Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
BY
LT CDR SAQIB HASAN PN
2011-2012
THESIS STATEMENT
(RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM-REASONS AND REMEDIES)
Pakistan got independence on the name of an ideology i.e Islam. The very
ideology was based on Two Nation Theory fueled by the religious
discrimination/extremism of Hindus towards Muslims of undivided India in that
era. Therefore, Muslims of Sub Continent got united under the flag of Islam to
liberate a country where they could practice it without dictation of Hindus. At the
time of independence, the internal differences among Muslims were somewhat
laid aside but afterwards with every passing decade, extremist religious
viewpoints started surfacing. The religious extremism, of which once Muslims
were victims themselves, started waging against factions of their own religion in
Pakistan.
1
2
The half cooked and under privileged clergy took lead and their
incomplete teachings based on hatred started targeting common man. The
ultimate product was intolerance, white collar looting, emotional black mailing,
confiscating lands on the name of mosques/madressahs and so much so,
organised crime under the garb of religion. Unchecked activities of the religious
jihadist factions after Afghan War 1979-1989 and of Kashmir valley added multi
dimensional problems for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) for checks and
balances in post conflict era, although sponsored by the earlier governments
themselves.
1 http:// http://www.amazon.com/Jinnah-India-Partition-Independence-Jaswant/dp/8129113783
2 The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Karachi, volume 1, number 2, 11 August 1947.
p. 1 quoted in www.wikipedia.com
Chapter II
then in Pakistan.
c.
Chapter III
d.
Chapter IV
3 Hasan Abbas , Pakistans Drift into Extremism (New York: An East Gate Book, 2005). p 12.
4 Yonah Alexander, Combating Terrorism, Strategies of Ten Countries, Ann Arbor University of
Michigan Press, USA, Manas Publications, New Dehli, 2003, p 27.
55 War Helps Recruit Terrorists, Hill Told, Washington Post, 17 February, 2005, p.6.
e.
Chapter V
Conclusion.
CHAPTER-II
ROOTS OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN SUB-CONTINENT AND
THEN IN PAKISTAN
The roots of religious extremism can be traced back from 20 June 1858
when British East India Company established their colonial rule after defeating
Mughal dynasty in the Sub-Continent6. Muslims launched an armed resistance a
year before for their independence which failed miserably. The British adopted
famous policy of divide and rule to suppress them.
They had a natural alliance with Hindus against Muslims because of many
reasons. Primary was the old age Hindu concept of Muslim rulers as usurpers
therefore any power assuring the usurpers not regaining the rule was their well
wisher. Secondly, the common British memory had not forgotten the crusades 7,
remembering Muslims as enemies. This became one of the reasons of hatred
among Muslims and British.
The emergence of Muslim clergy (mullah) was the episode of this very era
when just to oppose the British, the later blocked every opportunity of prosperity
and contemporary education. Fixated point of view towards religion, emerging
modern world, scientific inventions rather every opportunity of keeping pace with
rapid paced world was banned by the clergy. Examples were forbidding English
language, scientific education, photography, entertainment, loud speakers,
wearing of trousers and shirts to common Muslims.
The same was against the teachings of Islam since, The Prophet
6 http://www.radianceweekly.com/48/165/muslims-and-1857-war-of-independence/2006-12-31/coverstory/story-detail/muslims-and-1857-war-of-independence.html
7 Ibid
British troops during the said battles 12. These episodes made Muslims and British
natural belligerents of each other and inculcated element of militancy in Indian
Muslims for freedom.
Hunter Report.
Therefore the British estimated that Indian Muslims were their worst
enemies and therefore started targeting them the most.
British
Support
to
Mushroom
Various
Religious
Factions.As
10
Sharia, the Islamic Law) and overthrow it by force 19. This initiated the element of
religious militancy in the sub continent which had the long lasting impressions in
the history to come.
