Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION
IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear
me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive
Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to
circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting
carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and
the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the
said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of
the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government,
to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case
of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E.
MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above

measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin/action by claimant to recover
goods upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he
has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the
penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent
and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The
question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it
could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so,
however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and
orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply
means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need
to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's
trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve
the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for
fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench,
especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a
new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the
purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act
adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the
exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there
is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has
reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the
grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to
protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more
appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable
language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of
the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept
ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of
1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who
forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was
felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying
down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best
virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to
every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they
confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the
meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection
open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of
the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to
define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would
thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment
of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty
of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in
1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that
every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open
hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other
side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is
only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached
based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides
complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the
problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full
appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or
intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this
country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently
declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two
hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain
arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of
admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as
long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission
of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious
and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the
country he has fled. 16Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public
morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate
liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs
and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and
eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still
after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power
is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the
basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions.
The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present
conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who
rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the
worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the
government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having
slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as
a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of
these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine.
Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more
effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power
and declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first,
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft
purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the
community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident
owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of
animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's
tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order
No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no
doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male
and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving
those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order,
we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful
method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute
ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age,
sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another."
The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving
them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal.
Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot
be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead
meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to
reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities,
usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine
and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged
measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The
executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that
summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not
necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of
the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the
need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There

certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first
in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had
the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see
fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities
for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they
and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there
is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to
enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the
executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court,
in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to
question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case
would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have
become afait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the
matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its
obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of
relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them
whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they
do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly
meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use
by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas/also known as a defendant's

appeal bond, is a type of surety bond that a court requires from an appellant who wants to
delay payment of a judgment until the appeal is over. An appellant'sbond to stay execution on a
judgment during the pendency of the appeal bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered
restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla Bidin Sarmiento and Cortes,
JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

DIGEST: 148 SCRA 659

Date of Promulgation: March 20, 1987
Ponente: Cruz, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner assails constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. E.O. No. 626-A was
held unconstitutional for violating the due process clause.
Facts:
13Jan1984: Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
for violating Executive Order No. 626-A
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported in violation of E.O. 626-A shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the govt, to be distributed to charitable institutions
as Chairman of National Meat Inspection may see fit (carabeef) and to deserving farmers as
the Director of Animal Industry may see fit (carabao). This amended E.O. 626; the latter
prohibiting only the slaughter of carabaos of age.
Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of replevin after petitioner filed supersedeas
bond of P12,000.00
Trial Court (TC): confiscation of carabaossustained; ordered confiscation of the bond;
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority and its presumed
validity
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC upheld the
TC.
Petitioners arguments:
1. E.O. is unconstitutional. It authorizes outright confiscation of carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial boundaries.
2. Penalty is invalid. It is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
3. Improper exercise of legislative power by the former President.
Issue/s:
WON EO 626-A is constitutional.
Ruling:
EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional. CA decision reversed. Supersedeas bond cancelled
and the amount thereof is ordered restored to petitioner.
Ratio:
On the power of courts to decide on constitutional matters
Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by lower courts subject to
review of the Supreme Court.
..while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to the review of the highest tribunal.
Sec. 5[2(a)] Art VIII, 1987 Constitution.
On the presumption of constitutionality
Not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted
On due process
Provisions of the charter are to be cats in precise and unmistakable language to avoid
controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation.
Clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient;
flexibility
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: a) notice and b) hearing intended as safeguard against official
arbitrariness/not accdg to law or rule.
On the power used by President Marcos in promulgating EO 626-A
The challenged measure is denominated as an EO but it is actually a PD issued by Pres.
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the

exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6.

But it was not shown that there is sufficient exigencies to exercise the extraordinary
power
Police power as used by the government to justify E.O. 626-A
Test:
1. Compelling state interest
2. Lawful method (as used in the case, but this is the same with the fit between
means and objective test)
1 = present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the
benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.
Failed to comply with #2; there is no reasonable connection between conservation of
carabaos (not having them slaughtered) and the means: non-transportation of carabaos.

G.R. No. L-24693

July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and
GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is
and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth,
such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its
validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, ErmitaMalate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu,
who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City
of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of
such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the
promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying
taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more
than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was
at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of
its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate
motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is
made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class
motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which would require the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence,
wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex,
the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his

passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up
and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative,
with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises
and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor,
or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite
and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against selfincrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining
room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary,
unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second
class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a
person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common
inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more
than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of
the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license
of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above
ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8,
1963.
In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the
City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory
or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the
challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid
and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could
complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the
assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor
prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September
28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar
Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of
Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and
the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the
City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila
and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in
Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of
Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three
new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the
reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto
as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by
the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.
1wph1.t

