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JUSTICE DE

LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


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RULES 44 to 56 (except 45 & 47)


Rule 44, Sec. 13
Mendoza vs. United Coconut and Planters Bank (2011)
Facts:
1.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for annulment of titles,
foreclosure proceedings and certificate of sale with the RTC
of Lipa City. The basis of their complaint was a foreclosure
proceeding over a real estate mortgage that they entered
into with respondent UCPB. The latter emerged as the
highest bidder. For the petitioners failure to redeem within
the period, UCPB consolidated its title over the property.
2.
Petitioners contend that the foreclosure proceedings
(extrajudicial) violated Act 3135.
3.
A Motion to Dismiss was filed by UCPB for failure to
prosecute (petitioners failed to set the case for pre-trial after
the last pleading had been filed).
4.
The petitioners, through counsel Atty. Malabanan, filed
an opposition to the MTD reasoning out that the counsel of
record was Atty. Rosales, and that he died. Because of his
death, Atty. Malabanan, who was the law partner of Atty.
Rosales, forgot about the case.
5.
RTC granted the MTD filed by UCPB.
6.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners
but was denied. Hence, they appealed the RTCs order
granting the MTD to the CA and filed an Appellants Brief.
7.
UCPB filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground
that the Appellants Brief failed to comply with the
requirements under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Respondent contended that the Appellants
Brief did not have the following items: (1) A subject index of
the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and
page references, and a table of cases alphabetically
arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to
the pages where they are cited; (2) an assignment of errors;
(3) on the authorities cited, references to the page of the
report at which the case begins and page of the report on
which the citation is found; (4) page references to the record
in the Statement of Facts and Statement of the Case.

8.

Respondent contended that the absence of a specific


assignment of errors or of page references to the record in
the Appellants Brief is a ground for dismissal of the appeal
under Section 1 (f), Rule 50.
9.
Petitioners contended that the assignment of errors were
only designated as Issues in their Appellants Brief; and
although the designation of the Assignment of Error may
vary, the substance thereof remains. Moreover, petitioners
stated that the textbooks and statutes were cited
immediately after the portion where they are quoted, which
is more convenient and facilitates ready reference of the
legal and jurisprudential basis of the arguments. They
claimed that the absence of a subject index does not
substantially deviate from the requirements of the Rules of
Court, because one can easily go over the Appellants Brief
and can designate the parts with nominal prudence. They
pointed out that Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides for
a liberal construction of the Rules in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
10.
CA dismissed the appeal. It held that the right to appeal
is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the
right must faithfully comply with the rules. It found that the
Appellants Brief failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure: In this case, the
plaintiff-appellants brief failed to provide an index, like a
table of contents, to facilitate the review of appeals by
providing ready references to the records and documents
referred to therein.
Issue:
W/N the CA erred in dismissing the appeal on the
ground that the Appellants Brief failed to comply with Sec 13, Rule
44 of RoC as said brief did not have a subject index, and
assignment of errors and page references to the record in the
Statement of the Facts.
Held:

NO.

1. As to the Subject Index

JUSTICE DE
LEON

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a. The Appellants Brief of petitioners did not have a


subject index. The importance of a subject index
should not be underestimated.

statement of issues puts forth the questions of fact


or law to be resolved by the appellate court.
3. As to the Statement of Facts:

b. The subject index functions like a table of contents,


facilitating the review of appeals by providing ready
reference. Unlike in other jurisdictions, there is no
limit on the length of appeal briefs or appeal
memoranda filed before appellate courts.
The
danger of this is the very real possibility that the
reviewing tribunal will be swamped with voluminous
documents.
This occurs even though the rules
consistently urge the parties to be brief or
concise in the drafting of pleadings, briefs, and
other papers to be filed in court. The subject index
makes readily available at ones fingertips the
subject of the contents of the brief so that the need
to thumb through the brief page after page to locate
a partys arguments, or a particular citation, or
whatever else needs to be found and considered, is
obviated.
2. As to the Assignment of Errors:
a. Moreover, the Appellants Brief had no assignment of
errors, but petitioners insist that it is embodied in the
Issues of the brief. The requirement under Section
13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for
an assignment of errors in paragraph (b) thereof is
different from a statement of the issues of fact or
law in paragraph (e) thereof. The statement of
issues is not to be confused with the assignment of
errors, since they are not one and the same;
otherwise, the rules would not require a separate
statement for each.
b. An assignment of errors is an enumeration by the
appellant of the errors alleged to have been
committed by the trial court for which he/she seeks
to obtain a reversal of the judgment, while the

a. Further, the Court of Appeals found that the


Statement of Facts was not supported by page
references to the record. The facts constitute the
backbone
of
a
legal
argument;
they
are
determinative of the law and jurisprudence
applicable to the case, and consequently, will govern
the appropriate relief.
b. Appellants should remember that the Court of
Appeals is empowered to review both questions of
law and of facts. Otherwise, where only a pure
question of law is involved, appeal would pertain to
this Court. An appellant, therefore, should take care
to state the facts accurately though it is permissible
to present them in a manner favorable to one party.
Facts which are admitted require no further proof,
whereas facts in dispute must be backed by
evidence.
c. Relative thereto, the rule specifically requires that
ones statement of facts should be supported by
page references to the record. Indeed, disobedience
therewith has been punished by dismissal of the
appeal. Page references to the record are not an
empty requirement.
d. If a statement of fact is unaccompanied by a page
reference to the record, it may be presumed to be
without support in the record and may be stricken or
disregarded altogether.
Rule 51, Sec. 8
Appellants brief requisites
De Liano vs. Court of Appeals (2001)

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


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Facts:
1.

Benjamin Tango, respondent, executed two REMs over


his house and lot in QC in favor of San Miguel Corporation
(SMC). The mortgages were third party or accommodation
mortgages on behalf of the spouses Bernardino and
Carmelita Ibarra who were dealers of SMC products in
Aparri, Cagayan. Other defendants in the case were
Francisco A.G. De Liano and Alberto O. Villa-Abrille, Jr., who
are senior executives of petitioner SMC.
2.
A case was filed which resulted to the cancellation of the
two REMs. SMC, De Liano and Abrille appealed the aforesaid
decision to the Court of Appeals. In due time, their counsel,
Atty. Edgar B. Afable, filed an Appellants' Brief which failed
to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court.
3.
Tango was quick to notice these deficiencies, and
accordingly filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal (brief did not
contain a Subject Index nor a Table of Cases and Authorities,
with page references. Moreover, the Statement of the Case,
Statement of Facts, and Arguments in the Brief has no page
reference to the record).
4.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Amended DefendantsAppellants' Brief which was denied. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:
W/N the CA erred in dismissing SMCs appeal on the
ground of pure technicalities.
Held:
NO.
1. Justice Malcolm: the word "brief" is derived from the Latin
brevis, and the French briefe, and literally means a short or
condensed statement. The purpose of the brief, as all law
students and lawyers know, is to present to the court in
concise form the points and questions in controversy, and
by fair argument on the facts and law of the case to assist
the court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion. The
brief should be so prepared as to minimize the labor of the
court in the examination of the record upon which the
appeal is heard and determined.
2. First requirement is a SUBJECT INDEX.

a. The index is intended to facilitate the review of


appeals by providing ready reference, functioning
much like a table of contents. Unlike in other
jurisdiction, there is no limit on the length of appeal
briefs or appeal memoranda filed before appellate
courts. The danger of this is the very real possibility
that the reviewing tribunal will be swamped with
voluminous documents. This occurs even though the
rules consistently urge the parties to be "brief" or
"concise" in the drafting of pleadings, briefs, and
other papers to be filed in court.
b. The subject index makes readily available at one's
fingertips the subject of the contents of the brief so
that the need to thumb through the brief page after
page to locate a party's arguments, or a particular
citation, or whatever else needs to be found and
considered, is obviated.
3. An ASSIGNMENT OF ERORS follows the SUBJECT INDEX.
a. An assignment of errors in appellate procedure is an
enumeration by appellant or plaintiff in error of the
errors alleged to have been committed by the court
below in the trial of the case upon which he seeks to
obtain a reversal of the judgment or decree; it is in
the nature of a pleading, and performs in the
appellate court the same office as a declaration or
complaint in a court of original jurisdiction. Such an
assignment is appellant's complaint, or pleading, in
the appellate court, and takes the place of a
declaration or bill; an appeal without an assignment
of errors would be similar to a suit without a
complaint, bill, or declaration. The assignment is
appellant's declaration or complaint against the trial
judge, charging harmful error, and proof vel non of
assignment is within the record on appeal.
b. The object of such pleadings is to point out the
specific errors claimed to have been committed by
the court below, in order to enable the reviewing

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


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court and the opposing party to see on what points


appellant or plaintiff in error intends to ask a reversal
of the judgment or decree, and to limit discussion to
those points. The office of an assignment of errors is
not to point out legal contentions, but only to inform
the appellate court that appellant assigns as
erroneous certain named rulings; the function of the
assignment is to group and bring forward such of the
exceptions previously noted in the case on appeal as
appellant desires to preserve and present to the
appellant.
c. It has been held that a general assignment of errors
is unacceptable under the rules. Thus, a statement of
the following tenor: that "the Court of First Instance
of this City incurred error in rendering the judgment
appealed from, for it is contrary to law and the
weight of the evidence," was deemed insufficient.
The appellant has to specify in what aspect of the
law or the facts that the trial court erred. The
conclusion, therefore, is that the appellant must
carefully formulate his assignment of errors.

both questions of law and of facts. Otherwise, where


only a pure question of law is involved, appeal would
pertain to this Court. An appellant, therefore, should
take care to state the facts accurately though it is
permissible to present them in a manner favorable to
one party. The brief must state the facts admitted by
the parties, as well as the facts in controversy. To
laymen, the distinction may appear insubstantial, but
the difference is clear to the practitioner and the
student of law. Facts which are admitted require no
further proof, whereas facts in dispute must be
backed by evidence. Relative thereto, the rule
specifically requires that one's statement of facts
should be supported by page references to the
record. Indeed, disobedience therewith has been
punished by dismissal of the appeal.14 Page
references to the record are not an empty
requirement. If a statement of fact is unaccompanied
by a page reference to the record, it may be
presumed to be without support in the record and
may be stricken or disregarded altogether.
5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES vs. ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.