Economic Crackdown on Muslims.Banning the modern education had it
s implications. Muslims who did not want to leave the religious elements, were
deprived of government jobs, latest and in turn their economical conditions
became worse. The British attributed the war of 1857 to the Muslims alone. As a
result, property belonging to Muslims was confiscated and they were denied
employment opportunities everywhere in the army, revenue department, and
judiciary20.
Pakistan Came Into Being Inheriting Religious Extremism.On an
occasion Jinnah said: "The great majority of us are Muslims. We follow the
teachings of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). We are members of the
brotherhood of Islam in which all are equal in right, dignity and self-respect.
Consequently, we have a special and a very deep sense of unity. But make no
mistake: Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it." 21
Islamic Democracy, as envisioned by founding father failed to take roots
and Islam was politicised for individual gains in Pakistan. The religious extremism
in Pakistan can be segregated in three eras; post Pakistan, post cold war and
post 9/11.
19
http://www.indianmuslims.info/articles/firoz_bakht_ahmed/role_madrasas_1857_war_independen
ce.html retrieved on 14 Dec 11
20 http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A023 retrieved on 3 Nov 11
21 Ghazali, Abdul Sattar, Islamic Pakistan, Illusions and Reality, (National Book Club, Islamabad
1999) quoted in http://ghazali.net/book1/chapter_1.htm Chapter 1 retrieved on 14 Dec 11
11
22 Asama Yaqoob, Muslim as an Identity Group in South Asia, Regional Studies, Autumn 2003,
p.98.
23 Hassan Abbas, Pakistans Drift into Extremism (New York: An East Gate Book, 2005), .p168.
24 Ibid, p166.
25 Farooq Hussein, Religious Liberty in Pakistan: Law, Reality and Perception, Current Affairs,
December 2004, p.131.
26 Ibid.
12
was although in the favour of the state but however reflected the traces of
militancy in Muslims of Pakistan27.
The 1973 constitution, given by Bhotto regime, formally establish Islam as
the state religion in Pakistan28. Bhutto also tried to counter the political nuisance
value of the conservative religious parties by conceding to a number of their
political demands, ........... banning the consumption of alcohol and declaring the
Friday as weekly holiday29
1977 to 1988 General Zias Brand of Islam.The Generals period that
followed Bhutto saw the all-encompassing `Islamisation` of Pakistans sociopolitical structure. Constitutional amendments resulted in two significant additions
to the Constitutional structure article 51(4A) (to bar non-Muslims from voting in
general elections) and article 227 (to bring all existing laws into conformity with
Holy Quran and Sunnah). The Islamic laws include Hadood Ordinance, Zina
Ordinance, Zakat Ordinance, Property Ordinance, Qanun-e-Shahadat Order and
Blasphemy Law30.
Major amendments in Pakistan Penal Code include (Under Blasphemy
Law), Section 295B (Defiling the Holy Quran: Punishment-Imprisonment for life)
and Section 295C (Use of derogatory remarks with respect to the Holy Prophet:
Punishment- death/ imprisonment for life)
31
27 http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/51736/Bangladesh/277585/Bangladesh-sinceindependence
28 Farooq Hussein, Op.cit 133.
29 Asma Yaqoob, Op.cit.
30 Salman Akram Raja Islamisation of Laws in Pakistan, Current Afairs, January 2004, p.43.
31 Farooq Hussein, Opcit 136.
13
Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court were established under judicial
reforms32. This era includes two important events of 1979, the Islamic revolution
in Iran and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.
Iranian Revolution.1979 Iranian revolution can be termed as a major
reason for deepening sectarian divisions and violence. The post revolution Iran
adopted as a matter of policy the spread of Shia ideas.
As a result, TNFJ (Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jaffria) emerged as a
pressure group in Pakistan33 and the Shia community became more vocal and
militant. The ensuing years witnessed increasing Shia activism and militancy;
and strong Sunni backlash34. The emergence of Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba
(ASS), later renamed Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), in 1982 with strong antiShia objectives was a clear manifestation. 35. This was the beginning of sectarian
conflict in the country with external support.
