Madel O.

Bungay
13-11235
Law

6/28/2014
Agrarian

1. Rupa Sr. vs. CA

G.R. No. 80129 (January 25, 2000)
Facts:
Rupa claimed that he had been a tenant of a parcel of coconut land formerly
owned by Vicente Lim and Patrocinia Yu Lim for more than twenty (20) years now,
sharing the harvests on a 50%-50% basis. Also, that he is the overseer over four
parcels of coconut land owned by the Lim spouses. However, without any prior
written notice, the land tenanted by the petitioner was sold to Magin Salipot for
P5,000.00 in January 1981.
Petitioner averred that he only learned of the sale on February 16, 1981, and
that he sought assistance with the local office of Agrarian Reform for the
redemption of the questioned property and even deposited the amount of P5,000.00
with the trial court.
However, the Regional Trial Court of Masbate rendered a decision dismissing
the complaint on the ground that Rupa was not a tenant of the subject property and
thus, not entitled to a right of redemption over the same. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals finds, in substance, that there is no clear and convincing evidence to show
that plaintiff was a share tenant of the spouses Lim and that Rupa is bound by his
admission in Criminal Case No. 532-U, entitled People of the Philippines. vs. Mariano
Luzong filed six months after the instant case wherein he admitted that he was the
overseer and administrator of the five parcels of land owned by the Lim spouses.
Thus, negating his claim of tenancy. The CA therefore affirmed on appeal the
decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the land or a mere
overseer thereof.
Law: The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines [Republic Act No. 1199]
Held:
In the case at bar, the SC found that there are compelling reasons for this
Court to apply the exception of non-conclusiveness of the factual findings of the trial
and appellate courts on the ground that the "findings of fact of both courts is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is in actuality contradicted by
evidence on record." A careful examination of the record reveals that, indeed, both
the trial court and the appellate court overlooked and disregarded the
overwhelming evidence in favor of Rupa and instead relied mainly on the
statements made in the decision in another case.
A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person
who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household
cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent,
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Briefly stated, for
this relationship to exist, it is necessary that:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;

3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
Upon proof of the existence of the tenancy relationship, Rupa could avail of
the benefits afforded by R.A. No. 3844, as amended, particularly, Section 12 thereof.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, this right of redemption is validly
exercised upon compliance with the following requirements: a) the redemptioner
must be an agricultural lessee or share tenant; b) the land must have been sold by
the owner to a third party without prior written notice of the sale given to the lessee
or lessees and the DAR in accordance with Section 11, RA 3844, as amended; c)
only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed; d) the right of
redemption must be exercised within 180 days from notice; and e) there must be an
actual tender or valid consignation of the entire amount which is the reasonable
price of the land sought to be redeemed.
We are therefore constrained to overturn the appealed judgment insofar as it
ruled that the records do not establish Rupa's status as an agricultural tenant.
Indeed, the testimony of Rupa and his witnesses in open court, in our view, had not
been convincingly rebutted and we have no reason to doubt the veracity of the
testimonies of his witnesses. Certainly, the passing statements contained in the
decision in the criminal case for malicious mischief cannot overcome the evidentiary
value of the testimonies of said witnesses.
Opinion: I am in agreement with the SCs decision and in what they said that
scrutiny of the entire evidence on hand would be in line with the State's policy of
achieving a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious
institutional restraints and practices. Also, it would appear that a meticulous review
of the evidence would found overwhelming evidence in favor of Rupa.

2. Daez vs. CA
G.R. No. 133507 (February 17, 2000)
Facts:
Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy.
Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan being cultivated by the herein respondents. DAR
Undersecretary Jose C. Medina denied the application for exemption upon finding
that the subject land is covered under LOI 474, the petitioner's total properties
having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law. The Secretary of DAR,
Benjamin T. Leong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all affirmed the said
Order and disregarded an Affidavit executed by the respondents stating that they
are not the tenants of the land. Their findings was that the Affidavit was merely
issued under duress. In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (eps) were issued to
the respondents. Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the
same riceland under R.A. No. 6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo
allowed her to retain the subject riceland but denied the application of her children
to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to prove actual tillage or direct
management thereof. This order was set aside by the DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao
but reinstated on appeal by the Office of the President. The Court of Appeals again

