1

SUCCESSION
Testate Estate of Cagro vs. Cagro
G.R. L-5826

FACTS:
The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the CFI of Samar which
admitted to probate a will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan, Samar on
Feb. 14, 1949.
The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation was not signed by the
witnesses at the bottom although the page containing the same was signed by the witnesses on
the left hand margin.
Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the left hand margin conform
substantially to law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid
HELD:
Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of
the will. It is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear
their signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the omission
of their signatures at the bottom negatives their participation.
Moreover, the signatures affixed on the let hand margin is not substantial conformance to the
law. The said signatures were merely in conformance with the requirement that the will must be
signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3
witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to add clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion and
in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
The probate of the will is denied.

SUCCESSION
BAGUNU vs. PIEDAD
GR# 140975,
December 08, 2000

FACTS:
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the
maternal aunt of the decedent, a 3rd degrees relative. Meantime, petitioner is the daughter of a
first cousin of the decedent, or a 5th degree relative of the decedent. Citing Articles 1009 and
1010, NCC, petitioner claims that she is also entitled to succeed to the decedents estate.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is entitled to succeed.
HELD:
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones, except when and to the extent that the right of representation can
apply. In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the
ascending line. In the collateral line, this right may only take place in favor of the children of the
decedents siblings when such children survive with their aunts/ uncles. Applying A.966,NCC,
respondent, being a relative within the 3rd civil degree of decedent excludes petitioner, a relative
of the 5th degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the decedents estate. Among other collateral
relatives, i.e., the 6th in the line of succession to which the parties belong, no preference or
distinction should be observed by reason of relationship by the whole blood. In fine, a
maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a 1st cousin of the full blood can inherit
equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle/ aunt, being a 3rd degree relative,
excludes the decedents cousin, being in the 4th degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would
have priority in succession to a 5th degree relative.

SUCCESSION

Vda de Ramos vs CA Gr no L-40804

FACTS:
An Appeal by way of certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying and disallowing
the probate of the second last will and codicil of the late Eugenia Danila previously probated by
the Court of First Instance of Laguna on the gound that evidence failed to establish that the
testatrix Eugenia Danila signed her will in the presence of the instrumental witness in accordance
with Article 805 of the Civil Code, as testified to by the two surviving instrumental witnesses.
The petitioners argue that the attestation clauses of the will and codicil which were signed by the
instrumental witnesses are admissions of due execution of the deeds, thus, preventing the said
witnesses from prevaricating later on by testifying against due execution. Petitioners further
maintain that it is error for the Court of Appeals to give credence to the testimony of the biased
witnesses as against their own attestation to the fact of due execution and over the testimonial
account of the Notary Public who was also present during the execution and before whom right
after, the deeds were acknowledged.Private respondents, on the other hand reiterate in their
contention the declaration of the two surviving witnesses, Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz,
that the will was not signed by the testatrix before their presence, which is strengthened by two
photographic evidence showing only the two witnesses in the act of signing, there being no
picture of the same occasion showing the testatrix signing the will. Respondent court holds the
view that where there was an opportunity to take pictures it is not understandable why pictures
were taken of the witnesses and not of the testatrix. It concludes that the absence of the latter's
picture to complete the evidence belies the testimony of Atty. Barcenas that the testatrix and the
witnesses did sign the will and the codicil in the presence of each other.
ISSUE:
Whether the last testament and its accompanying codicil were executed in accordance with the
formalities of the law
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court said that the oppositors' argument is untenable. There is ample and
satisfactory evidence to convince the court that the will and codicil were executed in accordance
with the formalities required by law. It appears positively and convincingly that the documents
were prepared by a lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero The execution of the same was evidently
supervised by his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also
acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies
not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman.. Consequently, respondent court
failed to consider the presumption of regularity in the execution of the questioned documents.
There were no incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion of anomaly.
While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove
their occurrence. There is no question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the
authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the
attestation claim far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses.

SUCCESSION

Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the
presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a
Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution. The absence of a photograph of
the testator Eugenia Danila in the act of signing her will the fact that the only pictures available
are those which show the witnesses signing the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each
other does not belie the probability that the testatrix also signed the will before the presence of
the witnesses. We must stress that the pictures are worthy only of what they show and prove and
not of what they did not speak of including the events they failed to capture. The probate of a
will is a proceeding not embued with adverse character, wherein courts should relax the rules on
evidence "to the end that nothing less than the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible"
should be presented to the court before a reported will may be probated or denied probate. The
court finds that the failure to imprint in photographs all the stages in the execution of the will
does not serve any persuasive effect nor have any evidentiary value to prove that one vital and
indispensable requisite has not been acted on. Much less can it defeat, by any ordinary or special
reason, the presentation of other competent evidence intended to confirm a fact otherwise
existent but not confirmed by the photographic evidence. The probate court having satisfied itself
that the will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law, and
there being no indication of abuse of discretion on its part, the court finds no error committed or
any exceptional circumstance warranting the subsequent reversal of its decision allowing the
probate of the deeds in question.

SUCCESSION

Azuela vs CA
Gr no. 122880
FACTS:
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by Felix Azuela the son of the cousin of the decedent,sought
to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981.
The will consisted of two pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino its three named witnesses
affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages but not at the bottom of the
attestation clause.The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo , who represented herself as
the attorney-in-fact of the 12 legitimate heirs of the decedent.Oppositor Geralda Castillo argued
that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law because the decedents
signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly
acknowledged. After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate. On the issue of lack of
acknowledgement, the RTC has noted that at the end of the will after the signature of the
testatrix, a statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi" a declaration
comprising the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is considered by the RTC as a
substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.On the oppositors contention that the
attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, the RTC is
of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of
the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof,
substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.With regard to the
oppositors argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part
of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note
that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the
testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause
and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the
will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of
the second page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and
acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.As regards the oppositors assertion that the signature of the
testatrix on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are
convincing enough to establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due
execution of the will.The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who
had substituted his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate on the ground that
that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the
will void and undeserving of probate. Hence, the petition to the Supreme Court.