4. STATEMENT OF THE CASE and STATEMENT OF FACTS.


a. A statement of the case gives the appellate tribunal
an overview of the judicial antecedents of the case,
providing material information regarding the nature
of the controversy, the proceedings before the trial
court, the orders and rulings elevated on appeal, and
the judgment itself. These data enable the appellate
court to have a better grasp of the matter entrusted
to it for its appraisal.
b. The statement of facts comprises the very heart of
the appellant's brief. The facts constitute the
backbone
of
a
legal
argument;
they
are
determinative of the law and jurisprudence
applicable to the case, and consequently, will govern
the appropriate relief. Appellants should remember
that the Court of Appeals is empowered to review

a. The statement of issues puts forth the questions of


fact or law to be resolved by the appellate court.
b. Thereafter, the appellant is required to present his
arguments on each assigned error. An appellant's
arguments go hand in hand with his assignment of
errors, for the former provide the justification
supporting his contentions, and in so doing resolves
the issues.
6. The rules require that authorities should be cited by the
page of the report at which the case begins, as well as the
page of the report where the citation is found. This rule is
imposed for the convenience of the appellate court, for
obvious reasons: since authorities relied upon by the parties
are checked for accuracy and aptness, they are located

JUSTICE DE
LEON

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more easily as the appellate court is not bound to peruse


volume upon volume, and page after page, of reports.
7. Lastly, the appellant is required to state, under the
appropriate heading, the reliefs prayed for. In so doing, the
appellate court is left in no doubt as to the result desired by
the appellant, and act as the circumstances may warrant.
Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Lee (2010)
Facts:
1. Respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed a Complaint against
Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila
for damages based on quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular
accident. The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger
jeep, and a bus with Body No. 119. The bus was owned by
petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being
driven by Margarito Avila. It resulted in the death of her
husband, Silvino Tan.
2. Petitioner denied liability for the vehicular accident, alleging
that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident
was the recklessness of Silvino Tan. Petitioner asserted that
it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of its employees, including
Margarito Avila.
3. The trial court rendered judgment against petitioner and
defendant Margarito Avila. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification in
the award of damages and held Avila and Philippine Hawk
solidarily liable.
4. As regards the issue on the damages awarded, petitioner
contends that it was the only one that appealed the decision
of the trial court with respect to the award of actual and
moral damages; hence, the Court of Appeals erred in
awarding other kinds of damages in favor of respondent,
who did not appeal from the trial courts decision.

Issue:
W/N petitioner is liable to respondent for damages
and W/N the damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals are
proper.
Held:
YES to both.
1. Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides: no error which does not affect the jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed
from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless
stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or
dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the
brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical
errors.
2. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of this
Rule, now includes some substantial changes in the rules on
assignment of errors.
a. GR: The basic procedural rule is that only errors
claimed and assigned by a party will be considered
by the court.
b. EXCEPTIONS: Errors affecting its jurisdiction over the
subject matter. To this exception has now been
added errors affecting the validity of the judgment
appealed from or the proceedings therein.
3. Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not
expressly stated in his assignment of errors but the same is
closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in his brief, such error may now be
considered by the court. These changes are of
jurisprudential origin.
4. The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the
same as that in the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise
indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held that
the latter is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

decision of the case. Also, an unassigned error closely


related to an error properly assigned or upon which the
determination of the question raised by error properly
assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate
court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error.
5. It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the
appellate court is authorized to consider a plain error,
although it was not specifically assigned by the appellant,
otherwise it would be sacrificing substance for technicalities.
6. The records show that respondents husband was leasing
and operating a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon.
Respondent testified that her husband earned an annual
income of one million pesos. The trial court awarded
respondent the sum of P745,575.00, representing loss of
earning capacity (P590,000.00) and actual damages
(P155,575.00 for funeral expenses), plus P50,000.00 as
moral damages.

10. Further, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondent


civil indemnity for the death of her husband, which has been
fixed by current jurisprudence at P50,000.00.
11. In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil
indemnity for the death of respondents husband, temperate
damages, and moral damages for the physical injuries
sustained by respondent in addition to the damages granted
by the trial court to respondent. The trial court overlooked
awarding the additional damages, which were prayed for by
respondent in her Amended Complaint.
12. The appellate court is clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in
the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case.
Rule 44, Sec. 13
Liberal rule: substantial compliance with requirements as to
appellants brief

7. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner assigned as


error the award of damages by the trial court on the ground
that it was based merely on suppositions and surmises, not
the admissions made by respondent during the trial.

PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY v. CORONA


INTERNATIONAL, INC.
(September 29, 2000)
Facts:

8. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the award by


the trial court for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
Silvino Tan, moral damages for his death, and actual
damages, although the amount of the latter award was
modified.

Corona Intl sold communication and computer facilities to


PCA but the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase price.
Hence, Corona Intl filed a collection case against PCA with the QC
RTC. PCA as counterclaim sought rescission of the contract of sale.
RTC ruled in favor of Corona Intl.

9. In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded


temperate damages in the amount of P10,000.00 for the
damage caused on respondents motorcycle. Under Art.
2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages "may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty." The cost of the repair of
the motorcycle was prayed for by respondent in her
Complaint.

PCA appealed to the CA wherein PCA filed its appellants


brief, which contained the following [I included the SoC and SoF just
in case Sir asks for the form]:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the trial court's Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered1. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the total sum of
P9,082,068 representing the balance of the contract price for

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


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Phase III of the project, the 10% retention for Phase I, II and III of
the project, and the contract price for Phase IV of the project;
2. Ordering the defendant to indemnify plaintiff the sum equal to
2% of P9,082,068 up to Mar 30, 1995, as actual and for damages;
3. Ordering the defendant to indemnify plaintiff the sum equal to 1
and % of P9,082,068.00 monthly from Mar 30, 1995 up to the
time the full amount is fully paid, as and by way of actual
damages;
4. The sum of P1M as and for attorney's fee; plus the costs of the
suit.
The counterclaim interposed by the defendant is hereby dismissed
for lack of evidence to sustain it. SO ORDERED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On 28 Jan 1992, Appellant Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA)
entered into a contract with Appellee Corona International
Incorporated (Corona) for the supply and delivery/installation of
complete communication facility/system with related office
automation hardware. Mr. Charles Avila, then Administrator of PCA
signed the contract in his capacity as such while Edgardo Silverio
signed in his capacity as President and General Manager of Corona.
On 11 Feb. 1992, Corona was paid the agreed mobilization fund in
the total amount of P6,727,457.47. Pursuant to the Contract,
Corona then had 120 calendar days from receipt of the Mobilization
Fund or until June 11, 1992 within which to complete the works,
thus:
"The covered equipment/facilities shall be delivered and
installed by the Contractor in the places/regions a specified
in the Bid Documents within 120 calendar days from the
date of receipt of the Mobilization Fund mentioned in the
succeeding paragraph hereof, which shall include
commissioning of the equipment/network xxx"
On 04 March 1992, Mr. Avila, in a Special Order created an
Inspection and Acceptance Committee responsible for the
inspection, acceptance and proper documentation of all the units
installed and ensure its conformity with the technical specifications
as provided for in the contract. The Committee was headed by Mr.
Paulino Raguindin. On 30 April 1992, Mr. Raguindin issued a
certification (Exhibit "28") that items delivered for Phase I under
the mentioned Contract has been completed by corona and duly
accepted by the Inspection and Acceptance Committee. On 06 May
1992, another certification (Exhibit "29") was issued by Mr.
Raguindin. This represented payment for Phase I of the project. On
08 May 1992, another certification of similar tenor was again
issued by Mr. Raguindin for which reason Corona was paid
P6,054,711.70 (P6,727,457.44 less 10% retention) representing

payment for Phase II of the project. Payment [was] received on July


4, 1992. On 29 May 1992, a similar certification (Exhibit "30") was
issued by Mr. Raguindin for which reason Corona was paid
P5,718,337.60 representing partial payment for Phase III of the
project. Payment was received on July 1, 1992. On 29 July 1992,
then Administrator Avila was replaced by the Incumbent
Administrator, Virgilio David. On 25 Sept 1992, David engaged the
services of Teleconsultant Incorporated for the purpose of
evaluating the works of Corona. On 18 Jan 1993, David informed
Silverio, in a letter dated 14 January 1993 that due to blatant
breach of the terms and conditions of the Contract and fraud, PCA
was rescinding or annulling the contract. Instead of responding,
Corona filed the instant Complaint.

Corona Intl filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal for failure to


comply with Sec 13, Rule 44 of the ROC. The CA granted the
MTD ruling that:
a. The SoC does not contain a clear and concise statement of the
nature of the action, nor a summary of the proceedings, nor
the nature of the judgment, nor any of the other matters
necessary to an understanding of the nature of the
controversy, with page references to the record. PCA simply
averred that This is an appeal from the trial court's Decision,
and thereafter merely quoted the dispositive portion of the
said Decision.
b. The SoF failed to asseverate a clear and concise statement in
narrative form the facts admitted by both parties and of those
in controversy, together with the substance of the proof
relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible,
with page references to the record.
PCA sought reconsideration but the same was denied.
Issue:
WON for failure to strictly comply with Sec. 13, Rule
44 PCA's appeal should be dismissed.
Held: NO. PCAs appellant's brief has substantially complied with
Sec 13, Rule 44.
Statement of the Case
PCAs "Statement of the Case" does not strictly adhere to
the requirements of Rule. Nonetheless, we should not lose sight of

JUSTICE DE
LEON

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the purpose of Sec 13(c) which is to apprise the court as to the


nature of the case before it. Despite its deficiencies, the nature of
the case is easily discernible from a reading of the pleading.
Statement of Facts
Aside from the lack of page reference to the records, there is
no failure to comply with Sec 13(d), Rule 44. The requirements laid
down in Sec 13, R44 are intended to aid the appellate court in
arriving at a just and proper conclusion of the case. However,
despite its deficiencies PCA's appellant's brief is sufficient in form
and substance as to apprise the appellate court of the essential
facts, nature of the case, the issues raised and the laws necessary
for the disposition of the same.
Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure,
and not to suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid
enforcement of the rules may thus, be allowed to attain the prime
objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason
for the existence of courts.

ALFONSO YUCHENGCO v. CA
(October 27, 2006)
Facts:
1.

