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University of Virginia
Unlike older sciences such as physics and biology, sociology has never had a revolution. Modern sociology is still classical-largely psychological, teleological, and
individualistic-and even less scientific than classical sociology. But pure sociology is
different:It predicts and explains the behavior of social life with its location and direction in social space-its geometry. Here I illustrate pure sociology withformulations
about the behavior of ideas, including a theory of scienticity thatpredicts and explains
the degree to which an idea is likely to be scientific (testable, general, simple, valid, and
original). For example: Scienticity is a curvilinearfunction of social distance from the
subject. This formulation explains numerousfacts about the history and practice of
science, such as why some sciences evolved earlier andfaster than others and why so
much sociology is so unscientific. Because scientific theory is the most scientific science, the theory of scienticity also implies a theory of theory and a methodologyfor the
developmentof theory.
The history of science is partly a history of revolutions (see, e.g., Kuhn 1962; Hacking
1981; Cohen 1985).l Historian Thomas Kuhn suggests that a scientific revolution overthrows and replaces the prevailing "paradigm"in a field of science-its strategyof explanation (1962: 10-11; see also generally Chapters2, 10). A new paradigmimplies a new
conception of reality and a new logic by which reality is understood(idem: 110; see also
Black 1995: 864-867). Examples are the Copernicanrevolution that overthrewthe earthcentered universe, the Darwinianrevolution that overthrewthe immutabilityof plants and
animals, and the Einsteinian revolution that overthrew the absolute nature of space and
time.2 The period before a scientific revolution is sometimes known as the classical era
of a science. Classical physics, for example, refers to physics before relativity theory
*Preparedfor a session entitled "Where Do Theories Come From?"at the annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association, San Francisco, California,August 24, 1998. The session was part of a Theory Section
Miniconference on "Methodsof TheoreticalWork."I presentedother versions to the Departmentof Sociology,
Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas, March 26, 1998; the Justice Studies Program,University of
New Hampshire,Durham,New Hampshire,May 7, 1998; the Departmentof Sociology, RutgersUniversity,New
Brunswick, New Jersey, October 14, 1998; the InternationalSociological Association Research Committee on
the Sociology of Law, World Congress of the Sociology of Law, WarsawUniversity, Warsaw,Poland, July 16,
1999, and Jagiellonian University, Krakow,Poland, July 17, 1999. For comments on earlier drafts I thankM. P.
Baumgartner,Albert Bergesen, Thomas J. Bernard,MarkCooney, MurrayS. Davis, Ellis Godard,MarcusMahmood, Calvin Morrill, RobertaSenechal de la Roche, ChristopherStevens, FrankJ. Sulloway, James Tucker,and
JonathanTurner.Please address correspondence to the author at the Department of Sociology, Cabell Hall,
University of Virginia, Charlottesville,VA 22903. Black@Virginia.edu
'Philosopher Karl Popper comments that new theories ideally "overthrow"past theories of the same subject:
"In this sense, progress in science-or at least striking progress-is always revolutionary"(1975: 93-94).
2Kuhn
proposes that a scientific revolution becomes a possibility when an old paradigm-"normal science"encounters facts it cannot explain. Such "anomalies"pose a "crisis"that may ultimately be resolved by a revolutionary paradigm (1962; see also McAllister 1996: Chapter 8). But Kuhn's model is wrong: Revolutionary
theories such as those of Copernicus, Darwin, and Einstein did not explain facts their fellow scientists were
trying to explain. No crisis existed (see Lightman and Gingerich 1992; Kelly 1994: 455-457). Revolutionary
scientists typically answer questions virtually no one else is asking and initiate revolutions virtually no one else
wants. Scientific revolutions thereby differ considerably from political revolutions (see Feuer 1982: 252-268;
see also 269-311; Kubler 1962: 109).
Sociological Theory 18:3 November 2000
? American Sociological Association. 1307 New YorkAvenue NW, Washington, DC 20005-4701
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(developed by Albert Einstein) and quantum theory (developed by Max Planck, Niels
Bohr, WernerHeisenberg, and others) early in the twentieth century.A revolution fundamentally changes science, and classical science becomes obsolete.3
CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY
Sociology has never had a revolution.Classical sociology merely refers to early sociology,
and it has never been overthrown or abandoned. On the contrary:Modern sociologists
widely agree that the fundamentalsof sociology outlined by the classical sociologistsMax Weber,Emile Durkheim,Georg Simmel, and the rest4-still prevail. Classical sociology is the model of sociology itself. Moreover,the classical conception of social reality
is largely psychological (a matter of subjectivity), the classical logic of explanation is
largely teleological (a matterof means and ends), and the classical subject is largely the
person (including a numberor group of persons). Social action is individual action.
Max Weber-possibly the most celebratedclassical sociologist-is explicitly and militantly psychological, teleological, and individualistic.He asserts, for example, that sociology is the "interpretiveunderstandingof social action"and that"subjectiveunderstanding
is the specific characteristicof sociological knowledge" ([1922] 1978, Volume 1: 4, 15;
see also 8; Ringer 1997: 1, 92). Human behavior is "action" only if it has "subjective
meaning"for the actor,and action is "social"only if "its subjective meaning takes account
of the behaviorof others"(idem: 4; see also 26; Volume 2: 1375-1376). Furthermore,only
"individual human beings" engage in social action (Volume 1: 13, italics in original);
collectivities do not.5 His most respected ideas of a substantive nature, such as his conception of the "legitimacy"of authority(idem: 212-216; see also Volume 2: 901-910) and
his theory of the rise of capitalism ([1904-05] 1958), are explicitly psychological, teleological, and individualistic as well.
The classical sociologist most famous for insisting that sociology is different from
psychology-Emile Durkheim([1895] 1964)-also continually addressesthe subjectivity
of the goal-seeking individual. He psychologizes virtually every subject, even society:
"Because society can exist only in and by means of individualminds, it must enter into us
and become organized within us. ...
([1912] 1995: 211, 432; see also 445). He claims that "everythingin social life rests on
opinion" and that sociology is primarilythe study of opinion: "We can make opinion an
object of study and create a science of it; that is what sociology principally consists in"
(439). Everywhere he discusses the contents of the human mind, whether a feeling of
solidarity with others ([1893] 1964), a predispositionto suicide ([1897] 1951), or a reverence for society ([1912] 1995). If Durkheimian sociology is not psychological, then
Durkheimis not Durkheimian.But Weberand Durkheimare not uniquely psychological,
teleological, and individualistic.They exemplify classical sociology.6 And they exemplify
modern sociology as well.
3Classical science may survive in a limited capacity,however. Although Einstein's general theory of relativity
is more powerful than Newton's law of gravity,for example, Newton's law is still used to predictgravitationon
or near the surface of earth (see Weinberg 1998; Greene 1999: 380-381).
