TRANSCENDENTAL TRUTH

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.

Logical Truth
When we commonly or ordinarily speak of truth or the true we mean logical truth, which
is the conformity of the mind or intellect (by means of our judgments) with things (with reality).
If Joe, for example, says that the lights in the auditorium are turned on when in reality the
auditorium is pitch black, he has not made a true statement but rather a false one, since his
statement did not conform with what is, with the real state of things. If I say that I am holding an
apple when in reality it is an apple I am holding, what I have affirmed is true since it agrees with
what is, with reality. Truth always implies a relation between being and intellect, but this relation
can be considered from either of its terms, that is, either as based in the intellect or as grounded
in being. Based in the intellect we have logical truth, the conformity of the mind or intellect (by
means of our judgments) to the thing (to reality): adaequatio intellectus ad rem.
Now, logical truth is not given in sense knowledge, nor in simple apprehension (the first
operation of the mind), but in the judgment (the second operation of the mind). Logical truth is
not given in sense knowledge for the senses are unaware of their conformity to being, that is, to
reality. Even though the senses are intentionally conformed to material reality, nevertheless, they
cannot know this conformity, are unable to measure their own relationship with what is, the real.
Therefore, strictly speaking, logical truth is not given in sense knowing. Llano writes: Truth,
strictly and formally considered logical truth does not occur in sense knowledge. Naturally,
with this I am not trying to say that our senses trick us, or that sensation does not correspond to
the thing which the senses know. I only wish to point out that the conformity which happens in
the senses is not the conformity of truth, precisely because it is not cognitively possessed as such.
To possess the truth means to know the conformity; but the senses do not know their conformity
in any way whatsoever; for example, even though the sense of sight possesses the image of what
it sees, it does not know that conformity exists between the thing seen and the image which it
perceives.1 In every sensation there is awareness of sensing but since the sense faculty is not
reflexive this is not equivalent to knowing the conformity between the thing and what the
senses grasp about the thing.2
Neither is logical truth to be found in the first operation of the mind, namely, simple
apprehension (simplex apprehensio, which is the act by which the intellect grasps or perceives
something without affirming or denying anything about it, its material object being the thing
apprehended by thought, its formal object being some essence, nature, or quiddity). Llano
writes: The intellect can know its conformity to the thing known. But the intellect does not
grasp this conformity at the level of its first operation simple apprehension by which it
knows the essence or quiddity of a thing as it forms the corresponding conceptThe conformity
between the concept and that which it represents is not formally and explicitly known in the
simple mental operation by which the concept is formed and known. If, for example, I think of
1
2

Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 3.

A. LLANO, Gnoseology, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 2001, p. 33.

what red means, there is no doubt that there is in my mind a real conformity with the object of
this concept and, ultimately, with whatever the concept has been extracted from: for example,
this specific rose which I now see. But to have the concept of redness is not the same thing as
formally to know its conformity to a real thing: this rose.3
The concept is a simple representative species, not a complex one. When one
understands or says something uncomplex, the simple aspect grasped is of itself neither
adequate nor inadequate to the thing. Equality and inequality are said by comparison, and the
concept does not contain in itself any comparison with or application to the thing from which
it was derived. Therefore a concept cannot properly be called true or false. This can only be
affirmed of that which is complex, of that which designates the comparison of the simple
apprehension to the thing apprehended, by representing composition or division.4 Now simple
apprehension, in knowing what a thing is (quod quid est), apprehends the essence of the thing by
means of a certain comparison with the thing itself, since it grasps the essence as the quiddity of
this and not some other specific thing. And therefore we must make clear that even though
the concept is not, of itself, true or false, nonetheless the intellect which apprehends what a thing
is is said to be always, of itself, true, even though it might be false accidentally (because however
simple a concept may be in itself, it always includes some complexity of notes which might not
agree among themselves).5
Logical truth, therefore, is found, properly speaking, in the second operation of the mind,
which is judgment.6 Gardeil explains that though its power of reflection the intellect is capable
of passing judgment upon its knowledge by comparing its apprehension with the thing
apprehended, and thus it becomes aware of the conformity with its object. So that it is in
judgment (the second operation of the mind) that the intellect comes in possession of truth as a
known or recognized conformity; which, for the intellect, is obviously a more perfect state of
affairs that the unrecognized conformity in simple apprehension. Logical truth is precisely the
truth as known, the conformity that has entered the awareness of the intellect.7 Llano writes:
Just as the truth, formally considered, is found in a more principal sense in the intellect than in
things, so too, it is found more principally in the intellect which judges, forming a proposition,
than in the act by which the intellect forms concepts, knowing the essences of things. The
intellect can be true or false, in the strict sense, when it judges the thing apprehended. And
therefore truth is found primarily in the intellect composing and dividing, i.e., in judgment; and
only secondarily in the intellect forming concepts.8
Truth is the identification of the knower in act with the known in act. Now, at the level
of simple apprehension, the intellect is still not in act with respect to the complete knowledge of
the being of the thing. This complete actualization comes about only in judgment. As Hoenen
has pointed out: from this perspective the difference between these two operations of the mind
consists in that: During apprehension the mind does not yet know that the content of its
3