Yuchengco filed a complaint with the Makati RTC alleging


that respondents published in the Manila Chronicle a series
of defamatory articles against him, to wit:
(a) that he was a Marcos crony or a MarcosRomualdez crony;
(b) that he engaged in unsound and immoral business
practices;
(c) that he was an unfair and uncaring employer;
(d) that he induced RCBC to violate the provisions of the
General Banking Act;
(e) that he induced others to disobey the lawful orders of
the SEC; and
(f) that he was a corporate raider.
2.
RTC ruled in favor of Yuchenco and ordered respondents
to pay damages.

3.

Respondents appealed to the CA and filed their


appellants briefs. Yuchenco filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging non-compliance with the required formalities of the
appellants briefs. The CA denied Yuchencos MTD and MR.

Issues:
1. WON the appeal should be dismissed because Yuchengco
was not served 2 copies of respondents Coyiuto, et al.s
brief as required by Sec. 7 of Rule 44.
2. WON the appeal should be dismissed because the
appellants briefs were not in the prescribed size and did not
have page references as required by Sec 13 (c) and (d) of
Rule 44.
Held:
1. No. Sec 7 of Rule 44 requires the appellants to serve 2
copies of the appellants brief to the appellee.
a. However, the failure to serve the required number of
copies does not automatically result in the dismissal of
the appeal. The CA has the discretion whether to dismiss
or not to dismiss the appeal. Pursuant to Sec 1 of Rule
50, an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee
upon the ground, among others, of failure of the
appellant . . . to serve and file the required number of
copies of his brief, within the reglementary period.
Manifestly, this provision confers a power and does not
impose a duty. It is directory, not mandatory.
2. No, respondents substantially complied with the rules. Sec
13 (c) & (d) of Rule 44 requires that the appellants brief
should contain a clear statement of the case and facts with
page references to the record.
b. The absence of page reference is a ground for dismissal
of the appeal, however, the same is not mandatory but
directory on the part of the CA. Where the citations
found in the appellants brief could sufficiently enable
the appellate court to locate expeditiously the portions
of the record referred to, there is substantial compliance
with the requirements of Sec 13 (c) & (d), Rule 46 of the
ROC. Such determination was properly within the
appellate courts discretion.

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

c. In the instant case, the Appellants Brief contained a


statement of facts with references to Exhibits and TSNs
and attachments. The Appellants Brief may not have
referred to the exact pages of the records, however, the
same is not fatal to their cause since the references they
made enabled the appellate court to expeditiously locate
the portions of the record referred to.
d. The ROC was conceived and promulgated to set forth
guidelines in the dispensation of justice, but not to bind
and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise,
courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts,
in rendering justice, have always been, as they in fact
ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on
the balance, technicalities take a backseat to
substantive rights, and not the other way around.
Circumspect leniency will give the appellant the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint
rather than to lose life, liberty, honor or property on
technicalities.
e. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and
inexpensive determination of the cases before them.
Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the
controlling principle to effect substantial justice.
Rule 50, Sec. 1 (e)
Liberal rule late filing of appellants brief
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS v. FELIX
(February 11, 1999)
Facts:

The late Elias Imperial was issued an Original Cert of Title by


the CFI of Albay. The OCT was subdivided resulting in the issuance
of several TCTs in the name of priv resps. Republic filed a complaint
with the trial court to declare the TCTs null and void and the
reversion of the lands covered by the TCTs to the mass of the public
domain on the ground that the same are foreshore land.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the land had been declared not foreshore in a previous cadastral

proceeding and an action to quiet title hence binding on the


government and such constitutes res judicata.
Republic appealed to the CA, in which the following events
happened:
1. Republic filed a notice of appeal and was required to file its
appellants brief within 45 days from receipt of the notice.
2. 1st extension: Due to the alleged heavy workload of the
solicitor assigned to the case, Republic moved for an
extension of 30 days within which to file the appellants
brief. The CA granted the motion.
3. 2nd extension: On the same ground of continuing heavy
pressure of work, Republic filed its second motion for
extension of 30 days or until 11 August within which to file
the appellants brief.
4. 3rd extension: On 11 Aug 1997, Republic asked for a third
extension of 30days, or until 10 September 1997, within
which to file appellants brief citing the same ground of
heavy pressure of work.
5. Meanwhile, on 30 July 1997, the CA issued a resolution
stating that the OSG is granted a LAST EXTENSION of 30
days from July 12, 1997, or until August 11, 1997, within
which to file the appellants brief. Failure to file said brief
within the said period will mean dismissal of the appeal.
6. On 12 August 1997, Republic received a copy of the
aforesaid resolution.
7. On 26 August 1997, petitioner filed an MR and despite the
CAs warning, reiterated its third motion for extension to file
the appellants brief.
8. 4th extension: On 10 Sept 1997, Republic filed a
manifestation and motion requesting another extension of 5
days (until 15 Sept 1997) to file appellants brief, reasoning
that the brief, although finalized, was yet to be signed by
the Solicitor General.
9. On 15 September 1997, petitioner filed the required
appellants brief.
10. On 29 Sept 1997, the CA denied petitioners appeal and MR
for lack of merit and sustained its Resolution of 30 July 1997
dismissing the case for failure to file the appellants brief
within the extended period.

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

Hence, Republic filed this petition for review on certiorari


alleging that the dismissal of its appeal will result to the prejudice
of, and irreparable injury to, public interest, as the Government
would lose its opportunity to recover what it believes to be nonregisterable lands of the public domain.
Issue:
WON the appeal should be dismissed for failure to
file the appellants brief within the time prescribed by the CA.
Held:

No.

The SC has long observed that the OSG regularly presents


motions for extension of time to file pleadings, taking for granted
the courts leniency in granting the same. Instead of contributing to
the swift administration of justice as an instrumentality of the
State, the OSG contributes to needless delays in litigation.
Deadlines must be respected and court warnings not taken lightly.
Nevertheless, the appeal should not have been dismissed.
The ROC was formulated in order to promote just, speedy,
and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding without
sacrificing substantial justice and equity considerations. The filing
of appellants brief in appeals is not a jurisdictional requirement.
Nevertheless, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA on its own
motion or on that of the appellee upon failure of the appellant to
serve and file the required number of copies of the brief within the
time provided.
If the appeal brief cannot be filed on time, extension of time
may be allowed provided:
(1) there is good and sufficient cause, and
(2) the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the
time sought to be extended.
The courts liberality on extensions notwithstanding, lawyers
should never presume that their motions for extension would be
granted as a matter of course or for the length of time sought; their
concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exercised in
accordance with the attendant circumstances.
What constitutes good and sufficient cause that will merit
suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court. The court

10

has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case


from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when
the purpose of justice requires it. Among the reasons which the
court allowed in suspending application of the rules on filing an
appeal brief were the following:
(1) the cause for the delay was not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules;
(2) there was no objection from the State, and the brief was
filed within the period requested;
(3) no material injury was suffered by the appellee by reason of
the delay in filing the brief;
(4) the fake lawyer failed to file the brief;
(5) appellant was represented by counsel de oficio;
(6) petitioners original counsel died; and
(7) the preparation of the consolidated brief involved a
comparative study of many exhibits.
In the case at bar, the need to determine once and for all
whether the lands subject of Republics reversion efforts are
foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing
the procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for
extensions to file appellants brief. Republics appeal presented an
exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest which in
the Courts discretion must be given due course.
DBP v CA (6/6/2001)
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

Doctrine:
The granting of an extension, including the duration thereof,
lies within the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised in
accordance with the attendant circumstances of each case. The
court has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a
case from their operation when compelling circumstances so
warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it. However, the
movant is not justified in assuming that the extension sought will
be granted, or that it will be granted for the length of time sought.
Thus, it is the duty of the movant for extension to exercise due
diligence and inform himself as soon as possible of the appellate
courts action on his motion.

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

Facts:
Present case is a petition for review on certiorari
Petitioners Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
Private respondents Environmental Aquatics Inc. and Land
and its corp. sister Land & Services Management Enterprises
Inc.; and Mario Matute, the assignee of the right of
redemption
1. The sister corporations executed a mortgage in favor of DBP
over 2 fishing boats and a parcel of land in New Mania to
secure their loan (P1,792,600.00) with DBP; the mortgage
annotated on the TCT of land
2. The loan was restructured thru a liquidation loan of
P2,163,800.00;
and
subsequently,
P1,973,100.00,
P190,700.00, and P684,788.00
3. Unable to pay, the mortgaged lot was foreclosed and sold by
the RTC- QC ex-officio Sheriff to DBP as the highest bidder;
the certificate of sale issued on December 19, 1990
contained a 1-year period from the date of registration for
redemption
4. On July 27, 1991, Matute, thru counsel Atty. Vitug, wrote
DBP a letter expressing his desire to redeem the lot by a
Mangers check upon receipt of the accurate figures in
writing of the principal obligation with interests from
December 19, 1990 to August 19, 1991
5. In reply, DBP, thru its Bacolod branch, on August 16, 1991,
rejected a piecemeal redemption and rather asked that
the total amount owed as per August 31 Statement be paid
if redemption be allowed
6. The parties are in contention of the amount payable:
a. DBP relies on EO 81 which it contends to burden Matute
in the amount of P18,301,653.11, the amount of loan
outstanding at the date of foreclosure
b. Matute relies on Sec.5 of Act 3135 and Sec.26 to 30 of
Rule 39, ROC which it contends burdens him to pay only
P1,507,000.00, the amount paid by DBP at foreclosure
7. Respondents filed a complaint for redemption with the RTC
which was granted and ruled that DBP may claim deficiency
from the sister corporations; MR by DBP was denied thus it
filed a Notice of Appeal
8. On July 6, 1998, DBP received a notice to file appellants
brief

