents."
De Asis and Viray appealed to the Regional Trial Court, without success. That Court rendered
judgment on June 15, 1987, affirming that of the Metropolitan Trial Court. 7 It adopted "by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . in the Decision appealed from;" declared
the findings to be "in strict accord with the evidence presented and the conclusions . . . so
obviously correct that a detailed discussion would serve no useful purpose;" and directed "the
court of origin to issue a writ of possession immediately in favor of the plaintiff and family, and to
issue an order directing the immediate return of the personal belongings of plaintiff taken by
defendant Benjamin De Asis inside the apartment in question that were hauled and/or transported
to his residence in Quezon City on April 15, 1987."
De Asis and Viray then appealed to the Court of Appeals. Their appeal met the same fate. By
judgment promulgated on November 27, 1987 by the Fifteenth Division, 8 their petition for review
was dismissed and the Regional Trial Court's decision affirmed.
It is to overturn these three adverse verdicts that De Asis and Viray are now before this Court.
They ask this Court to rule favorably to them on two questions of law, viz.: (a) whether or not the
posting in the premises, in the first week of December, 1985, of notice of termination of the lease
had legally caused its cessation or extinguishment as of December 31, 1985; and (b) whether or
not De Asis had "the legal and contractual right to repossess the premises" without and
independently of prior judicial authority. 9
The Court gave the petition due course by Resolution dated June 28, 1989 and required the
parties to submit memoranda. The petitioners submitted their memorandum on August 23, 1989.
No memorandum was filed by or in behalf of Rustico Victor within the time appointed.
It is indisputable that the parties' written agreement created a lease on a month-to-month basis.
Such a lease, therefore, must be construed, by established doctrine, 10 as providing a definite
period and as terminable by notice at the end of any given month.
It appears undisputed, too, that the lessor had posted a notice of termination of the lease at the
doorway of the leased apartment and that notice had subsequently been noted and removed by
the lessee's representative. The giving of notice of termination in this manner is explicitly
authorized by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides that a demand
by a landlord for payment of rent or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate the
premises may inter alia be made "by posting such notice on the premises if no persons be found
thereon."
The lease having thus been licitly terminated, the lessee, Rustico Victor and his sons became
obliged to surrender the leased apartment to the lessor. They did not. They stayed away from the
place and did not show up during the repossession undertaken by the lessor, announced in
advance through the posting of another notice on the door of the apartment.
What the Victors eventually did was to bring a forcible entry suit against De Asis on the theory
that the stipulation in the lease contract authorizing repossession by the lessor without court
action was void as contrary to public policy, and De Asis had perpetrated the legally proscribed
act of taking the law into his own hands.

The stipulation referred to does by its terms empower the lessor to repossess the apartment
extrajudicially. It states that 11
7. Upon failure of the Lessee to comply with any of the terms and conditions of this
lease, as well as such other terms and conditions which may be imposed by the
Lessor prior to and/or upon renewal of this lease agreement as provided in par. 2
above, then the Lessor shall have the right, upon five (5) days written notice to the
Lessee or in his absence, upon written notice posted at the entrance of the
premises leased, to enter and take possession of the said premises holding in his
trust and custody and such possessions and belongings of the Lessee found
therein after an inventory of the same in the presence of a witness, all these acts
being hereby agreed to by the Lessee as tantamount to his voluntary vacation of
the leased premises without the necessity of suit in court.
It is noteworthy that in an earlier case decided in 1975, Consing v. Jamandre, 12 this Court
sustained the validity of a substantially Identical condition in a written lease agreement, which
read as follows: 13
9. That in case of the failure on the part of the SUB-LESSEE to comply with any of
the terms and conditions thereof, the SUB-LESSEE hereby gives an authority to
the SUB-LESSOR or to any of his authorized representatives to take possession
of the leased premises, including all its improvements thereon without
compensation to the SUB-LESSEE and without necessity of resorting to any court
action but in which case the SUB-LESSEE shall be duly advised in writing of her
failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract by way of reminder
before the takeover.
This Court ruled that the stipulation "is in the nature of a resolutory condition, for upon the exercise
by the Sub-lessor of his right to take possession of the leased property, the contract is deemed
terminated;" and that such a contractual provision "is not illegal, there being nothing in the law
prescribing such kind of agreement. 14
Similarly, there is considerable authority in American law upholding the validity of stipulations of
this nature. 15
Although the authorities are not in entire accord, the better view seems to be, even
in jurisdictions adopting the view that the landlord cannot forcibly eject a tenant
who wrongfully holds without incurring civil liability, that nevertheless, where a
lease provides that if the tenants holds over after the expiration of his term, the
landlord may enter and take possession of the premises, using all necessary force
to obtain the actual possession thereof, and that such entry should not be regarded
as a trespass, be sued for as such, or in any wise be considered unlawful, the
landlord may forcibly expel the tenant upon the termination of the tenancy, using
no more force than is necessary, and will not be liable to the tenant therefor, such
a condition in a lease being valid.
. . . although there is contrary authority, the rule supported by a substantial number
of cases is that despite the effect of forcible entry and detainer statutes, where a
lease expressly gives a landlord a right to use such reasonable force as is
necessary in making re-entry and dispossessing a tenant, when the landlord
becomes entitled to possession because of the termination of the term, the
landlord can use force in making re-entry and dispossessing the tenant.
Be this as it may, since the lessor (De Asis) had licitly and efficaciously terminated the month-tomonth lease by notice, and had therefore acquired an affirmative right of action to judicially eject
the lessee after giving notice to vacate, the existence of such an affirmative right of action
constitutes a valid defense against, and is fatal to any action by the tenant who has been ousted
otherwise than judicially to recover possession. So has this Court had occasion to rule, with
unassailable logic, it might be added. In Apundar v. Andrin, 16 this Court said:
In Medel v. Militante (41 Phil. 526), we held that when the tenant denies his
landlord's title this gives rise to a right of action on the part of the landlord to recover
immediate possession of the denied premises; and it follows as a necessary
corollary from this proposition that if the landlord acquires possession peacefully,
as in this case, by the mere act of reentry, the tenant cannot maintain an action to
put the landlord out. The existence of an affirmative right of action on the part of

the landlord to oust the tenant is fatal to the maintenance of any action by the
tenant. Otherwise, the absurd result would follow that a tenant ousted under the
circumstances here revealed would be restored to possession only himself to be
immediately put out in a possessory action instituted by the landlord. To prevent
circuity of action, therefore, we must recognize the affirmative right of action on the
part of the landlord as a complete and efficacious defense to the maintenance of
an action by the tenant.Circuitus est evitandus; et boni prejudices est lites dirimere,
ne lis ex lite oriatur.
Another consideration based upon an Idea familiar to jurisprudence is equally
decisive. This is found in one of the implications of the familiar maxim, Ubi jus ibi
remedium, the converse of which is of course equally true, namely: Nullum
jus nullum remedium. Applying this idea to the case before us, it is manifest that
inasmuch as the plaintiffs right of possession has been destroyed, the remedy is
also necessarily taken away. Even under the language of the statute itself (Sec.
80, Code of Civ. Proc.), the action of unlawful detainer does not lie unless the
property is unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff, which imports an actual present
right of possession in him.
Upon the view that the Court thus takes of the facts, the petition for review on certiorari must be
accorded merit and relief correspondingly granted to the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of November 27, 1987 in CA-G.R. SP No.
12280, subject of the appeal, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and another rendered
DISMISSING Civil Case No. 115635-CV of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch 6).
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.
Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.
Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the
Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled TCT
No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the
President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing
petitioner German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023
into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained Development
Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development.
Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons,
petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless,

petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions
occupied and cultivated by private respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have
occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of
P.D. No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Office
of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan,
San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed
right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter,
petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly
removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2)
bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of
force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and
threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings
in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1
On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible
entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the
dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court. 3
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July 24,1986,
said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court
and the Regional Trial Court. 4
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property
at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence
an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. 5 Petitioner moved
to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September
26, 1986. 6
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner
when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its
answer and whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against
petitioner. 7
We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to
exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues
presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals.
Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional
pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for
reconsideration negates any violation of due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject
property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against
petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. 8
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose
were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable
possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees
twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession
raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title
to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has
in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he
is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. 10

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic
action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine
of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is unavailing
because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the
owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of
the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent
court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 146082. July 30, 2004]

MELCHOR CUSTODIO, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO F. CORRADO, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision dated July 28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 45764, and its Resolution[2] dated November 13, 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The CA affirmed the Decision[3] dated September 9, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 9, in RTC Appeal Case No. 3301, which reversed the
Decision[4] dated August 19, 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calatagan, Batangas,
dismissing respondent Rosendo F. Corrados Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with Injunction and Damages, in Civil Case No. 120.
The facts and antecedent proceedings, as culled from records, are as follows:
On July 12, 1993, respondent Rosendo F. Corrado filed an ejectment[5] case against
petitioner Melchor Custodio with the MTC of Calatagan, Batangas, docketed as Civil Case No.
116. It was dismissed by the MTC on March 15, 1994 on the grounds that (1) it had no jurisdiction
as the complaint is a possessory suit, (2) there was no barangay conciliation, and (3) the plaintiff
failed to prove his case by preponderance of evidence. Upon appeal, the RTC of Balayan,
Batangas affirmed the appealed decision docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099.[6]
On January 2, 1995, respondent filed with the same MTC another complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 120,[7] and which is the
core case subject of the present petition.
The Complaint avers that respondent Rosendo F. Corrado (then plaintiff) is the registered
owner of a residential lot in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, Batangas covered by TCT No. T21342.He claims that more than a year prior to the institution of the complaint, petitioner Melchor
Custodio (then defendant), under a dubious claim of tenancy relationship with respondents father,
Crisanto Corrado and without his knowledge and consent, demolished his old residential house
on the said lot and constructed a two-bedroom bungalow where petitioner and his family now
reside.
In his Answer,[8] petitioner Melchor Custodio alleged that he is a legitimate leasehold tenant
of Crisanto Corrado since 1961 up to the present. He further claimed that respondents father
consented to the construction of the bungalow thirty (30) years ago when the subject lot was still
owned by respondents father and before it was transferred to respondent. As affirmative
defenses, he alleged inter alia that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action; (b) the
required barangay conciliation under P.D. 1508[9] was not complied with; and (c) the present
complaint is now barred on the ground of res judicata and is violative of the rule on forum
shopping.
The parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference:
1. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21342 covering the lot in question is in the name of
plaintiff Rosendo Corrado;