SUCCESSION

ISSUES:
1.Whether a will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages; not signed by
the instrumental witnesses and which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is
fatally defective and is sufficient to deny probate.
2.What is the difference between a jurat and an acknowledgment?
RULING:
1.Yes. The Supreme Court said that a will whose attestation clause does not contain the number
of pages not signed by the instrumental witnesses and which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to
deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. The
purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is that the
document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the
testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of
sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the
top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in
the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages
and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended
with much greater difficulty.The defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal. It was further
observed that it cannot be denied that the requirement affords additional security against the
danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this
requirement, it must be considered material. In some other cases a will was admitted to probate
when upon an examination of the will itself provides the number of pages the will has although it
has not been numbered. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance
with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or
anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
2.The difference between a jurat and an acknowledgement an acknowledgment is the act of one
who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be
his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the
notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free
act and deed, while a jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before
him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. Ordinarily, the language of
the jurat should avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public,
while in this case, the notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document.
Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in
of the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses.A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a
notary public. Therefore the petition was denied.

SUCCESSION

GARCIA V. GATCHALIAN
21 SCRA 1056
FACTS:
Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age, died in the municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal, leaving no forced heir. On the same year, Pedro Garcia filed with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for the probate of an alleged will instituting him as sole heir. Felipe
Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and
Angeles C. Talanay opposed the petition on the ground, among others, that the will was procured
by fraud; that the deceased did not intend the instrument signed by him to be as his will; and that
the deceased was physically and mentally incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged
execution of said will. The trial court denied the allowance of the will on the ground that the
attesting witnesses did not acknowledge it before a notary public as required by law.
Garcia appealed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with Article 806 of the NCC.
RULING:
No. It is indispensable for its validity that a will must be acknowledge before a notary
public by the testator and also by the witnesses. As the document under consideration does not
comply with this requirement, the same may not be probated.

SUCCESSION

ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA

September 14, 1993
FACTS:
The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the
lawyer who drafted the 8-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator,
the 3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter 4 followed the reading with their
own respective copies previously furnished them.
Said will was admitted to probate. Later on, a codicil was executed, and by that time, the
testator was already suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses
were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final
draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the
presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary
public who followed the reading using their own copies.
ISSUE:
Was there substantial compliance to the reading of the will?
HELD:
Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one reason or another,
are incapable of reading their wills. Hence, the will should have been read by the notary public
and an instrumental witness. However, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was
not. In this case, there was substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable where
the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are
never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of
the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent
thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his
instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place.

SUCCESSION

Tedoro CANEDA, et al.petitioners vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and William

CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, already in the twilight
years of his life executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses and he was
duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was declared therein that, among other things
that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to
specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long after, he himself
filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last will and testament but the scheduled
hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard
by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will, sought his
appointment as special administrator of the testators estate but due to his death, he was
succeeded by William Cabrera, who was appointed by RTC which is already the probate court.
PETITIONERS: The petitioners assail to the allowance of the testators will on the ground that it
was not executed in accordance with all the requisites of law since the testator was already in a
poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise
contend that the will is null and void because its attestation clause is fatally defective since it
fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing
the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
RESPONDENTS: The respondent, on the other hand, argue that Mateo was of sound and
disposing mind and in good health when he executed his will. Further, they also contend that the
witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is fatally defective such
that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
RULING:
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify
that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the
same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution
and once signed by the witnesses; it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the
essential formalities required by law has been observed. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or
fraud or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfection in the form of
attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that
the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of
Article 805.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the
language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a will invalid should

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SUCCESSION

it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These
considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the
total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since
there is no plausible way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation clause statement,
or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the
testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

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SUCCESSION

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE

vs
ALIPIO ABAJA AND NOEL ABELLAR
GR No. 147145. January 31, 2005
FACTS:
Abada and his wife Toray died without legitimate children. Abaja, filed with CFI of
Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will of Abada. The latter allegedly named his
testamentary heirs his natural children, Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova (respondent Abaja
was the son of Eulogio). One Caponong opposed the position on the ground that Abaja left no
will when he died and if such was really executed by him it should be disallowed for the
following reasons: 1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; 2) it was not intended
as the last will of the testator; and 3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by Caponong, the
alleged intestate heirs of Abada, Joel Abada et. al. also opposed the petition. The oppositors are
the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
Respondent Abaja filed another petition for the probate of the will of Toray. Caponog and
Joel Abada et. al. opposed the position on the same grounds. Caponong likewise filed a petition
praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Abada
and Toray.
During the proceeding, the judge found out that the matter on hand was already submitted
for decision by another judge admitting the probate will of Abada. Since proper notices to the
heirs has been complied with as well as other requirements, the judge ruled in favor of the
validity of the probate will.
RTC ruled only on the issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to dismiss the
petition for probate that is wheather the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by
law. It held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter forcloses all other issues.
Caponog-Noble filed a notice of appeal. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the requirements of the applicable
law.
RULING:
Abada executed his will on 4 June1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code
of 1989 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Priocedure which governed
the execution of wills before enactment of the New Civil Code. The matter in dispute in the
present case is the attestation clause of Abadas will.

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SUCCESSION

An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record
of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. A will, therefore, should not be
rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law.
The Supreme Court rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abadas will.
Abadas will clearly show four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is
reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of
witness is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of
evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on the liberal
construction. Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However,
it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if
from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what
the law expects of it.

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SUCCESSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.

