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SME Capital Structure: The Dominance of Demand Factors

By Kenny Bell and Ed Vos*

Abstract
SME capital structure behaviour is found typically to follow pecking order behaviour. However, the
theoretical underpinnings of the pecking order theory are doubted in the case of SMEs as SME
managers highly value financial freedom, independence, and control while the pecking order theory
assumes firms desire financial wealth and suffer from severe adverse selection costs in accessing
external finance. Alternatively, the contentment hypothesis of Vos, et al (2007) contends the reason
SMEs exhibit pecking order behaviour is the aversion to loss of control to outside financiers and the
preference for financial freedom. This paper develops the capital structure predictions of the
contentment hypothesis, reviews the predictions of the tradeoff and pecking order theories for relevant
variables, reviews the findings of existing SME capital structure studies, and provides original
empirical support for the contentment hypothesis using a survey of over 2,000 firms from Germany,
Greece, Ireland, South Korea, Portugal, Spain, and Vietnam.

Kenny Bell, Department of Finance, University of Waikato. Private Bag 3104, Hamilton, New
Zealand. kmb56@students.waikato.ac.nz
*Correspondence to: Ed Vos, Department of Finance, University of Waikato. Private Bag 3104,
Hamilton, New Zealand. evos@waikato.ac.nz

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456725

SME Capital Structure: The Dominance of Demand Factors


Introduction
The dominant capital structure theories have presupposed firms act in such a way as to maximise the
financial wealth of their shareholders. The pecking order theory assumes adverse selection costs are
dominant in capital structure decisions and, due to information asymmetry, firms maximise value by
choosing to finance investment internally, given available funds (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Theories
predicting an optimal target capital structure balance the financial wealth enhancing aspects of debt,
such as tax advantages (Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), and Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)), and
control of agency costs to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), against the financial wealth
reducing aspects of debt, such as financial distress costs and agency costs to debtholders. Within these
theories, financial wealth is the primary concern.
However, it is doubted that the objective functions of small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs) are dominated by financial wealth maximisation. The reluctance to relinquish control and the
desire for independence are oft cited examples of attitudes small firm owners exhibit (Bolton (1971),
and Ang (1992)). Lifestyle factors are also considered important motivation for SME behaviour
(LeCornu et al. (1996)). Diener & Seligman (2004) show relationships to be a primary determinant of
ones happiness, while wealth only aids happiness up till basic needs are met. This suggests SME
managers may be, in general, averse to substantial growth (Wiklund et al. (2003)) as maintaining a
low, natural growth rate, or staying at a certain optimal size both allows them to meet their basic
needs financially and maintain close relationships with customers and suppliers (Vos et al. (2007)).
Thus, the aforementioned capital structure theories are likely to be unsuitable to explain the behaviour
of SMEs.
Previous studies of general small firm capital structure have presupposed small and medium
sized enterprises to (predominantly) act in such a way as to maximise their financial wealth. A
consequence of this presupposition is these studies have assumed that SMEs, in general, desire
substantial growth and consequently have a desire for external finance (Beck et al. (2008), Cassar and
Holmes (2003), Chittenden et al. (1996), Ramalho and da Silva (2009), Sogorb-Mira (2005), Hall et al.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456725

(2004), and Michaelas et al. (1999)). The only exceptions to this we know of are Lucey and Mac an
Bhaird (2006) and, to a far lesser extent, Degryse et al. (2009), and Psillaki and Daskalakis (2008).
Lucey and Mac an Bhaird examine 299 Irish SMEs and find the desire for independence and control
to be important in SME capital structure decisions while Degryse et al. (2009), and Psillaki and
Daskalakis (2008) mention independence and control as a possible explanation of their finding related
to profitability.
As in Lucey and Mac and Bhaird (2006) we use a survey of over 2,000 SMEs covering 7
countries, we examine the borrowing behaviour of privately held SMEs and aim to determine what
factors, both behavioural and financial, influence the use of external debt financing for SMEs. The
findings show SMEs prefer internal funds over debt, firm age is an important determinant of
borrowing decisions, growth oriented firms use more debt to fund their growth, higher educated
firms owners use less debt, and the effect firm size has on borrowing behaviour is predominantly
related to demand factors, and not supply factors.
This paper differs from Lucey and Mac an Bhaird (2006) in several important respects. Firstly,
these authors utilise a relatively small and geographically concentrated sample (n=299), while this
study uses over 2,000 SMEs from 7 different countries. Secondly, this study utilises the nonlinear
tobit regression method which acknowledges the limited nature of the dependent variable in question.
That is, conventional measures of leverage or financing lie in the interval [0, 1], with many firms
showing nil debt, making the use of the standard linear regression model inappropriate. Thirdly, this
study uses both profitability and reported obstacles to accessing financing as independent variables in
the analysis, both of which are found to be important and are not included in Lucey and Mac an
Bhairds (2006) paper.
The theory in this paper is primarily based on the contentment hypothesis of SME financing
offered in Vos et al. (2007). This hypothesis argues SMEs, in general, place a greater utility value on
connections and relationships than financial wealth and exhibit financially content behaviour. The
central prediction of this hypothesis relating to the capital structure of SMEs is, if given the
unconstrained choice between external debt and internal funds, SMEs will, in general, choose not to
utilise debt due to the preference for independence and control. As in Berggren et al. (2000), Lucey

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456725

and Mac an Bhaird (2006), and Vos et al. (2007), we relax the restrictive presumption that SMEs
desire growth and allow growth orientation to be a determinant of the capital structure choices of
SMEs in the development of a new capital structure theory.
This paper reviews the findings of previous SME capital structure studies and reinterprets the
results to show that, while SMEs tend to exhibit pecking order behaviour with respect to their capital
structures, the theoretical underpinnings of the pecking order theory are unlikely to hold. The
predictions of the contentment hypothesis (Vos et al. (2007)) are used as the basis of the development
of a capital structure theory for SMEs.
Using data on over 2,000 firms across 7 countries from the EBRD-World Bank Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 2004 survey, small firms are shown to
exhibit financial contentment, a reluctance to relinquish control to outside financiers and,
consequently, an aversion to debt. Within this survey, firm size is shown to proxy for differences in
demand factors for debt, and not supply factors as the finance-gap hypothesis predicts. The data
suggests SMEs follow a borrowing life cycle of around 30 years. Firms initially show signs of growth
early in their life and subsequently show signs of financial contentment, presumably as the firm
owners age and accumulate their desired amount of funds.
We next further motivate the study in the literature and develop hypotheses relating the
important explanatory variables to borrowing behaviour. Then we describe the data used in this study
and the variables utilised or constructed from this dataset. After we briefly examine the univariate
relations in this dataset, we discuss the regression methods used in this paper. Finally the results are
presented to support the conclusions.
Motivation
Most prior studies of SME financing have concluded SMEs exhibit pecking order behaviour with
regards to their financing (e.g. Cassar and Holmes (2003), Ramalho and da Silva (2009), Psillaki and
Daskalakis (2008), Sogorb-Mira (2005), Berggren et al. (2000), Lucey and Mac an Bhaird (2006), and
Michaelas et al. (1999)). However, the traditional pecking order theory relies on adverse selection
costs, or asymmetric information, as the primary assumption underlying the theory (Myers and Majluf