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the

Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable
American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by
petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for
petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they
considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged
ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to the
alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here
being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter,
to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted
by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged
ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of
authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance
No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the
ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a
fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of
the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been
the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption
of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice
Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the
people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject
and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that
the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it
is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has
been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the
matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable
and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence
of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the
present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due
process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being
specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers,4extending as it does "to all the great public needs." 5 It would be, to paraphrase
another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. 6
Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the
stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in
Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The
challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose,
in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated
to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in
the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore

that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues
eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances
punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a license tax for and regulating
the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and
monte;12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays; 13 prohibiting the
operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium
joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used, 15 all of which are intended to protect public
morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police
power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where
such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a
denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by
the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question
of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard
to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural
and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from
the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." 20 Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication
of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be
more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it
with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has
been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for
an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive
plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and,
in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance
for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to
pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far
back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or
regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue
purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful
occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power
to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much
wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number
of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor
in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of
privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In
fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable. 23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by
the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other
day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of

1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation
that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform. 25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing
licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it
were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with
this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that
the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood
because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in
refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is
permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As
was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be
affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which
may result from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for
the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot
be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises
could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or
oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable
situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every
regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be
absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent.
It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce
unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for
the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of
said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of
freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy
of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention
even in contractual relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the
liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles
of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the
gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or
uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age
and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining
whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of
the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join
him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel
is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would
require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a
full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void
on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v.
General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what
makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act

that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this
the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with
such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered
a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly
adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.

DIGEST: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc., Et Al Vs The Honorable
City Mayor Of Manila
[G.R. No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.]
FACTS: The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760.
There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised
charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable
and violative of due process insofar as it would impose fees per annum for motels; that the
provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel (OMKA) , motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any
person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at
all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date
of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the
number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would
be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport
number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally
filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of authorized representative of a hotel
(OMKA).
That the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than
18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common
inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the
OMKA of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every
24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided
for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the
automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction
of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due
process clause.
In the answer, after setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that
the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb
immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power.
The trial court ruled based on evidence or the lack of it, on the authority of the City of
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that the challenged Ordinance No.
4760 would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.
HELD: The validity of the ordinance must be upheld.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY, PRESUMPTION OF. An ordinance, having been
enacted by councilors who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the

necessities of their particular municipality or city and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject and necessitate action, must be presumed to be valid and
should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights under the
guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity
for evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual
foundation laid for overthrowing Ord. No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which
is not the case here. No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower
court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside
POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is a
manifestation of a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As
such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers extending as it does to all the great
public needs.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note included as annex to the
stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the
ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers.
LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. Municipal license fees can be classified into those imposed for
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful
occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied
from the power to license and regulate, but in taking the amount of license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this class of cases. Aside from
applying the well known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere
with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who
might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important
factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. (Cu Unjieng v. Patstone
[1922], 42 Phil,, 818, 828).
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for
the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class
motels, P4,500 yearly. This Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American
Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the states police power.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN. The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the
City of Manila making it unlawful for OMKA of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every
24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as
transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable
nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence
of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every
regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.

G.R. No. 122846

January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as
subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power
and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring
the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate
area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those
same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up"
rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our
sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same
parameters apply to the present petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the
reversal of the Decision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the
validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,
Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the
Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to
protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general
and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or
other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of
room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms
more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of
said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this
ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person,
the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be
liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the
business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or
contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order ( TRO)5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9
impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor
Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as
owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge
customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
(TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention 7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly
affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. 8 The
three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and
operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila. 9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. 10 The RTC also notified the
Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff. 11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. 12 The RTC issued a
TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the
Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is
a legitimate exercise of police power. 14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to
desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance. 15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the
Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.

During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for
decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question. 16 On October 20, 1993,
the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is
hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution." 18 Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed
investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless
be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the
ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where the legitimate purpose
of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an
inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the
Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers
on cities, among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. 22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III,
Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a
single offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right
to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of
the Ordinance.24First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that
admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is
only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse
effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty
is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. 25 In their petition
and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court
of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.

We must address the threshold issue of petitioners standing. Petitioners allege that as
owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully
interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection
rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether
or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their
patrons' equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's
participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle
of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the
judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly
from the Constitution.27The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates
concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. 28 In this jurisdiction, the
extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the
standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme
Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing
requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines,
the doctrine of transcendental importance.31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the
overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court
wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third
parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an
injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the
issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must
exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own
interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise
injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued
viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative
silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the
American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for
customers to bring suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed
standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of
other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the
United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive
health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional
protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected
unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of
confidential relation to them."36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United
States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal
protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of
beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States
High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of
third parties who seek access to their market or function." 38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the
former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In
overbreadth analysis, challengers to government actionare in effect permitted to raise the
rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the
overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally
guaranteed rights.39 In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping

intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in
the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of
their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the
recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. 40Ermita-Malate concerned the
City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information
such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be
admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the
annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance
in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances
were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in
transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there
is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments
have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the
State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. 41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be
rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government
Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. 42 Police power is based
upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and
its people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by
the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, 44 movie theaters,45 gas
stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the
fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nations legal system, its use has
rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves,
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet
the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of
its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of
Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process
or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the
co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are
compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If
the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate

many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the
judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and good
standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of
law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous and
sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and
far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. 48 The
purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life,
liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the
guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but
distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due
process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow
before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. 49 Procedural due process concerns
itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an
intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level
of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd
situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed.
Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It
inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has
reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of
fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted
with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of
constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been
utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield
to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency
because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes
and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best
tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court
in U.S. v. Carolene Products. 51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that
the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a
"discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right." 52 Consequently,
two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of
review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by
the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender 53 and
legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig, 55 after
the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. 56 While the test may have first been articulated
in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive
due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal
protection challenges.57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld
if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. 58 Under intermediate review,
governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of

compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of
laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental
rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 61 The United States
Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such
as suffrage,62 judicial access63 and interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by
the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the
petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard
the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to
invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be
deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in
question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial
since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of
cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas.
Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet
fundamental freedoms which the people reflexively exercise any day without the
impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence that accurately reflect the degree
of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right
in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what
may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel
labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and
nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury
to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we
upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights,
thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed
by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[ 65]
In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and
to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[ 66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the
meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
"liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of
sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have
gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in Manila since they
provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus

became the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." 68 Whether or not this depiction
of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior
among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected 69 will
be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains
significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski,
so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which
his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which
are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If
his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that
a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of
which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the
right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into
the personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or
impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than
twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the
power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and
rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels.
Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of
a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look
to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. 71 It must also
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power
is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. 73 However, this is not in
any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise
enjoys the presumption of validity. 74
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to
candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument. 75 The Ordinance makes no
distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons
engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit
activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it
makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit
patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its
longtime home,76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city the Pearl of
the Orient as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still

steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that
Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities
such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis
wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate
businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering
incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that
would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in
fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as
curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would
be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws
and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day
rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers
a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is
a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting
the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates
wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court
is sworn to protect.77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the
State is as old as Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy
does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on
which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little
shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply
variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests. 79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is
ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is
more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are
widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. 80 Our penal laws, for one,
are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted
distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the
right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the
enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not
with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our
recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and
protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral
duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their
expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are
entrusted by the people to uphold the law. 81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to
governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due
process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is
possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more
judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9,
is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHUR

Associate Justice

TERESITA LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

(On Sick Leave)

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

DIGEST:
Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels
and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes
on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the
Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution.

The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under
the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor
of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights.
Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for
obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up.
Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected
only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.

Mayor Lim signed into law City Ordinance No. 7774 prohibiting short-time admission, short-time
admission rates, and wash-up rate schemes in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension
houses, and similar establishments in the city of manila. White Light Corporation and other
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila complained that the Ordinance is
unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; an
invalid exercise of police power; and an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their
business. On the other hand, the City of Manila argued that the Ordinance is a valid police
power measure. It asserts that the subject establishments have gained notoriety as venue of
prostitution, adultery and fornications in Manila. Thus, it became the ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill-seekers. Is Ordinance No. 7774 constitutional?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Ordinance No. 7774 is unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the ordinance is an arbitrary and
whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates
and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and
the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is
subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact
be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective
in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.
Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. (visit
fellester.blogspot.com) Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates
from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments. (White Light Corp. vs. City of ManilaG.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009)

Notes:
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila
(1967) upheld the validity a City Ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating
personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before
they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance that sought
a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area.
xxx The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

must
must
must
must
must
must

not contravene the Constitution or any statute

not be unfair or oppressive
not be partial or discriminatory
not prohibit but may regulate trade
be general and consistent with public policy
not be unreasonable.

G.R. No. 118127

April 12, 2005

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and
Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON.
GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO,
HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G.
VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON.
HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G.
RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO
C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON.
VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P.
NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ
E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON. FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q.
BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA.
CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE,
JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F.
RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity
as councilors of the City of Manila, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE
TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION

TINGA, J.:
I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you
feel bad after.
Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1
It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less
immoral than if performed by someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his
dishonesty.
J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I
The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the
fundamental law of the land. It is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the
conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer
fall, and heavily" in the words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees
when faced with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail
to pass the test of constitutionality.
The pivotal issue in this Petition1 under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court), 3 is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783
(the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.4
The antecedents are as follows:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. 5 It built
and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited
with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the
members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance,
insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.8
Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30
March 1993, the saidOrdinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.10
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary
notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the ErmitaMalate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East,
Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be
allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain
forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are
used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy
the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community, such as but not limited to:
1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses

5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
12. Inns
SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said
officials are prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from
granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business
enumerated in the preceding section.
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the
businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the
date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or
to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area,such as but not
limited to:
1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome
family entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural
shows, stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in
the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage
depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any
machinery, or funeral establishments.
SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon
conviction, be punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that
in case of juridical person, the President, the General Manager, or person-in-charge of
operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent
violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.
SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.
Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)
In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included
in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria

Court considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment"
and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as
"tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the
inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." 11
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the
following reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as
Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City
Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The
Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 499 13 which specifically
declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions;
(3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory
closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal
interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by
punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its
enactment; (5) TheOrdinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is
confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council
has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisanceper se nor does it have
the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal
protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of
motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside
of this area.14
In their Answer15 dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the
City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect
the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of
the Local Government Code,16 which reads, thus:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
....
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
....
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public
dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or
entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the
inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms
of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,17 petitioners insisted that the power of regulation
spoken of in the above-quoted provision included the power to control, to govern and to
restrain places of exhibition and amusement.18
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila
to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police
power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409, 19 otherwise known as
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila) 20 which reads, thus:
ARTICLE III
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
. . .