11

9. On August 20, at the expiration of period to file brief, DBP


asked for 1st extension of 30 days to file the same (or until
Sept. 19) invoking its counsels heavy workload which the
CA granted
10. On Sept. 21 (as Sept. 19 was a Saturday), DBP filed 2nd
extension (or until October 19) which was granted
11. On Oct.19, DBP filed 3rd extension on the ground that its
lawyer was stricken with acute bronchitis and was granted
until Nov. 8 (or 20 days)
12. On Nov. 9 (as Nov. 8 was Sunday), DBP filed 4th extension
for 10 days (or until Nov. 18) on the ground that its lawyer
just reported back to work and needed to time to complete
revisions in the brief
13. On Nov. 18, even without court action on its 4th extension,
DBP filed 5th extension to add other revisions
14. But on Nov. 20, private respondents filed a MTDismiss for
failure to submit its appellants brief
15. On Nov. 27, DBP filed a last Motion for extension for
additional 10 days (or until Dec. 8) on the ground that its
computer broke down
16. On Dec. 8, DBP filed a very urgent motion for a 5-day
extension (or until Dec. 13) on the ground of the need to reencode the brief; DBP claims that it received the CA
resolution granting its 4th extension only after it sent out its
messenger to file the last motion for extension
17. Finally, on Dec. 14 (as Dec. 13 was a Sunday), DBP filed its
brief
18. On Jan. 25, 1999, the CA denied DBPs notice of appeal for
failure to file its appellants brief; MR likewise denied
Issue:
Whether the CA was correct in denying DBPs notice
of appeal for failure to file appellants brief.
Held:
NO.
Petition is granted; petitioners appeal
reinstated and case is remanded to CA for further proceedings.
1. It is noted that the periods prayed for in petitioners last 3
motions for extension amounted to only 25 days and that all
3 motions were filed within the extended period sought in
the immediately preceding motion; and that private
respondents have not alleged nor proven that they have

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

sustained any material injury or that their cause has been


prejudiced
2. In a previous case, Republic v. Imperial (1999) which
involved 18,142 square meters of several parcels of land
which the government claims to be of public domain, the SC
granted additional extensions of time to file brief since
public interest on the reversion efforts of foreshore lands
constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural
rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension
3. The ruling cited hereinbefore is applicable in this present
case.
If petitioners appeal is denied due course, a
government institution could lose a great deal of money
over a mere technicality.
4. Distinction between:
Failure to file a notice of appeal
within the reglementary period

Failure to file a brief within the


period granted by the appellate
court
Results in the failure of the
Results in the abandonment of
appellate court to acquire
the appeal which could lead to
jurisdiction over the appealed
its dismissal upon failure to
decision resulting in its
move for its reconsideration,
becoming final and executory
in which case the appealed
upon failure of the appellant
decision would also become
to move for reconsideration
final and executor; but prior
thereto, the appellate court
shall have obtained
jurisdiction of the appealed
decision

5. It is not contended that petitioner failed to perfect its appeal


within the reglementary period; it merely failed to filed its
appellants brief within the last extended period accorded to
it by CA
6. In a considerable number of cases, the Court has deemed it
fit to suspend its own rules or to exempt a particular case
from its operation where the appellant failed to perfect its
appeal within the reglementary period, resulting in the
appellate courts failure to obtain jurisdiction over the case.
Thus, there is more leeway to exempt a case from the
strictures of procedural rules when the appellate court has
already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case
Rule 46

12

Certiorari with CA certification against forum shopping


must be made by petitioner himself
Santos v. CA (7/5/2001)
Bellosillo, J.
Doctrine:
Gen. Rule: (as applied in this case) The certification, as
opposed to verification, against forum shopping must be made by
petitioner himself and not by counsel because of the personal
knowledge required on whether any similar action involving the
same issues was previously commenced in any other tribunal or
agency; exception: it may be signed by an authorized lawyer who
has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed
Facts:
Present petition is for review on certiorari
Petitioners Ismael Santos, Alfredo Arce, and Hilario Pastrana
Private respondents Pepsi Cola Products Phil. Inc. (Pepsi),
Luis Lorenzo and Frederick Dael
1. Pepsi dismissed Santos, Arce and Pastrana due to
redundancy of positions and streamlining of certain physical
and sales distribution systems to improve its warehousing
efficiency
2. However, Pepsi created new positions with substantially
same duties and responsibilities as those of the dismissed
employees
3. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal:
a. Petitioners allege that the new positions created belie
their claim of redundancy and lack of notice to the DOLE
at least 1 month before the intended termination is
against the law (Art. 283, Labor Code)
b. c.2. Pepsi contends that the redundancy program was
made in good faith and a management prerogative
4. d.
LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and
ruled that the 1-month period was complied with
5. e.
NLRC ruled that 2 months already passed before
DOLE was notified, however, it affirmed the dismissal
holding that the notice requirement was dispensed with
because the petitioners acknowledged the existence of valid
cause for dismissal

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

6. f.
Petitioners then filed for certiorari with the CA but
dismissed the same for failure to comply with procedural
requirements, one of which is the verification and
certification being executed not by petitioners themselves
but by their counsel

Rule 50, Section 1 (e)


Strict rule failure to file appellants brief on time is ground
for dismissal

Issue:
Whether CA erred in finding that there was failure to
comply with the requirements of the Rules.

Facts:
The present petition is for certiorari
a. RTC convicted Tobias and petitioner herein, Sajot, for estafa
b. Tobias appealed the case with CA and filed appellants brief
therefor which case is now pending
c. As for Sajot, he was required by CA to file appellants brief
within 30days from receipt of notice although he was
granted three (3) extensions to file the same
d. CA eventually dismissed the appeal for failure to file brief
despite extensions granted; CA denied MR for being a
prohibited pleading

Held:
NO.
The CA Resolution dismissing outright the
appeal is affirmed.
1. It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the
certification must be made by petitioner himself and not by
counsel since it is petitioner who is in the best position to
know whether he has previously commenced any similar
action involving the same issues in any other tribunal or
agency
2. An exception to the rule [as stated in item (1)] was held in
BA Savings Bank v. Sia in that a certification may be signed
by an authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the
facts required to be disclosed in such document
3. However, BA Savings Bank must be distinguished from the
case at bar since the complainant therein was a corporation,
and hence, a juridical person and can only act through
natural persons; therefore, physical actions may be
performed on behalf of the corporate entity only by
specifically authorized individual
4. In the present case, petitioners are all natural persons and
there is no showing of any reasonable cause to justify their
failure to personally sign the certification; hence, the
argument of the petitioners that they executed a Special
Power of Attorney specifically to authorize their counsel to
execute the certification on their behalf is of no
consequence because no justifiable reason exists for them
to be substituted
5. Another procedural flaw: failure to indicate the material
dates that would show the timeliness of the filing of appeal
with the CA
6. On substantial issue: the SC affirmed the finding of CA
dispensing with the 1 month period

13

Sajot v. CA (3/11/1999)
Pardo, J.

Issue:
Whether CA gravely abused
dismissing the appeal for failure to file brief?

its

discretion

in

Held:
NO. The petition for certiorari to annul is dismissed.
1. Petitioner was himself guilty of neglect; was aware of his
conviction and of the requirement of filing an appellant's
brief. His excuse that he relied on the services of his counsel
and that he was busy is flimsy. Equally busy people have
in one way or the other learned how to cope with the same
problem he had. Were we to accept his excuse, this Court
would have to open cases dismissed many years ago on the
ground of counsel's neglect. In many cases, the fact is that
counsel's negligence is matched by his client's own
negligence.
2. We note that even during the trial of the estafa in the RTC,
petitioner never appeared in court except during the
arraignment. Thus, the court issued a warrant for his arrest
and interpreted his non-appearance as flight. Petitioner's
lack of vigilance as found by the trial court in its decision is
emphasized when his counsel in the present petition filed a
motion to withdraw primarily on the ground of irreconcilable
professional relationship between Atty. Florentino Temporal
and petitioner. Despite petitioner's repeated assurances

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

relayed by phone, letters and telegrams that he will meet


with Atty. Temporal to formulate the appellant's brief, he
never did so. Moreover, petitioner paid Atty. Temporal's
professional fees with checks drawn against closed
accounts.
GOVERNMENT OF BELGIUM VS CA
Facts:
1. A Complaint for specific performance of contract with
damages was filed by petitioner against respondents Unified
Field Corporation (UFC), Marilyn G. Ong, Victoria O. Ang,
Edna C. Alfuerte, Mark Dennis O. Ang, and Alvin O. Ang, with
the RTC of Makati City.
2. In its Complaint, petitioner avers that it entered into a
Contract of Lease with respondent UFC, represented by its
President and co-respondent, Marilyn G. Ong. By virtue of
the said contract, petitioner leased from UFC Units "B" and
"D," with a gross area of 377 square meters, more or less,
and six parking lots, at the Chatham House Condominium,
located at the corner of Valero and Herrera Streets, Salcedo
Village, Makati City (leased premises), for a maximum term
of four (4) years beginning 1 October 1997.
3. For the use of the leased premises, petitioner agreed to pay
the sum of P5,430,240.00, as rentals for the first two years,
from 1 October 1997 to 30 September 1999, payable in full
upon the official turn-over of the leased premises; and the
sum of P678,780.00, as security deposit, for a total amount
of P6,109,020.00.[6] The Contract provided for the pretermination option that may be exercised by the lessee.
4. On or about 23 June 2000, three months prior to the
expiration of the third year of the lease, petitioner, through
counsel, served by personal service upon respondent UFC,
through its President and co-respondent, Marilyn G. Ong
informing the corporation that petitioner was preterminating the Lease Contract effective 31 July 2000.
5. Considering that under the Contract of Lease, it could preterminate the lease after the expiry of the second-year term
without having to pay pre-termination penalties, petitioner
also requested the return or delivery of the total sum of
P1,093,600.00, representing its unused two months advance

14

rentals for August and September 2000, in the sum of


P414,820.00, and the security deposit in the sum of
P678,780.00, within forty-five days after the pre-termination
of the lease contract, or on 15 September 2000.
6. On 31 July 2000, petitioner vacated and surrendered the
leased premises to respondent UFC through the latter's
President and co-respondent Marilyn G. Ong free of any
outstanding bills for water, electricity, telephone and other
utility charges or damages to said leased premises.
7. However, respondents UFC and Marilyn G. Ong, in her
capacity as UFC President, totally ignored the demands
made by petitioner in its letter of 23 June 2000 and,
consequently, failed to return or deliver the P1,093,600.00
sought by petitioner.
8. Petitioner claims that respondent UFC plainly committed
fraud in the performance of its clear duty under paragraph
22 of the Contract of Lease by not returning petitioner's
unused two months advance rentals and security deposit
despite repeated demands therefor. Hence, the individual
respondents as directors of respondent UFC should be
deemed to have willfully and knowingly assented to a
patently unlawful act or are guilty of gross negligence or bad
faith, as the case may be, in directing the affairs of
respondent UFC. Under Section 31 of the Corporation Code
of the Philippines, the respondent directors must be jointly
and severally held liable together with respondent UFC.
9. Respondents
filed
their
Answer
with
Compulsory
Counterclaim on 2 August 2001. Thereafter, pre-trial was
set. However, respondents failed to appear and, worse,
failed to file their pre-trial brief, as required by the Rules of
Court. They were therefore declared to have waived their
right to adduce evidence on their behalf. Respondents did
not seek for a reconsideration of the aforesaid Order; hence,
petitioner was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte on
19 June 2002 and 19 August 2002.
10. On 8 November 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor
of petitioner.
11. Respondents elevated the case on appeal to the Court of
Appeals. They received a Notice to File Brie from the Court
of Appeals. Respondents were unable to comply with this
directive.