(1984)). Further, this theory relies on firms desire for financial wealth maximisation as the primary
driver behind their financial behaviour. This view ignores behavioural aspects and is highly unlikely
to apply in the SME situation as SME managers are concerned with independence, control, and
financial freedom (Bolton (1971), and Cressy (1995)), and are averse to significant growth (Vos et al.
(2007), and Wiklund et al. (2003)). Further, it is doubted that information asymmetry is a problem for
SMEs in the debt markets (Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2008), Vos et al. (2007), and Lucey and Mac an
Bhaird (2006)). Thus, we believe, the assumptions underlying the traditional pecking order theory do
not apply to the vast majority of SMEs. A new theory is required to explain this phenomenon.
The contentment hypothesis, first offered by Vos et al (2007), stems from the assumption that
those in small firms aim for utility or happiness maximisation, often at the expense of gaining wealth.
The typical small firm is not painted as growth-cycle oriented (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006)),
where firms aim to grow ultimately to an IPO level (Berger and Udell (1998)), but as content with
modest sustainable growth (Vos et al. (2007)). Those firms who desire substantial growth are the
exception, rather than the rule. The central prediction of this hypothesis relating to the capital
structure of SMEs is, if given the unconstrained choice between external debt and internal funds,
SMEs will, in general, choose not to utilise debt due to the preference for independence, control, and
financial freedom. The added value of this paper is that we empirically test this prediction of the
contentment hypothesis of Vos, et al (2007).
That happiness is important to SME managers has been examined in the economics literature
and touched on in the psychology literature. Levesque et al. (2002) develop a dynamic utility
maximising model to explain why some people choose to be self-employed or be in employment.
Their paper was based on ideas from Douglas and Shepherd (1999) who, following Baumol (1990),
Gifford (1993), and Eisenhauer (1995), characterise entrepreneurship (a term they use to be
synonymous with the control of a privately held firm) to be a utility-maximising response. This is in
stark contrast to the classical economic view that an entrepreneur is one who assembles factors of
production to satisfy the needs and wants of others for a financial profit. Indeed, Schindehutte, Morris,
and Allen (2006) show, using in-depth psychological interviews, entrepreneurs are more concerned

with psychological aspects of entrepreneurship such as peak performance, peak experience, and flow,
compared with extrinsic rewards such as money. Their results suggest we should place less emphasis
on small business as a mode of wealth generation and economic growth and more emphasis on
entrepreneurship as a mode of happiness generation.
In the conceptual framework employed for this paper, we assume there is typically disutility
of debt for the managers of small firms. Small business managers should value the option to manage
their operations and debt limits the ability to do this. Debt could be viewed as a nuisance and a limit to
the financial flexibility and control of the firm (Cressy (1995)). Due to tax advantages of debt in
almost all countries, the use of debt is conventionally viewed as a path to value creation in a firm.
However, the tax benefits to debt are outweighed by the wealth and non-wealth related utility costs
of debt (Vos and Forlong (1996)). An implication of the contentment hypothesis is debt carries a
disutility value and this disutility comes from both financial and nonfinancial aspects of applying for
and carrying debt. Debt is viewed by SME managers as a necessary lesser evil, required to fund new
investment or regular operations only when internal funds are limited. A generalisation of the
hypothesis is: SME managers who perceive other utility benefits as an indirect result of utilising debt
will be more inclined to make use of debt. These managers are more willing to sacrifice control and
freedom (usually temporarily) to fund regular operation and new investment; a growth-oriented
creative entrepreneur would, for example, take on debt to fund product development. Further, some
managers, such as aging family firm owners, will be more averse to debt than others, as they will
place a higher utility value on financial freedom. This provides the framework for the hypothesised
effects of the relevant variables discussed below. Table I shows the findings of 10 previous SME
capital structure studies and our hypotheses are motivated by the results contained within. The
dependent variable of interest in this paper is external debt as a proportion of total financing of new
investment. Thus, the results relating to the most comparable dependent variable from each of the
previous studies are reported.

Table I
Summary of Previous SME Finance Studies
This table shows the signs of the reported relationships in the multivariate regression results from Ramalho and da Silva
(2009), Degryse et al. (2009), Sogorb-Mira (2005), Hall et al. (2004), Chittenden et al. (1996), Michaelas et al. (1999),
Lucey and Mac an Bhaird (2006), Beck et al. (2008), Psillaki and Daskalakis (2008), and Cassar and Holmes (2003)
respectively. Independent variables not included in a specific study are left blank. The primary focus of this paper is on the
use of external debt for new investment. Thus, the most comparable dependent variables from these studies are reported. *
denotes significant at the 10% level, ** denotes significant at the 5% level, *** denotes significant at the 1% level.

Author(s)

Ramalho
and da Silva
(2009)

Degryse et
al. (2009)

Sogorb-Mira
(2005)

Countries
Studied

Portugal

The
Netherlands

Dependent
Variable

Long term
debt ratio

Long term
debt ratio

Non-debt tax
shields

Negative

Tax Rate

Chittenden et
al. (1996)

Spain

Hall et al.
(2004)
Belgium,
Germany,
Spain, Ireland,
Italy, The
Netherlands,
Portugal, UK

Long term debt


ratio

Long term
debt ratio

Long term
debt ratio

Positive***

Negative***

Negative***

Negative***

UK

Collateral or
Asset
Structure

Positive*

Positive***

Positive***

Positive***

Positive***

Firm Size

Positive ***

Positive***

Positive***

Positive***

Positive**

Profitability

Negative*** Negative***

Negative***

Negative

Negative***

Growth

Positive*

Positive***

Positive

Positive

Age

Negative

Positive

Negative***

Liquidity

Negative***

Reported
financing
access
obstacles
Closely held
dummy

Positive***

Author(s)

Michaelas et
al. (1999)

Lucey and
Mac an
Bhaird
(2006)

Beck et al.
(2008)

Countries
Studied

UK

Ireland

48 countries

Psillaki and
Daskalakis
(2008)
Greece,
France, Italy,
Portugal

Dependent
Variable

Long term
debt ratio

Long term
debt ratio

Bank financing
ratio

Debt ratio

Non-debt tax
shields

Negative

Tax Rate

Negative

Collateral or
Asset
Structure

Positive***

Firm Size

Positive***

Profitability

Negative***

Growth

Positive***

Age

Negative*** Negative*

Positive

Negative

Positive***

Positive

Cassar and
Holmes (2003)

Australia
Long term
debt ratio

Negative***

Positive***

Positive**

Positive***

Negative***

Negative***

Positive

Positive

Liquidity
Reported
financing
access
obstacles

Positive***

Closely held
dummy

Negative

Firm size and manager/owner separation


In all previous SME capital structure studies, firm size has been found to be positively related to the
leverage of small firms. The tradeoff theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and firm
size as larger firms tend to be more diversified and incur lower financial distress costs (Warner
(1977)). Conventionally, firm size has been assumed to be negatively related to information opacity
(Berger and Udell (1998)). Thus, the traditional pecking order theory predicts a positive relationship
between firm size and leverage as larger firms incur less adverse selection costs. However, there is

some doubt in the literature that firm size is related to informational opacity amongst SMEs. Hyytinen
and Pajarinen (2008) examine credit rating disagreements using the method of Morgan (2002) and
show information asymmetry is unrelated to the size of Finnish SMEs, when controlling for firm age.
Further it is arguable that, due to increased complexity of the operations of larger firms, financiers
incur higher assessment costs when considering financing large firms. Any relative gains from
financing large firms over small, for a given creditworthiness, would then have to come from
economies of scale. It is unclear if the gains from economies of scale do in fact outweigh the higher
assessment costs and no study we have encountered directly addresses this issue. Note that both the
expected effects related to the tradeoff and pecking order theories rely on size as a proxy for
financiers perceived creditworthiness of a firm. Thus, if creditworthiness is controlled for in a capital
structure study, these theories would be silent on the predicted effect of firm size on leverage.
We provide an alternative explanation for the role of size. In a firm where managers and
owners are separate, the objective function of the firm is likely to be better approximated by the
maximisation of owners wealth compared with closely held firms. The objective function of closely
held firms is more complicated as managers and owners are the same people (LeCornu et al. (1996)).
Other personal benefits are considered in formulating the goals of closely held firms. Due to higher
manager/owner separation, larger firms should typically utilise more debt to maximise owners utility
via wealth maximisation while smaller, more closely held, firms will be less inclined to utilise debt
due to the undesirable personal effects debt has. Closely held firms will have lower levels of growth
desire (Wiklund et al. (2003)) and require less financing, causing them to make less use of debt. Thus,
our first two hypotheses:
H1: Firm size is positively related to the use of external debt and leverage.
H2: The level of manager/owner separation (closeness) is positively (negatively) related to the
use of external debt and leverage.
Curiously, the only study reported in Table I that does not find a significant positive
relationship between firm size and leverage is Lucey and Mac an Bhaird (2006) which includes a