41particularlyrefer to the generationof sociologists whose work spannedthe turnof the twentiethcentury.See
any textbook on the history of sociological theory for a more complete list.
5Weberacknowledges that a concern with subjectivity limits the scope of sociology, such as its capacity to
understandhuman behavior in tribal societies: "Our ability to share the feelings of primitive men is not very
much greater"than our ability to share"the subjective state of an animal"-which is "atbest very unsatisfactory"
([1922] 1978. Volume 1: 16).
<'Sodoes Georg Simmel: Everywhere he addresses the subjectivity of individuals, such as the psychological
dynamics of friendship,coquetry, sex, and love ([1908] 1950: 50-51, 324-329; see also Poggi 1993).
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Forms of Religious Life ([1912] 1995)-they would still be acclaimed as majorcontributions. The statureof classical sociology could hardly be greater (see, e.g., Parsons 1968:
xiii; Alexander 1987: 31-32 and title of essay; Turner1996: 15). It has never been questioned, much less overthrown.
Pure sociology, however, is not classical sociology. It has a new conception of social
reality and a new strategy of explanation. It answers questions unasked by classical sociologists and their modern counterparts.It solves a crisis unknown to either. The crisis is
that sociology is not really sociological.
NORMAL SOCIOLOGY
In our studentdays we hear that sociology is the science of social life. Its subject is social,
and its theory is social. Our teachers and textbooks tell us sociology is different from
psychology-because it is not psychological. They tell us sociology is differentfrom ideology and humanism-because it is scientific. They tell us we should read classical sociologists (such as Weber and Durkheim) to see how sociology is done. But sociology is
actually not so different from psychology, and it is not so scientific either.
Virtually all sociology explicitly or implicitly addresses human subjectivity. Often it
explains humanbehavior with the psychological impact of the social environment.Motivations and meanings are central. This applies, for example, to the sociology of deviant
behavior, collective behavior, political behavior,religious behavior, legal behavior, medical behavior, and behavior in business organizations,schools, professions, families, and
other groups. It also applies to fields such as social stratification,race and ethnic relations,
and culture (including the sociology of science, knowledge, and art). All include subjective matterssuch as prestige, prejudice,perceptions,and beliefs. Even when the questions
asked by sociologists are not explicitly psychological-when they seek only to explain
particularpatternsof humanbehavior-their answers are psychological, including answers
based on psychological assumptions about human preferences and proclivities. Where
then is the science of social life that is truly different from psychology?
And where is the science of social life that is truly scientific? Much is ideological-a
critique of modern society. Much is humanistic-interpretations and arguments rather
than predictions and explanations. Much is scholarship about scholarship, books about
7Although sociological theory-the explanation of human behavior-is still largely classical, sociology has
otherwise advanced considerablyin its methods of research(including statistical methods) and its accumulation
of empirical findings (mainly on modern societies such as the United States).
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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
books, words about words. If explanatory at all, most is teleological: It explains human
behavioras a meansto an end. It assumesor imputesends-goals, needs, values, interestsand then explains humanbehavior as a means to those ends.
Teleology has a bad reputationin sociology-but only when it attributesa mission or
destiny to society as a whole. A well-known example is Karl Marx's theory that all societies inevitably progress toward communism (see, e.g., Marx and Engels in Feuer 1959;
see also Popper [1961] 1964). We hear that teleology is unscientific because the goal or
purposeof a society is unobservableand unknowable.We hearit is metaphysical.Yet other
versions of teleology still dominate sociological theory. Virtually all sociology explains
humanbehavior as a means to an end-a goal or purpose.Teleology is the superparadigm
of sociology (Black 1995: 861-863). But it is bad science: Like the goal or purpose of
society as a whole, the goal or purposeof humanbehaviorof any kind is unobservableand
unknowable (see idem: 861-864).
Sociology is unscientific in other respects as well. Research is often independentof
theory,and theoryis often independentof research.Because so muchtheory is untestableunfalsifiable-it is mostly irrelevantto researchers,and research is mostly irrelevantto
theorists. Moreover, most sociologists study only a single subject in their own society:
Americans study American society, Germansstudy Germansociety, Japanese study Japanese society, and so on. Many study only their own part of society: Many women study
only women, many African-Americansstudy only African-Americans,many HispanicAmericans study only Hispanic-Americans,and so on. Their researchis largely practical
and ideological, designed to assess the well-being of their society or part of society. Some
searchfor inequality,injustice, or other conditions they wish to evaluate or expose. Others
conductsurveysaboutmodernlife in the mannerof politicalpollstersandconsumerresearchers. Who thinks what? How do they feel?
And theory? Much so-called theory is merely a discussion of other theorists, a clarification or elaboration of past ideas. Much is merely conceptual, a way to classify and
describe humanbehavior.Even explanatorytheory is mostly untestable-neither right nor
wrong. What then is it?
Many sociologists believe sociology can never meet the highest standardsof sciencetestability, generality, and so on. They lack a requirementof good science: the faith that
they can do what seems impossible to others. They accept their inferiorityin the world of
science.8 Otherstotally or partiallyreject the standardsof science. They regardthe nature
of sociology as a matterof personal opinion and claim the right to do whateverthey like,
scientific or not. Theirsociology is not even classical. Classical sociology is more scientific.
In sum, from the beginning I was disappointedby the psychological, teleological, and
ideological natureof sociology. Sociology had not met its obligation to be sociological,
and sociologists lacked faith in sociology. I became a sociological fundamentalistand
vowed to say only what is truly sociological or to say nothingat all. I dreamedof a genuine
science of social life.
But what is truly sociological? What is social life'?These simple questions led to a new
sociology with a new theoretical logic: pure sociology.
sHistoric figures in science, philosophy, and modern art virtually always believe their work is extremely
important.A numberof eminent scientists called their own work "revolutionary,"for example, includingCharles
Darwin and Albert Einstein (see Cohen 1985: 46). PhilosopherLudwig Wittgensteinevaluated his first book in
its preface: "The truth of the thoughts that are here communicatedseems to me unassailable and definitive. I
thereforebelieve myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution to the problems"(1921: 5; italics
omitted). Philosopher FriedrichNietzsche called his work Thus Spake Zarathustra"the most exalted" and "the
profoundest"book in existence ([1888] 1992: 5. italics omitted; see also 39. 42-45, 87). And Spanish painter
Salvador Dali entitled his journal Diary of a Genius ([1964] 1986).
But how many sociologists regardtheir own work as historically important?How many claim it is revolutionary, or even that anyone else's is revolutionary'?I have never seen or heard such a claim.