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

12. Petitioner thus filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to


Dismiss Appeal of the respondents on the ground that
respondents' counsel received the Notice to File Brief on 16
July 2003 as shown by the Registry Return Receipt and had
forty-five (45) days or until 1 September 2003 to file their
appellants' brief, but failed to do so. No opposition to the
said Motion to Dismiss Appeal was filed by respondents.
Neither did they file a motion for extension of time to file
appellants' brief.
13. On 30 September 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution which provides that respondents had already
abandoned and dismissed their appeal by failure to file
appellant's brief pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court.
14. On 27 October 2003, respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution stating that
their failure to file their appellants' brief was due to their
counsel's inadvertence, attaching their brief thereto and
praying for its admission. Respondents' counsel had used his
residence as his mailing address and the domestic helper
might have misplaced the notice to file brief; hence,
respondents' counsel failed to monitor the running of the
reglementary period for the filing of the appellants' brief.
15. On 27 November 2003, the CA granted the MR and required
respondent to file appellant's brief.
16. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
afore-quoted Resolution which the Court of Appeals denied.
Issue:
WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the MNT on the ground of newly discovered evidence
based on Ofelia Ticzon's Affidavit.
Held: YES. Respondents evidently continued with their lack of care
even when they filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals as shown
by their not having filed an appellants' brief under the
reglementary period. The purported inadvertence of their counsel
cannot justify a relaxation of the rules. It is the counsel's
responsibility to see to it that he has established an efficient
system to monitor the receipt of important notices and orders from
the courts. While the omission can plausibly qualify as simple
negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to call for the

15

exception to the oft-repeated rule that the negligence of counsel


binds the client. Respondents are, thus, bound by their counsel's
negligence.
Finally, it appears that respondents finally "attached" their
Brief only in their Motion for Reconsideration filed on 27 October
2003 in the Court of Appeals seeking a reconsideration of the
appellate court's Resolution of 30 September 2003, dismissing their
appeal. The delay in the filing thereof, 57 days after the expiration
of the period to file the same on 1 September 2003,was, indeed,
unreasonably long.
There were many cases cited in this case. Here's a summary
of it:
(1) The general rule is for the Court of Appeals to dismiss an
appeal when no appellant's brief is filed within the
reglementary period prescribed by the rules;
(2) The power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss
an appeal is discretionary and directory and not ministerial
or mandatory;
(3) The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the
reglementary period does not have the effect of causing the
automatic dismissal of the appeal;
(4) In case of late filing, the appellate court has the power to
still allow the appeal; however, for the proper exercise of the
court's leniency it is imperative that:
a. the circumstances obtaining warrant the court's
liberality;
b. that strong considerations of equity justify an exception
to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial
justice;
c. no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by
the delay;
d. there is no contention that the appellees' cause was
prejudiced;
e. at least there is no motion to dismiss filed.
(5) In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period;
and
(6) Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an
adequate excuse as to call for the appellate court's
indulgence except:

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

a. where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel


deprives the client of due process of law;
b. when application of the rule will result in outright
deprivation of the client's liberty or property; or
c. where the interests of justice so require.
Rule 51, Sec. 5
Form of decision; memorandum decision
FRANCISCO VS PERMSKUL
Facts:
1. On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in
Makati to the private respondent for a period of one year for
the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the
lease contract, the private respondent deposited with the
petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid
rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when
caused by reasonable wear and tear.
2. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the
property. He thereafter requested the refund of his deposit
minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the
additional ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of
the lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the
lessee still owed him for other charges, including the
electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for
repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their
original condition.
3. The private respondent sued in the MeTC of Makati. After the
submission of position papers by the parties, a summary
judgment was rendered on October 11, 1985, sustaining the
complainant and holding that the repainting was not
chargeable to him. The defendant was ordered to pay the
plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00, representing the balance
of the deposit after deducting the water and electricity
charges. The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of
P1,250.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs.
4. This decision was appealed to the RTC of Makati and was
affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987.
This was done in a memorandum decision.

16

5. When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his


petition for review was denied on September 29, 1987, as so
too was his motion for reconsideration, on December 1,
1987. He is now before us to fault the respondent court,
principally for sustaining the memorandum decision of the
regional trial court. His contention is that it violates Article
VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution which provides the
following:
"Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration
of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or
denied without stating the legal basis therefor."
6. According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision
rendered by the regional trial court should be revoked for
non-compliance with the above-quoted constitutional
mandate. He asks that the case be remanded to the regional
trial court for a full blown hearing on the merits, to be
followed by a decision stating therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. For his part, the
private respondent demurs. He justifies the memorandum
decision as authorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes the
ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals, which
sustained the said law.
7. Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:
Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. Every
decision or final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall
clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law on which it is based which may be
contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted
by reference from those set forth in the decision, order or
resolution appealed from.
Issue:

Whether or not said decision complied with the law.

Held: YES.
In the case at bar, we find that a judgment was made by the
metropolitan trial court in compliance with the rule on summary
procedure. The decision consisted of three typewritten pages,

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

single space, and stated clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it was based. It was a concise and well-written decision,
and a correct one to boot, for which Judge Paciano B. Balita is to be
commended.

decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of


the higher court. The Idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body
of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court
since they are being approved or adopted anyway.

The problem, though, as the petitioner sees it, is that in


affirming this judgment, the regional trial court of Makati rendered
a mere memorandum decision that simply adopted by reference
the findings of fact and law made by Judge Balita and then
concluded, without saying more, that "there was no cogent reason
to disturb the same." It is claimed that as Judge de la Rama did not
make his own statement of the facts and the law as required by the
Constitution, his memorandum decision was a total nullity.

For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must


provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said
decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized
under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an
annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did


not review the memorandum decision of the regional trial court
which was the subject of the petition for review. A reading of its
own decision will show that it dealt extensively with the
memorandum decision and discussed it at some length in the light
of the observations and reservations of this Court in the
Romero case. Moreover, in reviewing the decision of the
metropolitan trial court, the Court of Appeals was actually
reviewing the decision of the regional trial court, which had
incorporated by reference the earlier decision rendered by Judge
Balita.
The question, of course, is whether such incorporation by
reference was a valid act that effectively elevated the decision of
the metropolitan trial court for examination by the Court of
Appeals.
The distinctive features of the memorandum decision are,
first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it
incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of
law contained in the decision, order or ruling under review. Most
likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not
impossible that the approval of the findings of fact by the lower
court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court.
At any rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by
reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the

17

UCPB vs UNITED ALLOY


Facts:
1. On August 27, 2001, United Alloy Philippines Corporation
(Unialloy) filed a Complaint for "annulment and/or
reformation of contract and damages, with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order"
against United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). The
Complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City.
2. On the same day, UCPB filed a Complaint for a sum of
money with an application for preliminary attachment
against Unialloy. This Complaint was filed before the RTC of
Makati City.
3. Thereafter, UCPB moved to dismiss the Complaint before the
Cagayan de Oro City RTC on the grounds of improper venue,
forum shopping, litis pendentia, and being a harassment or
nuisance suit. On September 13, 2001, the RTC of Cagayan
de Oro City dismissed Unialloys Complaint.
4. By virtue of a Motion for Immediate Execution filed by UCPB,
the same court issued an Order of Execution for the turnover
to the bank of the property, subject of the Contract sought
to be annulled or reformed.
5. On October 9, 2001, Unialloy filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals. On February 18,
2002, the CA issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor
of the corporation. This issuance was later amended by the
second challenged Resolution of April 3, 2002.

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

Issues:
1. Whether it was proper for the Court of Appeals to take
cognizance of the Petition for Certiorari.
2. Whether the CA Resolution granting the preliminary
mandatory injunction was sufficient in form.
Held:

1. The appellate court was correct in taking cognizance of


the petition for certiorari since what the petition was assailing was
the September 14, 2001 RTC Order of Execution, as well as the
Writ of Execution issued pursuant thereto. It is contrary to what the
petitioner is saying that said petition pertained to the September
13, 2001 RTC Order dismissing the Complaint.
Petitioners arguments are off-tangent, because they focus
on the September 13, 2001 RTC Order of dismissal and the failure
of respondent to appeal the Order. Clearly, however, the Petition
before us plainly seeks to annul and set aside the February 18,
2002 CA Resolution, which does not address the September 13,
2001 Order. The records show that the assailed Resolution merely
pertained to the September 14, 2001 RTC Order of Execution and
the Writ of Execution itself.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is applicable in the case at bar.
Furthermore, Section 1(f) of Rule 4122 of the Rules unequivocally
states that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution.
Rule 41 adds that in instances in which an order is not appealable,
the aggrieved partys recourse is a special civil action under Rule
65. Hence, an order of execution, when issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may be the
subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
2. An order granting a preliminary injunction, whether
mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and unappealable.
However, it may be challenged by a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Being preliminary, such an order need
not strictly follow Section 5 of Rule 51 requiring that "every decision
or final resolution of the court in appealed cases shall clearly and
distinctly state the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which

18

it is based x x x." Therefore, the CA Resolution was sufficient in


form and substance.
Rule 51, Sec. 8
Aklan College, Inc. v. Enero (1/27/2009)
Ponente: J. Nachura
D: The appealing party is legally required to indicate in his
brief an assignment of errors, and only those assigned shall
be considered by the appellate court in deciding the case.
However, this is not without qualification, for the appellate
court is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the
lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors
not assigned
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
1. Petitioner is an educational institution in Aklan while
respondents were high school teachers of petitioner.
2. On November 15, 16 and 17, 1994 and on January 6, 10 and
11, 1995, high school students of petitioner held mass
actions against the principal of the high school department
at the public plaza opposite the school. The demonstrations
were held with validly issued permits of the Office of the
Mayor
3. Petitioner averred that the rallies were illegal strikes
instigated by respondents. Thus, after an administrative
investigation,
respondents
were
dismissed
from
employment
4. Respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal against
petitioner before the Labor Arbiter alleging that what took
place was a peaceful assembly
5. The LA absolved respondents and held petitioner guilty of
illegal dismissal. LA ordered petitioner to pay respondents
backwages, 13th month pay, SIL, moral damages and
exemplary damages
6. On appeal however, NLRC reversed said decision holding
petitioner no guilty of illegal dismissal but retained the
award for 13th month pay and SIL pay
7. Both parties filed a MR which was both denied for lack of
merit