Afghan War.Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a turning point
that brought the rivalry of two superpowers (US and USSR) into Pakistans
neighbourhood. Zia regime offered to play role of a frontline state and sought
political, economic and military support from US. It was considered necessary to
mobilise religious feelings and Jihadi spirit for Afghan resistance. Subsequently,
extremist elements (like Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and Jumiat-eUlema-e-Pakistan) were encouraged and Jihadi sentiments were supported
32 Salman Akram Raja, Opcit, p.52.
33 Muhammad Amir Rana,Opcit,p.113.
34 ICG Report, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,(April,2005)
35 Mariam Abou Zahab, The Regional Dimensions of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan, Available on
www.ceri-sciences-po.org, accessed on 28 Jan 2012.
14
alongwith liberal funds provided to groups and institutions for training Afghan and
other Muslim nationals from a host of countries to wage war against Soviets 36.
Religious schools multiplied during this period and by the time Afghan war ended
in 1989, Jihadi culture had acquired deep roots in Pakistani society.
Rise of Ethnic Groups and Religious Parties.
Islamic fanaticism were laid when Zia regime during its tenure provided funds for
establishing Mosques and Madaris, particularly in small towns and rural areas.
The same also led to the rapid growth of militant religious organisations. During
1979-1989, CIA gave $ 2.1 billion for the training of 200,000 Afghan Mujahideen
and over 20,000 Arabs including Osama bin Laden 37.
Unfortunately, the Zia regime being fully aware remained unmoved during
this period instead of taking preventive measures. It is important to list some
leading extremist and militant groups which have been engaged in extremist and
militant violence in Pakistan. Religious outfits of Pakistan are listed at AppendixII. The Sunni backed groups indiscriminately killed shia sect members and vice
versa. Some groups are:
Shia:
Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jaffria (TNFJ).
Tehrik-e-Jaffaria Pakistan (TJP).
Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP).
Sunni:
36. Ibid.
37. Lt Cdr Amir Hasan PN, Increasing Religious Extremism In Pakistan Ways To Address, (37 th
PNWC IRP 2007 2008) p.9
15
38. Article on Regional Implications of the Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan by Kalim
Bahadur, (Strategic Analysis: Jan-Mar 2006), p.7 quoted in Hasan,, Amir Lt Cdr PN, Increasing
Religious Extremism in Pakistan (Lahore PNWC IRP 2007) p 9-11
39. Hasan Abbas, Paksitans Drift into Extremism, (New Dehli: Elegant, 2005), p. 225.
40 Hassan Abbas, Opcit, p.134.
16
Although democracy returned, even then Army continued to play vital role in of
Pakistan by keeping Afghan and Kashmir Policies under her control 41.
Post Cold War Era: 1991 - 2001
By the end of 1991, Soviet Union disintegrated and US backed away from
Afghan affairs42. At that time, Nawaz Sharif was prime minister of Pakistan. One
important development in these years was the involvement of ISI chief (Lt Gen
Javed Nasir), in supporting Muslims in Xingjian Province of China, rebel Muslims
in the Philippines and some religious groups in Central Asian States on the name
of Islam43.
This spoiled the Pakistans impression internationally and put Pakistan on
the US state departments watch list.
41 Ibid.
42 Griffin, Michael, Reaping the Whirlwind (London: Pluto Press, 2001), p..xii.
43 Hassan Abbas, Opcit, p.148
44 Ibid, p153.
45 Ibid.
17
18
49 Tahmina Rashid, Implications of the 9/11: A Pakistani Perspective, IPRI, February 2003, p.20.
50 Hassan Abbas, Opcit, p228.
19
CHAPTER-III
EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM ON PAKISTANI SOCIETY
Mystification Over Rule of Islam.