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dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm is closely held, showing that the idea that size is a
proxy for manager/owner separation, and this is turn affects leverage, is worthy of investigation.
Profitability
Profitability has been found to be negatively related to leverage in previous SME financing studies. In
the tradeoff framework, higher profitability improves the creditworthiness of a firm (lowers financial
distress costs) and thus a positive relationship between profitability and leverage is predicted (Jensen
and Meckling (1976)). This effect is clearly not dominant. The traditional pecking order theory
predicts a preference for internal funds over debt. More profitable firms have higher levels of retained
earnings and are better able to fund investment out of internal funds and thus will utilise lower levels
of leverage.
The prediction of the contentment hypothesis related to profitability is identical to that of the
pecking order theory. However, the preference for internal funds over debt derives from the idea that
debt reduces firms financial flexibility and the happiness of the decision makers, rather than the
selection of lower cost financing. Thus, we present the hypothesis:
H3: Profitability is negatively related to leverage and the use of external debt.
Owner age and firm age
Table I shows previous capital structure studies which include firm age as an independent variable
typically find a negative relationship. Firm age is often thought of as a proxy for creditworthiness in
the literature (Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2008), and Wiklund, Baker, and Shepherd (2008)). Older firms
are more likely to have developed relationships with banks which are important in lending
assessments (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Cole, Goldberg, and White (2004), and Cole (1998)). Thus,
as financial distress costs are lower for older firms, the tradeoff theory would predict a positive
relationship between firm age and leverage. Likewise, the pecking order theory would predict a
positive relationship as longer, improved lending relationships reduces adverse selection costs.
Wiklund et al. (2008) show the odds of firm survival increase with firm age for the first 7 years of

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operation, but at a decreasing rate, suggesting most of the creditworthiness gains are received early in
the life of the firm. Also, older firms have a longer opportunity to accumulate retained earnings,
reducing the need for debt if internal funds are preferred. Under this aspect, the pecking order theory
would predict a nonlinear relationship between firm age and debt. Note that neither the pecking order
nor the tradeoff theory predict any relationship between owner age and leverage, when controlling for
firm age, as these theories assume financial wealth maximisation to be the objective function of the
firm and owner age has no bearing on this.
The contentment hypothesis presents a different story. Again, the hypothesis makes a similar
prediction to that of the pecking order theory with different underlying assumptions. As firm owners
age, they are likely to more highly value financial freedom. Older, wiser, individuals are more likely
to be less concerned with gaining wealth and more concerned with financial independence and control
(Vos et al. (2007)). Thus, our hypothesis relating to owner age is:
H4: SME owner age is negatively related to the use of external debt and leverage.
The relationship between firm age and external leverage is, as with the pecking order theory,
initially positive. As firms improve their credit reputation and lending relationships those seeking debt
are better able to obtain financing on favourable terms. The relationship subsequently becomes
negative as firms accumulate internal funds.
H5: Firm age is positively related to the use of external debt and leverage up till a certain age.
Firm age is subsequently negatively related to the use of external debt. This suggests
empirical studies should investigate a quadratic relationship.
When data is only provided on the age of the firm, we encounter the confounding effects of
omitted variable bias, as firm age and owner age are interrelated. Firm age can be used as a proxy for
owner age but care must be taken with interpretation.

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Growth
Past firm growth has typically been found to be positively related to leverage in previous SME studies.
Financial distress costs are greater for firms with growth opportunities as growth opportunities
represent an intangible asset. Thus the tradeoff theory predicts a negative relationship between growth
opportunities and leverage. The pecking order theory is somewhat ambiguous on its predictions
relating to growth. Firms with a higher potential for growth, requiring new investment, are more
likely to exhaust internal funds, suggesting a positive relationship between growth and leverage
(Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)). However, growth opportunities are very difficult to value for
outsiders, causing informational asymmetries to be more severe which would suggest a negative
relationship between growth and leverage.
However, neither of these theories make any mention of firms attitudes towards growth as
important. Within conventional theories, growth is implicitly assumed to be desirable as this typically
increases wealth. Further, there has been much empirical research which suggests a substantial
proportion of small firms are content with modest growth (Davidsson (1989), Kolvereid (1992), Cliff
(1998), Wiklund et al. (2003), and Vos et al. (2007)). Wiklund et al. (2003) suggest growth aversion is
prevalent amongst SMEs as the positive atmosphere of the small firm may be lost in growth. The
classical economic view would label this as irrational and presume that wealth maximization is the
goal of the firm. We label this as evidence of utility based decision making worthy of praise. These
ideas imply managers of those firms who are growth oriented are likely to be less concerned with the
freedom limiting aspects of debt compared with the managers of non-growth firms. Growth oriented
firms will view debt as a necessary means to finance the growth of their firm. Thus, our hypothesis:
H6: Growth orientation is positively related to the use of external debt and leverage.

If no relationship is found between growth orientation and the use of debt, this may provide
evidence of poor access to finance for small, growth oriented firms. The indications from previous
SME studies are that there is no evidence to suggest the existence of a finance gap with the exception
of Beck et al. (2008) who examine 48 both developing and developed countries. These authors found

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financing access to be related to the level of institutional development suggesting the hypothesised
finance gap may only exist in less developed countries.
Education
Previous SME capital structure papers have been silent on the potential effects of education on the use
of debt. This is one of the contributions of this paper. More educated SME managers are likely to be
better able to recognise the tax advantages to debt and thus the tradeoff theory would predict a
positive relationship between education levels and the use of debt. It is arguable that more educated
SME managers would be able to reduce informational asymmetries or may appear to be more
creditworthy to potential financiers, causing a reduction in adverse selection costs. Thus, the pecking
order theory would also predict a positive relationship.
However, more educated individuals may show more signs of financial contentment as they
are wiser and better able to recognise what is valuable to them in the long term (Diener and
Seligman (2004), and Vos et al. (2007)). They would gain higher utility from financial freedom,
relationship building, and exercising caution in decision making and consequently would make less
use of debt. Thus, our hypothesis:
H7: Education is negatively related to the use of external debt and leverage.

Financing access obstacles


Beck et al. (2008) use the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) to examine the financing
behaviour of small firms across 48 countries. A distinctive characteristic of this survey was its
inclusion of a question asking firms to report how severe access to financing was to the operation and
growth of their firm. Given all firms desire external financing equally, this would predict a negative
relationship between the level of the financing obstacle and the use of external debt as firms reporting
access to financing as an obstacle are likely to have experienced a denial of financing. Those not
reporting financing as an obstacle would not have experienced such a denial and would show a higher
use of financing. This relationship applies both to the pecking order and the tradeoff theories.

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However, the contentment hypothesis predicts that a large proportion of firms do not desire
external financing. Indeed, Beck et al (2008) find a positive relationship between the reported level of
financing obstacles and the use of bank financing. If firms desire debt financing, they are obviously
more inclined to report problems accessing financing. Thus we offer the hypothesis:
H8: Reported obstacles to the access to financing are positively related to the use of external
debt and leverage.

Gender
Gender is largely irrelevant to the conventional capital structure theories. We leave the reader to
hypothesise relationships between gender and the level of financial distress costs, agency costs to debt,
or adverse selection costs.
We are motivated, within the contentment framework, by work by Barber and Odean (2001)
who find men to exhibit overconfident behaviour, compared with women, in common stock investing.
Males, in their study, have shown signs of lower desire for peace and contentment, compared with
women. We hypothesise a similar relationship may be true in the small business arena. A higher
proportion of male SME managers may have an overzealous growth orientation (funded with debt)
and thus our hypothesis:

H9: Female SME managers make less use of external debt than male SME managers.
Note that several studies have shown women to be discriminated against in credit markets
(Coleman (2000), Verheul and Thurik (2001), and Orser, Riding, and Manley (2006)) A close
examination of the econometric methods employed in these studies is required to assess if this
observed gender effect is related to demand or supply factors. Our hypothesis is based on a lower
demand from women but future research should aim to make a distinction between demand and
supply factors relating to gender.