BONILLA, MARCELA RODELAS
vs
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL.,
GR No. L-58509. December 7,1982
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant filed a petition w ith the CFI-Rizal for probate of the holographic will
of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was
opposed by appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferene Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla, Frias
and Ephraim Bonilla. The grounds of their opposition are as follows: 1) Appellant was stopped
from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of
the death of the testator; 2) The alleged copy of the will did not contain a disposition of property
after death and was not intended to take effect; 3) The original must be presented not the copy
thereof; and 4) The deceased did not leave any will.
The appellees also move for dismissal of the petition for the probate of the will. The
appellees motions were denied. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was then
approved. Appellants Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Appellant appealed the case to the
CA which was certified the case to the SC on the ground that the appeal does not involve
questions of fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved
by means of a photostatic copy.
RULING:
A photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gan vs Yap, 104
Phil 509, the Court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic
will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity. But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that
Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or
carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court, Evidently, the photostatic or
Xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

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SUCCESSION

G.R. No. 126707. February 25, 1999.

BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA MERCED, BLANQUITA M.
MACATANGAY, MA. OLIVIA M. PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN, RUBEN M.
ADRIANO, HERMINIO M. ADRIANO, JOSELITO M. ADRIANO, ROGELIO M.
ADRIANO, WILFREDO M. ADRIANO, VICTOR M. ADRIANO, CORAZON A.
ONGOCO, JASMIN A. MENDOZA and CONSTANTINO M. ADRIANO, petitioners, vs.
JOSELITO P. DELA MERCED, respondent.
FACTS:
Evarista dela Merced died intestate leaving behind five (5) parcels of land situated in Orambo,
Pasig City. She was survived by three sets of heirs, viz: (1) Francisco M. dela Merced, her
legitimate brother ; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her niece who is the only daughter of her deceased
sister Rosa de la Merced-Platon; and (3) the legitimate children of another deceased sister of
hers, Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano. Almost a year later, Francisco dela Merced died. He was
survived by his wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced and their three legitimate children, namely,
Luisito E. dela Merced, Blanquita M. Macatangay and Ma. Olivia M. Paredes.
These three sets of heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement on the Estate of Evarista M. dela
Merced. But, respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced, an illegitimate son of the late Francisco de la
Merced, objected to the extrajudicial settlement and sought its annulment. He alleged that he
was fraudulently omitted from the said settlement despite his relation to the late Francisco.
Therefore, he asked for his inclusion as one of the beneficiaries to the share of one-third (1/3)
pro-indiviso share in the estate of the deceased Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.
The trial court denied Joselitos petition. The trial court noted that Francisco Dela Merced is a
legitimate child, not an illegitimate child; while, Joselito Dela Merced is an illegitimate child of
the late Francisco Dela Merced. Hence, it ruled that Joselito cannot represent his alleged father
in the succession of the latter in the intestate estate of the late Evarista Dela Merced, because of
the barrier in Art. 992 of the New Civil Code which states that:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother, nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
Joselito appealed and obtained a favourable judgement. The Court of Appeals cancelled
extrajudicial settlement and allowed Joselito to inherit from Evarista. In coming up with this
judgment, it relied on Article 777 of the New Civil Code in allowing. It ruled that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent, so that Francisco dela
Merced inherited 1/3 of his sisters estate at the moment of the latters death. Said 1/3 of
Evaristas estate formed part of Franciscos estate which was subsequently transmitted upon his
death on March 23, 1987 to his legal heirs, among whom is Joselito, his illegitimate child.
Joselito became entitled to his share in Franciscos estate from the time of the latters death in
1987. The extrajudicial settlement therefore is void.
ISSUE AND RULING:
1) Whether or not respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced can inherit from Evarista M. Dela
Merced?

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SUCCESSION

Joselito P. dela Merced can inherit from Evarista M. dela Merced not by right of
representation, but by his own right as the heir of the late Franscisco Evarista, who is a
legitimate heir of the latter. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. By virtue of this
article, Joselito dela Merced has a rightful and undisputed right of an heir to the share of his
father in the estate of Evarista dela Merced.
Upon the death of Evarista dela Merced, her brother Franciso dela Merced inherited a
portion of the state of the former as one of her heirs. Consequently, when Francisco
subsequently died, his heirs including Joselito dela Merced who is his illegitmate child
automatically inherited from Francisco dela Merceds share in the estate of Evarista dela
Merced.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable in this case because this case is not a
situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his
father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where
an illegitimate child inherits from his father; the latters share in or portion of, what the latter
already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista.

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SUCCESSION

G.R. No. L-12190. August 30, 1958.

TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E.
GAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILDEFONSO YAP, Oppositor-Appellee. Benedicto C.
Balderrama, Crispin D. Baizas and Roberto H. Benitez for Appellant. Arturo M. Tolentino
for Appellee.
FACTS:
Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan and in the City of
Manila. Among her surviving heirs are Ildefonso Yap, her husband and Fausto E. Gan, her first
cousin. Fausto initiated probate proceedings on the alleged will left by deceased to which
Ildefonso opposed. Ildefonso asserted that the deceased had not left any will nor executed any
testament during her lifetime.
The probate proceedings ensued with both Fausto and Ildefonso presenting their evidence.
Fausto was not able to exhibit the alleged will to the court the alleged will of Felicidad. So, in
order to establish the contents and due execution of the alleged will, he offered in evidence the
testimonies of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez. On
the other hand, Ildefonso countered the evidence of Fausto with the testimonies of the two
persons who were constantly at the side of Mrs. Felicidad, namely: Dr. Tanjuaquio and Mrs.
Bantique, the attending physician and personal attendant of Mrs. Felicidad respectively. They
swore that Mrs. Felicidad Esguerra Yap made no will and could have made no will on that
day.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the trial court judge refused to probate
the alleged will. Hence, this case.
ISSUE AND RULING:
1) Whether or not a holographic will can be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who
have allegedly seen it and declared that it was in the handwriting of the testator
notwithstanding the failure of production of the holographic will before the trial court?
The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by
the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as
material proof of authenticity.
Tedoro CANEDA, et al.petitioners vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and William CABRERA, as
Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
Facts:

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On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, already in the twilight
years of his life executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses and he was
duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was declared therein that, among other things
that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to
specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long after, he himself
filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last will and testament but the scheduled
hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard
by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will, sought his
appointment as special administrator of the testators estate but due to his death, he was
succeeded by William Cabrera, who was appointed by RTC which is already the probate court.
PETITIONERS: The petitioners assail to the allowance of the testators will on the ground that it
was not executed in accordance with all the requisites of law since the testator was already in a
poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise
contend that the will is null and void because its attestation clause is fatally defective since it
fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing
the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
RESPONDENTS: The respondent, on the other hand, argue that Mateo was of sound and
disposing mind and in good health when he executed his will. Further, they also contend that the
witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is fatally
defective such that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
RULING:
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting
witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the
execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the
conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses; it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. In the absence of
bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfection in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance
with all the requirements of Article 805.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the
language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a will invalid should
it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These
considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the
total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since
there is no plausible way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation clause statement,
or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the

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testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

FEDERICOAZAOLAvs.CESARIOSINGSON
G.R.No.L14003;109Phil102|5August1960
REYES,J.B.L.,J.
Facts:
9September1957:FortunataS.Vda.deYance,testatrix,diedatQuezonCity,leavinga
holographicwillwherebyMariaMilagrosAzaolawasmadethesoleheirasagainsther
nephew,CesarioSingson(Cesario).
FranciscoAzaola(Francisco)submittedtheholographicwillandtestifiedthat:(1)hesaw
the holographic will one month, more or less, before the death of testatrix; (2) he
recognizedallthesignaturesappearingintheholographicwillasthehandwritingofthe
testatrix;(3)thepenmanshipandsignaturesappearinginthedocumentaryevidencearein
thehandwritingofthetestatrix;(4)theholographicwillwashandedtohim,andthat,
apparently it must have been written by her; and (5) he was familiar with the
penmanshipandhandwritingofthetestatrix.
Whenaskedifthepenmanshipreferredtointhepreviousanswerasappearinginthe
holographicwillwasthetestatrix,Franciscoanswered,Iwoulddefinitelysayitishers.
Franciscopresentedthemortgage,specialpowerofattorney,generalpowerofattorney,
deedofsale,anaffidavit,andtworesidentcertificatesforcomparisonofsignatures.
Cesarioopposedtheprobateonthefollowinggrounds:(1)thewillwasprocuredby
undueandimproperpressureandinfluenceonthepartofFranciscoandhiswife;and(2)
thetestatrixdidnotintendtheinstrumenttobeherlastwill,andthattheinstrumentwas
writtenonadatedifferentfromwhatappearsonthewill.
Issue:
WhetherArt.811,par.1oftheCivilCodeparticularlythatrequiringatleastthree
witnessesismandatoryormerelydirectoryinnature.
Ruling:
ShortAnswer:Art.811,par.1oftheCivilCodeismerelydirectoryinnature.Thelaw
foreseesthepossibilitythatnoqualifiedwitnessmaybefound,andprovidesforresortto
expertevidencetosupplythedeficiency.
Weagreewiththeappellant,thatsincetheauthenticityofthewillwasnotcontested,he
wasnotrequiredtoproducemorethanonewitness.

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Art. 811 cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three

witnessestoidentifythetestator,underthepenaltyofhavingtheprobatedenied.
Theruleofthisarticlewasderivedfromtheruleestablishedforordinarytestaments.It
cannotbeignoredthattherequirementcanonlybeconsideredmandatoryinthecaseof
ordinarytestamentswherethreewitnessesarerequiredattheexecutionofthewill(Art.
805).Wherethewillisholographic,nowitnessneedbepresent(Art.10),andtherule
requiringproductionofthreewitnesses mustbedeemedmerelypermissiveifabsurd
resultsaretobeavoided.
Thelawleavesittothetrialcourtifexpertsarestillneeded,i.e.,thecourtshouldresortto
experttestimonyifnocompetentwitnessisavailable;hence,nounfavourableinference
canbedrawnfromaparty'sfailuretoofferexpertevidence,untilandunlessthecourt
expressesdissatisfactionwiththetestimonyofthelaywitnesses.
Considering, however, that this is the first time the Court has been called upon to
construetheimportofsaidarticle,theinterestofjusticewouldbebetterserved[xxx]by
giving the parties ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert
witnesses,shouldtheCourtdeemthemnecessary.
Disposition:DecisionappealedfromisSETASIDE,recordsareREMANDEDtothe
Court oforigin,with instructions toHOLD A NEWTRIALin conformitywiththis
opinion.

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EUGENIARAMONALCODOY,andMANUELRAMONALvs.EVANGELINE
CALUGAY,JOSEPHINESALCEDO,andEUFEMIAPATIGAS
G.R.No.123486|12August1999
PARDO,J.
Facts:
6 August 1990: Evangeline Calugay (Calugay), Josephine Salcedo (Salcedo), and
EufemiaPatigas(Patigas),(hereinafterreferredtoasrespondents)deviseesandlegatees
in the holographic will of deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the
RegionalTrialCourtapetitionforprobateoftheholographicwillofthedeceased,who
diedonJanuary16,1990.
28June1990:EugeniaRamonalCodoyandManuelRamonal(hereinafterreferredtoas
petitioners)filedanoppositionallegingthattheholographicwillwasaforgeryandthat
thesameisevenillegible.Someoftheirargumentswereasfollows:(1)therepeated
datesappearingonthewillaftereverydispositionis outoftheordinary,andthatit
shouldappearattheendasregularlydone;and(2)assumingtheholographicwillisinthe
handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence,orthroughfraudandtrickery.
Respondentspresentedsix(6)witnessesandvariousdocumentaryevidence.Petitioners
filedademurrertoevidence.
The lower court granted the demurrer to evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversedtherulingofthelowercourt,citingthecaseofAzaolav.Singson.
Issue:
WhethertheprovisionsofArt.811oftheCivilCodearepermissiveormandatory.
WhetherthecaseofAzaolav.Singsonisapplicabletothecase.
Ruling:
Based on the language used, Art. 811 is mandatory. The word shall denotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion, and that the
presumptionisthatthewordshall,whenusedinastatuteismandatory.
Paramountconsiderationinthiscaseistheintentofthedeceased;toestablishthis,an
exhaustiveandobjectiveconsiderationofevidenceisimperative.
Inthiscase,notallthewitnessespresentedbytherespondentstestifiedexplicitlythat
theywerefamiliarwiththehandwritingofthetestator.
InspiteofAzaolav.Singson,inthecaseofAjerov.CourtofAppeals,theSCsaid,the
objectofthesolemnitiessurroundingtheexecutionofwillsistoclosethedooragainst
badfaithandfraud,toavoidsubstitutionofwillsandtestamentsandtoguarantytheir
truthandauthenticity.Therefore,thelawsonthissubjectshouldbeinterpretedinsucha
wayastoattaintheseprimordialends.Butontheotherhand,alsoonemustnotlosesight
ofthefactthatitisnottheobjectofthelawtorestrainandcurtailtheexerciseoftheright
tomakeawill.[xxx]However,wecannoteliminatethepossibilityofafalsedocument