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

8. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before CA seeking to


partially annul the decision of NLRC insofar as it held
petitioner liable to pay respondents 13th month pay and SIL.
CA however held that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in awarding respondents 13 th month pay and SIL
pay. It modified the award and increased it
9. Petitioner filed a MR which was again denied. Hence this
petition
Issue:
WON CA erred in affirming the NLRC decision and
increasing the monetary awards of 13th month pay and SIL pay
Held: No
Ratio:
1. Whether respondents received 13th month pay and SIL pay is
a factual issue which does not fall to the recognized
exceptions where the Supreme Court can review such facts
2. Petitioner avers that it was improper for CA to increase the
monetary award on the subject benefits in favor of
respondents who did not filed an appeal from the decision of
NLRC
3. As a rule, a party who does not appeal from the decision
may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate
court other than what he has obtained from the lower
tribunal, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. Due
process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties
who did not appeal
4. As an exception, he may assign an error where the purpose
is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot
seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative
relief unless he has also appealed or filed a separate
petition
5. In this case, the CA is not precluded from affirming,
reversing or modifying the decision of the NLRC on the
propriety of payment of 13th month pay and SIL pay to the
respondents. It is the propriety of the award of these
benefits which were precisely the issues raised by petitioner
in its appeal before the said appellate court
6. Section 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court provides that only
those issues assigned as errors will be considered in the
appealed decision, viz.:

19

SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which


does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or
the validity of the judgment appealed from or the
proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the
assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on
an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as
the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors
7. The appealing party is legally required to indicate in his brief
an assignment of errors, and only those assigned shall be
considered by the appellate court in deciding the case.
However, this is not without qualification, for the appellate
court is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the
lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors
not assigned
8. The CA may reverse the decision of the lower tribunal on the
basis of grounds other than those raised as errors on appeal
in the following instances:
a. Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction
over the subject matter;
b.
Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are
evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of
law;
c.
Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve
the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice;
d. Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but
raised in the trial court and are matters of record having
some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties
failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
e. Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned; and
f.
Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon
which the determination of a question properly assigned,
is dependent
9. The CA did not commit reversible error in increasing the said
awards. The present case falls under the 3 rd exception
enumerated above. A just, fair and complete resolution of
the case necessarily entails the correct computation of
these benefits. To avoid dispensing piecemeal justice, the

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

full period of employment of respondents was rightfully


considered by the CA in the computation of the 13 th month
pay and the SIL pay
Issue not raised on appeal cannot be dealt with by the CA;
final against non-appealing party
PNB v. Rabat (11/15/2000)
Ponente: C.J. Davide, Jr.
D: Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of
this Rule, now includes some substantial changes in the
rules on assignment of errors. The basic procedural rule is
that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be
considered by the court, except errors affecting its
jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception has
now been added errors affecting the validity of the
judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein
Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not
expressly stated in his assignment of errors but the same is
closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in his brief, such error may now be
considered by the court
Petition: Petition for review
Facts:
1. Respondent spouses Francisco and Merced Rabat (RABATS)
applied for a loan with PNB which granted the loan on
January 14, 1980
2. Rabats signed a credit agreement and executed a REM over
12 parcels of land which is subject to the interest rate of
17% per annum plus the appropriate service charge and
penalty charge of 3% per annum on any amount remaining
unpaid or not renewed when due
3. The amount due to PNB reached the aggregate amount of
P3,57, 380 as evidenced by the several promissory notes all
of which are due on March 14, 1983

20

4. The Rabats failed to pay their outstanding balance on due


date and after demand, PNB filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the REM
5. A public auction was held and PNB won as the highest
bidder. As the proceeds of the public auction were not
enough to satisfy the entire obligation, PNB sent a new
demand letters. Upon failure of Rabats to comply with the
demand, PNB eventually filed on May 5, 1992 a complaint
for sum of money before RTC
6. The Rabats, on their answer, admitted the loan and their
default thereof but assailed the validity of the auction sales
for want of notice to them before and after the foreclosure
sales. They also averred that the bid price was grossly
inadequate and that the accumulated interest and penalty
charges was so big due to PNBs scheme since the
properties were sold in 1987 yet PNB only filed the instant
case in 1992
7. RTC dismissed the complaint and set aside the 2 auction
sales of the mortgaged property. Only PNB appealed from
the judgment raising the issue of WON RTC erred in
nullifying the auction sale on the ground that the bid was
very low and WON RTC erred in ruling that Rabats are not
liable to pay the interest and penalty charges
8. CA rendered a decision affirming the trial courts ruling
nullifying the auction sales, but on a different ground. CA
discovered that the Rabats did not actually receive personal
notices concerning the foreclosure proceedings. Hence, they
could not have known the said foreclosure sales
9. Unsatisfied, PNB seasonably filed the present petition
Issue: WON CA may review and pass upon the RTCs finding and
conclusion on an issue which was never raised on appeal and
therefore had attained finality
Held: No
Ratio:
1. Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
expressly provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. -- No error which does
not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity
of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will
be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and


properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain
errors and clerical errors
2. In his book, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented on
this section, thus:
a. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of
this Rule, now includes some substantial changes in the
rules on assignment of errors. The basic procedural rule
is that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will
be considered by the court, except errors affecting its
jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception
has now been added errors affecting the validity of the
judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein
Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not
expressly stated in his assignment of errors but the
same is closely related to or dependent on an assigned
error and properly argued in his brief, such error may
now be considered by the court. These changes are of
jurisprudential origin
b. The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the
same as that in the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise
indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held
that the latter is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case.
Also, an
unassigned error closely related to an error properly
assigned (PCIB vs. CA, et al., L-34931, Mar. 18, 1988), or
upon which the determination of the question raised by
error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered
by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to
assign it as error (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German
Airlines, L-28773, June 30, 1975; Soco vs. Militante, et
al., G.R. No. 58961, June 28, 1983)
It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule,
the appellate court is authorized to consider a plain
error, although it was not specifically assigned by the
appellant (Dilag vs. Heirs of Resurreccion, 76 Phil. 649),
otherwise it would be sacrificing substance for
technicalities

21

It may once be noticed that the exceptions are for the


benefit of the appellant and not for the appellee
3. PNB, the sole appellant, never raised the issue of lack of
personal notice to the RABATs. Neither is such issue closely
related to or dependent on PNB's assigned error on appeal
nor is it an exception to Section 8 of Rule 51
4. Needless to stress, the Court of Appeals erred in resolving
PNBs appeal on the basis of an issue which was not raised
on appeal and whose resolution thereon by the trial court
has long become firm and final against the party adversely
affected by the resolution
5. Even granting arguendo that the issue of personal notice
may be raised, still we cannot agree with the Court of
Appeals. In the first place, in extrajudicial foreclosure sales,
personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary
6. Thus, the petition was granted the CA was directed to
decide with reasonable dispatch the case on the basis of the
issue raised by PNB
Only errors assigned shall be considered by appellate court
in deciding the case exception, matters closely related to
an error assigned
Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. CA (11/14/1996)
Ponente: J. Hermosisima, Jr.
D: True, the appealing party is legally required to indicate
in his brief an assignment of errors, and only those
assigned shall be considered by the appellate court in
deciding the case. However, equally settled in jurisprudence
is the exception to this general rule
Petition: Petition for review
Facts:
1. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) was the owner
of a parcel of land (Lot No. 1272, Balanga Cadastre situated
in the Barrio of Puerto Rivas, Municipality of Balanga Bataan
covered by an OCT

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

2. The said church was succeeded by Roman Catholic Bishop of


San Fernando which was likewise succeeded by Catholic
Bishop of Balanga
3. On August 23, 1936, by virtue of the authority given by
RCAM, the parish priest and administrator of the properties
of the church in Municipality of Balanga executed a deed of
donation covering an area portion of Lot No. 1272 in favor of
Ana delos Reyes and her heirs as a reward for her long and
satisfactory service to the church
4. Ana left the property to her nephew, the respondent in this
case which took possession of the property in the concept of
owner, built his house and paid the taxes due thereon
5. His possession was never disturbed until 49 years later
when petitioner filed the instant complaint against him
alleging that the deed of donation was void and that he
vacate the said property
6. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the instant action is barred by the statute of
limitations
7. RTC ruled that the deed of donation was void since the
parish priest has no authority to dispose the property as he
is merely the administrator and hence, respondent never
acquired ownership over the property
8. Respondent filed a petition for review to CA contending that
the lower court erred in not ruling on the issue of
prescription which he raised. CA ruled in favor of respondent
holding that petitioner is barred by laches
9. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition
Issue: WON CA erred in applying the doctrine of laches considering
that respondent did not assign such error on their appeal
Held: No
Ratio:
1. True, the appealing party is legally required to indicate in his
brief an assignment of errors, and only those assigned shall
be considered by the appellate court in deciding the case.
However, equally settled in jurisprudence is the exception to
this general rule
2. We have ruled in a number of cases that the appellate court
is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of
proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not

22

assigned. It is clothed with ample authority to review rulings


even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal
3. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals may consider grounds
other than those touched upon in the decision of the trial
court and uphold the same on the basis of such other
grounds, the Court of Appeals may, with no less authority,
reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of
grounds other than those raised as errors on appeal. We
have applied this rule, as a matter of exception, in the
following instances:
a. Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction
over the subject matter;
b. Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are
evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of
law;
c. Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve
the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice;
d. Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but
raised in the trial court and are matters of record having
some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties
failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
e. Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned; and
f.
Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon
which the determination of a question properly assigned,
is dependent
4. The instant controversy falls squarely under the exception to
the general rule that only assigned errors may be passed
upon by the appellate court. A just, fair and complete
resolution of the present case necessitates the consideration
and the application of the doctrine of laches which is not the
same as but is undoubtedly closely related to, the issue of
prescription which was properly raised by private
respondent before the respondent Court of Appeals

JUSTICE DE
LEON

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APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

5. Laches1 means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable


and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it. It has also been defined as such neglect or
omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse
of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity
6. The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that
relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has
become stale, or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable
length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept
on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. In
other words, public policy requires, for the peace of society,
the discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion;
thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or
enforcement of a right which has become, under the
circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit
7. Petitioner lost his right in this case by reason of laches
Rule 51

In re: Joaquion Borromeo


A.M. 93-7-696-0, Feb 21, 1995

Facts:
Mr Borromeo is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law
books and ostensibly came to possess some superficial
awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural
rules. For some 16 years not (since 1978), he has been
instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts.