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The social structureof an idea predicts and explains its success. The success of an idea is
the degree to which it is defined as true and important-its magnitude.One idea is recognized as useful or even brilliantwhile anotherreceives only mild approvalor total indifference. How does the former differ sociologically from the latter?
Hold constantan idea's content, and its success partly depends on the social location of
its source and audience.19Who presents the idea to whom? One relevant variable is the
closeness of the audience to the source: The magnitude of an idea is an inverse function of
social distance from the audience (see idem: 159). An intimate's idea is more likely to
tance from the subject. The success of an idea increases with the social distance of the
source and audience from the subject until a point when it decreases.2'A statementabout
8Other distances in social
space are two-directional and possibly asymmetricalas well. A might speak B's
native language, for example, while B cannot speak A's-an asymmetricaldistance in culturalspace. OrA might
receive informationabout B's great wealth while B has little or no informationabout A's wealth-an asymmetrical distance in vertical space.
Formulations pertaining to the behavior of social life in social space should recognize the two-directional
natureof social distance. For instance, law may have relationaldirection from a closer towarda fartherparty,or
vice versa, and the amountof law depends more on the distance from the complainantto the defendantthan from
the defendant to the complainant(compare Black 1976: 40-48).
19Thecontent of an idea, such as the degree to which it is scientific or new, also predicts and explains its fate.
But here I leave aside the content of ideas and focus entirely on their social structure-the shape of social space
where they occur.
2"Bysocial superiorI mean someone with a higher social elevation-more social status. Social status includes
vertical status (wealth, such as money or livestock), radialstatus (integration,such as employment or marriage),
relational status (a degree of prominence, resulting from social ties to others), functional status (a level of
performance, such as the points scored by a basketball player), cultural status (conventionality, such as the
relative preponderanceof a religion), and normative status (respectability,a condition that declines with the
application of social control) (see Black 1976: Chapters2-6).
- Theoreticalsociologists do not always recognize curvilinearityin social life. For example, Durkheimpresents
three majorpropositionsabout egoistic, altruistic,and anomic suicide and a fourth (in a footnote) about fatalistic
suicide ([1897] 1951: Chapters2-5; 276, note 25), but these can be reduced to two curvilinearformulations:
1) Suicide is a U-curvilinearfunction of social integration(egoistic and altruistic suicide at the extremes), and
2) suicide is a U-curvilinearfunction of social regulation (anomic and fatalistic suicide at the extremes).
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a stranger is more likely to succeed than a statement about someone closer such as a
colleague, spouse, or oneself. Courtroom testimony by a strangerto a subject is more
likely to succeed than identical testimony by a subject's wife or mother.Even less likely to
succeed is the subject's own testimony.The same principle implies that an idea in a physical or biological science (such as chemistry or biology) is more likely to succeed than an
idea in sociology-because the humansubjects of sociology are closer to humansthan the
nonhumansubjectsof the naturalsciences.22For the same reason a sociological idea about
a foreign or past society is more likely to succeed than an idea about the sociologist's own
society. Because classical sociology was more comparative and historical than modern
sociology, it was regardedas more importantin its own time than is modern sociology
today (see Elias [1987] 1994: 94). The same still applies to comparative and historical
sociology: It attractsmore recognition and respect than the sociology of modern life.
The success of an idea likewise depends on the social status of its subject: The magnitude of an idea is an inverse function of the social elevation of the subject. An idea about
a lower subject (such as the source's or audience's employee) is more likely to succeed
than the same idea about a higher subject (such as the source's or audience's employer).
Legal testimony about a social inferior is more likely to succeed than identical testimony
about a social superior.Testimony about a homeless man, for instance, is more likely to
succeed than identical testimony about a prominent politician (see Cooney 1994: 848851). The sociology of lower subjects (such as poor people or criminals) is more likely to
succeed than the sociology of higher subjects (such as monarchsand states).
What Is Interesting.?
The social structureof the subject also predicts and explains what is interesting-what
attractsideas and attention(compareDavis 1971). The social distance from the source and
audience is again relevant: The attractiveness of a subject is an inverse function of social
subjects such as the rich and powerful attractmore ideas and attention than lower subjects such as the poor and weak. The rich and powerful are more interesting to themselves as well.
But recall that ideas with closer and higher subjects are less likely to be defined as true
and important.An implication is that ideas with more interestingsubjects (also closer and
2-EconomistMilton Friedmanobserves thatthe closeness of economics to everyday life impedes the success of
economic ideas: "Familiaritywith the subject matterof economics breeds contemptfor special knowledge about
it" (1953: 40).
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higher) are less likely to succeed. For example, ideas abouthumanbehavioroccur at a very
high rate and attracta great deal of attention:Everyone is an amateurpsychologist and
sociologist. Closer and higher humansare the most interestingof all. Yet ideas with closer
and higher subjects are less successful. Although domestic sociology (on the sociologist's
own society) is more common and attractsmore attentionthan foreign sociology (on other
societies), then, domestic sociology is doomed to be forever unimportant-forever disappointing. The same applies to the sociology of higher subjects, such as the sociology of
law and religion. Sciences with nonhumansubjects are different:Naturalscientists such as
physicists and astronomersregardtheir ideas as more importantthan those of sociologists,
and virtually everyone agrees-even sociologists.
The formulations above, however, logically imply nothing about the ultimate truthor
value of any ideas (see Black 1979b: 159-160). The sociology of knowledge, including
the sociology of science, implies nothing about whether any idea deserves special credibility or prestige (compare, e.g., Pickering 1984: 413-414; see also Mannheim 1936:
75-87, 286-306). Nor does it imply epistemological relativism-the view that no form
of knowledge is better than another.Like moral or aesthetic relativism, epistemological
relativism is itself an evaluation-an evaluation of evaluation (compare, e.g., Woolgar
1983; Fuchs 1992: 20-34). Ludwig Wittgenstein remarks that neither a moral nor an
aesthetic evaluation derives from facts alone, and that the two are logically indistinguishable: "Ethicsand aesthetics are one and the same" ([1921] 1961: 147; see also Monk
1990: 277). But he does not go far enough: Ethics, aesthetics, and epistemology are one
and the same.
THE THEORYOF SCIENTICITY
Science is a matter of degree-scienticity. The scienticity of an idea increases with its
testability, generality, simplicity, validity, and originality.23Testability is the capacity of
an idea to predict facts,24generality the diversity of facts it addresses, simplicity its economy of expression,25validity its conformity with the facts,26and originality its newness
(see generally Black 1995: 831-847; see also, e.g., Friedman 1953; Jasso 1988). Super23Another aspect of scienticity is facticity-the degree to which an idea pertains to an observable aspect of
reality. Note that the scienticity of an idea pertainsto its content alone and is logically independentof its origins,
including the psychology and sociology of its occurrence (see Dahrendorf[1961] 1968: 8-11; compare Mannheim 1936: 286-306).
