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as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the lawyer submits himself to the authority of
the court. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the
unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the
regulatory prerogative of the courts. The Court has consistently ruled that even with the presence of an
agreement between the parties, the court may nevertheless reduce attorney's fees though fixed in the
contract when the amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or unreasonable. For the law recognizes
the validity of stipulations included in documents such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with
respect to attorney's fees in the form of penalty provided that they are not unreasonable or
unconscionable.
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acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the taking of an appeal. In this case, the appeal
was filed out of time because the counsel of private respondent relied on the footnote of the
notice of the decision of the Labor Arbiter which stated that "the aggrieved party may
appeal ... within ten (10)working days, as per NLRC Resolution No. 1, series of 1977. Thus,
private respondent's late filing of the appeal notwithstanding, the Court finds that public
respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the appeal.
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JOHN CLEMENT CONSULTANTS, INC. and EDI STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and NESTOR A. FLORES, Respondents.
FACTS:
Nestor Flores was engaged as Managing Consultant by the John Clement Consultants, Inc.,
(JCCI). He was placed in charge of a division of JCCI, Staffbuilders International, Inc. (SBII). A year or so
afterwards, Flores was promoted to the position of Managing Consultant of JCCI's International Division.
Flores was assigned in Bahrain. During his tour of duty in that country, he obtained cash advances
amounting to P14,211.30. This liability he failed to liquidate even after he returned to the Philippines, an
infringement of standing company policy. Upon the return to the Philippines of the JCCI President,
Flores met with him and reiterated his desire to resign. His resignation was accepted, and he was told
that a written communication to this effect was expected. Flores failed to submit any resignation letter.
Flores ceased to come to the company premises; and he failed to appear at the meetings scheduled to
discuss the terms of the severance of his ties with the JCCI. He also failed to return the company car
assigned for his use, eventually doing so only on July 23, 1980, after receipt of a series of telegrams
demanding such return. Three months after his resignation, Flores filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against JCCI and EDI with the Ministry of Labor & Employment. Due proceedings were had on his
complaint, inclusive of the submission of position papers by the parties, and the holding of a hearing on
the issues. The decision on Flores' complaint was rendered by the Labor Arbiter. It dismissed his
complaint for lack of merit. The judgment however declared that there was due to him the sum of
P6,671.24 representing his bonus or share in the profits for the period from January to June, 1980,
which amount JCCI and its affiliates were ordered to pay within ten (10) days under sanction of
automatic issuance of a writ of execution for failure to do so. Notice of the Labor Arbiter's decision was
received by Flores on December 29, 1982. Fifteen days later, on January 13, 1983, he perfected an
appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission. 2 JCCI filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on
January 28, 1983, asserting that it had been filed beyond the reglamentary period of ten (10) days from
notice. The motion to dismiss was never resolved. On April 26, 1984, the NLRC, by a majority vote,
promulgated judgment reversing the Labor Arbiter's decision, ordering the reinstatement of Flores to his
former position and the payment to him of fixed back wages for one (1) year without qualification or
deduction from earnings elsewhere during the period of his dismissal, and affirming the Arbiter's award.
JCCI's motion for reconsideration filed on May 18, 1984 was denied by Resolution dated August 28,
1985, the NLRC inter alia holding itself to have jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC had jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the Labor
Arbiter's decision: the appeal was perfected after the lapse of' the reglamentary period of ten (10)
calendar days prescribed under the law.
RULING:
The petition should be granted. The writ of certiorari will issue in the petitioners favor. As the
Solicitor General correctly points out, Flores' appeal was indeed filed out of time: and the facts clearly
establish that Flores had not been illegally dismissed but had in truth voluntarily resigned, his offer to
resign being unconditional and irrevocable, and Flores clearly had acted in bad faith: he deliberately
withheld submission of his written resignation in order to retain employment in JCCI while
"moonlighting" in a rival enterprise, contrary to JCCI Company policy. In taking cognizance of Flores'
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appeal, notwithstanding the recorded actuality that it was filed 15 days after notice of the judgment
sought to be appealed and therefore, beyond the 10-day period of appeal set by law, the NLRC had acted
without jurisdiction, in deliberate disregard of this Court's holding in the afore cited Vir-Jen case that
the ten-day period of appeal set out in Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, meant calendar and
not working days. This Court is also satisfied, after a thoroughgoing review of the record that the
findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter are warranted by the evidence, and the rejection and reversal thereof
by the NLRC was without justification, and was therefore whimsical and capricious.
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Moreover, a careful review of the records of the case show that the petitioner was effectively and
illegally dismissed from the service by the private respondent. After he was relieved of his duties
allegedly temporarily, he continued to report for duty but he was never given any assignment. And
when on July 30, 1982 he asked for his salary at the accounting department of private respondent
he was told that there was none and that he had already been laid off. No doubt the decision of the
labor arbiter which was sought to be appealed is supported by the evidence and the applicable law.
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the employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal by the employer may be
perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The word "only" makes it
perfectly clear, that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the
employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected. That
requirement is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even
evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.