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being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is
CONTESTED, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the
handwritingofthedeceased.
OtherfindingswhichconvincedtheSCthattheresaneedtoadduceadditionalevidence:
[1]theholographicwasinthepossessionofoneoftherespondentsfive(5)yearsbefore
the death of the testator; [2] there was no opportunity for an expert to compare the
handwritingofthetestatorwithotherdocumentssignedandexecutedbyherduringher
lifetime;[3]avisualexaminationoftheholographicwill,whencomparedwiththeother
documentsshowthatthestrokesaredifferent;and[4]comparingthesignatureinthe
holographicwillwiththoseintheotherdocuments,theCourtcannotbecertaininruling
thattheholographicwillwasinthehandwritingofthedeceased.
Disposition:DecisionappealedfromisSETASIDE.CaseisREMANDEDtotheCourt
oforigintoallowpetitionerstoadduceevidenceinsupportoftheiroppositiontothe
probate.

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PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL. v. MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-20234
December 23, 1964
FACTS
On May 9, 1939, the spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint
last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that two parcels of land owned
and acquired by them during their marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be
given to a niece, Manuela Rebaca. Bernabe de la Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the
aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu which, by order of October 31, 1939, admitted it for probate.
Upon death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate of
the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952. For failure of
Manuela R. Potot and her attorney to appear, the case was dismissed on March 30, 1954.
The Court of First Instance declared the testament null and void, for being executed
contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code, but on appeal by the testamentary heir,
the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a
court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament.
ISSUE
Whether the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu has
conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already
decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a
third party.

RULING
Yes. The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939
by the Court of First Instance of Cebu has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament
despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills,
whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party. The error thus
committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal,
but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final
decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is
binding upon the whole world, and public policy and sound practice demand that at risk of
occasional errors judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law.
But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future
misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1939 could only affect the share of the deceased
husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife,
Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the
probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. Be
it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testators
lifetime.

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It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was
concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is
considered a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First
Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of
the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question.
Gonzales v. CA
G.R. No. L-37453. May 25, 1979
FACTS:
Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of
the deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The
said will was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two
months prior to the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and
acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages.
Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the
probate.
The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and
attested in accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a
will.
RULING:
No. The law requires only that witnesses possess the qualifications under Art. 820 of the
NCC and none of the disqualifications of Art. 821. There is no requirement that they are of good
standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order
that his testimony is believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not
mandatory that evidence be established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the
community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former being determined by Art.
820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends on the
convincing weight of his testimony in court.

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Heirs of Uriarte vs. CA

G.R. No. 116775. January 22, 1998
FACTS:
Private respondent Benedicto is the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica while
Petitioners are grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by
her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the
partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. Private respondent claimed to be the sole
surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that
Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justas tenant, refused to give him his share
of the harvest. He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim
only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents.
They claimed, among others, that private respondent did not have any right to the
property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of the property.
ISSUE:
Who among the petitioners and the private respondent are entitled to Justas estate as her
nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided by Articles 963 966 of the Civil Code. They provide:
ART. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each
generation forms a degree.
ART. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and
descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not
ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
ART. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
ART. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons,
excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the child is one degree
removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to
the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed

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from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin,
and so forth.
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third
degree relative of Justa.
On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justas
cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful
heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.
Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo,
his mother being Ursulas daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this
being the case, private respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her
estate.
Petitioners misappreciated the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As
already stated, private respondent is the son of Justas half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justas
nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant,
ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent.

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G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988

CASIANO V. CA
FACTS:

On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the Malotos.
Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced
on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. The Malotos
then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did
on March 21, 1964. That should have signalled the end of the controversy, but, unfortunately, it had
not.

March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo
Hervas, discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),"
dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed
to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the
cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas.

The document was submitted to the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on April
1, 1967. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and
Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what
they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed.

The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo
de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

On May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will,
filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings
therein and for the allowance of the will When the trial court denied their motion, the petitioner came
to us by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the orders of the trial court
Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the
document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral,
upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had
been revoked. The respondent court stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of
the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana
RULING:

There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the due execution of the will. The
heart of the case lies on the issue as to whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana. The provisions
of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830. No will shall be revoked
except in the following cases:

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(1) By implication of law; or

(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills: or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking
it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction. If burned, torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the
express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate
distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its
unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the
Rules of Court. (Emphasis Supplied.)

It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se
constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part
of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may
be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator.

Animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that
requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the
effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the
overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or
by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to
show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid,
Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto.
For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana.
And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in
stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen)
was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.