Section 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:
. . .
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others
as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a
single offense.
Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence,
private respondent had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality. 21
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and
the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed
the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners
likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be
denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the
Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila. 24
On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an exparte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance.25 And on 16
July 1993, again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for by MTDC.26
After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining
the petitioners from implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of
said Decision reads:27
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993,
of the City of Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
that had been issued by this Court against the defendant. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28
Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on 12 December 1994,
manifesting that they are elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure
questions of law.30
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors
were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject
ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police
power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinancecontravenes P.D. 49931 which
allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein;
and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.32
In the Petition and in its Memorandum,33 petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they
made before the lower court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the
exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause
exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised
Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. 34 They allege that
theOrdinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it
enjoys the presumption of validity. 35
In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that
the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It
reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is
violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its
lawful business; that it is violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on
petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the execution of
the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.

This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the
Ermita-Malate area being its home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court
witnessed the area's many turn of events. It relished its glory days and endured its days of
infamy. Much as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to
restore its lost grandeur, it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end.
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring
the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence
thereof violates a constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress
the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to
shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them worthless.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. 37
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the
Constitution and to the laws.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass
muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing
laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress
to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their
derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.39
This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not
been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.40
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an
enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as
agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and
carry out the declared objects of their creation. 41 This delegated police power is found in
Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:
SECTION 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in
this case, thesangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the
legislative bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16
of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/
municipality provided under the Code.42 The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the
validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good.43In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was
an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general
laws.
The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people
of the blessings of democracy.44
SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 45
SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. 46
Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 47
A. The Ordinance infringes
the Due Process Clause
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . ." 48
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard
to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, 49 and as
such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power. 50
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life,
liberty and property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and
distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from
seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of
judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of
the general law.51
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations
and partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned.52
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually
called "procedural due process" and "substantive due process."
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic
procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of
hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. 53
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an
adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words,
substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the
government's action.54 Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is
such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. 55 For example, if a law
is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so
long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area
where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the
government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary
to achieve a compelling government purpose. 56
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such
power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically 57 as its exercise is subject
to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the

prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights.
Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. 58 Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to
his life, liberty and property. 59
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 61
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights 62 a violation of the due process clause.
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive
veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses,
cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case
of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila 63had
already taken judicial notice of the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery
and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels, which provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."64
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social
and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives
of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means
employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable
regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community.
However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's
social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and
transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed" under
the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect
and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the
alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual
disease in Manila.
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and
establishments of the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit, 65 it is baseless and
insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke
bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and
inns. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated
establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the
community.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further
the illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual
immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places that it may
even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of
the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote
instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in a church cloister or a court chamber, we

would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering the closure of the church or court
concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for that matter will
not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there
are impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches
continually recall the presence and universality of sin in man's history.66
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature
cannot be said to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself
is amoral, but the deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. While a
motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone
be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a
mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were so and if that were allowed, then the
Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills, it would be
extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every
nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try
as the Ordinancemay to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a
moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in
the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs
inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are
covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable,
they unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent"
establishments. In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights,
personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing
those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to
those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution,
fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily
inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or
permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these
violations;67 and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other
means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
Means employed are
constitutionally infirm
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels
and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the
enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of
the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place
outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area." Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent
violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring establishment shall
be closed and padlocked permanently."
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its
purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of
a person's fundamental right to liberty and property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed
by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." 68In
accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to
pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. 69
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents,70 sought to clarify the
meaning of "liberty." It said:

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognizedas essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
"liberty" must be broad indeed.
In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the
autonomy of the person in making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood where they formed under
compulsion of the State.71
Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under
Section 1 of theOrdinance may seek autonomy for these purposes.
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to
consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premises be it
stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state
policy as contained in the Constitution.72 Adults have a right to choose to forge such
relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to
make this choice.73 Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do
not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government
restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to
be let alone is the beginning of all freedom it is the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.74
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,75 borrowing the words of
Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which
his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which
are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If
his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that
a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of
which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the
right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into
the personal life of the citizen.76
There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the
Court chooses to exercise restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should.
The previous pronouncements of the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for adults
to engage in criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. The
Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be
prosecuted for their illegal conduct, they should suffer the consequences of the choice they
have made. That, ultimately, is their choice.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the
respondent of the beneficial use of its property. 77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids
the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3
instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area
or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently
restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation." The provision is the most important
protection of property rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of
the government to take property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the
government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is
about loss spreading. If the government takes away a person's property to benefit society,
then society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole. 79
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs
when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking
occurs when the government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
the property.80
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,81 it was held that a taking also could
be found if government regulation of the use of property went "too far." When regulation
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 82
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when
regulation becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of
degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other
occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation
constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The Court asks
whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by public action must be
compensated by the government and thus borne by the public as a whole, or whether the
loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action. 83
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation
is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that
interferes with reasonable expectations for use. 84 A regulation that permanently denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view,
equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the
owner acquired the land make the use prohibitable. 85 When the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking. 86
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require
compensation under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that
fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have
occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on
the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investmentbacked expectations and the character of government action. These inquiries are informed
by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.87
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary
to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the
distinct investment-backed expectations of the owner. 88