reversed this Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the previous Decision of
DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence, this Appeal.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject
landholdings.
Law: Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994
Held:
It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for
retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment
in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no
procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of
the subject 4.1865 hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the
same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory. The issuance
of eps and cloas to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from
retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of
1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part
of the landowner's retained area.
Opinion: Social justice in Agricultural Lands was clearly delivered in the ruling of
this case. As the Court said, right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed
right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the
effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and
the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to
perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area as its name denotes,
is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus,
sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to
the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process.
3. Ocho vs. Calos, et al.
G.R. No. 137908 (November 22, 2000)
Facts:
Caloses averred that their parents, Efipanio and Valentina were the original
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 23,7109 hectares located in Valencia,
Malaybalay, Bukidnon covered by OCT No. P-2066 and issued by virtue of
Homestead Patent No. V-42876. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, the said
land was placed under the Operation Land Transfer and subsequently distributed to
qualified farmer beneficiaries. The original farmer-beneficiaries, however, allegedly
unlawfully conveyed their respective rights over the lands granted to them to third
persons. The amended complaint thus sought the nullification of the Emancipation
Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title issued to these third persons. The PARAD
rendered his decision ordering the revocation/cancellation of all EPs, CLTs, TCTs and
other titles involving OCT No. P-2066 for being null and void ab initio. On appeal, the
DARAB reversed the decision and upheld the validity of the EPs and TCTs issued.
This Decision was substantially affirmed by the Court of Appeals except on the part
of petitioner Ramon Ocho and Vicente Polinar who were directed "to restore and
surrender to the government their landholdings". Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari on the basis of the resolution in a previous case docketed as DAR
Administrative Case No. 006-90 which the respondents have purportedly allowed to
lapse into finality.
Issue: Whether or not res judicata exists.

Law: Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 [Republic Act No. 6657]
Held:
There is no question that the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other
agricultural lands had already been passed upon by the proper quasi-judicial
authority (the hearing officer of the DAR) in Adm. Case No. 006-90. Said decision
became final and executory when the Caloses failed to file an appeal thereof after
their motion for reconsideration was denied. Applying the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other agricultural lands
may no longer be relitigated. The findings of the Hearing Officer in Adm. Case No.
006-90, which had long attained finality, averring that petitioner is not the owner of
any other agricultural lands, foreclosed any inquiry on the same issue involving the
same parties and property. The CA thus erred in still making a finding that petitioner
is not qualified to be a farmer-beneficiary because he owns other agricultural lands.
Opinion: It is true that the very object for which courts were constituted was to put
an end to controversies. Therefore, the courts decision should be given due and
utmost respect. Relitigation on cases already decided upon even if there is already a
clear ruling would be a waste of resources and would cripple the systems efforts in
trying to litigate other issues that need to be decided upon.
4. Spouses Bejasa vs. CA
G.R. No. 108941 (July 6, 2000)
Facts:
Isabel Candelaria is the owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T58191 and TCT No. T-59172 measuring 16 hectares and 6 hectares, more or less,
situated in Barangay Del Pilar, Naiyan, Oriental Mindoro.
On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement
on the land with Pio Malabanan. The contract stipulated that Malabanan will clear,
clean and cultivate the land, purchase and plant calamansi, citrus and rambutan
seeds and make the necessary harvests of fruits. Sometime in 1973, Malabanan
hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and clear it.
On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the
land, modifying their first agreement. Malabanan was under no obligation to share
the harvests with Candelaria.
In 1983, Malabanan died.
On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan
as her attorney-in-fact having powers of administration over the disputed property.
On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the
land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife, for a period of one year. Meanwhile, the
Bejasas agreed to pay rent to Victoria of P15,000.00 in consideration of an
"Aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" also for a term of one year. The Bejasas were
unable to pay the full amount of the consideration. After the aryenduhan expired,
despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the
land and did not give any consideration for its use.
On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasan again entered into a threeyear lease agreement over the land. The special power of attorney in favor of Jaime
Dinglasan was also renewed by Candelaria on the same date. Jaime filed a
complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking the ejectment of the Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed
the case.

