[G.R. No. 153883.

January 13, 2004]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y. LIM, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del
Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933.
In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in
Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to
Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth
have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.
The trial court then issued an Order,[1] which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the
hearing of this case be set on December 27, 1999 before this Court, Hall of
Justice, Rosario Heights, Tubod, Iligan City at 8:30 oclock in the afternoon at
which date, place and time any interested person may appear and show cause
why the petition should not be granted.
Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Iligan and the Province of Lanao del Norte once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks at the expense of the petitioner.
Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at 134 Amorsolo
St., Legaspi Vill., Makati City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan
City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o, Iligan City.
SO ORDERED.
During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
First, she claims that her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been
using Yu in all her school records and in her marriage certificate. [2] She presented
a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) [3] to further show the
consistency in her use of the surname Yu.

Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as
Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been
Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her
deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her
being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a
legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering
that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as
her parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her
daughters father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting
marriage contracted in China.
In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of
the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there
is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the
present.
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any
evidence although it actively participated in the proceedings by attending
hearings and cross-examining respondent and her witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondents petition and
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the records of the
petitioner straight and in their proper perspective, the petition is granted and the
Civil Registrar of Iligan City is directed to make the following corrections in the
birth records of the petitioner, to wit:
1. Her family name from YO to YU;
2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN) to YU DIOTO (CO
TIAN);
3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by changing YES to NO in
answer to the question LEGITIMATE?; and,
4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
SO ORDERED.[4]

The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of

Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision.[5]
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF
THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT CHULE Y. LIM FROM CHINESE TO
FILIPINO DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER
DEMONSTRATED ANY COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO
CONTINUE USING HER FATHERS SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.[6]
To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondents
recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably are
substantial corrections and changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may
either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in
the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our
ruling in Republic v. Valencia[7] where we held that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where
the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered.[8]
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republics
failure to cite this error amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering that the proceeding
can be appropriately classified as adversarial.
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent
did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a

Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
[9]
Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to
by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and
shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.[10]
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing
Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the
case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that
her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not
required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become
a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino
since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age
of majority.
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,[11] citing In re Florencio
Mallare,[12] we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a
Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil.
332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. [13]
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in
Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. [14] The exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship.[15]
In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals
decision in allowing respondent to use her fathers surname despite its finding
that she is illegitimate.
The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow
respondent to use her fathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of
her fathers misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can

remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for
her to use her fathers surname.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using
her fathers surname which she has used for four decades without any known
objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the
reasons allowed for changing ones name or surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the
use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name by which he has been known
since childhood.
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. In Pabellar v.
Rep. of the Phils.,[16] we held:
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases,
allows a person to use a name by which he has been known since childhood
(Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679;
Republic v. Taada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the illegitimate
children of their father from using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil.
222).[17]
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, [18] there
is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has
already been using since childhood. [19]
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false
impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the
proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future
mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in
general.[20] In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China
would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondents
case, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would
even avoid confusion to her community in general.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893 dated
May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED.Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is
DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of respondent
Chule Y. Lim, to wit:
1. Her family name from YO to YU;
2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN) to YU DIOTO (CO TIAN);

3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by changing YES to NO in answer to

the question LEGITIMATE?; and,
4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161434

March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC,
FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
G.R. No. 161634
March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ
G. R. No. 161824
March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential
elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes)
certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his
parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe
was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec,
contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe
was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines
which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino
Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on

respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by
the latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship
was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84,
Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence,
Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the
place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan--respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an
American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced
by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not
make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the
allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born
only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in
view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents
presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Landmark Case: In Re Mallare, A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974 (Case Digest)
In Re Mallare, A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974
Facts
Mallares father Esteban was the illegitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother, and believed himself to be Chinese. Mallare became a lawyer,
but his admission to the bar was revoked because his citizenship was
questionable.
Issue
Is Mallare a Filipino citizen?
Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the revocation after finding that Esteban was a
Filipino because his mother was not married to his Chinese father. Furthermore,
when Mallare came of age, he registered as a voter and exercised his right of
suffrage. The Court considered these acts to be enough to show that Mallare had
elected Filipino citizenship, without needing any formal declaration on his part.
Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese
father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935
Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the
Court the following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified
accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is
a registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony
was scheduled on May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to
take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's
petition for admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be
so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship,
under the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act
providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall
be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the
present jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".
Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine
citizenship within a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the
election should be made within 3 years from "upon reaching the age of majority",
which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after
reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the reasonable
time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.