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Data
5.1 Survey used
This study utilises data from the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS) 2004 covering 4,453 firms across Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
South Korea, Spain, and Vietnam.
This survey is conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
and the World Bank. The primary purpose of the survey is to provide information as to the constraints
on business development and operation, especially for small firms; ninety percent of the surveyed
firms had less than 250 employees. The survey has been conducted in 1999, 2002, 2004 and 2005.
Regularly, the survey covers countries in the Eastern European Bloc; however, the 2004 survey was
conducted for these non-transition (developed) countries for direct comparison of the business
environments between developing and developed countries. In this paper, however, we utilise the
survey to test the validity of the contentment hypothesis for small firm borrowing behaviour in
developed countries. Valid tests of the contentment hypothesis require an examination of a business
environment where firms have substantial financial choice and an industrialised setting is the most
appropriate for this task. As this hypothesis is most applicable to privately held SMEs, government
owned firms, foreign owned firms, publicly listed firms, bank owned firms, privatised (ex state owned)
firms, subsidiaries, firms with sales or fixed assets greater than 50,000,000, firms with more than
250 employees, and firms operating for more than 75 years are excluded from the analysis. After
these exclusions, 3,458 observations remain.
The sample structure for this survey is designed to be self-weighted, thus we utilise equal
weightings of observations in our analysis (Synovate (2005a)).
The survey is limited in that it does not include accounting data. Interviewees are asked to
estimate the levels of some accounting data, such as the value of sales and fixed assets, but the level
of debt is not included and thus a leverage ratio cannot be calculated. However, firms were asked
what proportion of their past years new investment was financed from each of a variety of sources.

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The dependent variable utilised in this study is thus the share (percentage) of a firms financing for
new investment from borrowings from local private commercial banks, borrowings from foreign
banks, borrowings from state-owned banks, borrowings from money lenders, and credit card
borrowing. This sum is referred to as external debt. A limitation of this variable is it only
encompasses increases in leverage; it does not allow any observations of reductions in leverage. Of
the 3458 included firms, 2,054 firms reported on the variables included in this paper. Thus, 2,054 is
the number of observations included in the multivariate regression analysis in this paper. Table II
shows number of included observations in each country and descriptive statistics.
Table II

Descriptive Statistics
The sample includes 3455 firms from Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain and Vietnam in 2004. External debt is the
sum of borrowing from local private commercial banks, borrowing from foreign banks, borrowing from state-owned banks (including
development banks), borrowing from money lenders or other informal sources other than family and friends, and credit card borrowing.
Other variable definitions are provided in

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Table

A 1. Government owned firms, foreign owned firms, publicly listed firms, bank owned firms, privatised (ex state owned) firms,

subsidiaries, firms with sales or fixed assets greater than 50,000,000, firms with more than 250 employees, and firms operating for more
than 75 years are excluded. The statistics calculated in this table utilise 2,054 observations with non-missing data for all variables included
in the regression analysis in this paper.

Panel A: Selected Statistics by Country


Country
Number of
observations
Mean proportion
of external debt
for new
investment
Estimated Sales
(000)
Growth Firm
Index
Education
Measure

Germany

Greece

Ireland

Portugal

South
Korea

Spain

Vietnam

Total /
Sample
Average

837

241

182

87

71

338

298

2054

21.47%

10.81%

32.59%

17.01%

11.40%

19.54%

2,568

2,059

3,722

956

4,108

3,496

571

2,458

0.64

0.84

1.16

0.33

1.58

0.66

0.63

0.73

127.4

173.6

212.8

149.1

231.8

123.8

166.4

150.0

20.80% 21.56%

Panel B: Full Sample Statistics


Proportion
of external
debt for
new
investment

Estimated
Sales
(000)

Growth
Firm
Index

Close

ROA

Firm
Age
(Years)

Education
Measure

Female

19.54%
0%

2,458
750

0.73
0

0.879
0

3.374
1

14.7
11

150.0
140

0.26
0

Maximum

100%

35,000

495

75

300

Minimum

0%

15,000

-19

Standard
Deviation

31.88%

5,351

0.939

0.33

17.486

12.0

71.3

0.44

Variable
Mean
Median

Table A1 shows a list of the variables utilised in this study with definitions. The survey is
publicly available and this list is both intended to inform the reader as to the variables used in this
paper and for potential future research ideas.
Important variables not included in the survey include intangibles, proportion of liquid assets,
age of the primary owner, leverage and any credit rating.
Non-response bias is a very real possibility for studies using this survey. Other potential
biases include:

The interview typically takes an arduous ninety minutes of time. Firm decision makers who
view debt as a nuisance possibly also view a ninety minute survey as a nuisance and may be
underrepresented. Our hypotheses predict typical SME decision makers to view debt as a

18

nuisance and consequently use less debt. Thus this effect is likely to bias the results against
our hypotheses.

The stated purpose of the survey is to better understand constraints that hinder the growth of
business and, as a consequence, owners that feel financially hindered may be overrepresented.
Our hypotheses are most relevant to those firms that have financial freedom, or are not
financially hindered so this effect is also likely to bias the results against our hypotheses.

Decision makers of rapidly growing firms may be too busy for a survey and may be
underrepresented. Our hypotheses are most relevant for those firms that are not growthoriented and thus this effect may bias the results in favour of our hypotheses. However, as
discussed in section Error! Reference source not found., a substantial proportion of small
firms are not growth-oriented. Indeed, Vos et al (2007) show less than 10% of SMEs in the
UK aim for rapid growth; further, firms that opt for rapid growth are the most likely to feel
financially hindered and thus have a desire to participate in this survey. Thus we expect the
effect of this bias to be small.

The survey only includes firms currently operating that were in business at the time of the
survey and had been in business for at least three years. Thus, our results may suffer from
survivorship bias. For example, managers of firms initially founded to be a temporary
operation that subsequently did not survive may have a different attitude to debt than
managers of firms founded as a going concern.
Variables included in this study
Firm size

The three common measures of firm size, number of employees, total assets and total sales are, in
some way, measured in the BEEPS 2004 survey. The survey provides classifications into three size
categories based on the number of employees. Small firms are defined to be those with less than 50
employees, medium firms are defined to be those with 50-249 employees, and large firms are those
with 250 to 10,000 employees (however, firms with 250 or more employees are excluded from this

19

study). Respondents were asked to estimate their firms total sales. The data is provided in 13 size
categories (10,000 20,000 for example) and the midpoint of the given category is taken to gain an
estimate of total sales in this analysis. Total assets is a more difficult variable to obtain from this
survey. Respondents were asked to estimate the replacement value of their fixed assets (land,
buildings, and equipment). Like total sales, this measure is provided in size categories and the
midpoint of the given category is taken to gain an estimate of total assets in this analysis. This
measure is somewhat weak in that it does not include the value of intangible assets and this problem is
particularly acute for firms with growth opportunities which are substantial intangible assets. As the
assets measure does not include intangibles and the employees measure is provided in just two
categories, we use estimated sales as our primary measure of firm size.
Manager/owner separation
Respondents were asked to state if the primary owners of their firm were also the managers. A
dummy variable,

, is constructed to indicate if a firm is closely held or not.