The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence presented by the private respondents as
oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the testimony of the two witnesses who testified in favor
of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive." We share the same view. Nowhere in the records before
us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates,
were unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we
think, believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told
her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document was the will
because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated
June 7, 1985 and the Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of the respondent Court of Appeals, and a
new one ENTERED for the allowance of Adriana Maloto's last will and testament. Costs against the
private respondents.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

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Heirs of Guido vs. Del Rosario

304 SCRA 18 GR. No. 124320
Facts:
Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the ownersclaimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of 520,638 and Lot No. 1132 with an area of 96,235
square meters, more or less situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
On March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the
deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay.
On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties
were titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation
("Golden Bay") under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. ("TCT") 225254 and 225255. With the
discovery of what happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for
ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TCT NO. 493363, 493364, 493665,
493366, 493367; and its Derivatives; As Alternative Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER
FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER WITH
DAMAGES, docketed as RTC BCV-94-127 before Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in
Imus, Cavite.
Upon learning that "Golden Bay" sold portions of the parcels of land in question, petitioners filed
with the "RTC" an Amended Complaint to implead new and additional defendants and to
mention the TCTs to be annulled. But the respondent court dismissed the Amended Complaint.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The
motion was granted by the RTC in an Order 1 dated July 7, 1995, which further allowed the
herein petitioners to file a Second Amended Complaint, 2 which they promptly did.
On August 12, 1995, the private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss 3 on the grounds that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that
they have not established their status as heirs, that the land being claimed is different from that of
the defendants, and that plaintiffs' claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was
granted by the respondent court in its Order 4 dated October 25, 1995, holding that petitioners
"have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except the allegations that they are the

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legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays that they have been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple."
Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration 5 but to no avail. The same was denied by
the RTC in its Order 6 of February 23, 1996.
Undaunted, petitioners filed before the supreme court a petition for certiorari via rule 65 of the
rules of court attacking the ruling made by the respondent court.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case could
proceed.
Ruling:
No
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special
proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. We
therefore hold that the respondent court did the right thing in dismissing the Second Amended
Complaint, which stated no cause of action. In Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 11 it was ruled that: . . . If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the
real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED.

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Agapay vs. Palang

267 SCRA 341
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage in 1949 with private respondent
Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol in Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, he left
to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May
12, 1950. In 1954, Miguel returned but did not stay with his wife and child. Eventually,
in 1973, Miguel contracted his second marriage with petitioner Erlinda Agapay. Two
months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land in
Pangasinan. A house and lot was also purchased by Erlinda in his own name. Miguel and
Carlina then executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle
and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal
property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia. Thereafter, Miguel
and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son and his parents were convicted of concbunage.
Subsequently, Miguel died. Carlina and Heminia instituted an action for the recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
in Urdaneta, Pangasinan to get back the riceland and the house and lot both located at
Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether Heirship and Filiation should be Ventilated in Proper Probate Court.
RULING:
Heirship and filiation inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the
decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of
the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a
special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant
ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.

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MALOLES II VS. PHILIPS (JANUARY 31, 2000) MALOLES II VS. PHILIPS

(G.R. NO. 129505, JANUARY 31, 2000)
FACTS:
In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He declared that
he has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de
Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The
petition was granted. Shortly after, he died. Octavio, his nephew, filed a Motion for Intervention.
He argued that as the nearest of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is
material and direct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to intervene in the probate proceeding.
RULING:
No. In order for a person to be allowed to intervene in a proceeding, he must have an
interest in the estate or in the will or in the property to be affected by it. He must be an interested
party or one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against
the estate like a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct. Octavio is not an heir or
legatee under the will of the decedent. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the decedent. As the
only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he may only inherit if a person dies intestate.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an heir
of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will.

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Jimenez vs. IAC

184 SCRA 367 or G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990
FACTS
Petitioners are siblings from the second marriage of the decedent to one Genoveva
Caolboy, after the death of decedent's first marriage to one Consolacion Ungson that resulted to
four (4) offspring.
During the subsistence of the first marriage, decedent bought five (5) parcels of land.
After the death of petitioner's parents, petitioner Virginia, offspring from the second marriage,
filed a petition before the Court of First Instance praying to be appointed as administratrix of the
properties belonging to the second marriage. When assigned thereafter, she filed an inventory of
the estate wherein she included the five (5) parcels of land belonging to the first marriage. As a
consequence, respondent Leonardo, Jr (offspring from first marriage), presented documentary
and testimonial evidence in support of his opposition.
The Probate Court ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land. Petitioner
Virginia appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the same dismissed the appeal. This
decision by the Court of Appeals become final and executory. Two years, therefrom, petitioner
went to the RTC to recover the said parcels of land, but again the action was dismissed on the
ground of res judicata. An appeal again of the decision of RTC was done, but failed. Thus this
petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the in a settlement proceedings (testate or intestate) the lower court has the
jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that the Probate Court's limited
jurisdiction on question of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.
The Court opined that all that the Probate Court can do as regards said properties is
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory to be administered by
the administrator. If there is a dispute as to ownership, the parties and the administrator have to

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resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because,
according to the Supreme Court, the Probate Court cannot do so.

Pastor, Jr. vs. CA

122 SCRA 883
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983
FACTS
Petitioner Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, Jr.) is one of the two (2) legitimate children of the
decedent, who died in June 5, 1966. His mother is also a Spanish subject and died later on the
same year with the death of his father. Petitioner is naturalized in 1937, but his sister Sofia Pastor
de Midgely (SOFIA) is a Spanish subject. His Father had one illegitimate child, named Lewellyn
Barlito Quemada (QUEMADA), the private respondent herein, a Filipino by his mother's
citizenship.
The decedent was involved in mining (thru ATLAS) in Cebu, and after his death,
QUEMADA filed a petition for probate of a holographic will of the decedent with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Cebu (PROBATE COURT) docketed as SP No. 3128-R. The will
contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30%
of decedent's 42% share in the operation by ATLAS.
The crux of the case was on the issuance of the PROBATE COURT dated August 20,
1980, of an order of Execution and Garnishment resolving the question of ownership of the
royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not
inofficious. The petitioners assailed this order, as it resolved the issues of ownership and intrinsic
validity of the will. Petitioner argued that before the provisions of the holographic will can be
implemented, question on ownership of mining properties and validity of the will must first be
resolved with finality.
ISSUE
Whether or not the probate court can resolved the issue of ownership of the property.
RULING
Supreme Court ruled on the negative. It held that, as a rule, the question of ownership is
an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. It said that in a special
proceeding for the probate of the will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity

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of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law. [Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9].