Cf. A. MILLN PUELLES, Fundamentos de Filosofa, Rialp, Madrid, 1976, p. 460.

Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, ch. 59.
5
A. LLANO, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
6
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 2, c.
7
H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 4 (Metaphysics), B. Herder, St.
Louis, 1967, p. 136.
8
Cf. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 3.
4

representation is in conformity (or not) with reality, with the res; when it judges, however, it
does know.9
The intellect in contrast to the senses can know its conformity with the intelligible
thing. However, it does not perceive this conformity when it knows the essences of things, but
rather when it judges that the thing really is the same as the form of the thing which it
apprehends. This is when it knows and says the truth. And the intellect does this by composing
and dividing because in any proposition, what it does is apply to or separate from something
signified by the subject, the form signified by the predicate.10
In judgment something new and decisive appears: reference to the real being of a thing.
(This reference takes place although in a remote and indirect way even in judgments about
fictitious beings.) In a proposition there is a comparison between that which is apprehended and
the thing, since the proposition affirms (or denies) that the thing really has (in the order of being)
the form which is attributed to it in the predicate. In judgment we turn back upon simple
apprehension, and that which had been grasped somehow as one (per modum unius) in a
synthetic apprehension is now analyzed, and the different aspects of the thing are distinguished
with different concepts, which are then composed by judgment in accord with the composition
which, in the thing itself, obtains between subject and form.
Judgment includes: the construction of a proposition; the knowledge of the conformity
between the terms in re; and assent. The force of assent refers the content of the proposition to
reality, confering upon it the relevance of truth. Judgment bears within itself an ontological
commitment, a declaration about the reality of things; therefore it must in principle be true
or false.
In simple apprehension the human spirit already possesses a similitude of the known
thing, but it does not yet know this; while in judgment not only does it have the similitude of the
thing, but also it reflects upon this similitude, knowing it and judging it.11 In a judgment which
refers to a simple apprehension the knower acquires a complete knowledge about the real content
of the apprehension; he now knows that in the concept he possesses a similitude with the
thing, and he is aware of the conformity: he knows that what he knows is the thing. And he has
acquired this greater intensity of knowledge by means of a reflection upon the act in which he
knew a real content.1213
9

A. HOENEN, La thorie du jugement daprs St. Thomas dAquin, Analecta Gregoriana, Rome, 1953, p. 9.
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 2.
11
In VI Metaphysicorum, lect. 4, no. 1236.
12
Cf. A. HOENEN, op. cit., p. 5.
13
A. LLANO, op. cit., pp. 34-36. Regarding the kind of reflection involved in judgments, Sanguineti states that in
any judgment, the intellect makes an implicit reflection on the content of its own operations. This reflection is
concomitant with the first intentional act, and leads the intellect to know whether or not what it thinks is real(J. J.
SANGUINETI, Logic, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1992, p. 110). Concerning the concomitant reflection involved in
judgments, Clavell explains that la consapevolezza della sua adeguazione alla realt, che si d nel giudizio,
comporta che in questa operazione della mente c una riflessione. Questa riflessione per concomitante, cio non
una nuova operazione che si aggiunga al giudizio. Se per conoscere ladeguazione fosse necessario un atto di
conoscenza diverso, sarebbe anche necessario un altro atto per conoscere la validit o adeguazione dellultimo e cos
via: ci troveremmo in un processo allinfinito. Quindi in ogni giudizio c una riflessione concomitante, con cui si
avverte lesattezza del giudizio. Con uno stesso atto conosco una certa realt e sono consapevole (aspetto riflessivo)
10