to be a state for the Muslims 51, rather than an Islamic state 52. In contrast, as
per Objectives Resolution Pakistan was to be a federal, democratic, and
Islamic entity.53 This resulted in declaration of Pakistan as an Islamic Republic in
1956. These two facts indicate the confusion of leadership over the role of Islam
in governance of Pakistan The ultimate effect was undesired tussle among rulers
of different schools of thought
Exploitation of Islam by Ruling Elite.Leaders like Ayub and Bhutto who
were not interested in giving any role to Islam in the affairs of the state but used
Islam as political tool for personal gains. Examples are Ayubs, use of Fatwa by
Ulema against Fatima Jinnah (for prohibition of rule by women) in presidential
elections of 1965 and declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims by Bhutto in 1973
to strengthen his rule. Furthermore, history seems to indicate that the pressure
on the governments by the poor masses is so overwhelming that the nations
leaders often use the shelter of Islam to fend it off 54. The overall effect on
Pakistan was that bounties of a true Islamic society promoting tolerance,
51 As per Stephen Philip Cohen, Muslim state refers to a state whose citizens are entirely or
predominantly Muslims; Islamic, refers to the belief that a Muslim state can be made to follow
Islamic guidelines.
52 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan. (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005).p.161.
53 Hassan Abbas, Opcit, p.57.
54 Farooq Hussein, Religious Liberty in Pakistan: Law, Reality and Perception, Current Afairs,
December 2004.
20
affection among masses and rulers amid national congregation for the prosperity
of state, remained hidden from the masses.
Zias Islam Retaliated Badly.The enforcement of Zias self proclaimed
Islamic code with respect to constitution; Islamic laws, Penal Code, judiciary,
women affairs, educational and showbiz reforms resulted in the surfacing of
clash of interpretations in already confused Pakistani society and divided the
nation on sectarian grounds.
Chaos by Religious Parties.
are having a common demand on their agenda that is enforcement of Islamic law
in Pakistan. However, history witnessed that their leaders made coalition with
different governments and opposition parties distinctively for personal gains only.
Issuance of fatwa by the Ulemas of JUP in support of Ayub in presidential
elections of 196555, JIs support to Yahya in 1970 56, JUIs coalition with PPP
government in 198857 are the few examples.
Instead of spreading love and fraternal feelings among fellow Pakistanis,
these parties have created hatred, divided the people into different belligerent
groups and have promoted sectarianism 58.
Iranian Revolution.Iranian revolution in 1979 accelerated the sectarian
violence in Pakistan. This phenomenon was a morale booster for Shia
community as the Iranian governments declared aim has been to export the
55 Musa Khan Jalazai, The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Pakistan, Lahore: Book Traders, 1998, p.197.
56 Ibid, p.160.
57 Ibid, p.126.
58 Editorial Note, The Nation 20 January 1998.
21
P i l g e r, w a s t o c r e a t e a t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i za t i o n t h a t e n c o u r a g e d
and
u t i l i ze d
Islamic
extremism
to
u n d e r mi n e
the
Russian
G o v e r n m e n t i n C e n t r a l As i a . C . I . A . c a l l e d i t O p e r a t i o n C y c l o n e
and in the following years 4 billion dollars were committed to its
p r o mo t i o n t h a t i n c l u d e d t h e e s t a b l i s h i n g o f a l a r g e n u mb e r o f
religious
madrassahs
or
schools
in
Pakistan.
In
Pakistan Officers of the British MI-6 and the local ISI played the
role of teacher
60
59 Iffat Malik, Kashmir Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute, (Oxford University Press, 2002), P 249.
60 Muhammad Amir Rana, Opcit, p. 83.
22
Afghanistan, focus of Jihadi activities was shifted to Indian held Kashmir in 1989.
This gave rise to the establishment of Jihadi organisations in Pakistan, as the
religious parties, which did not participate in Afghan Jihad also started taking part
in Kashmir Jihad mainly due to financial gains. .
The desired human resource for Jihadi activities consists of students of
Madrassahs, members of student unions of different religious parties and many
jobless people61.
leaders of Jihadi organisations who just because of their own benefit send
socially deprived people for Jihad62. Keeping in view the above discussion, it can
be deduced that Afghan and Kashmir Jihads promoted Jihadi culture in Pakistan
and played major role to put Pakistani society on the path of extremism.