[G.R. No. 124715. January 24, 2000]

RUFINA LUY LIM petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING,
INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION,
ACTION
COMPANY, INC. respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim who died
intestate and whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings. Petitioner filed for the
administration of the estate of her husband before the RTC of Quezon City. Herein Private
respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor
Y. Lim, then filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain
properties
from
the
estate
of
the
decedent.
The RTC of Quezon City, sitting as probate court, appointed petitioner as special administrator.
After which, letters of administration were accordingly issued and denied private respondents
new motion for exclusion. Private Respondents then filed a separate civil action for certiorari
before the CA and rendered decision in favor of them. Hence, petitioner filed before the SC
raising that the respondent CA arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore
the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81, 83, 84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby
preventing the petitioner, from performing her duty as special administrator of the estate as
expressly provided in the said Rules. Petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a probate
court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory.
ISSUE:
WON probate court has jurisdiction in the determination of the question of title in probate
proceedings.

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SUCCESSION

RULING:
NO. In MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, SC made an
exposition on the probate courts limited jurisdiction: "It is a well-settled rule that a probate
court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim
are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which
under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness
of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents motion for
exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and
exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving
inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to
adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no less true that such
authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised
judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the
name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness
of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still
proceeded to issue the impugned orders. By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate
court in effect acted in utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of
private
respondents.
Certainly,
the
probate
court
through
such brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on
this matter.

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G.R. No. L-24365

June 30, 1966

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, deceased.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor and appellee, vs. MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant. MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, a California citizen domiciled in the Philippines, left a will
designating his daughter Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan also referred to herein as Lucy
Duncan, appellant, as his sole heir. However, the court has declared that the named devisee in the
contested will, Maria Helen Christensen also referred to herein as Helen Garcia, appellee, is also
a natural child of the deceased. Appellee Maria Helen now avers that said contested will must be
invalidated on the ground of preterition. Appellant, in response, avers that this is not a case of
preterition, rather governed by Article 906 and a defective disinheritance governed by Article
918 and therefore be entitled only to the completion of appellees legitime.
ISSUE:
Whether there has been preterition consequently invalidating the will or merely
ineffective disinheritance thereby only reduction of the instituted heir for the completion of
legitime on the forced heir.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the inheritance of Lucy Duncan, herein appellant must only be
reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.
While the classical view, pursuant to the Roman law, gave an affirmative answer to the
question, according to both Manresa (6 Manresa 7th 3rd. 436) and Sanchez Roman (Tomo VI,
Vol. 2.0 p. 937), that view was changed by Article 645 of the "Proyecto de Codigo de 1851,"
later on copied in Article 906 of our own Code. Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain dated January 16, 1895, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932, respectively.
In each one of those cases the testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than
the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the
rest of the estate to other persons. It was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask

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SUCCESSION

that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. (6
Manresa, pp. 438, 441.)
Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain dated January
16, 1895, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932, respectively. In each one of those cases the testator
left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to
the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons. It
was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be
annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. (6 Manresa, pp. 438, 441.)
The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed wishes of the
testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. He
refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of
P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no
reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude
towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his estate equally
to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.
The decision of this Court in Neri, et al. v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185, is cited by appellees in
support of their theory of preterition. That decision is not here applicable, because it referred to a
will where "the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, and (that) without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left
nothing to them or, at least, some of them." In the case at bar the testator did not entirely omit
oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of P3,600.00.

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SUCCESSION

REMEDIOS NUGUID
vs
FELIX NUGUID AND PAZ SALONGA NUGUID
GR No. L-2344. June 23, 1966
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, single, died in December 30, 1962. She was without descendants but
was survived by her parents and siblings. On May 18,1963, Remedios Nuguid,her sister filed in
CFI a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario on November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago,
said will instituted Remedios as the universal heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the ascendants of
the decendent, filed their opposition to the probate proceeding. They contend that they were
illegally preterited and as a consequence, the institution is void. The courts order held that the
will in question is a complete nullity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited, thereby rendering the holographic
will void.
RULING:
Article 854 of the Civil Code states that the preterition or omission of one, some or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received nothing by the testament. The
one-sentence will institute petitioner as the universal heir. No specific legacies or bequest are
therein provided for. It is in this posture that the Supreme Court says that the nullity is complete.
Preterition consist in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are neither

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SUCCESSION

instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir his/her share in the
legitime for a cause authorized by law.

ACAIN vs. IAC

October 27, 1987
FACTS:
Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will
provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother
Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to
Segundos children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's
widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
ISSUE:
Was there preterition?
HELD:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article
854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition
even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.

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SUCCESSION

The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by
the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the
adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and
preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of
at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a
clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the
legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as
the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to
a declaration that nothing at all was written.
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have
an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the
appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary
disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to
receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However, intestacy
having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of
heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the
probate of the will left by the deceased.

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SUCCESSION

GARCIA vda. de MAPA et. al., vs. CA et. al.

Facts:
Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, died leaving a will and designating her spouse Ludovico
Hidrosollo as the universal heir of her estate having died without any descendant or ascendant.
Ludovico Hidrosollo was designated as universal heir but with the obligation to hold the residue
of her estate in trust for their nephews and nieces.
Issue:
1. WON a trust is created
2. WON a trust can be created without consideration of the legitimes of the compulsory heirs
Held:
Although the word "trust" itself does not appear in the Will, the testatrix's intent to create one is
nonetheless clearly demonstrated by the stipulations in her Will. In designating her husband
Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal and sole heir with the obligation to deliver the properties to
petitioners and private respondents, she intended that the legal title should vest in him, and in
significantly referring to petitioners and private respondents as "beneficiarios," she intended that
the beneficial or equitable interest to these properties should repose in them. To our mind, these
designations, coupled with the other provisions for co-ownership and joint administration of the
properties, as well as the other conditions imposed by the testatrix effectively created a trust in
favor of the parties over the properties adverted to in the Will. "No particular words are required
for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. " (Art. 1443,
Civil Code of the Philippines).
However, we must not lose sight of the fact that as the surviving spouse of the testatrix,
Ludovico Hidrosollo was entitled to a legitime of one-half (1/2) of her hereditary estate. As that
portion is reserved by law for the compulsory heirs, no burden, encumbrance, condition or
substitution of any kind whatsoever may be imposed upon the legitime by the testator. The trust
created by Concepcion should therefore be, as it is hereby declared to be effective only on the
free portion of her estate, i.e., that portion not covered by Ludovico Hidrosollo's legitime.