Some regard objectivity as central to scienticity (e.g., Popper [1961] 1964: 152-156; Polanyi [1962] 1964:
Chapter 1; Fuchs 1997). But if objectivity is a revelation of the one and only reality, it is scientifically unknowable. If it is mental, it is sociologically irrelevant.If it is an observable characteristicof an idea, it is an element
of validity and is already included in my concept of scienticity.
24A prediction is a logical implication about quantitativevariation. If an idea cannot be tested by counting
something, its validity is unknowable (see Black 1995: 831-833). Even so, testability is a matterof degree. An
idea is more testable than another if its implications are clearer and more readily observable. Ideas are merely
suggestive if they do not imply predictionsof a quantitativenaturebut nevertheless inspireresearch.The work of
Karl Marx (e.g., Marx and Engels in Feuer 1959) is suggestive ratherthan testable, for example, and the same
applies to sociological theorists such as Erving Goffman (e.g., 1959, 1967) and Pierre Bourdieu (e.g., [1979]
1984, [1992] 1996). Others, such as Talcott Parsons (e.g., 1951, 1954) and Niklas Luhmann(e.g., [1984] 1995,
1990), are hardly even suggestive: Their work inspires little research.
25The simplicity of an idea is measurable with its length, such as the number of words or mathematical
notations it includes (Gell-Mann 1994: 30-34; McAllister 1996: 118-120; see also Black 1995: 838-841).
Friedmancomments that a scientific theory is simpler if it requiresless "initialknowledge ... to make a prediction" (1953: 10).
26The
validity of a scientific theory is measurable with its precision: the degree to which the frequency and
magnitudeof its explanatoryvariablematch the frequency and magnitudeof the variableit seeks to explain. The
highest validity is total precision. For instance, a theory that variableA explains variableB is highly precise if all
As are also Bs and all Bs are also As, but less precise if only a few As are also Bs or only a few Bs are also As.
An example of a theory with low precision is that later-borns(childrenwith at least one older sibling) are more
likely to be highly creative than firstborns-which is said to explain majorinnovations in such fields as science,
art, religion, and politics (Sulloway 1996). Its precision is low because most people are later-borns-all the more
so in earlier societies with largerfamilies-while very few are highly creative.
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distancefrom the subject. Both very close and very distant subjects attractless scienticity.
Scienticity increases with social distance until the subject disappears or becomes completely alien.27This principle explains numerous differences across sciences, scientists,
and nonscientists as well as aspects of the evolution of science, including sociology. First
consider why some sciences are more scientific.
The Behavior of Science
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Closer sciences such as biology and sociology advance by making contact with previously distant subjects as well. Darwin's revolutionarytheory might never have occurredto
him had he known only the flora and fauna of his native England and never taken his
famous voyage on the Beagle to South America and its nearbyislands. Especially valuable
was the "strangeness"of the species in the GalapagosIslands (Desmond and Moore [1991]
1992: 170; see also Darwin [1859] 1967: 1; Sulloway 1996: Chapter1). A close subject is
a scientific handicap.
The Behavior of Sociology
Sociology took a great leap forwardin the late nineteenthand early twentieth centuriesits classical period-when sociologists reached beyond their home societies. Classical
sociologists devoured informationabout past and present societies aroundthe world provided by historians, explorers, missionaries, and other observers. But later sociologists
mostly studied only their own societies, and comparativeand historical sociology came to
be regardedas a specialty. Scienticity declined. Some researchmethods-such as participant observation and in-depth interviewing-brought modern sociology even closer to its
subject and subverted its scienticity still more. Modern sociology became less scientific
than classical sociology.
The scienticity of each field and topic in sociology varies with its closeness to the
subject as well. Close sociology is less scientific. Domestic subjects (located in the sociologist's own society and time) attract less scienticity than foreign subjects. Domestic
sociologists are more practical and ideological, and also more concerned with unobservables such as human meanings, motives, interests, and goals.29Outsidersare more scientific: Social distance contributedto such respected works as French aristocratAlexis de
Tocqueville's study of American society ([1835-40] 1969), Swedish economist Gunnar
Myrdal's study of American race relations (1944), and northernpsychologist John Dollard's study of race relations in the American South (1937). Yet modern sociologists have
gravitated increasingly to subjects ever closer to their own lives. Many study only their
own race, ethnicity, gender, or locality.30Once preoccupied with distant subjects below
their own social elevation (slum dwellers and poor criminals), they increasingly shifted to
closer and higher subjects (professionals and others like themselves) and underminedtheir
scienticity even more. The sociology of white-collar crime, for instance, is more critical
and otherwise unscientific than the sociology of blue-collar crime (Black 1995: 856,
note 137). The sociology of knowledge-an especially close subject-is one of sociology's
28Theparticle accelerator's detector drastically reduces the social distance from physicists to particles: "The
relationship between the scientist and natureis at its most intimate and physical in the detectors .... The consummationof the marriagebetween scientist and naturein the detector sometimes leads to progeny for the proud
scientist: a discovery" (Traweek 1988: 158-159).
29Some physicists are more scientific about human behavior than many sociologists: They dismiss anything
"unconscious"as "unknowable"and "assert their ignorance of human motives" and "everything 'subjective'"
(Traweek 1988: 91).
30Themost scientific science is international-stateless-with a subject matterindependentof the nationality
of its practitioners:"Particle physicists from anywherein the world are fond of remarkingthat they have more in
common with each other than with their next-door neighbors" (Traweek 1988: 126). But sociology's largely
domestic subject mattersegregates most of it in particularnations. Internationalinteractionbetween sociologists
will remain infrequentand shallow until the subject matterescapes its national boundaries.
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least scientific fields. Science itself was one of the last subjects to be studied scientifically.
The sociology of sociology hardly exists.3
Closeness to the subjectis also an occupationalhazardof anthropologistsand historians
who study only a single society and period. Initially separatedfrom their subject by a
considerable distance in social space, their researchbrings them closer and reduces their
scienticity. Traditionalanthropologistsliterally live with their subject, a condition so intimate that many explicitly reject scientific standardssuch as generality and simplicity in
social science (e.g., Geertz 1973; see also Cooney 1988: 22; Fuchs andMarshall 1998: 21).