2. That the defendant has never been a tenant of the plaintiff;

3. That the construction of the two-bedroom bungalow structure on the subject premises was
without the consent of the plaintiff;
4. That the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116 which involved the same parties was by reason of
alleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508;
5. That subject property is located in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, and not in Barangay Gulod,
Calatagan;
6. That no Barangay Certification is attached to the instant complaint pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1508;
7. That the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court was appealed before the Regional Trial Court
which was docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099.[10]
After trial, the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint without
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The MTC initially resolved several issues and ruled inter alia that: (a) It has jurisdiction over
the complaint which is an accion publiciana case although denominated as recovery of
possession and ownership; (b) Prior compliance with barangay conciliation is not required
because the parties reside in non-adjoining barangays of different municipalities with respondent
residing inBarangay Binubusan, Municipality of Lian, Batangas, and petitioner residing
in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan and the complaint included a prayer for preliminary injunction and
TRO; and (c) The filing of the present Civil Case No. 120 does not constitute forum shopping and
the judgment in the previous ejectment case in Civil Case No. 116 will not amount to res judicata in
the present case because there was no judgment on the merits in Civil Case No. 116. The MTC
noted that there was no adjudication as to the rights of the parties, particularly the determination
of their possessory rights in Civil Case No. 116 as its dismissal was anchored on respondents
non-compliance with the required barangay conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 and on respondents
failure to allege the particular date of deprivation of possession required for the court to determine
whether the case was filed within the one (1) year period.
However, the MTC finds that the petitioners continued stay on respondents property has
factual and legal basis since evidence on record, such as milling tickets, convincingly show that
petitioner has been a tenant of respondents father, Crisanto Corrado, cultivating the latters three
(3)-hectare sugarcane land, including the subject lot, since 1961. It did not give credence to
respondents claim of ignorance to the tenancy relationship between petitioner and his father since
the latest milling tickets showed that petitioner continued working on the subject lot even after it
was transferred to respondents name.
Respondent appealed the MTC decision to the RTC, which set aside and reversed the MTC
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the decision of
the lower court dated August 12, 1996 and a new one entered declaring the plaintiff as the true
and absolute owner of the residential lot in question; ordering the defendant to deliver the
possession thereof to the plaintiff and to vacate the same, with costs against the defendantappellee.
SO ORDERED.[12]
In reversing the MTC, the RTC found merit in respondents allegation that petitioner cannot
claim any right to possess respondents lot on the premise that he is an alleged tenant of
respondents father. The RTC found it unacceptable for the MTC to rule that respondent is bound
by the action of his father in allowing petitioner to construct a house on the subject lot and occupy
the same. The RTC stressed that the parties had stipulated during the pre-trial that the subject lot
is registered under the name of respondent and that petitioner is not a tenant of
respondent.Further, respondent acquired the said lot in 1970 not from his father but from the

government, which was the registered owner since 1909. Thus, respondents father never
acquired any right over the said land, hence, he has no right to transmit or alienate the land to
anyone. The RTC further stated that petitioners alleged possession, if any, would have been only
by tolerance by the government and he would have acted promptly at the time respondent
purchased the lot if he truly believed that he had the legal right over the lot. Finally, the RTC
clarified that contrary to the MTCs ruling, the case is not merely an accion publiciana, where only
physical possession is involved, but one of accion reinvindicatoria because respondent claimed
recovery of full possession as an absolute owner. The RTC concluded that since respondent is
the absolute owner of the property, the MTC cannot bar him from recovering possession based
on spurious authority granted by a third party who is not an owner.
Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC
decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the RTC decision dated September 9, 1997 in RTC Appeal Case
No. 3301.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The CA ruled that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable because there is no identity of
causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. It stressed that the former is an ejectment
suit which was dismissed for failure of respondent to state the date of deprivation of possession
while the latter is for recovery of possession, and not ejectment. It also brushed aside the alleged
tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent, noting that the milling tickets were issued
for respondents father as the planter and petitioner as the tenant, but without any evidence
showing that they referred to the subject lot and without any indication that petitioner was getting
his share from the subject lot.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition submitting the following issues for our resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CIVIL CASE NO. 116 AND CIVIL CASE NO. 120 HAVE TWO (2) SEPARATE CAUSES OF
ACTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT WHAT DETERMINES THE NATURE OR CAUSE OF
THE ACTION IS NOT THE CAPTION OF THE COMPLAINT BUT THE MATERIAL
ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN NOT
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT FOR RES JUDICATA TO APPLY,
SUBSTANTIAL AND NOT ABSOLUTE IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION WILL SUFFICE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS AMPLY ESTABLISHED BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP WITH RESPONDENT AND
HIS FATHER, CRISANTO CORRADO.[14]
In our view, the relevant issues for our resolution are: (a) whether or not the principle of res
judicata is applicable in this case; and (b) whether the alleged tenancy relationship between
petitioner with respondent and the latters father was established by preponderance of evidence.
On the first issue, petitioner insists that the principle of res judicata is applicable in this case
since the material allegations in the complaints of Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120 would clearly
reveal an identity of cause of action. Citing jurisprudence, it argued that what should control in
determining the cause of action are the averments in both complaints seeking recovery of
possession of the subject lot with the ultimate goal of dispossessing and ejecting petitioner from
the property and restoring it to respondent and not the different captions of the two complaints. He
argued further that the application of the principle of res judicata only requires substantial and not
absolute identity of causes of action. For his part, respondent countered that while there may be
identity of parties and subject matter, the causes of action are not identical in Civil Case Nos. 116
and 120 as the former is one for ejectment to recover material possession while the latter is one
for recovery of possession and ownership of the subject land.

We find petitioners contentions bereft of merit. The principle of res judicata is inapplicable
because Civil Case No. 116 for ejectment was not decided on the merits and its cause of action
is different from Civil Case No. 120 for recovery of possession and ownership.
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be, between the first and second actions, (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject
matter, and (c) identity of cause of action.[15]
In the present case, the judgment in Civil Case No. 116 was not on the merits. A judgment
on the merits is one rendered after argument and investigation, and when there is determination
which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal
or merely technical point, or by default and without trial.[16] Thus, a judgment on the merits is one
wherein there is an unequivocal determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with
respect to the causes of action and the subject matter of the case.[17] In this case, the MTCs
dismissal of Civil Case No. 116 was anchored on its lack of jurisdiction and lack of proof of the
date of demand without determining and resolving who has the right of possession between
petitioner and respondent. Verily, the case was not resolved on the merits but was dismissed on
technical points. A judgment dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction cannot operate as res
judicata on the merits.[18]
There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. We agree
with the findings of the CA which we find no reason to set aside, to wit:
In Civil Case No. 116, the case as found by the MTC is an ejectment suit and for failure of
plaintiff-private respondent to state the date when he was deprived of his possession, the court
held that it did not entitle him to file an ejectment suit against herein defendant-petitioner. In Civil
Case No. 120, the cause of action is for recovery of possession and not ejectment. These are
two separate causes of action and therefore the principle of res judicata does not apply to the
present case.[19]
Indeed, an ejectment case such as Civil Case No. 116, involves a different cause of action
from an accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria, such as Civil Case No. 120, and the judgment
of the former shall not bar the filing of another case for recovery of possession as an element of
ownership. A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than
possession and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a
bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership. [20] Incidentally, we
agree with the findings of the RTC that Civil Case No. 120 is not an accion publiciana but more
of an accion reinvindicatoria as shown by the respondents allegation in the complaint that he is
the registered owner of the subject lot and that the petitioner had constructed a bungalow thereon
and had been continuously occupying the same since then.
The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of
possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our jurisprudence. What really
distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and
from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question
ofpossession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry
are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real
property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to
recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership
which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover
possession.[21]
Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to the circumstance
obtaining in this case is far from novel and not without precedence. In Vda. de Villanueva v. Court
of Appeals,[22] we held that a judgment in a case for forcible entry which involved only the issue
of physical possession (possession de facto) and not ownership will not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title or ownership, such as an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to
recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership, because there is no identity
of causes of action between the two.
Anent the second issue, petitioner contends that tenancy relationship between him and
respondents father was amply supported by evidence. It must be stressed that this is a factual
issue requiring re-evaluation and examination of the probative value of evidences presented
which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Besides, this issue had already been
squarely resolved by the Court of Appeals and we find no impelling reason to set it
aside. According to the Court of Appeals, the milling tickets only showed that they were issued to
Crisanto Corrado but did not show whether such tickets referred to the same lot in question. In

petitions for review on certiorari, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it
from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law. For a question to be one of law,
it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants. The findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on this Court, which
is not a trier of facts.[23]
At any rate, the issue of tenancy relationship had already been settled during the pre-trial stage
where the parties stipulated that the subject lot is registered in the name of respondent and that
petitioner was never a tenant of respondent. Petitioner and respondent are bound by such stipulations
which are deemed settled and need not be proven during the trial. Pre-trial is a procedural device
intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between the parties. It thus paves the way for a less
cluttered trial and resolution of the case. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the
trial, or totally dispense with it. Prescinding therefrom, it is a basic legal precept that the parties are
bound to honor the stipulations they made during the pre-trial.[24]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision dated July
28, 2000 and Resolution dated November 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
45764 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 4223