1 Elements: (1)

Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he


claims, giving rise to the situation complained of;(2) Delay in asserting
complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he
has an opportunity to sue;
(3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant

23

o In the words of CJ Fernando with all the valor of ignorance.


Expectedly, the results have been disastrous.
In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite
unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to
compose and circulate many scurrilous statements against
courts, judges and their employees, as well as his adversaries,
for which he is now being called to account.
Because of his ill-advised incursions, 3 banks came to have
calamitous transactions because of his failure to comply with
his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on
imposing his own terms and conditions for their fulfilment.
These banks were: Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), and Security Bank and Trust Co (SBTC).
He obtained credit accommodations from the banks for him and
members of his family, failed to pay these obligations, and
when demands came, he laid down his own terms which were
inconsistent with the contract.

ISSUE:WON he is guilty of constructive contempt --- YES.


repeatedly committed contempt over time, despite warnings

He

RATIO: COURTS CONCLUSION (There is a very long part on the


details of the cases)
He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be
without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings
rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings,
rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and
unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual
version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal
(and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law
BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION:
paramount need to put an end to litigation at some point, and
to lay down definite postulates concerning what is perceived to
be a growing predilection on the part of lawyers and litigants
o 1) Reason for courts; Judicial Hierarchy
Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of
controversies. In every country there is a more or less
established hierarchical organization of courts, and a more
or less comprehensive system of review of judgments and
final orders of lower courts.

JUSTICE DE
LEON

BARRON|CHING|DIZON|FERRER|GRAN|ILANO|LEONARDO LORESCA| SALVA SY| VILCHES| YAO


APRAC|| Ateneo Law School

The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several


levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by the
parties a trial or hearing in the first instance as well as
a review of the judgments of lower courts by higher
tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of
the factual and legal issues through briefs or memoranda.
The procedure for review is fixed by law, and is in the very
nature of things, exclusive to the courts.
o 2) Paramount Need to End Litigation at Some Point
It is the essence of the judicial function that litigation must
end.
In Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967
decision, 48 a party "may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not
be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the timehonored aphorism that courts are the temples of right."
o 3) Judgments of SC not reviewable
The sound, salutary and self-evident principle in most
jurisidiction is that judgment of the highest tribunal of the
land may NOT be reviewed by any other agency, branch,
department, or official of government. Once the SC has
spoken, the matter must rest.
o 4) Final & Executory Judgments of lower courts not
reviewable even by SC
In respect of lower courts, ordinary remedies available udner
the law are MNT/MR and appeal to either CA or SC,
depending on whether questions of both fact and law, or of
law only, are raised.
Exceptionally, certiorari may be
available of in cases of ruling rendered in GADALEJ.
However, should judgments of lower courts become final
and executor before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse
of appeal, they, too, become inviolable, impervious to
modification. They may no longer be reviewed even by the
SC.
[SUMMARY of] ADMINISTRATIVE CIVIL/CRIMINAL ACTION
AGAISNT JUDGE. Not substitute for appeal; proscribed by law
and logic
o 1. Common basis of Complaints against judges = rendered
manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory order. This

24

would lead the OMB or TC to review the decision and


determine its correctness.
o 2. Exclusivity of specific procedures for correction of
judgments & orders
o 3. Only courts authorized, under fixed rules to declare
judgments/orders erroneous or unjust.
o 4. Contrary rule results in circuitousness and leads to absurd
consequences
o 5. Primordial requisites for administrative criminal
prosecution
JUDGES MUST BE FREE FROM INFLUENCE OR PRESSURE.
Because he transgressed all these principles, Borromeo must be
held liable

Rule 52
No motion for extension of time to file motion for
reconsideration
Sec. of Agrarian Reform vs. Tropical Homes
GR 136827 & 136799, July 31, 2001
Facts:
Carlos Iigo is the former registered owner of parcels of land
covered by four CTCs located in Bago Inigo, Toril, Davao City.
In 1971, Inigo and Tropical Homes entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) for the development of the property into a
residential area, later known as Better Living Subdivision
o Tropical applied for the reclassification of the area from
agricultural to residential. This was granted.
When Inigo died, the heirs pursued the JVA with Tropical.
In 1990, DAR-Davao notified Tropical that the property would be
covered by the CARP.
In 1991, DAR issued 3 notices of acquisition to Tropical that a
portion of the land would be the subject of compulsory
acquisition.
This landholding is in present controversy.
o DAR distributed landholding to the identified farmerbeneficiaries.
[PARAD] Tropical filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the cancellation of the CLOA

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mainly on the ground that the landholding was outside the


coverage of the CARP.
o Some bona fide residents of the landholding were excluded
in the CLOA. They filed a motion for intervention while the
petition of Tropical was pending.
o The PARAD ruled in favour of Tropical, but the motion for
intervention was denied.
[DARAB] The residents filed a Notice of Appeal with DARAB.
They also filed a motion for a writ of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction to stop Tropical from demolishing the
farmers-beneficiaries houses, fencing the property, and posting
guards to secure the area. The motion was granted by DARAB.
o DARAB reversed the PARAD ruling.
[CA] Tropical filed a petition for review and motion for issuance
of a TRO with the CA. Tropical claimed that it would suffer
irreparable injury if the execution of the DARAB order was not
enjoined.
o CA granted the TRO.
o In 1998, CA decided in favour of Tropical.
o Both petitioners and petitioner-appellants filed MRs.
While the 1st motion was denied for having been filed
beyond the 15d reglementary period, the 2nd MR was
ordered expunged for the rollo, pursuant to the motion for
partial reconsideration filed by Tropical. In that motion, it
was alleged inter alia that petitioners-appellants are not
parties to the case and that at no point in the whole legal
process, from the PARAD to the CA, were they allowed to
intervene.
Hence this case.

ISSUE:
WON the petitions may be given due course --- NO.
1st, because the MR was not filed on time. 2nd, DARAB rules
discourage motion for intervention.
RATIO
The procedural infirmities are replete and fatal to both causes of
action. Filed beyond the reglementary period to appeal.
o Petitioners claim that they received the CA Decision dated
Aug 5, 1998 on Aug 19. Thus, counting 15d, their MR should
have been filed on Sept 3. However, what they filed instead

25

was a Motion for Extension of Time praying for an additional


15d to file their MR.
o Unfortunately for petitioners, this Court has already ruled
squarely on the matter that no such motion for
extension shall be entertained
o In Habaluyas Enterp v. Japson, we ruled that the 15d for
appealing or for filing MR cannot be extended.
o Even when petitioners argue that the Legal Assistance
Division of the DAR is undermanned because of a
substantial number of its staff on official leave, the Court
still did not change its ruling.
o We cannot go against what is settled in our jurisprudence by
the mere expedient that there is not enough people to do
the work. The DAR must develop a system of procedure
that would enable it to comply with the reglementary period.
DARAB rules discourage motion for intervention. For a motion
for intervention to be entertained in DARAB, 2 requisites must
concur: (1) substantial right or interest in the case and (2)
cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another
proceeding. In Republic v. SB, the denial of a motion for
intervention cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by
mandamus. Hence, it behooves this Court to leave the denial of
the motion for intervention to the wisdom of the PARAD.
While it is true that alitigation is not a game of technicalities, it
is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice.

Rule 53
Motion for new trial may be filed after motion for
reconsideration, but within 15 days
Tiongco vs. Deguma
GR 133619, Oct 26, 1999
Facts:
Jose Tiongco filed with RTC-Iloilo a complaint for damages
arising from fraudulent conspiracy, public scandal, with
preliminary injuction against Atty. Marciana Q. Deguma, Atty.
Napoleon Pagtanac, IMDC Major Carmelo Tiongco, Jr. and

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Estrella Tiongco Yared. Jose Tiongco also prays for a preliminary


writ of mandatory injuction for defendants to vacate the house
on Lot 1404. He further prays for damages.
o After summons, Pagtanac filed his answer with counterclaim
of P100,000 as moral damages and P50,000 as exemplary
damages. The other defendants filed similar counterclaims
with varying amount of damages.
o The TC dismissed Tiongcos complaint but granted the
counterclaims.
Tiongco filed an appeal before the CA. (One respondent also
appealed questioning the inadequacy of the moral damages
given to her. [not very important but just in case sir asks])
Tiongco claims that the judgment by the TC is contrary to
evidence and repugnant to law, and consequently, the TC erred
in awarding moral damages in favour of defendants.

ISSUE:

WON TC must be reversed NO

RATIO:
Tiongco is aware that his complaint would not hold water. First,
he claimed that Tiongco Jr. and Deguma unlawfully
confederated, conspired and schemed to induce Yared to
execute and sign deeds of transfer and documents. Second, he
clains that TIongco Jr and Deguma have been fornicating inside
the 2-storey house thereby transforming the property into a
house of sin and creating public scandal. Pagtanac, A pao
lawyer, was impleaded for having tolerated and condoned the
alleged immorality.
o The entire record of the case is bereft of evidence to support
the allegations as to the existence of the above mentioned
deeds of transfer and documents, much less their execution.
o Thus, the CA affirmed the TCs award of moral and
exemplary damages in favour of all respondents. It deleted,
however, the actual damages for lack of evidentiary support
and disallowed the grant of attorneys fees for want of
ratiocination.
Tiongco filed an MR for the CAs judgment contending that it
was unjust and contrary to law and jurisprudence.