Transcendental Truth
Logical truth, as was already mentioned, is the conformity of the intellect to the thing by
means of judgment. But though truth primarily (per prius) is said of the intellect, logical truth or
truth of the understanding must depend upon real being (ens reale): veritas supra ens fundatur.
For example, when I say that the thing in front of me is a tall pine tree, it is clear that the actual,
real thing in front of me is presupposed by the truth of the understanding and is the measure of
my intellect. So logical truth has a foundation in the truth of things or what is called ontological
or transcendental truth. Truth per prius has a foundation in truth per posterius. Individual beings
(entia), in fact, have a truth in themselves.
If logical truth is adequatio intellectus ad rem, the conformity of intellect (by means of
judgment) to thing (to reality), ontological or transcendental truth (also called the truth of things),
on the other hand, is the conformity of thing to intellect: adaequatio rei ad intellectum. Alvira,
Clavell and Melendo write: a) The truth of things is the basis and measure of the human
intellect: natural things, from which our intellect draws its knowledge, measure our intellect. As
St. Thomas states: any being is known to the extent that it is actual, and consequently the
actuality of each thing is a sort of light within that being.14 This inner light (which is, in the final
analysis, nothing but the act of being) is what makes it true and intelligible. Hence, the relation
of beings to mans intellect is merely a relation of reason; things do not acquire any new (real)
relation when they are understood by man. Their truth does not depend on whether or not man
knows them; on the contrary, our intellect has a real dependence on ontological truth.
The truth attributed to things in reference to the human intellect, is in some way
accidental to them, since they would still exist by themselves (in their essence) even assuming
that mans intellect did not or even could not exist. But the truth attributed to things in reference
to the divine intellect is inseparable from them, since their very subsistence depends on Gods
Intellect, which gives them the act of being.15
Being cannot, therefore, be reduced to its intelligibility for man: being is not the same
as being understood, or being perceived as Berkeley claimed (esse est percipi). Immanentist
philosophies consider intelligibility as the basis of being, thus seeing everything the other way
around. For instance, idealism considers things only insofar as they are objects of knowledge.
But object in idealism does not mean the thing exterior to mans intellect; rather, it is the thing
as represented in the intellect. In short, truth in idealism is no longer the conformity of the
intellect with the thing; rather, it is conformity with its object, which is only another way of
saying that the intellect knows itself.
di conoscerla: Lintelletto riflette sul suo atto, non soltanto in quanto lo conosce, ma in quanto conosce la sua
conformit con la cosa; il che, certamente, non potrebbe essere conosciuto senza conoscere la natura dellatto stesso,
il quale non conoscibile senza che si conosca la natura del principio attivo che lo stesso intelletto, alla cui natura
appartiene il conformarsi alle cose; onde secondo questo conosce la verit lintelletto che riflette su se stesso(De
Veritate, q. 1, a. 9). Tutto questo avviene in un unico atto e la spiegazione si trova nel fatto che proprio nel momento
in cui lintelletto conosce, diventa lui stesso conoscibile, perch in atto (Cfr. In I De Anima, 9 e In XIII Metaph., 8,
n. 2539)(L. CLAVELL, La verit dellessere, in L. Clavell and M. Prez de Laborda, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome,
2006, pp. 222-223).
14
In De Causis, lect. 6.
15
Idem, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 5, c.

b) The truth of created beings is based on Gods Intellect. Creatures have a real relation
of dependence with respect to Gods creative Intellect. Things are measured by Gods Intellect in
which all creatures are present, as artifacts are present in the artisans mind. In other words, the
truth of things is predetermined in Gods Mind, which is their exemplary cause. Hence to be
open to the truth of things is to subject oneself to God.16
If truth per prius is said of the intellect, truth per posterius is said of the thing. Aquinas
writes: Since the true is in the intellect in so far as it (the intellect) is conformed to the thing
understood (rei intellectae), the abstract aspect of the the true (ratio veri) must needs pass from
the intellect to the thing understood, so that the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it
has some relation to the intellect.17 If the former truth per prius is called formal or logical truth,
this latter truth per posterius is called transcendental truth or ontological truth. In transcendental
truth one speaks of a thing as true when it corresponds to the idea of its maker. The Angelic
Doctor explains: For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the
architects mind; and words are said to be true in so far as they are the signs of truth in the
intellect. In the same way, natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness
of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true which possesses the nature
proper to a stone, according to the preconception of the divine intellect.18
So, transcendental truth is the conformity of a thing to an intellect to which it is related.
This is so, for St. Thomas states: A thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either
essentially (per se) or accidentally (per accidens). It is related essentially (per se) to an intellect
on which it depends as regards its act of being (esse).19 Hence, transcendental truth or
ontological truth essentially (per se) means order to Gods intellect since every creature depends
upon the divine intellect as regards its act of being (esse). It is related accidentally (per accidens)
to an intellect by which it is knowable. Aquinas adds: Now we do not judge of a thing by what
it is accidentally, but by what it is essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true essentially, in
so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends.20
Finite creatural beings are true because of their relation to the divine intellect. The
artificial things made by man depend on the divine intellect absolutely (simpliciter) by reason of
their actuation in the order of being, although these artificial things made by the work of man
depend on the human mind of the artist, architect, or artisan in their being such. Such
dependence refers not to efficient causality, but rather to exemplar or exemplary causality, which
is in the order of formal causality, albeit extrinsic. Llano explains: (1) The human, practical
intellect of the artisan is the cause of the becoming (fieri) of artificial things and is the measure
of their truth (but only inasmuch as they are artificial, not inasmuch as they are beings).
Effectively, the artisan produces his work in accord with the exemplary idea which he has of it in
his mind. The truth of the artifact, therefore, depends upon its conformity to its paradigm.