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3)
months from its approval within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any
place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area." The directive to "wind up business operations" amounts
to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically
confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed"
business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering
dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment
idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the
edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. It is
apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or
to convert into allowed businesses are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent
closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a "taking" of private property.
The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one
outside the Ermita-Malate area. In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just
compensation with an additional burden imposed on the owner to build another
establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to the
"problem," it merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and
oppressive. The conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. How may the
respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge
without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private property without due
process of law, nay, even without compensation.
The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by
the government. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it
will be closed permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as
this end benefits them as a whole.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning
ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to
a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious
purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no
support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local
government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be
stretched to cover this particular taking.
Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It
needs restating that the property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because
it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of
eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore "wholesome." 89 If it
be of public benefit that a "wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a particular
purpose, then certainly the public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the
condemnation of private property for public use. 90
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions.
It in no way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the
establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments
come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make
possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever
other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which
its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. 91
Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid
and constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid;

and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled
discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. 92
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,93 as cited in People v. Nazario,94
the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to
assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons
passing by." The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all "because one may
never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' "
Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments
"tend to disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community." The cited case supports the nullification of
the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying
out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without
infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that
is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an
interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this
regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to
liberty and property.
Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far
cry from the ill-considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.
In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,95 the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating
"sexually oriented businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores,
video stores, cabarets, motels, and theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model studio
and sexual encounter centers. Among other things, the ordinance required that such
businesses be licensed. A group of motel owners were among the three groups of
businesses that filed separate suits challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted
that the city violated the due process clause by failing to produce adequate support for its
supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime and
other secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental
of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association.
Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of the
legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered, was adequate to
support the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10 )
hours should be included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the
Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect
on personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer
than ten (10) hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and
traditions of the nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.
The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted
businesses. It imposed reasonable restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.
The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila,96 it needs pointing out, is also different from this case in that what was involved
therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in
order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily,
there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance
did not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but
is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 97
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful
curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an
undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be
upheld as valid.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other
words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others.98 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall
be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in
like circumstances.99 The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws."100 It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to
artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. 101
The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:
What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: "The
ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the
sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men
governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea
of law." There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot
approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into
account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a
meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare
be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to
liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the
equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from
being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason." Classification
is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the
laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. 102
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is
reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating
the equal protection clause.103 The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be
arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. 104
In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the
public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is
invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a
just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels
in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not
become any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as
prostitution one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession
exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in
prostitution. It is not any less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the
assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are employed
and be inapposite when men are in harness? This discrimination based on gender violates

equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government

objectives.105 Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of
consistency with prevailing laws.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1
thereof.
The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of motels, hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a)
4 (iv), which provides that:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
. . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
. . .
(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports . . . .
While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any
entertainment or amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
. . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
. . .
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public
dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or
entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the
inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms
of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City
Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The
Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments. It is well to recall the
rulings of the Court inKwong Sing v. City of Manila106 that:

The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code,
means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should
not be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the
power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations
as to the mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised. 107
And in People v. Esguerra,108 wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of
Tacloban which prohibited the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the
municipality is empowered only to regulate the same and not prohibit. The Court therein
declared that:
(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to
regulate or to license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly
withheld.109
These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion 110 that they were modified by the
Code vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers.
Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public
dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or
amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate,
suppress and suspend "such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment,
particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to
"prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community" are stated in the second and third clauses, respectively of
the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4
(vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of
which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of
each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or
paragraph.111 These powers, therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated
as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression and
prohibition.112
The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or
entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)),
public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places
for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore
cannot be included as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment,
particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain
forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend, suppress or
prohibit.
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and
those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its
limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and
any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be
construed against the City Council.113 Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction
that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express
exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the
rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the
construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or
punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction. 114
The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the
general welfare clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of
Manila is likewise without merit. On the first point, the ruling of the Court in People v.
Esguerra,115 is instructive. It held that:
The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section
2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other
provisions of the same Code, and therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for
the power to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically
by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the general power granted by

section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding
the provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory,
because the power to prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling, giving away and
dispensing of intoxicating liquors.
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the
legislative will must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of
Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones
which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which are
irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest
expression of legislative will.116 If there is an inconsistency or repugnance between two
statutes, both relating to the same subject matter, which cannot be removed by any fair
and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the legislative will
which must prevail and override the earlier. 117
Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains
provisions contrary to those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them.
Such repeals have been divided into two general classes: those which occur where an act is
so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can
remain in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier
act and is intended to be a substitute therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on
the ground that the latest expression of the legislative will should prevail. 118
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city
charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part
or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners' interpretation that the
Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the
Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the
latter's provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory powers.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet
applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be
said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community.
It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.119
Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and
establishments in another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:
. . .
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for
habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment
and maintenance of
houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction,
maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or
exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities
inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
. . .