CO vs. HRET
Facts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes. The congressional election for the second district of
NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the
position of representative in the second legislative district are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,
Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that
Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident
of the second district of Northern Samar.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather,
Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines fromChina and established his residence
in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose
Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in
the year 1915, he filed withthe court an application for naturalization and was
declared a Filipino citizen.In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina
named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered
himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during
those elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and
those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal footing.
They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides,

privater e s p o n d e n t d i d m o r e t h a n m e r e l y e x e r c i s e h i s
right of suffrage. He has
e s t a b l i s h e d h i s l i f e h e r e i n t h e Philippines.On the issue of residence, it is
not required that a person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence
and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented
house or in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to
run for Congress would be tantamountto a property qualification. The Constitution only
requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand residence
requirements
BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX
CABILING
MA,
JR., andVALERIANO
CABILING
MA,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 183133

Present:

-versus-

COMMISSIONER
ALIPIO
F.
FERNANDEZ, JR., ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER
ARTHEL
B.
CARONOGAN,
ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER
JOSE
DL.
CABOCHAN,
ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER TEODORO B.
DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z.
LITTAUA, in their capacities as
Chairman and Members of the
Board of Commissioners (Bureau
of Immigration), and MAT G.
CATRAL,
Respondents.

CORONA,C.J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
July 26, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and
an alien father, who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and
took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of majority,
but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil
registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented
aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?
Positioned upon the facts of this case, the question is translated into the
inquiry whether or not the omission negates their rights to Filipino citizenship as
children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years lived and spent as Filipinos.
The resolution of these questions would significantly mark a difference in
the lives of herein petitioners.
The Facts
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.),
Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli),
Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong)
Ma,[1] a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. [2]
Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all
born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and
1957, respectively.[3]
They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for
almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their
primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak nor
understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know
any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have
already raised their respective families in the Philippines. [4]
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration
their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). [5]
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides that (t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship are citizens of the
Philippines. Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose

L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte. [6] On 14 January

1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary
Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte.[7] In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of
allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the
fact of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005.[8]
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners,
however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry
as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the
Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a
Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more
than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and
Felix, Jr. did so.[9] On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied
with the registration requirement.
Individual certifications[10] all dated 3 January 2005 issued by the Office of
the City Election Officer, Commission on Elections, Surigao City, show that all of
them are registered voters of Barangay Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since
June 1997, and that records on previous registrations are no longer available
because of the mandatory general registration every ten (10) years. Moreover,
aside from exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the
incumbent Barangay Kagawads in Barangay Washington, SurigaoCity.[11]
Records further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli were born also in Surigao City in
1953[12] and 1959,[13] respectively. The Office of the City Civil Registrar issued a
Certification to the effect that the documents showing that Arceli elected
Philippine citizenship on 27 January 1986 were registered in its Office on 4
February 1986. However, no other supporting documents appear to show that
Lechi Ann initially obtained an ACR nor that she subsequently elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Likewise, no document exists that
will provide information on the citizenship of Nicolas and Isidro.
The Complaint
On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the ComplaintAffidavit[14] of a certain Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao Kong)
Ma and his seven (7) children are undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral,
however, did not participate in the proceedings, and the Ma family could not but
believe that the complaint against them was politically motivated because they
strongly supported a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004 National and Local
Elections.[15]
On 9 November 2004, the Legal Department of the Bureau of Immigration
charged them for violation of Sections 37(a)(7) [16] and 45(e)[17] of Commonwealth
Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended. The Charge Sheet[18] docketed as BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 (OC-STF04-09/23-1416) reads, in part:

That Respondents x x x, all Chinese nationals, failed and

continuously failed to present any valid document to show their
respective status in the Philippines. They likewise failed to produce
documents to show their election of Philippines (sic) citizenship,
hence, undocumented and overstaying foreign nationals in the
country.
That respondents, being aliens, misrepresent themselves as
Philippine citizens in order to evade the requirements of the
immigration laws.
Ruling of the Board of Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration
After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were afforded the opportunity to
refute the allegations, the Board of Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI), composed of the public respondents, rendered a Judgment
dated 2 February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and his children violated
Commonwealth Act No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) in relation to BI
Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August
2001, respectively.[19]
The Board ruled that since they elected Philippine citizenship after the
enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625, which was approved on 7 June
1941, they were governed by the following rules and regulations:
1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, providing that the election of
Philippine citizenship embodied in a statement sworn before any officer
authorized to administer oaths and the oath of allegiance shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry;[20] and Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID,
now Bureau of Immigration [BI]) Circular dated 12 April 1954,[21] detailing the
procedural requirements in the registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship.
2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August 1956[22] of the CID, requiring the
filing of a petition for the cancellation of their alien certificate of registration with
the CID, in view of their election of Philippine citizenship;
3. Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 182, 19 August 1982; and
DOJ Guidelines, 27 March 1985, requiring that the records of the proceedings be
forwarded to the Ministry (now the Department) of Justice for final determination
and review.[23]
As regards the documentation of aliens in the Philippines, Administrative
Order No. 1-93 of the Bureau of Immigration [24] requires that ACR, E-series, be
issued to foreign nationals who apply for initial registration, finger printing and
issuance of an ACR in accordance with the Alien Registration Act of 1950.

[25]

According to public respondents, any foreign national found in possession of

an ACR other than the E-series shall be considered improperly documented
aliens and may be proceeded against in accordance with the Immigration Act of
1940 or the Alien Registration Act of 1950, as amended. [26]
Supposedly for failure to comply with the procedure to prove a valid claim
to Philippine citizenship via election proceedings, public respondents concluded
that Felix, Jr. Balgamelo, Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi Ann are undocumented
and/or improperly documented aliens.[27]
Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did not submit any document to
support their claim that they are Philippine citizens. Neither did they present any
evidence to show that they are properly documented aliens. For these reasons,
public respondents likewise deemed them undocumented and/or improperly
documented aliens.[28]
The dispositive portion[29] of the Judgment of 2 February 2005 reads:
1.
Subject
to
the
submission
of
appropriate
clearances, summary deportation of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,
Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma,
Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma, Taiwanese [Chinese],
under C.A. No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7), 45(e) and 38 in relation
to BI M.O. Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22
August 2001, respectively;

2.

Issuance of a warrant of deportation against Felix (Yao

Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi
Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No.
613, Section 37(a);

3.

Inclusion of the names of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma,

Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma,
Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma in the Immigration Blacklist; and

4.

Exclusion from the Philippines of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,

Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma,
Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613,
Section 29(a)(15). (Emphasis supplied.)

In its Resolution[30] of 8 April 2005, public respondents partially

reconsidered their Judgment of 2 February 2005. They were convinced that

Arceli is an immigrant under Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 13(g).

[31]
However, they denied the Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Felix Ma
and the rest of his children.[32]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix, Jr., and Valeriano filed the Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court
of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89532. They sought the
nullification of the issuances of the public respondents, to wit: (1) the Judgment
dated 2 February 2005, ordering the summary deportation of the petitioners,
issuance of a warrant of deportation against them, inclusion of their names in the
Immigration Blacklist, and exclusion of the petitioners from the Philippines; and
(2) the Resolution dated 8 April 2005, denying the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition [33] after
finding that the petitioners failed to comply with the exacting standards of the law
providing for the procedure and conditions for their continued stay in
the Philippines either as aliens or as its nationals.[34]
On 29 May 2008, it issued a Resolution [35] denying the petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration dated 20 September 2007.
To reiterate, a persons continued and uninterrupted stay in
the Philippines, his being a registered voter or an elected public
official cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election. The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit
of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. The constitutional mandate
concerning citizenship must be adhered to strictly. Philippine
citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who
is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate
right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with
fervor,
enthusiasm
and
promptitude.[36]
Our Ruling

The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose

mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. The mandate states:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) xxx;
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.[37]
In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. It laid down the
manner of electing Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with subsection (4), Section 1, Article IV, of the
Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government
of the Philippines.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a
statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of thePhilippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election
and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
In Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching,[38] we
determined the meaning of the period of election described by phrase upon
reaching the age of majority. Our references were the Civil Code of
the Philippines, the opinions of the Secretary of Justice, and the case of Cueco v.
Secretary of Justice.[39] We pronounced:
x x x [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a
time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should
be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should
be made upon reaching the age of majority. The age of majority
then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. [40] In the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity
of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by
basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper
period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the

pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States

Government to the effect that the election should be made within a
reasonable time after attaining the age of majority.[41] The phrase
reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the elections
should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.[42] However, we held in Cue[n]co vs. Secretary of Justice,
[43]
that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to
mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of
majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled
that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the constitutional
provision adverted to above, which period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when the
person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the extension of the option
to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite.
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was
born on February 16, 1923. He became of age
on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was
made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twentyeight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after
he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that
said election has not been made upon reaching the
age of majority.[44]
We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. Ramos,[45] a case in which we
adopted the findings of the appellate court that the father of the petitioner, whose
citizenship was in question, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the
reasonable period of three (3) years upon reaching the age of majority; and that
the belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and
oath of allegiance x x x was defective because the affidavit of election was
executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several years before their
filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily explained. [46]
In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because they belatedly
complied with all the requirements. The acts of election and their registration with
the nearest civil registry were all done beyond the reasonable period of three
years upon reaching the age of majority.
The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied
with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was

only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was
belatedly done.
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect
Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete
the statutory requirements for such election.
Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, is in line
with our decisions in In Re:Florencio Mallare,[47] Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives,[48] and Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine
Bar, Vicente D. Ching.[49]
In Mallare, Estebans exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age
was deemed to be a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. [50] The Court
of Appeals, however, said that the case cannot support herein petitioners cause,
pointing out that, unlike petitioner, Esteban is a natural child of a Filipina, hence,
no other act would be necessary to confer on him the rights and privileges of a
Filipino citizen,[51] and that Esteban was born in 1929 [52] prior to the adoption of
the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625. [53]
In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise his right of suffrage,
as he established his life here in the Philippines.[54] Again, such circumstance,
while similar to that of herein petitioners, was not appreciated because it was
ruled that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of Ong would have
resulted in absurdity, because the law itself had already elected Philippine
citizenship for him[55] as, apparently, while he was still a minor, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to his father.[56]
In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his application for admission to
the Philippine Bar because, in his case, all the requirements, to wit: (1) a
statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election
and of the oath with the nearest civil registry were complied with only fourteen
(14) years after he reached the age of majority. Ching offered no reason for the
late election of Philippine citizenship.[57]
In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners argument of good faith
and informal election unacceptable and held:
Their reliance in the ruling contained in Re:Application for
Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, [which was
decided on 1 October 1999], is obviously flawed. It bears emphasis
that the Supreme Court, in said case, did not adopt the doctrine laid
down in In Re: Florencio Mallare. On the contrary, the Supreme
Court was emphatic in pronouncing that the special circumstances
invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the

Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered

voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. [58]
We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being
elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and
other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of
election of citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in petitioners case, the
election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of
election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of
citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual
exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners,
is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration
of the election of Philippine citizenship.
For what purpose is registration?
In Pascua v. Court of Appeals,[59] we elucidated the principles of civil law
on registration:
To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish
authorities are unanimous on the meaning of the term to register as
to enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to
enter in a list.[60] In general, registration refers to any entry made in
the books of the registry, including both registration in its ordinary
and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the
marginal notes. In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in
the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of
ownership and other real rights.[61] Simply stated, registration is
made for the purpose of notification.[62]
Actual knowledge may even have the effect of registration as to the
person who has knowledge thereof. Thus, [i]ts purpose is to give notice thereof to
all persons (and it) operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to
others.[63] As pertinent is the holding that registration neither adds to its validity
nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one between the parties. [64] It lays
emphasis on the validity of an unregistered document.
Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted.
In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is to
give notice to third parties; that failure to register the contract does not affect the
liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons; and that neither
does such failure affect the partnerships juridical personality. [65] An unregistered

contract of partnership is valid as among the partners, so long as it has the

essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to
third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the
contents of their contract.[66] The non-registration of a deed of donation does not
also affect its validity. Registration is not a requirement for the validity of the
contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind
third persons.[67]
Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that registration is not a mode of
acquiring a right. In an analogous case involving an unrecorded deed of sale, we
reiterated the settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of
acquiring dominion, but only a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large.[68]
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant
case, registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the
registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the
petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been
claimed.
Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of
marriage.[69] Thus, has it been admitted through existing rules that the late
registration of the fact of birth of a child does not erase the fact of birth. Also, the
fact of marriage cannot be declared void solely because of the failure to have the
marriage certificate registered with the designated government agency.
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to
the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to
the state coupled with a pledge to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance
to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino
and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.
Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as
Filipinos. Their present status having been formed by their past, petitioners can
no longer have any national identity except that which they chose upon reaching
the age of reason.
Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of
Appeals that since the ACR presented by the petitioners are no longer valid on
account of the new requirement to present an E-series ACR, they are deemed
not properly documented.[70] On the contrary, petitioners should not be expected
to secure E-series ACR because it would be inconsistent with the election of
citizenship and its constructive registration through their acts made public,
among others, their exercise of suffrage, election as public official, and continued