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[G.R. No. L-28734. March 28, 1969.]

EMETERIO A. RODRIGUEZ (in substitution of RUFINO A. RODRIGUEZ, who died
during the pendency of this case in the Court of Appeals), and JOSE AYALA, executorspetitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PETRA RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIA
RODRIGUEZ and ROSA RODRIGUEZ, oppositors-respondents.
Jose A. Garcia and Ismael M . Estrella for executors-petitioners.
Magno and Paredes for oppositors-respondents.
FACTS:
Doa Margarita Rodriguez died in the City of Manila on July 19, 1960, leaving a last will and
testament under date of September 30, 1951 and that said last will and testament was legalized
by virtue of the resolution or order of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of
September 23, 1960, without the appellants opposition in Special Proceeding No. 3845, hence
the extrinsic validity of the will was substantially not in question. On August 27, 1962, the
executor of the last will and testament of the late Doa Margarita Rodriguez presented a project
of partition and the same was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila, again without
the opposition of the appellants. Hence, the intrinsic validity of the will could never be again
questioned and raised as issue in the trusteeship proceedings No. 51872 of the same court.`
The aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals would write finish to this litigation.
Unfortunately, it was not so. It ought not to have been the case, for, as admitted, the deceased, to
quote from the language of the January 18, 1967 decision of the Court of Appeals, "at the time of
her death left no compulsory heirs or forced heirs and, consequently, [was] free to dispose of her
properties even to strangers at will as provided in her will." It was likewise noted therein that the
testatrix created a trust which was objected to by private respondents, who claimed to be first
cousins of the deceased. Such an objection was overruled by the lower court which granted
letters of trusteeship to petitioners, who were the executors under the will. Such an order of the
lower court was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, which, in the original decision
of January 18, 1967, affirmed the action taken by the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the first cousins of the deceased are the rightful heir of Doa Margarita
Rodriguez.

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SUCCESSION

HELD:
NO.
In the resolution setting aside the original decision of January 18, 1967, the Court of Appeals
held that the above "perpetual prohibition to alienate" the property mentioned, constitutes a clear
violation of Article 867 and Article 870 of the Civil Code. It was further stated in the aforesaid
resolution that the Court of Appeals did arrive "at the considered view that the trust in question is
a nullity for being in violation of the aforestated rules (against perpetuities and the limitation
regarding the inalienability of the hereditary estate)." 5 There being then no institution of heirs as
regards the properties covered by the trust, the Court of Appeals held that "there should be
intestate succession concerning the same, with the nearest relative of the deceased entitled to
inherit the properties in accordance with the law on intestacy.
The contention of [petitioner] that there had already been a project partition approved by the
lower court [which] operates as a waiver on the part of the [respondents] to raise the issue of the
invalidity of the questioned provision of the will which We have sustained in our decision, seems
to be not well taken.
Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the
testator allowed to prevail that We could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of
giving it effect. Thus: "Where the testators intention is manifest from the context of the will and
surrounding circumstances, but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the
language will be subordinated to the intention, and in order to give effect to such intention, as far
as possible, the court may depart from the strict wording and read a word or phrase in a sense
different from that which is ordinarily attributed to it, and for such purpose may would or change
the language of the will, such as restricting its application or supplying omitted words or phrases.

44

SUCCESSION

RABADILLA vs. CA June 29, 2000

FACTS:
A certain testatrix Aleja Belleza instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest
of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, as a devisee to a 511, 855 hectare land. A Codicil
was appended to his Last Will and Testament and under the said Codicil, the following condition
were imposed to the effect that: 1. The naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla; 2. He
shall deliver the fruits of said land every year to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, sister of
Aleja the (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies. 3. That in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza,
the near descendants, shall continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza; 4. That the said land
may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of Belleza. When Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla died in 1983. Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel him to reconvey
the said land to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply with
the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the land was
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will. In his defense,
Johnny avers that the term near descendants in the will of Aleja pertains to the near
descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no
near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to
deliver the fruits of the devised land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.
HELD:
Yes. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The near descendants being
referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised property was
already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died,
ownership over the same property was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations
of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had
by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And

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SUCCESSION

since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear therefore, that Johnny
should have continued complying with the terms of the Will. His failure to do so shall give rise
to an obligation for him to reconvey the property to the estate of Aleja

Van Dorn vs Romillo

139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US
citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines
and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this
time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that
petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and
prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared
as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
It is not binding.

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Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own
representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital
obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated
against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

Vda. De Tupas v. RTC

FACTS:
Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his widow,
Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also left a win dated May 18, 1976,
which was admitted to probate on September 30, 1980 in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos.
837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital. However, at the time of
his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them the year before (on
August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said lots.
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance, Tupas' widow
brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. in the same Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (docketed as Civil Case No. 16089) to have the donation declared inofficious insofar
as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible " ... by one-half or such proportion as ... (might
be deemed) justified ... and " ... the resulting deduction ... " restored and conveyed or delivered to
her. The complaint also prayed for attorney's fees and such other relief as might be proper.
ISSUE:
WON the donation of the deceased is valid.
HELD:

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SUCCESSION

The fact that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the
donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed,
it is an obvious proposition that collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter
vivos.
Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having been made to a
stranger (to the donor) it is, by law chargeable to the freely disposable portion of the donor's
estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious.
If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must
be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be
reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or
reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased.

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