If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in
uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the abovequoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with
houses of ill-repute and expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is
evident that these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment, operation
and maintenance.
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves.
That these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from
another Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation
expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and
Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in
paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable
diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and
"amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places
of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the
show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these
establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim
reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be
referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and
effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict
grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration
appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle
applies.120
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions
of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential
Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage
depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any
machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to
have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the
same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. 121 As succinctly
illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority:122
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local
political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources
of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents
vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
Congress, the local government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will
of their principal. In the case before us, the enactment in question, which are merely local in
origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. 123
Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be
the rule, it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the
validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set
aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or
is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is
valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or
unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in
derogation of a common right.124
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and
impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes;
it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and
explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten,
the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra
vires, null and void.

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the
concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police
power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary we
reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of
the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative
bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated
establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without
infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws not
even under the guise of police power.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
declaring theOrdinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Ynares- Santiago, J., concur in the result only.
DIGEST:
City Of Manila Vs. Laguio
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
o
o
o

Due Process
Equal Protection
Requisites of a Valid Exercise of Police Power by LGU

FACTS:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses. It built and
opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited
with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used
as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants,
and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance also
provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment
shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance,
insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise
of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power
W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law
HELD:
The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of
police power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills fo prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring within that

classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super
clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which
are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent places....
Every house, building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt
from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure
men.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try
as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a
moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in
the hearts of men.
The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra
vires. The Local Government Code merely empowers local government units to regulate,
and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights adn
impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes;
it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and
explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten,
the City Council unde the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra
vires null and void.

G.R. No. 120095 August 5, 1996

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as
acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON.
FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:p
The limits of government regulation under the State's police power are once again at the
vortex of the instant controversy. Assailed is the government's power to control deployment
of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition
to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. By contending that
the right to overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution,
petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous
requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of
the police power.
The factual antecedents are undisputed.
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C.
Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other
foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas
employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing
kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the government, through the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on
the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.

Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations, 1 the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994,

issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for
screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and
deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and
certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary
prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA. Upon request of the
industry, implementation of the process, originally scheduled for April 1, 1994, was moved
to October 1, 1994.
Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series
of orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders
were the following issuances:
1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing,
certification and deployment of performing artists.
2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which
could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and
has passed the required tests.
3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to
received (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions
therefrom.
4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the
ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special
Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the
academic test.
In Civil Case No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the
Philippines (FETMOP), on January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department
orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel;
2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their
licenses without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the
Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the
constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.
On February 2, 1992, JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. Kary International, Inc., herein
petitioners, filed a Motion for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial
court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995.
However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayed
for a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal from the trial court's Order, respondent court, in CA G.R. SP No. 36713 dismissed
the same. Tracing the circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and
the assailed Department Order, respondent court concluded that the issuance constituted a
valid exercise by the state of the police power.
We agree.
The latin maxim salus populi est surprema lex embodies the character of the entire
spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the
State's police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all
public needs," 2 this "least limitable" 3 of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its
regulatory powers.
Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in the early case
of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro 4 wrote:
"The police power of the State," one court has said... is a power coextensive with selfprotection, and is not inaptly termed "the law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be
that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety and welfare of society." Carried onward by the current of legislature, the

judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the
purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public
welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual. 5
Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good.
As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden
rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement,
does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed
orders compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned
Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to
a valid exercise of the police power.
In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the
labor export of countries with mammoth populations such as India and China. According to
the National Statistics Office, this diaspora was augmented annually by over 450,000
documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for
various destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities and
sometimes better living conditions.
Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the
last few years, women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47%
between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991, 6 the year former
President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other
countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson.
It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but
also of the fact that most of our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and
entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal
abuse." 7 Even then, we noted that "[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant
Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers" compelled "urgent government action." 8
Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing
artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced
into prostitution), and following the deaths of number of these women, the government
began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set
standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of these
measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to
unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates
and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts. Worse, some
of our women have been forced into prostitution.
Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of
Labor issued on August 16, 1993, D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry
Advisory Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry
matters. 9 Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on
January 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders. These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1,
which called for guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing overseas
Filipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were duly
represented in the EIAC, 10 which gave the recommendations on which the ARB and other
requirements were based.
Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in
the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the
deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would only
drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the
method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic
skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for
the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this
scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by

auditions, where those deemed unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is
inherently subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. The ARB requirement
goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by
defining the minimum skills required from entertainers and performing artists. As the
Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by experienced artists possessing
merely basic skills. The test are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those
passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and therefore exposing
themselves to possible exploitation.
As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see
nothing wrong with the requirements for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a
minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers.
The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and
nature or work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps
keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with
unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices. Parenthetically, none of these issuances
appear to us, by any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary.
They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our
OCW's. They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and
guidelines. Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and
after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations. On the
whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists
bound for Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for
expansion and growth.
In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates
government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic
constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.
More emphatically, the social justice provisions on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first
paragraph states:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the
welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment,
while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide
mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As this Court explained
in Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v. Drilon,11 in reference to the
recurring problems faced by our overseas workers:
What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above
all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and
daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.
Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home.
We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the
right of our performing workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under
the old process, because, having previously been accredited, their accreditation became a
"property right," protected by the due process clause. We find this contention untenable.
A profession, trade of calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and right to make a living because
these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which
normally constitutes an actionable wrong. 12
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling,
business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the