16

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 153-154.

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 1, c.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
17

(2) The speculative intellect of man gets its knowledge from things and is, in a certain
sense, moved by them, and thus things measure it. In speculative knowledge, the intellect
contemplates things as they are, so these things are the measure and the rule of the truth of the
speculative human intellect.
(3) The divine intellect measures things radically because it is the origin of their entire
reality. In the divine intellect are found all created things as in their cause, just as all of his
artifacts are in the mind of the artisan. Thus the divine intellect has a certain similarilty to (1), but
differs from the practical intellect of man in that the divine artisan is the cause of the entire being
of things, whereas the human artisan is only the cause of their fieri (coming to be): since the
human artisan acts always on some particular matter, he is not the origin of the being of the
finished product, but only of the process by which this matter comes to acquire its new form.
Thus: the divine intellect (and its truth) measures and is not measured (it is mensurans
non mensurata); the thing (and its truth) is measured by the divine intellect and, in its turn,
measures the human intellect (the thing is mensurata et mensurans); our intellect is measured
(mensurata) by natural things which it knows speculatively; it is only the measure (mensura) of
the coming to be of artificial things.2122
The Convertibility of Being and Truth
Truth23 is a transcendental property or aspect of being (ens), identical in reality with
being (ens). Transcendental being (ens) and transcendental truth or the true (verum) are the
21

Cf. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 2.
A. LLANO, op. cit., p. 21.
23
Studies on transcendental truth in Aquinas: G. SHNGEN, Sein und Gegenstand. Das scholastische Axiom ens et
verum convertuntur als Fundament metaphysischer und theologischer Spekulation, Mnster, 1930; R. J. McCALL,
St. Thomas on Ontological Truth, The New Scholasticism, 12 (1938), pp. 9-29; J. VAN DE WIELE, Le problme
de la vrit ontologique dans la philosophie de saint Thomas, Revue philosophique de Louvain, 52 (1954), pp.
521-571; R. B. SCHMITZ, Veritas rerum. Sein-Wahrheit-Wort. Thomas von Aquin und die Lehre von der Wahrheit
der Dinge, Mnster, 1984 ; J. F. WIPPEL, Truth in Thomas Aquinas, Review of Metaphysics, 43 (1989), pp. 295326, 543-567; J. PIEPER, Living the Truth. The Truth of All Things and Reality and the Good, Ignatius Press, San
Francisco, 1989; J. A. AERTSEN, Truth as Transcendental in Thomas Aquinas, Topoi, 11 (1992), pp. 159-171 ;
L. DEWAN, St. Thomass Successive Discussions on the Nature of Truth, in Sanctus Thomas De Aquino: Doctor
Hodiernae Humanitatis, edited by D. Ols, O.P., Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1995, pp. 153-168 ; L.
DEWAN, A Note on Metaphysics and Truth, in Doctor Communis: The Contemporary Debate on the Truth,
Proceedings of the II Plenary Session, 22-24 June 2001, Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City,
2002, pp. 143-153 ; H. SEIDL, Metaphysics and Truth, in Doctor Communis: The Contemporary Debate on the
Truth, Proceedings of the II Plenary Session, 22-24 June 2001, Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican
City, 2002, pp. 154-160 ; E. FORMENT, Verdad y metafsica, in Doctor Communis: The Contemporary Debate on
the Truth, Proceedings of the II Plenary Session, 22-24 June 2001, Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas,
Vatican City, 2002, pp. 169-191 ; E. BERTI, Osservazioni a proposito di verit e metafisica, in Doctor Communis:
The Contemporary Debate on the Truth, Proceedings of the II Plenary Session, 22-24 June 2001, Pontifical
Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City, 2002, pp. 161-168 ; J. AERTSEN, Truth in Aquinas, in Doctor
Communis: The Contemporary Debate on the Truth, Proceedings of the II Plenary Session, 22-24 June 2001,
Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City, 2002, pp. 50-54 ; Y. FLOUCAT, La vrit comme
conformit selon saint Thomas dAquin, Revue Thomiste, 104 (2004), pp. 49-102 ; L. DEWAN, Is Truth a
Transcendental for St. Thomas Aquinas?, Nova et Vetera (English edition), 2.1 (2004), pp. 1-20 ; J. AERTSEN, Is
Truth Not a Transcendental for Aquinas?, in Wisdoms Apprentice: Thomistic Essays in Honor of Lawrence Dewan,
O.P., edited by P. A. Kwasniewski, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, pp. 3-12 ; J. F.
22