Impact on Pakistan Post 9/11.Following the events of 9/11, Pakistan
had to radically revamp its foreign policy. United States has depended heavily on
Pakistan for tackling the terrorism problem originating in the region. A series of
international terrorism plots uncovered in US, UK and Australia had traces to
61 Data is based on different sources and details are given in Appendix III.
62 Jalazai, Musa Khan, Dying to Kill Us, (Lahore: Al-Abbas International, 2005), p.27.
23
period was to preserve the legitimacy of the Kashmiri freedom fighters struggle
and not allow it to fall prey to the new definition of terrorism 63. On the other hand
India wanted to seize the opportunity to put more pressure on Pakistan on
account of its alleged support to the infiltration across the LOC. This undermined
the ongoing struggle of Kashmiri people64.
Pakistans Nuclear Arsenal.
coalition reflected a major policy shift, which required withdrawing support from
the Taliban government. For Pakistan, the logic of this shift was clear i.e. to
preserve its strategic assets and national sovereignty. By this coalition, it is
assumed that Pakistan has been able to safeguard its strategic assets. The issue
of Weapons of Mass Destruction still dominates the US and Western policy
makers.
Economic Meltdown.
for war on terror in Afghanistan, it has suffered loss of PKR 2,080 Billion from
2004 to 2008-2009. The estimated cost of the war on terror was around 484
billion rupees in 2007-200865. The Ministry of Finance has calculated that the
24
25
CHAPTER-IV
WAY FORWARD AND RECOMMENMDATIONS
Extreme hopes are born of extreme misery 66. As said by Bertrand Russel
clearly depicts a picture of hope to devise the strategies for curbing religious
extremism in Pakistan. The root causes as defined in chapters II and III would be
taken as reference to suggest viable options. The recommendations may be as
follows:
Clarifying Role of Islam in Running State Affairs. Confusion over the issue
may be clarified by a joint team of intellectuals and ulema in order to eliminate
the chances of using Islam as a shield by clergy and politicians in future.
Eradication of Zia Regime Reforms.
devised by Zia regime have been diluted but there is still a need to do away with
the after effects. Believes of religious minorities and all sects of Islam should be
considered while making legislations in the country in line with Quaids vision.
The same would curtail the element of religious extremism.
Eliminating Social Evils. Poverty, Illiteracy, and Justice add fuel to the
fire of religious extremism. Economic reforms on the lines of Bangladesh,
designed by Dr M Yunus (Grameen Bank fame) may be given a thought. Since
the strong economy is the prime driving factor in eliminating these social evils
therefore, a well-off, literate and satisfied individual is less likely to turn into a
religious fanatic.
26
Ban
on
sectarianism main role is need to be played by the Ulemas of different sects and
those who have influence on Jihadi organisations. The first step to resolve these
problems may be the voluntary ban on issuance of the controversial literature.
Second step may be that Ulema of Sunni/ Shia sects must reach some
compromise in order to reduce sectarian strife from society. Final step can be
the evolution of uniform code consisting of all agreed and non-controversial
points common to all sects.
27
28
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Religious extremism is a multifarious issue in Pakistan. The tendency of
militancy in Sub-Continent Muslims was a natural phenomenon due to British
oppression and so was its inheritance by Pakistani Muslims. Exploiting religion
by British in their favour and Muslim religious scholars lack of modern education
contributed towards the self interpreted Islam. That very wrong impression of
Islam was carried on and made the basis of weak moral fabric of clerics,
politicians and masses. Religious militancy, sectarianism, terrorism and wrong
use of word Jihad was the connection of this wrong interpretation, abused by Zia
and coming governments.
Post 9/11 events, Military Operations in FATA, suicide attacks and
economic slash worsened the situation making religious extremism a nightmare
for populace and Government. Although the U-turn policy of President Musharraf
has somehow halted this peril, but has conversely affected our legitimate national
stance on Kashmir and internal security situation. Careful watch on religious
outfits/madressahs, elimination of social evils, economic sustenance and last of
all, the national will, could be the path leading to success in fighting against
religious extremism in Pakistan.