police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of
legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and
welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it
must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and
manner in which every one may so use of his own property so as not to pose injury to
himself or others. 13
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much
wider. 14 To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process
clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating
entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are
required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice
their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the
Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and
other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they has either re-trained or had
undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is
not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right
under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable
regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed
regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract. In Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause
of the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
government." 15 Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and
always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject
impressed with the public welfare.
A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists
under the assailed department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. We do not agree.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or
class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to
which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute
equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. 16 We have held, time and again, that the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such
classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to
the subject of the particular legislation. 17 If classification is germane to the purpose of the
law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future
conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.
In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists
and entertainers destined for jobs abroad. These orders, we stressed hereinfore, further the
Constitutional mandate requiring government to protect our workforce, particularly those
who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of
government regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of
absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the
assailed measures enable our government to assume a measure of control.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

DIGEST:
JMM v NLRC (1993)

JMM Promotions & Management, Inc., petitioner, vs. National Labor Relations
Commission and Ulpiano L. De Los Santos, respondents.

Ponente: Cruz, J.
Facts:
1.
Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petitioner, a
recruiting agency, made the following:
a.

Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)

b.

Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4)

c.

Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec. 17)

2.
The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) to the respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal because
of failure of the petitioner to post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book VII of
the POEA Rules. The decision being appealed involved a monetary award.
3.
The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee, posting of cash bond and
surety bond, and placement of money in escrow are enough; posting an appeal bond is
unnecessary. According to Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and legal
claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license,
and/oraccreditation and contracts of employment. On the other hand, according to Sec. 17,
the escrow shall answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result
of recruitment violations or money claims.
4.

Sec. 6 reads:

In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
The bonds required here are different from the bonds required in Sec. 4.

Issue: Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact that it has
posted bonds of 150k and placed 200k in escrow before?

Held:
Yes. It is possible for the monetary reward in favor of the employee to exceed the amount
of 350,000 because of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The reason for
such is that overseas employees are subjected to greater risks and hence, the money will
be used to insure more care on the part of the local recruiter in its choice of foreign
principal to whom the worker will be sent.
Doctrine: Construction:
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in
this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it
was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. That the thing may rather have effect than
be destroyed.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided;
instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts
of a coordinated and harmonious whole. With regard to the present case, the doctrine can
be applied when the Court found that Sec. 6 complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.

In the POEA Rules, the bonds required in Sec. 4 Rule 2, Book 2 and
the escrow required in Sec. 17 Rule 2, Book 2 have different purposes from the
appeal bond required in Sec. 6, Rule 5 Book 7.
The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to answer for all claims against the employer, which is not
limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been
violated.
The escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against the
employer.
On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award. Indeed, this appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary
award. Also, it is possible that the monetary award may exceed the bonds posted
previously and the money placed in escrow. If such a case happens, where will the excess
be sourced? To solve such a dilemma, an appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the
monetary award is required by Sec. 6.

G.R. No. L-5060

January 26, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.
Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or caused to
be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the
municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30
and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is
no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the
provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the
municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except
upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the permit for the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production
of the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying
for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the
ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested.
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer
unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit
be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him, and
such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age, brands, knots
of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of identification of the
animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued and the date on which such permit is issued. Names
of owners shall be alphabetically arranged in the record, together with date of permit.
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the provincial
treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner, together with date
of permit.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing for
food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos,

Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained
in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for human
consumptionin a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2)
cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal
slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle
without a permit in that municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2)
expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such
permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the
killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and examined apart
from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse"
may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered" and the words "killed for food" in section
30, and the words "slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption" and the words "killing
for food" in section 33; and the other whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as
limiting and restricting merely the words "killed for food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But
upon a reading of the whole Act, and keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object of its
enactment, it is very clear that the latter construction is that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy
the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end it
provides an elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding and registry of ownership of all such
cattle throughout the Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to establish their title; it prohibits
and invalidates all transfers of large cattle unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper
officer in the municipality where the contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves
or persons unlawfully in possession, so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in order
to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to
dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of identification,
resting as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each separate animal throughout the
Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were requiring proof of ownership
and the production of certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered,
and this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner outside of a municipal
slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human
consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the
municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the
office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it will readily
be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the brands and marks of
identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortion, since thieves and persons
unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering
them outside of municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing
themselves to the danger of detection incident to the bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse,
where the brands and other identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for
which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive
other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for
in section 30.
It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the "killing for
food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition is clearly included in
the general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human consumption anywhere; but it is not
improbable that the requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was expressly and specifically
mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the event