Profitability
Two measures of profitability are available in the survey. The percentage margin that a firms sales
price exceeds material inputs and labour costs is provided. Clearly this is not a complete measure of
profitability, however, a firm with higher margins is likely to be more profitable. An estimate of
operating costs is provided, categorised in the same fashion as fixed assets and total sales. This allows
the more commonly used measure, return on assets (ROA), to be estimated. Profit is estimated as the
difference of the estimate of sales and the estimate of operating costs. The estimated replacement
value of fixed assets is used as the value of assets in the calculation of ROA. Using only fixed assets
in these calculations yields many extreme values of ROA due to the exclusion of intangible assets. To
control for these extreme values the variable is split into three groupings (see

20

Table A 1 for definitions of these variables): ROA (negative), ROA (Core), and ROA (High). These
variables allow us to effectively estimate a piecewise linear function of ROA. As ROA is more
commonly used in the literature, we employ this (in piecewise groupings) as the primary measure of
profitability in this study.
Age
Firm age is provided in the survey; however, this survey does not provide information as to the age of
the primary owners. Thus, it is difficult to separate the negative effect on the use of debt due to aging
owners and the positive effect on the use of debt due to better creditworthiness. The effect of aging
owners is likely to be strongest later in the life of the owner and, presumably, later in the life of the
firm. The effect of developing creditworthiness is likely to be strongest early in the life of the firm, as
the firm gains a credit history and a reputation (Wiklund, Baker, and Shepherd (2008)). Thus a
quadratic relationship between the use of debt and firm age can be investigated. To avoid the
confounding effect of extreme values of firm age which almost certainly do not coincide with owner
age, firms that have been in operation for more than 75 years are excluded (40 observations were
excluded after other sample exclusions).
Creditworthiness

Creditworthiness is an important control variable as it aids in controlling for a firms access to


external debt financing. However, the BEEPS 2004 survey has little direct information on
creditworthiness. Respondents were asked if their firms financial statements are checked and
certified by an external auditor. Firms choosing to have their financial statements audited are likely to
do so knowing their financial statements will show strong creditworthiness. This self-selection effect
allows us some measure of creditworthiness from this survey.
Firms were asked to report if they have any payments overdue (by more than 90 days) to
utilities, taxes, employees or material input suppliers. A variable,

, is constructed as the

amount overdue to all of these creditors as a percentage of sales. Although this variable gives us a

21

direct measure of creditworthiness (or lack thereof), it has limitations. Firstly the survey responses are,
by nature, self-reported. There may be some managers who are too embarrassed to admit, even in an
anonymous interview, to having payments overdue. Secondly, the given categories do not include
lending delinquencies, which are a better indicator of lending creditworthiness. And thirdly, having
payments overdue to utilities, taxes, employees or material input suppliers is likely to increase the
desire for bank or other lending financing. Firms with overdue short term debt payments are likely to
attempt to take on longer term loans to fund the short term overdue payments. As the presence of
overdue payments to utilities, taxes, employees or material input suppliers may increase the desire for
borrowing, it is unclear what the dominant relationship (if any) between the

variable and the

use of external debt.


Growth
Several variables in the survey are indicators of growth orientation. A growth firm index is created
from four characteristics indicating a firm to be growth oriented. Respondents were asked if they had
undertaken one of the following initiatives over the last 36 months: developed successfully a major
new product line/service, upgraded an existing product line/service, agreed to a new joint venture with
a foreign partner, and obtained a new product licensing agreement. The index is the number of yes
responses out of the possible four. Clearly over any 36 month period a substantial number of nongrowth firms will answer yes to some of these questions. Even non-growth firms develop new
products and upgrade existing products in ever changing market places. Product development is often
necessary to simply keep up with competition and maintain a level of sales. Despite a number of nongrowth firms being captured by this index, this variable still provides a proxy for growth orientation
as it will capture a much larger proportion of growth oriented firms compared with non-growth firms.
Respondents were asked if they were members of a business association or a chamber of
commerce. If a firm is a member of a business association they are likely to be both growth oriented
and have more connections to financial institutions. This variable is thus a combined measure of
growth orientation and financing access.

22

Growth in sales is a commonly used measure of firm growth in the literature. This is included
in the BEEPS 2004 survey. However, the growth firm index measure is preferred for two reasons.
Firstly, the growth in sales measure was not reported for a substantial number of firms, resulting in a
loss of included observations. Secondly, the growth firm index better captures growth intention, rather
than simply historical growth success. Firms developing or upgrading products are demonstrating the
intent to grow, while firms with growth in sales simply demonstrate success in achieving growth. The
intent to grow is what we wish to observe when examining capital structure behaviour.
Financing access as an obstacle to operation and growth
In the BEEPS 2004 survey, respondents were queried on their perception of access to financing as an
obstacle to the operation and growth of their firm. The included options were no obstacle, a minor
obstacle, a moderate obstacle, and a major obstacle. A scale variable from 1-4 is used in this study.
Education levels
Data on the education levels of the primary decision makers are not directly available in the BEEPS
2004 survey. However, firms were queried on the proportions of their workforce that have gained
various levels of education. To the extent that decision makers education levels are related to the
education levels of their firms workforces, this will provide a proxy for the level of education of the
primary decision makers. An education index is created as a weighted average of the proportions of
employees gaining a vocational qualification, a secondary school qualification and university
education (weights are detailed inTable A1).

New investment
The level of new investment is an important control variable as it controls for the need for financing.
The best proxy provided in the dataset is the amount spent on new fixed assets. To remove the size
effect from this variable, the amount spent on new fixed assets is divided by firm size (estimated
sales). Using this variable strengthens any conclusions relating to growth orientation. Growth oriented
firms may simply use more external debt as they must make higher levels of investment. Thus

23

controlling for the level of investment allows us to investigate more clearly the relationship between
growth orientation and the use of external debt. Furthermore, as the included variable is fixed assets,
this variable also controls for the presence of potential collateral.

24

Univariate relations
Table III

Correlation Matrix of Variables


The sample includes 3455 firms from Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain and Vietnam in 2004. External debt is the
sum of borrowing from local private commercial banks, borrowing from foreign banks, borrowing from state-owned banks (including
development banks), borrowing from money lenders or other informal sources other than family and friends, and credit card borrowing.
Other variable definitions are provided in

25

Table

A 1. Government owned firms, foreign owned firms, publicly listed firms, bank owned firms, privatised (ex state owned) firms,

subsidiaries, firms with sales or fixed assets greater than 50,000,000, firms with more than 250 employees, and firms operating for more
than 75 years are excluded. Correlations are calculated using all observations with non-missing data for both variables of concern. *=
Significant at 10%. **= Significant at 5%. ***= Significant at 1%.

Business
Auditor Association Closely Held
0.187*** 0.233***

Firm Age

0.136***

Auditor
Business Association

Education

Sales

ROA
(Core)

-0.169*** 0.201***

-0.053*** -0.038**

0.040**

-0.081***

0.079***

-0.001

0.004

-0.045** 0.075***

0.121***

-0.004

0.115***

0.008

-0.061*** 0.165***

0.022

0.108***

0.249***

0.008

Education
Sales
ROA (Core)
Female
Growth Firm

External Debt

0.049***

0.062*** -0.067*** 0.081***

-0.105*** -0.064*** -0.010

Closely Held

Female

Financing
Access
Obstacles

Growth
Firm

0.010

-0.027

-0.037**

-0.010

-0.004

0.041**

0.137***

-0.052***

-0.037*

0.007

-0.058*** 0.149***

-0.014

0.123***

-0.006

-0.036*

0.046**

-0.084***

-0.016

-0.006

-0.003

0.093***

0.111***
0.056***

Financing Access
Obstalces

Table III shows the linear correlations amongst the main variables used in this paper. The univariate
relationships with external debt are generally found to be as predicted by the contentment hypothesis.
Higher educated firms use less debt, larger firms use more debt, more profitable firms use less debt,
growth firms use more debt, and firms reporting access to financing as an obstacle use more debt. The
expected signs are found for the correlations between our measure of female presence and external
debt, and between closely held firms and external debt. However, these relations are not shown to be
statistically significant. Larger firms are, however, found to be less likely to be closely held, providing
support for the explanation behind H1 and H2. Firm age is found to be significantly positively related
to external debt, suggesting the creditworthiness advantages to firm aging are dominant in this dataset.
Multivariate analysis is, of course, required to confirm the suggested relationships.