August 19, 1908

NICOLAS LUNOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
HIGINO MENESES, defendant-appellant.
T. Icasiano, for appellant.
R. Salinas, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod, Juan de la Vega, Evaristo Rodriguez, Fernando
Marcelo, Esteban Villena, Benito Litao, Ventura Hernandez, and Casimiro Pantanilla, residents
of the town of Bulacan, province of the same name, filed a written complaint against Higino
Meneses, alleging that they each owned and possessed farm lands, situated in the places known
as Maytunas and Balot, near a small lake named Calalaran; that the defendant is the owner of a
fish-pond and a strip of land situated in Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on one side, and the
River Taliptip on the other; that from time immemorial, and consequently for more than twenty
years before 1901, there existed and still exists in favor of the rice fields of the plaintiffs a statutory
easement permitting the flow of water over the said land in Paraanan, which easement the said
plaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901 and consisted in that the water collected upon their lands
and in the Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the Taliptip River. From that year however,
the defendant, without any right or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into a fishpond and by
means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the water through said place
into the Taliptip River, that in consequence the lands of the plaintiff became flooded and damaged
by the stagnant waters, there being no outlet except through the land in Paraanan; that their
plantation were destroyed, causing the loss and damages to the extent of about P1,000, which
loss and damage will continue if the obstructions to the flow of the water are allowed to remain,
preventing its passage through said land and injuring the rice plantations of the plaintiffs. They
therefore asked that judgment be entered against the defendant, declaring that the said tract of
land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting the flow of water from the property
of the plaintiffs, and that, without prejudice to the issuing of a preliminary injunction, the defendant
be ordered to remove and destroy the obstructions that impede the passage of the waters through
Paraanan, and that in future, and forever, he abstain from closing in any manner the aforesaid
tract of land; that, upon judgment being entered, the said injunction be declared to be final and
that the defendant be sentenced to pay to the plaintiffs an indemnity of P1,000, and the costs in
the proceedings; that they be granted any other and further equitable or proper remedy in
accordance with the facts alleged and proven.
In view of the demurrer interposed by the plaintiffs to the answer of the defendant, the latter, on
the 29th of August, 1904, filed an amended answer, denying each and everyone of the allegations

of the complaint, and alleged that no statutory easement existed nor could exist in favor of the
lands described in the complaint, permitting the waters to flow over the fish pond that he, together
with his brothers, owned in the sitio of Bambang, the area and boundaries of which were stated
by him, and which he and his brothers had inherited from their deceased mother.
Apolinara de Leon; that the same had been surveyed by a land surveyor in September, 1881, he
also denied that he had occupied or converted any land in the barrio of Bambang into a fishpond;
therefore, and to sentence the plaintiffs to pay the costs and corresponding damages.
Upon the evidence adduced by both parties to the suit, the court, on the 13th of March, 1907,
entered judgment declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decision in their favor, and
sentenced the defendant to remove the dam placed on the east of the Paraanan passage on the
side of the Taliptip River opposite the old dam in the barrio of Bambang, as well as to remove and
destroy the obstacles to the free passage of the waters through the strip of land in Paraanan; to
abstain in future, and forever, from obstructing or closing in any manner the course of the waters
through the said strip of land. The request that the defendant be sentenced to pay an indemnity
was denied, and no ruling was made as to costs.
The defendant excepted to the above judgment and furthermore asked for a new trial which was
denied and also excepted to, and, upon approval of the bill of exceptions, the question was
submitted to this court.
Notwithstanding the defendant's denial in his amended answer, it appears to have been clearly
proven in this case that the lands owned by the plaintiffs in the aforesaid barrio, as well as the
small adjoining lake, named Calalaran, are located in places relatively higher than the sitio called
Paraanan where the land and fish pond of the defendant are situated, and which border on the
Taliptip River; that during the rainy season the rain water which falls on he land of the plaintiffs,
and which flows toward the small Calalaran Lake at flood time, has no outlet to the Taliptip River
other than through the low land of Paraanan: that the border line between Calalaran and Paraanan
there has existed from time immemorial a dam, constructed by the community for the purpose of
preventing the salt waters from the Taliptip River, at high tide, from flooding the land in Calalaran,
passing through the lowlands of Paraanan; but when rainfall was abundant, one of the residents
was designated in his turn by the lieutenant or justice of the barrio to open the sluice gate in order
to let out the water that flooded the rice fields, through the land of Paraanan to the abovementioned river, that since 1901, the defendant constructed another dam along the boundary of
this fishpond in Paraanan, thereby impeding the outlet of the waters that flood the fields of
Calalaran, to the serious detriment of the growing crops.
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is charge imposed upon one estate for
the benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner, and the realty in favor of which the
easement is established is called the dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servient
estate.
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the easement of receiving and giving
passage to the waters proceeding from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; this easement
was not constituted by agreement between the interested parties; it is of a statutory nature, and
the law had imposed it for the common public utility in view of the difference in the altitude of the
lands in the barrio Bambang.
Article 552 of the Civil code provides:
Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man
descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates construct works preventing this easement, nor
the one of the higher estate works increasing the burden.
Article 563 of the said code reads also:
The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of the easements of waters to which this
section refers shall be governed by the special law relating thereto in everything not
provided for in this code.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, article 111 of which, treating of
natural easements relating to waters, provides:

Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the waters that flow naturally, without
the work of man, from the higher lands together with the stone or earth which they carry
with them.
Hence, the owner of the lower lands can not erect works that will impede or prevent such an
easement or charge, constituted and imposed by the law upon his estate for the benefit of the
higher lands belonging to different owners; neither can the latter do anything to increase or extend
the easement.
According to the provisions of law above referred to, the defendant, Meneses, had no right to
construct the works, nor the dam which blocks the passage, through his lands and the outlet to
the Taliptip River, of the waters which flood the higher lands of the plaintiffs; and having done so,
to the detriment of the easement charged on his estate, he has violated the law which protects
and guarantees the respective rights and regulates the duties of the owners of the fields in
Calalaran and Paraanan.
It is true that article 388 of said code authorizes every owner to enclose his estate by means of
walls, ditches fences or any other device, but his right is limited by the easement imposed upon
his estate.
The defendant Meneses might have constructed the works necessary to make and maintain a
fish pond within his own land, but he was always under the strict and necessary obligation to
respect the statutory easement of waters charged upon his property, and had no right to close
the passage and outlet of the waters flowing from the lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of
Calalaran into the Taliptip River. He could not lawfully injure the owners of the dominant estates
by obstructing the outlet to the Taliptip River of the waters flooding the upper lands belonging to
the plaintiffs.
It is perhaps useful and advantageous to the plaintiffs and other owners of high lands in Calalaran,
in addition to the old dike between the lake of said place and the low lands in Paraanan, to have
another made by the defendant at the border of Paraanan adjoining the said river, for the purpose
of preventing the salt waters of the Taliptip River flooding, at high tide, not only the lowlands in
Paraanan but also the higher ones of Calalaran and its lake, since the plaintiffs can not prevent
the defendant from protecting his lands against the influx of salt water; but the defendant could
never be permitted to obstruct the flow of the waters through his lands to the Taliptip River during
the heavy rains, when the high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place are flooded, thereby
impairing the right of the owners of the dominant estates.
For the above reasons, and accepting the findings of the court below in the judgment appealed
from in so far as they agree with the terms of this decision, we must and do hereby declare that
the defendant, Higino Meneses, as the owner of the servient estate, is obliged to give passage to
and allow the flow of the waters descending from the Calalaran Lake and from the land of the
plaintiffs through his lands in Paraanan for their discharge into the Taliptip River; and he is hereby
ordered to remove any obstacle that may obstruct the free passage of the waters whenever there
may be either a small or large volume of running water through his lands in the sitio of Paraanan
for their discharge into the Taliptip River; and in future to abstain from impeding, in any manner,
the flow of the waters coming from the higher lands. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, in
so far as it agrees with decision, and reversed in other respects, with the costs of this instance
against the appellants. So ordered.
SPS. DOLORES MIRANDA PROVOST and JEAN PROVOST
Vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. VICTOR RAMOS and FE A. RAMOS,
QUISUMBING, J.:
The instant petition seeks the annulment of the Decision[1] dated February 13, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57008 and its Resolution[2] dated August 27, 2003, denying the
motion for reconsideration. The appellate court reversed the Decision[3] dated December 10,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch 28, in Civil Case No.
573, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated February 19, 1999 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Mambajao, Camiguin in Civil Case No. 212.
The antecedent facts are as follows.

Private respondents, spouses Victor and Fe Ramos, are the owners of a parcel of land surveyed
as Lot No. 12542, Case 15, Cad. 473 situated in Putingbalas, Tupsan Grande, [5]Mambajao,
Camiguin. The spouses lot was donated to them by Nicolasa Yap Vda. de Abao on October 24,
1994. Adjacent to the lot is a parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 12543, C-15, Cad. 473 owned
by petitioner Dolores Miranda Provost. She bought it from Rosario Abanil.
Sometime in May 1992, the Provosts constructed a fence separating the two lots. In 1994, the
Ramoses, believing that the Provosts encroached on a portion of their lot, demanded the return
of the encroached area but the latter refused. The Ramoses thus had a relocation survey and the
relocation survey showed that the fence was indeed on their land.
The Provost spouses disagreed, arguing that the cadastral survey plan used had been
disapproved by the DENR Regional Office for being defective and was replaced with a correction
survey of Barangay Tupsan, Mambajao. Under the correction survey, Lot No. 12542 with an area
of 4,402 square meters was surveyed as Lot No. 13436, Cad 473, Module 2, but with a reduced
area of 3,845 square meters, and Lot No. 12543 with an area of 1,774 square meters as Lot No.
12769, Cad 473, Module 2 with an increased area of 2,634 square meters. Upon request of
petitioners Provosts, another relocation survey was done using the approved cadastral survey
plan. This relocation survey showed that the fence was within petitioners property.
On December 26, 1994, the Ramos spouses filed a complaint for recovery of ownership
and possession with damages and with prayer for preliminary injunction before the MTC.They
alleged that the Provosts encroached on 314 square meters of their lot. The MTC dismissed the
complaint and held that the Ramoses failed to prove their ownership and possession of the
disputed area. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision, stating that the claim by
the Ramoses over the property sought to be recovered was based on a disapproved survey plan.

Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC
decision and ordered the Provosts to vacate the area, remove the fence, and pay damages, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated December 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, Mambajao, Camiguin in Civil Case No. 573 entitled, Spouses
Victor Ramos, et al. vs. Jean Provost, et al. is reversed and set aside and in lieu
thereof, another one is entered:
(a) ordering respondents to vacate and surrender the
encroached area of 314 square meters to the petitioners and to
remove their fence;
(b) to pay petitioners the following amounts:
(1) the amount of P6,355.82 as actual damages;
(2) the amount of P500.00 per annum as reasonable rentals
of the encroached area;
(3) the amount of P35,500.00 as attorneys fees
plus P1,500.00 as traveling expenses every hearing;
(4) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(5) the amount of P500.00 as litigation expenses and to pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[6]

Hence, this petition for certiorari where petitioners argue:

1.
That respondent Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of its
jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of private respondents outside of the issue raised
in the decisions of both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court.
2.
The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in insisting on the technical description
of the erroneous and disapproved survey of private respondents land as the basis
for its findings that petitioners had encroached the land of respondents.
3.
That the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in merely denying in a cavalier manner
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration as mere refutation of its own findings,
without stating the legal basis for the denial in direct violation of the provisions of
the second paragraph, of Section 14, of the 19[8]7 Constitution of the Philippines,
that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis [therefor].
4.
That there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law open to petitioners, except this petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[7]

At the outset, we note that this case involves an error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction. Thus, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not
proper.Nevertheless, we shall give due course to the instant petition as one proper for review
under Rule 45.