Scienticity is everywhere lower where the subject is closer. Considerlaw: For centuries
legal scholarshipwas pursuedexclusively by those extremelyclose to law-lawyers, judges,
and law professors-and hardlyany scientific ideas about the subject existed. Many legal
professionals continue to impute their own scientific incapacitationto everyone and insist
that law is immune to science (see Black 1997). Yet when legal strangerssuch as sociologists and anthropologistsbegan to study law, especially foreign law in foreign places, a
significant degree of scienticity occurred (see Cooney 1988: 20-27). Art resists science
for the same reason: Most art scholars are too close to be scientific. Nearly all participate
in art-whether as artists, collectors, critics, or historians-and nearly all insist that art is
immune to science. But closeness to art, not art itself, is the enemy of science (see Bourdieu [1992] 1996: Preface, 229-231, 296).32
The social status of the subject is also important.Ideas about lower subjects are more
scientific: Scienticity is an inverse function of the social elevation of the subject. Down-
ward science (directed at subjects below the scientist) is more scientific than lateral or
upwardscience. In sociology the poor attractmore scienticity than the rich, the marginal
more than the integrated, minorities more than majorities, criminal behavior more than
legal behavior,the behavior of factory workers more than the behaviorof corporateexecutives, and so on. American sociology was once primarilyconcernedwith poor, disadvantaged, and unrespectablepeople, and some of its most scientific work pertains to their
behavior. The Chicago School of sociology of the 1920s and 30s, for instance, mainly
studied those at lower elevations, such as slum dwellers, strugglingimmigrants,and petty
criminals (e.g., Anderson 1923; Zorbaugh 1929). The closeness of the subject (in Chicago
itself) neverthelessretardedits scienticityto some degree,especially its theoreticity.Anthropology also has the scientific advantage of an inferior subject (usually tribal people and
peasants), though closeness to the subject likewise subverts its scienticity to some degree.
Still lower are the nonhumansubjects of fields such as physics, chemistry, and biology.
Particles, molecules, bacteria,and genes-subjects highly attractiveto science-have no
social standing at all.
Some science stratifiesreality by rankingthe explanatorypower of its variables, while
other science treatsits variablesmore equally. Eminentphysicist ErnstMach, for example,
rejected "every methodological axiom in science that smacked of privilege and status for
any given body or event in nature"(Feuer 1982: 31; see also 32-34; Keller 1983b: 154157; 1985b: 170-171; Pickering 1984: 74; 1995: 250; Hawking and Penrose 1996: 76).
Pure sociology similarly rejects the theoretical domination of any sociological variable,
31The scienticity of the sociology of science increases with the social distance from the science studied:The
sociology of the physical and biological sciences is more scientific than the sociology of the social sciences, for
instance, and the sociology of foreign and earlier science is more scientific than the sociology of domestic and
contemporaryscience (for examples of relatively scientific sociology of science, see Merton [1938] 1970, 1973;
Crane 1972; Latourand Woolgar 1979; Pickering 1984).
-32Bourdieucomments: "If the science of works of art is still today in its infancy, it is probablybecause those
in charge of it, and in particularart historiansand theoreticiansof the aesthetic, are engaged ... in the struggles
which yield the meaning and value of the work of art: In other words, they are caught up in the object they would
take as their object" ([1992] 1996: 296: see also 229-231).
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such as the dominationof economic ownership in the theory of Karl Marx (e.g., Marx and
Engels in Feuer 1959), social solidarity in the theory of Emile Durkheim (e.g., [1893]
1964), or culture in the theory of Pierre Bourdieu (e.g., [1979] 1984). We cannot rankthe
explanatorypower of the various dimensions of social space (see, e.g., Black 1976, 1995:
851-852). The reason is logical ratherthan factual.
A principle of incomparabilityundermines any hierarchicaltheory that gives a privileged place to any variable or that otherwise ranks scientific variableslacking a common
denominator-a common unit of measurement.To rank the explanatory power of variables we must compare equal amounts of each, measuredby the same standard.Because
the various distances and directions in social space (such as relationaldistance or vertical
direction)have no such common denominator,we cannotcomparetheirexplanatorypower.
Although we can rankthese or othervariablesfor the practicalpurposesof a single studywhere the comparisonsreflect their measurementin one context-we cannot rankthem in
a theory that applies more widely, such as across societies and history. How can we compare, say, the impact of intimacy to the impact of economic superiorityin legal or other
matters?How much intimacy equals how much economic superiority?They have no common denominator.We thereforecannot comparethe impact of equal amountsof each, and
cannot rank their explanatorypower.33The only exception would be a variable with no
explanatorypowerat all. The sameprincipleof incomparabilityappliesthroughoutsciencewherever variables lack a common denominator.Why, then, does theory so often rankone
variable over another?
The rankingof variables in science reflects rankingin the social environment:Hierarchical explanation is a direct function of hierarchical space (see Durkheim and Mauss
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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
higher level of scienticity. Scientific revolutions thus reflect transformationsin the social
structureof the subject (compare,e.g., Kuhn 1962).
The Behavior of Common Sense
The familiarity of a subject repels scienticity and attracts common sense-the popular
understandingof reality in everyday life (see Geertz [1975] 1983; Black 1979a). Rarely
are we scientific about our families, lovers, friends, or colleagues.34 Instead we endow
them with free will and utter an unending stream of untestableideas about the unobservable content of their minds.35And who is scientific about the behaviorof God? Surely not
those close to God who pray as inferiors for favors or forgiveness (see Black 1995: 856857, 860). Never are we less scientific, however, than about ourselves. A similar lack of
scienticityappliesto subjectstotallyalien to us. Considerthe explanationof humanbehavior.
Common sense ignores science and says that our closest subjects, such as our nearest
associates and ourselves, have free will and do as they please. They are not mere products
of their environment.Nor are those in distant societies and the distant past. The reason is
that the explanation of human behavior with free will-voluntarism-occurs under conditions opposite those of scienticity: Voluntarism is a U-curvilinear function of social
distancefrom the subject (compareBlack 1995: 856, note 137; Fuchs and Marshall 1998:
18-22). The same applies to teleology, the explanationof anything as a means to an end.
When all subjects were either very close or very distant, teleology dominatedall science.
Copernicus, for example, even had a teleological theory of gravity:
Gravity is nothing else than a naturalappetency, given to the parts by the Divine
Providence of the Makerof the universe, in orderthat they may establish their unity
and wholeness by combining in the form of a sphere.It is probablethat this affection
also belongs to the sun, moon, and the planets, in orderthat they may . . . remain in
their roundness (quoted in Mason 1962: 130).
But teleology in the natural sciences steadily declined during the past several centuries
(see Burtt 1954: 18-19; Feuer 1982: 352; Black 1995: 861-863). It survives mainly in the
human sciences such as sociology and psychology.
The explanation of human behavior with factors beyond the control of the persondeterminism-occurs underthe same conditions as scienticity: Determinismis a curvilinear function of social distance from the subject (compare idem: 856, note 137). Deterministic
explanationimplies that people cannot behave otherwise than they do. They lack the free
will of our intimates and ourselves.