and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines since birth. The failure to register as
aliens is, obviously, consistent with petitioners election of Philippine citizenship.
The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship of children of Filipino
mothers have been indicated not alone by the jurisprudence that liberalized the
requirement on time of election, and recognized positive acts of Philippine
citizenship.
The favor that is given to such children is likewise evident in the evolution
of the constitutional provision on Philippine citizenship.
Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching their age of majority,[71] upon the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they automatically become Filipinos [72] and
need not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The 1973
provision reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) xxx.
(2) Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of
the Philippines.[73]
Better than the relaxation of the requirement, the 1987 Constitution now
classifies them as natural-born citizens upon election of Philippine
citizenship. Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof provides:
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section
1
hereof[74] shall
be
deemed
natural-born
citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)
The constitutional bias is reflected in the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission.
MR. CONCEPCION. x x x.
xxxx
x x x x As regards those born of Filipino mothers, the 1935
Constitution merely gave them the option to choose Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, even, apparently, if
the father were an alien or unknown. Upon the other hand, under

the 1973 Constitution, children of mixed marriages involving an

alien father and a Filipino mother are Filipino citizens, thus
liberalizing the counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution by
dispensing with the need to make a declaration of intention upon
reaching the age of majority. I understand that the committee would
further liberalize this provision of the 1935 Constitution. The
Committee seemingly proposes to further liberalize the policy of the
1935 Constitution by making those who became citizens of
the Philippines through a declaration of intention to choose their
mothers citizenship upon reaching the majority age by declaring
that such children are natural-born citizens of the Philippines.[75]
xxxx
xxx Why does the draft resolution adopt the provision of the 1973
Constitution and not that of the 1935? [76]
xxxx
FR. BERNAS. x x x Precisely, the reason behind the modification of
the 1935 rule on citizenship was a recognition of the fact that it
reflected a certain male chauvinism, and it was for the purpose of
remedying that this proposed provision was put in. The idea was
that we should not penalize the mother of a child simply because
she fell in love with a foreigner. Now, the question on what
citizenship the child would prefer arises. We really have no way of
guessing the preference of the infant. But if we recognize the right
of the child to choose, then let him choose when he reaches the
age of majority. I think dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on
us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or
not she is considered a citizen of another country is something
completely beyond our control. But certainly it is within the
jurisdiction of the Philippine government to require that [at] a certain
point, a child be made to choose. But I do not think we should
penalize the child before he is even able to choose. I would,
therefore, support the retention of the modification made in 1973 of
the male chauvinistic rule of the 1935 Constitution. [77]
xxxx
MR. REGALADO. With respect to a child who became a Filipino
citizen by election, which the Committee is now planning to
consider a natural-born citizen, he will be so the moment he opts
for Philippine citizenship. Did the Committee take into account the
fact that at the time of birth, all he had was just an inchoate right to
choose Philippine citizenship, and yet, by subsequently choosing

Philippine citizenship, it would appear that his choice retroacted to

the date of his birth so much so that under the Gentlemans
proposed amendment, he would be a natural-born citizen? [78]
FR. BERNAS. But the difference between him and the natural-born
who lost his status is that the natural-born who lost his status, lost it
voluntarily; whereas, this individual in the situation contemplated in
Section 1, paragraph 3 never had the chance to choose. [79]
xxxx
[on the period within which to elect Philippine citizenship]
MR. RODRIGO. [T]his provision becomes very, very important
because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a
Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen, entitling him to run
for Congress, to be a Justice of the Supreme Court x x x. [80]
We are guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine
Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973
Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born
citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of
the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election should
not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the
petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine
citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil
registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact
that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied
with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The
documents they submitted supporting their allegations that they have already
registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for
validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of
Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other
issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be
complied with within a reasonable time.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007, and the Resolution
dated 29 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89532 affirming
the Judgment dated2 February 2005, and the Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of
the Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 OC-STF-04-09/23-1416
are hereby SET ASIDE with respect to petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix
Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given ninety (90)
days from notice within which to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of
Immigration embodied in its Judgment of 2 February 2005. The Bureau of

Immigration shall ENSURE that all requirements, including the payment of their
financial obligations to the state, if any, have been complied with subject to the
imposition of appropriate administrative fines; REVIEW the documents submitted
by the petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance with the decision of this Court.
SO ORDERED.