Simply, the main issue in this case is whether petitioners (Provosts) encroached on the property
of private respondents (Ramos spouses).

Private respondents anchor their claim on the deed of donation and an old survey plan, while
petitioners base theirs on the deed of absolute sale and the corrected survey plan.

Petitioners aver that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it held that they
encroached upon the Ramoses property since the frontage (points 7, 8 and 9) in the old survey
plan of the Ramoses property was the same frontage in the new survey plan and the fence was
constructed at point 8 of the cadastral plan. They argue that the points of the frontage of
respondents property in the old and new survey plan are similar but with different technical
descriptions on measurements and bearings, thus the location of the frontage in the two surveys
cannot be identical. More so, under the approved survey plan, the fence was constructed at point
9, which is point 4 of their lot and clearly within their property.They posit that the Court of Appeals
did not bother to check the technical descriptions and instead relied on the testimony of the
engineer who conducted the relocation survey using the technical description on the disapproved
survey plan. They maintain that private respondents were unable to establish the identity of their
property, since they relied on a disapproved survey plan. Moreover, the contested area was
previously occupied by Asterio Aboc, a tenant of Rosario Abanil.

Private respondents, on their part, state that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
continuous and open possession as owners, as evidenced by the tax declarations and that
petitioners did not deny points 7, 8 and 9 of respondents property. They insist that the Provosts
encroached on their land as the fence was constructed at point 8.

The Court of Appeals in reversing the RTC decision reasoned that the petitioners had no right to
move the common boundary such that the area of the adjoining lot was reduced to 3,552 square
meters. It further held that they could not validly claim ownership over the area of 2,327 square
meters since they bought only 1,774 square meters, and that the correction survey plan was under
protest as it would prejudice private respondents.[8]

We stress that regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of ownership
or accion reivindicatoria.[9] Section 8, Rule 40[10] of the Rules on Civil Procedure nonetheless
allows the RTC to decide the case brought on appeal from the MTC which, even without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, may decide the case on the merits. In the instant case, the
MTC of Mambajao should have dismissed the complaint outright for lack of jurisdiction but since
it decided the case on its merits, the RTC rendered a decision based on the findings of the MTC.

Now, on the main issue, we sustain the decision of the RTC.

Significantly, the parties do not deny that a correction survey was made in Barangay Tupsan; that
the survey plan was approved on February 16, 1994; and that the area of the private respondents
property under the corrected survey plan was reduced to 3,845 square meters, while that of
petitioners was increased to 2,634 square meters.

In an action to recover under Article 434[11] of the Civil Code, the claimant must (1) establish the
identity of the property sought to be recovered and (2) rely on the strength of his title and not on
the weakness of defendants claim. It is also settled rule that what defines a piece of land is not
the area, calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in the description but the boundaries
therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.[12]
In this case, we find that private respondents failed to identify the property they seek to
recover. They relied on the old survey plan, the technical descriptions of which did not indicate
the accurate measurements and limits of their property. The technical descriptions under the old
cadastral survey plan cannot be the basis to delineate the boundaries of the lots or determine
their respective areas for the obvious reason that it was not approved. In fact, a relocation survey
plan[13] of Lot No. 12542, attached to the complaint as Annex B and presented in evidence by the
petitioners as Exhibit 1, reveals that the area of the lot is still subject to verification and final
computation.
Moreover, private respondents failed to prove open, continuous and adverse possession of the
disputed area. That their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of owners

since World War II based on the early tax declarations, is insufficient to delineate
boundaries.[14] Also, they admitted that Asterio Aboc is the tenant of Rosario Abanil.[15] They
merely claimed that a portion of the land where Abocs house was once built, is part of their
property. Such claim without further proof of title does not suffice to define the boundaries of the
adjoining lots. It thus appears clearly that the contested area was part of Abanils lot sold to
petitioner Dolores Provost.
As held in Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals,[16] when the records do not show that
the land subject of the action for recovery has been exactly determined, such action cannot
prosper, inasmuch as respondents ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear
satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.
Considering that there is already an existing correct and approved cadastral survey plan
of Barangay Tupsan, and absent any showing that the same is erroneous, that plan should be
the basis to delineate the boundaries.
Additionally, however we find the RTCs award of actual damages for P10,000; attorneys fees
for P10,000; and litigation expenses for P5,000, without legal and factual basis; hence, the awards
must be deleted.

An award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses is proper when the court deems it just
and equitable that attorneys fees and litigation expenses should be recovered, and when the civil
action or proceeding is clearly unfounded and where defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith. The award of attorneys fees as damages is the exception rather than the rule. It is not to be
given to the defendant every time the latter prevails. The right to litigate is of great consequence
that a penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it mistakenly unless, of course
such party acted in bad faith. In this case, we could not award attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation in the absence of showing of gross and evident bad faith in filing the action.[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 13, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution dated August 27, 2003 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated December 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch
28 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages, litigation
expenses and attorneys fees are deleted.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149295. September 23, 2003]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. GENEROSO DE JESUS, represented by his

Attorney-in-Fact, CHRISTIAN DE JESUS, respondent.
DECISION

VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Philippine National Bank disputes the decision handed down by the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 23 March 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56001, entitled Generoso De Jesus,
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Christian De Jesus, versus Philippine National Bank. The
assailed decision has affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, declaring respondent Generoso de Jesus as being the true and
lawful owner of the 124-square-meter portion of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-17197 and ordering petitioner bank to vacate the premises, to deliver possession
thereof to respondent, and to remove the improvement thereon.
It would appear that on 10 June 1995, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro for recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages, over the questioned property. In his complaint, respondent stated that he had acquired
a parcel of land situated in Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 1,144 square meters
covered by TCT No. T-17197, and that on 26 March 1993, he had caused a verification survey of
the property and discovered that the northern portion of the lot was being encroached upon by a
building of petitioner to the extent of 124 square meters. Despite two letters of demand sent by
respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the area.
Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building sometime in
1981 from then Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was in existence and to
remedy the situation, Mayor Ignacio offered to sell the area in question (which then also belonged
to Ignacio) to petitioner at P100.00 per square meter which offer the latter claimed to have
accepted. The sale, however, did not materialize when, without the knowledge and consent of
petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines.
The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent declaring him to be the rightful owner
of the disputed 124-square-meter portion of the lot and ordering petitioner to surrender
possession of the property to respondent and to cause, at its expense, the removal of any
improvement thereon.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, sustained the trial court but it ordered to be deleted the
award to respondent of attorneys fees, as well as moral and exemplary damages, and litigation
expenses.
Petitioner went to this Court, via a petition for review, after the appellate court had denied the
banks motion for reconsideration, here now contending that 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN ADJUDGING PNB A BUILDER
IN BAD FAITH OVER THE ENCROACHED PROPERTY IN QUESTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN NOT APPLYING IN FAVOR OF
PNB THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND THE RULING IN
TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.
108894, February 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 7.[1]
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals have both rejected the idea that petitioner
can be considered a builder in good faith. In the context that such term is used in particular
reference to Article 448, et seq., of the Civil Code, a builder in good faith is one who, not being
the owner of the land, builds on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of any
defect in his title or mode of acquisition.
The various provisions of the Civil Code, pertinent to the subject, read:
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon
the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to

replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or
sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the
proper rent.
A builder in good faith can, under the foregoing provisions, compel the landowner to make a
choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder
to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with
the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way
around.[2] Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. He much choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to
instead remove it from the land.[3] In order, however, that the builder can invoke that accruing
benefit and enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a choice be made by the landowner, he
should be able to prove good faith on his part.
Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning
or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of
malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An
individuals personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively
be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry.[4] The essence of good
faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence
of intention to overreach another.[5] Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is
not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.[6]
Given the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court, it should be evident enough
that petitioner would fall much too short from its claim of good faith. Evidently, petitioner was quite
aware, and indeed advised, prior to its acquisition of the land and building from Ignacio that a part
of the building sold to it stood on the land not covered by the land conveyed to it.
Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on the land by Ignacio, has in
actuality been part of the property transferred to petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to
a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some
works (or sown or planted something) and not to a case where the owner of the land is the
builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or otherwise
for, elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land,
the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. [7]
In fine, petitioner is not in a valid position to invoke the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil
Code. The Court commiserates with petitioner in its present predicament; upon the other hand,
respondent, too, is entitled to his rights under the law, particularly after having long been deprived
of the enjoyment of his property. Nevertheless, the Court expresses hope that the parties will still
be able to come up with an arrangement that can be mutually suitable and acceptable to them.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56001 is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985
FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendant-appellant.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Order of the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo to the then Court of
Appeals, which the latter certified to this instance as involving pure questions of law
Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T3087, known as Lot No. 685, situated in the municipality of Dumangas,
Iloilo, with an area of approximately 8,870 square meters. Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant,
owns an adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with an approximate area of 231 sq. ms.
Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had
encroached on an area of thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRA's property, After the
encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of DEPRA's lot made on November 2,1972,
his mother, Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back from his
encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on February 6,1973 against DUMLAO in the

