Trip Adler

Moral Reasoning 72
Longer Paper #1
4/20/05
Tolerance: Does It Require Tolerating Everything? Or Does It Require Intolerance?

Does a system of tolerance require citizens to tolerate every belief and practice

that differs from their own? Could the existence of tolerance require some intolerance?

Tolerance is what exists when we accept and permit the beliefs and practices of others

while at the same time we strongly disagree with them. For any individual act, we can

either be tolerant or intolerant. But in this essay we are not concerned with individual

acts of tolerance or intolerance, but in the greater principle of tolerance. We are

interested in a system of toleration that will serve society well. Assuming that some form

of tolerance is good for society, the question we are asking is this: Can the individuals of

a society be tolerant individuals without being tolerant of every single belief and practice

of others? A first thought that comes to mind is that this cannot be true; it is impossible

for an individual to be a tolerant person when he is intolerant of some beliefs and actions,

because this would be a contradiction. This point is correct when tolerance is defined as

applying to every belief and practice of others. However, the idea of toleration involving

acceptance of everything is not very useful to us, because it is not necessarily best for

society to have tolerance of everything. Therefore, in answering the question about

whether individuals can be tolerant without tolerating everything, we must answer the

question by grounding the system of tolerance on a vision for society.

We will first consider the writings of two philosophers, Thomas M. Scanlon and

John Stuart Mill, who both describe a particular goal for society and show that a system
of tolerance is required to reach this goal, but that such a system must have room for

some amount of intolerance. We then consider an argument for tolerance requiring

toleration of everything, but then discuss Bernard Williams’ view that this argument is

week. Through the writings of these three authors, we show that at least two systems of

tolerance grounded on creating a better society do not require tolerating everything, and

that at least one argument against this idea is clearly inconsistent. This does not prove

that a system of tolerance that requires toleration of everything does not exist, but it does

show that it is possible to have a system of tolerance that involves some intolerance.

We will begin with the theory of tolerance explained by Thomas M. Scanlon in

“The Difficulty of Tolerance,” from Toleration: An Elusive Virtue. In his essay, he

describes several different types of tolerance and makes the point that there are costs of

toleration. However, the argument relevant to this essay is that tolerance has value,

because it creates a society in which there are particularly good relations among citizens:

“What tolerance expresses is a recognition of common membership that is deeper than

these conflicts, a recognition of others as just as entitled as we are to contribute to the

definition of our society. Without this, we are just rival groups contending over the same

territory” (231). Therefore, Scanlon grounds his theory of tolerance on the idea that “all

members of society are equally entitled to be taken into account in defining what our

society is and equally entitled to participate in determining what it will become in the

future” (229). The purpose of having a system of tolerance is that it promotes this idea.

He argues that the best way to create this type of society is a particular system of

tolerance in which toleration is a generally accepted doctrine, but it is okay to be

intolerant in certain situations, primarily when enforcing tolerance in behavior and when
preventing the intolerant from acting on their beliefs: “[The] advocacy of tolerance

denies no one their rightful place in society. It grants to each person and group as much

standing as they can claim while granting the same to others” (235). This means that

being intolerant of intolerance does not contradict the basic values of tolerance.

Therefore, we see that this system of tolerance grounded on equality of citizens does not

require tolerating every belief and practice, because there always is this one exception.

In his essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill similarly describes a system of tolerance

grounded on a vision for society, and again argues that some intolerance is necessary for

this system. In this case, the ultimate goal of mankind is to maximize utility. According

to Mill’s Principle of Utility, this means developing and exercising the highest human

capacities to the fullest extent possible: “[It is] utility in the largest sense, grounded in

the permanent interests of man as a progressive being” (8). He argues that the best way

to promote this goal is to protect what he calls the List of Liberties, constrained by his

Harm Principle. The List of Liberties contains two basic types of liberties, which are

liberty of thought and liberty of action. Liberty of thought can never be regulated and

includes the liberty of expressing and publishing opinions. Liberty of action cannot be

regulated as long as it does not harm others, but if it does, then regulating the action will

ultimately increase utility. It is the Harm Principle that determines when an action can be

regulated: “The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,

in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The

only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized

community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (14). To explain this in terms

of tolerance, the Harm Principle is what allows for some intolerance. The List of
Liberties protects all liberties and supports tolerance of everything, but because it is

constrained by the Harm Principle, there are some instances regulated by this principle in

which intolerance is allowed. Specifically, it is acceptable to be intolerant of actions that

harm others. Because such harming actions can be considered acts of intolerance, it is

fair to say that Mill’s theory always requires tolerance, except of intolerant actions.

Although this is an overgeneralization, it is similar in many ways to Scanlon’s theory.

The important point is that Mill generates a theory of tolerance grounded on a particular

vision for society, but in order to promote this type of society, the system of tolerance

requires intolerance of some actions.

The opposite argument to what we are considering in this essay is that tolerance

necessarily requires tolerance of everything in order for it to positively shape a society.

This argument is made in the definition of a particular form of relativism called “vulgar

relativism” described by Bernard Williams in “Interlude: Relativism,” from Morality:

An Introduction to Ethics. It first must be understood that this approach to tolerance is a

little different from those of Scanlon and Mill, because instead of discussing the success

of one society, the definition of vulgar relativism deals with the interaction of different

societies. But because two or more societies that interact are basically one larger society,

his essay is totally relevant. Vulgar relativism “consists of three propositions: that ‘right’

means […] ‘right for a given society’; that ‘right for a given society’ is to be understood

in a functionalist sense; and that (therefore) it is wrong for people in one society to

condemn, interfere with, etc., the values of another society” (20). Assuming that by

“functionalist sense” Williams means “what is needed for a society to survive,” vulgar

relativism basically says that a society will have the easiest time surviving if it determines
what is right for itself instead of having other societies decide this. In other words, it is

best for societies in general if they are absolutely tolerant of other societies. This directly

contradicts the main argument of this essay. But Williams contends that relativism is

incompatible with the claim that it is wrong for any society to be intolerant of other

societies: “The view is clearly inconsistent, since it makes a claim in its third

proposition, about what is right and wrong in one’s dealings with other societies, which

uses a nonrelative sense of ‘right’ not allowed for in the first proposition” (21). The

problem is that what is right for a given society is determined by the beliefs and practices

of that society. So if one society has intolerant beliefs and practices, in particular beliefs

and practices that encourage interference with the values of other societies, then it is right

for that society to be intolerant. Williams makes a convincing argument that vulgar

relativism is inconsistent, and therefore, it does not contradict the idea that the best

system of tolerance for a society can allow some intolerance.

In understanding the writings of these three philosophers, we can see that a

system of tolerance meant to benefit society does not necessarily require citizens to

tolerate every belief and practice that differs from their own. This does not mean a

system of tolerance that requires toleration of everything cannot exist. If the members of

a society all believe that tolerance is the greatest virtue imaginable, it is possible to have a

system of toleration in which everything is tolerated without exception, but there still is a

positive impact on society. However, this essay makes it clear that such a system is not

the only possibility; often maintaining tolerance in a society requires some intolerance.