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her or not Philippines, a signatory to the Warsaw Convention, should adhere to the

provision of the Warsaw Convention in the determination of its jurisdiction with respect
to a case for damages involving a tortuous conduct committed by an airline personnel
while in an international carrier against a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Yes. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this
country. In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 (1992), we held that:
The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw
Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the
Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of
accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was
deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became
applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto,
to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and
fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof. The
Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine
government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
Alfredo Mallari, Sr. and Alfredo Mallari, Jr. v. CA and Bulletin Publishing Corp.
G.R. No. 128607 January 31, 2000
FACTS:
The passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. and owned by Mallari Sr. collided with the
delivery van of Bulletin along the National Highway in Brgy. San Pablo, Dinalupihan,
Bataan. Mallari Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a
Fiera which had stopped on the right lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van
of Bulletin coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The
collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the
highway. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting
injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the
gravity of his injuries. Claudia Reyes, the widow of Israel Reyes, filed a complaint for
damages against Mallari Sr. and Mallari Jr., and also against Bulletin, its driver Felix
Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance Co. The complaint alleged that the collision
which resulted in the death of Israel was caused by the fault and negligence of both
drivers of the passenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van.

ISSUE:
WON Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. are liable for the death of Israel
HELD:
Yes. The collision occurred immediately after Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it
while traversing a curve on the highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of
Sec. 41,pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road
is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is
approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side
of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying
upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction
comes into view. Mallari Jr. already saw that the Bulletin delivery van was coming from
the opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at
5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook 2 vehicles in
front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting
in the death of Israel was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney,
Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was
not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Mallari failed to present
satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption. The negligence and
recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against Mallari Sr., who
admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier,
considering the fact that in an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold
it responsible for the payment of damages sought by the passenger. (See Arts. 1755,
1756 and 1759 for the rationale of common carriers liability).
Batangas Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal
G.R. No. L-22985, January 24, 1968
Facts:
Caguimbal who was a paying pasenger of Batangas Transportation Company
(BTCO) bus died when the bus of the Bian Transportation Company (Binan) which was

coming from the opposite direction and a calesa managed by Makahiya, which was then
ahead of the Bian bus met an accident. A passenger requested the conductor of BTCO
to stop as he was going to alight, and when he heard the signal of the conductor, the
driver slowed down his bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop; at this
juncture, a calesa, then driven by Makahiya was at a distance of several meters facing
the BTCO bus coming from the opposite direction; that at the same time the Bian bus
was about 100 meters away likewise going northward and following the direction of the
calesa; that upon seeing the Bian bus the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light; that
as the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite directions,
the Bian bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass between the
BTCO bus and the calesa; that without diminishing its speed of about seventy (70)
kilometers an hour, the Bian bus passed through the space between the BTCO bus and
the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body
and then bumped and struck the calesa which was completely wrecked; that the driver
was seriously injured and the horse was killed; that the second and all other posts
supporting the top of the left side of the BTCO bus were completely smashed and half of
the back wall to the left was ripped open. The BTCO bus suffered damages for the repair
of its damaged portion.As a consequence of this occurrence, Caguimbal and Tolentino
died, apart from others who were injured. The widow and children of Caguimbal sued to
recover damages from the BTCO. The latter, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against
the Bian and its driver, Ilagan. Subsequently, the Caguimbals amended their complaint,
to include therein, as defendants, said Bian and Ilagan. CFI dismissed the complaint
insofar as the BTCO is concerned, without prejudice to plaintiff's right to sue Bian and
Ilagan. CA reversed said decision and rendered judgment for Caguimbal. BTCO appealed
to SC.
Issue:
Whether BTCO is liable to pay damages for failure to exercise extraordinary
diligence?
Held:
YES. BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part. The
recklessness of the driver of Binan was, manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of
the accident which resulted in the death of Pedro Caguimbal. Indeed, as driver of the
Bian bus, he overtook Makahiya's horse-driven rig or calesa and passed between the
same and the BTCO bus despite the fact that the space available was not big enough
therefor, in view of which the Bian bus hit the left side of the BTCO bus and then the
calesa. Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides the general rule that extraordinary

diligence must be exercised by the driver of a bus in the vigilance for the safety of his
passengers. The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, the
BTCO bus driver drove partly to the right shoulder of the road and partly on the
asphalted portion thereof. Yet, he could have and should have seen to it had he
exercised "extraordinary diligence" that his bus was completely outside the asphalted
portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the width of which being more
than sufficient to accommodate the bus. When the BTCO bus driver slowed down his
BTCO bus to permit said passenger to disembark, he must have known, therefore, that
the Bian bus would overtake the calesa at about the time when the latter and BTCO bus
would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted portions of the
road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to
allow the Bian bus to go through. It is true that the driver of the Bian bus should have
slowed down or stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no
especial obligations toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike the BTCO bus driver
whose duty was to exercise "utmost" or "extraordinary" diligence for their safety. Perez
was thus under obligation to avoid a situation which would be hazardous for his
passengers, and, make their safety dependent upon the diligence of the Bian driver. In
an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of
fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the
damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes
the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe
extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that
might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence
of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that
negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that
it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the
new Civil Code.