Municipal Court of of Dumangas, docketed as Civil Case No 1, Said complaint was later amended
to include DEPRA as a party plain. plaintiff.
After trial, the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith, and applying
Article 448 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment on September 29, 1973, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with the plaintiffs, as
lessors, and the defendants as lessees, over the disputed portion with an area of
thirty four (34) square meters, the rent to be paid is five (P5.00) pesos a month,
payable by the lessee to the lessors within the first five (5) days of the month the
rent is due; and the lease shall commence on the day that this decision shall have
become final.
From the foregoing judgment, neither party appeal so that, ff it were a valid judgment, it would
have ordinarily lapsed into finality, but even then, DEPRA did not accept payment of rentals so
that DUMLAO deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court.
On July 15,1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against DUMLAO before the then
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV (Trial Court), involving the very same 34 square meters,
which was the bone of contention in the Municipal Court. DUMLAO, in his Answer, admitted the
encroachment but alleged, in the main, that the present suit is barred by res judicata by virtue of
the Decision of the Municipal Court, which had become final and executory.
After the case had been set for pre-trial, the parties submitted a Joint Motion for Judgment based
on the Stipulation of Facts attached thereto. Premised thereon, the Trial Court on October 31,
1974, issued the assailed Order, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that the thirty four (34) square meters
subject of this litigation is part and parcel of Lot 685 of the Cadastral Survey of
Dumangas of which the plaintiff is owner as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 3087 and such plaintiff is entitled to possess the same.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that the Decision
of the Municipal Court was null and void ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue
of possession, whereas decisions affecting lease, which is an encumbrance on real property, may
only be rendered by Courts of First Instance.
Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the Municipal Court, we hold the
same to be null and void. The judgment in a detainer case is effective in respect of possession
only (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). 1 The Municipal Court over-stepped its bounds when it
imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease", which like "forced co-ownership" is not
favored in law. Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction over which belongs
to Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) (Sec. 44(b), Judiciary Act of 1948; 2 Sec.
19 (2) Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). 3 Since the Municipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, its
Decision was null and void and cannot operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for Queting
of Title. Besides, even if the Decision were valid, the rule on res judicata would not apply due to
difference in cause of action. In the Municipal Court, the cause of action was the deprivation of
possession, while in the action to quiet title, the cause of action was based on ownership.
Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer
case "shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land. " 4
Conceded in the Stipulation of Facts between the parties is that DUMLAO was a builder in good
faith. Thus,
8. That the subject matter in the unlawful detainer case, Civil Case No. 1, before
the Municipal Court of Dumangas, Iloilo involves the same subject matter in the
present case, the Thirty-four (34) square meters portion of land and built thereon
in good faith is a portion of defendant's kitchen and has been in the possession of
the defendant since 1952 continuously up to the present; ... (Emphasis ours)

Consistent with the principle that our Court system, like any other, must be a dispute resolving
mechanism, we accord legal effect to the agreement of the parties, within the context of their
mutual concession and stipulation. They have, thereby, chosen a legal formula to resolve their
dispute to appeal ply to DUMLAO the rights of a "builder in good faith" and to DEPRA those of a
"landowner in good faith" as prescribed in Article 448. Hence, we shall refrain from further
examining whether the factual situations of DUMLAO and DEPRA conform to the juridical
positions respectively defined by law, for a "builder in good faith" under Article 448, a "possessor
in good faith" under Article 526 and a "landowner in good faith' under Article 448.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the
building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof
(Paragraphing supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the option either to pay for the encroaching part
of DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO. He
cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell the encroached part of
his land, 5 as he had manifested before the Municipal Court. But that manifestation is not binding
because it was made in a void proceeding.
However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Facts in the Court of First
Instance. It was thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that DEPRA is "entitled to possession,"
without more, of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have the kitchen
removed. He is entitled to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell his encroached
land, DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. 6 In this case, DUMLAO had expressed his willingness
to pay for the land, but DEPRA refused to sell.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is
entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building,
under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner of the land, upon the other hand,
has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or
to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot as respondents here
did refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of
the building to remove it from the land where it erected. He is entitled to such
remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land. the other party fails to pay
for the same (italics ours).
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendantspetitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffsrespondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to
sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be
executed and is. furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453
(now Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608[1946]).
A word anent the philosophy behind Article 448 of the Civil rode.
The original provision was found in Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code; which provided:
ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or
planting, after the payment of the indemnity stated in Articles 453 and 454, or to

oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent.
As will be seen, the Article favors the owner of the land, by giving him one of the two options
mentioned in the Article. Some commentators have questioned the preference in favor of the
owner of the land, but Manresa's opinion is that the Article is just and fair.
. . . es justa la facultad que el codigo da al dueno del suelo en el articulo 361, en
el caso de edificacion o plantacion? Algunos comentaristas la conceptuan injusta,
y como un extraordinario privilegio en favor de la propiedad territorial. Entienden
que impone el Codigo una pena al poseedor de buena fe y como advierte uno de
los comentaristas aludidos 'no se ve claro el por que de tal pena . . . al obligar al
que obro de buena fe a quedarse con el edificio o plantacion, previo el pago del
terreno que ocupa, porque si bien es verdad que cuando edifico o planto demostro
con este hecho, que queria para si el edificio o plantio tambien lo es que el que
edifico o planto de buena fe lo hizo en la erronea inteligencia de creerse dueno
del terreno Posible es que, de saber lo contrario, y de tener noticia de que habia
que comprar y pagar el terreno, no se hubiera decidido a plantar ni a edificar. La
ley obligandole a hacerlo fuerza su voluntad, y la fuerza por un hecho inocente de
que no debe ser responsable'. Asi podra suceder pero la realidad es que con ese
hecho voluntario, aunque sea inocente, se ha enriquecido torticeramente con
perjuicio de otro a quien es justo indemnizarle,
En nuestra opinion, el Codigo ha resuelto el conflicto de la manera mas justa y
equitativa y respetando en lo possible el principio que para la accesion se
establece en el art. 358. 7
Our own Code Commission must have taken account of the objections to Article 361 of the
Spanish Civil Code. Hence, the Commission provided a modification thereof, and Article 448 of
our Code has been made to provide:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted
in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.
Additional benefits were extended to the builder but the landowner retained his options.
The fairness of the rules in Article 448 has also been explained as follows:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a
just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements
after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for
the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. (3
Manresa 213; Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico,
G.R. No. 49167, April 30, 1949; Article applied: see Cabral, et al vs. Ibanez [S.C.]
52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.] 52 Off. Gaz. 2050). 8
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside, and this case is hereby ordered
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for further proceedings consistent with Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code, as follows:
1. The trial Court shall determine
a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter area of land;

b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the kitchen;
c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters may
have acquired by reason thereof, and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than that of the
kitchen built thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional, Trial
Court shall render judgment, as follows:
a) The trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen (15) days within which to
exercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate
the kitchen as his own by paying to DUMLAO either the amount of tile expenses
spent by DUMLAO f or the building of the kitchen, or the increase in value ("plus
value") which the said area of 34 square meters may have acquired by reason
thereof, or to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of said area. The amounts to be
respectively paid by DUMLAO and DEPRA, in accordance with the option thus
exercised by written notice of the other party and to the Court, shall be paid by the
obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the option by tendering the
amount to the Court in favor of the party entitled to receive it;
b) The trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA exercises the option to oblige
DUMLAO to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because,
as found by the trial Court, the value of the land is considerably more than that of
the kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice of such rejection to DEPRA and to
the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of DEPRA's option to sell the land. In
that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice
of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the Court
formal written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is
reached by the parties, the trial Court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the
termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the
lease, provided that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less
than Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month, payable within the first five (5) days of each
calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more than two (2)
years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of time
since 1952 that DUMLAO has occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed
shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced lease.
DUMLAO shall not make any further constructions or improvements on the kitchen.
Upon expiration of the two-year period, or upon default by DUMLAO in the
payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months, DEPRA shall be entitled to
terminate the forced lease, to recover his land, and to have the kitchen removed
by DUMLAO or at the latter's expense. The rentals herein provided shall be
tendered by DUMLAO to the Court for payment to DEPRA, and such tender shall
constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed
by the Court.
c) In any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount computed at Ten Pesos
(P10.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of DEPRA's
land for the period counted from 1952, the year DUMLAO occupied the subject
area, up to the commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding
paragraph;
d) The periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its Precision shall be inextendible,
and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial Court the amount due to
the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order of
execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for compliance
with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee.
No costs,
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82220 July 14, 1995

PABLITO MENESES and LORENZO MENESES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO
QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed
Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato,
Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING,
SR. (Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Luisa, Norberto, Jimmy, Ma.
Victoria, Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed Quisumbing), all represented by Atty. Galileo
Brion, respondents.
G.R. No. 82251 July 14, 1995
CESAR ALMENDRAL, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, respondent.
G.R. No. 83059 July 14, 1995
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING
(Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO
QUISUMBING, (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all
surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR. (Petrona, Natividad,
Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO
QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Victoria, Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed
Quisumbing),petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLITO MENESES, LORENZO MENESES and BRAULIO C.
DARUM,respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
For review in these consolidated petitions is the Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07049 affirming the Decision dated March 26, 1984 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 37, Calamba, Laguna, in Civil Case No. 474-83-C which declared as null and
void the original certificates of title and free patents issued to Pablito Meneses over lots found by
the court to be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by Ciriaca
Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing.
I
On March 1, 1977, Braulio C. Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baos, Laguna, issued
to Pablito Meneses Free Patent No. (IV-5) P-12807 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1268
covering Lot 1585 with an area of 417 square meters, and Free Patent No (IV-5) 12808 and
Original Certificate of Title No P-1269 for Lot 190 with an area of 515 square meters. Both lots
are located in Los Baos, Laguna.
Pablito Meneses acquired said property from Silverio Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and
Transfer of Rights executed on May 5, 1975 in consideration of Bautista's "love and affection" for
and "some monetary obligations" in favor of Pablito Meneses (Rollo, p. 45). After the execution
of said document, Pablito Meneses took possession of the land, introduced improvements
thereon, declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes.
In turn, Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter land from his aunt, Sergia (Gliceria) M. Almeda.
He had been occupying the land since 1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the land as far back as September
6, 1919 when their matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 989 covering a lot with an area of 859 square meters located in Los Baos,
Laguna with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was
registered on August 14, 1973 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the names of