same in reality, they are convertible or interchangeable: ens et verum convertuntur. Alvira,
Clavell and Melendo explain: Are the transcendentals realities or notions? We have to say that
they are both. As real things, they are absolutely identical to being (ens). Unity, truth, goodness,
and the other transcendentals, are not realities distinct from being (ens) but only aspects or
properties of being (ens).
They are, so to speak, common properties of every being (ens). Just as all the
individuals of a given species have certain common properties as a result of belonging to the
species (men have understanding and will, lions are mammals, snow is white), all things, by the
fact of their being beings (entia), are good and true and endowed with unity.
Two short clarifications are necessary in this respect. In the first place, properties, in
the more technical sense, flow from the specific essence. The transcendentals, on the other hand,
flow from the act of being (esse) and can, therefore, be attributed to everything that in some way
is. Secondly, properties are accidents, whiteness, for instance, is something inherent in snow, and
the will is an accident proper to all men. The transcendentals, however, are not accidents, but are
identical with the subject itself.
Consequently, when we say that being is good, or that it has unity, we are not adding
anything real (a substance, a quality, a real relation). We are merely expressing an aspect which
belongs to every being (ens) as such, inasmuch as it has the act of being (esse). Because being is
being, it is good, has unity, etc. Being (ens), the good (bonum) and the true (verum) are identical
realities. This is usually expressed by saying that ens et unum (et bonum, et verum) convertuntur:
that being, unity, and the other transcendentals are interchangeable or equivalent.
This equivalence is shown in the possibility of predicating one transcendental of
another. We can say, for instance, that every being is good, one and true. We would never dare
say, however, that every being is an animal, or every being is a plant. Besides, the term being
(ens) and the other transcendentals can exchange their roles as subjects and predicates in a
sentence. We can say that that which is good, to the extent that it is good, is being (ens). But we
could just as well say that any being (ens), to the extent that it is being (ens), is good. This
interchangeability is a sign of the real identity of the transcendentals.24
How Being and Truth are Distinct
Nevertheless, although ens and verum are the same or identical in reality, they are distinct
notions: truth adds to being a relation of conformity with an intellect capable of knowing it.
There is added to being a reference to an intellect. Truth which is in a thing itself is nothing else
but the entity as it is related to the intellect, or relates the intellect to itself.25 Alvira, Clavell and
Melendo write: As far as our knowledge is concerned, the transcendental notions are not
synonymous with the notion of being, since they explicitly express aspects which are not
expressly signified by the notion of being. Though they are interchangeable as predicates of the
WIPPEL, Truth in Thomas Aquinas, in J. F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II, Catholic
University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, pp. 65-112.
24
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op cit., pp. 135-136.
25
De Veritate, q. 1, a. 4, c.