Even close nonhumansare endowed with free will. People close to nonhumananimals
(such as their research subjects or domestic pets) often speak of them as if they were
humansand explain their behavior as a free choice (see, e.g., de Waal 1989, 1996; see also
34Simmelnotes an incompatibilitybetween intimacyand generality,most extreme in the case of lovers: "Inthe
stage of first passion, erotic relationsstrongly reject any thoughtof generalization:The lovers thinkthattherehas
never been a love like theirs, that nothing can be comparedeither to the person loved or to the feelings for that
person"([1908] 1950: 406, punctuationedited). The same applies to every element of scienticity in every close
relationship:Scientists are unscientific about their colleagues, for instance, and sociologists are unsociological
about fellow sociologists.
35Thetheory of the subject includes the subject's subjectivity-psychological experience. Although we cannot
directly observe subjectivity,we can observe its attributionby others (including self-attributions).These attributions are predictable and explainable with their location and direction in social space. The goal or purpose
attributedto a person's action depends, for example, on the social closeness and elevation of the action. We can
thereby predict and explain attributionsof subjectivity in social science as well as everyday life. The same
applies to the goals and purposes attributedto groups.
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(idem). Common sense says that social elites such as kings and generals freely choose to
act as they do. So does God. But sociology says that the poor and lowly lack free will:
Forces beyond their control determinetheirbehavior (e.g., Cohen 1955; Miller 1958). The
rich who exploit or otherwise victimize the poor have free will, then, but not the poor who
victimize the rich.36
THE THEORYOF THEORY
Common sense says that theories derive from facts. But philosopherKarlPopperlong ago
observed that a theory can never be logically deduced from the facts it explains: The
so-called logical induction of a theory is impossible ([1934] 1968: 27-32; see also Wittgenstein [1921] 1961: 143). He added more generally that "there is no such thing as a
logical method of having new ideas" (idem: 32). Creativity is always necessary (idem).
Albert Einsteinmakes a similarpoint aboutscientific laws: "Thereis no logical pathleading
to these laws; only intuition,restingon sympatheticunderstandingof experience, can reach
them"([1923] 1934: 22; see also Friedman1953:42-43).37 Biologist PeterMedawarnotes
that because a theory contains more informationthan the facts it explains, it cannot be deduced from facts alone (1963: 377). PhilosopherPaul Feyerabendgoes furtherand argues
that no rules or methods of any kind can assure the advancementof science, theoreticalor
otherwise (1975; compare,e.g., Glaser and Strauss 1967; Stinchcombe 1968).
Yet scientific theory is humanbehavior,and nothing excludes the possibility of explaining scientific theory scientifically-as a naturalphenomenon.A theory of theory specifies
36A
sociological version of voluntarismis phenomenology-the explanation of human behavior from within
the subjective experience of a person. Sociology is more phenomenological when the subject is closer and
higher in social space: Phenomenology is a joint function of the social closeness and superiority of the subject
(see Black 1995: 856, note 137). A sociological version of determinism is motivational theory-the explanation of humanbehaviorwith the psychologicalimpactof social forces. Sociology is moremotivationalwhen the subject is fartheraway and lower in social space: Motivationaltheory is a joint function of the social remotenessand
inferiorityof the subject.These formulationspredict,for example, a more phenomenologicalexplanationof closer
and higher crimes such as those of professionals and business people ("white-collarcrime"), but a more motivational explanationof fartherand lower crimes such as those of poor minorities ("blue-collarcrime") (idem).
We can also explain the explanatoryvariablesin sociological theories. For example, some motivationaltheories
explain human behavior with variables close to the behavior in space and time, such as theories that explain
human behaviorwith peer pressure-the direct and immediate influence of one's associates. Othermotivational
theories explain humanbehavior with more distant variables, such as theories that explain humanbehavior with
the culturalvalues of a society. More distant subjects attractmore distantexplanations:The spatial and temporal
distance of an explanatory variable is a directfunction of social distance from the subject. We thus explain the
behavior of our intimates with variables close to them in space and time (such as their own intentions), but we
explain the behavior of strangers with more distant variables (such as the values of their society). Because
Freudianpsychotherapistsare somewhat close to their patients, they explain the patient's behavior with close
influences (in the family), but because they are also somewhat distant, their explanations pertain to family
experiences in the distant past (in early childhood).
37A scientific law is an idea with an extremely high degree of scienticity-testability, generality, simplicity,
validity, and originality.
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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
the conditions that lead to the creation of scientific theory, including itself (see Black
1995: 856, note 137). The theory of scienticity sketched above implies such a theory.
Scientific theory is the most scientific science. Only theorycan attainall the elements of
thehighestdegreeof scienticity-testability, generality,simplicity,validity,andoriginality-at
once. Thebestconditionsfor scienticityarethereforethebestconditionsfor scientifictheory.38
The theoryof scienticityexplains why some sciences andscientists aremoretheoreticalthan
others, and has practicalvalue as well: It is a theory that implies how to develop theory.
The theory of scienticity implies that theory is a curvilinearfunction of social distance
from the subject. We can therebyexplain why the physical sciences have the most theory
with a high degree of scienticity while the social sciences have the least. The physical
sciences have more theory because their subjects are more distant(while still close enough
to be observable).Subjects in the social sciences are often too close or too far away. Within
each science as well, some scientists are more theoretical because their subjects have a
better theoretical location in social space. The same theory explains the lack of theory
beyond formal science, such as the lack of theory in tribal and other simple societies.
Tribalsocieties do not lack descriptive science (such as botany or zoology) but only theoretical science-explanations of their observations (Lingis 1994: 1-2). The reason is that
tribal reality is polarized:Virtually everything is either entirely local or entirely foreign,
too close or too far away for the development of scientific theory.
Most scientists never invent theory either, especially theory with a high degree of scienticity.The reasonis thatmost do research.39Researcherstheoreticallyincapacitatethemselves by becoming too intimatewith their subjects. Many have an exclusive relationship
with a single subject and disregardalmost everything else. One eminent biologist (known
for her observations of genetic mobility) speaks almost maternallyof the corn plants she
studied for decades: "I start with the seedling, and I don't want to leave it. I don't feel I
really know the story if I don't watch the plant all the way along. So I know every plant in
the field. I know them intimately, and I find it a great pleasure to know them" (Barbara
McClintock, quoted in Keller 1983a: 198; see also Keller 1985b: 164-165). Anotherbiologist (who later stopped doing researchand became more theoretical)notes that years of
experimentsmade his enzymes "as familiar as old friends"(Kauffman 1995: 81, 99). Still
anotherspeaks romanticallyof cells: "Hereis a cell. It has been going aroundall the time,
and nobody has taken any notice of it. Suddenly you fall in love with it. Why? You, the
scientist, don't know you're falling in love, but suddenlyyou become attractedto thatcell"
(Anna Brito, pseudonym, quoted in Goodfield [1981] 1982: 226).