Mecenas v. CA
Facts:
On April 22, 1980, two vessels, Tacloban City and Don Juan collided at the
Talbas Strait within the vicinity of Mindoro. M/V Don Juan sank and hundreds of
passengers died. Among them were petitioners parents, whose bodies were never
recovered. Petitioners filed a complaint seeking damages against Negros Navigation. The
trial court awarded P400,000, but the Court of Appeals reduced the award to P100,000.
Issue:

Whether the reduction of the award was properly ruled upon by the Court of
Appeals
Held:
In an action based upon a breach of the contract of carriage, the carrier under our
civil law is liable for the death of passengers arising from the negligence or wilful act of
the carrier's employees although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or even in violation of the instructions of the carrier, which liability may
include liability for moral damages. It follows that petitioners would be entitled to moral
damages so long as the collision with the "Tacloban City" and the sinking of the "Don
Juan" were caused or attended by negligence on the part of private respondents.
Whether petitioners are entitled to exemplary damages as claimed must depend upon
whether or not private respondents acted recklessly, that is, with gross negligence. We
believe that the behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in this instance playing
mahjong "before and up to the time of collision" constitutes behaviour that is simply
unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the lives and welfare
of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengers had been entrusted. There is also
evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying more passengers than she had been certified
as allowed to carry. We conclude that Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation are
properly held liable for gross negligence. We find no necessity for passing upon the
degree of negligence or culpability properly attributable to PNOC and PNOC Shipping or
the master of the "Tacloban City," since they were never impleaded here. Exemplary
damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is
socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents
against such behaviour. In requiring compliance with the standard of extraordinary
diligence, a standard which is in fact that of the highest possible degree of diligence,
from common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law
seeks to compel them to control their employees, to tame their reckless instincts and to
force them to take adequate care of human beings and their property. Both the demands
of substantial justice and the imperious requirements of public policy compel us to the
conclusion that the trial court's implicit award of moral and exemplary damages was
erroneously deleted and must be restored and augmented and brought more nearly to
the level required by public policy and substantial justice.

Philippine National Railways (PNR) vs.CA


GR L-55347, 4 October 1985
Facts:

On 10 September 1972, at about 9:00 p.m.,Winifredo Tupang, husband of


Rosario Tupang, boarded Train 516 of the Philippine National Railways at Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect,
the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before
the train could resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at
Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. The train did
not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the
train. Instead, the train conductor, Perfecto Abrazado, called the station agent at
Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the information. Police authorities
of Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of
Winifredo Tupang. As shown by the autopsy report, Winifredo Tupang died of cardiorespiratory failure due to massive cerebral hemorrhage due to traumatic injury. Tupang
was later buried in the public cemetery of Lucena City by the local police authorities.
Upon complaint filed by the deceaseds widow, Rosario Tupang, the then CFI Rizal, after
trial, held the PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage and ordered it to
pay Rosario Tupang the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of Winifredo Tupang, plus
P20,000.00 for loss of his earning capacity, and the further sum of P10,000.00 as moral
damages, andP2,000.00 as attorneys fees, and cost. On appeal, the Appellate Court
sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR did not exercise the utmost diligence
required bylaw of a common carrier. It further increased the amount adjudicated by the
trial court by ordering PNR to pay the Rosario Tupang an additional sum of P5,000,00 as
exemplary damages. Moving for reconsideration of the above decision, the PNR raised
for the first time, as a defense, the doctrine of state immunity from suit. The motion was
denied. Hence the petition for review.
Issue:
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of Tupang.
Held:
PNR has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to
observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its
passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its
obligation under the contract of carriage. PNR failed to overthrow such presumption
of negligence with clear and convincing evidence, inasmuch as PNR does not deny,(1)
that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so overcrowded that he
and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the
coaches of the train, (2) that the train did not even slow down when it approached the
Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, and (3) that neither did the train stop,
despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at

Iyam Bridge. While PNR failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it
appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted
to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly
and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid
falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting
the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as
moral damages. The Supreme Court modified the decision of the appellate court by
eliminating there from the amounts of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00

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