29
APPENDIX-I
Excerpts from the Hunter Report
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
139
tion of the devout Musalmans believe India to be now a Country of the Enemy
But the more sensible majority of them while sorrowfully lamenting its lapsed
state are willing to accept the duties belonging to that condition The whole
Kuran is based upon the conception of the Musalmans as a conquering
and not as a conquered people. As already explained however the Kuran was
long ago found inadequate to the necessities of Civil Polity and a system of
Canon and Public Law has been developed from it to suit the exigencies of
30
31
APPENDIX II
RELIGIOUS OUTFITS IN PAKISTAN
Sect
Deobandi
Barelvi
Ahle Hadees
Shia
JI
Total
Political
4
6
4
3
3
24
Sectarian
33
22
10
16
82
Jihadi
5
13
3
3
4
104
Tableeghi
3
2
3
1
7
26
Total
46
43
20
23
14
237
founded by Maulana Abdul Aala Maudodi. After the creation of Pakistan the
organisation really flourished and in 1953 it played a major role in the Khatam-eNabuwat movement and the campaign against Ayub Khan. JI did not meet with
much success in the 1970 elections. In 1977 JI organized the Nizam-e-Mustafa
movement. JI joined the Zias Majlis-e-Shura, played a significant role in Afghan
war and participated in the 1985 non-party elections.
Presently it is well-
organised religious and political party. Other than Pakistan, JI also works in
India, Bangladesh and Occupied Kashmir, but the management there is
independent of Pakistan. The circles working in the Arab Emirates, Europe and
America are under the JI Pakistan. JI has a student wing which is known as
Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba.
colleges of Pakistan. It has also a wing for female students known as Islami
Jamiat-e-Talibat.
32
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam.
Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind. Maulana Shabir Ahmed Usmani laid the foundation of the
party in the country after Pakistan came into being, in 1952. Presently this party
has been divided in three factions
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP).JUP is a political organisation and was
created in 1948. Syed Mohammad Naeemuddin Muradabadi was first Nazim-eAala. All India Sunni Conference had supported the creation of Pakistan and for
this reason it was given the name of JUP. This was probably the only religious
party which supported the creation of Pakistan.
SECTARIAN ORGANISATIONS
Tehrik Nifaz Fiqah-e-Jafaria (TNFJ).
Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan,
the
reasons based on which SSP was established. First to counter the Tehreek-eNifaz-e-Fiqah Jafferia, second to oppose the feudalism in Jhang where majority
of feudal is Shia and third reason was to counter PPP in Punjab (Motive of Zia).
Present government has banned it since 14 August 2001.
33
JIHADI ORGANISATIONS
Jaishe Mohammad.
offshoot of Harkatul Jihadual Islami in 1984. The new organization was created
by Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, Maulana Muhammad Masood Alvi and
Saifullah Shaukat. HM is an important Deobandi Jihadi organization and was
banned by US in October 2001. It is considered largest organization in terms of
its militant activities in Kashmir and Afghanistan.
against HM is that it has close contacts with Osama bin Laden and that it has
been in fore front with threats to America.
34
Irshad
Ahmed
created
Harkatul
Jehadul Islami in 1979. When the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan Maulana
Irshad Ahmed led the first delegation of religious scholars from NWFP to that
country to participate in the war. There these scholars took military training and
later were instrumental in providing manpower from Pakistan and obtaining
religious decrees in favour of Jihad. This organization has a structure similar to
that of Hizbual Mujahdeen and Lashkare Taiba in strength and cohesiveness.
Since Harkatual Jehadul Islami is active in Myanmar, Usbekestan, Tajeikstan and
Chechnya along with Occupied Kashmir and Afghanistan, its organizational
structure is proportionally larger.
Lashkare Taiba (LeT).
and the two are mistaken for each other. LeT was banned in Pakistan on 13
January 2002, but Jamatul Dawa had already taken precautionary measures
prior to this. As professor Hafiz Saeed announced that his organizations new
name is Jamaatul Dawa. LeT initiated its militant activities in Occupied Kashmir
on 25 January 1990. LeT remained very active since its inception. LeT claims to
have played a major role in the Kargil operation.