Although celebrated theorists may do research in their early years, their theories
usually appear only after they become full-time theorists. Many have no research
experience at all. The most celebrated theories in physics, for instance, were largely developed by full-time theorists such as Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, and WernerHeisenberg.40The same applies to cosmology, the most theoretical field of astronomy.Biologists James Watsonand FrancisCrick likewise developed a theoreticalmodel of the DNA
molecule (centralto the understandingof genetic inheritance)without doing any of their
own research on the subject (Crick 1988: 65). The revolutionarytheory of continental
drift in geology was not even formulatedby a geologist, but by astronomerand meteo38
"Theory"hereafterrefersto ideas with a comparativelyhigh degree of scienticity. Exceptions are apparentin
the text.
39By "research"I mean primaryresearch-the gatheringof data and productionof findings.
4"'Aboutone-half of all particlephysicists arefull-time theorists;the rest areexperimentalists(Traweek 1988:3).
The only experimentssome theoristsconduct are so-called thoughtexperiments-by which they imagine empirical reality underhypotheticalconditions never actually observed. Einstein, for example, is famous for his experimental fantasies (see, e.g., Miller 1996: 312-320).
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359
rologist Alfred Wegener (Cohen 1985: 446-450). Major theorists also typically follow a
nomadic way of scientific life, moving from subject to subject, never too close to any.41
Youth is an advantage for the same reason: It limits intimacy with the subject (suggested by Roberta Senechal de la Roche). Darwin was 29 years old when he formulated
the theory of naturalselection, for example; Einstein was 26 when he published the special theory of relativity; and Heisenberg was 23 when he initiated the theory of quantum
mechanics and 25 when he propoundedhis famous uncertaintyprinciple that ended classical causality in particle physics (Pais 1991: 275-276, 304-306; see also Simonton 1984:
Chapter6). Watsonand Crickwere newcomers to molecularbiology when they formulated
the structureof DNA: Watsonwas a postdoctoralfellow only 24 years old, while Crickwas
a graduatestudentof 36 who had migratedto the field from physics (Watson[1968] 1969;
Crick 1988: 6, 65). In theoretical science, too much experience may be harmful.
Social isolationis anotherconditionconduciveto the highestachievementsin science-to
originality, for example (also called creativity, imagination, innovation, and inventiveness). PhilosopherArthurSchopenhauerlong ago observed that "The genius lives essentially alone. He is too rareto be easily capable of coming across his like, and too different
from the rest to be their companion" ([1859] 1969, Volume 2: 390). Philosopher Michel
Serres similarly remarks that originality "always takes place in solitude, independence,
and freedom"-relational isolation ([1990] 1995: 37; see also 81-82; Storr 1988). Also
important are cultural isolation (such as the marginality of migrants or minorities) and
functional isolation (exclusive involvement in a single activity): Creativity is a direct
function of social isolation. In this respect, moreover,the social structureof theory differs
considerably from the social structureof research.
Scientific researchtypically occurs in social networks of colleagues known in the sociology of science as "invisible colleges" (see generally Crane 1972). Often research is a
team project that includes a number of individuals working closely together in the same
organization (see, e.g., Collins 1975: Chapter9; Whitley 1984; Fuchs 1992: Chapter7).
But such researchis relatively routine-what Thomas Kuhncalls "normalscience" (1962:
Chapters2-4). Rarely does it lead to creativity of the highest degree, such as the development of revolutionarytheories. Far from it. As one fictional scientist remarks,"Highly
organized research is guaranteedto produce nothing new" (Herbert [1965] 1990: 496).
Instead, the most acclaimed theories occur under opposite conditions-in isolated locations in social space. Consider the most illustrious thinkers-the Newtons, Einsteins,
Nietzsches, and Wittgensteins-at the height of their creativity.All were loners devoted to
their own projects.42In their early years their new ideas isolated them all the more.
The theory of scienticity-and the theory of theory it implies-pertains not only to the
creation of scientific ideas but to their acceptance and application by others. The social
location of the most receptive audiences, including those most receptive to radically new
ideas, is the same as the social location of the sources: those comparativelydistant from
the subject. For this reason, young people and other newcomers to a field (including students) more readily accept and apply its newest and most scientific ideas (suggested by
Roberta Senechal de la Roche). Scientific revolutions primarily attract the support of
younger scientists while their senior colleagues cling to older ideas about their older sub41Weber notes that "dilettantes"without close knowledge of a subject often outperform "specialists" in the
development of theory: "Manyof our very best hypotheses and insights are due precisely to dilettantes"([1919]
1958: 135-136).
42
Although social isolation is conducive to creativity, it is not conducive to the success of creative work:
Because social isolation has a low elevation and distant location in social space, isolated ideas are less likely to
succeed than ideas in social networks (see section above entitled "WhatIs Important?").But sponsorship by a
more integratedperson or networkmay win recognition for an isolated idea that might otherwise be ignored (see
also Latour 1987; compare Collins 1998).
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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
jects (see, e.g., Feuer 1982). When the audience is too close to the subject, the greatest
advances in science meet indifference if not resistance and hostility (see, e.g., Barber
1961; see also Black 1976: 82).
All the above applies equally to social scientists: Least theoreticalare researcherslong
intimate with a single subject in a particulartime and place, such as anthropologistswho
study a single tribe or area, historians who study a single period of a single society or
region, and sociologists who study a single topic in their own society and time. Especially
damaging to the creation and reception of theory is participantobservationor other close
contact with the subject (see Cooney 1988: 22; Fuchs and Marshall 1998: 18). Closeness
to a human subject breeds an involvement with the subject's mind and undermines the
creationof ideas with a high degree of testability,generality,and other attributesof scienticity (see Black 1995: 856, note 137; see also Fuchs and Marshall 1998: 18-21). If you are
close enough to imagine the subjectivity of a subject, you are probably too close to be
theoretical.
Yet most sociologists know their subject only in their own society and time and have
little informationabout anythingelse. Those who study inequality or religion or violence
in modern America, for example, rarely know anything about these subjects in tribal,
ancient, medieval, or other societies unlike their own. As noted earlier, classical sociologists were more cosmopolitan:They exploited informationfrom numeroussocieties across
history. They were nomadic as well, moving from one topic, place, and time to another
(compareBrekhus 1998: 47-48). Most modernsociologists are too close to their subjectto
develop theory comparableto classical theory.