same subject, they are distinct notions. The transcendentals add new facets to the notion of being
(ens), not because they add new realities to being (ens), but rather because of our way of
knowing reality. We call one and the same thing being (ens) because it has the act of being
(esse); and we call it true because it is knowable; we call it good because it is desirable, and we
call it one because of its internal cohesion.26
Truth and the Act of Being (Esse)
Finite being (ens) has intelligibility in so far as it has a participated act of being (esse as
actus essendi). The act of being (esse) is the root of all intelligibility; a being (ens) is knowable
to the extent that it has esse. Aquinas writes in Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 16, a. 3, c: As good
has the aspect of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as
it has esse, is to that extent knowable(sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet
ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse, intantum est
cognoscibile). Regarding the act of being (esse) as the foundation, the root, of truth, Llano
explains: Being (ens) is internally structured as essence and act of being, as constitutive coprinciples of any concrete reality. Basing himself on this metaphysical doctrine St. Thomas
clearly affirms: Truth is founded more on the act of being (esse) of the thing, than on its
quiddity, just as the name of being (ens) is derived from the act of being (esse).27 On
formulating this important thesis, St. Thomas reveals the original nucleus of his gnoseology,
which already goes beyond all immanentism, and even all formalism and logicism. Being as act
(actus essendi) is the foundation of truth. Formalism is surpassed from the moment that every
form whether real or known is seen to have its ultimate foundation in the act of being, which
is not a formal content, but rather the purely actualizing act of all determinations. The actus
essendi is not a position of the subject, as Kant would have it when he considers thought to be
the foundation of being. Nor is it reduced simply to existential reality, to mere fact,
corresponding as a particular case to a logico-formal structure, as in the neo-positivist theory
of truth. The act of being isthe root of the truth of knowledge, since truth is given in the
operation with which the intellect grasps the being of the thing (esse rei) just as it is.
Effectively, all knowledge terminates in the existent, in the reality which participates in
the act of being (esse); and thus the esse rei is the cause of the true appreciation which the mind
has of the thing.28
It could be objected that truth is found in the study of logic and of other strictly formal
fields of knowledge, in which there does not seem to be any reference to real things.
Nonetheless, logical relations secundae intentiones are beings of reason cum fundamento in
re: they have a less proximate foundation in things, but they do not completely lack this
foundation. If as in the positivist trends in contemporary philosophy one defends a logic
without metaphysics or a purely self-sufficient analysis of language, the language of truth
becomes tied up in insoluble difficulties.29
26

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 136.

Veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur(In I Sent., d. 19, q.
5, a. 1 ; cf. In In Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1).
28
In II Met., n. 298; In Divinis Nominibus, c. 5, n. 625; In Epistolam ad Colosenses, lect. 4.
29
A. LLANO, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
27

There are various degrees of intelligibility and truth corresponding to the various degrees
of act of being (esse) of a being (ens). The more a being (ens) has an intensive degree of act of
being (esse), the more is it ontologically intelligible and true. God, being Pure Act of Being,
Ipsum Esse Subsistens, is maximally intelligible and true (but due to the imperfection of the
human intellect what is in itself maximally intelligible, God, is more difficult for us to
understand, like the brightness of sun blinds us when we attempt to look at it due to the
limitation of our sense of sight). God is Maximum Perfection and Maximum Truth. As regards
the source and origin of truth, Llano writes: The source and origin of truth is the act of being
(esse). Finite things participate in the act of being (esse), whence they also participate in truth. It
is not that they are act of being (esse), but only that they have act of being (esse), partially; nor
are they truth, but they participate in truth. Every being is a composite of potency and act, and
therefore it is less true as it is more potential. Only pure act, subsistent being, is the full and
unrestricted truth, the ultimate cause of all truths. The search for truth comes to an end only in
Being-by-essence.30
In his explanation of Summa Theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 5, c., Gilson writes that things are
true in themselves to the extent that they are conformable to an intellect, and the intellect itself is
true according as it apprehends a thing such as it is. Now, in the unique case of God, it is not
enough to say that His knowledge apprehends its object such as it is; His esse (the pure act of
being that He is) is His very understanding: esse suumest ipsum suum intelligere. Moreover, all
other beings are true in themselves in so far as they are conformed to the knowledge God has of
them, for Gods act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being, and He
Himself is His own act of being and of understanding. In this perfect coincidence of a being, of
its knowledge, and of the object of its knowledge, is found the identity of absolute being with its
own truth. Because God is suum esse et intelligere (which is Gods esse), it must be said of Him,
not only that truth is in Him, but that He Himself is the supreme and the prime truth. Thus, with
the theology of esse, the conclusion of the De Veritate of Saint Anselm was finally receiving,
along with its proper limitation, its full justification. Each and every thing has its own truth as it
has its own being, but there is one truth according to which all things are true. Things are true
inasmuch as, in themselves, they are conformed to their model in the divine intellect. Here as
always things are called true from a truth found in an intellect; in the last analysis, truth is said of
things from the truth of the intellect which God is, because His act of understanding and His act
of being are one and the same act.31

30
31

A. LLANO, op. cit., p. 31.

. GILSON, The Elements of Christian Philosophy, Mentor-Omega, New York, 1963, pp. 166-167.