Sources:
Tariq Rehman, Madrassas: Religion, Poverty and the Potential for Violence in
Pakistan, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Winter 2005, Volume 1.
Muhammad Amir Khan, A to Z of Jihadi Organisation in Pakistan by (Lahore:
Mashal Books, 2004).
A report on Islamic Parties of Pakistan by International Crisis Group cited in
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/southasia/pakistan/216%20Islamic%20Parties%20in%20Pakistan.pdf
35
APPENDIX III
SOURCES OF MANPOWER FOR JIHADI ORGANISATIONS
Organisatio
n
Jaishe
Mohammad
Harkatual
Mujahdeen
Harkatul
Jehadul
Islami.
Lashkar-e
Taiba
Al Baraq
Hizbul
Momineen
Sources:
Sect
Sources of manpower
Deoband
i
Deoband
i
Deoband
i
Ahle
Hadees
Barelvi
Shia
Tariq Rehman, Madrassas: Religion, Poverty and the Potential for Violence in
Pakistan, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Winter 2005, Volume 1.
Muhammad Amir Khan, A to Z of Jihadi Organisation in Pakistan by (Lahore:
Mashal Books, 2004).
36
APPENDIX IV
SECTARIAN BRUTALITY IN PAKISTAN 1989 2012
Year
Incidents
Killed
Injured
1989
67
18
102
1990
274
32
328
1991
180
47
263
1992
135
58
261
1993
90
39
247
1994
162
73
326
1995
88
59
189
1996
80
86
168
1997
103
193
219
1998
188
157
231
1999
103
86
189
2000
109
149
NA
2001
154
261
495
2002
63
121
257
2003
22
102
103
2004
19
187
619
2005
62
160
354
2006
38
201
349
2007
341
441
630
2008
97
306
505
2009
106
190
398
2010
57
509
1170
2011
30
203
297
2012
18
85
78
Total
2586
3763
7778
Source: Figures are compiled from news reports and are provisional
Year 2012
Month
January
February
TOTAL
Incidents
13
5
18
Killed
40
45
85
37
Injured
27
51
78
Source: Figures are compiled from news reports and are provisional.
Sources:
Data from 1989 - 2002 is based on the book, A to Z of Jihadi Organisation in
Pakistan by Muhammad Amir Khan (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004).
Data from 1989- 2007 is based on South Asia Intelligence Review by South Asia
Terrorism Portal [data base on line] available with World Wide Web @
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm [cited
on 04 December 2012].
38
APPENDIX V
EFFECTIVENESS OF PAKISTANI LEAs IN 2011
As per Security Report of 2011 by Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies
(PIPS),The last half of the year 2011 was a period of comparative peace in
Pakistan in terms of internal armed conflict, acts of terrorism and the consequent
casualties. A decrease in the number of suicide attacks and drone strikes were
the major contributing factors. Although the security situation is slowly improving
as violence has decreased 24 percent in the last two years, Pakistan is still
among the most volatile regions in the world.
About the overall decrease in terror activities and in turn effectiveness of Law
Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) it analyses. The trend of an overall decrease in
the number of violent incidents and casualties in Pakistan that was witnessed in
2010 continued in 2011. A total of 2,985 violent incidents, were reported in 2011,
compared to 3,393 in 2010 and 3,816 in 2009, a decrease of 12 percent and 22
percent, respectively. Similarly, the overall casualties in violent incidents also
went down, from 10,003 fatalities in 2010 to 7,107 in 2011, representing a
decrease of 29 percent. The number of people injured in these attacks also
declined from 10,283 in 2010 to 6,736 in 2011, a decrease of about 34 percent.
An overall comparison of the terror attacks in Pakistan from 2008-2011
substantiate the fact according to PIPS report.
Source:
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APPENDIX VI
DRAFT ORDINANCE FOR MADRESSAHS
Two parallel systems of education existed in Islamic Republic of Pakistan
i.e. general education, imparted through educational institutions, colleges and
universities and religious education being given in Deeni Madrassahs in private
sector. Despite the fact that both the systems of education were rendering
valuable social services in the uplift of the country, a wide gulf existed between
these systems.