26

Subsequently, he filed a petition for new trial on the ground


of newly discovered evidence.
o The CA denied the MR for lack of merit and the petition for
new trial for being filed out of time.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

HELD: WON CA decision must be reversed NO.


reduced amount of damages)

(Affirmed by

RATIO:
Generally, denuncia falsa or malicious prosecution refers to
unfounded criminal actions. The term had already been
expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted to vex and
humiliate defendants despite the absence of a cause of action
or probable cause.
o Malicious prosecution = an action for damages brought by
one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other
legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without
probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution,
suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.
o Moral damages can be recovered based on malicious
prosecution (Art. 2219 of the Civil Code)
o Art 21 of the Civil Code is an additional legal justification for
the award of moral damages. Denouncing persons for
allegedly engaging in illicit sexual affairs and illegitimate
activities which undermined their good name and honor is
contrary to morals and good customs. Here, there is moral
injury caused to defendants.
While we commiserate with the mental and emotional
tribulations suffered by Deguma and Pagtanac because of the
unfonded accusations, we find that the amounts granted are
still excessive.

(THIS IS IT) With regard to his petition for new trial:


o Tiongco insists that he seasonably filed his petition for new
trial. He argues that his earlier MR stopped the running of
the period for taking an appeal
SC: Such interpretation is erroneous
(see Rule 45, Sec 2 and Rule 52, Sec 1) An MR, seasonably
filed in the CA, will not necessarily preclude an MNT as

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long as it was also filed on time. Further, a denial of MR


entitled the party who filed the MR another 15d to appeal the
same period within which to file MNT (fresh period rule).
In this case, Tiongco received the copy of the CA
decision on Aug 5, 1997. He seasonably filed his MR on
Aug 14. He filed a petition for NT on Sept 9.
o Considering the provisions pertinent to the subject matter
and since Tiongco did not wait for the resolution of his
MR, the period within which he should have filed his MNT
should be 15d from Aug 5.
o Thus, his MNT filed on Sept 9 or 35d after receive of the
decision was 20d late.
We sustain therefore, the dismissal of the MR and the petition
for NT.

Rule 56, Sec. 2


Certiorari filed with CA; petition must be accompanied by
duplicate original or certified true copy of assailed orders
Republic vs. Carmel Development Inc. (2002)
FACTS:
1. Respondent Carmel filed with the RTC a Complaint for
recovery of possession with preliminary injunction against
the Department of Education and the Caloocan City School
Board (School Board). Carmel sought to recover possession
of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the Pangarap
Elementary School and the Pangarap High School which
were established by the Department of Education.
2. The Department of Education filed a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Answer as well as a Manifestation with Motion to
Dismiss.
3. Carmel filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default
alleging that the period to answer had already lapsed. On
the same day, the trial court granted the motion declaring
the Department of Education and the School Board in
default and allowing Carmel to present its evidence ex parte
(Order 1).
4. In an another Order (Order 2), the trial court declared the
Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer filed by the

27

Department of Education and the School Board as moot and


academic. Thereafter, in another Order (Order 3), the trial
court declared that no action shall be taken on the
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss filed by the
Department of Education and the School Board considering
that the defendants have already been declared in default
and have lost their standing in court.
5. Subsequently, the Department of Education filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Orders 1, 2, and 3, and to Lift
Order of Default. Aside from praying for the lifting of the
order of default, the Department of Education likewise
sought the dismissal of the case for violation of Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.
6. Carmel filed an Opposition to the motion to dismiss.
7. In an Order (Order 4), the trial court set aside its orders 1, 2,
and 3, and lifted the order of default. The trial court,
however, denied the dismissal of the case.
8. The Department of Education filed a Manifestation with
Motion for Reconsideration of Order 4.
9. Subsequently, the trial court issued another Order (Order 5)
denying the Department of Educations motion for
reconsideration.
10. Dissatisfied, the Department of Education filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA seeking to annul the
trial courts Orders 4 & 5.
11. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Department of
Educations petition for certiorari and denied their motion to
reconsider the same.
12. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the
ground that it was not accompanied by certified true copies of the
assailed decision and resolution but only duplicate originals.
Held: Yes, the Court held that it was error for the Court of Appeals
to dismiss the petition for certiorari filed by the Department of
Education on the ground that it was accompanied by mere
duplicate originals instead of certified true copies of the assailed
orders.

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The Department of Education assails the dismissal of its


petition for certiorari by the CA on the ground that copies of the
Orders of the Regional Trial Court must be certified true copies
instead of mere duplicate originals pursuant to Section 1, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It (Department of Education)
argues that either duplicate originals or certified true copies of the
assailed judgment, order or resolution is allowed under Rule 46 2 of
the 1997 Rules which is the applicable rule. Meanwhile, Carmel
maintains that the petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65
which requires the submission of certified true copies of the
assailed orders.
This issue has been settled in Rosa Yap Paras and Valente
Dy Yap vs. Judge Ismael O. Baldado and Justo De Jesus Paras
wherein it was held that:
The filing of original actions for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals is governed by Section 3, Rule
46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
requires that the petition for certiorari be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original
or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution, or ruling subject thereof x x x. The same
Section provides that the failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Carmel argues that the phrase [e]xcept as otherwise
provided found in the second paragraph of Section 2 of Rule 46
means that original actions for certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals are governed solely by Rule 65 which states that the
petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
2

Sec. 3, Rule 46 - Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with requirements. - x x x.It shall be filed in seven (7)
clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the
respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated
as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the
judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such
material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other
documents relevant or pertinent thereto. xxx.

28

judgment, order or resolution subject thereof x x x. The Court held


the phrase [e]xcept as otherwise provided means exactly what it
says, that is, except as otherwise provided in Rule 46, original
actions for certiorari shall be governed by Rule 65. Contrary to
Carmels contention, Rule 46 applies to original actions for
certiorari because Section 2 thereof expressly states that [t]his
Rule shall apply to original actions for certiorari, x x x. That Rule
46 applies to actions for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals
can hardly be disputed.
Rule 46 should be construed in relation to Rule 65 without
rendering any of its provisions useless. This is evident in Section 6
of Rule 65 which provides that [i]n petitions for certiorari before
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provision of
Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed.
In fine, the Court held that Rule 46 primarily governs
original actions for certiorari filed in the CA but Rule 65
generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65
co-exist with each other and should be construed so as to
give effect to every provision of both rules.
Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (2008)
1. The spouses Gregorio and Hilaria were the owners of a
parcel of agricultural land, upon which they likewise erected
their residence. Living with them on the subject property
were Virgilio, Gregorios son by another woman, and 15
tenants.
2. When Gregorio died, Hilaria administered the subject
property with Virgilio. Sometime later, Hilaria and Virgilio
executed a Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor
of Deleste.
3. Later, Noel was appointed as the regular administrator of
the joint estate.
4. The subject property was included in the list of assets of the
joint estate. However, Noel could not take possession of the
subject property since it was already in Delestes
possession. Thus, Noel filed before the CFI an action against

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Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property to


the Estate, docketed as Civil Case No. 698.
5. While Civil Case No. 698 was pending, Presidential Decree
No. 27 was issued, which mandated that tenanted rice and
corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer
Program and be awarded to farmer beneficiaries. In
accordance therewith, the subject property was placed
under the Operation Land Transfer Program.
6. Thereafter, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in the names of herein
private respondents, the tenants and actual cultivators of
the subject property. The CLTs were registered in 1986.
7. Subsequently, in 2001, Original Certificates of Title (OCTs)
and Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued in favor of the
private respondents over their respective portions of the
subject property.
8. In 2002, the Heirs of Deleste, filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition
seeking to nullify private respondents EPs.
9. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
rendered a Decision declaring that the EPs were null and
void in view of the pending issues of ownership and the
subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a
residential/commercial land.
10. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD. The
Heirs of Deleste filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned Decision, but the Motion was denied by the
DARAB.
11. The Heirs of Deleste thereafter filed a Petition for Review
(CA-G.R. SP No. 85471) with the Court of Appeals
challenging the Decision and Resolution in DARAB Case.
However, the Petition was denied by the Court of Appeals.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the Heirs of Deleste was
likewise denied by the appellate court for being pro forma.
12. During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 85471 before the
Court of Appeals, a Petition for Prohibition, Declaration of
Nullity of Emancipation Patents Issued by DAR and the
Corresponding [Original Certificates of Title] Issued by the
[Land Registration Authority], Injunction with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was filed in 2005 by

29

herein petitioners Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, et al. with


the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00365.
13. Petitioners are more than 120 individuals who claim to be
the descendants of Fulgencio Nanaman, Gregorios brother,
and who collectively assert their right to a share in
Gregorios estate. Arguing that they were deprived of their
inheritance by virtue of the improper issuance of the EPs to
private respondents without notice to them, petitioners
prayed that a TRO be forthwith issued, prohibiting the DAR
Secretary, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the DARAB,
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as well as the RTC,
Branch 4 of Iligan City, from enforcing the EPs and OCTs in
the names of private respondents until CA-G.R. SP No.
00365 is resolved. Petitioners further prayed that judgment
be subsequently rendered declaring the said EPs and the
OCTs null and void.
14. In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 on, among others, the ground that
the Annexes attached to the petition are not duplicate
originals or certified true copies in violation to Section 3,
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, hence, sufficient ground for
the dismissal of the petition.
15. Aggrieved, petitioners now come to this Court via the
present Petition for Review
Issue: W/N the CA was correct in dismissing outright petitioners
Petition for failure to attach the duplicate originals or certified true
copies of some of their annexes, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Rules of Court.
Held: Yes, the Court of Appeals was mistaken in this regard.
It should be recalled that petitioners initiated before the
Court of Appeals, in its original jurisdiction, a Petition for
Prohibition.
Section 3 of Rule 46 DOES NOT require that all supporting
papers and documents accompanying a petition be duplicate
originals or certified true copies. What it explicitly directs is that all
petitions originally filed before the Court of Appeals shall be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true

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copy of the judgment, order, resolution or ruling subject thereof.


Similarly, under Rule 65 governing the remedies of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, petitions for the same need to be
accompanied only by duplicate originals or certified true copies of
the questioned judgment, order or resolution. Other relevant
documents and pleadings attached to such petitions may be mere
machine copies thereof.

30

As to petitioners Petition for Prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No.


00365, the attached annexes that were not duplicate originals or
certified true copies, were mere supporting documents and
pleadings referred to in the petition and were not themselves the
judgments, orders or resolutions being challenged in said Petition.
At any rate, petitioners were able to attach certified true copies of
these annexes to their Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal
of their Petition.