Ciriaca's heirs: Emilio, Manuel, Eduardo, Norberto, Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato,
Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing.
In 1962, the Quisumbing instituted and accion publiciana in the then Court of First Instance of
Bian, Laguna to recover possession over a portion of the property from Dominga Villamor and
Lorenzo Lanuzo docketed as Civil Case No. B-350. On January 3, 1966, the case was decided
in favor of the Quisumbings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the Quisumbings' right
over the property.
In LRC Case No. B-327, the Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an
additional area of 2,387 square meters which had gradually accrued to their property by the
natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. In its Decision of September 28, 1978, the Court
of First Instance of Bian confirmed the Quisumbings' title thereto which, after it was duly
surveyed, was identified as Psu-208327. The additional area was divided into two lots in the
survey plan approved by the Director of Lands on November 16, 1964. In ordering the
confirmation and registration of title on favor of the Quisumbings, the land registration court said:
. . . There is no doubt that the applicants' right to the property was bolstered by the
unappealed decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350 of this Court
when the properties applied for were classified as accretions made by the waters
of the Laguna Lake. . . . (G.R. No. 82229, Rollo, p. 20).
On April 17, 1979, the Quisumbings filed Civil Case No. 07049 before the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, Branch VI, Calamba against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Braulio C. Darum and
Cesar B. Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses. They
alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baos, using his brother Pablito as a "tool
and dummy," illegally occupied their "private accretion land" an August 6, 1976, and,
confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land Inspector Cesar Almendral, obtained
free patents and original certificates of title to the land.
On March 26, 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by the
Meneses brothers are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid right as owners of
the riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. In so holding, the trial
court relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350, and quoted
the following portions of the appellate court's decision:
Plaintiffs-appellees are titled owners of a (sic) 859 square meters of land under
TCT No. 25978 of the Laguna Land Registry, the northwest boundary of which is
the Laguna de Bay.
It is ascertained that the northwest portion of Quisumbing's lot is bounded by the
Laguna de Bay. The nature of the Laguna de Bay has long been settled in the case
of Government of the Philippines v. Colegio de San Jose (55 Phil. 423) when it
held that:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depression of the earth;
it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks and springs,
and is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to
the definition first quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.
Consequently, since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the authorities cited by the
appellants referring to seashore would not apply. The provision of the law on
waters will govern in determining the natural bed or basin of the lake. And
accordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:
Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers andlakes by accessions or sediments from the
waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Since the title indicate(s) that the northwest portion of the property is bounded by
Laguna de Bay, which is a lake, even if the area where Lanuza's house and
Villamor's house for that matter is located is not included within the title, it must
necessarily be an accretion upon appellees' land by accessions or sediments from
the waters thereof which should belong to the owner of the adjacent land. The
authorities cited by the appellants treat of the ownership of accretions by water of
the sea under Title I. Lakewaters being terrestrial waters, their ownership is

governed by Title II of the Law of Waters. As held in the Colegio de San Jose case,
the provisions of the Law of Waters regulating the ownership and use of sea water
are not applicable to the ownership and use of lakes which are governed by
different provisions. As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is
necessary in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation as the law does
not require the same (Ignacio Grande, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. L-17652, June 30, 1962 citing Roxas vs. Tuazon, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City
of Manila, 10 Phil. 567 and 3 Manresa, C.C. pp. 321-326, pp. 4-5) (Records, pp.
80-84).
The trial court also found that the free patents issued to Pablito Meneses had been procured
through fraud, deceit and bad faith, citing the following facts as bases for its conclusion: (1) The
Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights allegedly executed by Silverio Bautista in favor of Pablito
Meneses was a simulated contract for lack of consideration; (2) The said instrument was sworn
to before Mayor Lorenzo Meneses who had no authority to notarize deeds of conveyances; (3)
Although the lots subject of the deed of conveyance were placed in his brother's name, Mayor
Meneses actually exercised rights of ownership thereto; (4) Land Inspector Cesar Almendral
admitted having anomalously prepared the documents to support the free patent applications of
Pablito Meneses and, having personally filled up the blank forms, signed them in the absence of
the persons concerned; (5) Almendral kept the documents in his possession from 1979 to 1980
despite orders from the Director of Lands to produce and surrender the same; (6) District Land
Officer Braulio Darum approved the free patent applications and issued the questioned titles
without the required cadastral survey duly approved by the Director of Lands and despite the
pendency of LRC Case No. B-327 involving the contested lots; (7) Darum represented the Bureau
of Lands in LRC Case No. B-327 without authority from the Director of Lands and after he had
withdrawn his appearance in said case, persisted in filing a motion to set aside the order for the
issuance of a decree in favor of the Quisumbings; (8) Darum and Almendral in bad faith, refused
to produce the missing original records of the free patent applications and their supporting
documents; and (9) When Darum was not yet an oppositor in LRC Case No. B-327, he admitted
in his letter to the Land Registration Commission that the contested lots are portions of the land
being claimed by the Quisumbings contrary to his later representation in the joint answer to the
petition that the subject lots are not portions of Lots 1 and 2, Psu-208327 owned by the
Quisumbings. Accordingly, the trial court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the lands covered by Pablito Meneses' Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 (Exh. "J"), covering Lot No. 1585, consisting of
417 square meters and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free Patent No.
12808 (Exh. "H"), covering Lot No. 190, consisting of 515 square meters, both
located at Los Baos, Laguna, as accretion lands forming parts of a bigger
accretion land owned by plaintiffs as declared in a final judgment (Exh. "A"),
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bian, Laguna, in LRC Case No. B-327,
which bigger accretion land is directly adjacent to or at the back of plaintiffs' riparian
land, and consequently, declaring as null and void and cancelled Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 and Original Certificate of
Title No. P-1269/Free Patent No. 12808;
2. Directing that the Register of Deeds of Laguna or his Deputy at Calamba,
Laguna, to make the corresponding entries of cancellation in his Registry of the
above mentioned Original Certificate of Titles/Free Patents;
3. Directing defendants Lorenzo Meneses and Pablito Meneses and all persons
acting in their behalves to vacate the subject lands and surrender the possession
thereof to the plaintiffs immediately; and
4. Directing the defendants to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the sums of:
a) P20,000.00, plus P500.00 per month from January, 1977, until
the subject property is completely vacated, as actual and
compensatory damages;
b) P350,000.00, as moral damages;
c) P70,000.00 as exemplary damages;

d) P40,000.00, as attorney's fees; and

e) the costs (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
Thereafter, the Quisumbings filed a motion for execution pending appeal which the trial court
granted in its Order of September 7, 1984 subject to the posting by the Quisumbings of a bond in
the amount of P500,000.00. The defendants unsuccessfully moved for the reconsideration of said
order.
The Quisumbings also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Pablito Meneses,
Silverio Bautista, Pablo Silva, Virgilio Cruz and Cesar Almendral for violation of paragraphs (e)
and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, for conspiring in the approval and grant of the free
patents over portions of Lots 1 & 2 of Psu-208327 owned by the heirs of Ciriaca Arguelles Vda.
de Quisumbing. In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the defendants
guilty as charged. The case was elevated to this Court but on August 27, 1987, the judgment of
conviction was affirmed (Meneses v. People, 153 SCRA 303 [1987]).
Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the decision in Civil Case No. 07049 to
the Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1987, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without
merit and affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
The defendants-appellants filed two motions for the reconsideration of the appellate court's
decision but it was denied in the Resolution of February 23, 1988 which in pertinent part stated:
However, for humanitarian considerations, and considering the appeal of the
defendants-appellants for a reduction of the moral and exemplary damages, We
favor the reduction of the moral damages from P350,000.00 to P50,000.00 and the
exemplary damages from P70,000.00 to P5,000.00. In all other respects, We find
no justification for modifying the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower
court (G.R. No. 82220, Rollo, p. 67).
Pablito and Lorenzo Meneses filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 82220. Cesar Almendral filed a motion in G.R. No. 82251 for a 45-day extension
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. After this Court had granted them a 30-day
extension, Almendral still failed to file any petition. The Quisumbings also filed a petition for review
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 83059, solely on the issue of the propriety of the reduction of
the amount of damages in the Court of Appeals' Resolution of February 23, 1988. Upon motion
of petitioners in G.R. No. 83059, the three petitions were consolidated in the Resolution of August
1, 1988.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 retell the same errors they had raised before the Court of Appeals,
contending in the main: (1) that the lands in question were not accretion lands but lands of the
public domain; (2) that no conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the issuance
of the free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses; and (3) that the Deed of Waiver and Transfer of
Rights was founded on a valid consideration.
As regards the issue of whether the lands in question are accretion lands, petitioners relied on
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in Republic of the Philippines v. Braga, CA-G.R. No. 55390R, October 23, 1980, holding that the property involved therein was part of the natural bed of the
Laguna de Bay and therefore what had to be determined was whether said property was covered
by water when the lake was at its highest depth.
Petitioners' assigned errors in G.R. No. 82220 are evidently factual issues which have been
thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court (Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 533 [1994]) and they carry even more
weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court (Binalay v. Manalo,
195 SCRA 374 [1991]). The jurisdiction of this Court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law
unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record
or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion (BA Finance
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 566 [1941]). We find no such showing in this case.
Petitioners' protestations notwithstanding the final decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case
No. B-350 has a bearing in the resolution of this case for while the lots occupied by Villamor and
Lanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners are claiming here, the two cases refer to the
same accretion lands northwest of the original land owned by the Quisumbings.

In the same vein, the decision of the land registration court in LRC Case No. B-327 ordering the
confirmation and registration of title in favor of the Quisumbings over 2,387 square meters of
accretion land is binding on petitioners in G.R. No. 82220. As correctly pointed out by the Court
of Appeals, said decision, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the whole world, more
so because it became final and executory upon the Bureau of Lands' failure to interpose an
appeal.
Since petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 claim that "the foreshore land known as Lots 190 and 1585
are part of Laguna de Bay" and therefore the Quisumbings "have no legal right to claim the same
as accretion land," we quote the following pertinent portions of the decision in Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 131 SCRA 532 (1984) which, although the case deals with the registration of a
reclaimed land along the Laguna de Bay, is nonetheless enlightening:
Laguna de Bay is a lake. While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same
gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans, this
phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. Thus, the
alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could
hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed
four to five months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which
bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the
water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period
(four to five months a year) than the level of the water at which the land is
completely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of
Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of the bed
or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land. The
Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore
land, to wit:
. . . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and
left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides.
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land
in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay
from different sources." Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to
"flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the
meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to
be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore
land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore
capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that
he has a registerable title (at pp. 538-539).
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). While
the trial court mainly relied on the findings in Civil Case No. B-350 that the lands in controversy
are accretion lands and it has not determined on its own the presence of said requisites, it is too
late now for petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 to claim otherwise. Consequently, the lands held to be
accretion lands could only benefit the Quisumbings, who own the property adjacent to the lands
in controversy (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 350 [1992]).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 also assert that the principle of indefeasibility of title should favor
them as the one-year period provided for by law to impugn their title had elapsed. They also urged
that, having been granted by the state, their title is superior to that of the Quisumbings. We hold,
however, that in the light of the fraud attending the issuance of the free patents and titles of Pablito
Meneses, said assertions crumble. Such fraud was confirmed by this Court in Meneses v. People,
153 SCRA 303 (1987) which held the petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act in the issuance of the same free patents and titles.
Unlike the petition in G.R. No. 82220, the petition in G.R. No. 83059 (questioning the reduction of
the damages awarded to the Quisumbings by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution of February
23, 1988) is meritorious. The task of fixing the amount of damages is primarily with the trial court
(Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]). While it is the appellate court's duty to review

the same, a reduction of the award of damages must pass the test of reasonableness. The Court
of Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded as damages when they are palpably
or scandalously and reasonably excessive (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 226
SCRA 423 [1993]; Prudenciano v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]).
There is no justification for the radical reduction by the Court of Appeals of the damages awarded
by the trial court. Its action was premise merely on "humanitarian considerations" and the plea of
the defendants-appellants. We may agree with the Court of Appeals in reducing the award after
scrutinizing its factual findings only if such findings are diametrically opposed to that of the trial
court (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra). But as it is, the Court of Appeals
affirmed point by point the factual findings if the lower court upon which the award of damages
had been based.
We, therefore, see no reason to modify the award of damages made by the trial court. Respondent
Braulio C. Darum in G.R. No. 83059 must also be solidarily liable for said damages in his capacity
as a public officer. A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity
for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected
by the mantle of immunity for official actions (Vidad v. RTC of Negros, Br. 42, 227 SCRA 271
[1993]).
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82220 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 83059 is
GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED while its
Resolution of February 23, 1988 insofar as it reduces the amount of damages awarded to the
Quisumbing family is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 and respondent
Braulio Darum in G.R. No. 83059.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 98045. June 26, 1996]

DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA, petitioners,

vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO
RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO,
ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/or
private capacities, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; RIGHTS OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO IMMOVABLE
PROPERTY; ARTICLE 457; REQUISITES.- In the case of Meneses vs. CA, this Court held
that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the
concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea
coast).These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the
effects of the current of waters.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.- Where the accretion was formed by
the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek
and the Cagayan River bounding petitioner's land, it cannot be claimed that the accumulation
was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the
creek and the river. In Hilario vs. City of Manila, this Court held that the word current indicates
the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low
tide. Not having met the first and second requirements of the rules of alluvion, petitioners
cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THAT DEPOSIT IS DUE TO THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER,
MANDATORY.- In Republic vs. CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit
should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art.
457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco vs. Director of Lands, et al., where

the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering
said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was
deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In the case at bar,
the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber
Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.
4. ID.; PUBLIC LANDS; FINDINGS AS SUCH BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS,
RESPECTED.- The mere filing of the Miscellaneous Sales Application constituted an
admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject of a Survey
Plan wherein said land was described as an orchard. Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands
classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust in
the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection
conducted by the Bureau of Lands. This Court has often enough held that findings of
administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined
to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Again, when said
factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties
and not reviewable by this Court.
5. ID.; PUBLIC LAND LAW; JURISDICTION OVER PUBLIC LANDS.- Having determined that
the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well as the Office of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the same in
accordance with the Public Land Law. Under Sections 3 and 4 thereof, the Director of Lands
has jurisdiction, authority and control over public lands. Here respondent Palad as Director
of Lands, is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession, disposition
and management of the lands of the public domain. He may issue decisions and orders as
he may see fit under the circumstances as long as they are based on the findings of fact. In
the case of Calibo vs. Ballesteros, this Court held that where, in the disposition of public
lands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly
acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one of
judgment, but not an act of grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXHAUSTED IN CASE AT
BAR.- The administrative remedies have been exhausted. Petitioners could not have
intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The
decision being appealed from was the decision of respondent Hilario who was the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Lands. Said decision was made "for and by authority of the Director
of Lands." It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the
Bureau of Lands. In any case, respondent Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary
of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge"
of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for
reconsideration by affirming or adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on said
motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the case
of Hamoy vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, this Court held that the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside the
orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions involving public lands
under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted beyond the
bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Manolo L. Tagarda, Sr. for petitioners.
Arturo R. Legaspi for private respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia challenge the
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint by the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. The complaint was for annulment of the
verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a
parcel of public land.
The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted administrative
remedies before having recourse to the courts.

The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de
Oro City. Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek
and along the banks of the Cagayan river.
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject
lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-ininterest.In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a
result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered against private respondents, which
decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.
The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same
became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before
the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which dismissed the same. Antonio
Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but private respondents filed
another case for certiorari with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which was likewise dismissed. The
decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from
portions of the subject lots they occupied.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey
plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area
being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant,
however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands.
In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera,
respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered a report
to the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (equivalent to
Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that private
respondents be directed to file appropriate public land applications.
Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilario
rendered a decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno
by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents who, if qualified, may file
public land applications covering their respective portions.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio,
Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad then ordered him
to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever improvements
they have introduced thereon. He also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession
thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners
Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC,
Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and
recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent
Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of execution by respondent
Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which
resulted in the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the
complaint. Applying Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, it contended that the approval of the
survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence, factual findings made by the
Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held to be controlling as the
preparation and approval of said survey plans belong to the Director of Lands and the same shall
be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.[1]
Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by
Antonio Nazareno cannot be considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the same had been acted
upon by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands and not as Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the present case does not fall within the exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also held that there was no showing of oppressiveness
in the manner in which the orders were issued and executed.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors:

I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND

CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING FACTS AND THE LAW ON THE
MATTER;
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE WHICH FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
EXECUTION ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR.,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE DECISION OF
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS MAKING THE CASE PROPER SUBJECT FOR
ANNULMENT WELL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.
The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or not the
subject land is public land. Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion
to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:
"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
In the case of Meneses v. CA,[2] this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property
under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action
of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to
the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a
case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually
received from the effects of the current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the abovementioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the
dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the
Cagayan River bounding their land.[3] It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of
such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the
action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v.
City of Manila,[4] this Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of
water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having
met the first and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a
riparian owner.
In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped from
denying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands
when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571.[5] The
mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public
land, having been the subject of Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No.
36302, Cad-237) which was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous
Sales Application wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio
Nazareno was, however, controverted by respondent Labis in his investigation report to
respondent Hilario based on the findings of his ocular inspection that said land actually covers a
dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. The investigation report
also states that except for the swampy portion which is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole area
is fully occupied by a part of a big concrete bodega of petitioners and several residential houses
made of light materials, including those of private respondents which were erected by themselves
sometime in the early part of 1978.[6]
Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was
formed by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with
the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands.[7] This Court has often enough held that
findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. [8] Again,
when said factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the
parties and not reviewable by this Court.[9]
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or
artificial. In Republic v. CA,[10] this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due
to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil
Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al.,[11] where the land was not
formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also

the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made
accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the
Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.[12] Even if this Court were to take
into consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio
Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land,[13] the same would still be part of the
public domain.
Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well
as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have Jurisdiction over the
same in accordance with the Public Land Law. Accordingly, the court a quo dismissed petitioners'
complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which ruling the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been
exhausted. Petitioners could not have intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-inCharge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the decision of respondent
Hilario who was the Regional Director of The Bureau of Lands. Said decision was made "for and
by authority of the Director of Lands."[14] It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the
Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an
Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands.
In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of the
Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration by
affirming or adopting respondent's Hilario's decision, he was acting on said motion as an
Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the case of Hamoy v. Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources,[15] This Court held that the Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director of
Lands with respect to questions involving public lands under the administration and control of the
Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot therefore,
be said to have acted beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.[16]
As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being an
artificial accretion of sawdust. As such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control
over the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141) which
states, thus:
"Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the exclusive officer
charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands who shall act
under his immediate control.
Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and
management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be
conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources."
In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or capriciousness
in the execution order of public respondent Abelardo G. Palad, the Director of Lands. This Court
finds otherwise since said decision was based on the conclusive finding that the subject land was
public land. Thus, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Director of Lands acted
within his rights when he issued the assailed execution order, as mandated by the aforecited
provisions.
Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to vacate the
subject land practically changed respondent Hilario's decision is baseless. It is incorrect for
petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the subject land to private
respondents Salasalans and Rayabas as they had not yet been issued patents or titles over the
subject land. The execution order merely directed the segregation of petitioners' titled lot from the
subject land which was actually being occupied by private respondents before they were ejected
from it.Based on the finding that private respondents were actually in possession or were actually
occupying the subject land instead of petitioners, respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands
and in the exercise of this administrative discretion, directed petitioners to vacate the subject land
on the ground that private respondents have a preferential right, being the occupants thereof.

While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied by
them, they nevertheless filed their protest or opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous Sales
Application, the same being preparatory to the filing of an application as they were in fact directed
to do so. In any case, respondent Palad's execution order merely implements respondent Hilario's
order. It should be noted that petitioners' own application still has to be given due course.[17]
As Director of lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any
form of concession, disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.[18] He may
issue decisions and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as long as they are based
on the findings of fact.
In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros,[19] this Court held that where, in the disposition of public
lands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly acts
within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one of judgment, but
not an act or grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari. Thus, except for the issue of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, this Court finds no reversible error nor grave abuse of
discretion in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-3788 December 21, 1907

PEDRO P. ROXAS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
JULIA TUASON, THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO MACATI, AND ALEJANDRO AND
CONSOLACION AGUIRRE,
TORRES, J.:
On February 19, 1906, attorneys Rosado, Sanz & Opisso, on behalf of Pedro P. Roxas, applied
for the registration of the estate owned by the said Roxas, known as the Hacienda de San Pedro
Macati, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act; said hacienda was
acquired by the petitioner by inheritance under the will of his late father, Jose Bonifacio Roxas, y
Ubaldo. The property consists of four different parcels of land, irregular shape, designated on the
accompanying plan under the letters "A", "B", "C", and "D", containing a total area of 1,761
hectares 51 ares and 5 centares, equivalent to 17,615,105 square meters, and according to the
last assessment for the purpose of taxation assessed at P415,221.34, of which P59,904
corresponded to the portion of said hacienda included within the limits of the city of Manila and
P256,769 corresponded to that portion situated in the Province of Rozal. The building constructed
of strong materials, called the "Casa-Quinta" or "Casa de Ingenieros," belonging also to said
Roxas, is erected within parcel "C," occupying, together with its appurtenances, an area of 8,430
square meters, and was assessed at P98,557.34. It does not appear that said hacienda is
mortgaged nor that any person has any right to or any interest therein; and it is almost wholly
occupied at the present time, under lease, by about 429 tenants whose names, residences, and
postal addresses, as well as the residence of the owner of the property and of his attorney in fact,
are stated in the application.
In his writing of April 24 the petitioner requested the summoning of the persons therein named,
and stated in addition that the total area of the hacienda is 17,613,595.91 square meters, as
specified in the corrections made to the technical description.
In another writing dated July 24, 1906, amending his former application, the petitioner gives the
postal address and names of several occupants of the property; and by other amendments to his
original petition dated August 30 and September 25, 1906, rectifications are made in the
boundaries of the hacienda, the last of which represents a decrease of 1,446.70 square meters,
or 14 ares and 46.70 centares which must be deducted from the original description.
The owners of the adjoining properties having been summoned and notified by means of
subpoenas and notices published in the daily papers, one of them, Julia Tuason, appeared and
by a document dated September 10, 1906, set forth her opposition to the registration and
authentication of the title of the petitioner, Roxas, as regards the parcel marked "C," for the reason
that two old monuments which had separated their respective properties had been pulled down
and new ones erected without her consent, and in her opinion the latter included a considerable
portion of the land owned by her, as may be seen on page 122, part IV, of the record.