Sometime on June 1987, Jaime filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court,
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro against the Bejasas for "Recovery of Possession with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages". The case was however referred to
the DAR who in turn certified that the case was not proper for trial before the civil
courts. The trial court dismissed the complaint including the Bejasas' counterclaim
for leasehold and damages.
The Bejasas then filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
"confirmation of leasehold and homelot with recovery of damages" against Isabel
Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Bejasas
reasoning that a tenancy relationship was created between the parties and that as
bona-fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have security of tenure.
Respondents appealed the aforementioned decision. On February 9, 1993, the Court
of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the trial court's ruling. Hence, this
Appeal.
Issue: Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship created in favor of the
Bejasas?
Law: The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines [Republic Act No. 1199]
Held:
After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that
there is no tenancy relationship between the parties.
Malabanan (as Candelaria's usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to stay on and
cultivate the land. However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give
consent to the creation of a tenancy relation, still, no such relation existed. There
was no proof that they shared the harvests. The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984,
they had no contact with Candelaria. They acknowledge that Candelaria could argue
that she did not know of Malabanan's arrangement with them. True enough
Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanan's lease
possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when
Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when
Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement, consideration
should be in the form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed to
lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement did not create a
tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease. Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even
assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land to
bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did. Again, there was no
agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is the
"aryenduhan", which states in no uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be
paid, and the term of the contract.
Opinion: In the case at bar, it was clear how the SC ruled in favor of strength of
evidence showing what is required by law. In a tenancy agreement, consideration
should be in the form of harvest sharing. Unless this is clear and proven in the
circumstances of the case, there will be no tenancy agreement to speak of.
5. Republic Rep. by the DAR vs. CA and Green City Estate Development
Corporation
G.R. No. 139592 (October 5, 2000)
Facts:
The five (5) parcels of land in issue with a combined area of 112.0577
hectares situated at Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Province of Rizal were

acquired by private respondent through purchase on May 26, 1994 from Marcela
Borja vda. de Torres. The tax declarations classified the properties as agricultural.
On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject parcels
of land under compulsory acquisition pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II of R.A. No.
6657 or the Comprehensive Land Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). Private respondent
filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land from
agrarian reform pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994 and DOJ
Opinion No. 44, series of 1990. The DAR Regional Director recommended a denial of
the said petition on the ground that private respondent "ailed to substantiate their
(sic) allegation that the properties are indeed in the Municipality's residential and
forest conservation zone and that portions of the properties are not irrigated nor
irrigable".
Private respondent filed an Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from
CARP coverage, this time alleging that the property is within the residential and
forest conservation zones and offering a portion of about 15 hectares of land
(irrigated riceland) to sell to farmer beneficiaries or to DAR. On October 19, 1995,
the DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the application for exemption. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was likewise denied. Appeal
was made to the Court of Appeals. The latter in turn created a commission to
conduct ocular inspection and survey. DAR likewise constituted its own team to
conduct an inspection and thereafter objected to the report filed by the commission.
On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the
Assailed DAR Orders and declaring the mountainous and residential portions of the
petitioner's land to be exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the landholdings subject of this controversy are exempt
from CARL coverage.
Law: Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 [Republic Act No. 6657]
Held:
The commissioner's report on the actual condition of the properties confirms
the fact that the properties are not wholly agricultural. In essence, the report of the
commission showed that the land of private respondent consists of a mountainous
area with an average 28 degree slope containing 66.5 hectares; a level, unirrigated
area of 34 hectares of which 5 to 6 hectares are planted to palay; and a residential
area of 8 hectares. The finding that 66.5 hectares of the 112.0577 hectares of land
of private respondent have an average slope of 28 degrees provides another cogent
reason to exempt these portions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10 of the
CARL is clear on this point when it provides that "all lands with eighteen percent
(18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act."
The crux of the controversy is whether the subject parcels of land in issue are
exempt from the coverage of the CARL. Petitioner DAR did not object to the creation
of a team of commissioners when it very well knew that the survey and ocular
inspection would eventually involve the determination of the slope of the subject
parcels of land. It is the protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour. In
the absence of any irregularity in the survey and inspection of the subject
properties, and none is alleged, the report of the commissioners deserves full faith
and credit and we find no reversible error in the reliance by the appellate court upon
said report.

Opinion: The determination of the classification and physical condition of the lands
was significantly material in the disposition of this case. This was mainly the reason
why the Court of Appeals constituted the commission to inspect and survey said
properties. Agreeing on the words of the SC, the report of the commissioners indeed
deserves full faith and credit as they were the ones tasked to do such and in
property law, there must always be a presumption of good faith.