Multivariate method
In our regression analysis, the effects of relevant explanatory variables on the use of external debt for
new investment are investigated. The dependent variable, external debt, is by nature censored below
by 0 and censored above by 100. That is, a firm cannot fund any less than 0% of its new investment

26

with external debt or any more than 100% of its new investment with external debt. Some firms who
fund 0% of their new investment with external debt will have a lower propensity to borrow than
others. In this dataset, firms sitting on the fence regarding whether or not to use debt will appear to
have the same propensity to borrow as those firms who strongly dislike debt. We wish to investigate
the relationship between this propensity and the explanatory variables. Tobit regressions allow
consistent estimation of this relationship. That is, we assume there is a latent (unobservable) variable
such that,
0

0,

100,

100
100

and,
(1)
where

is the country and industry specific intercept,

vector of the characteristics of firm , and

are coefficients to be estimated,

is a

is a normally distributed error term. Country and industry

dummy variables are included to control for country and industry level fixed effects. Initially, linear
relations are investigated, with two exceptions. The

variable is estimated in a piecewise manner

in order to control for, but still include, extreme values of return on assets, and a quadratic term of the
variable is also included. The initial regression equation estimated is thus,

log

.
Next the same regression is estimated with interaction terms added.

27

We wish to investigate how the desire for growth affects the aversion to debt. To do this, the
index variable is interacted with the

variable. This interaction is

used to investigate how profitable growth oriented firms utilise debt relative to profitable nongrowth firms. If growth firms less strongly reduce their use of debt as they become more
profitable, compared with non-growth firms, this will provide evidence to suggest growth
oriented firms are less averse to debt than non-growth oriented firms.

An interaction between size and financing access obstacles is investigated. This allows us to
examine how size affects the external debt use of firms for differing levels of reported
financing obstacles. If the access to finance is related to the size of a firm, we would expect
larger firms, who also report financing obstacles, to be better able to expand their external
debt than smaller firms. Beck et al. (2008) find this interactive relationship to be significant
using a dataset containing many developing countries, however, this study investigates if the
same relationship holds in the developed business environment.

Robustness tests are performed using the available alternative measures of the explanatory
variables.

28

Results
Table IV

Determinants of the Use of External Debt


The sample includes 3455 firms from Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain and Vietnam in 2004. Government owned
firms, foreign owned firms, publicly listed firms, bank owned firms, privatised (ex state owned) firms, subsidiaries, firms with sales or fixed
assets greater than 50,000,000, firms with more than 250 employees, and firms operating for more than 75 years are excluded. Proportion
of external debt for new investment is the sum of borrowing from local private commercial banks, borrowing from foreign banks, borrowing
from state-owned banks (including development banks), borrowing from money lenders or other informal sources other than family and
friends, and credit card borrowing. Other variable definitions are provided in

Error! Reference source not found..

Observations with missing values for any included variables are omitted; 2054 observations remain after these exclusions. All regressions
are tobit regressions, with left censor value 0 and right censor value 100, and include country and industry fixed effects. Huber/White robust
standard errors are used in all regressions. p-values are reported in parentheses. *= Significant at 10%. **= Significant at 5%. ***=
Significant at 1%.

log

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

9.402***
(0.000)
1.520
(0.818)
-2.502
(0.662)
-3.449**
(0.017)
-0.021
(0.819)
0.770
(0.194)
-0.011
(0.304)

9.263***
(0.000)
0.911
(0.890)
-2.332
(0.684)
-3.417**
(0.018)
-0.023
(0.799)
5.002**
(0.040)
-0.317**
(0.041)
0.0076**
(0.034)
-5.8E-05**
(0.028)
5.613**
(0.024)
19.291***
(0.002)
-0.087**
(0.026)
6.787***
(0.001)
-1.898
(0.737)
93.105***
(0.005)
9.281*
(0.063)
0.138
(0.751)

9.229***
(0.000)
0.788
(0.905)
-2.350
(0.680)
-3.874**
(0.029)
-0.022
(0.806)
5.021**
(0.040)
-0.319**
(0.040)
0.0076**
(0.033)
-5.8E-05**
(0.027)
4.891
(0.112)
19.427***
(0.002)
-0.087**
(0.026)
6.756***
(0.001)
-1.928
(0.733)
92.929***
(0.005)
9.273*
(0.063)
0.136
(0.754)
0.628
(0.662)

11.897***
(0.001)
0.530
(0.936)
-2.354
(0.683)
-3.434**
(0.017)
-0.021
(0.822)
5.008**
(0.040)
-0.316**
(0.041)
0.0075**
(0.035)
-5.7E-05**
(0.030)
5.656**
(0.023)
19.120***
(0.002)
-0.087**
(0.025)
23.462
(0.215)
-1.720
(0.761)
91.665***
(0.005)
9.145*
(0.067)
0.134
(0.757)

5.571**
(0.026)
19.475***
(0.002)
-0.086**
(0.026)
6.732***
(0.001)
-1.732
(0.759)
94.769***
(0.005)
9.176*
(0.065)
0.134
(0.759)

(5)

2.032
(0.760)
-1.770
(0.754)
-3.649**
(0.012)
-0.041
(0.649)
4.919**
(0.044)
-0.301**
(0.052)
0.0071**
(0.046)
-5.4E-05**
(0.039)
5.848**
(0.019)
19.831***
(0.001)
-0.087**
(0.026)

-1.767
(0.754)
91.611***
(0.005)
6.903
(0.173)
0.193
(0.653)

29

log

-1.220
(0.371)

log
log
log
log
Number of Observations
Country and Industry Fixed Effects
Included?

2054
Yes

2054
Yes

2054
Yes

2054
Yes

35.173
(0.492)
17.332
(0.739)
111.212*
(0.086)
10.019***
(0.000)
9.267***
(0.001)
10.618***
(0.000)
3.019
(0.455)
2054
Yes

Table IV reports tobit regressions showing how firm characteristics affect the level of use of external
debt. Specification (1) shows the initial specification discussed in the previous section. When omitting
any interactions between the explanatory variables we find broad support for our hypotheses. Firm
size is positively related to the use of debt. It is, however, unclear whether the size effect is due to
higher levels of manager/owner separation for larger firms or the conventionally expected lower
levels of creditworthiness for smaller firms. As the level of manager/owner separation is somewhat
controlled for with the

dummy variable, we are inclined to conclude larger SMEs are indeed

more creditworthy. Another possibility, however, is firm size proxies for an unobserved dimension of
growth orientation. Support is found for H1, however little support is found for H2.
External debt is significantly negatively related to the core measure of profitability:
. Firms with more internal funds available, or more financial freedom, will choose to
utilise less external debt for financing, providing support for H3. This finding contradicts the
prediction of the tradeoff theory which would predict more profitable firms to have better
creditworthiness, lower financial distress costs and thus utilise higher levels of debt.
The expected quadratic relationship between firm age and external debt is observed however
insignificant. As previous studies had found an age effect (Michaelas et al. (1999), Lucey and Mac an
Bhaird (1999), and Chittenden et al. (1996)) we were motivated to investigate higher order
polynomial relationships between firm age and the use of external debt. A significant quartic

30

relationship between firm age and external debt was discovered. The implied univariate relationship
between firm age and the use of external debt (ignoring censoring effects), for the relevant sample
range, is graphed below.
Figure 1
External debt

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Firm Age

The hypotheses in section Error! Reference source not found. relating to firm age and
owner age were formulated on the assumption that both firm age and owner age were observed.
However, in this survey, owner age is not available. As firm age and owner age are related, this must
be kept in mind when interpreting the observed effects in this dataset.
The observed relationship shows firms increasing their use of external debt up till age 14,
moderately decreasing their use of external debt from age 14 to age 28, moderately increasing their
use of external debt from age 28 to age 56, and strongly decreasing their use of external debt from age
56 onwards. Figure 1 shows two distinct up-down cycles in this relationship. What is observed, we
believe, is two separate small business life cycles. In the first cycle firms initially increase their use of
debt as they develop creditworthiness and a reputation. Subsequently, as the owners age and become
more financially content they make less use of debt. After around 30 years in business, the firm is sold
to younger owners, or perhaps passed down to the next generation, and the cycle repeats. Clearly a
more direct test of this relationship would be required for any conclusive finding, however, the
observed result in this study certainly indicates this effect is worthy of further investigation. If the life
cycle explanation holds, we find support for H5 and suggestive support for H4.