that some of the municipalities should be disposed to modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the
passage of local ordinances or regulations for the control of municipal slaughterhouse.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same conclusion. One
of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the slaughter for food of
carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human consumption. A construction
which would limit the prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of such animals in
municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and unpenalized their slaughter outside of such
establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively
demanded by the language of the statute it should be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the
language of the statute is clearly susceptible of the construction which we have placed upon it, which tends to
make effective the provisions of this as well as all the other sections of the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied him
on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes." Counsel for appellant
contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in the event that the animal is
not unfit "for agricultural work or draft purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of
the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the statute
constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing
for the compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of the police power of
the State. But whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with necessary
modifications understood, the language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of
Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where the question involved was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting
and penalizing the taking or carrying away by any person, including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand,
from any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,) that the law in question "is not a taking of the property for
public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or
injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not
be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interest of the
community."
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao owners in
these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute; and that, without
inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation
of which detracts from their right and authority, and in some degree interferes with their exclusive possession
and control of their property, so that if the regulations in question were enacted for purely private purpose, the
statute, in so far as these regulations are concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine
Bill relied on be appellant; but we are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference with the right
and title of the owners, as is involved in the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to
entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is no more than "a just restrain of an injurious private use of
the property, which the legislature had authority to impose."
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra)
was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the former opinion, in distinguishing the
exercise of the right of eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police powers of the State, said:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder
of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that
his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . .
Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restrain and regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power
vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be
done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude to is
rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its
boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for human
consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests
to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent
domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be
determental to the public welfare. And we think that an examination of the general provisions of the statute in
relation to the public interest which it seeks to safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides,
leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership
by the particular provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed not for private purposes but,
strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign
police power which every State possesses for the general public welfare and which "reaches to every species
of property within the commonwealth."
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease had
threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away seventy, eighty,
and in some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these animals. Agriculture being the
principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in use in the
fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with which they were infected struck an almost
vital blow at the material welfare of the country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years, and the
production of rice, the staple food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the
impoverished people were compelled to spend many millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the
fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country could easily be
made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon the resources of the Islands
was such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the people, and in many
provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle for
existence with which they were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the immediate
needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the United States as a
relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish employment in the provinces where the need
was most pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread failure of the
crops throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft
purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural community
material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of the work animals
upon which such a community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields and the transportation of
the products of the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government to increase the supply
of these animals by importation, but, as appears from the official reports on this subject, hope for the future
depended largely on the conservation of those animals which had been spared from the ravages of the
diseased, and their redistribution throughout the Islands where the need for them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and applications of
preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have proved in some degree
successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the gradual increase and
redistribution of these animals throughout the Archipelago, in response to the operation of the laws of supply
and demand, will ultimately results in practically relieving those sections which suffered most by the loss of
their work animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the three to five fold
or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures now adopted prove entirely
successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall
have more nearly equalized the supply to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of
cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment of a special
law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other personal property by roving bands;
and it must be assumed from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the Islands
necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and registration
of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of their slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the
provisions of the statute touching the branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing
the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of
the State; and we are of opinion that, under all the circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and
penalizing the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the
due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right

of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply of
animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and records
of the administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the material welfare and
future prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept
away the work animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law under consideration, but that the
very life and existence of the inhabitants of these Islands as a civilized people would be more or less
imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions,
there can be no doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of
work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a
perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of ownership and control of the private property of the citizen.
The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private
property by police regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of
carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and
proper exercise of that power.
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136):
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in
the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything
essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by
summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has
been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise
endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the
slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of
wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of
interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary
vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the
restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and
houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are
sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in
this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the
interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus
interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second,
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions
upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals
are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to
protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by
so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this
"general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens,
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature
to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as
natural persons are concerned."
And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may be
exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict
with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite in
number and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public
authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their property, and even to destroy it, where the
owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but where,
nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the interference or destruction. A strong
instance of this description is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private property

of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile
army, or any other great public calamity. Here the individual is in no degree in fault, but his interest
must yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law." The establishment of limits within the denser
portions of cities and villages within which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not be
erected or repaired may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but
regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also be
established for the general good, even though they prevent the owners of water-fronts from building
out on soil which constitutes private property. And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the
protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may
establish regulations to that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil
equally with other persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of property,
which the legislature have authority" to impose.
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances,
and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now
become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public safety. Milldams are sometimes
destroyed upon this grounds; and churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban population, to be
detrimental to the public health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further
use for cemetery purposes.
These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States clearly indicate
the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our opinion that the provision of
the statute in question being a proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the
Philippine Bill, which provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law," a provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United
States, and is found in substance in the constitution of most if not all of the States of the Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the costs of
this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

U.S. vs. Luis Toribio

Oct14
Facts:
Sometime in the 1900s, in the town of Carmen, province of Bohol, Toribio applied for a
license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is
found to be fit for agricultural work. Even so, he still slaughtered his carabao for the
purpose of human consumption. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal
treasurer of the municipality, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the
slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human
consumption.
The counsel for appellant contended that the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor
penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure if the
slaughtering of large cattle happened outside the municipal slaughterhouse. They said that
the prohibition and penalty is limited only to the large cattle slaughtered at the municipal
slaughterhouse for the prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in
section 33 stated only the phrase at the municipal slaughterhouse.
They also contended that the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the
exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners,
and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives
them of the enjoyment of their private property.
Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition and the penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 is limited only to
the slaughter of large cattle at the municipal slaughterhouse.
Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large
cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

HELD:
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of
the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction
should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and
to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. The court is of
opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering
or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without
the permit provided for in section 30.
Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the
constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate
and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with the rights of
the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so
used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests
of the community.