At the time of its creation, Pakistan inherited a modest network of Deeni
Madrassahs from grand Madrassahs established in United India. As education
sector remained neglected, religious institutions lost state patronage and were
left wholly to the generosity of private sector. Absence of state patronage acutely
narrowed employment opportunities for young Ulema, causing resultant
frustration and despair.
To bridge the existing gulf between the formal education and Deeni
Madrassahs system an Ordinance called The Pakistan Madrassah Education
(Establishment and Affiliation of Model Deeni Madrassahs) Board Ordinance,
2001 was promulgated, whereby a Pakistan Madrassah Education Board was
established. The board established three Model Deeni Madrassahs, two at
Karachi and Sukhar each for boys and one at Islamabad for girls.
While promulgating the Ordinance it was also envisaged that the activities
and functioning of Madrassahs may be regulated through an independent
enactment providing for their registration. However, Wafaqs/Tanzimaat-eMadrassahs were not inclined to do so, as it was feared to affect their autonomy.
After consultation with the lttehad Tanzeemaat-e-Madrassahs-e-Deenya in
a number of meetings, the Government promulgated an Ordinance by amending
the Societies Registration Act, of 1860 on 18 th August 2005 by adding new
Section after Section 20 of the Act. Salient features of the amended Ordinance
are as under:a.
All Deeni Madrassahs by whatsoever name called shall not be
established or operate without being registered under this Act and shall be
subject to the provision of this Act in addition to what is provided in subsections (2), (3) and (4).
b.
Every Deeni Madrassahs shall submit annual report of its activities
and performance to the Registrar.
40
c.
Every registered Deeni Madrassahs shall maintain account of its
actual expenses and receipts and annually submit its report to the
Registrar. The Deeni Madrassahs shall ask to carry out audit of its
accounts by an Auditor and submit its audited accounts to the Registrar.
d.
No Deeni Madrassahs shall teach or publish any literature which
promotes militancy or spreads sectarianism or religious hatred.
Despite the fact that the above Ordinance was promulgated in
consultation with Ittehad Tanzeemaat-e-Madrassahs-e-Deenya, certain
reservations were expressed by prominent religious leaders. In order to resolve
the issue, Minister for Religious Affairs negotiated with the delegation of Ittehad
Tanzeemaat-e-Madrassahs-e-Deenya and finally certain amendments were
agreed upon, to be incorporated in the said Ordinance. The amendments so
agreed were minor in nature and of no material consequence; therefore second
amendment was made in the Ordinance, promulgated in December, 2005
explicitly defining the Government role as a Regulatory Authority. Salient features
of this Ordinance are as under:a. All Deeni Madrassahs by whatsoever name called shall not operate
without getting themselves registered as under, namely:(1)
The Deeni Madrassahs existing before the commencement
of the Societies Registration (Second Amendment) Ordinance,
2005 if not already registered, shall get themselves registered
under this Act up to 31st December, 2005.
(2)
The Deeni Madrassahs which are established after the
commencement of the Societies Registration (Second Amendment)
Ordinance, 2005, shall get themselves registered within one year of
their establishment.
(3)
One Deeni Maddrassah having more than one campus shall
need only one registration.
(4)
Every Deeni Maddrassah shall submit annual report of its
educational activities and performance to the Registrar.
(5)
Every Deeni Maddrassah shall cause to be carried out audit
of its accounts by an Auditor and submit its audited accounts to the
Register.
b. No Deeni Maddrassah shall teach or publish any literature which
promotes militancy or spreads sectarianism or hatred.(Provided that
41
42
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44
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/51736/Bangladesh/277585/Banglade
sh-since-independence
www.ceri-sciences-po.org
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http://www.notable-quotes.com/h/hope_quotes.html retrieved on 12 Dec 11
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/216%20Islamic
%20Parties%20in%20Pakistan.pdf
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