31

A significant positive relationship between the

index and external debt is

observed. Those who show signs of growth orientation do indeed make higher use of debt, providing
no evidence to support the finance gap hypothesis. The result shows growth oriented firms managers
are happy to choose to utilise external debt to finance their growth, supporting H6. Conversely, it
shows those firms that do not show signs of growth intention do not choose to utilise debt. This effect
may simply be due to a lack of access to external debt for non-growth firms, causing them not to grow.
The literature on growth intention has shown otherwise in the past (Wiklund et al. (2003)) and we
wish to confirm this with this dataset. To do so, the following tobit regression is run:
.
Tobit regression is used as the growth firm variable is censored below by 0. Control variables
included are firm size, profitability, a dummy indicating whether or not the firm is closely held, firm
age, education, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firms financial statements are
audited. The estimated equation is:
5.42
0.00

0.234
0.00

P-values are given below the estimates in parentheses. If non-growing firms were not growing
due to a lack of access to external finance, we would expect non-growth firms to report higher levels
of financing obstacles. The opposite is found. Non-growth firms are found to report significantly
lower levels of financing access obstacles than growth firms showing it is not a lack of access to
external debt that causes firms (in general) not to grow, it is the growth orientation of the firm, further
confirming findings in the literature.
Firms that are members of business associations or chambers of commerce show significantly
higher use of external debt. This effect is likely due to a combination of improved access to external
debt, improved access to favourable borrowing terms and an increased desire for debt.
Firms with higher educated employees (and presumably managers) are found to utilise
significantly less external debt. A tradeoff theory prediction would state that higher educated
individuals would be better able to recognise tax benefits of debt and consequently make higher use of

32

debt. However, the observed result suggests more educated individuals better recognise what truly is
valuable, such as financial freedom, and, as a result, use less external debt. We find support for H7.
As in Beck et al (2008), we find financing access obstacles to be significantly positively
related to the use of external debt, supporting H8. The interpretation of this result provided in Beck et
al (2008) is those who make use of external debt feel more financially constrained as a result. No in
depth explanation is provided in their paper but we offer a simple one. Those firms who have
problems relating to gaining access to financing are also those who have a desire for financing. A
substantial proportion of the firms not reporting access to financing as an obstacle are those that also
do not desire external financing. Thus, those who report access to financing as a problem tend to
borrow more.
No significant relationship is found between gender and the use of external debt. However,
the sign of the coefficient is as predicted by H9.
The

variable simply acts as a control for the need for debt and shows

statistical significance and the expected sign.


The coefficient on the

variable is positive and significant. SMEs with audited

financial statements have lower levels of informational opacity (Hyttinen & Pajarinen (2008)) and,
thus, lenders are better able to assess their creditworthiness. The observed relationship shows, due to
self-selection of auditing in many cases, those with audited financial statements are indeed more
creditworthy, and more likely to make higher use of external debt. The coefficient on the
variable is unhelpful in explaining the level of external debt use and shows the unexpected sign
showing this may be a poor measure of creditworthiness in this dataset.
In regression (3), the interaction term between profitability and the growth firm index variable
is found to be unhelpful in explaining the level of external debt use. The negative effect of increasing
profitability is no different for growth firms and non-growth firms. What this suggests is growth firms
have similar level of aversion to debt compared with non-growth firms. Growth firms, thus, utilise
debt when in need of finance and, when they have the choice (they are profitable), they are just as
inclined to choose internal funds over debt, compared with non-growth firms. The sign of the variable,

33

if we were to interpret it, suggests growth firms are less averse to debt compared with non-growth
firms.
In regression (4), an interaction term is included between firm size and reported financing
access obstacles. The sign on this interaction term suggests the size effect reduces as firms report
higher levels of financing obstacles. This term however, is unable to separate the size effect due to
increasing levels of manager/owner separation and increases in growth orientation, from the classical
finance-gap size effect which says larger firms are more creditworthy. Furthermore, this interaction
term does not show statistical significance in this regression equation. Thus, regression (5), interacts
firm size with dummy variables representing the four possible responses to the question relating to
access to financing. Firms either reported access to financing as no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a
moderate obstacle, or a major obstacle, to the operation and growth of their business. These
interaction terms measure the effect firm size has on the use of external debt for the firms included in
each of the four financing obstacle categories separately.
Firstly, the size effect is positive and highly significant for those firms who report access to
financing as no obstacle. Those firms who report financing access as no obstacle to the operation and
growth of their business can reasonably be assumed to have borrowed their desired amount of debt.
That is, supply side problems are not relevant for these firms and any differences in the use of debt are
due to demand differences. The observed magnitude of the coefficient then indicates the magnitude of
the size effect due to demand differences across firms of different sizes. Firms who report access to
financing as a minor or moderate obstacle show a positive and statistically significant size effect of a
similar magnitude to that found for firms who report access to financing as no obstacle. There are
clearly some financing supply constraints placed on these firms and differences in the use of financing
across different firm sizes may not simply be due to demand differences. If, however, larger SMEs
were less subject to these supply constraints we should observe a larger size effect for those firms who
report access to financing problems, compared with the size effect for those firms who report no
obstacle. The only assumption we need to make here is that demand differences across firms of
different sizes do not differ across the access to finance obstacles categories. Finally, and perhaps

34

most interestingly, the size effect for those firms reporting access to financing as a major obstacle is
statistically insignificant. This finding shows, amongst the firms with the most severe problems
accessing finance, being larger does not allow better access to external debt. Further, this finding does
not need to be qualified by the assumption that demand differences across firms of different sizes do
not differ across the access to finance obstacles categories.
Unreported robustness tests are summarised as follows:

Using firm size as measured by the estimate of fixed assets or the employee size
categories produce similar results to those obtained using estimated sales. However, the
statistical significance on the ROA variable disappears due to the endogeneity between
the ROA variable and the fixed assets variable.

Using percentage margin as the measure of profitability produces similar results to those
obtained using ROA.

Using growth in sales over the past 36 months produces insignificant results relating to
this variable. However, as discussed earlier, the growth firm index is considered a better
measure of growth orientation which we wish to measure.

Conclusions
This paper has shown SMEs exhibit pecking order behaviour, consistent with previous studies on
small firm capital structure. However, the assumption of adverse selection costs being dominant in
capital structure decisions is shrouded in doubt. The contentment hypothesis contends the preference
for internal funds over external funds, in the SME case, is due to the reluctance to relinquish control
over the firm to outside financiers and contentment with sustainable, organic growth. While this
theory makes some similar predictions to that of the traditional pecking order theory, some notable
differences are present, and empirically supported.
Firstly, the pecking order theory is somewhat ambiguous on its predictions relating to
indicators of firm growth. On the one hand, growing firms require more funds for new investment and
are more likely to exhaust internal funds and require debt financing (demand factor). On the other
hand, growth opportunities are difficult to value for potential external financiers, increasing

35

information asymmetry and adverse selection costs, and thus predicting growing firms to be less able
to access debt financing (supply factor). The contentment hypothesis, however, posits that adverse
selection costs are not dominant and it is demand factors that are most important in capital structure
decisions. Those who choose product development and expansion, and exhaust internal funds, choose
to utilise higher levels of external debt which, for the majority of firms in the developed environment,
is readily available.
More educated individuals should be better able to overcome information asymmetry,
reducing adverse selection costs, and reducing the aversion to external financing. Thus the traditional
pecking order theory predicts a positive relationship between education and the level of external debt.
This paper shows education levels to be negatively related to external debt levels on a statistically
significant basis. The contentment hypothesis explanation of this relationship is more educated SME
owners are wiser, less concerned with financial wealth, and more concerned with retaining control of
their businesses. This relationship requires education to proxy for personal values and a future SME
study should query respondents on their personal values relating to financial wealth, as well as their
education, to better understand this relationship.
Our results concerning reported access to financing obstacles confirm demand factors are
dominant in borrowing decisions. We find those reporting higher access to financing obstacles (those
who desire financing) to use more debt, showing those who demand financing do indeed make more
use of financing, even when they perceive problems accessing financing. The pecking order theory is,
alternatively, based on supply factors being dominant in borrowing decisions.
Finally, the pecking order theory predicts supply constraints are worse for smaller firms. We
find the size effect to be statistically insignificant for those firms reporting access to financing as a
major obstacle. We also find the size effect for those reporting access to financing as minor or
moderate obstacle to be no larger than the size effect for those reporting access to financing no
obstacle. These results indicate that supply constraints for smaller SMEs are no worse than the supply
constraints for larger SMEs.