The municipality of San Pedro Macati also filed opposition to the requested registration, alleging
that the land occupied by the municipal building and the public school had been in the possession
of the town from time immemorial, and that all the land occupied by roads, highways, lanes, and
public landing places belonged to the public domain and should be excluded from registration in
favor of the petitioner.
Under date of the 18th of September, 1906, the attorney for Alejandro Aguirre and Consolacion
Aguirre also filed opposition to said application for registration alleging that the two parcels of land
owned by them had been improperly included within the bounds of said hacienda in the parcel
marked "C," the second said parcels, which is the only subject of the respective bill of exceptions
and appeal interposed by them, consists of a building lot situated in Calle San Pedro, opposite
the first parcel of land, which was the subject of another bill of exceptions and appeal by the
petitioner; said second parcels measures 10 meters and 87 centimeters on its front and rear, and
9 meters and 20 centimeters along each of its sides, its boundaries being stated.
Evidence consisting of both oral testimony and documents, which appear in the record, having
been adduced by both parties in the suit, the judge, after a notation of default having been entered
against all the respondents, rendered his decision on the 17th of October, 1906, overruling the
opposition made by Julia Tuason, by the municipality of San Pedro Macati, and by Alejandro and
Consolacion Aguirre as to the second parcel, and ordered the registration of the Hacienda of San
Pedro Macati in favor of Pedro Roxas, the petitioner herein, excluding the parcel of land with a
frontage of 23 Spanish yards and a depth of 24 Spanish yards occupied by the municipal building,
which the government has the right to use without the payment of rent therefor, so long as the
same is occupied by the said building or by another in substitution thereof and used for the public
good and for official purposes. The respondents, Julia Tuason, the municipality of San Pedro
Macati, and Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre, excepted to said judgment and moved for a new
trial on the ground that the same was contrary to law and to the weight of the evidence; said
motion was overruled, the respondents again excepting. The respective bills of exceptions having
been presented, the same were forwarded in the ordinary manner.
The only subject of controversy between the petitioner, owner of the Hacienda of San Pedro
Macati, and the respondent Julia Tuason is the question of the boundary line, between their
respective contiguous premises.
The representative of the petitioner affirms that the real boundary of the hacienda on the side that
adjoins the land of Tuason was and still is a creek or sapa separating both properties, and that in
former years said creek was wider that at the present time.
The respondent, however, maintains that the boundary between the sitio called Suavoy, formerly
an island of that name, and the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati is determined by straight lines
drawn between some old monuments distant a few yards from the bank of the said creek.
The record does not show that the boundary of the land of Julia Tuason was inclosed by
monuments belonging to her or that the creek which divides the sitio or Island of Suavoy from the
land of the said hacienda is included within the respondent's land, since in the bill of sale executed
by the procurador general of the Augustinian friars on March 28, 1893, to Julia Tuason, no
mention is made of monuments erected thereon nor of any creek existing in the large tract of land
purchased by her, except that the land is situated in the barrio of Suavoy and that it is bounded
on two sides by the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati.
Nor does the record show that there was more land on the side of the hacienda, forming part of
the barrio or sitio of Suavoy, not included in the tract acquired by Tuason from the Augustinian
Fathers, and that said creek traversed said barrio from one end to the other, or the respondent's
land, in order to affirm on good grounds that her land extended to the opposite bank of the
aforesaid creek.
From the fact that the land of Julia Tuason was bounded on two sides by the Hacienda of San
Pedro Macati it does not follow that the strip of a few meters in width on the bank of the creek
above referred to belonged to her, there being no evidence in support thereof, and if her statement
were true, she would have applied for a survey and demarcation of her property in accordance
with the area of the same stated in her title deed; and if she did not do so it must be because she
renounces its verification in this manner or for some other reason.
Further than this, it is impossible to draw the above conclusion, inasmuch as the strip of land,
irregular in shape, running parallel to the creek and forming a portion of its bank, has always up
to the present time been occupied by tenants of said hacienda as being an integral portion thereof,

even at the time when the land now owned by Julia Tuason belonged to the Augustinian Fathers,
the original owners thereof.
It is so affirmed by Rafael Rivera, the collector of rents of the hacienda, and by two tenants thereof,
Tomas Medina and Santos Tenorio; the two last named were lessees for about thirty years and
twenty-seven years, respectively, of certain portions of the hacienda with their respective part of
said strip, as a prolongation and integral part of the lands of the hacienda, and they were never
molested or interfered with by the Augustinian Fathers or their tenants, nor later by Julia Tuason,
who later acquired the adjoining land on the other side of the creek, or by her tenants; these latter
when cultivating the land did not cross the creek, it being recognized as the boundary line between
both properties; that in 1871 the said creek was wider than at present, having then a width of
about 4 Spanish yards, small bancas plying on it around the Island of Suavoy,. and some of the
monuments of the hacienda were 4 meters distant from the bank, others 2 meters, and some 1
meter; that the witness Santos Tenorio was present at an interview held between an Augustinian
priest named Martinez, in charge of the land at the time, and the owner of the hacienda, Bonifacio
Roxas, in connection with the boundary line of the two adjoining estates, and after some
explanations the said creek was settled as the limit in spite of the fact that the old monuments
were already in existence at some distance from the bank in the direction of the hacienda; and
that in 1882, when the first-named witness, Rafael Rivera, took charge of his office of collector,
the owner of the hacienda pointed out to him the said creek as the limit of his property, everybody
asserting that Suavoy was at that time an island, although two of the witnesses of the respondent
stated that said creek was only a canal.
The proven fact that said creek was wider in 1871, when it had a width of about 4 Spanish yards,
is the best explanation as to why some of the monuments of the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati
are now at some distance from the bank of the same, and no legal reason whatever exists why
the slow increase which has taken place on the hacienda's side should be considered as
belonging to the respondent, inasmuch as the latter does not own the bed of the creek and
because it may be assumed that the slow decrease in the width thereof benefited both properties
equally since the respondent has not been able to show or prove that her land has been thereby
reduced.
Article 366 of the Civil Code in dealing with the right of accession to real property
reads: lawphil.net
The accretions which banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the currents
belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.
The provision in this article is perfectly applicable to the strip of land, which, on account of the
accretion, has come to be undeniable increase in the land of the hacienda inasmuch as it has
increased all along the bank of the creek, the gradual effect of the currents; and even though the
law does not require an express act of possession of the accretion which has enlarged the estate,
it is certain that the owner of the hacienda has possessed it for more than thirty years through his
tenants, who have been cultivating their respective parcels of land together with the
corresponding portion of the said strip down to the bank of said creek.
For these considerations the question of the situation of the old monuments and the placing of
new ones in the intervening space is of no importance, inasmuch as it has already been shown
that the respondent has no title to the accretion which by spontaneous increase formed the strip
of land between the creek and the monuments, and no proof is offered in the record that the land
of Julia Tuason reached the other side of the creek toward the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati.
In conclusion: The result of the evidence, as stated in the judgment appealed from, does not
maintain the claim of the respondent; on the contrary, it has been shown in a convincing manner
that the present natural limit of both properties is the aforesaid creek; therefore, the opposition
filed by Julia Tuason is untenable.
As to the opposition filed by the municipality to the registration applied for, the judgment appealed
from is held to be in accordance with the law and the merits of the case because, as is therein set
forth, the petitioner, Pedro Roxas, is the owner of the building lots and portions of land to which
the said opposition refers; the municipality of San Pedro Macati has only the usufruct of the plot
occupied by the municipal building as long as the same or any other building of a public and
official nature is erected thereon; the municipality can not dispose of it as a property of its own
because, according to the documents offered in evidence by the petitioner, the Spanish
Government had recognized the dominion of the petitioner's predecessor over the land occupied
by said municipal building and by the town cemetery, and the grant made by the owner was ever

understood to be only of the usufruct thereof so long as used for public purposes, the same being
returnable to him upon ceasing to be used for such purpose.
In connection with the land occupied by the public school of said town, no opposition based on
ordinary or on extraordinary prescription may be made by the municipality because the plot was
granted only for the purpose of erecting thereon a public school, and the possession thereof, on
the part of the municipality, was simply usufructuary, the government of the Province of Manila
having recognized the title thereto which pertained to the petitioner, owner of the said hacienda,
whereof the said plot forms a part; moreover, the possession thereof by the municipality has been
but for a few years only. The school building having been destroyed, the land was abandoned
many years ago, and for this reason prescription can not be invoked because the possession
thereof was interrupted and ceased many years since; in view thereof, the decision of the lower
court respecting the petition of the municipality is held to be in accordance with the law and the
merits of the case.
The attorney for Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre excepted to the decision of the 17th of
October, 1906, whereby their claim to the second parcel of land, as stated in their petition, was
dismissed; their bill of exceptions, entered in the general register under No 3788, was duly
forwarded, but notwithstanding the fact that the time prescribed has been exceeded, the
appellants have not filed their brief nor notified the appellee regarding the same; therefore, the
latter by a petition dated June 26, 1907, requested that their appeal be considered as having been
abandoned; this request is held to be well based and in accordance with the law.
Therefore, by virtue of the considerations above set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment
appealed from should be affirmed as regards the respondents who have appealed, Julia Tuason
and the municipality of San Pedro Macati; the appeal of Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre is
hereby declared to be abandoned, each of the appellants to pay their respective share of the
costs. So ordered.