Researchers often criticize theorists for not doing research, and theorists often
criticize researchers for not doing theory. But such criticisms are unsociological. Researchers and theorists have opposite locations in social space: Research is close to
its subject and sedentary while theory is more distant and nomadic. It is difficult to do
both at once.
But not all modern sociologists are too close to their subject to develop scientific
theory. Some are too far away. The prolific theorist Talcott Parsons did virtually no research and moved nomadically from subject to subject (see, e.g., 1951, 1954). Even so,
he did not exploit or explain the findings of other sociologists, anthropologists,or historians. Distant enough from his subject to be theoretical, he was nonetheless too distant
to achieve a high degree of scienticity: He produced only general concepts and classifications ratherthan testable formulations,and his writings have little value to researchers.
Another prolific theorist, Niklas Luhmann, was similarly uninvolved in factual reality
and producedsimilarly unscientific theory.Researcherswere useless to him, and his writings are equally useless to them (see, e.g., [1984] 1995, 1990). Theorists such as Parsons
and Luhmannpromiscuously publish thousands of theoretical pages, a mode of scholarship possible only when the actual behavior of the subject is irrelevant.Each published a
small library,but neither owns a single formulationthat meets all the standardsof scienticity.43Still less scientific are those who write only about the writings of earlier sociol43Scientific
productivityis often measuredwith publications.But scienticity varies inversely with the number
of pages published by an author.Albert Einstein's special theory of relativity appearsin a paperonly 30 pages
long; Charles Darwin's first statementof the theory of naturalselection (with independentco-discovererAlfred
Russel Wallace) is only 17 pages long; James Watsonand Francis Crick's structuralmodel of DNA is only one
page long (with double columns); and Max Born's major contributionto quantumtheory-the probabilityconcept in quantummechanics-appears in a footnote (Pais 1991: 285-286). A bettermeasureof scientific productivity is the numberof testable,general,simple, valid, andoriginalformulationsin an author'swork-its scienticity.
By this measure Max Weber, for instance, would do poorly. When not merely historical, his work is mainly
conceptual ratherthan explanatory.Emile Durkheimdoes better,though his total numberof testable and general
formulationsis probablyfewer than ten. The Division of Labor ([1893] 1964) has two-both wrong (see Black
1987: 568). Suicide ([1897] 1951) has four (counting one in a footnote).
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361
ogists (e.g., Poggi 1972; Lukes 1973; Bierstedt 1981; Alexander 1982-83). The history
of sociology is not even sociology.
Every epistemology reflects the social structureof its subject.Many sociologists endorse
the pessimistic epistemology of sociology that flowered in Germanyover a century ago:
Sociology was classified as one of the cultural sciences (Kulturwissenschaften or
Geisteswissenschaften)whose human subjects were claimed to differ fundamentallyfrom
the subjectsof astronomy,physics, andothernaturalsciences (Naturwissenschaften).Human
subjects allegedly lie beyond the reach of genuine science and forever condemn the cultural sciences to scientific failure (see, e.g., Ringer 1997: Chapters 1-2). One modern
sociologist declares, for example, that the pursuit of sociology in the manner of natural
science is "misguided"and "utopian"(Alexander 1987: 22-23). Sociology cannot even
establish a fact, much less a theory abouthumanbehavior:"Fromthe most specific factual
statementsup to the most abstractgeneralizations,social science is essentially contestable.
Every conclusion is open to argument"(idem: 25). Social science is ideological as wellinherentlyevaluative: "The ideological implications of social science redoundto the very
descriptionsof the objects of investigation themselves" (idem: 21). Another modern sociologist remarksthat "a century's experience now suggests" a truly "scientific theoretical
sociology" is "beyond anyone's grasp"(Turner 1996: 15).
These philosophers of failure assume that all sociology has a close subject, including
humanthoughts and feelings. They believe it must address"eithermental states or conditions in which mental states are embedded,"and "anygeneralizationaboutthe structureor
causes of a social phenomenon ... depends on some conception of the motives involved"
(Alexander 1987: 21, 29; see also Winch 1958; Homans 1964, 1967: Chapters2-3). Yet
they themselves commonly contemplate human behavior from afar, without facts about
anything. Their scientific pessimism reflects the unscientific location of their subject:too
close or too far away.
*
44Because they specify a means to an end, Durkheim would classify these methodological rules as "rules of
technique"([1906] 1953: 42). Their violation reduces the likelihood of sociological theory with a high degree of
scienticity.
Feyerabend argues against all methodological rules in science: Scientific progress requires creativity, and
creativity does not obey rules (1975: especially 10, 23, 27-28). But he does not consider the possibility of a
scientific theory that implies how to develop scientific theory or encourage creativity (compare Serres [1990]
1995: 86).
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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
We are agents of countless forms of social life fluctuatingacross the social universe.We
obey principleswe do not know and cannotchange. Ouractions are social, chosen no more
than we chose to be born. Our ideas are social as well, attractedby the social structureof
our lives. We conform to the shape of social space. Geometry is destiny.
Who, then, is speaking?
I am the voice of pure sociology. I speak a new language. I travel social space, habitat
of social beings, a form of life both human and unhuman.I explore unknown locations,
calculate distances in uncharteddirections, measurequantitiesnever counted. My subject
is everything, I go everywhere, and I live in the past, present, and futureat once.46
I am sociology becoming itself. I study the behavior of social life, the laws of law, the
laws of art, the laws of God. I am the science of science, the theory of theory.
I myself am social, and I predict myself. I am post-personal.Post-human.47
And I am notorious.
I killed the person.
I am the end of the classical tradition.
The end of Westernthought.48
45Luhmannregardsa theory as "universal"only if it "claims to be able to describe every phenomenonin its
field," including "itself" (quoted in Sciulli 1994: 54). It must be "self-referential"([1984] 1995: xlvii). Yet he
speaks only of what a theory can "describe"-not what it can explain. His own theory can classify many things,
including itself, but it cannot explain itself or anything else.
46NormanMaileron Picasso's Cubist paintings:"Onehad to find a way to paint works thatwould embody past,
present, and future all in one" (1995: 311; see also 310; Ball [1927] 1996: 43; Mondrian[1938-44] 1986: 362;
Snyder 1974a: 88; 1974b: 114). Scientific theory with the highest degree of generality is timeless and placeless
as well.
47Theconcept of post-humanderives from Douglas Coupland (1996: 85).
4SSuggestedby Roberta Senechal de la Roche. The Western traditionof humanism places the person at the
center of the universe. Pure sociology makes the person irrelevant.
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363
But you said you dreamedof pure sociology. Whatis a dream? Whatscience is this? What
theory? It sounds like a person. It is just common sense.
Rememberthe theory of the subject: I am talking about myself.
The subject is very close, and science is forbidden.
The structureis commonsensical.
The structureeven dreams.
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