36

The findings in this paper call for a change in the way SMEs are studied in general. The
intentions and objectives of small firms being studied must be considered to be heterogeneous in
future research. Surveys of small business should, by default, include questions on the growth
intentions and objectives of surveyed firms. Surveys of small business finance should include
questions relating to the perception of external debt and equity, and how these perceptions relate to
the control of the business. Owner age should also be examined as important in future surveys.
The findings in this paper suggest that debt carries disutility for SME managers. A future
study should aim to separate the disutility of debt due to increases in financial risk from the disutility
of debt due to non-financial factors, such as loss of control.
An investigation into supply constraints is required that differs between those growth-oriented
firms who deserve to grow and those growth-oriented firms that do not deserve to grow and
examines the differences in their access to finance. That is, one should examine how firms with
genuinely positive NPV investment projects differ in their access to external finance compared with
firms with negative or ambiguous NPV investment projects. An apparent finance gap reported by
managers overconfident in the quality of their investments may simply be a result of financiers
correctly assessing the quality of SME investment prospects.

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39

40

Table A 1

Variables and Sources


Estimated sales, estimated fixed assets and estimated operating costs were imputed from categories provided in
the dataset; midpoints of the given ranges were used. For example, if the given category was between 50,000
and 100,000, the variable value would be imputed as 75,000.

Variable

Definition

External debt use

Share (percentage) of firms financing for new investment from


borrowings from local private commercial banks, borrowings
from foreign banks, borrowings from state-owned banks,
borrowings from money lenders, and credit card borrowing.

Estimated sales

The estimate of the firms total sales.

Estimated fixed assets


Estimated operating costs

Estimated operating
profit
Estimated operating ROA
(ROA)
Estimated operating ROA
(Negative)
Estimated operating ROA
(Core)
Estimated operating ROA
(High)
Education

Age
Auditor

Exporter

Macroeconomic obstacle

Financing access obstacle

No financing access
obstacle
Minor financing access
obstacle
Moderate financing
access obstacle

Major financing access


obstacle

The estimate of the replacement value of the physical production


assets owned and used by the firm (land, buildings, equipment)
The estimate of the total operating costs (material inputs, bought in
components. services, labour costs, energy, fuel, repairs,
depreciation, rent, advertising and other administration expenses
etc..)
(estimated sales) (estimated operating costs)
(estimated operating profit)/( estimated fixed assets)
= ROA, ROA < 0
= 0,
otherwise
= ROA, 0 <= ROA <= 8
= 0,
otherwise
= ROA, ROA > 8
= 0,
otherwise
A weighted average of the proportions of a firms workforce with
various education levels. = (percentage of workforce with a
vocational qualification) + 2*(percentage of workforce with a
secondary school qualification) + 3*(percentage of workforce
with some university education or higher)
The number of years since the firm began operations in the country
surveyed.
= 1 if firm has its annual financial statements checked and certified
by an external auditor.
= 0 otherwise or if respondent did not know.
= 1 if a firm exports, directly or through a distributor, a non-zero
percentage of its sales.
= 0 otherwise
Reported level of the obstacle macroeconomic instability is to the
operation and growth of the firm (inflation, exchange rate).
1=No obstacle, 2=minor obstacle, 3=moderate obstacle, 4=major
obstacle
Reported level of the obstacle financing access (e.g., collateral
required or financing not available from banks) is to the
operation and growth of the firm. 1=No obstacle, 2=minor
obstacle, 3=moderate obstacle, 4=major obstacle
= 1 if a firm reports no obstacle as their level of the obstacle
financing access is to the operation and growth of the firm.
= 0 otherwise
= 1 if a firm reports minor obstacle as their level of the obstacle
financing access is to the operation and growth of the firm.
= 0 otherwise
= 1 if a firm reports moderate obstacle as their level of the
obstacle financing access is to the operation and growth of the
firm.
= 0 otherwise
= 1 if a firm reports major obstacle as their level of the obstacle
financing access is to the operation and growth of the firm.
= 0 otherwise

Original Source
BEEPS 2004
Q45a
BEEPS 2004 Q57a
BEEPS 2004 Q57b
BEEPS 2004 Q57c
BEEPS 2004 Q57a, Q57b
BEEPS 2004 Q57a, Q57b, Q57c
BEEPS 2004 Q57a, Q57b, Q57c
BEEPS 2004 Q57a, Q57b, Q57c
BEEPS 2004 Q57a, Q57b, Q57c
BEEPS 2004
Q69a2, Q69a3,
Q69a4
BEEPS 2004
S.1a
BEEPS 2004
Q49
BEEPS 2004 Q7

BEEPS 2004
Q54o

BEEPS 2004
Q54a
BEEPS 2004
Q54a
BEEPS 2004
Q54a
BEEPS 2004
Q54a
BEEPS 2004
Q54a

41

Financing cost obstacle

Importer***

Margin
Bribe***

New fixed assets


Relationships***

Percentage of domestic sales to small firms and individuals.

Growth firm

Industry dummies

Country dummies

Business Association

Female
Close***
Small
Medium

Reported level of the obstacle financing costs (e.g., interest rates


and charges) is to the operation and growth of the firm. 1=No
obstacle, 2=minor obstacle, 3=moderate obstacle, 4=major
obstacle
= 1 if a firm imports, directly or through a distributor, a non-zero
percentage of its sales.
= 0 otherwise
Percentage margin that sales price exceeds material inputs and
labour costs.
Response to question, It is common for firms in my line of
business to have to pay some irregular additional
payments/gifts to get things done with regard to customs,
taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. Scale: 1=never, ,
6=always.
Amount spent on new buildings, machinery, and equipment in
2004 divided by estimated sales.

Indicator of a growth firm. Number of the following activities


undertaken in the last 36 months: Developed successfully a
major new product line/service, upgraded an existing product
line/service, agreed to a new joint venture with foreign partner,
obtained a new product licensing agreement.
Dummy variables indicating a firms primary industry. Included
industries are mining and quarrying, construction,
manufacturing, transport/storage/communication,
wholesale/retail/repairs, real estate/renting/business services, and
hotels/restaurants.
Dummy variables indicating a firms country of operation.
Included countries are East Germany, West Germany Greece,
Ireland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Vietnam.
= 1 if firm is a member of a business association or chamber of
commerce.
= 0, otherwise
= 1 if one of the principal owners of the firm is reported to be a
female, = 0, otherwise or question unanswered.
= 1 if an individual or family member owner is also a
manager/director of the firm.
= 1 if firm employs less than 50 employees
= 0, otherwise
= 1 if firm employs between 50 and 249 employees
= 0, otherwise

BEEPS 2004
Q54b
BEEPS 2004
Q15
BEEPS 2004
Q14
BEEPS 2004
Q39a
BEEPS 2004
Q58a
BEEPS 2004
Q9f
BEEPS 2004
Q60a1, Q60a2,
Q60a4, Q60a5.

BEEPS 2004 Q2

BEEPs 2004
country2
BEEPS 2004
Q36a
BEEPS 2004
Q4c
BEEPS 2004
Q4b
BEEPS 2004
S4b
BEEPS 2004
S4b

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